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Presidential Powers in Latin America Beyond Constitutions

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Presidential Powers in Latin America Beyond Constitutions Botelho, JCA and Silva, RR. 2021. Presidential Powers in Latin America Beyond Constitutions. Iberoamericana – Nordic Journal of Latin American and Caribbean Studies, 50(1), pp. 28–39. DOI: https://doi.org/10.16993/iberoamericana.508 RESEARCH ARTICLE Presidential Powers in Latin America Beyond Constitutions João Carlos Amoroso Botelho and Renato Rodrigues Silva If constitutional powers of Latin American presidents have been studied extensively, there have been fewer attempts of conceptualizing and measuring these powers in combination with partisan sources and informal practices which also may be used by presidents to exert influence in Latin America. The article advances from previous attempts that have focused on constitutional powers in order to develop indices able to capture variation in presidential powers between one president to another in a specific country and within the same presidency, even if constitutional powers remain the same. The results also show that the factor that leads to the concentration of powers by the executive in Latin America is partisan powers. This finding contradicts an influential understanding in the literature that presidencies with more constitutional powers are more problematic for sustaining democracy. Keywords: Presidential Powers; Latin America; Constitutional Prerogatives; Partisan and Informal Sources; Power Concentration Resumen: Si los poderes constitucionales de las/los presidentes latinoamericanos han sido estudiados extensivamente, hay menos intentos de conceptualizar y mensurar esos poderes en combinación con fuentes partidarias e informales que presidentes también pueden utilizar para ejercer influencia en Amé- rica Latina. El artículo avanza en relación a intentos anteriores que han enfocado poderes constitucionales y elabora índices capaces de capturar variación en los poderes presidenciales entre un presidente y otro en un país específico y en una misma presidencia, aunque los poderes constitucionales sean los mismos. Los resultados también muestran que el factor que lleva a la concentración de poderes por el ejecutivo en América Latina es los poderes partidistas. Ese hallazgo contradice una visión influyente en la literatura de que presidencias con más poderes constitucionales son más problemáticas para sostener la democracia. Palabras clave: poderes presidenciales; América Latina; prerrogativas constitucionales; fuentes partidis- tas e informales; concentración de poderes Introduction Despite the relationship identified by the authors The variation of powers among Latin American presidents between the constitutional and partisan powers, Shugart has been a topic of interest in the literature. For Shugart and and Mainwaring propose a typology of presidential pow- Mainwaring (2002), the capacity of presidents to influence ers in Latin America limited to constitutional guarantees law and policy formulation in Latin America depends on the of influence over the legislative process. If the constitu- relationship between their constitutional and partisan pow- tional powers of Latin American presidents have been ers. A president who does not have constitutional guaran- studied extensively (García Montero 2009; Mainwaring & tees of influence may still exert these if happens to be the Shugart 2002a; Negretto 2013; Payne et al. 2003), there leader of a party or a coalition with legislative majority. The have been fewer attempts of conceptualizing and meas- same happens to a president who does have these guaran- uring these powers in combination with the partisan tees and may be influential even if their party or coalition sources and informal practices which also may be used by does not hold a legislative majority or if the president does presidents to exert influence in Latin America. not control the majority obtained by their party or coalition. The article contributes both by advancing from previous indices that focus on constitutional powers and by show- ing that the factor that leads to the concentration of pow- Department of Political Science, Universidade Federal de Goiás, Goiânia, BR ers by the executive in Latin America is partisan powers. Corresponding author: João Carlos Amoroso Botelho The indices developed here are able to capture variation in ([email protected]) presidential powers between one president to another in Botelho and Silva: Presidential Powers in Latin America Beyond Constitutions 29 a specific country and within the same presidency, even if formulation in Latin America depends on the relationship constitutional powers remain the same. Indices restricted between their constitutional and partisan powers. However, to these powers, such as the ones proposed by Negretto this understanding was little operationalized, even by the (2013) for Latin America, would not be able to do the authors themselves. At the same time, informal practices same. that may grant or withdraw power from presidents also The results also show that the presidencies of Nicaragua, need to be considered for the Latin American countries, Bolivia, Ecuador, Uruguay, and Colombia were potentially as the literature has pointed out (Hartlyn 1998; Helmke & dominant. However, this potential led to a concentration Levitsky 2006; O’Donnell 1994, 1996; Siavelis 2006). of powers by the executive only in Nicaragua and Bolivia, Since Shugart and Carey (1992) proposed a way to meas- who possessed presidents with the most partisan powers ure presidential powers considering the legislative and among the 17 countries analyzed here. non-legislative capacities granted by the Constitution, The role of partisan powers contradicts Shugart and several authors have explored that and further sugges- Carey’s (1992) claim that presidencies with more consti- tions to offer alternative forms of measurement. Whether tutional powers are more problematic for the survival of they be for a greater number of cases (Doyle & Elgie 2016; democracy. It is also consistent with recent findings from Johannsen 2003) or specific regions, such as Latin America Pérez-Liñán, Schmidt, and Vairo (2019) on the effects that (Corrales 2013; Negretto 2013), parts of Europe (Hellman the concentration of power by the executive has on demo- 1996; Metcalf 2000), or countries from the former Soviet cratic instability in Latin America. The problems in this Union (Frye 1997), these options are also based on consti- sense identified by the literature do not refer to the presi- tutional prerogatives. dencies with the highest values for constitutional pow- Shugart and Carey (1992) measure presidential power ers in the indices developed here (from Chile and Brazil), by adding the scores given to a number of legislative but to three of the five (from Nicaragua, Bolivia, and and non-legislative powers. A limitation of their index, Venezuela) with the highest indices of partisan powers. according to Negretto (2013), is the understanding that The article is composed of five additional sections. The each legal prerogative evaluated contributes equally to a next item deepens the theoretical discussion and relates it president’s power. That means, for instance, that having to the arguments developed here. After that, the method- veto power would be the same as having decree power. ological procedures are explained. In the following three With the aggregation of the scores, they also do not take sections, the results and the conclusions of the analysis into account that the effects may be interactive. In other are presented and discussed. words, a specific combination of legal instruments may contribute to a president’s overall power (Cheibub 2007; Theoretical Discussion Negretto 2013). Presidential power is defined in the literature in terms There are studies (Carey & Shugart 1998; Negretto 2004) of the dimensions in which it can be exercised (Negretto that show, for instance, that agenda-setting and veto pow- 2013; Shugart & Carey 1992). There are also more specific ers have interactive effects. Thus, a president with moder- views (Biglaiser & DeRouen 2004; Hicken & Stoll 2008), ate agenda-setting and veto powers would have a larger that understand it as the degree to which power is concen- impact on the formulation of law and policies than one trated in the executive at the national level of government. with strong power in one of those categories and no power For Shugart and Carey, presidential power is expressed in in the other. An index estimated by aggregation could not constitutional terms, divided into two basic dimensions, capture these details, since the addition of the two scores one that refers to power over legislation and the other that at the mid-point of the scale would be equal to the sum of encompasses non-legislative powers, including authority a maximum and a minimum score. over the cabinet and calling early elections to congress. Fortin (2013) goes further and evaluates that presiden- Negretto (2013) expands the possibilities of exercising tial power indices have limited validity, for reasons such presidential power and understands it as a multidimen- as the impossibility of indicators in measuring the set of sional concept, encompassing the presidents’ authority in powers associated with the presidents or, on the other the exercise of their functions as party leader, head of state, hand, in generating separate measures of legislative and head of government, and legislator. To operationalize this non-legislative powers. Another problem would be the multidimensionality, however, the author follows the pro- assumption that
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