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What Should the European Union Do Next in the Middle East?

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What Should the European Union Do Next in the Middle East? No. 112 y September 2006 t is urgent that the EU should follow What should the European Union up on UN Resolution 1701 and the I deployment of member states’ do next in the Middle East? troops to Lebanon with a strategic- diplomatic initiative aimed at the fundamental problem, namely the lack Michael Emerson & Nathalie Tocci of an agreed resolution to the Israeli- Palestinian conflict. The reasons for this sive framework, leading eventually to a Temporary Mechanism in order to are a mix of old and new; reasons which two-state solution. But in addition to channel funds to the collapsing are rooted in the international, European Israel’s reservations to the Roadmap, Authority. Yet despite these efforts, and Middle Eastern domains. the US took over the agenda of the today the Roadmap is dead and there is The unresolved conflict remains poison Quartet, which in practice sought sound no peace plan or process in sight. democratic governance (and the for the international relations of the However, the Lebanon war and the removal of then president Arafat) in the region and the world. The Palestinian European peacekeeping efforts there Palestinian Territories as a precondition cause did not create Osama bin Laden have heightened EU stakes in Middle for negotiations over statehood or the and Al Qaeda, but the persistence of the East peace. The EU is obliged now to final map. The EU went along with this conflict, coupled with the escalating take the initiative on the political front, out of deference to the US and the Middle Eastern crises in Lebanon, Iraq since it has its soldiers exposed to the strong European perception that a peace and Iran have had a threefold hazards of crossfire between the Israeli process, to have any chance of success, detrimental effect on the aim to army and Hezbollah. Italy is in the lead required American leadership. In eradicate terrorism. They have helped with 3,000 troops. Prime Minister Prodi practice the Roadmap was stillborn, al-Qaeda ideologues lump together has acted swiftly and impressively. Also although at the declaratory level it different sets of fundamentally as regards the southern Palestinian remained part of the official and public unconnected crises, in their quest to front, Foreign Minister D’Alema has discourse up until the summer of 2006. forge a global ummah in pursuit of a hinted at a possible peacekeeping global jihad. They have been a prime Despite stalemate in the Roadmap, the involvement in the Gaza Strip, which recruitment motivation of Islamic EU nonetheless continued to pour time, would be decided on the basis of terrorists in Europe. They have also effort and resources into reviving the experience on the Lebanese front with acted as a key factor in the escalating peace process. Between 2002 and 2005, the strengthened UNIFIL mission. degradation of relations between Islam it devoted increasing financial and Yet peacekeeping alone in Lebanon and and the West. technical resources to the Palestinian more so in the Gaza Strip runs the risk Authority and its reform process, with The EU and its member states could of enmeshing European forces into an some discernible successes in the fiscal now take the initiative diplomatically, endless ‘mission impossible’. and judicial domains in particular. In both because it has a reasonably Peacekeeping, with any chance of 2004 and 2005, coupled with the work balanced position between the success, must be accompanied by of the Quartet’s Special Envoy for adversaries and because of its strategic diplomatic action aimed at Disengagement, it attempted to mitigate deepening involvement the Middle East establishing legitimate and recognized the detrimental effects of the Gaza conflict in terms of financial resources borders to be protected, to the north, disengagement, took an active role in and manpower. The EU tried to get the south, and eventually to the east. Gaza’s border management (through the peace process going in 2002 with the Having taken the lead on the Lebanese EU mission in Rafah), and US, Russia and UN in the ‘Quartet’. front, Italy, with the EU, needs now to unsuccessfully tried to mould Sharon’s Under the Danish Presidency at the time act strategically to protect its own unilateralism into a revived Roadmap it drafted a first version of the people and pursue a solution to the process. In 2006, while having ‘Roadmap’ as a means to engage the Middle East conflict which has become sanctioned the elected Hamas-led PA, Bush administration in the moribund an ever more pressing European the EU contributed to pulling the peace process, and so to integrate the interest. newfound US and Israeli concerns over Palestinian Authority back from the Palestinian governance in a comprehen- brink, elaborating an International Michael Emerson is Senior Research Fellow at CEPS and Nathalie Tocci is Research