“The Price of Pestilence: ’s response to the in the face of the Hundred Years War”

DISSERTATION

Presented in Partial Fulfillment of the Requirements for the Degree in the Graduate School of The Ohio State University

By

Sarah Kathryn Douglas

Graduate Program in History

The Ohio State University

2015

Dissertation Committee: Dr. John Guilmartin, Professor of History Dr. Geoffrey Parker, Andreas Dorpelan Professor of History Dr. Barbara Hanawalt, King George III Professor of British History, Emerita

Copyright by

Sarah Kathryn Douglas

2015

Abstract

In 1348, the Black Death swept across Europe and killed nearly 50% of the population.

Immediately prices for labor, livestock, and consumables skyrocketed and governments everywhere ground to a halt. England was no exception as King Edward III had the additional concern of paying for his military campaigns against during the opening phase of the Hundred Years War (1337-1453). While the Black Death has received ample attention from historians of everything from economics and culture to disease and environment, none have addressed the effect of the upon military affairs. This has generated a significant gap, not only in the study of medieval military history, but in our understanding of the effects of as a whole. This dissertation compares two expeditions, one before the plague and one after: the 1346-47 Crécy- campaign and the 1359-60 Reims campaign. This comparison reveals that despite the shock caused by the plague to all spheres of life, the English quickly and efficiently adapted to its new political, economic, and demographic limitations. Not only did government offices resume business as usual within three years of the disease’s arrival, but they adopted innovative methods of taxation and customs manipulation with the sole intent of permitting the government to go to war.

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Dedication

To my family, who has supported me no matter what.

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Acknowledgments

I wish to acknowledge the assistance of my thesis advisors, Dr. John Guilmartin, Dr.

Geoffrey Parker, and Dr. Barbara Hanawalt because their guidance throughout this process has been invaluable to my development as a student and as a scholar. I also wish to thank Dr. Clifford J. Rogers for his advice and comments, which have increased my knowledge of . Lastly, fellow students Jon Hendrickson, Rob Clemm, and Will Waddell deserve my sincerest appreciation for serving as sounding boards for my research ideas, providing encouragement and at times, far more valuable opposition.

Their friendship has meant a great deal during my graduate studies and I would not be the historian I am without them.

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Vita

June 2007 ...... B.A. History, The Ohio State University

March 2009 ...... M.A. History, The Ohio State University

September 2008 to present ...... Graduate Teaching Associate, Department

of History, The Ohio State University

Publications

“British Commemoration of the American Revolution,” The Dulles Review (2007).

Review, “Knighthood as it was, not as we wish it were: Saul’s in

Medieval England,” Ehistory.com (December 2011)

Review, James Ross, “John de Vere, Thirteenth of : ‘The Foremost Man of the Kingdom’,” H-War, H-Net Reviews (January 2013)

“The Search for Hitler: Hugh Trevor-Roper, Humphrey Searle, and the Allied

Investigation into the Death of Adolph Hitler,” The Journal of Military History 78

(January 2014), 159-210

Fields of Study

Major Field: History

Sub-Fields: Military History, Medieval European History, East Asian History

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Table of Contents

Abstract ...... ii

Dedication ...... iii

Acknowledgments...... iv

Vita ...... v

Table of Contents ...... vi

List of Tables ...... viii

List of Figures ...... x

List of Abbreviations ...... xii

CHAPTER 1: Introduction ...... 1

CHAPTER 2: A Contest of ...... 18

CHAPTER 3: The Theory of Feeding Mars ...... 53

CHAPTER 4: The Art of Feeding Mars ...... 86

CHAPTER 5: Crécy-Calais, 1346-47 ...... 138

CHAPTER 6: The World Turned Upside Down ...... 174

CHAPTER 7: The Reims Campaign, 1359-60 ...... 212

CHAPTER 8: Conclusion ...... 241 vi

Appendix A: Glossary of Terms ...... 251

Appendix B: Weights & Measures ...... 257

Bibliography ...... 258

vii

List of Tables

Table 1: Engels and Erdkamp caloric demands of soldiers “on the ” ...... 78

Table 2: Erdkamp grain requirements from ancient sources ...... 78

Table 3: Erdkamp additional ration information ...... 78

Table 4: Foxhall and Forbes Soldier Grain Consumption ...... 79

Table 5: Single day caloric requirements for 200 soldiers ...... 80

Table 6: Grain demands of soldiers on the march ...... 81

Table 7: Daily caloric requirements of horses on campaign ...... 81

Table 8: Daily caloric intake of medieval sailors based upon modern caloric content .... 83

Table 9: Crécy campaign manpower based upon Wrottesley’s estimates ...... 145

Table 10: Ayton's estimates for 1346 manpower ...... 146

Table 11: Victuals purveyed in England, January to June, 1346 ...... 148

Table 12: Victuals purveyed in England, January to June, 1346 ...... 149

Table 13: 1337-38 English mariner provisions ...... 151

Table 14: Horses required to transport estimated victuals ...... 152

Table 15: Maximum use of 1346-47 victual stores ...... 155

Table 16: Archer weaponry and supplies collected, 1345-46 ...... 157

Table 17: Men-at-arms and archers obtained as reinforcements at Calais ...... 166

Table 18: Total forces involved in the ...... 167

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Table 19: Commissions to sheriffs for archers ...... 169

Table 20: Bows and Arrows requisitioned for the Tower of in January 1359 .. 216

Table 21: Archers Requested from 28 Counties in January 1359 ...... 216

Table 22: Mounted Archers Requested ...... 219

Table 23: Victuals and Carts required Per Day for the Reims Army ...... 223

Table 24: Bows and Sheaves of Arrows Collected, November 1359 ...... 231

Table 25: Men-at-Arms and Archers raised in March 1360 ...... 235

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List of Figures

Figure 1: The farthest extent of II's territory ...... 23

Figure 2: The French line of inheritance...... 34

Figure 3: The County of c.1400 ...... 38

Figure 4: English-controlled territory at the beginning of the war ...... 43

Figure 5: Structure of the medieval English Crown ...... 88

Figure 6: English administration on the local level ...... 92

Figure 7: Subsidy totals during the reign of Edward I ...... 99

Figure 8: Estimated Population in England, 1085-1600 ...... 108

Figure 9: Crécy-Calais campaign trail from landing to the Siege of Calais ...... 160

Figure 10: Statistical Analysis of Patent Rolls ...... 197

Figure 11: Statistical Analysis of Close Rolls ...... 197

Figure 12: Statistical Analysis of Fine Rolls ...... 198

Figure 13: Statistical Analysis of Charter Rolls ...... 198

Figure 14: Statistical Analysis of the Black 's Register ...... 199

Figure 15: Analysis of the Calendar of Documents Relating to ...... 199

Figure 16: English Grain Price Comparison, 1300-1400...... 202

Figure 17: Analysis of English Livestock Prices, 1300-1400 ...... 202

Figure 18: Analysis of English Labor Wages by Decade, 1300-1400 ...... 203

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Figure 19: English Customs Yield, 1340-1360...... 208

Figure 20: The 1359-60 Campaign ...... 229

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List of Abbreviations

Anon, 1307-1334 The Anonimalle Chronicle 1307-1334, Wendy R. Childs and John

Taylor, eds. (Leeds: The Archeological Society, 1991).

Anon, 1333-1381 The Anonimalle Chronicle, 1333-1381, V.H. Galbraith, ed.

(: Manchester University Press, 1927).

CAng Chronica Angliae 1328-1388 Auctore Monacho Quodam Sancti

Albani, E. M. Thompson, ed. (London: Longman & Co., 1874).

CCR Calendar of Close Rolls, Edward III, 7 vols. (London: Eyre and

Spottiswoode, 1896-1909).

CChR Calendar of Charter Rolls, Edward III, 2 vols. (London: Hereford

Times, Ltd., 1912, 1916).

CDRS Calendar of Documents Relating to Scotland, 2 vols (:

H.M. General Register House, 1887).

CFR Calendar of Fine Rolls, Edward III, 4 vols. (London: His

Majesty’s Stationary Office, 1913-1923).

CJB Chronique de Jean le Bel, J. Viard, ed., (: Librairie Renouard,

H. Laurens, successeur, 1904-05).

xii

CLBL Calendar of Letter-Books of the Corporation of the ,

R.R. Sharpe, ed.,3 vols. (London: John Edward France, Bream’s

Buildings, 1903-1905).

CPR Calendar of Patent Rolls, 5 vols. (London: His Majesty’s

Stationary Office, 1896-1909).

Chronicon Godfrey le Baker, Chronicon, Edward Maunde

Thompson, ed. (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1889).

Chroniques , Chroniques de J. Froissart, S. Luce, ed., 6 vols.

(1869-1876).

EcHR The Review

Edward III W. Mark Ormrod, Edward III (New Haven: Yale University Press,

2011).

EHR English Historical Review

Foedera Feodera, conventions, litterae, etc., T. Rymer, ed., A. Clarke, F.

Holbroke, and J. Coley, revised eds., Vols. 3,4 (London: Record

Commissions, 1821, 1825). de Klerk Jan de Klerk, “Edouard III, Roi D’Angleterre, En Flandre,” Octave

Delepierre, trans., in Miscellanies of the Philobiblon Society, Vol.

X (London: Wittingham and Wilkins, 1866-67).

Knighton Knighton’s Chronicle, G.H. Martin, ed., trans. (Oxford: Clarendon

Press, 1995).

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RBP Register of , 4 vols. (London: His

Majesty’s Stationary Office, 1930-1933).

Scalacronica Sir Thomas Gray, “Scalacronica 1271 – 1363,” Andy King, ed.,

trans., The Publications of the Surtees Society, Vol. 209

(Rochester, NY: The Boydell Press, 2005)

Trial by Battle Jonathan Sumption, The Hundred Years War I: Trial by Battle

(Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press, 1990)

Trial by Fire ---, The Hundred Years War II: Trial by Fire (London: Faber and

Faber, Ltd., 1999).

TNA The National Archives (Kew, Richmond, , UK)

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Chapter 1: Introduction

In 1348, at about the feast of the Translation of St. Thomas the [7 July], the cruel pestilence, hateful to all future ages, arrived from countries across the sea on the south coast of England at the port of Melcombe in . Travelling all over the south country it wretchedly killed innumerable people in Dorset, Devon and …. Next it came to , where very few were left alive, and then travelled northwards, leaving not a city, a town, a , or even, except rarely, a house, without killing most or all of the people there, so that over England as a whole a fifth of the men, women and children were carried to burial. As a result, there was such a shortage of people that there were hardly enough living to look after the sick and bury the dead. Eulogium historiarum sive temporis1

Without a doubt, the Black Death is one of the most devastating epidemics in . The work of a bacterium known as , in 1346 the plague migrated west from China to Scythia where it devastated the Kipchak Khanate as it laid siege to Caffa.2 In an act of biological warfare, the infected flung disease- ridden bodies over the walls and the Genoese merchants escaped in vain. As the plague

1 F.S. Haydon, ed., Eulogium historiarum sive temporis, Vol. 3 (London: , 1863), 213-14. 2 The tale of Genoese merchants fleeing Caffa is the commonly accepted means of introduction to western Europe. , “Chronicle,” quoted in The Black Death: The Great Mortality of 1348-50, a Brief History with Documents, John Aberth, ed. (New : Palgrave MacMillan, 2005), 19-20; Nicephorus Grecoras, “Historia Byzantina,” quoted in The Black Death: The Great Mortality of 1348-50, a Brief History with Documents, John Aberth, ed. (New York: Palgrave MacMillan, 2005), 15-16; Bruce M.S. Campbell, “Physical Shocks, Biological Hazards, and Human Impacts: The Crisis of the Fourteenth Century Revisited,” in Economic and Biological Interactions in Pre-Industrial Europe from the 13th to the 18th Centuries, S. Cavaciocchi, ed. (: Firenze University Press, 2010), 13-33. This story (as well as the identity of the disease itself) appears to be supported by genetic analysis of the bacterium as isolated in plague victim teeth and bones (Stephanie Haensch, Raffaelia Bianucci, et al., “Distinct Clines of Yersinia pestis Caused the Black Death,” PLoS Pathog, Vol. 6, No. 10 (2010). For more on the Golden Horde, see: Leo de Hartog, Russia and the Mongol Yoke: The History of the Russian Principalities and the Golden Horde, 1221-1502 (New York: St. Martin’s Press, 1996). 1 swept across the rest of western Asia and northern Africa, they carried it first to in

October 1347, to Marseilles in November, and then finally to Genoa and Venice in

January 1348. The disease moved north rapidly, striking the rest of Italy, France, and Portugal by June, and England by October. It then spread through Germany to

Scandinavia in 1349-50, finally ending in Russia the following year. During that time, prices for labor, livestock, and consumables fluctuated radically and governments, at least temporarily, ground to a halt.3 By the time the plague died out in 1351, it left nearly 50% of the total population of Europe dead it its wake.4

To make matters worse, the plague did not hit during a period of and prosperity. The twelfth and thirteenth centuries had been dominated by warmer average temperatures in the summer months and milder winters, both of which allowed previously uncultivated land to be cleared for farming, yields to increase, and populations to swell. This general prosperity came to an end by 1300 with the beginning of the Little

Ice Age; as successive crops failed to produce adequate provisions, famine killed an estimated 10% of the European population.5 These shortages greatly contributed to the turmoil throughout the century that included economic strain, social strife, religious upheaval, and perhaps most of all, endemic warfare throughout all of western Europe. It

3 David Farmer, “Prices and Wages, 1041-1350,” in The Agrarian and Vol. II: 1042-1350, Joan Thirsk, ed. (: Cambridge University Press, 1988), 734; David Farmer, “Prices and Wages, 1350-1500” in The Agrarian History of Vol. III: 1350-1500, Edward Miller, ed. (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1988), 248, 444, 467,471, 501-502, 785. The fluctuations between 1348 and 1350 were so extreme that most historical calculations of average sale and/or purchase prices exclude these years all together. 4 The 50% death rate is the current accepted average, increasing the mortality of the disease from the traditional 1/3 of the European population (John Aberth, The Black Death: The Great Mortality of 1348-50, a Brief History with Documents (New York: Palgrave MacMillan, 2005), 3; Joseph P. Byrne, The Black Death (Westport, CT: Greenwood Press, 2004), 59. 5 The Little Ice Age either began in the late thirteenth century or the early fourteenth century. As studies of comparative tree growth in Europe, Greenland, and Australia show that some of the coldest years of the previous century were between 1348 and 1350 (Campbell, “Physical Shocks,” 24). 2 was in this “calamitous” atmosphere that the plague arrived, prompting one chronicler to note that “…everyone believes it is the end of the world.”6

By the time of the plague’s arrival King Edward III of England was involved in his bid for the French throne, these resultant military campaigns constituting the opening phase of the Hundred Years War (1337-1453).7 This conflict was the culmination of hundreds of years of dynastic strife between the royal lines of England and France, and was sparked by Edward III’s refusal to pay to the French King Philip VI in 1337.

This fact was exacerbated not only by the French alliance with the Scots, but by

England’s economic ties to the cloth-weaving cities of Flanders, a region nominally controlled by the French. As a consequence of Edward’s refusal to fulfill his feudal obligations, Philip seized and in 1340 Edward declared himself the rightful king of France. The resulting war saw one of its most active periods between 1337 and 1360, the “Great Pestilence” devastating both belligerents directly in the middle.

Unsurprisingly, the Black Death and its impact upon European society have received ample attention from historians. Not only is the dispute surrounding the identity of the disease quite active for historians and scientists alike, but its impact is a major topic of research and debate. Some scholars assert that the demographic shock of the

“great mortality” reshaped the nature of political authority within the kingdoms of

6 Barbara Tuchman’s monograph A Distant Mirror: The Calamitous (New York: Ballantine Press, 1978). Agnolo di Tura, “Sienese Chronicle,” quoted in The Black Death: The Great Mortality of 1348-50, a Brief History with Documents, John Aberth (New York: Palgrave MacMillan, 2005), 81. 7 The historiography dealing with the Hundred Years War is extensive. Currently the definitive work on this topic is that of British judge and historian Jonathan Sumption. His magnum opus will include five volumes in all when completed, three of which are currently in print: Jonathan Sumption, The Hundred Years War I: Trial by Battle (Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press, 1990); Jonathan Sumption, The Hundred Years War II: Trial by Fire (London: Faber and Faber, Ltd., 1999); Jonathan Sumption, The Hundred Years War II: Divided Houses (Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press, 2009). Volume IV is expected in 2015 while a release date for the final volume has not as yet been set. 3 western Europe, causing power to shift down the social scale.8 Others focus on the economic effects of the plague, arguing that labor shortages increased workers’ wages, prompted the use of more efficient agricultural techniques, and pushed for the introduction of better machines of manufacture.9 This in turn “liberated” the class by redistributing wealth, fostering growth in western European per capita GDP.10 A side effect of these changes, however, was increased social strife in the second half of the century, the 1358 in France and the 1381 ’ Revolt in England notable, and violent, examples.11

The scholarship does not stop there. Bruce M.S. Campbell’s work focused on the relationship between medieval climate change and the plague’s emergence on the

Steppe.12 John Aberth proposed that the high mortality of the Black Death, as well as the successive plagues which followed into the fifteenth century, resulted in a “cult of

8 Debate over the identity of the plague is peopled by historians as well as epidemiologists and biologists. See Kirsten I. Bos, Verena J. Schuenemann, G. Brian Golding, Herna´n A. Burbano, Nicholas Waglechner, Brian K. Coombes, Joseph B. McPhee, Sharon N. DeWitte, Matthias Meyer, Sarah Schmedes, JamesWood, David J. D. Earn, D. Ann Herring, Peter Bauer, Hendrik N. Poinar, and Johannes Krause, “A draft of Yersinia pestis from victims of the Black Death,” Nature, Vol. 478 (27 October 2011), 506-510. Aberth’s The Black Death is the best current survey on the plague. 9 John Aberth, The First Horseman: Disease in Human History (Upper Saddle River, NJ: Pearson Education, Inc., 2007); Aberth, The Black Death; Philip Ziegler, The Black Death (Stroud, Gloucestershire: Sutton Publishing Ltd., 1969). Robert S. Gottfried (The Black Death: Natural and Human Disaster in Medieval Europe (New York: The Free Press, 1983)) discusses the advancements in metallurgy as well as the advancements of water pump technology, permitting the expansion and increased safety of mining, particularly in England. 10 The economic impact of the plague constitutes a major argument regarding the effect of the Black Death. This specific thesis was proposed most notably by M.M. Postan, who stated that the plague led to the “commutation of labour services and the emancipation of serfs” (Medieval Economy and Society: An Economic History of Britain in the . London: Pelican, 1975). Historians such as Robert C. Palmer ( in the Age of the Black Death, 1348-1381 (Chapel Hill, NC: The University of North Carolina Press, 1993)), Colin Platt (King Death: the Black Death and its aftermath in late-medieval England (London: University College London Press, 1996)), and Jim (“‘The World Upside Down’. Plague as an Agent of Economic and Social Change,” in The , E.M. Ormrod and P.G. Lindley, eds. (Stamford: Paul Watkins, 1996), 17-78), have qualified but generally upheld this conclusion. See also John Hatcher, “England in the Aftermath of the Black Death,” Past & Present, No. 144 (August 1994), 3-35. 11 Aberth, The First Horseman, 22. 12Campbell, “The Great Transition”; Campbell, “Physical Shocks,” 13. 4 remembrance” that increased secular investment in Renaissance art.13 David Herlihy explored the disease’s impact upon the greater religious turmoil of the time, believing that the high mortality rate of -educated clerics, when combined with the criticism the Church faced in the wake of the plague, forced a shift towards vernacular education, and perhaps eventually, the .14

The plague is even discussed in comparative terms. While a myriad of advances followed the plague in the West—even influencing society so far as improving public health practices—eastern Europe and Asian societies did not experience relative development.15 Timur Kuran focused on what he referred to as a point of “divergence” between western Europe and the Middle East, arguing that Islamic religious institutions and long-standing economic policies hindered the change that was structurally possible in western Europe.16 Stuart Borsch compared the effect of the plague in England and Egypt specifically, focusing on how England endured while the centralized political structure in

Egypt collapsed in the face of high mortality rates.17 Such comparative work is also temporal, as James Westfall Thompson contrasted the political, economic, and cultural impact of the Black Death vis-à-vis the heavy causalities following .18 Even

13; Aberth, The First Horseman, 19-20. 14 David Herlihy, The Black Death and the Transformation of the West (Cambridge, MS: Harvard University Press, 1997), 70. The entirety of Chapter 3, “Modes of Thought and Feeling,” explores the effect of the plague upon the Church, peoples’ relationship to the clergy, and the religious schisms of the fifteenth and sixteenth centuries. 15 Paul Slack, “Responses to Plague in Early Modern Europe: The Implications of Public Health,” in In Time of Plague: The History and Social Consequences of Lethal Epidemic Disease, Arien Mack, ed. (New York: New York University Press, 1991), 111-131; Herlihy, The Black Death. 16 Timur Kuran, The Long Divergence: How Islamic Law Held Back the Middle East (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2011). 17 Stuart Borsch, The Black Death in Egypt and England: A Comparative Study (Austin: University of Texas Press, 2005). 18 James Westfall Thompson, “The Aftermath of the Black Death and the Aftermath of the Great War,” American Journal of Sociology, Vol. 26, No. 5 (March 1921), 565-572. 5 the Rand Corporation in 1966 used the Black Death as a model when theorizing for the

US government the potential global impact of thermonuclear war.19

Despite this expansive body of work, no one has dealt with both the short and long-term effect of history’s greatest epidemic upon warfare. In fact, in Clifford J.

Rogers’ Oxford Encyclopedia of Medieval Warfare and Military Technology, notable

Black Death historian John Aberth claimed that “the Black Death seems to have made surprisingly little impact on Europeans’ ability or appetite for waging war.”20 As this dissertation will prove, while the plague did not influence Europeans’ appetite for war, it did alter the means by which they waged it.

Using England as a case study due to the sizeable body of source material available, I argue that despite the extreme shock caused by the plague to all spheres of life from the time it hit England in late 1348 until it died down in 1351, the English

Crown quickly and efficiently adapted to its new political, economic, and demographic limitations. Not only did government offices resume business as usual by 1351, but they adopted more efficient and effective methods of taxation and customs collection with the sole intent of permitting the government to continue waging war. The disaster was therefore a catalyst of change in England, which helped to reshape the government and how it prepared for military engagements. The French , by comparison, was neither stable nor powerful enough to institute similar economic reforms. When

19 J. Hirschleifer, Disaster and Recovery: The Black Death in Western Europe (Santa Monica: The Rand Corporation, 1966). 20 John Abert, “Black Death,” The Oxford Encyclopedia of Medieval Warfare and Military Technology, Vol. 1 (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2010), 153. Aberth concedes, however, that the plague does seem to have imposed, by the very severity of its mortality, a de facto truce throughout Europe and between Europeans and their Muslim neighbors” (153). 6 combined with the continual devastation of its infrastructure, the fragmented French government was no match for the English war machine.

When examining the long-term effects of the Black Death upon warfare, I will prove that the continuing hardships imposed by the demographic disruption of the plague, as well as the five successive waves of plague that hit Europe between 1360 and 1410, led to the creation of labor-saving technologies, ideological advances, and fiscal adaptations which eventually permitted states to execute acts of institutionalized violence on a far grander scale. Not only did the technological progress include water pumps, farming methods, and mercantile shipping technology, but the plague contributed to the evolution of gunpowder weapons, the of more complex defensive fortifications, military-fiscal states that hired standing armies of professional soldiers, and the exploitation of the fully rigged ship to project these new, deadly forces first to other countries, and then to other continents.

This thesis will show that although the Early and were not periods of stagnation—both in terms of military practice and secular innovation—the

Black Death generated a momentum that ushered in the early modern period.

Under significant demographic pressure in the late fourteenth and early fifteenth centuries, the societies of western Europe increased their production of labor-saving technologies and ushered in what Bruce M.S. Campbell coined “the Great Transition.”21

It was at this time that the West, defined in this thesis as the nexus of the former Roman

Empire, Roman Christianity, and the settlement regions of western European Germanic

21 Bruce M.S. Campbell, “The Great Transition: Climate, Disease and Society in the Thirteenth and Fourteenth Centuries” (paper presented at Cambridge University, UK, February 4th, 2013). 7 tribes, diverged from the Middle East and beyond in terms of its political, economic, and social practices. These developments, in turn, led to the sustained expansion of Western states outside of Europe and ultimately, to turn the common phrase, victories in battles of the “West versus the rest.”22 While “revolution” is overused almost to the point of futility in current historical study, this does not negate the fact that most of these changes were driven, ultimately, by the continual needs states possessed to go to war.

In order to explore how the English government was able to prosecute war despite the epidemic, this thesis will compare two similar campaigns of Edward III’s reign, one before the Black Death and one after. Following a sketch of the Hundred Years War causes in Chapter 2, and a historiographical introduction to the theoretical concepts explored in this thesis in Chapter 3, Chapter 4 will analyze English administrative systems and how those systems were used to support military affairs. This chapter will also explore the military expenditure in a non-campaign year of Edward III’s reign, 1329, in order to provide scale to the data presented in the rest of this thesis. Too often statistical data is presented without any basis of comparison and so this year functions as a base in this examination. Unless otherwise noted, the records and data presented involve only those resources and populations south of the Trent, as the English territory north of this river traditionally supported defensive (and at times offensive) military action against the Scots.

In Chapter 5, I investigate the first campaign in this qualitative and quantitative comparison, the 1346-47 Crécy-Calais campaign. Edward began planning for this

22 Philip E. Tetlock, Richard Ned Lebow, and Geoffrey Parker, “” in Unmaking the West: “What-if” Scenarios That Rewrite World History (Ann Arbor, MI: University of Michigan Press, 2006), 6. 8 expedition in 1344 when first granted his request for a subsidy in support of his war aims. When these funds were collected, Edward immediately used them to procure victuals and collect weaponry, and while Edward utilized some of his stores prior to Crécy-Calais, he saved most for his forthcoming major expedition to France.

Crown efforts to gather supplies and manpower reached their height from January to July 1346, and while the process was not without issues, the king was able to depart for in July with adequate foodstuffs to feed the approximately 15,250 soldiers at his disposal. His plan was to use these victuals at the outset and then rely upon foraging when necessary. This plan was successful as he was not only able to defeat the

French at the Battle of Crécy, but begin the siege of Calais in August 1346 that involved over 30,000 men.23 The result was a decisive victory and English occupation of the city for over 200 years.

Although news of Edward’s victory at the Battle of Crécy garnered him the financial support from Parliament that he required to sustain the siege at Calais, ultimately the campaign would be one of the largest and most expensive of the Middle

Ages. As such, a period of recovery was required after the stress of recurrent taxation, the number of subjects essentially drafted into military service, and the collection of supplies for the expedition.24 Although Parliament remained supportive of Edward’s cause,

23 TNA E101/25/8, nos. 1-4; TNA E101/25/14, mm. 1,2; TNA E101/25/16, nos. 1-8; TNA E101/568/9; C76/22, m.1; TNA E101/25/11, mm. 1-2; TNA E101/25/11, mm. 3,4; TNA E372/191; TNA E372/192; George Wrottesley, ed., Crecy and Calais from the Original Records in the Public Record Office (London: Harrison and Sons, St. Martin’s Lane, 1898); Register of the Black Prince, 5 Vols. (London: His Majesty’s Stationary Office, 1930). 24For an example, see CCR, 1346-1349, 282, 382-383. 9 general discontent with —made worse by lingering debts from over ten years of warfare—led to sanctions on Edward’s use of any further subsidies.25

Amidst England’s attempts at recovery, the plague arrived. As Chapter VI will discuss, the epidemic was the work of the bacterium Yersinia pestis, a descendent of the soil-dwelling bacillus Yersinia pseudotuberculosis.26 It was during an outbreak of the plague in China and India in 1894 that Swiss-born French bacteriologist Alexander

Yersin first isolated the bacterium. Four years later French researcher Paul-Louis

Simond identified the as its vector.27 After comparing the symptoms of the two epidemics—chills, fever, muscle cramping, seizures, vomiting of blood, and most notably, a swelling of the glands known as buboes—researchers concluded that the identity of the Black Death was the bubonic manifestation of Y. pestis.28

Over time historians came to doubt this hypothesis because the Black Death was far more severe in scope and symptomology than the Chinese-Indian outbreak: not only did the medieval epidemic spread faster and kill a larger percent of the population than in the nineteenth century, but key aspects such as the occurrence of buboes and mortality rate were more severe in Europe than in Asia. Nevertheless, recent A-DNA analysis of

25 This discontent dictated that when the king asked for a renewal of subsidies in 1348, parliament imposed several restrictions before granting it: Edward could not use the subsidy to pay old debts, he could not turn the tax into a levy on wool, and Parliament demanded that the funds be more directly applied to the costs of war (G.L. Harriss, King, Parliament, and Public Finance in Medieval England to 1369 (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1976), 326-327). 26 Bos et al., “A draft,” 506. 27 Cohn, The Black Death Transformed, 1. 28 As the Black Death chapter will discuss, the bubonic manifestation of the plague involves an infection of the lymphatic system, thus the formation to buboes primarily around the groin, neck, and armpits. The other two manifestations are pneumonic and septicemic. involves an infection of the respiratory system caused by inhalation of infective particles into the lungs. This version can be transmitted from human to human without bites from or other animals, colloquially referred to as “air borne”. The final manifestation, and the rarest, is septicemic plague, which involves an infection of the blood stream. Upon contraction (most commonly from a bite like but also rarely through open sores on the body), Y. pestis multiplies in the blood stream, causing sepsis, blood clotting, tissue necrosis, and death. 10 plague victims’ teeth and bones in graves throughout western Europe has identified the central Asian strain of Y. pestis in its bubonic form without mutation.29

Whatever its identity, historians estimate that between 25% and 75% of the

European population died of the disease, which reappeared in 1361, 1371, and approximately 15 more times before the sixteenth century. Although now the disease is referred to as the “Black Death,” this term was not coined until the sixteenth century and did not enter into popular usage until the disease itself was identified in the nineteenth.30

As the plague swept through the Continent in 1348, Edward III and any Crown officials who could afford to do so fled London in hopes of avoiding the coming disaster.

By January 1349 the scheduled sitting of Parliament was canceled and soon after the government ceased all operations. Crown business (which included correspondence, appeals, commissions, legal judgments, and civil decisions) dropped from 34% to 79% of previous totals by 1360, with military affairs as part of that business decreasing as well.31

Contrary to what one might expect, due to tales of flagellates whipping themselves in the streets and the masses flooding into churches begging God to end their suffering, such panic turned out to be temporary.32 In fact, historian W. Mark Ormrod stated that the English Crown “showed a stubborn determination to sit out the period of disruption and ensure that proprietary interests survived intact once the temporary

29 Samuel K. Cohn’s The Black Death Transformed is the most well-known argument against the identification of the Black Death as the work of Y. pestis. Genetic analysis, however, has seemingly overcome such objections, and now those researching the plague are attempting to indentify reasons for the Black Death’s comparative virulence. 30 Aberth, The Black Death, 1-3. 31 These totals will be displayed and discussed in Ch. VI. CCR 1343-1346, CCR 1354-1360, CCR 1360- 1364; CFR, Vol. V, CFR, Vol. VI, CFR, Vol. VII; CPR Vol. VII, CPR Vol. XI. 32 Slack, “Responses to Plague in Early Modern Europe,” 118. 11 emergency had passed.”33 Although most Crown staff had fled London, the Chancery soon began meeting at alternate locations and the King’s Bench never stopped operations in the north. By August of 1349, most Westminster departments were back open and by

September, the government was more or less running as normal.34 Even the widespread violence against Jews, which escalated at the height of the plague in 1349, ceased almost entirely by early 1351.35

The economic recovery was also quick. Although commodity and labor prices did fluctuate severely during the plague’s height, they soon stabilized. Wheat, a luxury grain, increased the most but in that time prices never reached the heights achieved during the famines in the early fourteenth century.36 Livestock prices behaved similarly, cart-horses seeing the most drastic increase, mostly likely due to their utility as a labor- saving device. Most importantly though, with competition over a vastly contracted labor supply, wages increased despite the 1351 Statute of Laborers, which attempted to wages at their pre-plague levels.37

Although the Crown’s response was impressive, the Black Death did leave the government with problems that it had not needed to confront beforehand: the population was most likely halved, prices for men and commodities were rising, and the sizeable debts incurred during the Crécy-Calais campaign lingered. The plague also deprived the

Crown of a crucial source of income: Edward III could no longer rely upon the English

33 W. Mark Ormrod, “The English Government and the Black Death of 1348-49,” in England in the Fourteenth Century, W. Mark Ormrod, ed. (Rochester, NY: Boydell Press, 1986), 175. 34 Ormrod, “The English Government and the Black Death,” 177. 35 Samuel K. Cohn, “The Black Death and the Burning of Jews,” Past & Present, Vol. 196, Issue 1(2007), 3-36. 36 Farmer, “Prices and Wages, 1041-1350,” 444. 37 Farmer, “Prices and Wages,” V. I, 248; Farmer, “Prices and Wages,” 457. 12 merchants he utilized heavily in 1346-47 to provide him with loans. While taxation and royal prerogative had always served as the main source of financial support for military expeditions, with the rising cost of military endeavors in the late thirteenth and early fourteenth centuries, Edward, like his father and grandfather before him, turned to merchants for supplemental income. Wool was England’s primary export commodity, and the customs imposed upon that commodity generated sizeable revenue for the

Crown. Initially Italian merchants were given the right to collect these customs in exchange for generous cash advances to the government, a duty that was assumed by

English merchants once these banks collapsed in 1345. Yet the Black Death severely hampered any attempts at international commerce, bankrupting the very companies in

1349 that served Edward well in during the Crécy-Calais campaign.38

These realities placed considerable pressure upon the Crown, especially since military aggression did not cease during the emergency. The French were eager to subdue

Flanders, push the English out of Calais, and end the ongoing dynastic dispute in

Brittany. To answer these aggressions, the English government was in dire need of institutional adaptations that could support the Crown’s military ambitions.

The ultimate solution was a significant increase in efficiency and central organization that created similarly remarkable stability during the rest of the 1350’s.

Instead of merely delegating the responsibility of collecting customs on exported wool to yet another group of English merchants, Edward passed the Ordinance of the Staple in

1353. With the consent of his merchants, Edward moved the wool staple from the

38 W. Mark Ormrod, “The English Crown and the Customs, 1349-63,” EcHR, New Series, Vol. 40, No. 1 (February 1987), 27. 13

Continent back to England and appointed new administrative officers at every port who standardized weights, measures, cocketting procedures, and even established courts to persecute smugglers.39

This economic intervention by the Crown had an immediate and drastic effect upon its revenue. Alien merchants flooded into England and in the first year of the domestic staple alone customs receipts increased from an average of £45,500 to

£65,400.40 The Ordinance not only improved the efficiency of the custom system but it took advantage of the simultaneous reduction in the sheep population caused by a murrain that swept through English livestock with devastating results.41

An immediate consequence of this increased revenue was that it enabled Edward to pay off his debts and expand his military interests both domestically and abroad. His expenses between 1351 and 1361, which included administrative expenses from Gascony and construction fees for maintaining royal fortifications in both Wales and France, totaled over £300,000.42 The lay and clerical subsidies granted by Parliament only added to Crown coffers, putting the government firmly in the black.

39 For example: CPR, 1354-8, 152; CFR, 1347-56, 302; CFR, 1356-68, 34-35, 42, 43, 92, 149, 173, 178, 193; CCR, 1354-60, 9, 37. 40 Ormrod, "The English Crown and the Customs," 33. 41 Philip Slavin, “The Great Bovine Pestilence and its economic and environmental consequences in England and Wales, 1318-1350,” EcHR, Vol. 65, No. 4 (4 November 2012), 1239-1266. There is an unfortunate dearth of work on the epizootics that swept through Europe with the plague, primarily due to the fact that animal populations are often far more difficult to chart than human ones. 42 R.A. Brown and H.M. Colvin, “The King’s Works 1272-1485,” in The History of the King’s Works, Vol. I, H.M. Colvin, ed. (London: Her Majesty’s Stationary Office, 1963), 228; H.M. Colvin, “Calais,” in The History of the King’s Works, Vol. I, H.M. Colvin, ed. (London: Her Majesty’s Stationary Office, 1963), 431; Harriss, King, Parliament, and Public Finance, 330. T.F. Tout, Chapters in the Administrative History of Medieval England, V. IV (Manchester: Manchester University Press, 1928, 1930), 105, n.1, 111-112, 118; TNA E403/344, TNA E403/347, TNA E403/349; TNA E403/347, TNA E403/349; TNA E403/347; CCR, 1349-54, 32-33, 39; TNA E403/347. 14

The Crown now had the financial resources to escalate its bid for dominance and

Edward exploited this expanded capacity for international aggression as much as possible. The money funded several successful military expeditions between 1353 and

1360. Most notably during this time, Edward and his son Edward, the Black Prince, were able to capture the French king John II at the battle of in 1356. He was ransomed for four million écus—more than twice the cost of the Crécy-Calais campaign—and the power vacuum his absence created led to momentous political turmoil in France.43

Although attempts had been made to fully exploit the wool trade before Edward’s reign, he was the first to institute an effective, enduring mechanism to control it. As the

Crown was motivated by the monumental pressures of attempting to established control of France in a time of plague-induced hardship, and given that the government began to reshape itself to meet the increased monetary demands war imposed, these developments constituted a major step in the establishment of England’s military-fiscal state.

France, by contrast, did not fare so well. The Valois had to contend with a countryside continually ravaged by the violence of invading armies, pillaging garrisons, and destructive bands of self-employed , while the English population—save for periodic attacks along the southern coast and initial problems with the Scots in the north—faced no such crises. French kings also did not possess an administrative apparatus capable of instituting economic or political reforms similar to those that followed the plague in England given the fragmented nature of French territorial administration. When coupled with no strong tradition of habitual taxation or effective

43 This is equivalent to £666,667 but not all of it would be paid. 15 exploitation of export trades, the French were unable to adapt to the disaster with the efficiency and effectiveness of their enemies across the Channel.44

As a consequence, by 1359 the English government was in excellent shape to launch its next great military expedition. Serving as the quantitative and qualitative comparison to Crécy-Calais, Chapter VII discusses the 1359-60 Reims campaign. The avowed goal of the expedition was the same as Crécy-Calais: draw the French army into open battle, defeat it, and establish Edward III as the king of both England and France.45

Although Crécy-Calais is the largest military expedition of Edward’s reign, Reims is considered the most complex due to his use of supplies and manpower purchased almost entirely with cash payments. As Edwardian historian Clifford J. Rogers wrote,

Edward’s army was “the best equipped force Edward had ever assembled.”46 This hired- for-pay military force, which relied entirely upon victuals purchased from private victuallers with Crown revenue, was the ultimate result of the changes wrought by the

Black Death upon the English government. Any victuals the Crown did have on hand were shipped to Holland and to sell for cash, not sent with the army to France.47

The campaign was therefore the expression of the evolving English military-fiscal state and would set a precedent for the character of English armies throughout the early modern period.

44 In England, “national” taxes based upon property or chattel ownership date back to the Anglo-Saxon period. Most notable is the , a tax originally created to raise funds the Crown used to resist Viking invasions. Given France’s different administrative districts and a lack of any similar property tax, the French Crown had no base upon which to build a more regular, effective taxation system. 45 Rogers, “Anglo-French Peace Negotiations.” 46 Clifford J. Rogers, War Cruel and Sharp (Rochester, NY: Boydell and Brewer, 2000), 396. 47 CPR, Vol. XI, 312, 415, 432; CPR, Vol. XII, 339, 343. 16

In my comparative analysis I evaluate the aspects of military affairs that were most affected by the plague: manpower, supplies, and finance. Specifically, I assess the military requisitioning and logistical preparation undertaken for each expedition, comparing fiscal organization, manpower acquisition, and the procurement of supplies.

My conclusions rest upon thousands of archival sources including financial records, legal documents, and government correspondence produced by the various administrative offices of the Crown. A glossary of terms has also been provided at the end of this thesis to assist in understanding the terms employed throughout my argument.

Logistics are the best lens through which to evaluate the effectiveness of any government’s military administration because supply and manpower acquisition are crucial to the success of military forces and both are subject to quantification. This focus is relatively new to the study of military history as traditionally the field concentrated on great armies and their great commanders. Yet with the integration of new methods and foci in the past forty years, historians have proven ’s adage that “an army marches on its stomach.”48 As such, through the use of logistical analysis, this thesis will expand our understanding of impact of one most destructive biological disasters the world has ever seen.

48 Martin van Creveld, Supplying War: Logistics from Wallenstein to Patton (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1977). Donald W. Engels, and the Logistics of the Macedonian Army (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1978). John Lynn, ed., Feeding Mars: Logistics in Western Warfare from the Middle Ages to the Present (Boulder, San Francisco, Oxford: Westview Press, 1993). 17

Chapter 2: A Contest of Dynasties

At most times, war has been the principal collective enterprise of mankind. It has given human societies their identities. It has shaped their institutions, and provided the ultimate test of their solidity. Jonathan Sumption49

INTRODUCTION

One universal experience in the history of mankind is war. Regardless of the time period or the society in question, socially sanctioned mass violence, and preparations for it, have shaped the world and the people who live it in, defining their values, their beliefs, and their practices. By war, past civilizations have been born, have thrived, or have been utterly destroyed. Given that epidemics have the same potential, surely no society can remain the same when facing the two in concert.

