Université Du Québec À Trois-Rivières Retards Dans Le Projet De Nouveaux Aéronefs Par Les Constructeurs Aéronautiques

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Université Du Québec À Trois-Rivières Retards Dans Le Projet De Nouveaux Aéronefs Par Les Constructeurs Aéronautiques UNIVERSITÉ DU QUÉBEC À TROIS-RIVIÈRES RETARDS DANS LE PROJET DE NOUVEAUX AÉRONEFS PAR LES CONSTRUCTEURS AÉRONAUTIQUES, CAUSES ET CONSÉQUENCES MÉMOIRE PRÉSENTÉ COMME EXIGENCE PARTIELLE DE LA MAÎTRISE EN GESTION DE PROJET PAR ROBINSON MARIANO DA SILV A FÉVRIER 2021 Université du Québec à Trois-Rivières Service de la bibliothèque Avertissement L’auteur de ce mémoire ou de cette thèse a autorisé l’Université du Québec à Trois-Rivières à diffuser, à des fins non lucratives, une copie de son mémoire ou de sa thèse. Cette diffusion n’entraîne pas une renonciation de la part de l’auteur à ses droits de propriété intellectuelle, incluant le droit d’auteur, sur ce mémoire ou cette thèse. Notamment, la reproduction ou la publication de la totalité ou d’une partie importante de ce mémoire ou de cette thèse requiert son autorisation. SOMMAIRE Depuis son origine, l'industrie aéronautique a été marquée par de grandes avancées technologiques, un avion est un produit avec plusieurs technologies embarquées qui ont permis l'amélioration des performances et de la sécurité des avions. Depuis les années 1980, l'industrie est en processus de consolidation, résultant de fusions ou de faillites de fabricants. La demande croissante de nouveaux aéronefs suscite l'intérêt de plusieurs gouvernements à travers le monde, pour le développement d'une industrie dans leur pays, par l'octroi d'incitations financières, souvent dans les subventions, ce qui provoquent des réactions de la part des gouvernements qui ont déjà une industrie consolidée. Au cours des 20 dernières années, nous avons envisagé le lancement de plusieurs nouveaux avions, certains avec succès et d'autres qui ont présenté des retards qui ont eu des répercussions négatives sur les constructeurs. Ces retards ont éveillé la curiosité de plusieurs chercheurs qui les ont étudiés afin de comprendre ce qui s'était passé, mais aucune étude n'a envisagé plus de deux projets. Grâce à ce diagnostic, nous plongeons dans la recherche pour découvrir, entendre et comprendre quelles sont les causes et les conséquences que les retards ont causées aux constructeurs et ainsi fournir un rapport. Au fur et à mesure que l'étude progressait, des incongruités ont été constatées à divers niveaux de la chaîne aéronautique, ce qui a causé des retards. Les incongruités ont été rassemblées dans les hypothèses. Même dans les constructeurs expérimentés, c'est l'anachronisme comportemental qui a mené aux erreurs. Dans certains cas, le nœud des retards a été caché et ce n'est qu'après une enquête approfondie qu'il a été possible de détecter un changement culturel où la financiarisation a joué un rôle majeur dans les retards. L'objectif principal du travail est de signaler que le retard dans le projet d'un nouvel aéronef n'est pas un problème, mais un symptôme d'un problème chez les constructeurs. 11 TABLE DES MATIÈRES SOMMAIRE ............................ .. ............................. .. ... ......................................... i LISTE DES TABLEAUX ............................................... ........... .... ........................ v LISTE DES FIGURES ......................................................................................... vi REMERCIEMENTS ................... ... .... ...... .. .. ................................. ..... ..... .. ... ........ x INTRODUCTION ........ .. .. ... ..................... .. .... ... .................................................. 1 CHAPITRE 1 - PROBLÈME GÉNÉRAL .......... ... ..... .. ..................... .... ............... 6 1.1 ÉVOLUTION ET CARACTÉRISTIQUES DE LA STRUCTURE DE LA CHAÎNE AÉRONAUTIQUE ............... ............................................................... 6 1.2 LES QUESTIONS DE RECHERCHE ..... .................... ........................ .. ....... 21 1.3 PROBLÈME SPÉCIFIQUE ......................................................................... 23 1.4 LOCALISATION ....................................................................................... 25 CHAPITRE 2 - CONTEXTE THÉORIQUE ........ ............... ..... ....................... 27 2.1 CONTRATS ....... ............. .. ... .. ..... .... ..... .. .......................... ... ...................... 28 2.2 ERREUR DE CONCEPTION DE PROJET ET ÉCHEC DANS LE PROCESSUS DÉCISIONNEL ........... .... .. .... ... ... .................... ................................... .. .... .... ... 31 2.3 MANQUE DE CONNAISSANCE ET MATURITÉ DES PROJETS ............... 39 2.4 GESTION DE LA CHAÎNE D'APPROVISIONNEMENT ............................. 44 CHAPITRE 3 - ÉTUDE DES RETARDS D'AÉRONEFS ................................... 52 3.1 RETARDS DU PROJET SPACEJET M90 ..... ...... .. ...... ................................. 