The High, Plain, Yet Dizzy Ground of Influence: American Views on Regime Change and the European Revolution of 1848
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THE HIGH, PLAIN, YET DIZZY GROUND OF INFLUENCE: AMERICAN VIEWS ON REGIME CHANGE AND THE EUROPEAN REVOLUTION OF 1848 Patrick J. Garrity Miller Center of Public Affairs University of Virginia November 2009 Working Paper Series on American Foreign Policy and Regime Change John M. Ashbrook Center for Public Affairs Ashland University Working Paper Series on American Foreign Policy and Regime Change from the Ashbrook Center THE HIGH, PLAIN, YET DIZZY GROUND OF INFLUENCE: AMERICAN VIEWS ON REGIME CHANGE AND THE EUROPEAN REVOLUTION OF 1848 by Patrick J. Garrity This Working Paper examines Amer- right under the law of nations to utter ican attitudes towards the European Revolu- one word of complaint, still less to tions of 1848 and the national debate over retaliate by war.”1 whether and how, to support foreign political reforms and regime change. This Webster was in many ways the foreign policy debate was in many respects central character in this mid-19th century the most “modern” of those which took search for ways to maximize American place during the American Republic’s first influence in favor of regime change without century, in that the protagonists anticipated crossing the line into direct political-military many of the arguments and policy options intervention. Webster’s soaring rhetoric that later emerged when the United States about human liberty seemingly put him on became a world power. Most of the the side of those who challenged the proposals for an active U.S. response to the perceived tradition of American non- Revolutions of 1848 (but not all) stopped involvement in the political affairs of short of military intervention and focused on Europe. But at the same time, Webster’s the ability of the United States to shape official actions were cautious, taking into world public opinion in a way that would account the fragile state of the Union and the facilitate the cause of human rights and limits of American power. liberalized regimes. Rufus Choate, a leading This Working Paper begins with a Massachusetts politician and orator, aptly brief discussion of the historical background captured this perspective when he described of the U.S. approach to regime change as the approach of his friend, Senator and later news of the Revolutions of 1848 first Secretary of State Daniel Webster. reached the American shore. The intel- lectual and political impetus for a more . to occupy the high, plain, yet assertive approach to foreign policy and for dizzy ground which separates influ- the promotion of foreign regime change ence from intervention, to avow and came largely from a new generation of promulgate warm good-will to hu- Democrats, who sought to advance Ameri- manity, wherever striving to be free, to inquire authentically into the The author would like to acknowledge the assistance history of its struggles, to take offi- of Benjamin Kunkel and Joshua Distel of the cial and avowed pains to ascertain Ashbrook Center for Public Affairs at Ashland the moment when its success may be University, for their assistance in the preparation of recognized, consistently, ever, with this Working Paper. the great code that keeps the peace of 1 Samuel Gilman Brown, ed., The Works of Rufus the world, abstaining from every- Choate, with a Memoir of his Life, 2 vols. (Boston: thing which shall give any nation a Little, Brown and Company, 1862), I: 520. 3 The High, Plain, Yet Dizzy Ground of Influence: American Views on Regime Change and the European Revolution of 1848 can interests and ideals through territorial rhetorical support for the latest experiment expansion, free trade, and support for liberal in French republicanism. This section movements abroad. The New Democrats examines closely the arguments of the most sought to overcome factional and intel- prominent advocate of caution in response to lectual resistance to such activism from foreign regime change, South Carolina within their own party and from the opposi- Democrat John C. Calhoun. Calhoun’s ex- tion Whigs, who traditionally held that pressions of caution generated the first America’s world-historic mission was one major defense of an activist foreign policy of democratic example rather than the towards the French Revolution from leading conquest of foreign territories or the sub- Democratic Senators such as Michigan’s version of other regimes. Nevertheless, the Lewis Cass and Illinois’ Stephen A. Whig persuasion also contained a strain of Douglas. Those who wanted to use the activism on behalf of human rights, French Revolution as a means to highlight especially strong rhetorical support for their opposition to slavery and American republican government and national self- territorial