Barbara Tuchman’s A Distant Mirror: The Calamitous 14th Century was the first to consider the Black Death and the Hundred Years War as twin disasters that shaped

Europe in the 1300’s.50 Her “Calamitous 14th Century” was full of disease, violence, economic hardship, political strife, and religious schism. It all began with marked climate change; colder winters, damper springs, and wet summers resulted in successive low crop yields and widespread famine. Then came war, religious fracturing, and the biological

49 Trial By Battle, xi. 50 Barbara Tuchman, A Distant Mirror: The Calamitous 14th Century (New York: Ballantine Press, 1978). 18 disaster that was the Great Pestilence. With such hardships, this century was one of the most unsettled in European history, notwithstanding Geoffrey Parker’s brilliant analysis of similar climate change and its impact in the equally calamitous seventeenth century.51

This chapter will investigate the short and long term causes of the most pivotal military conflict of the fourteenth century: the Hundred Years War. It is commonly known, yet worth pointing out, that the war lasted longer than one hundred years, and that it was not a conflict sustained consistently within that time. Like many wars, there were bouts of temporary peace and shifting alliances that turned with Europe’s internal political tide. The concept that the series of struggles from 1338 to 1453 was a single, cohesive war was only applied centuries afterward by historians attempting to unite this sustained period of aggression under one inclusive umbrella.

The construct is useful, however, because this war was the first to involve disputed rights to both French duchies and the monarchy itself. Although quarrels had arisen for hundreds of years before 1337 over sovereignty and feudal rights of “English” on the Continent, Edward III’s dynastic claim to the French crown set this case apart. When compounded by French prompting of Scottish aggressions in England, and

English intervention in Flanders and , both combatants were primed for war.

For historians, the war’s conclusion often serves as a dividing line between the medieval and early modern worlds, especially given that Constantinople also fell in 1453.

Any remaining vestiges of that existed before the war were mere ghosts

51 Geoffrey Parker, Global Crisis: War, Climate Change, and Catastrophe in the Seventeenth Century (New Haven: Yale University Press, 2013). Parker’s book dealt with the effect of climate change in the seventeenth century, namely that colder temperatures led to increased political, economic, and military strife throughout Europe. 19 afterward, and warfare had been irrevocably changed with gunpowder, blue water proto- navies, and standing armies of professional soldiers. As such, this protracted conflict has enormous utility to those studying the fourteenth and fifteenth centuries.

This chapter will first trace both the short- and long-term origins of the war.

Although it was certainly not inevitable, the war was the product of a lengthy, highly ambiguous relationship between England and the Continent. In a more proximate sense, it was the result of both personal and political tension between the monarchs of England and France, compounded by the reality that Edward III was a more legitimate successor

(at least hereditarily) to the French throne than Philip VI after Charles IV died in 1327.

Certainly no one in either France or England was surprised when a Frenchman was chosen over an Englishman, and yet that situation is what set the Hundred Years War apart from all that had come before.

THE LONG ROAD TO WAR

The seeds for the Hundred Years War were sown in 1066.52 It was in this year that the Anglo-Saxon king died without an heir and William the

Bastard, of Normandy, claimed to be his rightful successor.53 The English crowned

52 In the introduction to his study of life in the fourteenth century during the Hundred Years War in both England and France, French medieval historian Philipe Contamine outlines the long history of territorial disputes between the two countries and asserts that the war was the ultimate result of this contest (Philipe Contamine, La Vie Quotidienne pendant la Guerre de Cent Ans: France et Angleterre (XIVe siècle) (Paris: Hachette, 1976). Most historians of the war agree with this interpretation. 53 Frank Barlow, Edward the Confessor (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1970). Frank Barlow’s The feudal , 1042-1216 (New York: Longman, 1999) also discusses the English Crown governmental system before the Conquest. 20 instead the king’s brother-in-law , motivating William to invade the country.54 Within a month he defeated Godwinson at the Battle of and on

Christmas Day, he was crowned the first Norman king of England.55

Although William’s introduction of feudalism is debated by historians, it cannot be denied that by the time Domesday was compiled in 1086, William had completed a massive overhaul of English administration, replacing most of the Anglo-Saxon with his Norman lords.56 Latin became the language of law, politics, and administration while the elite language transformed from to Norman French. Cross-channel economic ties swelled, particularly in the trade of wool, gradually elevating England’s

54 See David C. Douglas’ : The Norman Impact Upon England (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1964); William I: C. P. Lewis, “The early of Norman England,” Anglo- Norman Studies, 13 (1990), 207–23; J. Le Patourel, “The Norman succession, 996–1135,” English Historical Review, 86 (1971), 225–50; G. Garnett, “‘Franci et Angli’: the legal distinctions between peoples after the conquest,” Anglo-Norman Studies, 8 (1985), 109–37. For a logistical discussion of William’s invasion force, see Bernard S. Bachrach, “Logistics in Pre-Crusade Europe,” in Feeding Mars: Logistics in Western Warfare from the Middle Ages to the Present, John Lynn, ed. (Boulder, San Francisco, Oxford: Westview Press, 1993), 57-78. 55 The story surrounding the contest for the English throne is immortalized in the famous Bayeux Tapestry, a woven cloth depicting the events of the and commissioned in the decade after William’s victory. For more information, see R. Howard Bloch’s A needle in the right hand of God: the Norman conquest of 1066 and the making of the Bayeux tapestry (New York: Random House, 2006) or for an alternate theory regarding the narrative’s content, see Andrew Bridgeford’s 1066: the hidden history of the Bayeux Tapestry (New York: Walker, 2005). 56 This issue is a complex one. “Feudalism” was a construct created by sixteenth-century French jurists attempting to define medieval property laws absent of Roman influence. Yet in the medieval period, the term “feudalism” (or foedus, upon which the term was based), was never used in the manner that the French jurists proposed. Marc Block in Feudal Society defined feudalism as a social and cultural outlook that dominated medieval civilization (Chicago: Chicago University Press, 1961) while the idea was later rejected by Elizabeth A. R. Brown in her article “The Tyranny of a Construct: Feudalism and Historians of Medieval Europe” (The American Historical Review 79(4) (1974)). Other notable historians who deal with the topic are George Duby (for example, in The Three Orders: Feudal Society Imagined (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1980)) and Susan Reynold’s controversial Fiefs and : the medieval evidence reinterpreted (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1994). In the end, however, Bloch’s definition has aged well and seems most appropriate: feudal society involved a subjugated peasantry used primarily for agricultural labor, a specialized martial class, land (or beneficial title) as a reward for military service, personal reciprocal ties of protection and homage, and the fragmentation of central authority that was its result. See also D. R. Roffe’s Domesday: the inquest and the book (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2000). 21 position in the international marketplace.57 Norman clerics were appointed to key religious positions and they reformed English Christian practices (and the buildings in which they occurred) to more closely resemble those on the Continent, strengthening

England’s ties to the Papacy as a result.58 Overall, William’s legacy ensured that the line between “English” and “French” remained blurred for several centuries after his reign.

These ties might have been merely familial had not control of both the duchy of

Normandy and England become combined during the rule of William’s younger son

Henry I.59 Although the titles had originally been inherited by William’s eldest and second son respectively, their untimely deaths led to unification under a single individual.60 This meant that Henry I, like his father, was not just the king of England; he was also a of the king of France. This fact would tie the two together for centuries, and be a factor in all future conflicts between them.

Although Henry I did a great deal to reform Anglo-Saxon legal practices and establish the key English financial institution that was the , it was his grandson, the Plantagenet Henry II, who expanded these ties to an unprecedented degree.

Taking the throne in 1154 after period came to an end, Henry II was born in

57 Marjorie Chibnall, The Debate on the Norman Conquest (Manchester: Manchester University Press, 1999), 117, 130-131, 134, 140-141. 58 Donald Matthew, Britain and the Continent 1000-1300 (New York: Oxford University Press, 2005), 60- 64, 70. 59 Another staple analysis of the Anglo-Norman period is David Crouch’s The : The History of a (London: Hambledon and London, 2002). For military-focused analysis, see J.O. ’s The Place of War in English History, 1066-1214 (Rochester, NY: Boydell Press, 2004) or Steven Morillo’s Warfare under the Anglo-Norman Kings, 1066-1135 (Woodbridge, Suffolk: Boydell Press, 1994). For a biography of Henry I, see Warren Hollister’s Henry I (New Haven, CT: Yale University Press, 2003) or Judith Green’s Henry I: King of England and (Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press, 2009). 60 Frank Barlow, William Rufus (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1983). C. W. Hollister, “The strange death of William Rufus,” Speculum, 48 (1973), 637–53. E. Mason, “William Rufus and the historians,” Medieval History, 1 (1991), 6–22. 22

Figure 1: The farthest extent of Henry II's territory

France to Henry I’s daughter Matilda and the of .61 In 1152 he had married

Eleanor, Duchess of , which gave him control of huge swaths of French

61 The Anarchy was a civil war in England that took place from 1135 to 1153. When Henry I’s son died in a shipwreck, he attempted to appoint his daughter Matilda as his rightful successor. However, when he died in 1135 Henry’s nephew Stephen of Blois was crowned king instead. Matilda responded by invading England in 1139 and the resulting war lasted throughout Stephen’s reign as neither opponent could achieve a decisive victory. The war finally ended in 1153 when Matilda’s son, the future Henry II, invaded England and negotiated a peace with Stephen involving his right to the throne. When Stephen died in 1154, Henry was crowned king of England (Edmund King, ed., The Anarchy of King Stephen's Reign (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1994); Stephen: G. J. White, “The end of Stephen's reign,” History, new ser., 75 (1990), 3–22). 23 territory.62 In 1887 historian Kate Norgate first referred to these holdings as the Angevin

Empire, and during his lifetime Henry II claimed lordship over , Aquitaine,

Normandy, Anjou, Main, Poitiers, Brittany, Wales, and Scotland.63

This rendered Henry the most powerful vassal of the French king, which both

Louis VII and his successor Philip II resented to the point of periodic military entanglements.64 One such clash was the Great Revolt in 1173, when Henry’s own sons, allying with rebel English , France, Scotland, Flanders, and Boulogne, led an uprising against him. Ultimately Henry II signed peace treaties with the belligerents but his troubles were not over as in 1183 and 1189 his sons Henry, Geoffrey, and Richard rebelled again after prodding from the new French king Philip II.65 Although Henry was able to suppress these aggressions as well, he died soon after, leaving the throne to his now-eldest son Richard I.

Richard I is an ideal example of the blurred lines between England and France.66

Historically it has been said that he did not speak English and only spent six months in

62 One of the best biographies of Henry II is W.L. Warren’s Henry II (Los Angeles: University of California Press, 1973). See also Christopher Harper-Bill and Nicholas Vincent’s edited volume Henry II: New Interpretations (Woodbridge, UK: Boydell Press, 2007). For Eleanor’s life and political involvement, see Jean Flori’s : queen and rebel (Edinburgh: Edinburgh University Press, 2007), originally published in French (Aliénor d’Aquitaine: La reine insoumise (Paris: Payot, 2004)). 63 This territory is also known of as Espace Plantagenêt in French publications. Kate Norgate, England under the Angevin kings (New York: Macmillan & Co., 1887). 64 The fact that his wife, Eleanor of Aquitaine, had previously been married to Louis VII and bore him no sons before their annulment in 1152 certainly could not have helped matters. 65 Philip II (r.1180-1223), the son of Eleanor of Aquitaine’s first husband King Louis VII, was the French king to hold the title of “King of the ”(Rex Francorum or “Roi des Francs”) and the first to be referred to as the “King of France” (Roi de France). For more on Philip II, referred to as Philip Augustus or Philip the Fair, see G rard Siv ry’s Philipe Auguste (Paris: Plön, 1993) or Jim Bradbury, Philip Augustus: king of France, 1180-1223 (London: Longman, 1998). 66 The literature on Richard I is prolific. See John Gillingham, Richard the Lionheart (New Haven, CT: Yale University Press, 1999), Jean Flori, Richard the Lionheart: and King (Edinburgh: Edinburg University Press, 1999) (also published in French), and Ralph V. Turner and Richard R. Heiser’s The Reign of Richard Lionheart: Ruler of the (New York: Longman, 2000). 24 his kingdom during his reign, far preferring his French .67 Whatever the truth of these assertions, he did spend the majority of his life outside of England, and his primary languages were French dialects such as langue d’oïl and langue d’òc.68 Not only was made Count of Aquitaine in 1172 but in his youth he formed a close relationship with

Philip II, which resulted in both support during his rebellion in 1189 and a joint effort in the in 1190, a year after Richard was crowned king.69 This friendship fell apart in 1192 when Phillip attempted to seize Normandy and supported Richard’s youngest brother John in his attempted coup back in England.70 He was able to suppress these efforts after his release from captivity in 1194, and spent most of the rest of his life in France constructing his prized Château Gaillard and defending his territories there. He died at one such siege, taking a bolt to the neck and passing away on April 6, 1199.

67 once wrote that Richard I “was a bad king” who disliked England and was loyal only to his military lifestyle. He goes so far as to say that the English subject were lucky to have seen little of him during his reign (William Stubbs, The Constitutional History of England in its origin and development, Vol. 1 (Oxford: Clarendon press, 1875), 512). 68 These are two of the three major dialects spoken in France in the medieval period, the other being Franco-Provençal, or Arpitan (Bernard Cerquiglini, Michel Alessio, and Jean Sibille, Les langues de France(Paris: Presses universitaires de France, 2003). For an interesting edited volume on the history of the use of French in England, see Jocelyn Wogan-Browne, ed., Language and Culture in Medieval Britain: The French of England c.1100-1500 (York, UK: The Press, 2013). 69 The Third Crusade involved military action against Saladin, or Salāh al-Dīn Yūsuf ibn Ayyūb (1137- 1138), who was the first sultan of Egypt and Syria. Saladin’s defeat of western Crusaders at the Battle of Hattin (1187) drastically undercut the power of the in the region. His forces occupied Jerusalem when Richard reached the area, and while Richard was able to get within sight of the city, infighting divided his army and left him without sufficient resources to besiege the city. For a contemporary account of Saladin’s life, see Baha’ al-Din Ibn Shaddad, The Rare and Excellent History of Saladin, D.S. Richards, trans. (Aldershot: Ashgate Pub., 2001). For an excellent narrative of the , see Christopher Tyerman, God’s War (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 2006). 70 Philip II withdrew from the Crusades in 1192 due to illness while Richard remained behind and eventually signed a peace treaty with Saladin. On his way back to England he was captured by the Duke of Austria and then turned over to the Holy Roman , Henry IV. Hefty taxes were exacted in England to raise his ransom, which caused general discontent against his brother John. 25

It was John who ultimately found this complicated relationship between England the Continent fatal to his reign.71 Although Henry II and Richard I had been able to control Philip II’s machinations against Angevin holdings in France, in 1200 John married Isabella, Countess of Angoulême, who at the time was betrothed to Hugh IX le

Brun, Count of Lusignan and son of the Count of La Marche. La Marche was a vassal of

Philip II, so for the insult Philip confiscated Isabella’s French holdings. This started a chain reaction that resulted in the loss of Anjou, Brittany, and most important of all, the . By 1204, the only remaining land on the Continent in English hands was the , which earned John the pejorative sobriquet “John Lackland.”

John’s steady Continental defeats and the punitive taxes he enacted to conduct those expeditions, when coupled with his often-abrasive and paranoid personality, led to widespread domestic unpopularity. This translated to a lack of military support from his nobles, which made John’s attempts to regain Normandy fruitless, exemplified by his

1214 campaign in France that ended with the Battle of and John’s surrender of

Anjou, the only territory he had been able to recapture. He then returned home to fomenting baronial dissatisfaction, which led to the First ’s War in June of 1215.

He was forced to sign after his loss at and died of on

October 18, 1216. Magna Carta would forever influence how English kings obtained monetary support for their campaigns, given that support was thereafter required

71 For work on John, see W.L. Warren, King John (London: Methuen, 1991), Stephen D. Church, King John: New Interpretations (Woodbridge, UK: Boydell Press, 2007), and Ralph V. Turner, King John: England’s Evil King? (Stroud, UK: History Press, 2009). 26 for collecting taxes.72 More importantly, John’s failure to regain his hereditary lands meant that all subsequent English kings faced domestic pressure to win back the

Continental territory their ignominious ancestor had lost.

John was succeeded by his nine-year-old son Henry III, who took the throne under the of the popular William Marshall, first earl of Pembroke.73 When he reached majority Henry began his attempts to win back land on the Continental through his 1236 marriage to Eleanor of ; her sister was Margaret, the wife of French

King Louis IX, which led to a domestically unpopular friendship between the two monarchs. He then tried and failed to win back French lands in 1242 by supporting recalcitrant nobles in in their war against Louis, and later had to suppress the

1252 rebellion in Gascony led by his French-born vassal Simon de Montfort.74 The uprising had been caused by Simon’s heavy-handed administration of the province, and peace was only restored in 1254 after Henry launched an expensive campaign to pacify the region. The financial hardships caused by this endeavor led to the 1258 revolt of

Henry’s barons led by none other than Simon de Montfort.75

The lasting outcome of this revolt was the 1259 Treaty of . Under the terms of this agreement, Henry formally surrendered all Angevin territory lost in the

72 J. C. Holt, Magna Carta (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1965). J.C. Holt, Magna Carta and medieval government (London: Hambledon Press, 1985). 73 David Carpenter, The minority of Henry III (London: Methuen London, 1990); David Carpenter, The reign of Henry III (London: Hambledon Press, 1996); Robert Stacey, Politics, policy, and finance under Henry III (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1987). For a biography of William Marshall, a fascinating historical figure, see David Crouch, William : court, career, and chivalry in the Angevin Empire, 1147-1219 (New York: Longman, 1990). There is also the multi-volume work edited by A.J. Holden, translated by Susanna Gregory, and noted by David Crouch: History of William Marshall (London: Anglo-Norman Text Society, 2002-2006). 74 J.R. Maddicott, Simon de Montfort (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1994). 75 Michael Prestwich, English politics in the thirteenth century (Houndmills, Basingstoke, : Macmillan, 1990). 27 rebellion. More importantly, he was granted Gascony as only when he acknowledged openly that he was a vassal of Louis IX. This formal confirmation of a feudal hierarchy, when coupled with his father’s significant loss of territory, rendered the treaty a significant benchmark in the long road to the Hundred Years War.

Montfort’s rebellion and the problems it created marred the rest of Henry III’s reign. Small periods of peace were juxtaposed with resurgent rebellions, and it was not until 1267 that Montfort was defeated completely. Family problems and illness also followed Henry III, and when he died in 1272, he was succeeded by his son Edward I.76

On its face, the protracted series of conflicts sketched above may seem irrelevant to the origins of the Hundred Years War. But the indelible connection between the two monarchies with its twists, turns, aggressions, and alliances created both the atmosphere and circumstances required for the sustained hostilities that began in 1338. The loss of

French territory in the late twelfth and early thirteenth centuries ensured that future kings would have to struggle to recapture their hereditary lands from a position of feudal inferiority as agreed upon in the Treaty of Abbeville.

This was the reality that the three Edwards faced when they became kings of

England in the late thirteenth and early fourteenth centuries. Like their ancestors, the three Edwards were nominally vassals of the king of France and they each launched campaigns to extend their Continental territory, attempts which met with varying success.

On its face, therefore, there is little that distinguishes the era of the three Edwards from

76 For a discussion of this protracted conflict, see H. Knowles, “The resettlement of England after the barons’ war, 1264–67,” Transactions of the Royal Historical Society, 5th ser., 32 (1982), 25–41. 28 that which came before.77 Yet a marriage alliance arranged by Edward I, and honored by

Edward II after his father’s death, rendered the war Edward III began in 1338 utterly distinct from all that had come before.

THE POWDERKEG IGNITES

Edward I, also known as Edward Longshanks, was crowned king of England in

1274.78 In addition to his many notable administrative and legislative developments, he subjugated Wales where he constructed a series of strong fortifications to enforce English authority. Edward also attempted to gain sovereignty over his northern neighbor due to a succession crisis in Scotland known as the Great Cause. Despite capturing the of

Destiny (also known of as the Stone of Scone) in this First War of , hostilities continued intermittently throughout his reign.

Most importantly, Edward I clashed with the French King Philip IV over his

French territory in the 1280’s when Channel commerce raiding began disrupting international trade. Philip ordered Edward I to Paris to discuss the issue but Edward refused to appear. Finding him in violation of his feudal obligations, Philip seized

Gascony. To reverse this loss by military means, Edward attempted unsuccessfully to form stable alliances with Flanders and the Holy , which led to a rapprochement between the two monarchs.

77 Michael Prestwich’s excellent The Three Edwards: War and State in England, 1272-1377 (London: Weidenfeld and Nicolson, 1980) paints a holistic picture of the father, son, and grandson. In his combined analysis, we see the changes in methods, ambitions, and personalities of the three Plantagenets, as well as how each reign influenced that of his son. 78 Michael’s Prestwich’s work on Edward I is essential reading: Michael Prestwich, War, Politics, and Finance under Edward I (London” Faber and Faber, 1972) and Edward I (Updated Edition: New Haven, CT: Yale University Press, 1997). 29

As part of the peace treaty agreed to in 1294, Edward I married Philip IV’s half- sister Margaret. More importantly, he arranged a marriage between his son Edward of

Caernarfon, the first English , and Isabella, Philip IV’s daughter.79 Under the terms of a later contract—the 1303 —Gascony was reestablished as an

English territory and Edward II’s heir would be invested with and portions of

Aquitaine. Isabella was only 12 when she married Edward II, who was twice her age. The wedding took place in 1308, a year after Edward I’s death, and once Philip IV passed away, Isabella’s brother King Charles IV agreed to honor the treaty’s terms.80

This match was not exceptional in any way; as we have seen, marriage was a common means by which monarchs attempted to establish or further solidify relations with allies and enemies alike. In this case, it was an attempt to reinforce the terms of the

1303 agreement. There was certainly no perceived danger from the alliance as Isabella had three brothers who could assume the crown of France after the death of her father.

The chance was small that any sons she bore could cause a succession conflict. Yet that is exactly what occurred.

Although Seymour Philips argued in his definitive biography that Edward II was a competent administrator, he was unpopular from the outset of his reign due in large part to the elevation of his favorites Piers Gaveston and then Hugh Despenser the Younger.81

Whether or not these relationships were sexual in nature, the Westminster Chronicle

79 For an authoritative biography of Edward II, see Seymour Philips’ Edward II (New Haven, CT: Yale University Press, 2010). Although Isabella, the “She-Wolf” of France, is often portrayed in a negative light—Sumption even describes her as “formidable and evil” (Trail by Battle, 97)—to see a more positive evaluation, see Alison Weir’s Queen Isabella: She-Wolf of France, Queen of England ( London: Pimlico Books, 2006). 80 For a biography of Charles IV, see Ivan Gobry, Charles IV le bel: successeur de Philipe V, 1322-1328 (Paris: Pygmalion, 2011). 81 Seymour, Edward II. 30 noted that Gaveston’s close connection with the king caused immediate discontent amongst the English barons.82 Edward’s second favorite Hugh Despenser was even more unpopular than Gaveston, especially with Queen Isabella. Although the two had four children together between 1312 and 1321, in the words of W. Mark Ormrod, their relationship was “the very model of the medieval dysfunctional family.”83

Tensions between Edward and Isabella came to a head when familiar troubles with feudal demesnes loomed in France. The city of -Sardos was under the auspices of the Duke of Aquitaine, and in 1323 violence broke out in the city when inhabitants who supported the English began attacking their pro-French neighbors; although Edward claimed no prior knowledge of the incident, Charles IV seized the duchy and a French army occupied the territory as punishment for Edwards’ perceived feudal disobedience.84

Edward sent Isabella to France in 1325 to negotiate a peace treaty on his behalf, and given the conditions she faced in England at the time, she was surely eager to go: when Charles occupied Aquitaine, Isabella’s private lands were seized and she was placed in the custody of Hugh Despenser’s wife, who confiscated her royal and

82 Flores Historiarum, Vol. III, Henry Richards Luard, ed. (London: Eyre and Spottiswood, 1890), 331. The true nature of the relationship between Edward II and his favorites is debated by historians. T.F.T. Tout rejected the idea that their relationship was sexual in 1914, as did W. Mark Ormrod in 2006 and Philips in 2010. All pointed out the lack of contemporary confirmation of a sexual relationship and noted that such suppositions only appeared after Edward II’s reign (T.F.T. Tout, The place of the Reign of Edward II in English History (Manchester: Manchester University Press, 1914); W. Mark Ormrod, “The Sexualities of Edward II,” in The Reign of Edward II: New Perspectives, Gwilym Dodd and Anthony Musson, eds. (Woodbridge: York Medieval Press, 2006), 22-47; Seymour, Edward II). 83 Chroniques I: 12-14. Edward III, 24. 84 Trial by Battle, 91-96. 31 limited her communications. 85 As historian Jonathan Sumption pointed out with justifiable incredulity, “this then was the suggested agent of reconciliation.”86

Regardless, Isabella began negotiations on her husband’s behalf and within a month, a peace with harsh terms—including an immediate demand for homage—was ratified. Edward sent his son in his place, and in August 1325 young Edward III reunited with his mother, who refused to return to England.87 In the months that followed, Isabella allied with Roger Mortimer, of Wigmore, who was living in exile in France.88

Mortimer soon became her lover and helped her arrange the marriage between Edward III and Philipa of Hainault. It was a necessary alliance given that her father William I, Count of Hainault, provided the manpower Isabella and Mortimer used to invade England in

September of 1326.89

Their successful offensive, attributed by Froissart to the favor of the for their queen due to Edward II’s abuses, was followed by the capture of the king and the arrest of Despenser.90 Edward was imprisoned and after Dispenser’s father was executed, he was found guilty in a public trial in Hereford.91 He was then executed before a sizeable crowd, recounted with vivid detail by many chroniclers including Froissart:

85 Trial by Battle, 97-98. Chroniques, I: 16-17. Froissart wrote that Isabella went to France with her son to escape the mal-intended machinations of the Despensers, and but incorrectly wrote that she was able to leave by claiming that she was going on pilgrimage. Froissart also recounted the meeting between Isabella and Charles IV, during which she told him how poorly she had been treated. According to Froissart, Charles was initially sympathetic to her plight (Chroniques, I: 17). 86 Trial by Battle, 98. 87 Trial by Battle, 98-101. Chroniques, I: 18-19. 88 For more on Mortimer, see Ian Mortimer, The Greatest Traitor: the Life of Sir Roger Mortimer, 1st Earl of March, Ruler of England 1327-1330, (Jonathan Cape, London, 2003). 89 Trial by Battle, 101-102. Chroniques, I:21-24. 90 Trial by Battle, 101-102. Chroniques, I: 29. 91 Chroniques, I:34-35. Froissart also recounted the capture of Hugh Despenser the Elder, Despenser’s father, at Bristol in October. Like his son, for his various perceived crimes against the kingdom, he was put on trial and then executed. 32 after reportedly being castrated, disemboweled, then quartered, his head was placed on a spike in London for public viewing.92 Days later Edward II abdicated in favor of his son, who was crowned Edward III on , 1327.93

It was then that a pivotal event in the origin story of the Hundred Years War occurred: a year to the day after Edward’s , Charles IV died without a male heir, creating a succession crisis the French had not dealt with in centuries.94 The dilemma, which seemed impossible when Edward II married Isabella, was now a reality.

Not only had all three of Isabella’s brothers died prematurely without leaving behind male heirs, but Isabella was Philip IV’s only child still living. This meant that Edward III was the last surviving direct male descendent of the .

It was no surprise on either side of the Channel that the French turned to a parallel line to the , that of Isabella’s first cousin Philip of Valois.95 Froissart noted that the French barons made this decision because inheritance could not pass through a female, which moved the succession to the wrong hereditary line and laid the

92 Chroniques, 1: 34-35. 93 Trial by Battle, 102. Chroniques, I:37-38. What happened to Edward II after his abdication is a matter of debate. Most contemporary historians including Philips agree that he died (most likely murdered) as reported on September 21, 1327. There is a small contingent of historians who propose that he lived after that time, however, such as Ian Mortimer in his controversial The Perfect King: The Life of Edward III, Father of the English Nation (London: Random House, 2007). Mortimer supported the authenticity of the Fieschi Letter, a dispatch from Manuele Fieschi to Edward III written around 1337. Fieschi was the of Vercelli who claimed that Edward II escaped England and lived the rest of his life in an Italian monastery. Although historians agree that the letter is not a forgery, and although the idea of Edward II surviving is an intriguing one, the letter is most likely an attempt to undermine Edward III’s political authority. 94 Charles’ wife Jeanne d'Évreux was pregnant at the time of his death, but bore a girl in April 1328 (Chroniques, I: 83-84). 95 Trial by Battle, 103-112. 33

35

Figure 2: The French line of inheritance

34 groundwork for the coming war.96 Regardless of this opinion, Philip VI was crowned king of France in April 1328.97

Edward III and Philip VI inherited these Continental territorial disputes, which began immediately upon Philip’s coronation. Philip demanded that Edward pay homage to him as Duke of Aquitaine while also refusing to pull French troops out of the duchy.

Edward had no grounds to resist the request and so paid homage at in 1329 for his remaining two possessions in France, Aquitaine and Ponthieu.98 After significant domestic conflicts caused by the increasing despotism of Roger Mortimer, the following year Edward broke into his mother’s bedchamber, arrested Mortimer, and executed him by hanging at Tyburn.99

Relations between the monarchs soured as Edward consolidated his domestic authority into the 1330’s. He continued to pay homage to Philip—such as his visit to the

Continent in 1331—yet according to Edouard Perroy, after Philip’s reoccupation of

Aquitaine, Edward ordered his loyal there to “stir [negative opinion] up against the new king if possible, and hold themselves ready to take action at the least alert.”100 He also deeply resented the “shameful” peace of Edinburgh-Northampton, in which he had to acknowledge France’s support of Scottish aggression against the English due to the

96 Chroniques, I: 11. 97 Isabella was deeply angered by this decision. As Sumption noted, when an envoy visited England to order Edward to pay homage for Aquitaine, she was said to have told the envoy that Edward “was the son of a king and would not do homage to the son of a count” (Trial by Battle, 109). Chroniques, I: 83-84. 98 CPR, 1327-1330, 390. CCR, 1327-1330, 539. Chroniques, I: 90-96. 99 Anonimalle Chronicle 1307-1334, 141, 145. Chroniques, 1: 87-89. Ormrod’s new biography of Edward III contains a comprehensive discussion of the king’s minority, which will also be included in Ch. IV (Edward III, 193-200). 100 Perroy, The Hundred Years War, 80. Edward III, 179-180. 35

Auld Alliance.101 To combat this interference, Edward supported the efforts of Edward

Balliol, a disinherited Scottish lord and to the throne living in exile in France, in the Second War of Scottish Independence.102

After victories at Dupplin Moor in 1332 and the Battle of the following year, Edward III moved to capture the strategically significant border city of

Berwick-upon-Tweed. There he defeated the Scots with the help of his deadly English longbowmen and from the city of Edinburgh controlled most of southern Scotland.103 It did not end the northern threat entirely, however, as the Scottish invasion of northern

England in late 1346 demonstrated.

Philip was similarly ill-disposed toward Edward, who like his predecessors sought to secure English interests in the County of Flanders, a profitable and urbanized region of northern Europe that encompassed parts of modern-day , France, and the

Netherlands. As far back as 1200, the rural pro-French Flemish nobility was often in opposition to the increasingly wealthy urban merchant class that produced a long, heavy cloth called the panni made with a treadle horizontal loom. This profitable trade made

101 Edward III, 148. This longstanding alliance between the two countries, referred to as the , existed informally as early as the late twelfth century during the reign of Henry II. As recounted earlier, both the kings of France and Scotland supported the rebellions staged by Henry’s sons, launching coordinated attacks against Henry’s lands in both Britain and France. The alliance became formal over one hundred years later when the Great Cause opened the door for Edward I’s interference with his northern neighbor’s succession. In response, the temporary Scottish government signed a treaty of mutual support with Philip IV, and this treaty’s renewals became formally known of as the Auld Alliance (Norman Macdougall, An Antidote to the English: the auld alliance, 1295-1560 (East Linton, Scotland: Tuckwell Press, 2001). See also: James Campbell, “England, Scotland, and the Hundred Years’ War in the Fourteenth Century,” in Europe in the , J.R. , et al., eds. (London: Faber and Faber, 1965), 184-216. 102 Edward III, 147-149. 103 Edward III, 151-163. Campbell, “England, Scotland,” 185-189. 36

Ypres, Lille, St. Omer, , and captains of the cloth-making industry in

Europe, and highly dependent upon wool imported from England.104

Although political relations between England and Flanders date to the twelfth century, it was not until the thirteenth that English wool became essential to the success of the Flemish cloth trade. Flemish cities thrived on the production of cloth they sold to the rest of Europe, and their primary supplier of wool was the kingdom across the

Channel. The English exploited this dependence to enforce a strong relationship with the county, such as in 1173 when Henry II seized all wool held by Flemish merchants in

England in retribution for their support of his sons in their aforementioned rebellion against him.105

The origin of fourteenth century tensions can be traced to the death of the , Baldwin IX, in 1206.106 With the succession of his powerless twelve-year- old daughter Joan, Philip II began awarding fiefdoms to pro-French nobles in return for their loyalty.107 Philip’s intervention set a precedent for future French kings, and created the tensions that thereafter existed between the pro-French nobility and the pro-English urban merchants.

When Philip IV became king of France in 1285, he followed his ancestors’ example and attempted to gain control of the region’s financial resources, thereby

104 David Nicholas, Medieval Flanders (London and New York: Longman Group UK Ltd., 1992), 114. The loom the Flemish used and their method of weaving had been created in Champaign in the mid eleventh century but was adopted with far greater commercial success by the Flemish. 105 Nicholas, Medieval Flanders, 116. 106 David Nicholas, Town and Countryside: social, economic, and political tension sin fourteenth-century Flanders (Brugge: De Tempel, 1971). Nicholas, Medieval Flanders, 151-156. 107 Nicholas, Medieval Flanders, 150-151. 37 undercutting Flanders’ alliance with England.108 Edward I retaliated in 1290 with trade embargoes and revoking various rights of Flemish merchants in England, which Philip countered in 1294 by ordering of Dampierre, the count of Flanders, to France and imprisoning him.109

The

FRANCE

Figure 3: The County of Flanders c.1400

108 Nicholas, Medieval Flanders, 187. 109 John H.A. Munro, Wool, Cloth, and Gold: The Struggle for Bullion in Anglo-Burgundian Trade, 1340- 1478 (Toronto: The University of Toronto Press, 1972), 5-6. Nicholas, Medieval Flanders, 187-188. 38

Peace was established between England and France in 1297 and yet the treatment of Flanders by both parties had an unintended consequence: although urban merchants were traditionally pro-English, at the dawn of the fourteenth century an emerging bloc called the Leliaert (“Lily”, derived from the fleur-de-lis) shifted their loyalty to France.

The Clauwaerts (“Claws” in reference to the on the Flemish ) remained in the English camp, but the escalating conflict between these parties led to significant discord in several trading cities including Ghent and Bruges.110

When the peace expired in 1300, Philip invaded, imprisoned Guy of Dampierre once again, appointed Jacques de Châtillon as royal lieutenant of the county, and created a new parliamentary body of officials chosen by the monarchy.111 Most importantly,

Philip revoked the punitive taxes that had been instituted in 1297, but only in select

Flemish cities. The resulting unrest led to open rebellion in 1302 when Philip officially withdrew from the region.112

While Guy of Dampierre’s sons formed a rebel pro-Claw government, in Bruges violent Claw mobs freed imprisoned party leaders and in Ghent anti-French artisan strikes led to violence against known Lilies.113 Châtillon raised an army to subdue the unrest, but on May 18, 1302 the Bruges Claws ambushed Châtillon’s forces and executed

110 Nicholas, Medieval Flanders, 190-191. Many of these merchants’ families aligned themselves with a party and then would switch sides when to their advantage. For example, John uten Hove, Wasselin Haec, and John uten Dale were Claws in Ghent in 1297 but were Lilies by 1302. Nicholas, Medieval Flanders, 190-191. 111 Nicholas, Medieval Flanders, 191. The traditional administrative until was the XXXIX and the system that replaced it—two councils of 13 officials apiece—existed for the rest of the medieval period (Nicholas, Medieval Flanders, 191). 112 Nicholas, Medieval Flanders, 191-192. The tax was highly contentious amongst the anti-French Flemish urban merchant class because it was heavily farmed by the pro-French Flemish nobility. However, the pro- French nobles were used to collecting the taxes, and so Philip made enemies of them in Ghent, the only city where the tax was abolished. 113 Nicholas, Medieval Flanders, 192. Guy’s sons, John and Guy of Namur created a locus around which the Claws throughout Flanders could rally. 39 nearly every member of the party, Flemish and French alike.114 Claw soldiers throughout

Flanders then formed an army and met the French at Courtrai in July 11, better known of as the Battle of the Golden Spurs.115 The result was a total defeat of the French and the death of the French commander, Robert of .116

The Peace of Athis-sur-Orge was negotiated three years later after the withdrawal of Ghent, Ypres, and Courtrai from the Battle of Mons-en-Pevele led to Flemish defeat.

The French instituted harsh reparations and required that all Flemings aged fourteen and above were required to swear eternal fidelity to the French king.117

Yet this defeat did not quash Flemish resistance to French rule. In 1311 the son of

Robert of Béthune, Count of Flanders, was imprisoned by the king for his anti-French stance.118 When Robert died in 1322 (the year Philip V died), Charles IV imprisoned his successor Louis II of Nevers (who had been raised in France and did not even speak

Flemish) in order to enforce his allegiance to the French throne. Although Louis later

114 Nicholas, Medieval Flanders, 192. 115 As Kelly DeVries discussed in his article “The Rebellions of the Southern ’,” this rebellion was the first in a long series of uprisings against the French (rebellions taking place in 1302-1305, 1323-1328, 1339-1346, 1379-1385, 1432-1438, 1449-1453, and 1487-1493). These rebellions were never successful in the long-term, and the French were increasingly violent in their suppression. DeVries argued that the Flemish continued to rebel, however, due to a “psychology of defeat”: they tried to obtain independence over and over again because they never believed that they couldn’t win (Kelly DeVries, “The Rebellions of the Southern Low Countries’ Towns During the Fourteenth and Fifteenth Centuries,” in Power and the City in the Netherlandic World, Wayne te Brake and Wim Klooster, eds. (Boston: Brill, 2006), 37). 116 This battle is discussed by DeVries in his Infantry Warfare in the Early Fourteenth Century. It is called the Battle of the Golden Spurs due to the 500 pairs of golden spurs taken from the fallen French nobles after the battle, all of which were held at Notre Dame at Courtrai until they were returned by force to the French after the Battle of Roosebeke in 1382. 117 Other terms included providing the king with an army of 600 men, Bruges was required to send 3000 citizens on pilgrimage, and all Lilies would be compensated for damage done to their property. Guy of Dampierre, who died in 1305, was succeeded by Robert of Béthune, who at first did not express any anti- French sentiments. It was not until 1309 that he began moves against the French, but he was hampered by the emerging discord between the Flemish cities (Nicholas, Medieval Flanders, 195-196). 118 Nicholas, Medieval Flanders, 196-197. After a brief imprisonment, Robert’s eldest son Louis I of Nevers escaped and fled to imperial Flanders while his younger son Robert of Cassel pushed for, and received, a rent of £10000.. 40 married Charles IV’s niece Margaret, this did not help him suppress further rebellions in

Flemish cities that broke out in 1323 and lasted for five years thereafter.119

This long series of conflicts may seem irrelevant to a discussion of the Hundred

Years War, but in truth they are anything but. They show that when Edward III and

Philip VI took their thrones, they not only inherited territorial disputes over French territory, but also over political influence in Flanders. Edward knew from the outset of his reign that he needed to maintain unimpeded ties with the Flemish to ensure the prosperity of the English wool trade, and Philip knew that in order to take advantage of Flemish economic success, he needed to undercut English influence, if not stifle it completely.120

Not only did Edward refuse to stifle his Flemish ambitions after swearing to

Philip, but in 1334 Edward sheltered Philip’s brother-in-law and enemy Robert of Artois.

Artois and Philip clashed over the latter’s interference in the countship, and after fleeing to Flanders made his way to England. There Edward III offered him asylum , which infuriated Philip to such an extent that in 1336 he sent Papal envoys to England with his formal objection to the situation.121

Matters came to a head the following year when Edward was called upon to appear before Philip to pay homage. As Eduard Perroy recounted,

About All ’ Day in 1337, the Bishop of Lincoln, Henry of Burghersh, arrived in Paris to present his master’s defiance. It was not addressed to the sovereign of the French kingdom, but to ‘Philip of Valois,

119 Henry Stephen Lucas, The Low Countries and the Hundred Years’ War, 1326-1347 (Norwood, MA: The Plimpton Press, 1929); William Henry TeBrake, A Plague of Insurrection: Popular Politics and Peasant Revolt in Flanders, 1323–1328 (Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press, 1994); Perroy, The Hundred Years War, 86-92; Allmand, The Hundred Years War, 7; Kelly DeVries, “The Rebellions of the Southern Low Countries’ Towns During the Fourteenth and Fifteenth Centuries,” in Power and the City in the Netherlandic World, Wayne te Brake and Wim Klooster, eds. (Boston: Brill, 2006), 27-44). 120 Nicholas, Medieval Flanders, 196-197, 208. Munro, Wool, Cloth, and Gold, 5-6 121 Chroniques, 1: 100-103. Trial by Battle, 170-173. 41

who calls himself King of France’. Edward could find no better way of denying his homage at Amiens, which had been imposed upon him by trickery and force, and, as it was paid to a usurper, had no binding value.122

When Philip seized Aquitaine soon after, Edward traveled to the Continent to obtain support for his coming campaign against the French.123

English chronicler Henry Knighton blamed the French for this conflict’s escalation into a significant quarrel. According to his account, Philip rejected Edward’s continued attempts to make peace and confiscated Gascony, which was Edward’s by right of inheritance.124 Then, when Edward went to the in an effort to defend his privilege, Philip attacked the English coastal cities of Hastings and

Southampton “with the greatest cruelty.”125 These attacks went hand-in-hand with commerce raiding along the coast, which attempted to undermine Edward’s efforts to remain financially stable enough to launch a land attack in France.126

The two monarchs coming to blows over French territory or influence in Flanders was not groundbreaking, nor was the strategy Edward pursued of obtaining Continental allies for support against the French. Edward was also not the first of his ancestors positioned as recalcitrant vassal of the French king. Ample precedent for all of these situations has been sketched above. What made this situation very different, however, was that Edward III was also a direct descendent of the House of Capet. Although the

122 Perroy, The Hundred Years’ War, 93. 123 Jan de Klerk. “Edouard III, Roi d'Angleterre, en Flandre,” Octave Delepierre, trans., in Miscellanies of the Philobiblon Society, Vol. X (London: Wittingham and Wilkins, 1866-67), 5. De Klerk was a Flemish chronicler who observed Edward’s expedition to Flanders and Brabant. He loved in Anvers and his chronicle primarily covers the start of the war and Edward’s expedition to the Continent in 1346-47. 124 Knighton, 2. 125 Knighton, 12. 126 Trial by Battle, 260-265. These raids were conducted primarily by the Genoese and came to an end in August of 1339 for reasons which will be discussed below. 42

Figure 4: English-controlled territory at the beginning of the war

legality of his position as heir to the French throne was questionable given the constraints of , Edward could arguably repudiate Philip’s authority over him as a “usurper” and establish himself as the rightful sovereign of French Crown territory.

