Nepal's Fitful Peace Process
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Update Briefing Asia Briefing N°120 Kathmandu/Brussels, 7 April 2011 Nepal’s Fitful Peace Process I. OVERVIEW far largely self-directed and more concerned with beauti- fying the bureaucracy surrounding the army, rather than making the institution more accountable and smaller. Nepal is entering a new phase in its fitful peace process, These long-term projects would be easy to push on to the in which its so-called “logical conclusion” is in sight: the back burner. But to do so would undermine implementa- integration and rehabilitation of Maoist combatants and tion of the new constitution and the deep political reform the introduction of a new constitution. The Maoists, the envisaged in the CPA, and consolidation of lasting peace. largest party, are back in government in a coalition led by State restructuring, though broadly agreed to be essential the Communist Party of Nepal (United Marxist-Leninist), or unavoidable, plays out in public as a binary debate on the UML party. Negotiations, although fraught, are on with the Maoists’ contested definition of federalism, rather than on second-largest party, the Nepali Congress (NC), to join. what it is Nepalis want out of this change and how best to Agreement is being reached on constitutional issues and dis- deliver that. cussions continue on integration. None of the actors are ramping up for serious confrontation and few want to be The immediate tasks, integration and getting the new seen as responsible for the collapse of the constitution- constitution right, are critical to addressing these issues in writing process underway in the Constituent Assembly the long term. This government has close to the two-thirds (CA). But success depends on parties in opposition keeping majority needed to pass the constitution or extend the CA. tactical threats to dissolve the CA to a minimum, the But the resistance of some in the NC and the Madhesi government keeping them engaged, and the parties in gov- parties, encouraged by India, could make for another ernment stabilising their own precariously divided houses. messy, last-minute action, in which substantive issues are It will also require the Maoists to take major steps to dis- compromised to defend power-sharing arrangements. Fur- mantle their army. ther, a constitution, or a plan for its deferral, that any of the larger parties does not sign off on would be contested The fundamentally political nature of the transitional arms from the start. Visible progress is needed to reassure the and armies arrangements became clear when the United fractured polity and public that the task of transforming the Nations Mission in Nepal (UNMIN) departed in January state has not been abandoned and to counter the threat of 2011, as did the resilience of the peace process and the localised violence in the lead up to the 28 May deadline. Maoists’ continued buy-in. That is encouraging, as is the Ideally, extension of the CA would be short and accompa- fresh momentum. But major challenges remain. The CA nied by a non-negotiable timeline for resolution of the feder- may need a short extension when its term expires on 28 alism question, and public disclosure of even a partial draft. May 2011 if the parties cannot quickly agree on integration or federalism. But the Madhesi parties and sections of the The NC and Madhesi parties from the country’s southern NC and UML are willing to argue against extension, largely Tarai region should join the government to make decisions as a bargaining posture, and to slow down negotiations to truly consensual and share the political gains of success. suggest that the CA is ineffective. All parties in government Until then, the ruling UML-Maoist coalition needs ur- are in the throes of factional struggles; internal disagreements gently to engage with these parties. The Maoists must finally and threatened splits complicate the outlook. In their rush make a good faith gesture on dismantling its People’s to get to the finish line, all parties risk doing the bare Liberation Army (PLA). The NC must go beyond its rhe- minimum to “complete” the process. After 21 months of torical dichotomy of democracy versus Maoist state capture fighting over access to power, including sixteen unsuccess- and contribute constructively to negotiations. ful votes to select a prime minister, and limited progress in the year before that, the Comprehensive Peace Agreement The Maoists are undergoing a transformation, dramati- (CPA) has become a ragged document. cally visible in divisive public spats between the leaders, as the party simultaneously acts as a revolutionary movement, There has been no empirical survey on the state of land- a political party aggressively pushing the limits of democ- holdings and no land reform measures implemented yet. ratic practice, and an expanding enterprise of financial The Disappearance and Truth and Reconciliation Com- interests and patronage. With the Maoists announcing, while missions have not yet been formed. Plans for what the in government, the creation of