52 3.1.1 Premier retard ................................................................................... 53 3.1.2 Deuxième retard ................................................................................. 54 3.1.3 Troisième retard ................. ....................... .. .. ................... ................. 57 3.1.4 Quatrième retard ............ ... ...... .. ............ ...... ... .................................. .. 59 3.1.5 Cinquième retard ............................................................................... 63 3.1.6 Sixième retard .......... .......................................................................... 65 3.1.7 Implications du retard de SpaceJet M90 ................. .... ........................ 68 3.2 RETARDS DU PROJET COMAC C919 ...................................................... 86 3.2.1 Premier retard ..................... .................. ...... ...................................... 90 3.2.2 Deuxième retard ................................................................................. 91 III 3.2.3 Troisième retard ................................................................................. 92 3.2.4 Quatrième retard ................................................................................ 94 3.2.5 Implications du retard de Cornac C919 ............ ............. ... ................... 95 3 .3 RETARDS DU PROJET BOEING 787 DREAMLINER .............................. 108 3.3.1 Premier retard ................................................................................. 119 3.3.2 Deuxième retard ............................................................................... 121 3.3.3 Troisième retard ............................................................................... 123 3.3.4 Quatrième retard .................... .... ... ..... ...................... ......... ............ ... 124 3.3.5 Cinquième retard ................................................ ....... ...................... 125 3.3.6 Sixième retard ........................................... ....................................... 126 3.3.7 Septième retard ...................... .. ......... ..... .... ... ... ............. .. ................. 128 3.3.8 Huitième retard ................................................................................ 128 3.3.10 Analyse des retards du Boeing 787 Dreamliner .... .. .......... ................ 134 3.3.11 Implications du retard de Boeing 787 Dreamliner ............................ 139 3.3.12 Analyse des rapports financiers de Boeing ....................................... 148 3.4 RETARDS DU PROJET AIRBUS A380 .. ........ .. ................ ..... ....... ............ 168 3.4.1 Premier retard .... ... .......................................................................... 173 3.4.2 Deuxième retard ............................................................................... 176 3.4.3 Troisième retard .......................... .. .... ............................................... 177 3.4.4 Problèmes postérieurs à la livraison ................... ..... ........ ........ .. ..... ... 179 3.4.5 Analyse des retards du Airbus A380 .................................................. 181 3.4.6 Analyse des rapports financiers d'Airbus .......................................... 191 CHAPITRE 4 - RÉSULTATS ET DISCUSSION ..... ......................................... 199 4. 1 HYPOTHÈSE 1 : PROBLÈME DES CONTRATS ................. .................... 206 4.2 HYPOTHÈSE 2 : ERREUR DE CONCEPTION DE PROJET ET ÉCHEC DANS LE PROCESSUS DÉCISIONNEL ... .... .... .. ................................... ... .. ............. 208 4.3 HYPOTHÈSE 3 : MANQUE DE CONNAISSANCES ET MATURITÉ DES PROJETS ...................................................................................................... 213 4.4 HYPOTHÈSE 4 : DÉFAILLANCES OU ABSENCE DE COORDINATION DE LA CHAÎNE D'APPROVISIONNEMENT AÉRONAUTIQUE ... .... .................. 218 IV 4.5 ANALYSE DES CAUSES DES RETARDS DANS LES PROJETS AÉRONAUTIQUES ...................................................................................... 224 4.6 RÉPONSE AUX QUESTIONS DE RECHERCHE ...................................... 236 CONCLUSION ... ............. ........................ ........................................................ 238 RÉFÉRENCES .................. .............................................................................. 243 v LISTE DES TABLEAUX Tableau 1 - Relation des fabricants d'avions ....... .............................. .... ................ .. .......... .4 Tableau 2 - Évolution du processus de production de Embraer .. ... ................................. 10 Tableau 3 - Évolution consommation de carburant par siège kilomètre .......................... 12 Tableau 4 - La Chaîne d'Approvisionnement Aéronautique ..........................................
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