43

Edward did not assert this claim until 1340—which many historians including W.

Mark Ormrod argued was because Edward himself was aware of the tenuous legality of his right to the throne—but this cast his aggressions in a completely different light than anything that had come before.127 As Ormrod wrote, Edward’s declaration “marked a sea- change in Anglo-French relations, transforming the basis on which Edward sought to resolve the long-standing dispute over Plantagenet sovereignty in Aquitaine.”128 Instead, in the words of Clifford J. Rogers, “the quarrel became not an arcane dispute over legal rights or even a personal vendetta or power struggle, but a long-running and at times bitterly fought war, which profoundly altered both the states involved, their self-images and the nature of their governance.”129

THE WAR AT LAST

In 1338, Edward first turned to the Holy Roman Empire. Accompanied by a large retinue of English lords, Edward traveled extensively to gain the alliances he required but from the outset, the king’s finances were a major hindrance to his goals.130 When he finally received the funding to secure support—mostly through heavy domestic taxation

127 According to medieval Dominican friar and philosopher Thomas Aquinas in his Summa Theologiæ, this distinction rendered Edward’s action legal under just war theory (Thomas, Aquinas, The summa theologiæ of Saint Thomas Aquinas (Scotts Valley, CA: NovAntiqua, 2008)). W. Mark Ormrod’s biography contains a detailed discussion of Edward’s conflict over asserting this title, which will be discussed below (W. Mark Edward III, 212-215). 128 W. Mark Ormrod, “A Problem of Precedence: Edward III, the Double Monarchy, and the Royal Style,” in James Bothwell, ed., The Age of Edward III (Rochester, NY: York Medieval Press, 2001), 133. 129 Rogers, War Cruel and Sharp, 4. 130 According to de Klerk, this retinue included the earls of Northampton, Derby, Suffolk, and , as well as the of , Lincoln, and Durham (de Klerk, 5-8). Edward was reportedly told by the Emperor’s representative, the Duke of Brabant, that they would aid Edward to “avenge the injustices of Philip of France and his ancestors” (de Klerk, 8-9). 44 and the extraction of loans from Italian merchants—Emperor Louis IV made him a lieutenant of the Empire and several German joined his cause.131

Although they allowed the French and their hired Genoese galleys to use Sluys as a naval base, the Flemish at first refused to get involved in the coming war. This changed in 1339 when Edward marched towards France with his Anglo-German army, mostly due to , a wealthy Claw merchant in Ghent. He became the de facto ruler of Flanders after the revolution in December of 1337, which had forced the Count to flee to the French court.132 Flemish chronicler Jan de Klerk referred to Artevelde as “very courageous” while Froissart noted that he commanded all of Flanders due to his authority and widespread popularity.133 Sumption, on the other hand, described him as “a ruthful autocrat whose rule was made tolerable only by the desperate situation in which Flanders found herself at the outset of the Anglo-French war.”134 Regardless, he was astute enough to know that for the Flemish cloth trade to survive, the Flemish needed to support

Edward’s cause.

Edward was acutely aware of Flanders’ importance to his own economic stability, but also knew that the Flemish needed firm legal justification for turning their backs on the French. This is why he combined his coat of arms with that of the French and declared himself the rightful king of France.135 The Flemings then paid homage to him

131 Edward III, 200-208. Incidentally, historians who believe that the Fieschi Letter was merely a tool of political propaganda (and not a true account of Edward II’s survival past 1327) assert that the letter attempted to undermine this alliance with the Germans. 132 Knighton, 12. 133 Chroniques, 1: 128-129. 134 de Klerk, 12-13. 135 Ormrod in his biography discussed Edward III’s private conflict over combining his arms when he made this claim. Although he was within his rights to do so, he had performed homage to Philip VI in 1329 (although the Crown dismissed this as Edward had been a minor at the time) and he did not openly declare 45 and rendered to him the whole land of Flanders.136 In return, he offered compensation to

Flemish inhabitants for damage done by drunken soldiers and undisciplined shipmasters.137 He also constructed a naval force to guard sea lanes between the Low

Countries and England, for which the Flemish gave him an army of 80,000 troops at a cost of £140,000.138 When he marched into France in 1339, he did so with Flemish and

German troops supporting him.139

One major problem Edward faced was that prior to this expedition French naval power was far superior to his own. Philip’s hired Genoese rowed galleys were able to effectively navigate the Channel and conduct frequent raids along the English coastline.

They were also able to threaten English access to the Continent and capture two prized

English ships, the Edward and Christofer.140 This reality undermined Edward’s siege of in 1339 because Philip’s galleys disrupted the already-paltry flow of supplies and money from England that he required to maintain his position on the Continent.141

The English gained the upper hand in this struggle when in August of 1339 the

Genoese withdrew most of their ships from the French armada. Although Philip had been paying the Genoese for their services, their commander Ayton Doria periodically withheld payment from his oarsmen. When the squadron mutinied and turned to Philip for assistance, rather than resolve the issue he had the oarsmen’s delegation thrown in his position as rightful king of France until 1340 (despite having opened hostilities two years prior). Ormrod therefore believed this claim was a feint to the fact that Edward III was waging war against his rightful feudal lord (Edward III, 212-214). 136 Knighton, 22. Knighton notes that the ordered the king to renounce his claim to the French throne, advice Edward ignored (Knighton, 52). 137 CCR, 1339-41, 105. 138 Trial by Battle, 228-233, 296-302. 139 de Klerk, 10. Knighton, 10,12, 22. 140 The Christofer was the first English ship to be armed with cannon. 141 John Francis Guilartin, Galleons and Galleys (London: Cassel, 2002), 15-20. 46 prison. Unsurprisingly the rest of the men refused to serve thereafter, and although some ships remained behind, by the end of the year, most of the Genoese returned to Italy.142

This set the stage for the on of 1340, a naval engagement that proved disastrous for the French. Taking place in the estuary between Flanders and Zeeland, Edward’s fleet ranged from 120 to 160 ships while Philip’s armada consisted of 202 sailing vessels, six galleys, and 22 barges carrying 40,000 men. French ships were chained together in an effort to block the English cogs from reaching land, the

Christofer at the head filled with Genoese crossbowmen. Although the captain of the remaining Genoese galleys suggested a pursuit strategy—which would have been an effective tactic for the maneuverable war galleys—the French commander elected to construct a veritable floating fortress instead.143

Edward arranged his ships into groups of three with the largest ships in the front, one filled with men-at-arms and then flanked by two with longbowmen. The day before the battle the English ships sailed past the French so that when the sun rose, they approached the line from the northeast rather than the southwest. This meant that when they attacked, the Genoese crossbowmen had the sun in their eyes, hindering their vision of the oncoming attack. This also meant that the English cogs were headed roughly in the direction of England, leading the French to believe that they were breaking off their attack entirely. When the French realized this was not the case and sounded the horn to advance, their formation quickly devolved in confusion.144

142 Trial by Battle, 260-265. 143 De Klerk, 17. Chroniques, 2: 34-38. Knighton, 28, 30. Trial by Battle, 260-265. 144 Chronqiues, 2: 35-37. Guilmartin, Galleys and Galleons, 15-20. 47

When the lines advanced and grappling commenced, the English with their smaller crews of experienced longbowmen cut down the Genoese archers who could not return fire as quickly. The crews of the forward vessels were quickly killed and the

French ships in reserve fled.145 The English attacked the remaining vessels, capturing 190 ships including the Christofer.146 Between 16,000 and 18,000 French soldiers were killed, including both French , Hugh Quiéret and Nicholas Béhuchet.147 The English reportedly lost only two vessels and although the victory did not end the French naval threat entirely, it did obstruct Philip’s future designs at sea.

Sluys was one of Edward’s only successes during the first years of the war due to his inability to establish steady financial support. Between 1337 and 1340 he used wool customs to pay his debts and then turned to granting wool staple farming rights to his

Italian supercompanies in return for sizeable cash advances.148 His magnates also provided him with loans by pledging their own possessions as collateral, and despoiled monasteries for any ornaments fit to sell for cash.149 Edward even pawned the English

Crown jewels on two separate occasions. Yet all of these efforts would be in vein.150

145 Knighton, 28, 30. 146 Chroniques, 2: 36. 147 Although Quiéret was killed when soldiers boarded his ship, Béhuchet was captured with plans for ransom. However, because he had been one of the admirals instrumental in the English coastal raids, Edward had him executed. To further undercut the already devastated French morale, he was hanged from the mast of his ship for all to see (Trial by Battle, 328). 148 For example, see CCR, 1339-1341, 11. Money lending by Italian supercompanies will be discussed in Chapter IV. 149 Knighton, 6. As can be expected, this behavior caused a great deal of resistance in England. As Knighton writes: “In the year of grace 1338 King Edward… took vestments and silver vessels and other ornaments from the monasteries in aid of his expedition across the sea, and there arose a great outcry from the people, and much evil would have come of it if the king had not listened to more wholesome council.” 150 Edward’s credit was so dismal that most of those to whom he owed money refused commodities for payment and insisted on the discharge of his debts with cash. 48

In 1340 Edward III was barely solvent as he marched into France. His German allies refused to accompany him upon seeing his battle plan, forcing him to besiege St.

Omer on July 26 while low on supplies and with only Robert of Artois and his Flemish allies in support. The Flemish then abandoned their fortified positions around the city when the Duke of launched a sortie before the approaching French army arrived. In the skirmishes that followed, Edward lost nearly half of his army.151

A month later Edward managed to gather another army and besiege Tournai.152

His Germans allies joined him at last and Edward’s strategy was starvation. His financial woes made this a problematic option, however, given that such a strategy is entirely reliant upon the ability of the besiegers to afford waiting out the besieged. Luckily for the

English the area around Tournai was plentiful enough to supplement the meager supplies

Edward was receiving from England or his allies. Conditions within the city were not so positive; it had been a hot summer and along with low crop yields, the population had been unable to prepare for the attack. When coupled with water access that allowed barges to deliver supplies regularly, the English had the advantage.153

By August, however, Edward’s allies were growing tired of the stalemate; it is also possible that increasing pressure from his creditors forced a change in the battle plan.154 Regardless, instead of waiting until those inside Tournai surrendered, the English and Flemish attempted to breach the walls. These assaults met with little progress and

151 Chroniques, II: 65-69. Trial by Battle, 338-343. 152 De Klerk, 19. Chroniques, II: 43-76. 153 De Klerk, 19. Chroniques, II: 43-56. Trial by Battle, 351-354. 154 Sumption, for example believes that Edward’s financial position was less a factor than the fact that his German allies had yet to see major action (and thus major reward). Allmand and Perroy, however, support the idea that his financial situation dictated this change in strategy. 49 high casualties, which soured relations between the allies. The Germans had not assisted in the attacks, and van Artevelde was not subtle in voicing his displeasure.155 Even worse,

Edward did not receive financial support from England as expected, forcing him to turn to usurers and agree to 20% interest for the funds needed to feed his troops.156

The French army, meanwhile, was encamped 10 away at Bouvines. Yet

Philip did not engage the invading army, a decision Sumption argued was

“incomprehensible,” the product of Philip’s “changeable and irrational” temperament.157

In light of Philip’s failure to handle the situation with his Genoese sailors correctly, this may seem to be another incorrect command decision. Yet an attack became unnecessary when the German army withdrew due to their lack of adequate financial compensation.

They were soon followed by the Flemish, who abandoned their English allies upon hearing rumors than another French army was moving to attack Flanders. Blaming his ministers in London for undermining his efforts, Edward had no choice but to seek a truce. On September 25, he signed the Treaty of Espléchin.158

Edward departed for Ghent three days later, and when news came from England that no wool could be raised for ready cash, no tradesmen would extend him credit. He turned to the Bardi and Peruzzi for assistance, but his existing debt was such that they soon defaulted. By the end of October Edward faced his creditors, who refused any

155 Sumption tells the story of van Arteveld berating the Germans and Brabanters for their cowardice during the siege. When a knight in the service of the Duke of Brabant responded by suggesting he return to Ghent and brew beer, van Arteveld killed him. Edward spent a great deal of time preventing Brabant from leaving the army with his troops immediately (Trial by Battle, 354). 156 Many chroniclers discuss the enormous expense of Edward’s expedition, which eventually forced him to abandon his endeavor (for one example, see de Klerk, 28, 30). Trial by Battle, 354. 157 Trial by Battle, 357. 158 Knighton, 30-36. 50 promise of wool and required immediate cash settlement of his debt.159 Only loans from his magnates—Henry of Lancaster the biggest contributor—and the surrender of four to the Duke of Brabant as collateral, eased his most pressing obligations.160

Under the cover of darkness he left Ghent on November 28, boarding a boat at Sluys bound for England.161

Edward reached the on the night of November 30 and immediately summoned all of his principle ministers to him. In a prolonged series of interrogations, he demand to learn why he did not receive the financial assistance requested while on the Continent. When the process was complete, Edward was so dissatisfied that he imprisoned or fired many of his principle ministers before instituting a series of administrative reforms that will be discussed in the following chapter.162

Edward’s Continental alliances, meanwhile, disintegrated almost completely: the

Holy Roman Emperor negotiated peace with Philip and the German princes still in

France returned to their principalities. Flanders was left alone as ally to the king it had actively embraced the previous year. The campaign that had cost Edward III nearly

£500,000 (£400,000 of which was borrowed) met with almost total failure.163

The only major benefit of the Treaty of Espléchin was that it gave the combatants time to recover. When it expired in 1345, Edward was already preparing for his next

159 Knighton, 30. Trial by Battle, 360-361. 160 Henry of Lancaster was one of Edward III’s closest allies. For a biography, read: Kenneth Fowler, The King’s Lieutenant: Henry of Grosmont, First 1310-1361 (New York: Barnes & Noble, Inc., 1969). 161 Trial by Battle, 361. 162 Trial by Battle, 361-362. 163 Trial by Battle, 362-363. It could be argued that the French loss of Flanders was a victory in and of itself. As Sumption points out, France experienced its share of hardships during this time, not only in the destruction of the northern infrastructure by the financial cost of a defensive war. 51 great expedition. This endeavor, the Crécy-Calais campaign, was an undertaking of advanced strategy and detailed planning. Like his efforts in 1338-1340, it demonstrates the complexities of medieval militaries and the administrations that created them. Indeed,

Crécy-Calais would not only be the largest expedition of Edward III’s reign, but one of the largest of the Middle Ages.

CONCLUSIONS

This chapter has traced both the short and long term origins of the Hundred Years

War. We have seen that it was the long-term result of a centuries-old relationship between England and France, a relationship that, more often than not, led to war between the two monarchies. What differentiated this series of conflicts from those previous quarrels, however, was that Edward as king of England had a legal claim to the French throne through his mother, Isabella, the last surviving daughter of Philip IV. Although

Edward’s motivations for exploiting that circumstance are debated, the fact is that they rendered this war different from everything that had come before. Even if Edward merely exploited his ancestry as a rhetorical devise or to garner the support of Continental allies, the result is the same: a war that lasted over 100 years and would fundamentally reshape the belligerents involved.

52

Chapter 3: The Theory of Feeding Mars

Strategy is to war what the plot is to the play; Tactics is represented by the role of the players; Logistics furnishes the stage management, accessories, and maintenance. The audience, thrilled by the action of the play and the art of the performers, overlooks all of the cleverly hidden details of stage management. George Cyrus Thorpe164

INTRODUCTION

In 1885, historian C.W.C. Oman theorized that medieval knights were incapable of any advanced tactical or strategic operations.165 Governments in the Middle Ages, he argued, also lacked the fiscal base and administrative resources needed to establish chains of supply across large distances, and moved through enemy territory with no though other than destruction and personal gain. Sadly Oman’s work remained the standard in medieval military theory for decades, as subsequent historians such as J.E. Morris, Hans

Delbrück, Ferdinand Lot, and R.C. Smail did little to contradict his theories.166

164George Cyrus Thorpe, Pure Logistics: The Science of War Preparation (Kansas City, MO: Franklin Hudson Publishing Co., 1917). Thorpe was a Lieutenant Colonel of the United States Marine Corps and attended the US Naval War College. His work on logistics quickly became a staple of American military theory and has gone through multiple editions. Thorpe’s theories regarding logistics have also served as a basis for the US Army’s current logistical doctrine, Field Manual (FM) 4-0 (U.S. Department of the Army, FM 4-0 (FM 100-10) (Washington D.C.: U.S. Department of the Army, August 29, 2003)). 165 C.W.C. Oman, The Art of War in the Middle Ages, A.D. 378-1515 (Oxford: B.H. Blackwell, 1885), 49. 166 John E. Morris, The Welsh Wars of Edward I (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1901). Hans Delbrück, Geschichte der Kriegskunst im Rahmen der politischen Geschichte, Vol. III (Berlin, 1920) (References were taken from: Hans Delbrück, History of the Art of War, Vol. III: Medieval Warfare, Walter J. Renfroe, Jr., trans. (Lincoln: University of Nebraska Press, 1982). Ferdinand Lot, L’Art militaire et les armées au moyen âge en Europe et dans le Proche Orient, 2 Vols. (Paris: Payot, 1946). R.C. Smail, Crusading Warfare (1097-1193) (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1956). 53

Yet as this chapter will discuss, historians such as J.F. Verbruggen, Bernard

Bachrach, Michael Prestwich, Kelly DeVries, and Clifford J. Rogers have thoroughly established that this so-called “Dark Age” was in fact an era of complex governments and sophisticated militaries.167 They prove that medieval armies, by extension, were not bands of errant knights wreaking havoc upon the countryside but were skilled forces that could execute organized tactical operations in order to accomplish intricate strategic and grand strategic goals.

Although the study of logistics is a comparatively new topic of study—which was due to the belief that it was boring or of minor significance—historians have demonstrated that examining how militaries organize their resources provides valuable insights into why armies win or lose wars. Historians such as H.J. Hewitt, John Lynn,

Yuval Harari, John Haldon, and Craig Lambert are amongst those who have investigated logistical capabilities in the medieval period and they have proven that these governments were capable of sophisticated logistical organization, defined as the means by which armies marshaled manpower, weapons, and supply to support military endeavors.168

167 See: Bernard S. Bachrach, “Charles Martel, Mounted Shock Combat, the Stirrup, and Feudalism,” Studies in Medieval and Renaissance History, 7 (1970), 49-75. Bernard S. Bachrach, Early Carolingian warfare: prelude to empire (Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press, 2001). See for example: Kelly DeVries, Infantry Warfare in the Early Fourteenth Century (Woodbridge, Suffolk, UK: Boydell Press, 1996). Michael Prestwich, War, Politics and Finance under Edward I (London: Faber and Faber Ltd., 1972). Michael Prestwich, The Three Edwards (London: Weidenfeld and Nicholson, 1980). Michael Prestwich, Armies and Warfare in the Middle Ages: The English Experience (New Haven; London: Yale University Press, 1996). J.F. Verbruggen, The Art of Warfare in Western Europe during the Middle Ages, Sumner Williard, trans. (Rochester, NY: The Boydell Press, 1997). Clifford J. Rogers, War Cruel and Sharp: English Strategy under Edward III: 1327-1360 (Rochester, NY: Boydell and Brewer, 2000). 168 H.J. Hewitt, The Organization of War Under Edward III (Manchester, England: Manchester University Press, 1966); John Lynn’s Feeding Mars: Logistics in Western Warfare from the Middle Ages to the Present (Boulder, San Francisco, Oxford: Westview Press, 1993); Yuval Noah Harari, “Strategy and Supply in Fourteenth-Century Western European Invasion Campaigns,” The Journal of Military History, Vol. 64, No. 2 (April 2000), 297-333; John D. Haldon, General Issues in the Study of Medieval Logistics: 54

A potential roadblock to studying any medieval topic is source availability, and to deal with this issue historians are developing the practice of logistical modeling. In logistical modeling, historians use statistical data regarding geography, topography, population distribution, human and animal victual consumption, and various other factors to estimate the potential needs of a military while on campaign. Using such data, historians can estimate everything from the number of horses needed on campaign to the amount of grain available to an army on the march given a theater of operation’s yearly agricultural yield. Although these calculations must be treated as theoretical estimates rather than absolute demands, when used correctly, they can fill in the gap medieval records leave behind.

This chapter will explore the groundbreaking work in medieval military history, and logistics more specifically. It will also discuss logistical modeling, which will be employed in this study to fill in record gaps wherever they exist. First, however, we turn to the historical perception of medieval armies.

“DARK AGE” WARFARE

In his analysis of medieval warfare, J.F. Verbruggen commented that, “few historical problems have received such unfortunate treatment at the hands of historians as that of the art of war in the Middle Ages.”169 This certainly applies to C.W.C. Oman’s

1885 The Art of War in the Middle Ages, one of the first modern analyses of medieval

Sources, Problems and Methodologies (London: Brill, 2006); Craig L. Lambert, Shipping the Medieval Military: English Maritime Logistics in the Fourteenth Century (Rochester, NY: The Boydell Press, 2011). 169 Verbruggen, The Art of Warfare, 1. 55 warfare.170 In this volume he analyzed military strategy and tactics from the end of the

Roman Empire to the rise in supremacy of the Swiss Confederacy in the fifteenth century. Most notably, of medieval European armies he commented that “the epoch is, as far as strategy and tactics are concerned, one of almost complete stagnation.”171 Not only were the minor operations of war “badly understood” but strategy was “absolutely non- existent.”172 Overall, Oman concluded that

… an invading army moved into hostile territory, not in order to strike at some great strategical point, but merely to burn and harry the land. As no organized commissariat existed, the resources of even the richest districts were soon exhausted, and the invader moved off in search of subsistence, rather than for any higher aim.173

To Oman’s credit, he revised his original work in 1924, extending his narrative into the sixteenth century and expanding his analysis into two volumes.174 While he integrated many of the historical studies completed in the interim and improved upon his overall analysis of medieval warfare, his assumptions regarding the lack of advanced tactical or strategic ability remained unchanged.

Oman was not alone. In his 1901 The Welsh Wars of Edward I, John E. Morris said of the Norman lords who settled the Welsh border that “they conquered for their own profit, and they satisfied the ambition which was characteristic of their race.”175 In 1920, noted German historian Hans Delbrück in his Geschichte der Kriegskunst im Rahmen der politischen Geschichte (History of the Art of War in the Middle Ages) agreed with Oman

170 C.W.C. Oman, The Art of War in the Middle Ages, A.D. 378-1515 (Oxford: B.H. Blackwell, 1885), 49. 171 Oman, The Art of War in the Middle Ages, 49. 172 Oman, The Art of War in the Middle Ages, 52. 173 Oman, Art of War in the Middle Ages, 52. 174 Charles Oman, A History of the Art of War in the Middle Ages, 2 Vols. (London: Methuen, 1924). Sometimes this is considered a second, expanded edition to the earlier work and at others it is treated as a new publication given its extensive revisions. 175 John E. Morris, The Welsh Wars of Edward I (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1901), 2. 56 by asserting that few examples of medieval strategy exist.176 He believed that knights were individualist incapable of mounting organized operations because they were more concerned with personal achievement and glory. As a consequence, while armies were aware that battle was important, they rarely capitalized upon their victories because medieval commanders lacked any tangible control over their troops. His conclusions are so problematic that notable Carolingian historian Bernard S. Bachrach later commented that “Delbrück’s work on medieval military history, magisterial when published, should now be given an honorable burial. It is of no value for the medieval period and often is seriously misleading.”177

By the 1950’s R.C. Smail commented of Ferdinand Lot’s comparatively comprehensive L’Art militaire et les armées au moyen âge en Europe et dans le Proche

Orient that “… he does understand, as so many of his predecessors apparently did not, that historians have made comparatively little progress in the study of the military aspects of medieval history, and that at present a general survey of the subject can be only imperfectly accomplished.”178 While Lot did an excellent job of discussing medieval battles in western Europe, he paid little attention to medieval sieges and often glossed over military engagements in favor of discussing the political motivations behind them.

Even Smail, who as evidenced above was aware of the difficulties in constructing general narratives of medieval military affairs, fell victim to these problems himself.

176 Hans Delbrück, Geschichte der Kriegskunst im Rahmen der politischen Geschichte, Vol. III (Berlin, 1920). References were taken from: Hans Delbrück, History of the Art of War, Vol. III: Medieval Warfare, Walter J. Renfroe, Jr., trans. (Lincoln: University of Nebraska Press, 1982). 177 Bernard S. Bachrach, “Medieval Siege Warfare: A Reconnaissance,” The Journal of Military History, 58 (1) (1994), 119-133. (p.119, n.1). 178 R.C. Smail, ‘Reviewed Work: L’Art militaire et les armées au moyen âge en Europe et dans le Proche Orient by Ferdinand Lot,” The English Historical Review, Vol. 64, No. 250 (January 1949), 92. 57

While his Crusading Warfare (1097-1193) was a competent analysis of warfare in the east during this first phase of the Crusades, he did not discuss any warfare in western

Europe or how those experiences could have influenced military methods in the east. He therefore undervalued any potential military skill of those forces which made their way east, commenting that “there were no standing professional armies moulded by a system and tradition of drill and discipline, so that such armed forces as there were had too little training or power of controlled manoeuvre to put into practice any but the simplest tactical plans.”179

The tide soon began to turn. In 1954 historian J.F. Verbruggen published Se

Krijgskunst in West-Europa in de Middeleeuwen IXe tot begin XIVe eeuw [The Art of

Warfare in Western Europe in the Middle Ages], in which he proved that mounted heavy cavalry fought in small, organized groups with commanders who were fully capable of tactical maneuver.180 More importantly, he pointed out that infantry existed throughout the medieval period, and in areas where these forces were well trained, feudalism was less entrenched (such as in Flanders). While Verbruggen did not adequately integrate sieges into analysis, his overall contribution to the field was significant.

Eight years later Lynn White’s Medieval technology and social change advanced the so-called “stirrup thesis,” arguing that the addition of the stirrup to saddles in eighth century western Europe led to the development of warfare revolving around mounted heavy cavalry, and by extension, to the creation of feudalism.181 He also discussed the

179 R.C. Smail, Crusading Warfare (1097-1193) (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1956), 3. 180 J.V. Vergbruggen, De Krijgskunst in West-Europa in de Middeleeuwen IXe tot begin XIVe eeuw (: Paleis der academiën, 1954). 181 Lynn White, Medieval technology and social change (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1962). 58 social implications of the crank and the heavy plough, arguing that these inventions in combination with the stirrup spurred significant social change in western Europe. White’s stirrup thesis was later disproven by another important medieval historian, Bernard S.

Bachrach.182 Yet his exploration of the complexities involved in operating heavy cavalry, and his general acknowledgement that military methods could drive social change, were marked developments that cannot be discounted.183

Michael Prestwich also contributed to the better understanding of medieval warfare, concentrating particularly on the concept of operational objectives.184 Not only did he expand the general understanding of Edward I’s reign and how this martial king financed his military campaigns, in his definitive Armies and Warfare in the Middles

Ages, he addressed the pragmatic realities of chivalry, the complex requirements of castle garrisons, and the proficiency medieval soldiers possessed when executing tactical maneuvers in combat. He proved that battle was neither always sought nor always avoided, but rather waged or avoided when it was strategically beneficial to do so.185

182 Barnard S. Bachrach, “Charles Martel, Mounted Shock Combat, The Stirrup, and Feudalism,” Medieval and Renaissance History 7 (1970), 49-75. 183 His thesis was first challenged by D.A. Bullough and then settled by Bachrach in 1970. D.A. Bullough, “Europae Pater: and His Achievement in Light of Recent Scholarship,” English Historical Review, 85 (1970), 58-105. 184 See for example: Michael Prestwich, “Cavalry Service in Early Fourteenth Century England,” in War and Government in the Middle Ages: Essays in Honour of J.O. Prestwich, John Gillingham and J.C. Holt, eds. (Totowa, NJ: Banes and Noble Books, 1984), 147-158; Michael Prestwich, “War and Taxation in England in the XIIth and XIVth centuries,” in Genèse de l’etat moderne, J.P. Genet and M. Le Mene, eds. (Paris, 1987), 181-192; Michael Prestwich, “Money and Mercenaries in English Medieval Armies,” in England and Germany in the High Middle Ages, Alfred Haverkamp and Hanna Vollrath, eds. (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1996), 129-150; Michael Prestwich, “The Garrisoning of English Medieval Castles,” in The Normans and their Adversaries at War, Richard P. Abels and Bernard S. Bachrach, eds. (Rochester, NY: Boydell Press, 2001), 185-200. 185 Michael Prestwich, War, Politics and Finance under Edward I (London: Faber and Faber Ltd., 1972). Michael Prestwich, Armies and warfare in the Middle Ages: the English experience (New Haven, CT: Yale University press, 1996). 59

Bernard S. Bachrach not only settled the stirrup thesis but contributed to a better understanding of early medieval warfare. His 1972 Merovingian military organization,

481-751 did a great deal to revise the understanding of Merovingian militaries by pulling them out of the shadow of the seemingly more advanced .186 His

1992 Armies and Politics in the early medieval West revealed the political complexities of early medieval armies and the political aparrati that created them.187 Eight years later his Early Carolingian Warfare discussed the methods by which Charlemagne built upon the military experience of his predecessors to create his large Frankish state.188

Other contemporary historians such as Kelly DeVries, Andrew Ayton, and

Clifford J. Rogers continue to push towards a better and more comprehensive understanding of medieval warfare. Dispelling the traditionally negative view of medieval infantries, DeVries traced their increasingly decisive role in battle in Infantry

Warfare in the Early Fourteenth Century.189 Added to this is his superlative body of work on the implementation of gunpowder in the late medieval West, dealing particularly with the rise of siege artillery in the final phase of the Hundred Years War.190 His joint

186 Bernard S. Bachrach, Merovingian military organization, 481-751 (Minneapolis, MN: University of Minnesota Press, 1972). 187 Bernard S. Bachrach, Armies and politics in the early medieval West (Aldershot, Hampshire, UK: Variorum, 1993). 188 Bernard S. Bachrach, Early Carolingian Warfare: prelude to empire (Philadelphia, PA: University of Pennsylvania Press, 2001). 189 Kelly DeVries, Infantry Warfare in the Early Fourteenth Century (Woodbridge, Suffolk, UK: Boydell Press, 1996). 190 For example, see Kelly DeVries, “The Technology of Gunpowder Weaponry in Western Europe during the Hundred Years War,” in Krongreβ der Internationalen Kommission für Militärgeschitchte Acta 22: Von Crécy bis Mohács Kriegswesen im späten Mittelaiter (1346-1526), Vol. 12 ( 1997), 285-298; Kelly DeVries, “Gunpowder Weaponry and the Rise of the Early Modern State,” War in History, Vol. 5, Issue 2 (April 1998), 127-145; Kelly DeVries, “The Use of Gunpowder Weapons in the ,” in Traditions and Transformations in Late Medieval England, Douglas Biggs, Sharon D. Michalove, and A. Compton Reeves, eds. (London: Brill, 2002), 21-38; Kelly DeVries, “‘The Walls Come Tumbling Down’: The Campaigns of Philip the Good and the Myth of Fortification Vulnerability to Early Gunpowder 60 publication with Robert D. Smith illuminated the topic of late medieval Burgundian artillery building, proving that their shifting loyalties during the Hundred Years War proved decisive in that conflict’s outcome.191

Ayton and Rogers have also provided important analyses of Edward III’s military expeditions. Ayton’s work focused on the changes in warfare during Edward III’s era of the Hundred Years’ War, particularly on the importance of English soldiers and archers in battle.192 Specifically his 1994 publication Knights and warhorses did a great deal to revise our understanding of aristocratic service under Edward III.193

Rogers first made his mark in the field in an edited volume on the Military

Revolution, in which he postulated the pivotal theory of military change known as punctuated equilibrium.194 Later, his War Cruel and Sharp proved that Edward III’s expeditions on the Continent were the work of complex strategic aims fulfilled by generally competent armies.195 As he noted in his introduction, examining Edward’s

Weapons,” in The Hundred Years War: A Wider Focus, L.J. Andrew Villalon and Donald J. Kagay, eds. (Boston: Brill, 2005), 429-446; Robert Smith and Kelly DeVries, The artillery of the of Burgundy, 1363-1477 (Rochester, NY: Boydell Press, 2005). 191 Robert D. Smith and Kelly DeVries, The artillery of the Dukes of Burgundy, 1363-1477 (Rochester, NY: Boydell Press, 2005). 192 Andrew Ayton and J.L. Price, “Introduction: The Military Revolution from a Medieval Perspective,” in The Medieval Military Revolution, Andrew Ayton and J.L. Price, eds. (New York: Barnes & Noble Books, 1995), 1-22; Andrew Ayton, “English Armies in the Fourteenth Century,” in The Wars of Edward III: Sources and Interpretations, Clifford J. Rogers, ed. (Rochester, NY: Boydell Press, 1999), 303-319; Andrew Ayton and Philip Preston, eds., The Battle of Crécy, 1346 (Rochester, NY: Boydell & Brewer, Ltd., 2005). 193 Andrew Ayton, Knights and warhorses: military service and the English aristocracy under Edward III(Rochester, NY: Boydell Press, 1994), 194 Clifford J. Rogers, ed., The Military Revolution Debate: readings on the military transformation of early modern Europe (Boulder: Westview Press, 1995). 195 In addition to War, Cruel and Sharp, see: Clifford J. Rogers, “Edward III and the Dialectics of Strategy, 1327-1360,” in Essays on Medieval Military History: Strategy, Military Revolutions and the Hundred Years War (Burlington, VT: Ashgate Publishing Company, 2010), 83- 102; Cifford J. Rogers, “The Military Revolutions of the Hundred Years War” in The Military Revolution Debate: readings on the military transformation of early modern Europe, Clifford J. Rogers, ed. (Boulder: Westview Press, 1995), 55-93; Clifford J. Rogers, “‘As if a new sun had arisen’: England’s fourteenth-century RMA,” in Essays on 61 endeavors makes “…a compelling argument for the sheer professionalism at arms of

Edward, his companions and his soldiers.”196 Supplementing this is his examination of how non-combatants faired at the hands of medieval armies during the Hundred Years

War and how De rei militari contributed to the development of strategy and tactics in medieval western Europe.197

Historians like Timothy Runyan and Susan Rose have complemented these land- based studies with comparative work on war at sea. Runyan evaluated the proliferation of ship designed in the High Middle Ages and how medieval governments increasingly contributed their resources to constructing ships catered specifically to warfare.198 In particular he focused on the shift of importance from the Mediterranean to the North

Atlantic, as well as on the financial changes which accompanied the swelling of

“national” navies. Rose similarly focused on shipping and between 1000 and 1500, discussing the tactics of naval engagements as well as the methods employed by government to utilize their mercantile resources for war.199

Although medieval historiography long suffered from the progressive interpretations of Renaissance and Enlightenment theorists, twentieth and twenty-first century historians have successfully overturned their “Dark Age” assumptions. The

Medieval Military History: Strategy, Military Revolutions and the Hundred Years War (Burlington, VT: Ashgate Publishing Company, 2010), 15-34. 196 Rogers, War Cruel and Sharp, x. 197 Clifford J. Rogers, “By Fire and Sword: Bellum Hostile and “Civilians” in the Hundred Years War,” in Civilians in the Path of War, Clifford J. Rogers and Mark Grimsley, eds. (Lincoln: The University of Nebraska Press, 2002), 33-78. Clifford J. Rogers, “The Vegetian ‘Science of Warfare’ in the Middle Ages,” in Essays on Medieval Military History: Strategy, Military Revolutions and the Hundred Years War (Burlington, VT: Ashgate Publishing Company, 2010), 1-19. 198 Archibald Lewis and Timothy J. Runyan, European Naval and Maritime History, 300-1500 (Bloomington, IN: Indiana University Press, 1990). See also Timothy J. Runyan, “Naval Power during the Hundred Years War,” in War at Sea in the Middle Ages and the Renaissance, John B. Hattendorf and Richard W. Unger, eds. (Rochester, NY: The Boydell Press, 2003), 53-68. 199 Susan Rose, Medieval Naval Warfare, 1000-1500 (New York: Rutledge Pub., 2002). 62 perception of medieval militaries admittedly lagged further behind, yet contemporary scholars have effectively pulled historical perceptions from the darkness into the light.

Contrary to what was once believed, armies in the Middle Ages were capable of advanced strategy, organized operations, and integrated tactics on both land and sea.

One significant topic, however, remained overlooked for far longer: logistics.

“DARK AGE” LOGISTICS

To determine whether or not medieval military commanders contemplated provisioning and the importance of logistical organization, one need look no further than late Roman Imperial administrator Publius Flavius Vegetius Renatus’ treatise Epitoma rei militaris (more commonly known as De rei militari).200 In this four-part discourse

Vegetius maintained that only through a rigorous dedication to training could men achieve success in war. He not only focused on strategy, tactics, and drill, but he also asserted that a main principle of war is to secure adequate provisions. This obligation and the maintenance of supply lines were so essential to military success that famine could be used to defeat an adversary. If accomplished, hunger itself could become a sword and an army could effectively achieve victory on the battlefield.201

The popularity of De rei militari in the Middle Ages is proven by the 200 medieval manuscripts (over half of which were written in various vernacular languages) that survive today. The text was also heavily borrowed by medieval scholars like John of

Salisbury in his 1159 Policraticus or Giles of Rome in his late thirteenth century

200 Flavius Vegetius Renatus, Epitoma Rei Militaris, Carol Lang, ed. (Leipzig: Aedibus B.G. Tevbneri, 1885). 201 Vegetius, Epitoma Rei Militaris, 69. 63 publication De regimine principum.202 It is also very likely that Edward III read the text during his years of military tutelage.203 So many medieval military practitioners focused on Vegetius’ rules of war that Christopher Allmand, who wrote the definitive history of the treatise in 2011, argued that until Carl von Clausewitz’s Vom Krieg, De rei militari was the most widely read military text in western Europe.204

Despite the wide readership of this text, as well as the many historical examples of sophisticated logistical organization, it was not until the latter half of the 20th century that historians began to focus on the topic with any depth or detail. Historians discounted the idea that organized provisioning was possible, which is a grave oversight given that logistics are an excellent lens through which to evaluate the effectiveness of any government’s military apparatus. As Vegetius understood, supply and manpower acquisition are crucial to the success of militaries, and without such organization, a battle can be lost before an army ever engages its adversary. Moreover, the methods of logistical organization that did exist in the medieval period are direct indicators of each government’s structure, efficiency, and available resources.

Although considered by professional military theorists as early as the nineteenth century, it was not until the 1960’s that historians turned their eyes to the fruitful topic of logistics. One of the first and best studies, and a source that will be drawn upon

202 , Policraticus: of the frivolities of courtiers and the footprints of philosophers, Cary J Nederman, ed. (Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press, 1990). Charles F. Briggs, Giles of Rome’s De regimine principum: reading and writing politics at court and university, c. 1275-1525 (Cambridge, NY: Cambridge University Press, 1999). 203 W. Mark Edward III (New Haven, CT: Yale University Press, 2012), 13. 204 Christopher Allmand, The De Re Militari of Vegetius: The Reception, Transmission and Legacy of a Roman Text in the Middle Ages (Cambridge, NY: Cambridge University Press, 2011). 64 extensively in this thesis, is H.J. Hewitt’s The Organization of War under Edward III.205

Hewitt evaluated how Edward III mobilized manpower, supply, and political resources to conduct his many military campaigns. An analysis ahead of its time, Hewitt’s chapters on

“national” defense, manpower acquisition, supply collection, shipping, and on-campaign logistical methods spelled out with excellent detail how the English government handled each issue. Hewitt’s work left no doubt whatsoever that the English government was capable of quite complex operations over extended periods of time. While his work is more descriptive than argumentative, it is an authoritative history that is essential reading for anyone attempting to understand the campaigns of Edward III.

While not dealing with a medieval topic, six years later Geoffrey Parker’s The

Army of Flanders and the Spanish Road explored the Spanish army stationed in the

Netherlands from the sixteenth to the eighteenth centuries.206 The was involved in the Thirty Years War, making it the longest standing army of that period.

This force was maintained at enormous cost to the Spanish government, which attempted to maintain a constant stream of supplies and manpower to northwestern Europe on the so-called “Spanish Road.” Most importantly, Parker proved that Spain’s inability to maintain such a complex provisioning system over a long period of time ultimately led to the failure of Spanish ambitions in the region.

205 H.J. Hewitt, The Organization of War Under Edward III (Manchester, England: Manchester University Press, 1966); H.J. Hewitt’s other notable work is The Horse in Medieval England (London: J.A. Allen & Co. Ltd., 1983). 206 Geoffrey Parker, The Army of Flanders and the Spanish road, 1567-1659; the logistics of Spanish victory and defeat in the Low Countries' Wars (Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press, 1972). 65

Soon after, Dennis Showalter dealt with the influence of industrialization upon warfare in Railroads and Rifles.207 By exploring the unification of Germany, Showalter examined how railroads were used to transport men and materiel across large distances.

He emphasized the influence of the needle gun and moveable artillery, both of which were produced in large numbers to support the troops on the battlefield. These methods required trained soldiers and steady financial support that were created by the Prussian state solely for the purpose of effectively waging war.