a new “volunteer” outfit, CPA calls the “democratisation” of the Nepal Army are so continuing extortion by the party’s various wings, monopoly Nepal’s Fitful Peace Process Crisis Group Asia Briefing N°120, 7 April 2011 Page 2 over decision-making and intimidation in some districts, into the circumstances and deals surrounding the sixteen and ideological reiteration of “revolt”, they are a difficult futile rounds of voting and eventual formation of the partner to trust. This is their moment to acknowledge that UML-Maoist government in February 2011, the engineer- capturing state power through armed force is no longer on ing of the departure of UNMIN from September 2010, their agenda, and to address the deep discontent within and the midnight extension of the Constituent Assembly the leadership. in May 2010.2 Although the present government could garner the two-thirds majority needed to pass a partial For the NC and UML, which have done little to rebuild constitution, leadership of the government could again their political organisations and regain political space after become a destabilising bargaining chip for a range of issues. the 2008 CA elections, contributing positively to immediate Essentially, the peace process has been reduced to complet- and medium-term peace process goals could revitalise ing integration and hence disbanding the PLA, and quick their bases. Their greatest challenges come from divisions promulgation of a new constitution; other commitments within, rigidity towards the new political order, and the to institutional and social reform, and to addressing im- social changes at the grassroots. Their weak organisations punity, have largely fallen by the wayside. and internal disputes, reservations about the extent of reform proposed by the peace process and poorly articulated party The Unified Communist Party of Nepal (Maoist), UCPN(M), policies may further marginalise them. agreed to extend the Constituent Assembly as part of a deal in which Prime Minister Madhav Kumar Nepal resigned Most Madhesi parties, whose participation in national in June 2010. Sixteen rounds of unsuccessful parliamentary politics in the last two years has been largely limited to voting followed to elect a new prime minister over the next making up the numbers for a variety of alliances, still seven months. In eleven of them, the NC candidate con- look to New Delhi for assistance. Their political agenda is tested unchallenged; in the last few rounds there was not devalued by their opportunistic political alliances, but even the required quorum present.3 There was a good deal of they retain the ability, with some assistance, to mobilise squabbling within the parties about prime ministerial candi- in order to give the government a hard time and push for dates and possible coalitions. There was no progress on a role in decision-making so their concerns are addressed. integration, though the three largest parties, the UCPN(M), NC and UML, did occasionally huddle together With the departure of UNMIN, New Delhi again finds it- to re-state their positions on the “package deal” of integra- self in a leadership role in international engagement with tion, power sharing and the constitution. In the meantime, Nepal. The new coalition demonstrates the limits of its there was a vigorous undermining of UNMIN and a policy of isolating the Maoists and India must now re- assess whether it can continue to hold this position and whether dissolution of the CA, its preferred option, will have controllable consequences. Re-engagement with the Maoists will require the various sections of the Indian es- tablishment to manoeuvre themselves out of the corner Group Asia Reports N°126, Nepal’s Peace Agreement: Making they have painted themselves into; having supported and it Work, 15 December 2006; N°155, Nepal’s Election: A encouraged Nepali actors in taking extreme anti-Maoist Peaceful Revolution?, 3 July 2008; N°163, Nepal’s Faltering stances, they will have to backtrack, potentially leaving Peace Process, 19 February 2009; N°184, Nepal: Peace and allies in Kathmandu to pay the political price. The rest of Justice, 14 Jan 2010; N°199, Nepal: Identity Politics and Fed- the international community needs to offer consultative, eralism, 13 January 2011; and Crisis Group Asia Briefings unstinting and transparent support to implementing long- N°68, Nepal’s Fragile Peace Process, 28 September 2007; term peace process commitments. N°72, Nepal: Peace Postponed, 17 December 2007; on the re- silience of Nepal’s political process and how they act against transformations, Asia Report N°194, Nepal’s Political Rites of Passage, 29 September 2010; on the changing peace process II. SOME STEPS FORWARD context and variable international influence, Asia Reports N°132, Nepal’s Maoists: Purists or Pragmatists, 18 May 2007; N°136, Nepal’s Troubled Tarai Region, 9 July 2007; N°156, The broad links between peace process issues, particularly Nepal’s New Political Landscape, 3 July 2008; N°173, Nepal’s constitution-drafting and integration, and power sharing, the Future: In Whose Hands, 13 August 2009.