expansion soon diverted the determination. The New Democrats thus had debate, however, especially in the House of potential allies among up-and-coming pro- Representatives. gressive Whig politicians and advocates of As the revolutions spread across the the Free Soil movement. This raised the continent, the American government and prospect that a political majority might public had to grapple with the policy issues emerge across parties in favor of a more raised by other forms regime change, activist or even interventionist foreign including the unification of Germany policy – a national majority that might trans- (presumably but not necessarily on repub- cend differences over slavery. lican and confederal lines); and the auto- The possibility of such a domestic nomy or independence of Hungary from the political coalition first emerged when the Hapsburg Empire. Section III reviews the unpopular July Monarchy of Louis-Philippe approaches of the Polk (Democrat) and was overthrown by yet another French Taylor-Fillmore (Whig) administrations Revolution in February 1848. Section II towards these developments. Both admini- considers the official and unofficial Ameri- strations adopted or embraced diplomatic can reactions to this revolution. The U.S. policies that were sympathetic towards the Minister in Paris, Richard Rush, almost prospective new regimes but that stopped immediately recognized the new Republic, short of outright intervention. Congres- an action that was ratified by the Polk sional members again debated whether and administration on the grounds that early and how the United States should proceed, favorable U.S. action towards republican especially after Austria, with the aid of government in Europe could encourage and Russian troops, suppressed the Hungarian strengthen the stable development of such Revolution. Cass and Whig grandee Henry regimes. The U.S. Congress – then in the Clay argued about the former’s proposal to midst of controversy over ratification of withdraw U.S. diplomatic recognition of peace with Mexico – debated the wisdom of Austria to protest the intervention and to a policy of active encouragement of repub- signal American support for a future lican governments in France and elsewhere Hungarian independence movement. Whig in Europe. These deliberations revealed sub- Secretary of State John Clayton and his stantial opposition among Southern Demo- successor, Daniel Webster, engaged in an crats and conservative Whigs even to acrimonious public controversy with 4 Working Paper Series on American Foreign Policy and Regime Change from the Ashbrook Center Austrian diplomat, the Baron Hülsemann, As noted in Section V, these about his allegations of improper American conservative Whigs, aligned with the Fill- interference in Austro-Hungarian affairs. more administration, and a strong majority The Hülsemann dispute provided additional of Southerners of both parties, constituted an grist for Congressional advocates and critics effective opposition to the New Democrats of an activist American foreign policy. and progressive Whigs on the Kossuth issue. Section IV examines the most As the nation slid deeper into domestic crisis important of these public debates over the over slavery during the 1850s, the prospect proper American approach towards regime of a new political coalition based on an change, which was triggered by the assertive foreign policy and an aggressive appearance of the Hungarian revolutionary approach to foreign regime change, leader Lajos (Louis) Kossuth. The Taylor disappeared. administration successfully urged Kossuth’s This Working Paper does not attempt release from confinement in Turkey and, to provide a comprehensive or definitive with Congressional approval, dispatched a account of the American response to the U.S. frigate to convey him to the United Revolutions of 1848, but rather to highlight States, where presumably he would live out the substantive arguments that emerged his life in quiet exile. But Kossuth and during the public debate. Three limitations many of his American supporters saw his must be noted in particular. First, the release merely as the next step in a second controversy over the future of slavery Hungarian Revolution, which would be increasingly dominated American domestic enabled (according to his most aggressive politics and affected the debate over the U.S. supporters) by an American-British- proper response to the European revolutions. Turkish military alliance directed at Austria The Paper identifies the points at which the and Russia; or by some other type of foreign policy debate was directly affected “intervention for non-intervention.” But by arguments about the peculiar institution; most New Democrats, such as Douglas, and but the entire subtext cannot be disentangled progressive Whigs, including New York entirely in a limited