Three years later Donald W. Engels’ Alexander the Great and the Logistics of the

Macedonian Army proved that what made Alexander’s army so formidable was that he took conscious steps to free his forces from handicaps like slow supply trains and camp followers.208 Not only did soldiers carry their own provisions but messengers were sent ahead to cities along the campaign trail with orders to prepare provisions for the coming army. What made Engels’ work particularly notable is that he utilized logistical modeling in his study through the use of soldier consumption statistics to estimate the victualling needs of Alexander’s armies. He used these demands to reconstruct Alexander’s route to

Persia, something that had not been done previously with any reliable accuracy.

These initial forays into logistical history were, in essence, case studies of certain countries or armies at specific times. As historians acknowledged the difficulty of constructing a general analysis of medieval warfare, so too are there inherent difficulties in constructing a general narrative of western logistical practices.

207 Dennis Showalter, Railroads and Rifles: soldiers, technology, and the unification of Germany (Hamden, CT: Archon Books, 1975). 208 Donald W. Engels, Alexander the Great and the Logistics of the Macedonian Army (Berkley: University of California Press, 1978). 66

The first and only major attempt as such synthesis was Martin van Creveld’s

Supplying War, in which he defined logistics as “the practical art of moving armies and keeping them supplied.”209 It is a sizeable history and an important one given that anyone wishing to study the topic must examine van Creveld before reading anything else. As

John Lynn wrote in his critique of the book, van Creveld “shifted logistics from a supporting role to center stage, convincing soldiers and scholars alike that throughout modern history, strategy has rested upon logistics.”210 Yet due to both the lack of previous research on the subject and source limitations, many of van Creveld’s arguments require qualification.

One of his most important claims is that no complex logistical organization existed before World War I. Prior to that time, he argued, armies had to keep moving or die because they relied almost entirely upon plundering for goods as they advanced.211

This was because

… no logistic system could sustain an army embarked on operations in enemy territory. Nor, indeed, was the need for such a system felt prior to our period. From time immemorial the problem had been solved simply by having the troops take whatever they required. More or less well-organized plunder was the rule rather than the exception.212

He cited Gustav Adolph to support his theory given that he was, in van Creveld’s opinion, the pinnacle of pre-modern military capability. Instead of increasing the complexity of his logistical arrangements, Gustav Adolph adjusted his armies for quick

209 Van Creveld, Supplying War, 1. 210 John A. Lynn, “The History of Logistics and Supplying War,” in John A. Lynn, ed., Feeding Mars: Logistics in Western Warfare from the Middle Ages to the Present (Boulder; San Francisco; Oxford: Westview Press, 1993), 9. 211 van Creveld, Supplying War, 12-13. 212 van Creveld, Supplying War, 7. 67 movement. He abandoned heavy cannon; had the barrels shortened and their thickness reduced; and introduced several light infantry pieces such as the leather gun. He also made sure to move with rivers so that he could transport his heavy artillery by boat. All of this was necessary, van Creveld pointed out, because he did not make any attempt to transport supplies with him. Consequently, as his large armies quickly exhausted local resources, it was either move continually or perish.213

Van Creveld also argued that while French statesmen Michel le Tellier and his son Louvois would establish the use of magazines in the 1640’s during the reign of Louis

XIV, they were never substantial enough to supply armies. Napoleon, on his part, did not invent any new methods of provisioning but instead merely avoided sieges. Later railroads were thought of as an innovative method of quick movement and a source of ready supply, yet van Creveld felt that they were never efficiently organized or effectively implemented. Schlieffen, for example, put little thought into the implication of railroads given that troops rapidly outpaced their railheads and motor transport was far too insufficient to be useful. Only after 1914 when battle lines stagnated were continual lines of supply created and any true concept of logistical organization emerged.

Many of van Creveld’s hypotheses are incorrect. Organized logistics not only existed before World War I, but at times was quite common. From the ancient world to the modern one, political entities have periodically been capable of organizing manpower and supply for military endeavors, and at times sustaining those efforts for part or all of their expeditions. For this reason, much like Delbrück’s work, van Creveld should be respected and yet honorably laid to rest.

213 van Creveld, Supplying War, 12. 68

John Lynn’s 1993 Feeding Mars is a valiant step in that direct.214 This edited volume investigated “the tedious task of supply” that according to Lynn attracts few scholars and even fewer readers.215 The contributors explored occurrences of organized provisioning throughout history, particularly that during the medieval and early modern eras. In the introduction Lynn openly acknowledged the contribution van Creveld made to the field, but the chapters within reveal the misconceptions van Creveld perpetuated. In the case of medieval armies, the need for supply and how the government went about acquiring it shaped society itself.216

Bachrach, for example, contributed an excellent chapter on pre-crusade logistics in Europe, detailing the upkeep of Roman fortifications by leaders such as Charlemagne

(who also attempted to build a canal connecting the Rhine and Danube) and the execution of the Norman Conquest in 1066.217 It was in that year that William the Bastard assembled an army to invade England to defend his right to the throne. From the spring to

Christmas Day, William oversaw the construction of over 700 vessels for transport, the recruitment of an army, provisioning of those forces prior to August, the crossing of the

English Channel, the landing at Pevensey, the march inland, the , and the siege of .218 It was the incorrect interpretations of Oman and van Creveld,

Bachrach argues, that allowed the logistics of William’s conquest to be overlooked.219

214 Lynn, Feeding Mars. 215 Lynn, Feeding Mars, vii. 216 John Lynn, “The History of Logistics and Supplying War,” in John Lynn, ed., Feeding Mars: Logistics in Western Warfare from the Middle Ages to the Present (Boulder, San Francisco, Oxford: Westview Press, 1993), 33. 217 Bernard S. Bachrach, “Logistics in Pre-Crusade Europe,” in John Lynn, ed., Feeding Mars: Logistics in Western Warfare from the Middle Ages to the Present (Oxford: Westview Press, 1993). 218 Bachrach, “Logistics in Pre-Crusade Europe,” 72. 219 C. Gillmor, “Naval Logistics and the cross-channel operation,” Anglo-Norman Studies 7 (1984), 114. 69

Timothy Runyan also wrote a chapter on the use of ships during the Hundred

Years War.220 He discussed how the English obtained soldiers for naval expeditions and explored the evolution of ship design during that period, specifically the marrying of maritime traditions in the Mediterranean and the to generate a more efficient, sea-worthy vessel. These ships were constructed in greater numbers during the war because of the simultaneous evolution in international commerce, and the English government impressed these ships (along with sailors upon occasion) in increased numbers in order to sustain the war in France.

Feeding Mars seemed to spur other historians to contribute to this fascinating topic of historical investigation. In 2000, Yuval Harari’s article on the logistics of medieval invasion campaigns linked strategy with the demands of supply in the west.221

In 2001 Mark Vaughn proved that the transition to war during the reign of Edward I was merely an extension of regular Crown victualling practices.222 The next year Emilie

Ant’s article on the 1224 Siege of Bedford displayed how Henry III marshaled significant resources to reacquire this important citadel.223 John Pryor’s 2006 edited volume

Logistics in Warfare in the Age of the Crusades explored provisioning while on campaign in the east and in 2011, Craig Lambert’s Shipping the Medieval Military employed a

220 Timothy J. Runyan, “Naval Power during the Hundred Years War,” in War at Sea in the Middle Ages and the Renaissance, John B. Hattendorf and Richard W. Unger, eds. (Rochester, NY: The Boydell Press, 20030), 53-68. 221 Yuval Noah Harari, “Strategy and Supply in Fourteenth-Century Western European Invasion Campaigns,” The Journal of Military History, Vol. 64, No. 2 (April 2000), 297-333 222 Mark Vaughn, “For the circumstances must dictate the proper means: a study in the history of logistics with special reference to thirteenth century England” (Unpublished PhD thesis, University of Reading, 1999). Mark Vaughn, “Mount the War-Horses, Take your Lance in your Grip…,” Thirteenth Century England, Vol. 8 (2001). 223 Emilie Ant, “Beseiging Bedford: in 1224,” Journal of Medieval Military History, 1 (2002), 101-124. 70 meticulous assessment of government records to display the continual importance of naval resources to Edward III’s war effort in France.224

When considered cumulatively, these many excellent studies illuminate the complexity of logistical organization in their various eras and societies. Although they are not holistic narratives like van Creveld’s flawed analysis, they work in concert to show that logistics as an organized practice did exist before the modern era. Those which focus on the medieval period specifically dispel the idea that the Middle Ages was a

“dark age” during which no sophisticated organization existed. Instead they show that medieval governments could at times generate complex logistical systems in order to further their military goals, whatever they might have been.

THE “SCIENCE” OF LOGISTICS

Because the sophistication of medieval logistics is a key argument of this dissertation, it is important to fully understand what exactly “logistics” is.

The term derives from the ancient Greek logistikos, which means “skilled in calculating.”225 It was first used to describe a Roman imperial administrator called the logista but was not applied in a martial context until the nineteenth century.226 French military theorist Antoine-Henri Baron Jomini discussed the concept of a major général de logis in his 1838 Précis de l'Art de la Guerre, defining logistics as “the practical art of

224Craig L. Lambert, Shipping the Medieval Military: English Maritime Logistics in the Fourteenth Century (Rochester, NY: The Boydell Press, 2011) based upon his Ph.D. dissertation, Craig L. Lambert, “Taking the War to Scotland and France: The Supply and Transportation of English Armies by Sea, 1320-60” (Unpublished PhD thesis, University of Hull, 2009). 225 James A. Huston, The Sinews of War: Army Logistics 1775-1953(Washington D.C.: Office of the Chief of Military History, United States Army, 1966), 692. 226 Huston, The Sinews of War, 692. 71 moving armies” which comprises “the order and details of marches and camps, and of quartering and supplying troops.”227 These tasks are the duty of the general-in-chief and his staff officers as “their functions are… necessarily very intimately connected; and woe to an army where these authorities cease to act in concert!”228

Jomini went into some detail regarding all of the duties designated as elements of logistics. He outlined 18 specific obligations, including preparing for troops while on the move; drawing up itineraries for moving troops; arranging camp or post security; dispersing orders for advance guards and rear guards; coordinating orders for troops marching in column; supervising baggage trains; overseeing convoys and supply delivery; and organizing troops while on retreat.229 His discussion of the topic, however, was isolated to the military campaign itself and did not extend to issues such as obtaining troops, financial support for campaigns, and government supply acquisition. More importantly, in this volume containing 47 articles dealing with any issues he felt germane to the art of war, the discussion of logistics was relegated to only two.

Modern logistical theorists have expanded this definition. James A. Houston, in his historical analysis of U.S. Army logistics, wrote that in the broadest sense logistics is about “the three big M's of warfare—material, movement, and maintenance. If international politics is 'the art of the possible,' and war is its instrument, logistics is the art of defining and extending the possible. It provides the substance that physically

227 Antoine-Henry de Jomini, Précis de l'Art de la Guerre: Des Principales Combinaisons de la Stratégie, de la Grande Tactique et de la Politique Militaire (Brussels: Meline, Cans et Copagnie, 1838). Hereafter the edition cited is: Antoine de Jomini, The Art of War, G.H. Mendell and W.P. Craighill, trans. (Westport, CT: Greenwood Press, 1862), 69, 252. 228 Jomini, The Art of War, 257. 229 Jomini, The Art of War, 254-257 72 permits an army to live and move and have its being.”230 Current U.S. Army doctrine defines logistics as anything that supports “all possible mixes of offensive, defensive, stability, and support operations.”231 A combination of both civilian and military efforts, effective logistics “must be properly planned, prepared for, managed, executed, and assessed from factory to foxhole to enable commanders to successfully execute and sustain full spectrum operations over time and, thereby extend the operational reach of the force.”232 When such efforts are successful, organized logistics “maximizes the capabilities of the Army by being responsive to the commander’s needs for agility, deployability, lethality, versatility, survivability, and sustainability.”233

These definitions signify that in the historical context, the study of logistics deals with the acquisition, deployment, and maintenance of manpower, weaponry, and materiel for military use. This includes everything from the administrative methods used to obtain these necessities (such as taxation, levying, or purveyance) to how the various resources were transported and then utilized in the field. The following chapter will outline the specific practices that are the focus of this study, and establish a base year, 1329, in order to provide scale to the logistical organization of the two campaigns in question.

When studying medieval history, however, a problem presents itself: source availability. Even in the modern era records accurately laying out the specific consumption of armies can be hard to come by, let alone in the pre-modern era when such reports were not always generated. Armies rarely undertook such administrative

230 James A. Houston, The Sinews of War: Army Logistics 1775-1953 (Washington, D.C.: Center of Military History, United States Army, 1997), viii. 231 U.S. Army, FM 4-0, 4. 232 U.S. Army, FM 4-0, 5. 233 U.S. Army, FM 4-0, 4-5. 73 duties while on campaign, and even when documents were produced discussing logistical needs, they tended to be inexact or limited in their scope. Forage, for example, was not something that was heavily regulated on the march, let alone recorded. In some cases, even if records were generated, they do not survive for modern historians to examine.234

The medieval English Crown was a highly complex apparatus that did little if it did not generate paperwork, but even in their case there are gaps which must be dealt with in order to create a holistic picture of Edward III’s logistical capabilities.

To compensate for these gaps, historians have developed a beneficial facet of logistical studies, one which this thesis will employ: logistical modeling.235 Engels in his

1978 study on Alexander and later Paul Erdkamp in his 1998 analysis of the Roman imperial army were pioneers of this method as both used estimates of various logistical requirements to hypothesize their armies’ demands, behaviors, and movements. Later

John Haldon in his 2006 General Issues in the Study of Medieval Logistics devoted an entire edited volume to developing these methods beyond simple mathematical calculations.236 He and those who contributed to the volume prove the necessity of understanding the environment and infrastructure of the theater in which a medieval army operated, as well as issues like topography, population density, agricultural production,

234 George Wrottesley’s Cressy and Calais, for example, is an 1898 calendar of government records relating to the eponymous campaigns. Some of the government rolls the calendar is based upon, however, do not survive, and so historians must use his secondary source to obtain the contained information. George Wrottesley, ed., Crecy and Calais from the Original Records in the Public Record Office (London: Harrison and Sons, St. Martin’s Lane, 1898). 235 Paul Erdkamp, Hunger and the Sword: Warfare and Food Supply in Roman Republican Wars (264-30 B.C.) (Amsterdam: J.C. Gieben, Pub., 1998). 236 John Haldon, ed., General Issues in the Study of Medieval Logistics: Sources, Problems and Methodologies (London: Brill, 2006). This Brill volume was the product of a conference hosted by Haldon which included historians, civil engineers, geographers, archeologists, computer mappers, geoscientists, and software engineers. The goal of the conference was to discuss the concept of logistical modeling and how to create the most accurate data. While the title indicates that the chapters were on various “medieval” topics, all should actually be classified as either late ancient or early medieval. 74 livestock availability, population mobility, and harvesting schedules.237 Moreover, they display how this method can increase the accuracy of logistical estimates, and in turn aid historians to paint a more accurate picture of medieval warfare.

A cornerstone of this strategy is an ecological theory called Modified Foraging

Theory. This hypothesis is a variation of Optimal Foraging Theory, which states that natural selection favors animals whose behavioral strategies maximize their net energy intake per unit time spent foraging.238 Animals therefore establish a balance between two extremes: “spending a long time (i.e. using more energy) searching for highly ‘profitable’ food items, or devoting minimal time (i.e. using less energy) to more common but less profitable food items.”239 Although applied to humans in hunter-gatherer societies,

Optimal Foraging Theory has received criticism for a failure to adequately predict human behavior “since even the simplest human societies may possess complex stochastic behavioral patterns that are not well described by such simple models.”240 Because of this, historians can employ Modified Foraging Theory, which “accepts the reality of important cognitive and cultural constraints, including lack of information on which to base decisions.”241

Modified Foraging Theory incorporates contextualized human behaviors regarding diet and food acquisition strategies (referred to as “prey choice” and “patch choice” respectively) in order to include the complex phenomenon of choice into the

237 John Haldon, “Introduction” in General Issues in the Study of Medieval Logistics: Sources, Problems and Methodologies, John Haldon, ed. (London: Brill, 2006), 20. 238 John Haldon, “Introduction” 20. 239 John Haldon, “Introduction” 20. 240 John Haldon, “Introduction” 21. 241 John Haldon, “Introduction” 21. 75 model.242 By assuming that armies balanced the instinctual need for food with “human” factors such as desire, preference, greed, or even issues of command control, a historian can better understand (or even predict) historical actions. If an army was in need of resources and had to choose between a town nearby with adequate provisions and another farther away with far more profitable possessions (including precious commodities), a foraging party might have chosen to sack the farther city because of the potential material gains despite the increased energy required to travel there. Conversely, as in the case of

Edward III in Flanders, a medieval army might suppress its foraging impulses in favor of victual purchase in order to maintain good relations with an indigenous population.

Using this theory and integrating the many aspects of logistical modeling, a historian can estimate the demands of an army on the march in a given theater of operations, and either add context to fragmented logistical knowledge they do have or propose estimates when no relevant sources exist.

To employ this model and accurately estimate logistical demands of an army,

Haldon outlines the many factors a historian must consider243:

I. Fiscal-Administrative structures a. Sources and methods of recruitment of soldiers and their induction into a military or class or caste b. The nature of the methods through which soldiers were supported, and how that support was planned, administered and executed (including discussion of the different forms of political authority and organization such a taxation) c. A discussion of the numbers involved, particularly in terms of the relationship between size of armies and logistical resources available at different periods and in different contexts (food and equipment, pack- animals, cavalry mounts)

242 John Haldon, “Introduction” 21. 243 John Haldon, “Introduction” 21. 76

II. Technological aspects a. Arms production and weapons technology: the interface between technology and society represents an aspect which has remained virtually totally unexplored, and not just in respect of weaponry and equipment b. Other dimensions, such as what might be termed the “psychology of technique”, for example, in respect of skills and types of knowledge, is especially relevant—the issue of the availability or not of certain mathematical and engineering skills, the ramifications of this for mechanics, as in road-building, fortifications, artillery and other aspects of engineering, will be an important aspect of the study, especially in its comparative elements

III. Supportive capacity of areas involved a. Climatic structure and seasonal variations b. Productive potential of land (agricultural, pastoral, wasteland, mixed) c. Quality of produce (seasonal variations, nutritional value variations)

IV. Communications: road systems, pathways, water supply, speed of passage

V. Carrying capacity of men, animals, vehicles a. Types of animals available (breeding, rates of production and exhaustion) b. Feeding requirements c. Question of use of wheeled transport and its regional/chronological variations

VI. Movement of bodies of soldiers; some statistics on average rates according to a. Numbers and types of men, animals, vehicles b. Terrain and routes c. Number of stops d. Weather

One area in which this model can be applied is in the case of victualling requirements of soldiers. Historical accounts exist that contain the average caloric intake or provisioning of soldiers in various eras, and that data can be used to estimate the requirements for any army while on campaign when records themselves are insufficient.

Engels was the first to employ this model and Erdkamp expanded the method in his own work. Combined, the caloric estimates they relied upon were:

77

Cal/day Description 3240 132 lb individual “on the march”244 3402 120 lb individual carrying a moderate load for 8 hours a day245 3600 US soldier in combat, 1972246 4000 143 lb “exceptionally active” individual 247 Table 1: Engels and Erdkamp caloric demands of soldiers “on the march”

Erdkamp also provided data by weight regarding grain consumption from ancient sources since this commodity was a staple of many armies’ provisioning248:

Source Context Corn/month Demand /day Herodotus Xerxes’ army 52.8 lbs 1.76 lbs. Thucydides Spartan army 94.6 lbs 3.15 lbs. Polybius Roman army 58.3 lbs 1.94 lbs. Table 2: Erdkamp grain requirements from ancient sources

These figures can be compared to soldiers’ rations in later centuries249:

Bread/day Meat/day General estimate, 16th-18th cent. 1.50 lbs. bread 1.00 lb meat, cheese, or fish Ottoman army, 17th cent. 1.54 lbs. biscuit Russian army, 18th cent. 1.76 lbs. rye bread British Army, American Revolution 1.00 lbs. bread German Soldiers, 19th cent. 1.54 lbs. bread .83 lbs. meat (2.20 lbs. when meat not issued) US soldier, 20th cent. 3.6 lbs. bread Table 3: Erdkamp additional ration information

244 Erdkamp, Hunger and the Sword, 29. This number is based upon FAO/WHO estimates and Erdkamp notes that these estimates are often criticized for being inflated. 245 Engels, Alexander the Great, 123. 246 Engels, Alexander the Great, 123. 247 Erdkamp, Hunger and the Sword, 29. This number is based upon FAO/WHO estimates. 248 Erdkamp, Hunger and the Sword, 43. 249 Erdkamp, Hunger and the Sword, 43-44. 78

Finally, L. Foxhall and H.A. Forbes in their article on staple foods in the ancient period provided a chart of solders’ grain consumption provided by various sources250:

Ancient Weight Description Source Recipient Measure (kg) Cals Spartans at Per man Sphacteria Thucydides, Book IV Adult Male per day 0.839 2,803 Spartan Slaves, Per man Sphacteria Thucydides, Book IV Adult Male per day 0.698 2,320 Athenian Prisoners, Per man Syracuse Thucydides, Book VII Adult Male per day 3.86 1,289 Per man Roman Infantry Polybius, Book VI Adult Male per month 26.9 2,990 Per man Roman Cavalry Polybius, Book VI Adult Male per month 80.559 8,969 Roman Allied Per man Cavalry Polybius, Book VI Adult Male per month 53.7 5,979 Cato's Slaves (workers, Per man summer) De Agri Cultura, 56 Adult Male per month 26.619 5,979 Cato's Slaves Per man (workers, winter) De Agri Cultura, 56 Adult Male per month 29.945 2,964 Cato's Slaves Adult Per man (administrators) De Agri Cultura, 56 Male/Female per month 19.964 3,334 Table 4: Foxhall and Forbes Soldier Grain Consumption As will be done in this study, a historian studying logistics applies these various statistics to his or her period of study in order to estimate the demands of an army while on campaign. Data may not always be available but approximations can be chosen with proper justification and applied successfully to obtain reliable estimates.

For example, when considering the medieval soldier, the estimated demand of

3,240 calories per day for a 132 lb individual “on the march” could suit the infantry

250 L. Foxhall, H.A. Forbes, “Σιτομετρεία: The Role of Grain as a Staple Food in Classical Antiquity,” Chiron, Vol. 12 (1982), 41-90. 79 forces on the campaign while the 3,600 calorie demand best suits mounted heavy cavalry.

Although they were riding, not walking, they were wearing heavy chainmail and from a social class that as a rule consumed a high-protein diet. This would make medieval heavy cavalry similar to modern U.S. soldiers in their physical size and their daily caloric demands. While engaging in a siege, however, an estimate of 3,402 calories can be used because soldiers were mostly sedentary (infantrymen and heavy cavalry alike) and thus exerted less energy on a daily basis.

With this data in mind, one can what heavy cavalrymen and infantrymen require:

CALORIC TOTAL SOLDIER # REQUIREMENT/DAY CAL/DAY Infantry 100 3,240 324,000 Heavy Cavalry 100 3,600 360,000 684,000

Table 5: Single day caloric requirements for 200 soldiers

Using these estimated requirements, a historian would determine that 200 soldiers required 684,000 calories of foodstuffs per day, which was met according to what a medieval kingdom generally provided for its soldiers (such as grain, meat, or cheeses).Using the caloric content of these provisions, one could then determine how much of each item was needed to meet an army’s daily requirements.

Another method is to estimate rations using those provided in other eras. A sack of grain contained 280lbs of grain and so an army would require three sacks a day to meet the army’s daily needs:

80

Soldier Caloric Grain # On March Total lbs Demand Demand Needed Heavy cavalry 3600 cal/day 3.9 lbs/day 100 390 Infantryman 3240 cal/day 3.5 lbs./day 100 350 Table 6: Grain demands of soldiers on the march

A significant concern beyond feeding men was providing food and fodder for horses. These horses were used, not only for transporting soldiers, but also for pulling the baggage train. Although in many cases records that would indicate how many horses were on campaign do not survive, heavy cavalry, some types of infantrymen, and baggage trains would all require animals of some kind, which had to be fed as well:

Grain Fodder (hay/straw) Horse doing moderate work251 10-12 lbs./day 10-12 lbs./day Horse doing hard work252 12-16 lbs./day 12-16 lbs./day Straßburgh, 14th cent.253 15.1 lbs./day French army, mid 18th cent.254 17.9 lbs./day 17.6 lbs./day Table 7: Daily caloric requirements of horses on campaign

Therefore, if a medieval army had 7,000 horses while on campaign with a requirement of

12 lbs of grain and fodder per day, the army would need to carry or forage for over

84,000 lbs of each daily. Such significant needs are one major reason why medieval armies, without organized supply systems, could not long sustain sieges.

While all of these numbers are purely theoretical, they can help the historian studying logistics to understand the scale of a given campaign. They can also serve as a

251 Engels, Alexander the Great, 126. 252 Engels, Alexander the Great, 126. 253 Erdkamp, Hunger and the Sword, 44-45. 254 Erdkamp, Hunger and the Sword, 44-45 81 barometer of an army’s organization or a government’s efficacy, or even in the case of shortages, the extent to which an army relied upon forage to meet its provisioning needs.

Caution must be used, however, when attempting to utilize the modern caloric content of food to analyze medieval daily intake. Industrialization and centuries of selective farming have increased, not only the per- yield of crops, but also the caloric intensity of agricultural produce. That is to say nothing of the potential effects of genetically modifying crops. In short, medieval food was not as high in its caloric content as modern food. This means that medieval populations had to consume more food to meet the demands of a high-intensity lifestyle.

Because of this, historians must demonstrate caution when analyzing the potential daily caloric intake based upon recorded medieval daily allotments of victuals. For example, records exist noting the victuals collected to support a 4,000-man English naval expedition to Scotland in 1337-38.255 As the chart on the following page shows, when broken down into allotments per man using the modern caloric content of given victuals, the daily intake of an English sailor in 1337-38 was nearly 8,200 calories per day. Now consider the medieval English male himself: men averaged 5’7” and while average weight cannot be reliably determined by the analysis of recovered human remains, as historian Paul B. Newman pointed out, most medieval records and illustrations support the likelihood of a lean and physically active population.256 Using modern ideal height and weight charts this would indicate an average weight of 150-160lbs.

255 Prestwich, Armies and Warfare, 247-248. 256 Paul B. Newman, Growing up in the Middle Ages (Jefferson, NC: McFarland & Company, Inc., 2007), 242. 82

4000 men, cereal to ITEM lbs/unit total lbs cal/lb Total cal 4 months bread ratio 510lbs wheat (qtr) 5,400 480 2,592,000 1,175 3,045,600,000 bread/qtr 336lbs barley (qtr) 8,250 336 2,772,000 1,050 2,910,600,000 bread/qtr beans & 2,400 430 1,032,000 367 378,744,000 peas (qtrs) ale (tons) 60 216 12,960 1,557 20,178,720 bacons 12,960 60 777,600 1,506 1,171,065,600 herrings 594,000 0.5 297,000 717 212,949,000 stockfish 32,400 6.6 213,840 372 79,548,480 cheese 9,072 14.0 127,008 1,826 231,916,608 (stones) TOTALcal 8,050,602,408 cal/man/day 8,192 Table 8: Daily caloric intake of medieval sailors based upon modern caloric content

Yet as indicated above, the U.S. Army’s daily caloric allotment for a highly active infantryman in 1972 was only 3,600 calories. Americans, moreover, are taller and heavier than even their modern European counterparts, as the CDC indicates that as of 2010 the average height and weight of an American man is 5’9.3” and 195.5lbs.257 Although two may not seem significant, the additional 35lbs cast a doubtful light upon the possibility that shorter and leaner medieval English peasants would require more than twice as many calories per day as a taller, heavier modern American infantrymen.

A more extreme illumination of this problem is the modern Japanese sumo wrestler, who averages 6’ tall and 340 lbs: not only does he consume a diet full of complex carbohydrates, low-fat protein, and vegetables much like a medieval peasant,

257 CD Fryar, Q Gu, CL Ogden, et. al., “Anthropometric reference data for children and adults: United States, 2007–2010,” National Center for Health Statistics. Vital Health Statistics, 11(252) (2012), 10, 16. 83 but his daily caloric intake is on average 6,000 calories per day.258 Because it is highly unlikely that a medieval English sailor would require 2,000 more calories daily than a modern Japanese summon wrestler who is five inches taller and as much as 200lbs heavier, medieval historians should extrapolate potential victualling demands based upon established allotments rather than potential daily caloric intake.

This thesis employs that method. Admittedly such estimates can be highly speculative, but they are more reliable than caloric-based approximations. Moreover, when used properly, such modeling can bridge the gaps of medieval records and reveal the logistical organization of which armies in the Middle Ages were entirely capable.

CONCLUSIONS

Verbuggen, Bachrach, DeVries, Rogers and many other contemporary historians have proven that medieval commanders “knew exactly what they were about” in their

“careful planning of campaigns and battles which emphasized coherent manoeuvre and tactical plans.”259 Although the study of military history, and logistics as an extension of that, was rehabilitated years after effective work was completed on other topics in medieval studies, Oman, Delbrück, and van Creveld have since been deposed as authorities on their chosen subject matter.

Not only could medieval armies execute coordinated tactical plans as elements of strategic goals, but they were capable of organized logistics that could support their operational objectives. Those historians who have focused on logistics specifically have

258 Paul Insel, Don Ross, Kimberly McMahon, and Melissa Berstein, Nutrition (Burlington, MA: Jones and Bartlett Learning, 2013), 323. 259 Matthew Bennet, “General Preface” in Verbruggen, The Art of Warfare, ix. 84 established that logistics should be at the center of any discussion of military effectiveness, and that medieval armies were fully aware of that realty. Those who have also employed logistical modeling prove that historians can solve the problem of source availability through careful estimates of an army’s provisioning needs.

This is especially true for Edward III during the opening phase of the Hundred

Years War, as well when considering how the English Crown adapted to the devastating event that was the Black Death. But before one can consider how the government survived one of the most destructive plagues in human history, one must first analyze how the Crown operated before the pandemic. It is to that discussion that we now turn.

85

Chapter 4: The Art of Feeding Mars

The organization of supplies was not a topic for the chroniclers. H.J. Hewitt260

INTRODUCTION

One need barely crack the cover of T.F.Tout’s influential six-volume Chapters in the Administrative History of Medieval England to appreciate the complexity of the government that Edward III inherited upon his coronation in 1327.261 His subjects possessed an increasingly distinctive “national” identity and were becoming more involved in matters outside the kingdom, particularly in relation to commercial pursuits.

The growing need for administrative records, city charters, financial accounts, and trade agreements fueled the emergence of a progressively literate population and an ever- evolving administration.262 At the same time, the English possessed a tangible dislike for foreigners, not only for clerical envoys appointed by the Pope or alien royal advisors but also for merchants from the Continent who did business throughout the country.263

260 Hewitt, The Organization of War, 50. 261 Tout, Chapters in the Administrative History. 262 While a great deal of work has been done on this subject, M.T. Clanchy’s From Memory to Written Record: 1066-1307 (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1979) is the classic study of the growth of literacy in England. See also: Nicholas Orme, “Lay Literacy in England, 1100-1300,” in England and Germany in the High Middle Ages, Alfred Haverkamp and Hanna Vollrath, eds. (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1996), 35-56. 263 For example, attacks on foreigners residing in London in 1311-12 caused many to leave the capital for other nearby ports (Nicholas, Medieval Flanders, 206). 86

This chapter will explore how the king and his government collected from this society the finances, manpower, and supplies required to wage war. Because the success of any army relies upon its logistical organization, such elements are essential to analyze when studying the effectiveness of any army on campaign. Too often, however, statistical data are presented without any contextual comparison or sense of scale, rendering that information impressive but generally meaningless; collecting 1,500 horses for a campaign in France may appear extraordinary, but if compared to a previous campaign that included 5,000, this number seems far less so. To avoid this common pitfall, 1329— an early year of Edward III’s reign in which no military campaigns took place—will serve as a base year to provide that scale and context. In so doing, we will not only understand the extent of Edward III’s military might, but how he continued to wield his proverbial sword despite the greatest pandemic the world has ever seen.

Yet to understand how the English Crown worked during Edward III’s reign, and more importantly whether or not the Black Death changed that operation, one must make some attempt to understand the system Edward had at his disposal.

THE ENGLISH GOVERNMENT

Governing England in the fourteenth century was the English Crown, which can be roughly organized into three major groups: the , legal/financial bodies, and Parliament.264 All emerged from the , or the king’s council, and their

264 J.H. Johnson, “The King’s and Household,” in William A. Morris, “Introduction,” in James F. Willard and William A. Morris, eds., The English Government at Work, 1327-1336 , V.I (Cambridge: The Medieval Academy of America, 1940), 206-249. Tout, Chapters in the Administrative History. 87 jurisdiction was far from defined; Tout’s Administrative History makes perfectly clear the vast overlap within Crown administration during the reign of the three Edwards. As he pointed out, “sharp differentiation between the various aspects of the action of the state

Figure 5: Structure of the medieval English Crown265

265 This diagram and the subsequent discussion of government structure are based primarily upon Tout’s six volumes although his three entities are the Exchequer, the Household, and the Chancery. Volume I is particularly significant as it discusses the origins and role of: the king’s council, the Wardrobe, the Household, the chamber, royal seals, the Exchequer, and the Treasury, Volumes II and III trace the evolution of these various offices through the medieval period while Volume IV further delves into the differences between the Great and Privy Wardrobe while Volume V explores the various royal seals and their use. This discussion is a cursory one as Tout correctly points out that “the systematic investigation of the central administration of the English monarchy in the thirteenth and fourteenth centuries would be beyond the powers of any single scholar who is not prepared to devote a long lifetime to the task” (Tout, Chapters in the Administrative History, I:10). 88

was foreign to the medieval mind” and it was only by the fourteenth century that “the most rudimentary distinction” was made between the different branches of government, and between the king’s personal power and the authority of the Crown.266

The royal household comprised the who oversaw the king’s private affairs, the Keeper of the who controlled the king’s Great Seal, the Lord High

Steward who supervised the royal household, the Keeper of the Wardrobe who administered royal expenditure, and the and Treasurer who oversaw the

Chancery and Exchequer respectively.267 These men had deputies who physically carried out their obligations and Tout noted that the king’s household “habitually” overlapped both the Chancery and the Exchequer in both their functions and responsibilities.268

The largest portion of the Crown dealt with legal and financial administration.

The King’s Bench enforced English while the Exchequer of Pleas dealt with equity and the Court of Common Pleas arbitrated civil disputes between subjects.269 The two most important legal entities, however, were the Chancery (directed by the

Chancellor) and the Treasurer’s responsibility, the Exchequer.

The Chancery was responsible for recording all government activity. This department predated the Norman Conquest and eventually began producing meticulous records of Crown dealings. The Charter Rolls, Close Rolls, and Patent Rolls recorded that business, along with the work of the Court of the Chancery, which handled related legal

266 Tout, Chapters in Administrative History, I: 4. 267 The Keeper of the Wardrobe had two deputies referred to as the Controller and the Cofferer. Tout, Chapters in the Administrative History, I: 4. 268 Tout, Chapters in the Administrative History, I: 4. 269 Tout, Chapters in the Administrative History, I: 177-178. 89 disputes.270 These records are abundant, and can provide a wonderful view of medieval

English Crown behavior.

The two houses of the Exchequer were overseen by the Treasurer and handled government revenue. The Treasurer’s deputy was the Chancellor of the Exchequer and together they monitored county officials as they reported revenue to the Lower house.

Once recorded, the amounts were verified by the Upper house and then recorded in the

Pipe Rolls.271 Like the Chancery, the Exchequer also possessed its own court, which handled cases relevant to its work.272

The English Parliament is an obvious descendent of the curia regis. This body, which began as an informal group of royal advisors and grew into a major locus of

Crown authority, predates Anglo-Saxon King Æthelstan's assemblies in the tenth century.273 Tout correctly pointed out that one should not overestimate Parliament’s independent authority during the reign of the three Edwards; at the time it was entirely reliant upon the king’s discretion to meet and within his right to end at any time.274

Parliament was not powerless, however, given that Magna Carta required consent to grant taxes, which by the fourteenth century included the subsidy as well as customs on exported goods. Because the three Edwards relied upon these to fund their military

270 Tout, Chapters in the Administrative History, I: 12-14. 271 The amounts were recorded on tallies, or wooden sticks with notches cut into them recording the amounts being reported. This tally was then turned over to the clerks of the Upper Exchequer, who verified the information. Perroy, The Hundred Years War, 53. 272 G.L. Harriss, “Budgeting at the Medieval Exchequer,” in War, Government and Aristocracy in the , c. 1150-1500: Essays in Honour of Michael Prestwich, Chris Given-Wilson, et. al., eds. (Rochester, NY: The Boydell Press, 2008), 179-196. 273 Tout, Chapters in the Administrative History, I: 4. Madicott, The Origins of the English Parliament, 2-6. Gerald L. Harriss, “War and the Emergence of the English Parliament, 1297-1360,” in The Wars of Edward III: Sources and Interpretations, Cliff Rogers, ed. (Rochester, NY: Boydell Press, 1999), 321-341. 274 Tout, Chapters in the Administrative History, I: 5. 90 campaigns, it can be argued that war was (at least in part) responsible for the emergence of Parliament as a formidable political body. As Gerald L. Harriss wrote,

Because parliament had an inescapable obligation to grant taxation for common defense, the Common sought to limit this to periods of open war, and to criticize and control the handling and expenditure of the tax…. In these matters the Commons were forced into a defensive dialogue with the Crown over their obligations which educated them in political argument and the techniques of parliamentary opposition.275

Although the constant financial pressure generated by the Hundred Years War arguably led to an absolutist political structure in France, in England it bestowed upon Parliament a permanent role in English administration.276

On the local level, the most important administrative officer was the . His role in was so crucial that the historians who attempted to streamline Tout’s work in the

1940’s—J.F. Willard and William A. Morris—devoted an entire chapter to describing his various responsibilities.277

Sheriffs were required to be “a landholder who was not the bailiff or a lord, by politics to be an adherent to the ruling group, and by administrative necessity to be a person of some executive ability and dependability.”278 Chosen by the Crown (or even the king directly upon occasion), they were responsible for maintaining public order and they oversaw courts that handled both civil and criminal affairs.279 They supported the work of county coroners, were responsible for administering Crown lands, purveyed

275 Harriss, “War,” 321. 276 Harriss, “War,” 339. 277 William A. Morris, “The Sheriff,” in James F. Willard and William A. Morris, eds., The English Government at Work, 1327-1336, V.II (Cambridge: The Medieval Academy of America, 1947), 41-108. Although the three edited volumes compiled by Morris and Willard are exceptional resources, they do not surpass Tout’s masterful work in either scope or diligence. 278 Marris, “The Sheriff,” 48. 279 Joseph R. Strayer, “Introduction,” in William A. Morris and Joseph R. Strayer, eds., The English Government at Work, 1327-1336, V.II (Cambridge: The Medieval Academy of America, 1947), 15-17. 91

goods or services for royal use, and executed writs issued by the Crown. They collected

Crown taxes and reported their expenses to the Exchequer on a yearly basis. Lastly, when

Parliament was called by the king, sheriffs oversaw the elections which decided who

would attend as representative for the area.

In medieval England, the office of sheriff helped tie the people to their monarch,

and English kings used their right of appointment to their advantage; Richard Heiser

accurately noted that for kings, “the sheriff’s office was vitally important to political

stability and survival.”280

Sheriffs

Law Justices of the Peace Local Government Enforcement Justices of Assize

Local Law Shire Courts Courts Coroners

Figure 6: English administration on the local level

At the apex of this complex and often problematic hierarchy was the king.281 This

entire administrative system emerged from the king’s personal royal council (curia regis)

280 Richard Heiser, “The Sheriffs of Richard I: Trends of Management as Seen in the Shrieval Appointments from 1189 to 1194,” The Haskins Society Journal: Studies in Medieval History, V.4 (1992), 119. 281 Sumption goes so far as to argue that the English government was “more elaborate than that of France and penetrating further into the recesses of provincial life” (Trial by Battle, 44). 92 and in the fourteenth century there was little distinction between “public” and

“private.”282 Royal officials were “attempting to ensure that the direction of public affairs should be in the hands of great officers of state who would be a upon the arbitrary exercise of royal power.”283 Yet the three Edwards still retained fairly autonomous royal prerogative, which they used to enforce their will whenever possible.284

One of the king’s most important roles was as the supreme commander of the military. By the beginning of Edward III’s reign, English armies were formed by various combinations of feudal obligation, commissions of array, and a system of hire referred to as indenture.285 Their success relied upon the king’s personal ability to organize and finance his armies in the field. Edward I did this mainly by spending the Wardrobe funds appropriated from the Exchequer by the Chamberlain. In later decades, the Wardrobe stratified into the Great Wardrobe, which oversaw household expenses, and the

Household Wardrobe, which handled the king’s army and military expenditure.286

The king himself often commanded his soldiers in the field and relied upon his nobles, along with their retinues, to serve under him. Formal offices included the marshal, , and . The marshal and constable were responsible for monitoring the king’s horses; in the field the marshal oversaw the king’s cavalry with the

282 As Tout explains, many of those offices became formally defined elements of the king’s council during the reign of Henry III (Tout, Chapters in the Administrative History, I: 177-187. 283 J.H. Johnson, “The King’s Wardrobe and Household,” in James F. Willard and William A. Morris, eds., The English Government at Work, 1327-1336 , V.I (Cambridge: The Medieval Academy of America, 1940), 206. 284 Johnson, “The King’s Wardrobe and Household,” 206. 285 William A. Morris, “Introduction,” in James F. Willard and William A. Morris, eds., The English Government at Work, 1327-1336 , V.I (Cambridge: The Medieval Academy of America, 1940), 11. Albert E. Prince, “The Army and Navy,” in James F. Willard and William A. Morris, eds., The English Government at Work, 1327-1336, V.I (Cambridge: The Medieval Academy of America, 1940), 332-393. 286 Tout, Chapters in Administrative History, IV: 97. 93 constable acting as adjutant. In practice both positions were hereditary and those men who served belonged to powerful English noble lines. Admirals were appointed at times of war to appropriate shipping for military use and then command them in combat.287

This position was created during the reign of Edward I and Edward III relied upon these officials heavily to move his military forces to the Continent.