Fellow at the European University Institute (EUI) in Florence. The views expressed are those of the authors alone. Available for free downloading from the CEPS website (http://www.ceps.be) y © Michael Emerson & Nathalie Tocci 2006 A further reason for serious European military actions, assassinations and and the Geneva Accord should be the diplomatic action is the state of Israeli widespread arrests. The Israeli public basis for negotiations for a permanent policy itself. Israel’s strategy is now in has visibly backed away from its and complete settlement of the tatters. Sharon’s disengagement plan support for unilateral disengagements. conflict?” One can speculate that today, emerged from the need to find an A recent poll published in Yediot or tomorrow after some debate, both alternative to a negotiated two-state Ahronot (25 August) revealed that a parties would deliver majorities in agreement. Citing as excuses Arafat’s mere 9% of the Israeli public still backs favour. The negotiators would then ambivalence, followed by Abbas’ Olmert’s convergence plan. Those who have entirely new terms of reference for impotence and finally Hamas’ want peace have to find a different way. finishing off quickly the details of land radicalism, the Israeli authorities Sharon’s unilateralism, inherited by swaps, refugee arrangements and forcefully argued – backed by the Olmert, is not working. security provisions. majority of the public – that unilateral- What should the EU do? It should The Sharon and Olmert governments ism was the only game in town. convene a conference of the parties and cold-shouldered the Geneva Accord. Sharon’s Gaza disengagement was its Quartet partners, and table as But now Israel faces a new situation, in conducted smoothly and peacefully. It primary working documents the March which the Sharon/Olmert policies are gave birth to a new centrist party – 2002 Arab League Peace Initiative and seen to have been disastrous. Several Kadima – which reflected the the October 2003 Geneva Accords. The Israeli politicians, including Defence mainstream goal of the Zionist left and Arab peace plan for the first time Minister Amir Perez and Foreign right to reconcile the competing claims offered a comprehensive peace with Minister Tzipi Livni have expressed of territorial expansion and Israel in return for the establishment of support for renewed negotiations. The demographic control. a Palestinian state on the 1967 borders, Geneva Initiative has re-launched a new Kadima, taken over by Ehud Olmert, a just and agreed solution to the refugee campaign to sensitize and rally support ran and won the March 2006 elections problem as well as Israel’s withdrawal for its cause. Israel is a democracy, and on a bid to ‘do Gaza in the West Bank’. from Syrian and Lebanese territory. should accept the verdict of the Together with the tightening grip over Providing substantive detail on the consultative referendum. Would the East Jerusalem and the West Bank, the Israeli-Palestinian dossier, the Geneva Palestinians accept shelving various cordoning-off of the Jordan valley, and Accord of 19 October 2003, is the most elements of old rhetoric concerning the the construction of the euphemistically- well-prepared and detailed peace plan objective of destroying the state of dubbed ‘separation barrier’, that exists, and was signed by a Israel? ‘convergence’ was the word on distinguished group of about 70 Israeli All signals suggest that they would. The everyone’s lips in the spring of 2006. and Palestinian independent individuals. prisoners’ document, which endorsed Kadima’s convergence plan was to The document treats the issues of the notion of a two-state solution, was rationalize its occupation of the West statehood, the map (the pre-1967 map signed by a senior member of Hamas Bank through a realignment of its subject to agreed reciprocal land swaps (as well as by representatives of Fatah presence and control. Doing so could on a 1:1 basis), a guaranteed land and other minor factions). The raise the chances of international corridor between the West Bank and document could serve as a basis for a recognition of Israel’s annexation of Gaza, Jerusalem’s holy sites, the much-needed national reconciliation, large swathes of occupied territory, security regime and the refugees (with which could herald the establishment of while concomitantly avoiding to absorb multiple options, but leaving Israel the a national unity government that would large number of Palestinians with it. In sovereign right to determine the number also normalize its relations with the the absence of a state on ‘their side’ of that it would accept back). Some parts international community. the wall, Palestinians would be of the wall would have to be governed through a mix of local self- Would the US once again mount such a dismantled, which is what the Israeli government and heavy international set of pre-conditions that the process government has always claimed could civilian and possibly military presence.
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