Every facet of English Crown administration helped kings wage war. It must therefore be analyzed when attempting to understand how Edward III found military success in France, and how Edward III achieved victory on the Continent despite the outbreak of the Black Death.

FUNDING WAR

The early modern Italian general Raimondo Montecuccoli once quipped that “to

wage war, you need first of all money; second, you need money, and third, you also

need money.”288 This was certainly true in medieval England where the government

used any means at its disposal to gather the financial resources needed to wage war.

Revenue from the royal , regular and irregular taxes, loans from national or

287 Maryanne Kowaleski thoroughly traces the practice of appropriating merchant shipping for military endeavors in the fourteenth century. The Cinque Ports were the earliest ports called upon to provide merchant shipping for the Crown. These ports were a confederation of south-eastern port towns which owned 57 manned ships for two weeks of service a year in return for a number of privileges and tax exemptions. They could not meet this quota during Edward III’s reign, however, both because of silting and because the constant warfare before his reign and during it imposed financial hardships the ports could not successfully endure (Maryanne Kowaleski, “Warfare, Shipping, and Crown Patronage: The Impact of the Hundred Years War on the Port Towns of Medieval England” in Money, Markets and Trade in Late Medieval Europe, Larwin Armstrong, Ivana Elbl, and Martin M. Elbl, eds. (Boston: Brill, 2007), 233-254). 288 Among other things, Montecucculi (1609-1680) served in the Austrian army and was a prince of the Holy Roman Empire. Although most of his work is unpublished, his Memorie della guerre was published in 1703. Roger Gard’s 1996 translation of Alfred de Vigny’s Servitude et grandeur militaries (New York: Penguin Books, 1996), reports the quote as “For war you need three things: 1. Money. 2. Money. 3. Money” (n.52, 183-184). 94 international merchants, and well as the extremely profitable exploitation of commodity exports, helped kings acquire the financial resources they required.289 English kings in the thirteenth century became increasingly proficient at utilizing these methods to fund their various campaigns, and Edward III took this practice to a new level. It can easily be said that no one was more adept at squeezing every last drop of money out of his kingdom than Edward III.

In addition to revenue gained from royal demesne (both rural and urban referred to as socage), one major source of military funding was taxation. There was no version of a government budget, collection was often problematic, and subjects frequently objected to their levying, but England had an established tradition of taxation that pre- dated the Norman Conquest.290 The Crown used that revenue to pay for royal household expenses, knights for royal retinues, stipendarii (soldiers hired for specific campaigns), and the -rente, a standard payment to vassals for their military service.291 As military demand increased, the number of taxes levied increased as well.

Scutage, or scutagium, is one of the earliest taxes by which English kings gained funds for war.292 Although the term could apply to dowry or ransom payments, it most often indicated payments made by a knight in lieu of military service to support a man- at-arms for 40 days. While an early example of English paid military service, it was not unique as in the late Roman Empire landed individuals could pay 25 soldi to the

289 G.L. Harriss, King, Parliament, and Public Finance in Medieval England to 1369 (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1976). 290 Harriss, “Budgeting at the Medieval Exchequer.” The Anglo-Saxon land tax, the danegeld, was the first such tax in Europe since the Roman era (C. Warren Hollister, The Military Organization of Norman England (Oxford: The Clarendon Press, 1965), 169-170). 291 Hollister, The Military Organization, 171-190. 292 The term derives from the term scuta, meaning “shield”. An important development in military funding, C. Warren Hollister devoted an entire chapter to the practice. Prestwich, Armies and Warfare, 57-82. 95 emperor rather than provide conscripts for the army and later Anglo-Saxon kings levied the fyrdwite for default of military service.293 In Merovingian France a fee of five to 60 soldi was established for ignoring a military summons and by the eleventh century soldiers in the Holy Roman Empire paid a tax to avoid military service.294 The

Merovingian tax continued until the thirteenth century and French kings took advantage of the rising wealth of cities in the twelfth when they created the arrière-ban, a tax that replaced the responsibility of providing soldiers for general levies.295

Scutage was first levied consistently during Henry I’s reign but Henry II was the first to use it more regularly to purchase supplies and manpower for military campaigns.296 Henry II’s sons Richard and John continued the practice, the latter’s successive levies one of the many complaints against him in the Baron’s Revolt. Magna

Carta addressed the tax explicitly and made an attempt to require that the king have the consent of a knights’ council before being called. This failed and Henry III set the tax at

40s to fund his military endeavors.297

Scutage fell out of favor in the late thirteenth century as unpaid service died out and the set value (40s) became insufficient to pay for a man-at-arms for the 40-day term.

Edward I only levied scutage three times—1282, 1301, and 1306—while Edward II did

293 This Roman fine was part of a larger military tax called the aurum tironicum The difference between the fyrdwitte and scutage was that areas usually paid the fine for not providing levies of soldiers required by the king’s request rather than individuals in the case of scutage. Prestwich, Armies and Warfare, 57-82 294 The wealthiest subjects generally owed 60 soldi while untitled noblemen were fined on a scale in accordance with their financial status. 295 Hollister, The Military Organization, 192. 296 Scutage payments were recorded in the but only one Pipe Roll from Henry I’s reign survives (that of 1130). Only ecclesiastical payments were recorded in this role, but it is possible that laymen were also levied at other times and the records are now lost. Hollister, The Military Organization, 195-200. 297 Henry III relied so heavily upon the tax that he levied it in 1223, 1224, 1230, 1242, 1245, and 1257 (List of Chancery Rolls preserved in the Public Record Office, XXVII (: Printed for his Majesty’s Stationary Office, 1908),57). Hollister, The Military Organization, 213-215. 96 so only once.298 Isabella and Mortimer levied it on Edward III’s behalf to support the

1328 Scottish campaign, although the full assessment was never collected and its call was widely unpopular.299 When Edward attempted to collect the arrears to raise funds for his 1338-1340 expedition, it was so unsuccessful that he abandoned the attempt.300

Carucage and were also levied for military purposes. was introduced by Richard I to replace the danegeld and was a property tax based upon the number of carucates—the area a team of eight oxen could cover in a single season— someone possessed.301 Tallage, a tax on personal property developed from levies on royal manors, was notably used to help raise Richard I’s ransom in 1194.302 Neither tax was levied regularly, and met with such resistance when they were that Parliament eventually outlawed them in exchange for granting Edward III subsidies in 1340.303

Legal courts were another source of Crown revenue. One such source was the eyre, a body of judges who traveled around the country to try felonies and administer

Crown justice. Henry I created the practice but it became fully evolved under Henry II who used it to reinforce Crown authority.304 Specifically eyres performed tasks such as levying fines for legal or feudal violations, or collected assessed taxes that were in arrears.305 Because of these powers the eyre became increasingly unpopular and was

298 List of Chancery Rolls, 57. 299 Prince, “Army and Navy,” 344-345. 300 For an example, see: CCR, 1337-1339, 266, 268, 278, 285, 385, 415, 536. Edward III, 193-200. 301 F.M. Stenton, “Introduction,” in C.W. Foster and T. Longley, The Domesday and the Lindsey Survey (Lincoln Record Society, XIX, 1924). On average, on carucate was 120 . 302 Prestwich, War, Politics and Finance, 222-223 303 Tout, Chapters in the Administrative History, III:105 304 Clay Kinsner, “Eyre,” in Ronald H. Fritze and William Baxter Robinson, eds., Historical Dictionary of Late Medieval England, 1272-1485 (Westport, CT: Greenwood Publishing Group, Inc., 2002), 201-202. 305 Bryant, “The Financial Dealings,” 761. 97 eventually canceled in 1294 by Edward I.306 It was called only once more by Isabella and Mortimer in 1329-1330, but brought so much opposition that when Edward took personal control of the Crown, he ended the practice for good.307 Although the Crown continued to gain revenue from other courts, none operated with the eyre’s unilateral authority or jurisdiction.

One of the Crown’s most prominent methods of collecting the funds it needed for war was direct taxation of moveable goods and chattels.308 Moveable goods constituted all personal property that could be transferred from place to place: oxen, cows, grain, household goods, etc.. Juries of local villagers overseen by sheriffs or other centrally- appointed officials assessed the value of each resident’s movables, and then officials collected the set percentage value of those goods, typically six to 15 percent (referred to as a 15th). These amounts, named the subsidy, were then reported to the Lower

Exchequer, generally by the sheriff, before being confirmed and recorded in the Pipe

Rolls by the clerks of the Upper Exchequer.309 Although the subsidy may have been created earlier, Henry III made clear use of the tax four times between 1225 and 1269 at varying percentages.310

306 Kinsner, “Eyre,” 202. 307 W.N. Bryant, “The Financial Dealings of Edward III with the County Communities, 1330-1360,” The English Historical Review, Vol. 83, No. 329 (October 1968), 761-763. In October of 1348 Edward planned to institute an eyre in Kent, and even selected judges for the job, but canceled his plans soon after (Bryant, “The Financial Dealings,” 764). 308 Christian Liddy, War, Politics and Finance in Late Medieval English Towns (Suffolk: Boydell & Brewer Ltd., 2005), 19. 309 Liddy, War, Politics and Finance, 4-5. 310 James Field Willard, Parliamentary Taxes on Personal Property 1290 to 1334 (Cambridge, MA: The Medieval Academy of America, 1934), 3. 98

The tax really came into its own during the reign of the three Edwards. Edward I instituted the tax nine times during his reign, after 1290 at differing urban and rural percentages, collecting more than £530,000 altogether:

£140,000

£120,000 £116,346

£100,000 £81,054 £81,838 £80,000

£60,000 £52,870 £49,755 £42,765 £38,485 £40,000 £34,419 £34,777

£20,000

£0 1275 1283 1290 1294 1295 1296 1297 1301 1306

Figure 7: Subsidy totals during the reign of Edward I311

The largest attempted assessment of Edward I’s reign was the 1283 30th, but problematic collection only yielded £42,765. No year saw greater returns than 1290 when the 15th brought in £116,346 12s 11.5d, but the pressure of continued subsidies weighed upon the population, causing the effectiveness of each subsequent collection to decrease over time. The collected percentages during Edward I’s reign were312:

 1275 = 15th countrywide  1283 = 30th countrywide

311 Prestwich, Edward I, 179. 312 Prestwich, Edward I, 179. 99

 1290 = 15th countrywide  1294 = 10th rural and 16th urban  1295 = 11th and 17th urban  1296 = 12th and 8th urban  1297 = 9th rural and urban  1301 = 15th rural and urban  1306 = 13th rural and 20th urban

Edward II also levied the subsidy seven times during his reign. The funds raised helped Edward to pay off his father’s debts, as well as those incurred during his campaigns against the Scottish, the French, and his own nobility. These large subsidies undoubtedly contributed to the ill will against him, and the tax itself to a lesser extent313:

 1309 = 25th countrywide  1313 = 20th urban and 15th rural  1315 = 20th urban and 15th rural  1316 = 16th urban and 15th rural  1319 = 18th urban and 12th rural  1322 = 10th urban and 6th rural

This ill will, along with a general perception that tax collectors were corrupt, was why in 1334 a new method of assessment was adopted. The lay subsidy was set at a rural

15th and an urban 10th, and the value collected (£38,170) became the expected sum at every subsequent collection until the tax was eliminated in 1632.314 Although the

Exchequer negotiated periodic forgiveness of these fines (resulting in a small total yield for the subsidy), but the ideal value and its percentages never changed.

Socage and those taxes sketched above were not substantial enough to pay for the

Crown’s routine expenses, let alone for military campaigns. The subsidies helped but

313 James H. Ramsay, “Statistics from Subsidy Rolls of Edward II,” EHR, Vol. 24, No. 94 (April 1909), 317-319. 314 Willard, Parliamentary Taxes, 5-6. 100 could not cover costs completely, and kings disliked requesting them because calling

Parliament meant that they often had to exchange the right to collect the subsidy for concessions on other issues. Although the answer to these financial problems would be to create new additions to the yearly revenue, Parliament blocked such attempts.315

English kings therefore turned to another source of potential revenue: the king’s hereditary right to regulate trade. The Crown’s collection of customs for exported goods dates back to the reign of Henry II, when certain ports were established as inspection points for merchant shipping.316 Crown officials who answered to the Exchequer collected a standard set value or “prise,” either for the king’s need (ad opus Regis) or the king’s use (al use le Roi).317 These officials were members of an emerging urban middle class, and were often merchants, mayors, bailiffs, or clerks. 318 These individuals completed one of the following tasks: collectors who gathered the customs; deputy butlers who collected the duty on wine; pesagers and tronagers who weighed goods that were assessed by weight; and controllers who oversaw these assessments and recorded the yields for the Lower and Upper Exchequer.319

Dating from the origin of the assessment, there were two types of custom: the

Antique Custuma and Nova Custuma. The Ancient Custom was defined as “the value, intrinsic or specific, of any portion of the Custom-revenue that was adjusted at the

315 Joseph R. Strayer, “Introduction,” in William A. Morris and Joseph R. Strayer, eds., The English Government at Work, 1327-1336, V.II (Cambridge: The Medieval Academy of America, 1947), 12. 316 Hubert Hall, A History of the Custom-Revenue in England from the earliest times to the year 1827 (London: Elliot Stock, 1885), 58. 317 Hall, A History of the Custom-Revenue, 60-61. 318 Strayer, “Introduction,” 28. One example of this is John de Barton, a king’s clerk from Hull who was in the customs service but was also a burgess and a Parliamentary representative. He makes frequent appearances in the state papers from the early years of Edward III’s reign (ex: CPR, 1327-1330, 57, 549). 319 Strayer, “Introduction,” 28. 101 discretion of the Crown, according to its necessities.”320 Traditionally this value was set at a half mark per sack of wool, a mark per last of hides, and 3d on every twenty solidi of led and tin. The rate was then set during Edward I’s reign at 6s 8d or 13s 4d depending upon the commodity in question. The New Custom referred to any value added to this base amount, such as the 3d added to the export fee for luxury goods.321

This system continued with little alteration until 1303 when the Carta Mercatoria was established. Under the terms of this agreement, foreign merchants could operate freely in England if they paid these cash fees in addition to the Ancient Custom322:

 1s per quintal of wax  2s per piece or ‘pannus’ of cloth of grain  1s 6d per piece of cloth of half-grain  1s per piece of cloth without grain  2s per cask of wine  20s for other miscellaneous trade goods

The Ancient and New Custom were collected separately and by the beginning of the fourteenth century, the combined revenue averaged £20,000 per year. While 25% of this sum was obtained from the trade in wines, cloths, and other miscellaneous goods,

75% was generated from the wool trade. England’s chief raw material, it has been estimated that 30,000 sacks of wool were exported by English merchants per year by

1300 while 10,000 sacks were the responsibility of their foreign counterparts.323

Wool was one of the most important international commodities in the medieval period. Various types of looms were used to convert the wool into textiles and weaving techniques created in the eleventh to thirteenth centuries remained virtually unchanged

320 Hall, A History of the Custom-Revenue, 66. 321 Hall, A History of the Custom-Revenue, 66-68. 322 Hall, A History of the Custom-Revenue, 70-71. 323 Hall, A History of the Custom-Revenue, 73. 102 until labor-saving inventions of the .324 England was known for producing some of the highest-quality wool in Europe. The country’s climate produced several different types of wool at different grades, and Herefordshire’s was regularly the most expensive.325 The earliest known set prices for wool were recorded in a Walloon-

Flemish document produced in the latter half of the thirteenth century, and because of the abundance of high-quality wool in England, its sale was the most important export commodity from which the Crown could benefit.326

English merchants knew how profitable wool was, and made large sums of money through its international trade.327 The Crown was well aware of the reality as well and did what it could to exploit this bountiful resource. They employed an extraordinary tax referred to as the maltolte or “evil tax” because it was seen as an abuse of Crown authority. It was assessed at times when the Crown was in demand of cash—such as during wartime—and was valued at a fifth to as much as a third of the commodity’s total value.328 Edward I made particular use of the maltolte until public opposition led to its

324 John H. Munro, “Textile Technology in the Middle Ages,” in The Dictionary of the Middle Ages, Joseph R. Strayer, ed. et al., Vol. 11 (New York: Charles Scribner’s Sons, 1988), 1-27. 325 Elisabeth Crowfoot, Frances Pritchard, and Lay Staniland, Textiles and Clothing c.1150-1450 (Rochester, NY: The Boydell Press, 2001), 15. The wool on a sheep’s neck was considered the best on the animal and the animal’s color determined its use. John H. Munro, “Wool-Price Schedules and the Qualities of English Wools in the Later Middle Ages, c.1270-1499,” Textile History, Vol. 9 (1978), 118. 326 John H. Munro, “Wool-Price Schedules and the Qualities of English Wools in the Later Middle Ages, c.1270-1499,” Textile History, Vol. 9 (1978), 118, 123. The document was titled Che Sunt Chi Les Abeies d’Engletierre et Ke Leur Lainnes Valent au Mains. 327 W. Mark Ormrod, “The English Crown and the Customs, 1349-63,” EcHR, New Series, Vol. 40, No. 1 (February 1987), 27. John H. Munro, “Textile Workers in the Middle Ages,” in The Dictionary of the Middle Ages, Joseph R. Strayer, ed. et al., Vol. 11 (New York: Charles Scribner’s Sons, 1988), 28. Mabel H. Mills, “The Collectors of Customs,” in James F. Willard and William A. Morris, eds., The English Government at Work, 1327-1336, V.II (Cambridge: The Medieval Academy of America, 1947), 168. 328 Hall, A History of the Custom-Revenue, 67. 103 abolishment. It was replaced in the 1303 by the Carta Mercatoria, which awarded 40s on every sack of wool exported to the Crown.329

Because the ability to wage war hinged upon the king’s ability raise money for his campaigns, and because both regular taxes and the subsidy were inadequate to support the king’s martial needs, the subsidy on wool became integral to English military success in the fourteenth century.330 It relied heavily upon its allies in the wool trade and often pursued policies that ensured England would continue to benefit from that relationship.

Flanders was one such ally.

Even with the sizeable income generated by the above methods, without a standard budget the government often had expenses that outpaced its revenue stream, especially at times of war. The Crown was therefore forced to rely on moneylenders, both foreign and domestic, to cover the difference. Not only did they borrow from English and

Flemish merchants, but from the reign of Edward I until the 1340’s, the primary source of credit was Italian super-companies.

Super-companies were merchant corporations that served as traders and moneylenders throughout Europe in the High Middle Ages. Many were founded in

Florence and historian Michael Prestwich argued this was the case because “they had extensive resources, and had all the financial expertise of the highly developed Italian

329 Hall, A History of the Custom-Revenue, 68-69. Munro, “Wool-Price Schedules,” 168. Strayer, “Introduction.” 330 The international cloth and wool trades were integral to military affairs to such an extent that both the Aragonese and the city-states in northern Italy paid their troops in coin and cloth. The Aragonese, for example, compensated their soldiers with 2/3 coin and 1/3 cloth during the reign of Alfonso V. They came to rely so heavily on upon cloth as a substitute for cash that Alfonso incurred large debts to his cloth merchants for advances on future sales, in one occasion an entire year in advance (Alan Ryder, “Cloth and Credit: Aragonese War Finance in the Mid Fifteenth Century,” War & Society, V.2, N.1 (May 1984), 1-21). 104 economy behind them.”331 Their earliest trade commodity was grain but in the latter half of the thirteenth century they expanded into the wool/cloth market as well, and thus became involved with England.332 By then their efforts generated enough profit to lend money to powerful institutions such as the Papacy, the Plantagenets, the Valois, and the

Angevins. Although this high-risk behavior led to their failure, in their heyday the Italian super-companies were so successful that through Europe they engendered (in the words of historian Ephraim Russell) a “cordial hatred.”333

Their increasing consumption of English wool led to their position as moneylenders to the Crown. The Riccardi of Lucca, for example, loaned over £200,000 to Edward I by 1280 and at one time even assumed the responsibilities of the king’s

Wardrobe. Their loans were integral to English success in Wales given that Edward I generated over £392,000 of debt subjugating the country. Riccardi support ended in 1294 when Philip IV seized all Riccardi property in France due (in part) to their support of the

English. Edward I took the opportunity to seize their English possessions, claiming it as repayment for unpaid obligations.334

Edward I still required loans so he forced English merchants to furnish them until another super-company, the Frescobaldi, stepped up in 1298. By 1314 they lent Edward I and Edward II nearly £150,000, but were so unpopular that when unrest with Piers

331 Prestwich, War, Politics and Finance, 205-206. 332 Edwin S. Hunt, The medieval super-companies: A study of the Peruzzi Company of Florence (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1994), 243. 333 Ephraim Russell, “The Societies of the Bardi and the Peruzzi and their dealings with Edward III,” in Finance and Trade under Edward III, George Unwin, ed. (Manchester: Manchester University Press, 1918), 93. 334 Prestwich, War, Politics and Finance, 205-208. 105

Gaveston came to a head, they fled the country with Edward’s remaining debt unpaid and collapsed soon after.335

The Crown turned to yet another set of super-companies, the Bardi and Peruzzi.

Although the Bardi lent £72,631 to the Crown between 1290 and 1326, only £4,926 was lent before the expulsion of the Frescobaldi. The Peruzzi were even less involved before the reign of Edward III, contributing only £900 to Crown expenses during the reigns of

Edward I and Edward II combined.336 When the Riccardi and Frescobaldi collapsed, however, the Bardi and Peruzzi increased their involvement significantly.

The loans granted by Italian super-companies were handled by the Crown in two separate ways. First, the government would accept a cash advance from the super- company and then pay the company back with cash once the Crown had the requisite amount (or more often, installment payments) available. The other method, which became far more popular in the fourteenth century when the loans became larger, was to accept a cash advance from the super-company and then allow the company to perform government functions in order to earn the value of their loans. This is why in 1287 the

Riccardi assumed the role of the Wardrobe and why at the beginning of Edward III’s reign, he allowed the Bardi and Peruzzi to farm the wool custom to a limit set by the

Crown in exchange for large cash advances.

This practice was frowned upon by English merchants because they felt that their

Italian counterparts were interfering with their business interests and wielding domestic authority they had no right to possess. As Prestwich notes, “aliens were never popular in

335 Prestwich, War, Politics and Finance, 208, 211. 336 Ephraim Russell, “The Societies of the Bardi and the Peruzzi,” 99. 106

England, and a group who were fulfilling some of the functions that had traditionally been performed by the Jews was likely to provoke considerable hostility.”337 Yet the

Crown’s need for funds outweighed these domestic squabbles, and the three Edwards relied so heavily upon the Italian super-companies that the Crown bankrupted nearly every one they relied upon.

As we have seen, by the reign of Edward III the Crown had many avenues it could pursue in order to raise funds for military campaigns. In addition to socage, the

Crown could rely upon fees involved with legal operations, the subsidies granted by

Parliament, customs revenues, and loans granted by merchants, both foreign and domestic. Customs and merchant loans became paramount sources of support for Edward

III, funds that he used to pay for the other necessities of war.

MANNING WAR

England’s population dictated the availability of manpower. Thanks to Domesday, historians reliably estimate that England’s population in 1086 was 1.5 to 2 million people, over half of which lived in the so-called “lowland zone” comprised of eastern and south-eastern England plus Rutland, Huntingdonshire, , and Wiltshire.338

337 Prestwich, War, Politics and Finance, 218. 338 H.E. Hallam, “Population Movements in England, 1086-1350,” in The Agrarian History of England and Wales Vol. II: 1042-1350, Joan Thirsk, ed. (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1988), 508. Many historians address England’s population throughout the medieval period, including 107

Estimated Population In England, 1085-1348 6,000,000

5,000,000

4,000,000

3,000,000

2,000,000 PEOPLE

1,000,000

0

1450 1086 1100 1150 1200 1250 1290 1300 1310 1320 1330 1340 1350 1360 1370 1377 1400 1500 1550 1600 YEAR

Figure 8: Estimated Population in England, 1085-1600339

Yet attempting to estimate the country’s population between this survey and the next semi-accurate benchmark in 1377 (when the first was assessed) is far more difficult. Historians either employ geometric theorems to calculate population growth after 1086 or generate estimates based upon the resources available throughout the country in the years in question.340 In the most recent study performed by the London

School of Economics, historian Bruce M.S. Campbell and others believed that the

339 Stephen Broadberry, Bruce M.S. Campbell, Bas van Leeuwen, “English Medieval Population: reconciling time series and cross sectional evidence,” Reconstructing the National Income of Britain and Holland, c. 1270-1500 (London: London School of Economics, 2010), 25. According to Josiah C. Russell, the population of England in 1377 was closer to 2.2 million based upon his interpretation of poll tax returns (Josiah C. Russell, “England: Preplague Population and Prosperity,” in The Black Death: A Turning Point in History?, William M. Bowsky, ed. (New York: Holt, Rinehart and Winston, 1971), 100-107). 340 This latter method relies heavily upon the concept of a Malthusian limit. Specifically, Campbell and others estimated the maximum resources available to the population for consumption and then used this approximation to calculate the rate of population growth over time. This method is useful because, as Malthus himself commented, food serves as a “constantly operating check” on population because population grows geometrically when unchecked whereas food only grows arithmetically (Thomas Robert Malthus, First Essay on Population, 1798, James Bonar, ed. (London: Macmillan & Co., Ltd., 1926), 14). 108 population in 1086 was 1.71 million, swelled to 4.75 million in 1290, and then fell in

1377 to 2.5 million due to both famine and plague.341

Soldiers gathered from this population could perform an array of roles within the

English military. Perhaps the most well-known is the heavy cavalryman known colloquially as the knight. Traditionally it was believed that knights dominated the battlefield during the Middle Ages, and although modern historians have dispelled this notion, heavy cavalrymen were still very important to medieval armies.342

In the nineteenth century Heinrich Brunner argued that Charles Martel, the founder of the Carolingian dynasty in France, was the first to recognize the importance of heavy cavalry in battle.343 Brunner asserted that after defeating the Muslin cavalry army at the Battle of in 732, the Franks understood the power of heavy cavalry and set out to adopt those practices in their own society. Land, called beneficia, were given to

Carolingian cavalrymen in exchange for their military service, and the result was the method of social, political, and military organization known as feudalism.344

While Bernard S. Bachrach dispelled the notion that the stirrup led directly to feudalism, as Clifford J. Rogers argued, it did allow heavy cavalrymen to maneuver more effectively. This elevated their battlefield capability at a time when battles were very

341 This decrease was caused by the Black Death (50% decrease) but also the famines of the early decades of the century (approximately 15% of the population). 342 Although the true importance of knights on the battlefield is still an issue of debate, either as the aristocrat leaders of armies or the actual locus of battle heavy cavalry were a central component of medieval armies. 343 Heinrich Brunner, “Der Reiterdienst und die Anfänge des Lehnwesens,” Zeitschrift der Savigny-Stiftung fur Rechtsgeschicht, VIII (1887), 1-38. This article was reprinted in Brunner, Forschungen zur Geschichte des deutschen und französischen Rechts (Stuttgart, 1894), 39-74. 344 The debate surrounding the existence, or lack thereof, of feudalism is not the purpose of this thesis. However, it cannot be argued that a mutually beneficial system in which “lords” gained military service and political support from “vassals” in exchange for land and prizes did exist to varying degrees with varying success in medieval western Europe. 109 important to medieval warfare.345 These heavy cavalrymen were martial elites called chevalier in French and equites in Latin, both of which are etymological equivalents to

“horseman”. The rider was held in place on the saddle by the cantles and pommel while stirrups helped the rider guide the horse as he charged with a couched lance towards the enemy.346 The strength of the knight came not individually but when many knights charged as a group, a tactic that required “team training and team practice.”347 Whether or not they were actually the decisive force in medieval battles is irrelevant; their perceived importance is why medieval European societies were structured around creating these expensive and highly-trained soldiers to people their armies.

These retinues consisted of men who were either members of the lord’s family, tenants of his land, or hired men-at-arms who made fighting for pay their singular profession.348 Although in France these retinues were heavy cavalrymen dating from the

Frankish period, the Anglo-Saxons’ use of horsemen was far more intermittent. Anglo-

Saxons did go to war with household retainers; in the tenth century the use of the word cniht became the translation of miles, which implied a lord’s retainer who served him in battle. Under Edward the Confessor retinues were made up of cnihtas, , and

345 Bernard S. Bachrach "Charles Martel, Mounted Shock Combat, the Stirrup, and Feudalism" Studies in Medieval and Renaissance History (1970), 49-75. This issue was discussed by Clifford J. Rogers in his Oxford Encyclopedia of Medieval Warfare and Military Technology. In the “cavalry” entry, Rogers argued that despite Bachrach’s arguments, the stirrup did assist in stabilizing the heavy cavalryman. He also argued that cavalry were important to warfare in the early and High Middle Ages because despite claims to the contrary, battles were not rare in favor of sieges (Clifford J. Rogers, “Cavalry,” Clifford J. Rogers, ed., The Oxford Encyclopedia of Medieval Warfare and Military Technology, Vol. 3 (Oxford, UK: Oxford University Press, 2010), 354-356). 346 Barber, The Knight and Chivalry, 155. 347 Barber, The Knight and Chivalry, 155. 348 Prestwich, Armies and Warfare, 42. 110 who were known at times to fight on horseback.349 The last Anglo-Saxon king, Harold Godwinson, repelled the 1066 Norwegian invasion in the north at the Battle of Stamford Bridge with retinues of men fighting on horseback. Yet in a display of cavalry’s intermittent use, Godwinson abandoned his horses and attempted to defeat

William the Conqueror with infantry.350

The Normans established the central role of heavy cavalry in English warfare.

William the Conqueror awarded his most loyal lords with land, upon which they built castles to enforce the king’s authority. At that time, there were as many as 1400 men that could be summoned for military service.351 Under William Rufus and Henry I the system evolved so that these households not only provided retinues but also castle garrisons and territorial defense forces. The system persisted in the eleventh and twelfth centuries, during which men of the noble class who fought on horseback in heavy armor were referred to milites.352

Into the thirteenth century this classification stratified. All heavy cavalry were identified as “men-at-arms” (referred to in records as hominess ad arma, hominess armorum, hominess de armis, hommes d’armes, or hommes armez) and within that group there were knights banneret and knights bachelor, as well as sergeants (serviens),

(scutifer), and valets (valletti).353 The latter classifications were for men who were minor

349 Prestwich, Armies and Warfare, 38, 42. A “” was a soldier roughly equivalent to a knight in class distinction and a was a household troop who generally fought on foot. 350 Kelly DeVries, The Norwegian Invasion of England in 1066 (Rochester, NY: Boydell Press, 2003). The intermittency of Anglo-Saxon cavalry is proven by the fact that while Godwinson used cavalry at Stamford Bridge, when they marched south to repel William at Hastings, they fought the Normans on foot. 351 Prestwich, Armies and Warfare, 75. 352 Prestwich, Armies and Warfare, 38, 13. 353 Prestwich, Armies and Warfare, 17. 111 landholders serving in the retinues of knights bachelors or bannerets.354 Although clearly distinguishing these groups is problematic (because in government records the terms were applied inconsistently), in theory men began as squires or valets with the hope of becoming sergeants who served in retinues and fought as heavy cavalrymen.355

It was in this century that the “knight” classification became more of a class distinction than a military one. Knights began their military careers as bachelors and if they expanded their landholdings or performed exceptionally in battle, they could be promoted to the position of banneret. The banneret was responsible for commanding a castle garrison, leading a retinue of cavalrymen, performing administrative functions, or even serving as a political representative of his lord.356

Referred to as “shock cavalry” given their method of driving the enemy from the battlefield with a coordinated , in the fourteenth century knights and men-at-arms generally wore a haqueton (padded doublet of buckram, linen, or leather), hauberk

(chainmail shirt), gambeson (padded defensive wool/linen jacket), cyclas (long thin cloth over-coat), helmet, and a remaining mixture of plate and mail. They typically carried a sword, a lance, and a dagger, but could also wield maces, axes, or various other specialty weapons if the individual chose to do so.357 While on campaign these men traveled with three to four horses (if not more), at least two of which were heavy horses known as

354 Although the term is anachronistic, these men would be akin to the early modern “” class rather than members of the nobility. 355 Prestwich, Armies and Warfare, 13. 356 Prince, “The Army and Navy,” 337. 357 Prince, “The Army and Navy,” 337. 112 destriers.358 These soldiers retained the squires or valets who were responsible for maintaining the soldier’s equipment and his horses.359

Men-at-arms were not alone on the medieval battlefield; they were joined by light cavalry, infantry, and various missile troops recruited in varying ratios. One such soldier was the light cavalryman known as the hobelar. Named for the pony they originally rode called the hobyn, the first soldiers identified by that name were recruited by Edward I in

Ireland to fight in Scotland.360 Hobelars were used as raiders, scouts, protection for archers, and auxiliary cavalrymen. Edward I made heavy use of them in his Scottish campaigns, and Edward II raised 845 English hobelars in 1319 to use at the failed .361 They wore a haqueton, a bascinet (an open-face military helmet), and iron gauntlets while carrying a sword, knife, or a lance. Their eponymous horse was far cheaper than a destrier and chosen for its maneuverability.362

Another soldier who was pivotal to medieval English military success was the foot archer.363 Although this did include crossbowmen, the English were noted for their decisive use of the longbow.364 These men typically wore a hacqueton, a bracer (an arm

358 They were referred to as “heavy horses” or “war horses” because they were larger animals that were trained to carry heavily-armed knights into battle. This also meant that they were trained to charge into crowds of armed men or charge into physical obstacles (such as pike hedges), making them extremely expensive animals. Prince, “The Army and Navy,” 337-338. 359 Prestwich notes that the differentiation between these terms (valet, page, , etc) often seems more elective than a literal distinction of duties (Prestwich, Armies and Warfare, 14-18). 360 Prince, “The Army and Navy,” 339. Prestwich, Armies and Warfare, 52. 361 Prestwich, Armies and Warfare, 52. 362 Hobelars became increasingly important to English armies due to their versatility and the rise of armor- penetrating arrows in the late thirteenth and fourteenth centuries. They were also more maneuverable than knights, which increased their usefulness. Prince, “The Army and Navy,” 339. 363 For an excellent analysis of the medieval archer, see Jim Bradburry’s The Medieval Archer (Rochester, NY: The Boydell press, 1985) or Kelly DeVries and Robert Douglas Smith, Medieval Military Technology (New York, Ontario, Canada: University of Toronto Press, 2012), 34-41. 364 Some debate surrounds the decisiveness of the longbow in battle. Traditionally it was assumed that the longbow caused heavy casualties, and thus helped the English achieve victory. However, historians such as 113 guard), and a helmet while carrying a short sword and bow with 1-2 sheaves of two dozen arrows each.365 Their job was to fire a bolt into the air in an arcing pattern so that the bolt in its descent gained enough momentum to pierce the chainmail and plate armor protecting any soldiers or mounts on the battlefield. Archery was seen as a vocation of the lower classes, and at times associated with poachers or criminals more generally (thus the connection of with the bow and arrow).366 Yet the longbow required a great deal of skill to operate, and those men who mastered it trained from a young age to be able to generate the significant pulling power required of a full-sized longbow.367

When these archers became mounted in the 1330’s, their mobility, and thus the army’s lethality, increased significantly.368

Rounding out these major classifications is the infantryman. Although most

English infantryman were longbowmen in the thirteenth and fourteenth centuries, there were also foot soldiers (pedites sagitarii during Edward I’s reign) who fought with spears, knives, or daggers.369 Because the localities providing these troops had to furnish

Kelly DeVries and Robert Douglas Smith argue that the longbow’s casualty rate did not lead to victory itself (as the weapon did not actually kill many people) but it was the confusion caused by arrow volleys that disrupted enemy troops that was so decisive (DeVries and Smith, Medieval Military Technology, 38- 39). Clifford J. Rogers, however, disagrees (See: Clifford J. Rogers, “The Military Revolutions of the Hundred Years War” in The Military Revolution Debate: readings on the military transformation of early modern Europe (Boulder: Westview Press, 1995), 55-93; and Clifford J. Rogers, “The Efficacy of the : A Reply to Kelly DeVries,” War in History (5), 233-242). 365 Prince, “The Army and Navy,” 340. 366 Bradbury, The Medieval Archer. 367 According to some historians, Prince and Bradburry for example, the longbow originated with the Welsh and was later adopted by the English. There is also some speculation that the English adopted the longbow and lengthened it, thus leading to its increased effectiveness against chainmail, but this is debated by historians just as the decisive nature of the weapon is (DeVries and Smith, Medieval Military Technology, 38). Although this is debated as well, the average estimated pull weight of a longbow was 110lbs (Robert Douglas Smith, “Weapons, Missile,” in Clifford J. Rogers, ed., The Oxford Encyclopedia of Medieval Warfare and Military Technology, Vol. 3 (Oxford, UK: Oxford University Press, 2010)). 368 Prestwich, Armies and Warfare, 134-136. 369 In thirteenth century records, it was common to refer to archers as infantryman (Prestwich, Armies and Warfare, 133). 114 them with their weapons and armor, foot soldiers were often poorly equipped and wore simple armor, perhaps only a helmet and iron gauntlets.370

Supplementing these soldiers were “support staff” such as engineers, artificers, and workmen of various kinds (such as the miners from the Forest of Dean who were at

Calais).371 There were also surgeons, chaplains, standard-bearers, vintners, cooks, and heralds. Victuallers would sometimes travel with the army as well and were responsible for purchasing goods for the army or supervising the use of supplies on hand.372 Add to this the private retinues of high-ranking nobility or monarchs (which might include wives, companions, or personal servants), and one can see that armies in the medieval period, as in other eras, were far more than just the soldiers who fought on the battlefield.

These different parts of an English medieval army were obtained in three major ways in differing ratios: a martial elite fulfilling its feudal obligation; a “national” gathered through commissions of array; and troops (either foreign or domestic) who were raised by establishing service agreements referred to as indentures.373

The first category involves troops raised through their need to fulfill a feudal obligation. Undoubtedly the term “feudalism” is a loaded one, but in the military context,

Michael Prestwich described the system best:

… feudal service was the military duty owed by the holder of a fief to his lord, as part of the obligation incurred following the act of homage. This service was unpaid, and normally lasted for a period of forty days. A summons would demand that service be provided in accordance with fealty and homage owed to the king. Such service was not, of course,

370 Prestwich, Armies and Warfare, 134. 371 TNA E372/191, m. 9D. 372 Albert E. Prince, “The Army and Navy,” in James F. Willard and William A. Morris, eds., The English Government at Work, 1327-1336, V.I (Cambridge: The Medieval Academy of America, 1940), 342-343. 373 Prince, “The Army and Navy,” 344. 115

termed ‘feudal’ by those who performed it; magnates were normally asked to provide their servitum debitum, or obligatory service.374

The early Norman kings called upon these men often to support their military endeavors, but scutage soon replaced direct service and by the reign of Edward I the 40s fee was inadequate to support a man-at-arms for 40 days.375

Between 1294 and 1307 English armies fought in thirteen campaigns in Wales,

Scotland, Gascony, and Flanders. Edward I involved many of his nobles in these endeavors, and their feudal service was the core around which he built his armies.376

Despite the significant debts that could result, many of these magnates refused to fight for pay in lieu of participating at their own expense.377 Although this decision might seem a strange one, Andrew Spencer argued that Edward’s lords refused pay so that they could leverage their involvement for personal benefit, benefit personally from scutage in their demesne, and have grounds upon which to object to a campaign that lasted longer than 40 days.378 The earls of Warwick and Lincoln, for example, received payment from the

Crown for their military service in 1277 but refused to do so later, while in 1300 only 23 out of the 87 bannerets accepted pay while on the Caerlaverock campaign.379

Although Edward I’s magnates served without pay, the knights and men-at-arms they provided were formally hired to serve in the lords’ retinues. Spencer estimated that on average only one out of every ten members of an earl’s retinue can be clearly

374 Prestwich, Armies and Warfare, 57-58. 375 Hollister, The Military Organization, 195-200. 376 Michael R. Powicke, “The General Obligation to Cavalry Service under Edward I,” Speculum, Vol. 28, No. 4 (October 1953), 832. 377 Andrew Spencer, “The comital military retinue in the reign of Edward I,” Historical Research, Vol. 83, No. 219 (February 2010), 46-48. 378 Spencer, “The comital military revenue,” 48. 379 Spencer, “The comital military revenue,” 48. 116 identified as his tenant; they appeared to hold land in the region of their retinue commander but received monetary compensation for their services.380 Spencer also argued that there was continuity in the men who served these magnates from campaign to campaign, noting that “while many of the gentry appear never to have served at all, those for whom warfare became a regular feature of their lives were more likely than not to serve consistently with the same commander.”381

Feudal service died out during the reign of Edward III. Objections to scutage and its increasing inability to pay for men-at-arms meant that the 1328 campaign against the

Scots was the last attempt to call a full feudal levy or levy the fine of scutage for not doing so.382 After that time magnates did provide retinues but were paid for their service, and the mixed companies of men-at-arms and mounted arches they supplied marked an important change in English military methods.383 Even when the Crown requested that men possessing more than £40 worth of land assume the order of knighthood, these individuals could pay a fine and avoid serving altogether.384

The second method for gathering soldiers for military service was the commissions of array. Something akin to the modern concept of a draft, as Albert Prince noted in his description of the medieval , “the principle that all citizens were bound to arm themselves and serve for the maintenance of the public peace and the

380 Spencer, “The comital military revenue,” 53-54. 381 Spencer, “The comital military revenue,” 59. 382 Prestwich, Armies and Warfare, 75. Prince, “The Army and Navy,” 345. 383 Spencer, “The comital military revenue,” 49. 384 Prince, “The Army and Navy,” 349-352. For examples of this request made by the Crown, see: CPR, 1330-1334, 435, 455. Admittedly this fine was not unlike scuttage, but it was not associated with feudal obligation and was not collected before every English campaign. 117 defense of the realm was of ancient standing and well-recognized validity.”385 “The strongest and most vigorous” men from 16 to 60 could be called upon to serve, and by the reign of Edward III those arrayed were most often hobelars or archers (although infantrymen and men-at-arms could at times be arrayed as well). Once collected these men were organized into vintaines (groups of 20 men) then gathered into hundreds

(centaines) before being grouped and moved by county.386 Each was collected by a

Crown-appointed arrayer, forming a posse that could be used for local defense or military campaigns abroad.387

Arrayers could be knights, sheriffs, or wealthy landowners who were chosen by the Crown to operate in appointed counties.388 In the words of H.J. Hewitt, “although

[arrayers] were at times subject to supervision, it would be an error to infer that the procedures adopted and the standards of fitness and skill looked for were uniform.”389

385 Prince, “The Army and Navy,” 355. The phrase often used in English governmental records was: Considerantes etiam quod omnes et singuli de dicto regno ad defensionem eiusdem contra inimicorum aggressus potentius et virilius quo poterunt astringuntur. 386 For example, see: CCR, 1333-1337, 485. Many of the writs that will be discussed in the following chapter, and are in the TNA category E101, are array writs sent to counties during each military campaign. 387 Prince, “The Army and Navy,” 355-357. A “hundred” was an administrative unit within a shire organized for military and judicial purposes. The hundreds possessed hundred courts and were overseen either by sheriffs or feudal lords (depending upon the area in question). This administrative unit dates back to the Anglo-Saxon era and was the geographical space that supported approximately 100 households, or 100 hides, headed by a hundredman or hundred eolder. It was later the level of administrative division at which the danegeld would be assessed and paid. Helen M. Cam, “Shire Officials: Coroners , and Bailiffs,” in The English Government at Work, 1327-1336, V.III, James F. Willard and William A. Morris, eds. (Cambridge: The Medieval Academy of America, 1950), 143-183. 388 Prince, “The Army and Navy,” 357. Not only did arrayers face complications posed by men who refused to serve, but because arrayers had quotas that they were required to meet, they often competed with each other to fulfill their obligations. For example, in 1334 Richard Routh and 50 archers were chosen by Ralph Brunner from East Riding but they refused to serve in Scotland over the winter of 1334-1335. The sheriff was ordered to arrest the company, seize their lands, and keep them in custody until the Crown decided what to do with them (Rotuli Scotland: I, 300). In another instance, Geoffrey Melsamby and Adam Avener competed over arraying soldiers in North Riding and threats ensured (CPR, 1338-1340, 74). 389 Hewitt, The Organization of Edward III, 36. 118

The size of groups arrayed differed by commission and arrayers had a standard set of orders to carry out once a writ was obtained390:

1. To choose and test a certain number of men ages 16 to 60 2. To clothe them 3. To equip them 4. To provide mounts for them if necessary 5. To pay them 6. To a) send them, under a leader, to an appointed rally point or (b) to hold them in readiness for departure till further instructions were received

By the reign of Edward III these arrayed soldiers were “bought and purveyed at the expense of the community.”391 This included armor, weapons, and the victuals required to feed them men until they left the county. The only exception to this was the weaponry for archers (bows, bowstrings, arrows, or arrowheads), which often came from the armory in the Tower of London.392 Military uniforms were also developed during this time, such as the Welsh levies provided by Edward the Black Prince and the London archers and workmen of Edward III’s Scottish campaigns.393

One small concession in the face of these significant expenses was that as of

1344, soldiers’ pay was to be provided by the local community only until the troop departed the county. At that time, men were maintained by the Crown, regardless of

390 Hewitt, The Organization of Edward III, 37. 391 For example, see: CCR, 1333-1337, 525, 530, 543. 392 Hewitt, The Organization of Edward III, 65. 393 The Welsh wore a short coat (courtepy) and hat (chaperon). The short coat was to have green on the right and white on the left. The hat was also supposed to be green (RBP, Vol. I (London: His Majesty’s Stationary Office, 1930), 14). Those workmen included carpenters, masons, and those working on the “engines of war” (CCR, 1333-1337, 47). The London contingent was made up of 600 archers and chosen to accompany Sir Thomas Ughtred in the 1335 Scottish campaign. They were to be clad at the costs of the community in a single livery, “uno garniamento de unica secta” (Rotuli Scotland: I, 383, 390). 119 delays, until they returned home.394

Once men were arrayed and organized, they moved by an appointed commander to their embarkation points.395 There are no records to indicate what these men ate along the way, but in 1359 as soldiers marched towards Sandwich, inns along the route were asked to sell victuals “at a reasonable price”. Additionally, many markets throughout

Kent were closed so that those in Canterbury, Dover, and Sandwich would have an abundance of available victuals for sale.396 It can therefore be deduced that soldiers ate a combination of pre-packed victuals from their home towns, goods purchased along the way with their wages, or even goods purchased by victuallers in nearby city markets.

The final method used by English armies was the system of Indenture. Indenture

This method involved hiring a soldier to serve in the military and creating a contract that outlined his specific terms of service. By the fourteenth century the idea of paying soldiers was certainly not new but the idea of soldiers fighting as defined by the terms of a formal contract was an innovation of the three Edwards.

Indenture first appeared during Edward I’s 1277 campaign in Wales.397 The contracts were rudimentary but the practice evolved under the reign of Edward II, who used them to hire soldiers for castle garrisons.398 It was Edward III who made great

394 Hewitt, The Organization of Edward III, 41. As can be imagined, due to this practice Crown expenses mounted significantly each day embarkation was delayed. 395 Hewitt, The Organization of Edward III, 41. For an example of this, see: CCR, 1333-7, 26-27. 396 CCR, 1354-60, 647. 397 N.B. Lewis, “An early indenture of military service, 27 July 1287,” BIHR, xiii (1935), 85. This contract was signed on 27 July 1287 and was between and Peter Maulay. J.E. Morris discusses another such contract signed between a knight and a lord in 1297 (J.E. Morris, The Welsh Wars of Edward I (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1901), 71, 278). 398 M.R. Powicke, “Edward II and Military Obligation,” Speculum, Vol. 31, No. 1 (January 1956), 92-119. 120 strides with indenture and relied upon them to a significant degree in order to wage his wars in both Scotland and France.

Historian N.B. Lewis best defined indenture contracts. They were

…voluntary contracts with particular individuals to serve under agreed conditions in return for specified payments and allowances: the terms of the agreement being… embodied in formal indentured contracts, written out in two identical copies, sealed alternately with the deals of both parties, so that each might have in his possession a permanent record of the terms to which he had bound himself, duly authenticated by the seal of the other.399

The role of the indentured retainer did not differ to any significant degree from that of the feudal levy, with the exception that the contract outlined specific terms of service, compensation, and rewards. Such contracts also included a specific clause called the restauratio equorum, which ensured that if the indentured retainer lost his horse while serving the lord, he was entitled to compensation equal to the value of the animal.400

The indenture contract provided security to the soldier being hired because it outlined specific pay rates and explicit terms of compensation for expenses or losses

(such as the restauratio equorum) while on campaign. It established the soldier’s terms of service—which like feudal obligation began at 40 days but was later extended to four to six months on average—and allowed him to void the contract should that limit be extended without permission. It provided the terms by which a soldier could be compensated if a lord or the Crown went into arrears, which at times included the

399 N.B. Lewis, “The Organisation of Indentured Retinues in Fourteenth-Century England,” Transactions of the Royal Historical Society, Fourth Series, Vol. 27 (1945), 31-32. 400 Prince, “The Army and Navy,” 353. The restauratio equorum was part of the indenture contract from its inception, and the specific terms of compensation, as well as requirements regarding the description of the horse and its training, were present at the outset. Given the great expense involved in training and maintaining destriers, it is no surprise that this clause was considered important enough to include. 121 distraint of property that could then serve as a type of pension when the lord died or the soldier’s service was terminated. It might include letters of protection or stipulations regarding the deferment of homage in the event of inheritance or bequest. Lastly it prevented a soldier from being arbitrarily dismissed from service unless “by reasonable cause,” which was determined by a tribunal of five independent arbiters whose names were included in the contract at the time of its creation.401

The contract also benefitted the Crown or the private individual creating the indenture because establishing these various terms of service prevented abuse by the soldier hired as much as it did the contractor. It allowed the lord or the Crown to dismiss the soldier for services not rendered and even seize property belonging to the soldier for failure to fulfill the indenture’s obligations. It covered “advantages in war,” which meant that the contractor was entitled to a portion of anything captured by the hired soldier while on campaign, be that precious materials or the ransom of captured knights. It eliminated the problems posed by bastard feudalism because soldiers could only sign one indenture at a time. Perhaps most importantly, indenture allowed the Crown or lord to hire the most able-bodied men available. They no longer had to rely upon hereditarily- determined vassals of indeterminate quality or even arrayed troops with varying degrees of military experience. As Prince pointed out, the system was so effective by the reign of

Edward III that “it needed only the storm of a vast continental war to prove the utter rottenness and decay of the rival system of service by feudal tenure.”402

401 Lewis, “The Organisation,” 38. Prince, “The Army and Navy,” 355. Lewis, “An early indenture,” 85. Prince, “The Indenture System”. 402 Prince, “The Army and Navy,” 354. 122

In all, English armies were made up of men-at-arms, hobelars, archers, and infantrymen at varying ratios. These men were collected in three main ways: a martial elite that was fulfilling its feudal obligation of homage; a “national” militia that was gathered through commissions of array and served due to a like obligation of allegiance; and troops (either foreign or English) who were raised by establishing service agreements referred to as indentures. Although feudal service was popular in the eleventh and twelfth centuries, the process of collecting scutage in lieu of feudal service, and then the comparative effectiveness of the other methods of manpower acquisition, meant that feudal obligation was all but eliminated by Edward III’s wars in France. It was replaced by commissions of array and indenture contracts, meaning that in our period of consideration, Edward III’s armies were almost entirely (if not completely) made up of soldiers fighting for pay at the cost of the Crown.

PURVEYING WAR

Once the armies had their soldiers, these men needed to eat. Using medieval chronicles alone, it would be difficult to determine how this was done. As H.J. Hewitt, noted, “glimpses of importance of food emerge here and there in the narratives: a storm dispersed the ships bringing victuals; the king devastated a region that the enemy might not profit therefrom; victuals were plentiful here and scarce there; for ‘lack of victuals’ the king was obliged to take this or that course.”403 Yet “the organization of supplies was not a topic for the chroniclers.”404 It was therefore assumed that medieval armies had no

403 Hewitt, The Organization of War, 50. 404 Hewitt, The Organization of War, 50. 123 organized commissariat and given no alternatives, were forced to live off the land as they traveled through enemy territory. As we will see, this is not the case.

The magnificent volume Feeding Mars proved that pre-modern sophisticated logistical organization was possible.405 Mark Vaughn’s work on the reign of Edward I further proved that the methods Edward III used to wage his wars in France and Scotland owed a great deal to the efforts of his grandfather.406 Edward I used members of his royal household to make exact estimates of consumption demands and employed purveyors to obtain those amounts for use on campaign. The result was a sophisticated system that

Edward I’s son and grandson would inherit and put to use in the following decades.

Edward III’s government, therefore, was fully capable of collecting supplies for military campaigns, organizing them for transport, moving them to the theater of operations, and dispersing them to troops as needed. That is not to say that collecting supplies while on the march, or foraging, was not a common practice, and at times required when pre-organized supplies were not available. But of Edward III’s logistical preparations, it can be said that “when allowance is made for the slowness of

405 Bernard S. Bachrach, “Logistics in Pre-Crusade Europe,” in John Lynn, ed., Feeding Mars: Logistics in Western Warfare from the Middle Ages to the Present (Boulder, San Francisco, Oxford: Westview Press, 1993), 57-78. Walter E. Kaegi, “Byzantine Logistics: Problems and Perscpectives,” in John A. Lynn, Feeding Mars: Logistics in Western Warfare from the Middle Ages to the Present (Boulder; San Francisco; Oxford: Westview Press, 1993), 39-56. Timothy J. Runyan, “Naval Logistics in the Late Middle Ages: The Example of the Hundred Years’ War” in John A. Lynn, Feeding Mars: Logistics in Western Warfare from the Middle Ages to the Present (Boulder; San Francisco; Oxford: Westview Press, 1993), 79-100. John F. Guilmartin, “The Logistics of Warfare at Sea in the Sixteenth Century: The Spanish Perspective,” in John A. Lynn, Feeding Mars: Logistics in Western Warfare from the Middle Ages to the Present (Boulder; San Francisco; Oxford: Westview Press, 1993), 109-136. 406 Mark Vaughn, “Mount the War-Horses, Take your Lance in your Grip…,” Thirteenth Century England, Vol. 8 (2001), 97-111. 124 communications and for the impossibility of accurate forecasts of needs, the organization may be regarded as remarkably efficient.”407

When preparing for military campaigns, the Crown took many steps to prepare, the first being to prohibit the export of grain in order to prevent merchants from trading with enemies.408 Next the Crown approximated victualling needs for the coming campaign, which involved calculations based upon the amount of manpower desired and the estimated amount of time the army would be on campaign. Once such estimates were calculated, the Crown set about collecting the requisite supplies.

If the Crown did not use cash to purchase directly the goods they needed, the

Crown appointed royal clerks to oversee collection, and these “receivers” hired clerks, called “purveyors”, to amass the victuals required.409 These purveyors were at times assisted by sheriffs and had the task of physically collecting various foodstuffs from their assigned counties, supervising the transport of those goods to appointed ports, and then overseeing their departure to the given theater of operations.410 When receivers gave purveyors these assignments, the purveyors would purchase goods at market, approach merchants with their needs, or request that merchants visit appointed depots with a requested amount of supplies. These goods would then be paid for with money advanced to the purveyor by the receiver or the merchant was given an indenture laying out the cost of the goods purveyed.411 The latter was the practice in most cases, which was a point of

407 Hewitt, The Organization of War, 51. 408 Prince, “The Army and Navy,” 365. 409 Prince, “The Army and Navy,” 365-368. These positions only existed at times of war, and so these royal clerks were given temporary powers to collect the goods they needed and oversee their transport. 410 Hewitt, The Organization of War, 51, 54. Prince, “The Army and Navy,” 369-370. 411 Prince, “The Army and Navy,” 368. 125 contention for English merchants given that they had to travel to the Exchequer at their own expense to receive payment.412

Sheriffs worked with the purveyors to purchase, transport, and clean tuns for packing goods collected. These tuns were stored at depots throughout England, many of which were on rivers, and then the sheriff and/or purveyor would hire barges to transport the goods down the river to appointed depots at sea ports. Tuns carrying grain were taken to mills along the way for grinding, sifting, and repacking before being moved on to the assigned depots for storage.413

Once the goods arrived at the assigned depots, they would be stored in secure locations. These granaries, public cellars, or private residences were rented either by the receiver, the city’s mayor, or the local bailiff. Such as when victuals were purchased, the funds for this were not provided beforehand but instead accounted for in an indenture, which the owner of the property could reimburse at the Exchequer at his own expense.414

As part of this rent receivers had to maintain security and ensure that the stored foodstuffs remained fit for consumption. Often this included receivers cleaning or repairing rented spaces so that they were fit for use. They had to hire workers to add oil to wine or to salt the meats in storage to prevent their decay. Individuals would also be hired to turn the flour and to add sticks and salt to the top of the tun, a process that could preserve flour for as long as two years.415

412 Prince, “The Army and Navy,” 369. This is one source of general complaints against the system of purveyance since at times merchants were forced to wait a considerable amount of time to obtain their refund. These refunds, moreover, were at times given in tallies rather than cash. 413 Prince, “The Army and Navy,” 369-370. Hewitt, The Organization of War, 54. 414 Hewitt, The Organization of War, 51. The owners of rented space often petitioned the Crown for payment up front or swifter repay after the fact, but these petitions were often rejected or simply ignored. 415 Prince, “The Army and Navy,” 370-371. 126

Victuallers and receivers then chartered vessels to transport the goods to the army’s embarkation point or to the theater of operations. They would then oversee the movement of the victuals to the ships in question, and at times travel with the goods to ensure their safe delivery. Should the victuals be transported to an embarkation point rather than directly to war, a receiver at that port would oversee the unloading and storing of the goods temporarily until the army officially left on campaign.416 This process is discussed at length in Craig Lambert’s Shipping the Medieval Military, as is Edward III’s victualling efforts during his English and Scottish campaigns.

But what were victuals? During Edward III’s reign (as was fairly typical throughout the medieval period), goods most often collected included417:

 Meat: beef, mutton, or pork in carcasses or sides (in the case of beef); this meat was usually salted for preservation; salted pork (bacones) could either refer to flitches of bacon or sides of pork  Oats, beans and peas: collected in quarters; beans and peas were usually grouped together when transported and mentioned in records  Wheat: collected in quarters; wheat was always ground into flour before transport  Cheese: collected in “weys” or in stones  Fish: collected in hundreds or thousands; stockfish, herrings, or “dried fish”  Beverages: collected in ; wine, ale, and cider

These goods, if stored properly, could last beyond a single expedition and be utilized at a later time. Should any items spoil while on campaign, the goods could be moved to a nearby market and sold for cash, which was then used to purchase fresher victuals.

Not only did men require victuals, but they also required mounts to ride and animals to transport the goods they consumed. This demand was so essential that Bernard

416 Prince, “The Army and Navy,” 373. 417 Prince, “The Army and Navy,” 370. Hewitt, The Organization of War, 51. 127

S. Bachrach once argued that early medieval military strategy revolved around the concern for horses while on the march.418 Cart horses or draft horses and destriers were needed, as were draught animals such as oxen, which pulled two or four-wheeled carriages purveyed from the local population as necessary.

Although cart and draft horses could travel faster than oxen, oxen were easier to maintain because they did not require grain to consume as horses did.419 Bachrach estimated that horses required approximately 22lbs of feed per day, half of which was grain, and could travel as part of a two-horse team pulling a four-wheeled cart for 745 miles before they would consume the full load they carried (1,430lbs).420 While this seems a great distance, this full cart of milled wheat fed 650 troops for a single day, meaning that without feeding any horses, an army of 5,000 men required eight carts of flour to feed the men daily. To pull these eight carts, the sixteen horses would require an additional cart and two horses to carry their feed, meaning that per day an army and its horses consumed 11,350lbs of flour (not counting the grain consumed by the war horses used by the men-at-arms or the smaller horses ridden by hobelars). When multiplied by the number of days on campaign, the number of horses and the food required to feed them would increase significantly.421

418 Bernard S. Bachrach, “Animals and Warfare in Early Medieval Europe,” Settimane de Studio del Centro Italiano di sull’a lot Medioevo 31 (1985), 707-751. 419 Bachrach, “Animals and Warfare,” 712-717. Bachrach estimates that mules or horses could travel about twice the pace of oxen pulling the same load. 420 According to Bachrach, two-wheeled wagons could carry approximately 1100lbs if pulled by two animals. 421 The decision between horses and oxen also depended upon the desired speed of an army, and while oxen pulling a four-wheeled cart could travel 9 miles per day, and horses at most 18 miles, armies unencumbered could move as fast as 31 miles per day (Bachrach, “Animals and Warfare,” 712-717). The issue of speed is one of the many reasons that medieval armies relied upon forage; although the raiding required with forage 128

At times of war these animals were requisitioned by sheriffs or purveyors for military use employing the same process as victual collection, and supplies such as hurdles, gangways, and harnesses were also collected to aid in their transport.422 When the animals were loaded onto ships, men would note each animal’s owner, its color or any distinguishing marks, and its estimated value so that the owner could be compensated should the animal be lost on campaign.423 Horses were difficult to transport in medieval vessels and the Channel’s often-choppy waters surely posed a particular threat to their safety. This, along with the huge costs associated with feeding horses before the campaign began, is perhaps why on certain campaigns horses were bought on the

Continent rather than transported to France with the army.

The Crown would also purvey miscellaneous items for use by the soldiers or the men assisting the army. This might include mining tools or axes and spades for sappers; horseshoes and nails for squires or valets to maintain mounts; individual containers for wine or ale; or supplies to repair supply carts.424 As gunpowder weapons were in their infancy during Edward III’s reign, the ingredients of gunpowder were collected, albeit in small amounts and through cash purchase by the keeper of the Tower.425 Guns were purchased as well, and a commercial record from Ghent in 1314 noted a gunpowder weapon (bussen met kruyt) being sent to England.426 Presumably more were purchased or

was time-consuming, it was also profitable and prevented and army from being slowed by a baggage train. In such cases forage was therefore a choice, not a last resort. 422 Hewitt, The Organization of War, 85-86. 423 Hewitt, The Organization of War, 87. 424 Hewitt, The Organization of War, 73. 425 Tout, Chapters in Administrative History (IV), 469-71. Hewitt, The Organization of War, 72. 426 Henry W.L. Hime, The Origin of Artillery (New York: Longmans, Green and Co., 1915), 119-121. For a general discussion of the origins of gunpowder, see: Kenneth Chase, Firearms: A Global History to 1700 (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2003). 129 smelted thereafter given that cannon were acknowledged in a 1327 illuminated manuscript given to Edward as a coronation gift; in De Officiis Regum (“On the Duties of

Kings”), an illustration contains the earliest known western depiction of cannon, shown as a vase on its side shooting a large bolt.427 Although gunpowder and “‘gunnes’ of copper” would not have constituted items in high demand by the Crown in the early years of Edward III’s reign, their desirability increased exponentially thereafter.428

In all, if the Crown did not purchase supplies directly with cash, it employed a complex system of country-wide purveyance to provide its armies with the sustenance and goods it required to operate. Purveyance was a contentious process for the English people, and complaints to Parliament make clear just how dissatisfied with it subjects were at times. It was a small concession, perhaps, that the system technically only existed at wartime, as our evaluation of 1329 will show.

THE BASELINE

In statistical analysis, baseline characteristics are defined as observations and measurements collected on subjects at the time of entry into a study before testing begins.429 In order to determine the effect of that study on the subjects, one must first show them to be comparable in terms of baseline measurements and observations.430

427 Hime, The Origins, 121. Hime postulates that the early depictions of cannon as vase-shapped may indicate their literal shape early on, which is why vasi or pots were words use to describe cannon in the fist decades of their use in Europe. 428 Hewitt, The Organization of War, 72. 429 Baseline characteristics,” Cambridge Dictionary of Statistics, B.S. Everitt and A. Skrondal, eds. (Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press, 2006), 36. 430 “Baseline balance,” Cambridge Dictionary of Statistics, B.S. Everitt and A. Skrondal, eds. (Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press, 2006), 35. 130

In this study, our baseline characteristics will be any financial resources, manpower, or supplies collected by the Crown to support military endeavors in 1329. By establishing this year’s characteristics as the baseline in our study, we will add scale to the two campaigns that are the focus of this thesis: the 1346-47 Crécy-Calais campaign and the 1359-60 Reims campaign. Without doing so, that data would lack context or scale, and as a consequence skew the potential influence of the Black Death upon these elements of English medieval logistical organization.

In 1329, Edward III was beginning the second year of his reign. While medieval

French was the hereditary language of the nobility and those government records not written in Latin, English was, in the words of Jonathan Sumption, “the language of prayer, of business, of light reading and polite conversation.”431 There were approximately five million people in England at the time, and London, England’s largest economic hub, had a population of roughly 40,000 individuals.432 Compared to the previous decade, commodity and livestock prices were lower while labor wages were gradually increasing.433 This was caused by declining global temperatures and the

431 Trial by Battle, 39. 432 Perroy, The Hundred Years War, 51. 433 For an evaluation of commodity and livestock prices, see David Farmer, “Prices and Wages, 1041- 1350,” in The Agrarian History of England and Wales Vol. II: 1042-1350, Joan Thirsk, ed. (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1988), 716-817; David Farmer, “Prices and Wages, 1350-1500” in The Agrarian History of England and Wales Vol. III: 1350-1500, Edward Miller, ed. (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1988), 431-485. With the loss of population and the failure of crops, staple goods and livestock (due to their use as both food and a labor-saving device) prices increase. Wheat jumped from 5.37s/quarter in the first decade of the fourteenth century to 7.94s/quarter in the 1310’s. Once widespread famine had caused a decrease in the overall population, grain prices decreased to 6.9s/quarter in the 1320’s. With this loss in population, unskilled labor wages increase more than skilled labor wages, presumably because labor shortage allowed unskilled laborers to demand more for their services. This can be seen in labor wages in the 1310’s and 1320’s, given that the wage of a crop reaper per acre per day increased 1.25d from the 1310’s to the 1320’s, as opposed to a carpenter’s wages (without food or lodging from the manor), which increased only .21d per day (Farmer, “Prices and Wages, 1041-1350,” 248, 734, 757; Farmer, “Prices and Wages, 1350-1500,” 444, 457, 471). 131 resulting failed crops, widespread famine, and 10% population loss in the first two decades of the century.434

While Edward III became king of England in 1327, Isabella and Mortimer were in control of the government. Mortimer’s position was informal and yet he possessed significant power as the queen’s foremost personal councilor and her escort to all government meetings. W. Mark Ormrod referred to this position as “anomalous” and argued that it caused tension in the English Court because it “was at once so influential and so utterly without accountability.”435 Edward III had little power in this system, as in the words of the Rochester chronicler, “the queen ruled, but Mortimer reigned.”436

By 1328, resentment was building against the queen and her consort. The very night of Edward III’s coronation a Scottish army had attacked Norham Castle, and the army raised to end the threat was unsuccessful.437 Not only could Mortimer not pin down the Scottish army, but Edward III was almost captured when the Scots launched a night raid on the English camp. The government was forced to seek a treaty by September

1327, and the “shameful peace” of Northampton, established in early 1328, forced

Edward to renounce his claim over Scotland.438

434 The work of Bruce M.S. Campbell deals with the effect of declining global temperatures at the is time (called the medieval cooling period): Bruce M.S. Campbell, “Physical Shocks, Biological Hazards, and Human Impacts: The Crisis of the Fourteenth Century Revisited,” in Economic and Biological Interactions in Pre-Industrial Europe from the 13th to the 18th Centuries, S. Cavaciocchi, ed. (Florence: Firenze University Press, 2010), 13-33. Bruce M.S. Campbell, “Nature as historical protagonist: environment and society in pre-industrial England,” EcHR, Vol. 63, No. 2 (2010), 281-314. For a discussion of the fourteenth century enclosure movement in England and the state of agricultural production at that time, see: Christopher Dyer, “Conflict in the landscape: the enclosure movement in England, 1220-1349,” Landscape History, Vol. 29 (2007). 435 Edward III, 63. 436 Edward III, 63. 437 This was the first and last time Edward III called a feudal summons, as was mentioned above while discussing scutage. 438 Edward III, 65-66. 132

Soon after the treaty was signed, Isabella took out sizeable and unpopular loans from the Bardi to pay household expenses and debts to Mortimer (some £30,000). At the

Salisbury Parliament called in October, Mortimer was awarded the earldom of March and the realm’s magnates took the opportunity to air their many grievances with the Crown.

The main spokesman of the discontented nobility was Henry of Lancaster, who openly claimed that Mortimer was misleading Edward III to mishandle matters of state and violate Magna Carta for his own personal gain.439 Matters were so tense that when

Parliament was closed at a point of impasse, Lancaster and Mortimer both raised armed forces in preparation for open conflict. By December it seemed that war was imminent.440

In January 1329, however, the parties met at Bedford and a peace was negotiated in which Henry of Lancaster was punished for his behavior.441 For the rest of the year political gatherings were scarce with only one Parliament sitting in February and one

Great Council meeting in July. Ormrod noted of Edward III during this time that he

“seems to have stayed away – or, rather, have been kept away – from London and

Westminster” until the end of the following year.442 One such distraction was Edward’s journey to France in May 1329 to pay homage to Philip VI, a meeting which only proved

439 Edward III, 74-75. 440 The Anonimalle Chronicle discusses this conflict: the scribe writes of 1328: “At this time the queen, mother of the new king, and sir Roger Mortimer usurped royal power and the treasure of the realm and they held the king under their subjection to such an extent that sir Henry, , who by common assent of the realm at the king’s coronation was made his chief guardian, could not come near him to advice him or protect him” (Anonimalle Chronicle 1307-1334, 141). Edward III, 74-77. 441 The Anonimalle Chronicle notes that peace was made through the intervention of several bishops (Anonimalle Chronicle 1307-1334, 141). 442 Edward III, 78. 133 to anger Philip because Edward would not discuss the surrendering of territories outlined in the 1327 treaty between the two monarchies.443

Although no military campaigns took place in 1329, the Crown still had military concerns that it was required to handle. The Crown’s revenue for the year was £39,624

11s 4.5d, and although a clerical 10th was granted, a meager £9,000 was collected and half of that belonged to the Pope.444 Customs for the year resulted in £13,355 4s 0.25d of that total, but cash was scarce. This is evidenced by the barrowing of £13,965 5s 5d from the Bardi for various Crown expenses throughout the year, including 5,000 marks

(£3,333 6s 8d) lent to Edward III to pay for his trip to France.445 The Crown attempted to repay these loans in periodic cash payments or by allowing the Bardi to profit from customs collections or commodity sales, such as in January when corn and hay were collected in Kent and then sold for £200, which went directly to the Bardi.446

For the year, the Crown spent £1,894 11s 1d on military-related manpower and wages; no soldiers were arrayed or called under a feudal summons but castles were garrisoned, various manpower debts incurred in previous years were discharged, and wages were paid to individuals who performed military-related tasks.447 The Crown paid

£374 3s 5d for soldiers to garrison various Crown castles (such as the men-at-arms and hobelars hired to guard to the castle of Dunstanburgh), and twenty men-at-arms were paid

443 Edward III, 84. 444 The Pope and the English clergy permitted the levying of the clerical 10th only if half of the funds collected were turned over to the Papacy. James H. Ramsay, A History of the Revenues of the Kings of England 1066-1399, Vol. II (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1925), 294. 445 TNA E403/243 m. 6; TNA E403/246 m. 11, 14, 22; CPR, 1327-1330, 344, 390, 418; CCR 1327-1330, 491-492. 446 For example, in September £133 6s 8d was paid to the Bardi for outstanding loans (TNA E403/243, m.6). CPR, 1327-1330, 344. 447 TNA E372/174 10D, 17, 18D, 20D-22D, 31D; TNA E403/243 m. 3, 14, 16; TNA E403/246 m. 1, 3-4, 7-13, 17-18, 21, 24. CCR 1327-1330, 426; CFR, IV, 130. 134 a total of £133 6s 8d annually to guard the king.448 A total of £827 15s was paid to individuals to for their service during the failed campaign in Scotland, while £252 19s

10d was paid to for his father’s expenses in Scotland during the reign of

Edward I.449 In July the Crown hired several individuals to assess the structure of the king’s castles, costing £27 2s 8d, and paid Nicholas Corand, the artilleryman of the

Tower of London, £4 16s to assess royal castle artillery.450 One of the largest military manpower expenses was the hiring of armorers John de Colonia, William le Hanberger,

Thomas de Copham, and Petro de Valentiens throughout the year at a total of £274 18s

6d to repair and maintain Crown armor.451

In regards to supplies, while no goods were purveyed the Crown did have military supplies to purchase and victualling debts to discharge. A total of £1,288 15s 3d was spent on these expenses, such as the £163 9s 5d spent on artillery (although the type, size, or other details about the artillery are not designated in the Issue Rolls).452 Just as there were manpower expenses from the previous year’s campaign in Scotland discharged in

1329, so too were victual expenses paid at a total of £526 5s 8d, with an additional £130 paid for the victuals of Portchester and castle.453 The other sizeable expense concerned horses, as the Crown paid £367 14s 4d to sustain the king’s horses while an additional £288 11s 4d was paid out to recoup horses lost in battle the previous year.454

448 TNA E403/243 m.3; TNA E403/246 m. 11, 17; CFR, IV, 130. 449 TNA E372/174 m. 10D, 17, 18D, 20D-22D, 31D; TNA E403/246 m.13; CCR, 1327-1330, 426. 450 TNA E403/243 m.8, 14, 16, 18. 451 TNA E403/246 m. 1, 3-4, 7-12, 17-18, 21, 24. 452 TNA E403/243 m. 14, 16; TNA E403/246 m. 4, 7-12, 21, 23-24. 453 TNA E372/174 m. 6-7; TNA E403/246 m.9, 11, 12. 454 TNA E403/246 m. 4, 7-8, 10-11, 14, 16, 21, 23-24. 135

In 1329, the Crown spent £3,183 6s 4d on military manpower and supplies. A total of £9,000 was collected in subsidies, and £13,965 5s 5d was borrowed from the

Bardi to help pay Crown expenses. Keeping these values in mind when analyzing the two campaigns of this study will display not only their individual scale, but also the degree to which the Black Death influenced government preparation for war.

CONCLUSION

If this chapter has done anything, it has proven H.J. Hewitt’s assertion that

Military power does not consist solely in the size, skill, courage and equipment of armies. It derives also from the efforts of noncombatants gathering from a score or more of counties hundreds of small purchases— here a few bushels of corn, there a few sheaves of arrows, elsewhere a side of salt pork—amounting in the aggregate to supplies for an army. The organization of these purchases and of their carriage to the ports is discharged efficiently, if at times ruthlessly, by men who contribute to England’s military success equally with the military staffs.455

It is clear, furthermore, that the English government possessed sophisticated methods by which it obtained financial support, manpower, and supplies for its military endeavors. It could rely upon taxation, customs, or moneylenders to raise funds for war while combining feudal service, array, and indenture in varying ratios to people its armies. It could feed those armies with cash purchase or purveyance, which altogether constituted an intricate system reflective of an even more complex government apparatus.

The above processes also display the extent to which the Crown relied upon the support of its people to wage wars, whether that support be financial, physical, or through the production of goods. Failure to obtain that support could be felt in the relative success

455 Hewitt, The Organization of War, 74. 136 or failure of military campaigns; if this vast and multi-tiered system did not function correctly, the Crown could not successfully prosecute the wars in which it was involved.

In Chapter II we saw how Edward III could not sustain his campaigns on the Continent in

1340 due to weaning financial support from England. In the following chapter, we will see how the reverse led to the opposite result on the battlefield of Crécy and outside the walls of Calais.

137

Chapter 5: Crécy-Calais, 1346-47

When the king of England was come before Calais, he laid his siege and ordained bastides between the town and the river: he made carpenters to make houses and lodgings of great timber, and set the houses like streets and cofered them wth reed and broom, that it was like a little town; and there was everything to sell, and a market-place to be kept every Tuesday and Saturday for flesh and fish, mercery ware, houses for cloth, for bread, wine and all other things necessary, such as come out of England or out of Flanders; they might buy what they list. Jean Froissart456

INTRODUCTION

In 1340 Edward III publically declared himself the rightful king of France. He utilized his alliances with the Flemish and princes of the Holy Roman Empire to wage war against Philip VI, and when those alliances fell apart in the face of stagnated offensives and mounting debts, Edward was forced to return to England without achieving his goals. The resulting Treaty of Espléchin, signed in September, instituted a nine-month truce that allowed the belligerents to regroup and prepare their next moves.457

As W. Mark Ormrod argued, in many ways this peace benefitted Edward III because it allowed the Anglo-Flemish alliance to continue; it did not require the renunciation of any present claims to land or titles; and its enforcement in all theaters

456 Chroniques, V. 4, 1-2. 457 Edward III, 227-228. 138 meant that the Scots were forced to abandon plans to besiege Sterling. It also allowed

Edward to return to England and assess his troubled government given that the “sudden and unexpected collapse of the usually mighty English fiscal machine certainly required some explanation.”458

His dissatisfaction with the answers he obtained is clear. As Ormrod discussed,

Edward believed that his requests for financial support while on campaign were not fulfilled because of the administration in charge of the government while he was in

France. In his anger he dismissed the chancellor, treasurer, chief justice of common pleas and four fellow justices, the constable of the Tower, and several clerks of both the

Chancery and Exchequer. Edward imprisoned a regency council member (Thomas

Wake), the constable of the Tower (Sir Nicholas de la Beche), and three prominent

English merchants (John Pulteney, William de la Pole, Richard de la Pole). He also replaced several customs collectors; as many as half of the country’s sheriffs; and every coroner and escheator in England. Without a doubt, it was “the most far-reaching and ruthless purge of government conducted” during his reign.459

After this clean sweep ended 1341, the intervention in Brittany in 1342-43, and the failed peace negotiations with the French in 1344-45, Edward was committed to undertake the next great military endeavor.460 As this chapter will discuss, the result was

458 Edward III, 228. 459 Edward III, 227-228. 460 When John III of Brittany (who also held the title of ) died in April 1341, Edward was eager to continue that alliance. One of John’s disputed heirs was Charles of Blois, Philip VI’s nephew, and the other was John de Montfort, who established close ties with the English when he was imprisoned in the by Philip VI for attempting to enforce his claim for Brittany (an alliance that was championed by Montford’s Flemish wife Jeanne). They pledged their alliance to Edward III as rightful king of France and in so doing enforced their own claims to Brittany. This tie motivated Edward III to intervene in Brittany in 139 the Crécy-Calais campaign of 1346-47, a mastery of administrative organization. It represents the fullest capacity of England’s logistical machine before the Black Death, which will serve to illuminate the impact of the epidemic upon war afterwards.

PREPARING FOR THE GREAT ENDEAVOR

The first move Edward III made to prepare for the coming campaign was to raise the funds he required. In 1344 he summoned Parliament, which during its meeting from

April to June granted him a biennial fifteenth from rural populations and a biennial tenth from cities and boroughs. All of the funds collected south of the River Trent would support the king in his campaign oversees while the funds collected above it would “be put in defense of the north.”461 They ordered for new silver to be coined “in the City of

York, and elsewhere where the King will it ordain,” and required that men-at-arms, hobelars, and archers fighting for the king be “at the King’s Wages” as soon as they departed their counties.462 Parliament also granted Edward a clerical triennial tenth, but with the proviso that church officers be exempt from the demands of royal purveyors.463

The lay subsidy collected in November of 1344 yielded £28,707 16s while the clerical tenth brought £34,393 11s 1d, although these funds were placed in local priories

1342-3, the result of which was the release of Montfort, and after a lengthy civil war, his establishment as the next duke of Brittany in 1365 (Edward III, 249-253). 461 Statutes of the Realm, Vol. I, (London: King’s College, 1810), 484. 462 Statutes of the Realm, Vol. I, 485. Interestingly, while they dated this sitting with the traditional year of the king’s reign in England, they also included the note that it was the fifth year of Edward’s rule in France. This increasingly aggressive attempt to support Edward’s claim to the throne from a propaganda standpoint also led to the striking of gold coins in 1344 that referred to Edward as the king of England and France. (Ormrod, EdwardIII, 260). 463 Statutes of the Realm, Vol. I, 486-487. 140 to ensure that the funds would be used for the defense of the realm.464 Customs on wool, cloth, and other exports yielded £50,010 16s 7.25d, and these funds first went towards discharging the Crown’s lingering debts from 1338-1340.465 While the rest was intended to help prepare for the next major campaign, the earl of Northampton’s expedition to

Brittany in June 1345; the expenses incurred by the earls of Derby, Oxford, and

Pembroke while in in July; and Edward’s own visit to Flanders to reinforce his alliances there drained most of these stores.466

Edward could not rely upon the Bardi and Peruzzi for financial support because they collapsed in 1345.467 While they occasionally operated in England after that time— such as in the winter of 1345 when Bardi officials were given writs of safe conduct to collect the subsidy—by April 1346 the king owed them £50,493 5s .5d from his 1338-

1340 expedition alone.468 Company records indicate that when they collapsed, they had lent Edward III a total of £359,600 and he still owed them over £231,000.469 Although there is evidence that the Crown repaid some of this debt, they did not repay all of it.470

464 Ramsay, A History of the Revenues, 294-295. CCR, 1343-1346, 425; CCR, 1346-9, 18; CFR, 1337-47, 391, 434. 465 CCR, 1343-1346, 461, 551, 583. Harriss, King, Parliament, and Public Finance, 324. 466 CCR, 1343-1346, 511, 533. Edward’s expedition to Flanders, which lasted little over a month, included approximately 2,000 men () 467 Ephraim Russell, “The Societies of the Bardi and the Peruzzi and their dealings with Edward III,” in Finance and Trade under Edward III, George Unwin, ed. (Manchester: Manchester University Press, 1918), 129. 468 CCR, 1343-1346, 551, 552; CPR, 1343-1345, 434. Russell, “The Societies of the Bardi and the Peruzzi,” 126-127. 469 Russell, “The Societies,” 129-131. The Bardi fixed the king’s debt at 900,000 florins and the Peruzzi set his debt at 600,000 florins. With an additional 200,000 florins owed by the king of Naples, the companies were 1,700,000 florins, or £262,000 sterling, in debt when they collapsed. 470 For example, Edward agreed to pay the Bardi £23,082 3s 10.5d but this was reduced to £13,454 2s 11.5d in 1348 given the king’s payment of certain debts for the Bardi. After this determination, however, the debt is not mentioned again in records (CPR, 1345-1348, 60, 80, 406, 441, 442, 443; CPR, 1348-1350, 10, 11; Russell, “The Societies,” 127) 141

Without the Bardi and Peruzzi to lend him ready cash, Edward turned to domestic merchants instead. At the end of 1345 the Crown received advances in return for allowing English merchant companies to farm the customs, such as the 20,000-mark loan granted in December.471 This advance, granted by Thomas de Melchebourne and partners, led to the company’s collapse. They were replaced by John de Wesenham until

May 1346 when he too was replaced by Walter de Chiriton and Thomas de Swanland.472

Despite the obviously-ruinous load of Crown borrowing, Edward was able to continue obtaining loans because the subsidies provided him with stable financial standing. This was solidified by the fact that he ordered the 1345 subsidy be collected in coinage and be brought to the Exchequer upon pain of imprisonment.473 The total yield, £44,918 13s 2d, along with the £50,099 16s 10.5d in customs for the year, provided the foundation for the coming expedition.474

In February 1346 Edward requested loans from the bishops of Bath, Wells, and 89 other members of the clergy for various sums, resulting in £13,620.475 Lords holding land in more than one county (except for those serving the king personally in the campaign) were assessed for men-at-arms and archers, paying a total of £2,450 6s 8d, while various other landholders throughout England paid fines in lieu of service between May and July at £1,925 5s 8d.476 The Crown accepted a £2,000 loan from the citizens of London, and to repay this loan and those from his money-lending merchants, he granted percentages of

471 CCR, 1343-1346, 40-41. Harriss, King, Parliament, and Public Finance, 325. 472 CCR, 1346-1349, 73. Harriss, King, Parliament, and Public Finance, 325. 473 CCR, 1346-1349, 128. 474 Ramsay, A History of the Revenues, 294-295 475 Foedera III pt. 1, 68-69. CCR, 1343-1346, 44. 476 TNA C47/2/58/1. CFR, 1337-1347, 498-507, 515-523. The authorization to assess fines: Foedera, III (I), 77-78. 142 the customs collected on every sack of wool exported (40s/sack).477 To Henry Picard and company he granted on April 6 20s on every sack of wool until they were paid back the

35,000 marks they were owed, while merchant Matthew de Canaceon on April 20 was awarded 8d on every sack exported to earn back £2,500 due to him from the Crown.478

Most significant, however, was the contract enrolled on June 14 in which Walter de Chiriton and Thomas de Swanland agreed to advance the king 6,000 marks (£4,000) before his departure, pay 1,000 marks (£666 13s 4d) to the Wardrobe once a month for the duration of the king’s campaign, and discharge other debts incurred by the Crown up to £50,000, which they were permitted to collect on customs for every export commodity save wine.479 These heavy promises are the reason that the year’s customs yield was only

£24,548, but Edward had to leverage guaranteed revenue collected incrementally for ready cash that he could invest in his campaign.480

While the Crown began raising funds in late 1344, they also began marshalling manpower.481 In October the Crown began assessing landholders throughout England with property valued at increments between £5 and £1,000.482 On January 9, 1345 the king, in order “to have the armed power of the realm in readiness,” continued these assessments; landholders of various values were required to provide a mixture of men-at-

477 CLBL, F: 143. 478 CPR, 1345-1348, 70, 83. 479 CCR, 1345-1348, 72-74. 480 Ramsay, A History of the Revenues, 294-295. 481 In his 1999 doctoral thesis, Ralph Anthony Kaner evaluated manpower acquisition (both in terms of soldiers and sailors) from the reigns of Edward I and Edward III (Ralph Anthony Kaner, “The Management of the Mobilization of English Armies: Edward I to Edward III,” unpublished Ph.D. thesis (The University of York, 1999)). In Chapter 7, Kaner dealt with the manpower acquired for Crécy-Calais (pp.129-168), and his discussion evaluates the same sources as in the following discussion where noted. 482 CPR, 1343-1345, 414-416. Kaner, “The Management of Mobilization,” 129. For examples, see: TNA C47/2/58/3 (dated October 18), TNA C47/2/34/16. TNA C47/2/36/1-12 (issued on October 20). 143 arms, hobelars, or archers along with the expense of their armor and weaponry.483 That month orders were issued to sheriffs for “any men-at-arms between 16 and 60 to be at

Portsmouth at mid-Lent, ready to cross to France”484 Landholder assessments continued in February, and those who did not provide the manpower were given the option to pay for the value of their assessment.485 While some returns were drafted listing available soldiers, the expedition was delayed in favor of more immediate concerns in Brittany,

Gascony, and Edward’s summer expedition to Flanders.486

Attention shifted back to the king’s intended great campaign after Edward III returned to England and in January 1346, orders to gather men pardoned for various crimes in exchange for their service in the army set the departure date at mid-Lent.487

From late January to early February orders were sent to all sheriffs south of the Trent, various English towns (including London), the earl of Northampton, and 22 other individuals ordering their assessed manpower to “pro defensione & salvation necessaria regni nostri Angliae.”488 However, on March 5 the king sent a message to mayors and bailiffs informing them that the departure date had to be pushed back; a storm had dispersed the English fleet and so the soldiers gathered were to report to

Portsmouth on May 1 instead.489 Assessments continued with this new date until the

483 CPR, 1343-1345, 427-428. Kaner, “The Management of Mobilization,” 130. 484 TNA C47/2/60/35-41. The writs were sent to Canterbury, Huntington, , Gloucester, Warwick, Leicester, and Lincoln. 485 TNA C47/2/58/4-6. Kaner, “The Management of Mobilization,” 133. 486 TNA C47/2/58/5. Edward III, 260-269. 487 Foedera, III (1), 67. Kaner, “The Management of the Mobilization,” 145. 488 Foedera, III (I), 67-68. TNA C47/2/42/1-3. TNA C76/22, m.3. CLBL, F: 137. Kaner, “The Management of the Mobilization,” 145-146. 489 TNA C47/2/41/4. Foedera, III (1), 71. This message was repeated to several English sheriffs on March 18 (Foedera, III (I), 76). Kaner, “The Management of the Mobilization,” 145. 144 departure was delayed once again to May 15.490 Even this plan was abandoned when further storms pushed the departure to June 28.491

As many historians have pointed out, historical accounts disagree about the size of Edward’s invasion force.492 Henry Knighton believed the army had 15,000 men, Jon le

Bel put the number at 24,000 (broken down to 4,000 cavalry, 10,000 archers, and 10,000 foot soldiers) and Froissart counted at least 14,000 (with 4,000 men-at-arms, 10,000 archers, and Welshmen on foot).493 George Wrottesley’s 1898 evaluation of Cr cy-Calais campaign records put the army’s size at 19,428 based upon writs issued for manpower throughout England and Wales:

Men-at-arms 2,000 Mounted archers and Hobelars 5,000 Infantry supplied by the towns 1,748 Archers supplied by the counties 3,580 Welshmen 7,100 TOTAL STRENGTH OF ARMY 19,428 Table 9: Crécy campaign manpower based upon Wrottesley’s estimates494

Modern narratives of the war also disagree. Sumption’s history estimated that Edward left England with 15,000-20,000 men while Clifford J. Rogers set the army at 15,250.495

In his edited volume The Battle of Crécy Andrew Ayton argued that the army consisted

490 For the individual embarkation orders, see: TNA C47/2/38/1-23. 491 CLBL, F: 141. Edward III, 269-271. Kaner, “The Management of the Mobilization,” 147. 492 Not only do historical chronicles disagree, but each history of the war (or the campaign specifically), differ in their estimates. Sumption 493Knighton, 55. CJB, II: 69. Chroniques, III: 130. 494 George Wrottesley, ed., Crecy and Calais from the Original Records in the Public Record Office (London: Harrison and Sons, St. Martin’s Lane, 1898), 10. Wrottesley’s compilation of government rolls and records is somewhat controversial because 495 Trial by Battle, 490, 526-528. Rogers, War Cruel and Sharpe, 423. On pg. 426, Rogers discussed the breakdown of this number. 145 of 14,000 soldiers and as many as 1,000 non-combatants.496 Subsequent historians studying the campaign have affirmed this estimate, including W. Mark Ormrod, Craig

Lambert, and Anthony Kaner.497

As Ayton pointed out in his analysis of the Crécy-Calais army, determining the exact number of soldiers on campaign is impossible because records are incomplete.

There is no surviving pay roll for the campaign and although the foreign accounts (the vadia guerre) kept by the Keeper of the Wardrobe, Walter de Wetwang, did exist at one time, they have since disappeared.498 Historians must instead rely upon accounts provided by early modern historians who created summaries of Wetwang’s record.499

Ayton’s skilled attempt at reconstructing these missing records, and his critical evaluation of the available sources, settle the argument: the army that landed on the

Cotentin Peninsula in July was comprised of approximately:

Retinue men-at-arms and esquires 2,800 Retinue archers and hobelars 2,800 Arrayed archers (including Welshmen) 5,000 Arrayed misc. soldiers (including Welshmen) 3,400 14,000 Table 10: Ayton's estimates for 1346 manpower500

496 Ayton, “The English Army at Cr cy,” 189. 497 Edward III, 265. Lambert, Shipping the Medieval Military, 207. Kaner, “The Management of the Mobilization,” 143 n.89. 498 See Ayton, “The English Army at Cr cy,” 160-162. Appendix I of Ayton’s chapter discussed the problematic reconstruction of this account while Appendix II discussed the general issue of source availability at length. He noted that while the missing records did survive the medieval period, they disappeared in the seventeenth or eighteenth century. 499 As Ayton discussed, summarized abstracts from Wetwang’s account were created in the seventeenth or eighteenth centuries, but these are merely summaries as exact numbers or details were not always provided (Ayton, “The English army at Cr cy,” 346 n.5). 500 Ayton, “The English army at Cr cy,” 189. 146

Rogers argued that many of the men in retinues had previous military experience, and

Ayton supported this conclusion while also noting that the archers served as a cohesive group due to the likelihood that they knew each other well before the campaign.501Added to this group are 1,000 non-combatants, which included medical personnel, royal clerks, victuallers, clergy, and miscellaneous other personnel.502

Edward also used his funds to collect the requisite victuals for his campaign.503

The process began in the spring of 1344 when Gilbert de Chishull collected goods from select counties but it ramped up in January 1345 after Edward was awarded his subsidy by Parliament.504 Chishull collected various victuals and turned them over to Walter de

Wetwang, who ordered they be sent to Normandy.505

As Craig Lambert pointed out in his analysis of the campaign, those amounts collected in 1345 match those recorded between January and September 1346, which indicates that the goods were in fact saved for the later campaign.506 As seen below,

501 Rogers, War Cruel and Sharp, 234-235. Ayton, “The English army at Crecy,” 215-224. 502 Ayton, “The English army at Cr cy,” 172-174. For example, on February 22 writs were sent to sheriffs, mayors, and bailiffs requesting that they aid Willian de Large of Wynchelsea to obtain 40 carpenters from London and elsewhere (Wrottesley, Crécy and Calais, 65). Also, Guy de Brian was asked on May 10 to send 40 miners from the Forest of Dean to Portsmouth for the king’s campaign (TNA C47/2/61/10; Foedera, III (I), 78). Sixty were sent to the Continent to assist with the siege of Calais in October (Wrottesley, Crécy and Calais, 148). Not only did Guy de Brian provide 60 miners, but he equipped them with a “‘supertunica of linen cloth and a hood of wooden cloth of uniform pattern,’” and provided “‘six horses to carry their implements’” (Wrottesley, Crécy and Calais, 148). 503 Craig Lambert, in his 2009 doctoral dissertation, and in the subsequent publication Shipping the Medieval Military, discussed the process of victual and supply acquisition for the 1346-47 campaign. Similar treatment of the same sources will be cited where appropriate. Most citations will be derived from his doctoral dissertation as some specific record data was not included in the published manuscript. 504 CCR, 1343-1346, 309. 505 TNA E101/24/15. Lambert, “The Supply and Transport,” 151. 506 TNA E101/25/11. Lambert argued that the number of bacons listed in this enrollment differed from the 1345 collection, but I believe that the same number of bacons was in fact enrolled; the first membrane of the document wotals were recorded is damaged, and I believe the number recorded is actuallyhe same as in the previous account (Lambert, “The Supply and Transportation,” 151-152, 152 n.383). 147

Beans & Wheat Flour Oats Peas qtrs qtrs Beef RECORD507 COUNTY/LOC bshls bshls qtrs bshls tuns qtrs bshls Carcasses Bacons E101/25/8 Derby, Nottingham 1,034 0 675 0 0 0 300 310 2 60 700 E101/25/11 Essex, Kent, Hampshire 992 6 443 4 644 3 143 0 0 70 644 E101/25/14 Bedfordshire 0 0 0 0 131 5 0 0 0 0 0 Essex, Derby, Hertford, , Lancashire, Nottingham, Rutland, E101/25/16 Yorkshire 1,059 0 223 0 587 2 209 524 7 46 755 E101/568/9 Lindsey 0 0 0 0 154 0 0 0 0 0 0 C76/22 Norfolk, Suffolk 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0

1,34 3,085 6 1 4 1,516 10 652 834 9 176 2,099 Table 11: Victuals purveyed in England, January to June, 1346508

148

507 All of these records come from the British National Archives (TNA). 508 Lambert’s account of victual collection includes the records listed above but various totals differ from those recounted in Lambert’s thesis. In addition to the difference in bacon noted above, Lambert argued that TNA E101/25/11 listed goods collected in 1345 (TNA E101/24/15). While I argue the same, Lambert further asserted that a second set of goods were collected and then enrolled in TNA E101/25/11 at the exact same values as those relisted from 1345, doubling that collection yield. In fact, E101/25/11 recounts the 1345 amount twice but this double listing does not indicate the same amount of goods was collected twice. The first time the goods are mentioned (m.1) they are listed as “de quibus”, and then later noted as the total amount collected with the cost and breakdown of these collections comprising the rest of the document (m.2). (Lambert, “The Supply and Transportation,” 151-153). 148

Cheese Cider Herring RECORD COUNTY/LOC Mutton (stones) tun pipes (lasts) Stockfish Salt (tuns) E101/25/8 Derby, Nottingham 360 0 0 0 0 0 50 Essex, Kent, E101/25/11 Hampshire 480 0 0 0 0 0 0

E101/25/14 Bedfordshire 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 E101/25/16 Essex, Derby, Hertford, Huntingdon, Lancashire, Nottingham, Rutland,

149 Yorkshire 749 12 8 1 0 0 0

E101/568/9 Lindsey 0 0 0 0 0 0 0

C76/22 Norfolk, Suffolk 0 0 0 0 20 20,000 0 1,589 12 8 1 20 20,000 50 Table 12: Victuals purveyed in England, January to June, 1346

149

Wetwang added to these preliminary stores goods assessed from January until the army’s departure for France in June. Goods were collected by sheriffs in various counties, and as seen in the map above, sent on rivers to the nearest ports for shipping to the army’s embarkation points.509 All were then sent to France with the army, with the exception of

122.5 quarters of beans and peas that spoiled before they could be unloaded in France; they were instead sold for £133 3s 8d in August, which was sent to William le Ferour, the king’s , for the maintenance of the king’s great horses.510

How long could these victuals feed Edward’s army? As Michael Prestwich pointed out, when a fleet was commissioned from 1337-38 to sail from the Thames to , the fleet of 4,000 sailors consumed the following over a four-month period511:

 5,400 quarters of wheat  8,250 quarters of barley  2,400 quarters of beans and peas  60 tons ale  12,960 bacons  45 lasts of herring  32,400 stockfish  9,072 stones of cheese

As discussed in Chapter 3, while some historians would estimate the caloric value of these foodstuffs to determine the length of time they would last, this method is highly problematic. Seven hundred years of natural hybridization and then genetic modification have made modern caloric estimates entirely unreliable when considering medieval food.

509 TNA E 101/25/8. TNA E101/25/14. TNA E101/25/16. TNA E101/568/9. TNA C76/22. 510 CCR, 1343-1346, 99. TNA E101/25/15. 511 Prestwich, Armies and Warfare, 247-248. 150

Historians should use instead total allotments like the data below to determine the amounts consumed per person per day.

4,000 men for 4 ITEM months 1,000 men/day 1 man/day wheat (qtr) 5,400 337.5 0.011 qtrs barley (qtr) 8,250 515.63 0.0169 qtrs beans & peas (qtrs) 2,400 150 0.00492 qtrs ale (tons) 60 3.75 0.000123 (0.5 cup) bacons 12,960 810 0.0266 bacons 2.8125 (= 37,125 0.0000922 lasts / 1.22 herrings (lasts) 45 (= 594,000 herring) herring) herring

stockfish 32,400 2,025 0.0664 stockfish cheese (stones) 9,072 567 0.0186 stones (0.26 lbs) Table 13: 1337-38 English mariner provisions

Before calculations are done to determine the potential yield of the victuals collected in 1346, one must also factor in the victuals consumed by horses. These animals signified a major campaign demand, both for the soldiers to ride and to pull the baggage train. The process to collect them for Crécy-Calais began on February 20, 1345 when the king wrote to Bartholomew de Burgesh, custodian of Dover and the Cinque ports, to prevent the export of horses valued over £3.512 From January to June 1346 while manpower and victuals were requisitioned, horses were as well; the burden of requisitioning these animals from the population is clear with the granting of exceptions to subjects from the obligation of purveying horses or the victuals needed to feed them.513

512 Foedera, III: 30. Kaner, “The Management of the Mobilization,” 133. Given that the king’s great horses could cost over £100, this indicates only the smallest or lowest quality horses could be exported. 513 CPR, 1345-1348, 59. CPR, 1345, 1348, 13, 17. 151

Although records indicating how many horses were used during the 1346-47 campaign no longer exist, approximations can be determined by estimating the demand posed by both soldiers and carts carrying victuals. The majority of the arrayed soldiers served on foot but the men-at-arms would have required at least three horses per man, resulting in approximately 9,000 horses for their use.514 One must add to this the horses required by the mounted hobelars and archers attached to the retinues, one for each of the

2,800 men involved. Lastly there were the horses required to pull carts, which can be determined by calculating the total load of the goods collected and then factoring in the load of a fourteenth century two-horse cart, which was at most 1,150lbs:

1346-47 ITEM lbs/unit515 Total (lbs) Collections Oats (qtrs) 336 3,085.75 1,036,812 Beans & Peas 430 1,341.50 576,845 (qtrs) Wheat (qtrs) 480 1,517.25 728,280 Flour (qtrs) 14 3,443.13 48,203.75 Beef carcasses 350 176 61,600 Bacons 60 2,099 125,940 Mutton 30 1,589 47,670 Cheese (stones) 14 12 168 Cider (tons) 216 9 1,836 Herrings 0.5 264,000 132,000 Stockfish 6.6 20,000 132,000 2,891,355lbs

Carts Needed516 2,628

Horses517 5,256

Table 14: Horses required to transport estimated victuals518

514 If there were 2,800 men-at-arms on the campaign, and each man had an average of three horses, the total horses required would be 8,400. Add to this a conservative estimate of 100 horses for the highly-ranked nobles for a total of 8,500 horses for the men-at-arms (Prestwhich, Armies and Warfare, 31). 515 Christopher Dyer, Everyday Life in Medieval England (London: Cambridge University Press, 2000), 99. 516 This assumes that a single cart pulled by two horses could pull 1,000-1,150lbs, with an 1,100lb average. 517 This number can be rounded to 5,300 horses to account for those required to pull carts of noble personal possessions, various miscellaneous supplies, and seized spoils. 152

Given these estimates, the total number of horses required for the campaign would have been approximately 17,100.519

Not only did obtaining horses pose a huge challenge for the Crown, but feeding them was a difficult proposition. It has been estimated that in the fourteenth century,

5,000 horses would consume an average of 2,000 quarters of oats a week in addition to fodder like hay.520 This would mean that a single horse consumed 0.057 quarters of oats a day, or 19.2lbs, and equally as much fodder. If the oats collected were allocated to the horses, then the potential use of the victuals collected for the 1346-47 campaign can be seen on the following page.521

Some observations should be made about these estimates: although it is likely that the noble retinues brought their own victuals (perhaps wines or more prestigious foodstuffs such as fowl or fruits), it is possible that the beef, mutton, and flour were also

518 Salt is not included in this estimate because those stores that were not used to preserve the meat were likely small enough to be carried on carts pulled by the horses added to the above estimate. 519 Lambert estimated that the campaign used approximately 17,000 horses based upon the available shipping tonnage, which confirms this estimate (Lambert, “The Supply and Tranportation,” 207). 520 Prestwich, Armies and Warfare, 248. Added to this would have been grass or hay the horses would have had easy access to while on the march in northern France. 521 It is true that this assertion is based upon various assumptions regarding daily consumption and the allocation of collected victuals. However, the horses would have either consumed wheat or oats, and the wheat would have been more effective as a foodstuff producing either bread or gruel for the soldiers (in combination with the beans and peas) as opposed to serving as feed for horses. It is also possible (and indeed highly likely) that the horses were fed a combination of oats and wheat, and human foodstuffs were also made with a combination of the two, but since the ratio of human to horse use cannot be known, for estimates it is less speculative to assume the horses used all of one foodstuff and humans the other. Christopher Woolgar, “Fast and Feast: Conspicuous Consumption and the Diet of the Nobility in the Fifteenth Century,” in Michael Hicks, ed., Revolution and Consumption in Late Medieval England (Woodbridge, Suffolk, UK: Boydell and Brewer, 2001), 16. Christopher Woolgar, who has also published as “C.M. Woolgar,” has performed several studies on medieval diet and noble/peasant food consumption. 153 allocated for their consumption while on campaign.522 The peasantry did not eat bread made from pure flour—a luxury reserved for the nobility—and wheat was typically used to make less refined breads or gruels for arrayed troops on campaign.523 Also, while peasants did eat beef and mutton, huge stores of fish were provided as an alternative. Pig was frequently consumed by the peasantry due to its low cost and widespread availability.524 Moreover, neither beef nor mutton was provided for the 1337-38 fleet, indicating that they may have been collected in this instance for the men-at-arms. The peasants would have obtained any remaining need for protein from the beans and peas, which were usually added to the bread and gruel as a thickener.525 Lastly, the length of time victuals would last should hinge upon the stores of wheat because in the fourteenth century, 75% of a peasant’s diet came from cereals.526

As the chart shows, if the soldiers were provided with a full “serving” of victuals at the rate provided by the 1337-38 allotments, then the collected supplies would have lasted for 22 days without any supplements from forage.527 However, Prestwich’s analysis of daily caloric intake estimated that the 1337-38 allotment provided 8,000

522 This is all the more likely given that the other foodstuffs resemble those collected for sailors in 1346-47 leaving the meat, mutton, and flour as additions that could have been allocated to that class of individuals not present in the 1337-38 fleet, the nobility. 523 Woolgar”, C.M. Woolgar, The Great Household in Late Medieval England (Hong Kong: World Print, Ltd., 1999), 124. As Woolgar pointed out, while a quarter of wheat could produce 25 loaves of bread made with refined flour for noble consumption, poor bread produced 50 loaves of bread from the same quarter. 524 Typically when the medieval nobility consumed pork, they were consuming baby pigs, not full-grown hogs, which were often left for the peasantry (Woolger, “Fast and Feast,” 16). As further proof of their availability to the peasantry, in the 1340’s before the Black Death a pig cost an average of 2.23s/beast, as opposed to 9.32s/cow (Farmer, “Prices and Wages, 1041-1350,” 248). 525 There was also a type of bread made for horses in the medieval period beans and peas. However, if we assume that the horses consumed the oats, then the beans and peas could have been used for human consumption. 526 Dyer, Everyday Life, 84. 527 Although the calculations indicate that the supplies provided for the nobility could last longer, 154

1337-38 Days Victuals 1346-47 Ratio 1337-38: Adjusted 1346-47 Victuals Consumption Available will last ITEM Horse/ Edward I Victuals Collected Rate servings/day (1337-38 Manpower garrison stores Days (man/horse/day) rates) Oats (qtrs) 3,085.75 0.057 qtrs 280,522 17,100 16 1.6 25.6 Beans & Peas (qtrs) 1,341.50 0.00492 qtrs 272,662 12,200 22 1.6 35.2 Wheat (qtrs) 1,517.25 0.011 qtrs 137,931 12,200 11 1.6 17.6 Bacons 2,099 0.0266 78,909 15,000 5 1.6 8 Cheese (lbs) 168 0.26lbs 646 15,000 0 1.6 0 Cider (tuns) 9 0.000123 tuns 69,105 12,200 5 1.6 8 Herring 264,000 1.22 herring 216,393 15,000 14 1.6 22.4 1,542,522.24lbs

155

Flour (lbs) flour 2lbs 621,730 2,800 222 --- 222 (3,443.13 qtrs) 1,243,461.81lbs bread528 Beef (lbs) 61,600.00 1lb 61,600.00 2,800 22 --- 22 Mutton (lbs) 47,670 1lb 47,670 2,800 17 --- 17 Table 15: Maximum use of 1346-47 victual stores

528 Woolgar noted that in 1337-38, the baker for the produced 35 loaves of bread per bushel of wheat when using high-quality flour rather than less-desirable cereals. Although there are examples of producing only 25 loaves per bushel, it is likely that the bread produced on campaign was not of this high a quality (Woolgar, The Great Household, 124). 155 calories per day while Edward I fed his garrison troops a diet of 5,000 calories a day.529

Although it was discussed in the previous chapter why daily caloric intake is a highly inaccurate method to employ when determining the consumption of medieval individuals, if we assume that the foodstuffs collected by Edward I were adequate, then the more substantial 1337-38 allotments had the potential to last for longer, perhaps a month, without any assistance from foraging in France. When factoring in victuals provided for the mariners transporting the army, it is possible that the packed victuals could have lasted the army until the end of July without help from either forage or from England.

Given that the army did forage, they were in France at an ideal time to do so. Hay mowing began at the end of June, which would have provided the horses with plenty of fodder to consume in addition to the collected oats.530 Cereal harvesting usually began a few weeks after this, meaning that when Edward landed in France in mid-July, peasants were likely in the fields harvesting their crops.531 This not only allowed the army easy access to fresh cereals, but the very act of marching through the countryside would have destroyed those crops as yet untouched, and increase the army’s punitive destruction of northern France. This in turn would have increased Philip VI’s drive to engage the

English army, which was arguably the goal of the chevauchée.532

The army also required weapons. As previously noted, most weaponry was the responsibility of those providing the soldiers, either the nobles raising the retinues or the counties providing the arrayed soldiers. The exception to this was the weaponry for

529 Prestwich, Armies and Warfare, 247. 530 Warren O. Ault, Open Field Farming in Medieval England (Oxon, UK: Routledge, 2006), 27. 531 Ault, Open Field Farming , 27-28. 532 Rogers, War Cruel and Sharp. 156 archers, which for the 1346-47 campaign was arrayed beginning on September 12,

1345.533 Acquisitions by county obtained through June 1346 were as follows:

Sheaves of Bow County Bows Bolts Arrows Strings Canterbury & Huntingdon 150 250 0 250 Essex & Hereford 160 400 500 400 Gloucester 300 500 0 500 Huntsford 100 0 0 300 Kent 100 300 0 300 London 300 1,000 0 1,000 Middlesex 100 300 0 300 Norfolk & Suffolk 200 400 0 400 Northampton 100 200 0 200 Oxford and Berks 200 4,000 0 400 Rutland 50 100 0 100 Somerset & Dorset 200 500 0 500 Surrey & 100 500 0 500 Warwick & Leicester 120 200 0 200 Worcester 100 200 0 200 TOTAL 2,280 8,850 500 5,550 Table 16: Archer weaponry and supplies collected, 1345-46534

Bows were typically painted white and purchased in bulk before storage in the Tower of

London prior to embarkation.535

Added to these were the 2,650 carts calculated above needed to carry the army’s victuals and miscellaneous supplies.536 In September 1345 the Crown arrayed 200 cart wheels and 100 axels from Kent, Surrey, and Sussex to ensure that these carts would

533 Foedera, II: 61. 534 Wrottesley, Crécy and Calais, 102. Foedera, III: 87-88. 535 Hewitt, The Organization of War, 65. 536 List of Ancient Correspondence of the Chancery and Exchequer, Lists and Indexes No. XV (New York: Kraus Reprint Co., 1968), 54. 157 remain functional.537 The nobility would have brought along their own sizeable baggage trains (and supplies to maintain them) for their weapons, victuals, and personal belongings, although this number cannot be determined with existing records. To transport and organize the horses, 1,000 hurdles and 20 gangways were arrayed from

Hampshire, Sussex, and Surrey before being sent to Portsmouth in June for embarkation along with the army.538

This lengthy process reveals the sophistication of the English logistical machine in the fourteenth century. When faced with funding difficulties in 1340, Edward returned to England and gained full rein over the complex English administrative machine. With this power, he utilized the methods at his disposal to raise the funding needed to wage war again in 1346. He was able to combine the support of his nobility with the power of country-wide array to amass and equip a large fighting force. To support these men the

Crown marshaled significant resources, both in regards to victuals and also the means to transport them in France. The quantity of these victuals prove, moreover, the assertion of

H.J. Hewitt and other historians (in addition to this thesis) that medieval governments were capable of logistically supporting their armies in the field, and that forage was often a supplement to collected stores, not a requirement in the absence of other options.539

Edward also utilized the well-established merchant society in England to transport his men and materials to the Continent. As Craig Lambert argued in Shipping the

Medieval Military, 89 ports in England contributed 747 ships manned by 15,917

537 Foedera, II: 62. 538 TNA E372/191 m. 11, 11D. Hewitt, The Organization of War, 86-87. 539 Hewitt, The Organization of War, 50-92. Prestwich (Armies and Warfare) and Lambert (“The Supply and Transport,” Shipping the Medieval Military) support this argument. 158 mariners.540 These ships transported the 15,000-man army, their 17,100 horses, and nearly 2.9 million pounds of victuals to France. Once they landed, Edward III continued his bid to become the next king of France.

THE CRÉCY-CALAIS CAMPAIGN

Although Edward III and his forces departed England on June 28, 1346, troublesome seas delayed their arrival until July 12.541 Arriving at the small port of St.-

Vaast-la-Hougue, it took the army six days to unload their men, horses, and supplies.542

During this time notices were sent to the surrounding towns letting them know that if they supported Edward III and his army, they would be safe from future attack.543 Despite this promise, the king ultimately showed little restraint when controlling his troops.

Despite the opinion of some historians that the violence of Edward III’s chevauchées through northern France were indicative of the uncontrollable nature of medieval soldiers, Clifford J. Rogers argued successfully that Edward’s goal with his destructive advance was to draw Philip VI into open battle.544 As discussed above, the

English army was moving through French territory at the peak of harvest season, and the destruction to crops the army surely caused, when coupled with like destruction to towns and cities, undermined Philip’s authority in the region. Given that the control of

Normandy, and Philip’s validity as king of France, were in question, he could not afford

540 Lambert, Shipping the Medieval Military, 139. 541 Trial by Battle, 500. 542 The Life and Campaigns of the Black Prince, Richard Barber, ed., trans. (Woodbridge, Sufffolk: The Boydell Press, 1979), 15-17. 543 Rogers, War Cruel and Sharp, 240. 544 Rogers, War Cruel and Sharp, 240. 159

Figure 9: Crécy-Calais campaign trail from landing to the Siege of Calais545

to allow the English to travel through his country unimpeded. As Rogers proved, the chevauchées were entirely intentional, and succeeded given the battle that took place six weeks after Edward’s arrival in France.

Once it set out from St.-Vaast-la-Hougue, the army was separated into three divisions.546 Edward’s son Edward (known as the “Black Prince” after his success in

545 This map is taken directly from: Rogers, War Cruel and Sharp, 239. The map displays the campaign trail of the English army from their landing at St.-Vaast-la-Hougue in July, through Crécy, to Calais. Not only is it obvious that the army did not move with waterways as Oman and van Creveld would believe necessary, but they successfully crossed not one but four major rivers in the north of France. 160

1356) was positioned at the front of the advance with a force of approximately 3,500 men and the earls of Northampton and Warwick.547 The earls of Suffolk, Arundel, and

Huntingdon along with Thomas Hatfield, , commanded another 3,500 men at the rear. The center of the advancing force, led by Edward III himself, constituted the main body of the army with approximately 7,500 soldiers in all. Although each part of the army would travel separately during the day, they would converge at pre-arranged locations every night.548 Froissart, in a rare mention of victualling efforts, noted that after departing the coast, the army found so much food in the surrounding countryside that the only thing they needed to take from the population itself was wine.549

Although most towns along Edward’s advance surrendered to the English, this had no effect upon the violence visited upon the population. When St.-Lô refused to surrender, the city was sacked with such marked violence that Rogers argued its severity was intended to send a message to the rest of Normandy that their only option was to surrender to the English.550 resisted the English as well, but according to Knighton

Edward III “fought valiantly side by side with [the English archers] at the barricade, until at last the English cleared the bridge and broke into the town of Caen.”551 Once inside,

546 Chroniques, V: 3,133, 139. 547 Prince Edward earned the epithet “Black Prince” after his destructive and successful campaign in Aquitaine in 1356, which culminated with the (also referred to as the ), at which he captured the Philip VI’s son and successor John II. 548 Rogers, War Cruel and Sharp, 244. 549 Chroniques, III: 139. 550 Rogers, War Cruel and Sharp, 245. 551 Knighton, 57. 161 the English “pillaged at their will” until Godfrey d’Harcourt convinced the king to stop the plunder just short of burning the city to the ground.552

After taking Caen, the violence continued. John le Bel wrote that “the English lords and their armies went along the whole of the coast, burning and wasting everywhere, from the Cotentin to the eastern confines of Normandy, doing as they chose without any kind of opposition.”553 As the plunder continued, spoils were sent to the coast to be carried back to England on ships screening the advance.554 The army was slowed, however, when it reached the as Philip had ordered bridges destroyed to stall their advance.555 Even with the staunch resistance by a company of French soldiers left behind to guard to crossing, the English were able to kill 400 men-at-arms and repair the bridge at St. Germaine enough to allow men and carts to cross.556

Once the Seine was behind them, the army turned north towards the Channel in pursuit of Philip’s army. They advanced at a rate of 15 miles per day, and Froissart noted that they were able to forage so successfully, “for the country was plentiful of wines and other victuals,” that they had no need to consume the supplies they brought with them.557

Despite the further destruction of bridges they crossed the on August 23, and at last faced Philip’s army of some 20-25,000 men at the forest of Crécy.558

552 Knighton, 57. Rogers, War Cruel and Sharp, 246-249. Godfrey d’Harcourt was a Norman lord who had been exiled to the English court by the French king. He subsequently assisted Edward on his campaign and is mentioned throughout Froissart’s chronicle for dispensing advice and frequently begging for the king to take mercy upon French subjects (Rogers, War Cruel and Sharp, 247). 553 CJB, 61. 554 CJB, 61. 555 Knighton, 59. 556 Knighton, 61.CJB, 62. 557 Chroniques, V: 168. This supports the above conclusion that the victuals collected before the campaign would have lasted to the Battle of Crécy. 558 Knighton, 61-63. Trial by Battle, 526-528. 162

Although the particulars of this immense battle need not be discussed, it is important to note that the confusion caused by English longbowmen caused the Genoese crossbowmen at the head of the French attack to panic and flee.559 They did so through the line of French cavalry, which disrupted their charge and made them more vulnerable to the English longbow volleys.560 Chaos ensued, and all accounts of the battle note the heavy casualties suffered by the French. This included the kings of Bohemia and

Mallorca; ten and ; six barons; the archbishop of Sées and the bishop of

Noyon; eighty bannerets; 1,542 knights and esquires; nearly all of the Genoese; and many other foot soldiers of indeterminate numbers.561 The English, by contrast, lost perhaps

300 men-at-arms and a small number of archers.562

After the battle Edward advanced towards the coast, “destroying and wasting the countryside all around for eight leagues… until he came to Calais with his army, by

God’s gift, safe and sound, on Thursday before the Nativity of St. Mary.”563 He undertook the siege of Calais “by land and by sea” on September 4, beginning what

Rogers called “probably the single largest military operation undertaken by the English until the modern period.”564

While one might assume the time between Edward’s departure from England and his arrival outside the walls of Calais constituted a lull in logistical activity in England,

559 CJB, 70. 560 Rogers, War Cruel and Sharp, 268-279. Kelly Devries included this battle in Infantry Warfare in the Early Fourteenth Century, describing the success of the English infantry and longbowmen over the Genoese ground troops and French heavy cavalry (DeVries, Infantry Warfare in the Early Fourteenth Century, 155-175). 561 Knighton, 63. 562 Rogers, War Cruel and Sharp, 270. 563 Knighton, 65. 564 Rogers, War Cruel and Sharp, 272. 163 this is far from the truth. On July 25, messages went out to wardens, bailiffs, and mayors along the cost of England to prepare ships and the populations in their jurisdictions for a possible French invasion.565 Prince Edward ordered levies be collected in South Wales at the beginning of August to provide him with funds, and also request that 100 men-at- arms and 100 archers be sent to him in France.566

On September 6 the king informed all sheriffs, mayors, bailiffs, and the bishop of

Durham of his victory at Cr cy and requested that bows, arrows, victuals, and “other necessaries” be sent to his camp outside Calais.567 This included 133 tuns of flour requested of 10 sheriffs in England on September 18.568 Prince Edward meanwhile wrote to his deputies in England and Wales asking for supplies to sustain himself in France, requesting wheat, poultry, coals, firewood, and more green and white cloaks for his

Welsh troops.569 He also renewed his August appeals for archers, requesting that his adjutants send him 38 archers, “the best [they] can find.”570

More importantly, on September 11 Parliament was called to order and Edward’s representatives requested the renewal of the subsidy on his behalf in order to raise more funds for the massive siege underway. A biennial fifteenth was granted “in boroughs and in cities and in ancient demesnes, as in the body of the county,” to be collected immediately for the king’s use overseas.571 Edward also requested that his representatives

565 Foedera, III: 87. 566RBP, I: 8-9, 13-14. 567 Foedera, III:89-90. 568 TNA C76/23, m.18. (Kaner, “The Management of the Mobilization,” 155). 569 RBP, I: 14, 16-19. (Kaner, “The Management of the Mobilization,” 155). 570 RBP, I: 18. 571 Rolls of the Parliament, C 65/12. RP, II.157-163 (11 - 20 September 1346) printed in C. Given-Wilson and Mark Ormrod, eds., “Edward III ,” The Parliament Rolls of Medieval England, DVD-ROM (Anastasia software, Scholarly Digital Editions, 2005). Once the tax was agreed upon, orders were issued 164 be given the funds to raise “4,000 men-at-arms, knights and esquires and other men-at- arms of good estate, and 40,000 foot soldiers, half of which foot soldiers the king of his grace releases, and there will be 5,000 crossbowmen among the said 20,000.”572 He guaranteed the protection of all ships and men who helped transport reinforcements and subsequent supplies to the continent, allowing for certain exceptions for those who had already been overburdened by Crown demands.573 The subsidy yielded £37,479 19s 10d, and was coupled with a clerical tenth yielding £48,111 1s 1d, both of which contributed to the Crown’s revenue for the year of £140,060 6s.574

By October, the king was preparing to bring reinforcements to him outside Calais.

Not only did he order sheriffs throughout the country to arrest any troops who had deserted the army in France and made their way back to England, but he proclaimed that the soldiers raised at the beginning of the month throughout England should be present at

Sandwich for embarkation on October 15.575 This date was not honored, however, and further writs were issued through November into December for soldiers to report to

Sandwich on December 18:

for its collection: “Order to the citizens of Bath, pursuant to the charter dated 10 April, 14 Edward III… to cause their entire portion of the tenth and fifteenth last granted for two years to be assessed and levied by taxers, collectors and clerks to be appointed by them upon all men of the said city and answer to be made therefor at the Exchequer at the stated terms” (CFR, 1337-1347, 486). The Fine Rolls also show the implementation of taxes to fund the expedition: October 11th, 1346: “in the Parliament lately summoned at Westminster it was ordained and agreed that all fruits, prevents and emoluments of benefices of aliens beneficed in the realm and not resident in the same benefices be taken into the king’s hand and applied to the king’s treasury in aid of the charges and expenses of the present war” (CFR, 1337-1347, 484). 572 Rolls of the Parliament, 1346. 573 Rolls of the Parliament, 1346. The petitions presented to Parliament at this sitting reveal that the English people were increasingly unhappy with the government’s wartime demands; one such petition requested that the king “remember how the said commonalty of his land have been charged yearly with various taxes, such as fifteenths, wool, ninths, men-at-arms, hobelars, archers, victuals, keeping the sea coasts and many other charges, by which they were nearly ruined.” 574 Ramsay, A History, 292-295. 575 CLBL, F: 153. TNA C47/2/61/11. TNA C47/2/61/15. Foedera, III: 93. TNA C76/23, m. 12-14. (Kaner, “The Management of the Mobilization,” 156-157). 165

Men-at- Men-at- Source Archers Source Archers arms arms Wirmegaye () 20 20 Kent 0 20 Gloucester 20 40 Essex & Hertford 0 30 Devon 10 20 Canterbury & Hunts 0 20 Hereford 10 20 Northampton 0 20 Wylughby 8 6 Rutland 0 10 John de Segrave 10 20 Bedford & Buckingham 0 30 Edmund de la Beche 6 12 Middlesex 0 12 Thomas Berkley 20 40 Oxford Berkshire 0 30 Thomas Chamsworth, 8 16 Wiltshire 0 12 the younger Thomas Chamsworth, 6 12 Warwick and Leicester 0 20 the elder John de Cobham, Kent 3 6 Gloucester 0 20 Philip Neville 3 6 Salop 0 20 Henry Hillarym Lincoln 4 8 Stafford 0 20 Simon Rochedord 3 6 Norfolk 0 30 Somerset & Dorset 0 30 Suffolk 0 20 Wilts 0 30 0 12 Surrey & Sussex 0 30 131 648

Table 17: Men-at-arms and archers obtained as reinforcements at Calais576

During this period of delay, other efforts to support the siege continued. On

October 20 the king forbade the export of corn except for the king’s use at Calais while merchants collecting customs at were required to pay out the rest of the loan they had granted the king (£2,276 7s 3d)in return for collecting 20s. on every sack of wool exported.577 Sheriffs in various counties were ordered to collect ladders, 200 tuns of wine, 244 tuns of flour, 100 cattle, 500 pigs, and 1,000 sheep.578 These supplies

576 TNA C47/2/61/13. Foedera, III: 96-97. 577 Foedera, III: 92. CCR 1343-1346, 109. 578 Foedera, III: 95. TNA C76/23, m. 8-9. Some of these expense were accounted for in: TNA E101/550/21, TNA E101/550/19, TNA E101/566/22, with a total of (£143 15s 1d). 166 supplemented goods transported to Calais by independent Flemish and English merchants who were encouraged by proclamations to do so; given that the English could not export grain to other regions, it is likely that many were eager to sell their goods in the bastide outside of Calais, named by Edward “Villeneuve-le-Hardi.”579 As John le Bel recounted, in this “Bold New Town” “there was merchandise to be bought whenever they wished— butchers’ shops, a market for cloth and all commodities as good as at or Amiens, for they had the Flemings on their side and it was from them that the goods came; much, too, was sent from England, for the sea is narrow at that part.”580

Category # Bishop and Earls 13 Barons and Bannerets 44 Knights 1,046 Esquires 4,022 Mounted Archers and Vintenars 5,104 Hobelars 500 Foot archers 15,480 Welshmen 4,474 TOTAL (army) 30,683 Masons, miners, tent-makers, men in charge of siege engines 314 TOTAL FORCES 30,997 Table 18: Total forces involved in the Siege of Calais581

These supplies supported the large force outside Calais, as indicated in the above table. Rogers argued convincingly that Edward amassed this sizeable force in an effort to

579 Rogers, War Cruel and Sharp, 273. 580 CJB, 74. 581 Rogers, War Cruel and Sharp, 273. Ayton pointed out that this number, while an accurate account of the soldiers involved in the siege during its course, it is unlikely that this many troops were stationed outside Calais at any one time (Ayton, “The English Army at Cr cy,” 234). 167 draw Philip VI into another battle and end the war.582 He surrounded the city, “was lodged… in a city raised in the fields,” and “placed a strong fleet in the harbour, so that no succor could come to the citizens either by sea or by land, beset as they were in their misery by the English.”583 It is likely, as Rogers argued, that Philip VI could not have managed another attack after the loss at Crécy, whatever his desires; all Edward had to do was wait.584 And despite Philip’s attempts to draw Edward back to England by supporting a Scottish invasion of the north and sending an army into Flanders, wait he did.

As Edward reinforced his position, the earl of Warwick launched an attack upon

Thérouanne, and after defeating the defense force and wounding the bishop in residence, they “sacked the market and stripped it, carrying its treasures in carts and on packhorses to the king at Calais, and they were all greatly enriched with wares of almost incalculable variety.”585 The Earl of Lancaster also obtain spoils when he sacked St. Jean-d’Ang ly,

Tonnay-, Lusignan, and many other towns in the region.586

Edward meanwhile constructed “a lofty fort, made of heavy timbers” along the

Calais inlet, manned with men-at-arms and archers.587 Although the use of gunpowder at

Crécy is debated, accounts confirm that Edward placed with these soldiers “bombards, espringals and other heavy pieces of artillery” in hopes of sinking any ships that attempted to reach Calais.588 As a testament to the novelty of this technology (and those

582 Rogers, War Cruel and Sharp, 274. 583 Knighton, 65. 584 Rogers, War Cruel and Sharp, 278-279. 585 Knighton, 65. 586 Knighton, 75. 587 CJB, 76. 588 Michael Prestwich, “The Battle of Cr cy,” in The Battle of Crécy, Andrew Ayton and Philip Preston, eds. (Woodbridge, Suffolk, UK: The Boydell Press, 2005), 154-155. 168 who used it), no French ships were sunk by these cannon during the blockade.589

The siege continued into 1347. On January 15 the Pope sent a letter to Edward requesting that he make peace with Philip, and yet three days later Edward accepted a loan from merchant Henry Picard of 20,000 marks to help sustain the siege.590 Into

February limited manpower assessments took place in an effort to raise further funds and on March 8, John Bedeford was appointed to oversee the grant of 20,000 sacks of wool to

Edward III, which were “granted to the King for carrying on the war with France.”591 On

March 17 John de Wesenham sent 50 tuns of wine to Edward, who ordered more soldiers be raised in preparation for the attack he believed Philip would launch in the spring, as seen in the chart below.592 Prince Edward followed these requests with Welsh assessments on March 6 for 2,480 Welshmen, 200 archers, and 100 lancers.593

County Archers County Archers County Archers County Archers Devon 60 Buckingham 100 Rutland 30 Hertford 100 Wiltes 200 Sussex 200 Norfolk 200 Canturbury 100 Gloucester 200 Salop 220 Suffolk 200 Northampton 200 Hereford 140 Worcester 140 Southampton 60 Stafford 140 Oxford 160 Surrey 100 Kent 240 Huntington 60 Berkshire 120 Wigora 100 Middlesex 60 Lincoln 200 Bedford 60 Leicester 100 Essex 200 Somerset 60 Dorset 200 1,900 Table 19: Commissions to sheriffs for archers594

589 Knighton, 77. 590 CLBL, F: 161. Foedera, III: 102. 591 CFR, 1337-1347, 17; individuals assessed for a total of £85 13s 4d. CLBL, F: 166. Knighton, 87. 592 CCR, 1343-1346, 188-189. On March 30 Edward also received pewter and wooden vessels, firewood, salt, charcoal, “& omnia alia” “for the king’s household beyond the seas” (Foedera, III: 114). 593 BPR, I: 56. 594 Foedera, III: 107. 169

On May 14 Edward summoned Henry of Lancaster, John de Veer, earl of Oxford, and 31 other magnates to him, believing that Philip was “preparing to give battle before

Witsuntide.”595 On May 28 he accepted a loan of £1,580 from William de Acun and 26 other merchants, and beginning in June he accepted loans from a wide range of church officers, which would be repaid by Michaelmas 1348, totaling £1,936.596 To raise further funds, Edward approved the sale of the 20,000 sacks of wool granted to him in March for

100,000 marks, £40,000 of which would be paid to him by August.597

While all of these preparations ensured that Edward could remain at Calais equipped for a potential French attack, the inhabitants inside the walls were starving.

Ships had managed to bring limited supplies into the city in April, but an English fleet in the Channel prevented any further relief of the population.598 In a plea for help to Philip

VI, the garrison commander noted that while they would never surrender to the English,

“we cannot find anything to live on in the town unless we eat human flesh.”599

Although this plea was intercepted by the English, and Philip did raise an army in

May as Edward suspected, he did not relieve the city as the inhabitants had hoped. When the French neared Calais in July, Philip’s informed him that he would not be able to engage the well-entrenched English without suffering heavier casualties than those sustained at Crécy.600 Edward, hoping for the battle he had prepared for, sent

595 Foedera, III: 120. 596 Foedera, III: 121. CPR, 1345-1348, 337-342. Although these funds were collected between June and December, they were still used to discharge the king’s debts. 597 CCR, 1343-1346, 290. 598 Knighton, 79. Rogers, War Cruel and Sharp, 277-278. 599 Robert of Avesbury, De Gestis Mirabilibus Regis Edwardi Tertii, ed. E.M. Thompson, (London: Rolls Series, 1889), 386. 600 Rogers, War Cruel and Sharp, 279. 170 requests to Sandwich and London for more victuals “because the French army is within three leagues of the King.”601

But an attack did not come. Philip opened negotiations, offering to engage in set battle elsewhere. This would have forced Edward to withdraw from his well-established fortifications but he accepted Philip’s offer, eager to wage a decisive battle that would end the war. Negotiations fell apart, however, when the parties could not agree upon the terms of Calais’ surrender.602 Philip withdrew, and Calais fell soon after.

CONCLUSIONS

When Sir Gaultier presented these burgesses to the king, they kneeled down and held up their hands, and said, ‘Gentle king, behold here we six, who were burgesses of Calais, and great merchants; we have brought to you the keys of the town and of the castle, and we submit ourselves clearly into your will and pleasure, to save the residue of the people of Calais, who have suffered great pain. Sir, we beseech your grace to have mercy and pity on us through your high nobles’; then all the earls and barons, and others that there were, wept for pity. The king looked felly on them, for greatly he hated the people of Calais, for the great damages and displeasures they had done him on the sea before. Then he commanded their heads to be stricken off; then every man required the king for mercy, but he would hear no man in that behalf… then the queen, being great with child, kneeled down, and sore weeping, said, ‘Ah, gentle sir, sith I passed the sea in great peril, I have desired nothing of you; therefore now I humbly require you, in the honour of the son of the Virgin Mary, and for the love of me, that ye will take mercy of these six burgesses’. The king beheld the queen, and stood still in a study a space, and then said, ‘Ah, dame, I would ye had been as now in some other place, ye make such request to me that I cannot deny you; wherefore I give them to you, to do your pleasure with them’. Then the queen caused them to be brought into her chamber, and made the halters to be taken from their necks, and caused them to be new clothed, and gave them

601 Foedera, III: 129. CLBL, F: 166. 602 Rogers, War Cruel and Sharp, 280-282. 171

their dinner at their leisure; and then she gave each of them six nobles, and made them to be brought out of the host in safeguard, and set at their liberty.603

Thus ended the lengthy siege of Calais on August 3, 1347. Although

Edward III spared the residents from the extreme violence visited upon the rest of the French population during his campaign, he forced the inhabitants to vacate the city permanently. He then repopulated Calais with English subjects, creating what

Susan Rose termed “an English town in France.”604

If anything, the Crécy-Calais campaign was a victory of logistics as much as it was a successful feat of arms. Edward marshaled the financial resources of his kingdom to raise the men and material he needed to successfully wage war on the Continent. He did not fight a definitive battle that ended the war, but he won a significant victory at

Crécy that undercut Philip’s military capabilities. This allowed him to remain outside the walls of Calais unmolested and conduct a siege that as Hewitt wrote, “was based on the delivery to the besieging army of huge quantities of English food.”605

The sophistication required to undertake this operation for 13 months should not be underestimated. If one assumes that an average of 20,000 soldiers participated in the

334-day siege at any one time, then the army would have required (based on 1337-38 demands) 73,480 quarters of wheat, 177,688 bacons, 124,057 stones of cheese, 821 tuns of cider, 617 lasts of herring, 29,821 quarters of flour, 6,680,000 lbs of beef, and an equal amount of mutton. Although horses would not have been in high demand, if each man-at-

603 John Bourcher, ed., trans., The Chronicles of Froissart (London; New York: MacMillian Press, 1904), 115-116; references Chroniques, IV: 61-62. 604 Susan Rose, Calais: An English Town in France, 1347-1558 (Rose Woodbridge, Suffolk: The Boydell Press, 2008). CLBL, F: 167. 605 Hewitt, The Organization of War, 59. 172 arms maintained his great horses, then an additional 161,823 quarters of cereals and an equal amount of hay would have been needed to feed them. Considering only a fraction of this demand was purveyed during the siege, the amount of victuals being transported to the area by English and Flemish merchants must have been substantial.

The methods the Crown employed to wage the Crécy-Calais campaign represent the pinnacle of pre-plague capital extensive logistical methods and capabilities. Unlike the failure in 1340, this campaign represents a successful marshalling of every resource the Crown could utilize; the result was the defeat of a larger French army and the capture of a French city that the English would control and use as a bridgehead into France for over 200 years. It was also a significant political coup for Edward, and when he returned to England in 1347, he used it to begin constructing the chivalric culture that would permeate his reign.606 Crécy-Calais only failed in its efforts to end the war, and Edward was intent upon achieving that final goal as soon as possible.

Looming on the horizon, however, was a disaster of seemingly biblical proportions. It would impose hardships and restrictions upon the English Crown that it had never dealt with before. Yet Edward’s government adapted to its newfound limitations with notable efficiency. The epidemic itself, and how the Crown handled the disaster, will be explored in the following chapter.

606 Michael Prestwich, Clifford J. Rogers, and W. Mark Ormrod (among others) deal with Edward’s embracing of chivalric imagery during his reign amongst the nobility he relied up to support his campaigns. 173

Chapter 6: The World Turned Upside Down

Some say that it descended upon the human race through the influence of the heavenly bodies, others that it was a punishment signifying God’s righteous anger at our iniquitous way of life. Giovanni Boccaccio607

INTRODUCTION

While Edward III was defeating Philip VI’s armies at Cr cy and then settling in for the Siege of Calais, an unprecedented human pandemic emerged in Eurasia’s continental interior.608 This “Great Pestilence” broke out in central Asia in the 1330’s, made its way west towards the Black Sea, and then was carried into the Mediterranean by merchants in 1348. After reaching Italy, it spread into the Continent at a pace of over

4km/day, and by 1351 an estimated 50% of the European population was dead.609

Epidemiologists and other genetic researchers have confirmed that the Black

Death was the work of the soil bacterium Yersinia pestis, typically carried by the fleas upon various rodents in areas like Uganda, Western Arabia, Kurdistan, Northern India,

607 Giovanni Boccaccio, Decameron quoted in The Black Death, Rosemary Horrox, ed., trans. (Manchester: Manchester University Press, 1994), 26. 608 Bruce M.S. Campbell, “Physical Shocks, Biological Hazards, and Human Impacts: The Crisis of the Fourteenth Century Revisited,” in Economic and Biological Interactions in Pre-Industrial Europe from the 13th to the 18th Centuries, S. Cavaciocchi, ed. (Florence: Firenze University Press, 2010), 13. 609 Samuel K Cohn, “The Black Death: End of a Paradigm,” The American Historical Review, 107:3 (2002), 703–738. The estimates of those killed by the plague vary from 20% to as high as 70%. As this chapter will discuss, the stated 50% appears to be the most reliable. 174 and the Gobi Desert.610 The outbreak in the 1330’s spread, epidemiologists argue, due to its presence in the Mongol army as it gradually conquered territory west along the Silk

Road. Once it reached the Black Sea, it spread to European merchants who carried it with them back to Italy.611 From there it swept through both urban and rural areas alike, killing the vast majority of those who contracted it.

This chapter will not only discuss the debate surrounding the identity of this ecological disaster, but also its effects upon European society. It was not until the twentieth century that historians turned their attention to its possible impact, and this chapter argues that England in particular adapted to the disaster with marked efficiency.

Despite initial panic, government operations returned to normal by 1351. Then, to raise the funds it needed for its military endeavors despite widespread manpower shortages, the Crown introduced the Statute of the Staple, a tax innovation that significantly increased Crown revenue. Edward III used these funds to discharge old debts and transition from the capital extensive methods employed before the plague to capital intensive, a transition that contributed to England’s overall successes in the war with

France for the rest of the decade.

Before we consider its impacts, however, we should understand the disease itself.

YERSINIA PESTIS

Yersinia pestis is a non-motile oval-shaped bacterium that evolved approximately

610 Philip Ziegler, The Black Death (Stroud, Gloucestershire: Sutton Publishing Ltd., 1969), 14. 611 David Herlihy, The Black Death and the Transformation of the West (Cambridge, MS: Harvard University Press, 1997), 24-25. 175

2,000 years ago from the soil-dwelling bacillus Yersinia pseudotuberculosis.612 A very young bacterium given that some are billions of years old, it is made up of a single chromosome and has 4,600,755 base pairs in its DNA strand, which compared to humans

(who have 23 pairs of chromosomes and 3 billion base pairs) is incredibly small. The bacterium has three types (referred to as biovars): antiqua, which is found in Africa; mediaevalia, which is from central Asia; and orientalis, which is found in East Asia and elsewhere. Y. pestis thrives in warm temperatures and is contracted by fleas exposed to infected soil (Xenopsylla cheopis being a commonly-found vector species on ), which then transmit the bacterium through bites into indigenous mammalian populations.613 In the case of the Black Death, recent research has indicated that the Asian gerbil

(Rhombomys opimus) was responsible for the outbreak as opposed to the Rattus rattus , which likely served only as an intermediary host along trade routes west.614

Y. pestis’ vector, or the means by which humans contract the disease, involves exposure to plague-infected fleas, exposure to plague-infected bodily fluids of other infected mammals, or the breathing in of plague-infected moisture released into the air by

612 Kirsten I. Bos, Verena J. Schuenemann, G. Brian Golding, et. al., “A draft of Yersinia pestis from victims of the Black Death,” Nature, 478 (27 October 2011), 506. Patrick S. G. Chain, Ping Hu, Stephanie A. Malfatti, et. al., “Complete Genome Sequence of Yersinia pestis Strains Antiqua and Nepal516: Evidence of Gene Reduction in an Emerging Pathogen,” Journal of Bacteriology, 188: 12 (June 2006), 4453-4463. 613 Ryan T. Jones, Sara M. Vetter, and Kenneth L. Gage, “Exposing Laboratory-Reared Fleas to Soil and Wild Flea Feces Increases Transmission of Yersinia pestis,” The American Journal of Trpolical Medicine and Hygiene, 89: 4 (9 October 2013), 784-787. This study indicates that 50% of the rodents exposed to infected fleas contract Y. pestis. BJ Hinnenbusch, AE Rudolf, et. al., ‘Rolse of Yersinia murine toxin in survival of Yersinia pestis in the midgut of the flea vector,” Science, 296: 5568 (April 2002), 733-735. 614 Boris V. Schmid, Uld Buntgen, W. Ryan Easterday, et. al., “Climate-driven introduction of the Black Death and successive plague reintroductions in Europe,” Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences of the United States of America, 112: 10 (January 2015), 3020-3025. This study also finds that contrary to traditional assumptions, the plague did not lay dormant in indigenous rat populations within Europe between each subsequent outbreak of the disease but rather was brought into Europe through contact with Central and East Asia. 176 other plague sufferers. Once contracted, the infection takes one of three forms: bubonic, pneumonic, and septicemic. These are not different strains of the Y. pestis bacterium but rather an indication of the infection site (and by extension, how it is spread from host to host): bubonic plague infects the lymph nodes, so named for the black swellings that forms in those locations, and must be transmitted through flea bites or exposure to bodily fluids of infected individuals. Pneumonic plague involves an infection of the respiratory system, spread when an infected host releases microscopic mucus into the air through sneezing or coughing, which is then breathed in by someone else. Septicemic plague, the rarest of the infections, involves the spread of the bacterium into the blood stream after exposure to a flea bite or bodily fluids, and is often a secondary consequence of bubonic or pneumonic plague’s spread throughout the body.615

Once Y. pestis enters a human host, it does not infect individual cells but rather it reproduces at the infection site at a rate that doubles its number every two hours, effectively causing toxic shock syndrome. The body generally cannot stop this reproduction because the bacterium is encased in a gel-like capsule that cannot be broken down by phagocytes or lymphocytes; in fact, once ingested by these cells, Y. pestis feeds on them in order to replicate. As such, in the case of bubonic plague, cellular necrosis occurs where the flea bites the human (or the lesion/sore exposed to infected bodily fluids) and the lymphatic system takes the bacterium to the nearest lymph nodes (which is where the body creates antibodies) where it proliferates unimpeded. During replication it can then spread to the blood stream and cause secondary septicemic plague, or spread to the lungs and induce secondary pneumonic plague. Alternatively, the blood can be

615 Joseph Patrick Byrne, The Black Death (Westport, CT: Greenwood Press, 2004), 20. 177 infected directly or an individual can breathe in infected particles present in the air around other infected individuals.616 Bubonic plague is by far the most common of the three, and accounts for approximately 85% of modern reported cases.617

The infection incubates in the human host for at most a week after exposure (two to six days for bubonic and one to three days for pneumonic), during which time the bacterium replicates enough to cause visible symptoms.618 In the case of the bubonic plague, these mimic influenza or pneumonia including fever, muscle aches, and fatigue.

If external lymph nodes are infected, large, black lumps 1cm to 10cm in diameter form on the groin, neck, or underarms called buboes, which give this infection its name.619

Although sometimes infected hosts die before indicators occur, a septicemic infection can cause more severe influenza/pneumonia symptoms including fever, vomiting, and diarrhea, along with an enlarged liver and shock. Pneumonic is the most lethal due to its

“airborne” nature and short incubation period, mimicking severe influenza/pneumonia with shortness of breath, coughing or sneezing, fever, chills, and malaise.620 In fact, with the exception of the black color of lymph node buboes, the symptoms of plague mimic influenza or pneumonia to such a degree that even in modern America isolated cases have been initially misdiagnosed.621

616 Byrne, The Black Death, 19-20. 617 Chilton D. Bryant and Dennis L. Peck, eds., “Plague,” Encyclopedia of Death and the Human Experience (London, UK: Sage Publications, 2009), 411. 618 Division of Vector-Borne Diseases, “Plague,” Centers for Disease Control and Prevention, Accessed 15 March 2015, Available: http://www.cdc.gov/plague. 619 Byrne, The Black Death, 19. “Boubon” is Greek for “groin”. Paul Bugl, “History of Epidemics and Plagues,” Accessed 18 February 2015, Available: http://www.uhavax.hartford.edu/bugl/histepi.htm#plague. 620 Michael B. Prentice, “Plague,” The Lancet 369:9568 (7 April 2007), 1196-1207. 621 Laura Geggel, “Colorado Plague Outbreak Shows It’s hard to Diagnose the Disease,” Live Science (30 April 2015). As the article recounts, during the summer of 2014 four people contracted bubonic plague from a dog (who had contracted Y. pestis from fleas), the dog’s owner, a vet, a veterinary clinic technician, 178

If left untreated, modern bubonic plague has a mortality rate of 50-75% while septicemic and pneumonic plague are at 100%.622 Luckily though, the plague is now curable. Vaccines exist but they are generally only useful when administered to individuals continually exposed to the plague; the body requires at least 30 days to generate antibodies once vaccinated, which would not prevent acute infection during an unexpected outbreak. However, antibiotics can be incredibly effective if administered in a timely manner—the Center for Disease Control (CDC) recommends within 24 hours of suspecting a Y. pestis infection—and Streptomycin, gentamicin, and tetracycline are the optimal methods of treatment.623 With proper care, the CDC reports that with antibiotic treatment, mortality rate has decreased to 11%, while the World Health Organization

(WHO) states that it is 8-10%.624

Historians and epidemiologists agree that there have been three confirmed Y. pestis outbreaks (or more accurately, waves). The so-called Justinian plague broke out in

540CE in Egypt, after which it spread to Constantinople, Europe, and Asia before dying out in 750.625 Then there was the Black Death, a name first used in the sixteenth century and then popularized in England due in part to Elizabeth Penrose’s 1823 History of

and an acquaintance of the owner. The owner was originally diagnosed with severe pneumonia, the veterinarian was diagnosed with bronchitis, the acquaintance was diagnosed with pneumonia, and the technician self-medicated with antibiotics. It was not until doctors realized the owner had been misdiagnosed that they tested the dog for the disease (which had been humanely euthanized due to its illness) and learned that the man had contracted pneumonic plague. With adequate treatment, all four individuals survived. 622 Bugl, “History of Epidemics.” 623 Jack D. Poland, D.T. Dennis, “Treatment of Plague,” Plague Manual WHO/CDS/CSR/EDC/99.2 (), 55- 62. This packet, available online, also contains a lengthy list of the species of fleas often found in various areas that serve as vectors for the plague, along with detailed discussions of the history of plague occurrence in various countries/regions around the world. Interestingly, penicillin, the first true antibiotic, is not effective against the plague. 624 “Plague,” Center for Disease Control and Prevention. 625 Aberth, The Black Death, 1. 179

England; before this time, it was referred to as “the plague” or “the Great Pestilence.”626

It appeared first in central Asia then moved into the Crimea in 1346, Constantinople in early 1347, Cyprus and Sicily by the Autumn, Marseilles by January 1348, Paris in spring, followed by Germany, the Low Countries and Great Britain by the end of the year. Although the outbreak died out in 1351, it would reappear at least 15 more times before the sixteenth century.627 That last major wave came in 1855-1896 (with reoccurrences in Manchuria in 1910-1911 and 1920-1921) and broke out mostly in China and India, although its first appearance in the U.S. was in 1899 after Chinese cargo ships docked in San Francisco.628

The outbreak in India and China is particularly significant because it was during this time that the bacterium was isolated and identified. Swiss microbiologist Alexandre

Yersin went to Hong Kong in 1894 where he isolated the bacterium responsible for the outbreak.629 Four years later, French physician and biologist Paul-Louis Simond discovered that the plague was transferred from rats to humans with fleas serving as the vector of transmission.630 When historians compared the reported symptoms and outcomes of this modern outbreak to the accounts of the Black Death, they concluded

626 Aberth, The Black Death, 1. Elizabeth Penrose published under the name “Mrs. Markham”: Mrs. Markham, History of England from the invasion of to the reign of Victoria (New York: D. Appleton, 1879), 139. She wrote “Edward’s successes in France were suspended for the next six years by a pestilence; so terrible as to be called the Black death, which raged throughout Europe, and proved a greater scourge to the people than even the calamities of war.” 627 In addition to an outbreak in 1360-1363, Byrne identified 1379-1383, 1389-1393, 1400, 1405-1407, 1413, 1420, 1427, 1433-1434, 1438-1439, 1457-1458, 146301464, 1467, 1471, 1479-1480, and 1485 (Byrne, The Black Death, 60). 628 “Plague,” Center for Disease Control and Prevention. 629 Byrne, The Black Death, 16. A few days earlier than Yersin, Dr. Shibasaburo Kitasato also isolated the bacillus but debate surrounds his discovery to due vague records. Regardless, Yersin has been credited with the discovery, thus the plague’s name of Yersinia pestis, or Yersin’s plague. 630 H.H. Mollaret, “The Discovery by Paul-Louis Simond of the role of the flea in the transmission of the plague,” Bulletin de la Société de pathologie exotique, 92: 5 pt. 2 (December 1999), 383-387. 180 that the two diseases were one in the same. The identity of the Black Death, which had long been a mystery, was apparently discovered at last.

This conclusion seemed bolstered by modern scientists when in 1998, a team of

French researchers used teeth from seven confirmed plague victims from the Justinian outbreak and 12 from the sixteenth and eighteenth centuries to confirm the presence of Y. pestis.631 In theory, bubonic plague leads to secondary septicemic plague before a victim’s death, and would therefore leave trace amounts of the bacterium in teeth pulp for researchers to later extract and identify.632 When these researchers reconstructed the available Y. pestis DNA, they found no mutations that would differentiate the ancient and sixteenth/eighteenth century strains from the modern one. A follow-up study by a related

French research team analyzed the teeth of one child and two adults from a Black Death grave in France, ending their article with the definitive phrase: “we believe that we can end the controversy: Medieval Black Death was plague.”633

Questions were raised about the team’s methods by biologists and epidemiologists, however, especially when a study was released in 2003 indicating that another team’s analysis of 108 teeth from 61 individuals who died from the Black Death using the same tooth pulp method failed to recover any Y. pestis DNA.634 Historians

631 Michel Drancourt, Gerard Aboudharam, et. al., “Detection of 400-year-old Yersinia pestis DNA in human dental pulp: An approach to the diagnosis of ancient septicemia,” Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences of the United States of America, 95:21 (13 October 1998), 12637-12460. 632 This method had been used as far back as the 1980’s to examine AIDS (M. Glick, M. Trope, et. al., “Detection of HIV in the dental pulp of a patient with AIDS,” American Dental Association, 119 (1989), 649-650. 633 Didier Raoult, Gerard Aboudharam, et. al., “Molecular identification by ‘suicide PCR’ of Yersinia pestis as the agent of Medieval Black Death,” Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences of the United States of America, 97:23 (August 2000), 12800. 634 M.T.P. Gilbert, J. Cuccui, et. al., “Absence of Yersinia pestis-specific DNA in human teeth from five European excavations of putative plague victims,” Microbiology, 150 (2004), 341-354. 181 backed up this scientific doubt around the same time, arguing that the characteristics of the medieval pandemic do not mirror those of modern bubonic plague outbreaks.

Historian Samuel K. Cohn was a charter member of the skeptical school, using

400 chronicles, 250 plague tracts, 50 saints’ lives, European merchant correspondence, and an excess of 40,000 death documents to raise valid concerns with identifying the

Black Death as Y. pestis.635 First he argued that medieval accounts indicate a mortality rate of nearly 100%, whereas the WHO and the CDC agree untreated cases of bubonic plague kill a lesser 50% to 75% of those infected. Subsequent medieval outbreaks also saw a decreased percentage of the population killed by the plague, 50% of the population dying in 1348-1351 as opposed to approximately 15% to 20% or less during each subsequent outbreaks; this indicates a building immunity to Y. pestis, which is, in theory, medically impossible. These death toll percentages also contrast drastically with the modern outbreak in China and India, which while killing approximately 12 million people, constituted only 2% of the total population.636

He also identified the problem of relying on the rat flea as a vector of transmission given how quickly the disease spread: the plague moved at a rate of over 4 km/day through both cities and rural areas, which if it was bubonic Y. pestis, would require that Europe was teaming with both live rats and dead ones.637 Historical accounts,

635 Samuel K. Cohn, Jr., The Black Death Transformed: Disease and Culture in Early Renaissance Europe (London: Arnold Publishers, 2002). Samuel K. Cohn, Jr., “The Black Death: End of a Paradigm,” The American Historical Review, 107:3 (June 2002), 703-738. 636 Wynne Parry, “Molecular Clues Hint at What Really Caused the Black Death,” livescience (7 September 2011), Accessed 21 November 2014, Available: http://www.livescience.com/15937-black- death-plague-debate.html. 637 The plague can remain dormant within a rat host for nearly a year, but it is agreed by epidemiologists that an epizootic among the carrier rodent population precedes each human outbreak (Bruce M.S. Campbell, “Physical Shocks, Biological Hazards, and Human Impacts: The Crisis of the Fourteenth 182 however, make no mention of large rat populations dying in the years before the plague or roaming urban and rural streets in great numbers during it, which seems to indicate that their presence was not prevalent enough to account for a bubonic epidemic. In nineteenth century China and India, for example, the bubonic plague moved far more slowly, which seems entirely contrary to expectations given that the world was far more globalized in the 1800’s than it was in the fourteenth century.

Lastly Cohn argued that the symptoms of the medieval plague do not mirror those found in modern outbreaks. The medieval plague seemed to have a very short incubation period (1-3 days as opposed to nearly a week) and in addition to pneumonia symptoms, involved black buboes forming all over the body in nearly every case. In modern outbreaks, however, while respiratory symptoms are typical, black buboes are an uncommon occurrence, and involve swelling of the lymph nodes only as opposed to forming all over the body.638

Cohn asserted, therefore, that the medieval plague was either a more virulent mutation of the modern Y. pestis strain, a combination of known diseases (such as influenza, malaria, typhoid, typhus, glandular fever, tularaemia, lymphogranuloma inguinale, various forms of filariasis, and even anthrax), or a disease as yet unknown to modern medical science.639 Basically, given the evidence, Cohn felt the Black Death was

“any disease other than” the bubonic plague.640

Century Revisited,” in Economic and Biological Interactions in Pre-Industrial Europe from the 13th to the 18th Centuries, S. Cavaciocchi, ed. (Florence: Firenze University Press, 2010), 13-33.). 638 Specifically, modern cases rarely involved the formation of buboes 639 Cohn, The Black Death Transformed, 57. Cohn openly posited that he had no indentified a viable alternative for the Black Death, which one reviewer noted “traded one mystery for another” (Sharon T. Strocchia, “Review,” Journal of Social History, Vol. 38, No. 2 (Winter 2004), 545). 640 Cohn, The Black Death Transformed, 1. 183

Then in 2010, another study was released that located the presence of Y. pestis in medieval plague victims.641 The study identified protein signatures specific for Y. pestis in mass graves from northern, central, and southern Europe that were known to be Black

Death burials, “[demonstrating] unambiguously that Y. pestis caused the Black Death.”642

Moreover, they discovered that the Black Death was due to two biovars of Y. pestis, mediaevalia and orientalis, indicating that the Black Death was caused by plague waves from both Central and East Asia that reached Europe at the same time. This study was followed by another in 2011, which focused specifically on plague victims found in

London.643 Using 46 teeth and 53 bones from the mass grave in Smithfield established in late 1348 or early 1349 specifically for plague victims, the team was able to identify Y. pestis and establish that from the fragments of DNA they were able to reconstruct, no mutations were present that would differentiate it from modern outbreaks.644

It seems as though new contributions from the scientific community occur every month. Most notably, in 2013 when digging a pit for a new Crossrail project in London

(an effort to establish a 73- long rail link with 37 stations across the city), 25 skeletons were located alongside mid-fourteenth century pottery.645 What makes this grave unique is that the bodies were arranged neatly in rows as opposed to being located in disarticulated piles; this indicates that the bodies were interred early on in the outbreak when people were still able (and willing) to individually bury the dead, rather than dump

641 Stephanie Haensch, Raffaella Bianucci, et. al., “Distinct Clones of Yersinia pestis Caused the Black Death,” PLoS Pathogens, 6:10 (October 2010). 642 Haensch, “Distinct Clones.” 643 Bos, “A draft.” 644 Bos, “A draft,” 506-509. 645 James Morgan, “Black Death skeletons unearthed by Crossrail project,” BBC News: Science & Environment (30 March 2014). 184 large numbers of bodies in single large pits.646 When 12 of these bodies were analyzed, not only was Y. pestis located, but the reconstructed DNA was nearly identical to that identified during the 2014 outbreak of bubonic plague in Madagascar.647

It would seem then that the debate is laid to rest. The Black Death was the work of Y. pestis found today without mutation. Yet as admitted by the scientists performing these studies, these findings do not explain the many differences between the modern plague and the medieval outbreak as outlined by Cohn and other historians. To bridge this gap, one must first understand the problematic nature of relying upon 667-year old

DNA to accurately understand its effect upon medieval Europeans.

First, DNA has a half-life of 521 years.648 When cells die, the bonds between the base pairs that make up DNA begin to break down, a process sped up by microorganisms and water. This means that the DNA in recovered plague bodies would have, at most, 1.6 million bonds still intact of the original 4.6 million that make up a single strand of Y. pestis, not accounting for the fact that some areas began burning plague victims once the death toll escalated. The consequence of this reality is that while no mutations have been identified in the strands examined thus far, future studies could locate something to explain the increased virulence of the Black Death.

Another factor to consider is that during the outbreak, an initial bubonic infection could have spread to the lungs and led to a secondary pneumonic infection. Given its far

646 There were two large pits located outside London during the outbreak. One, the Smithfield grave, has been located. The location of the other is still unknown. 647 Vanessa Thorpe, “Black death skeletons reveal pitiful life of 14th-century Londoners,” The Observer (29 March 2014). 648 Matt Kaplan, “DNA has a 521-year half-life,” Nature: International Weekly Journal of Science (10 October 2012). 185 shorter incubation period (hours in some circumstances), the increased severity of pneumonic plague symptoms, and the 100% mortality rate, these factors could explain the severity of the Black Death in comparison to modern outbreaks.

Some genetic researchers and epidemiologists might also argue that the answers lie beyond these reconstructed DNA strands.

For example, DNA is packaged in proteins (much like peas in a pea pod), which can greatly determine how DNA strands are expressed. The study of this potential expression (as well as DNA’s interaction with other factors such an individual’s internal environment) is referred to as epigenetics.649 Such influences can be seen in the efforts by genetic researchers to identify the DNA sequence that causes Autism, which as yet have been unsuccessful. This failure has led some researchers to theorize instead that Autism is an epigenetic phenomenon, meaning that it is not the product of a specific “Autism gene sequence” but rather the result of certain DNA sequences (or more likely groups of sequences) interacting in certain circumstances with their epigenetic context.650 This means that while the recovered DNA strands of Y. pestis could be identical, their epigenetic contexts could have led them to effect humans in entirely different ways.

These circumstances can also apply to the disease’s host as recent research indicates that bacterial infections can differ in virulence depending upon epigenetic differences in infected individuals. It seems that while DNA codes could not prevent such infections, epigenetic differences could. A 2012 study, for example, argued that

649 Josep Casadesus and David Low, “Epigenetic Gene Regulation in the Bacterial World,” Microbiology and Molecular Biology Reviews (September 2006), 830-856. 650 Interview with Dr. Peter White, Director of the Biomedical Genomics Core, Principle Investigator of the Center for Microbial Pathogenesis, and Director of Molecular Bioinformatics, Nationwide Children’s Hospital (Columbus, Ohio), 21 February 2014. 186 epigenetic differences could either promote a host’s defense against a bacterial infection or inversely weaken the immune system’s response to it.651 As a consequence, bacterial infections have the potential to reshape the epigenome and create a “memory of infection” that could influence immunity. It is acknowledged by researchers than humans can generate epigenetic immunity to viruses—a genetic mutation known of as CCR5- delta32, which is found amongst Europeans, confers resistance to HIV—so it is entirely plausible that the same could be said of long-term exposure to certain bacteria such as Y. pestis.652 The fact that two of three Y. pestis biovars are endemic to Asia would seem to bolster the argument that the modern plague was far less virulent due to an epigenetic immunity present in Asian populations frequently exposed to the disease.

Some researchers even believe that microbes don’t really cause infections at all, but rather genetic and internal environmental circumstances (an epigenetic condition) allow the host to become colonized by the infection.653 In other words, a potential genetic or environmental defect in a host’s immune surveillance gene (what would engage the lymphatic system to eliminate it) could allow Y. pestis to proliferate, whereas in other hosts without that defect it would not be able to do so (or do so with such virulence or similar symptomology). While this scenario seems fanciful— certainly it mimics humanity’s victory over aliens from Mars in H.G. Wells’ famous novel War of the

651 Helene Bierne, Melanie Hamon, and Pascale Coassart, “Epigenetics and Bacterial Infections,” Cold Spring Harbor Perspectives in Medicine (2012), 1-24. 652 Parry, “Molecular Clues.” 653 “Single gene links susceptibility to rare infections with predisposition to autoimmune disease,” Science News (12 October 2014), Available: http://newswire.rockefeller.edu/2014/10/12/single-gene-links- susceptibility-to-rare-infections-with-predisposition-to-autoimmune-disease-2/. Jeremy Manry and Lluis Quintana-Murci, “A Genome-Wide Perspective of Human Diversity and Its Implications in Infectious Disease,” Cold Spring Harbor Perspectives in Medicine (2013). This idea is so prevalent in the health and genetic research fields that an annual conference is devoted to the topic: EMBO Conference on Host Genetic Control of Infectious Diseases. 187

Worlds—one need only contemplate the reason that indigenous populations in North and

South America experienced widespread epidemics after first contact with Europeans.

Diseases to which Europeans had long since developed an inherent tolerance were completely foreign to the immune systems of these new populations. Conversely, while

African populations had developed a heightened tolerance to malaria, its lethality to

Europeans meant that they could not easily venture into the continental interior until the modern development of quinine.

It would seem then that scientists should next explore the epigenetic factors prevalent in medieval European populations. However, scientists can never perform such studies because at least 10 grams of brain tissue are required to examine epigenetic factors.654 Since victim brains have long since decomposed, isolated and fragmented

DNA strands absent of any epigenetic context are all that remain.

Moving from the hosts’ internal environment to the environment in which they lived, some historians have theorized that the many famines and subsequent food shortages throughout Europe due to overpopulation and climate depression in the first half of the fourteenth century created a population ill-equipped to fight off any bacterial infection, let alone one so deadly. In a 2013 article Sharon DeWitte and Philip Slavin asserted that most Europeans at the outbreak of the plague suffered from chronic shortages of protein, calcium, and Vitamin B12.655 In an earlier article Slavin argued that the epizootic that killed many species of animal in Europe (including cows, ox, and

654 Interview, Dr. Peter White, 21 February 2014. 655 Sharon DeWitte and Philip Slavin, “Between Famine and Death: England on the Eve of the Black Death—Evidence from Paleoepidemiology and Manorial Accounts,” The Journal of Interdisciplinary History, 44:1 (Summer 2013), 37-60. 188 sheep) in the first half of the century specifically contributed to this calcium and protein deficiency.656 Examination of the recently-recovered Crossrail plague victims bolsters such claims as a majority of the skeletons possessed the physical markers of malnutrition,

16% had rickets, and many showed obvious signs of undertaking prolonged and physically damaging heavy labor.657 One can only imagine what else could be discovered about the health of these victims had soft tissue and internal organs been available for examination.

However, if one assumes that the Y. pestis strains in medieval Europe and nineteenth century China were the same without mutation (and one discounts the possibility of any genetic or epigenetic influences), dietary standards between the two areas would have to differ significantly in order to account for the increased virulence of the medieval outbreak. However, the majority of China’s population in the nineteenth century was rural and consumed a predominantly vegetarian diet consisting of cereals and only small amounts of milk, butter, cheese, liver, fish, or eggs. Protein deficiency was a constant issue as 95% of intake came from plants, which is known to have a lower biological value than animal proteins or even soy (which only accounts for an estimated

10% of the plant protein consumption).658 Rickets, a disease indicating low absorption of calcium and Vitamin D2 was also common, as was iron-deficient anemia and goiter

656 Philip Slavin, “The Great Bovine Pestilence and Its Economic and Environmental Consequences in England and Wales, 1318–50,”EcHR, LXV (2012), 1239–1266. 657 Morgan, “Black Death skeletons.” 658 Frederick J. Simoons, Food in China: A Cultural and Historical Inquiry (Boca Raton, FL: CRC Press, 1991), 478. 189 caused by low iodine levels.659 This means that while the late nineteenth century Chinese peasant diet did have its benefits, it also had notable deficiencies that could have compromised an immune system just as the famines of the early fourteenth century did

European populations.

It must also be remembered that out of the millions of medieval plague victims, scientists have examined the bones and/or teeth of less than 100. With the frequent discovery of more bodies, improved diagnostic tools, and our expanding understanding of the role of DNA, epigenetic factors, and nutrition in disease expression and/or prevention, conclusions that seem entirely plausible today could be rendered irrelevant within a year or less. Conversely, as more bodies are examined, factors heretofore unknown or thought to be insignificant could become crucial.

The above discussion has made clear two things: first, that making broad assumptions about the nature of the plague based solely on 667-year-old reconstructed

DNA strands is highly problematic; and two, that dismissing Y. pestis as the culprit of the

Black Death based solely on symptomology despite recent burial studies discounts the highly complex and still largely mysterious relationship between the human body and the diseases that affect it.

It must also be remembered that while interesting, such discussions are secondary to the real issue: in the words of historian John Aberth, “whatever it was, it killed an awful lot of people.”660

659 Simoons, Food in China, 489-491. It should be noted that the calcium intake of Chinese peasants was likely very high, but researchers have postulated that excess amounts of calcium can actually decrease the body’s ability to absorb other key nutrients. 660 Aberth, The First Horseman, 16. 190

THE GREAT PESTILENCE AND THE WILL TO SURVIVE

As the Black Death moved out of central Asia and towards Europe, those in its path speculated about its origins. Muslim author Abū Hafs believed that the plague originated in the “land of darkness” before spreading from China into India.661 Byzantine astronomer and historian Nicephorus Grecoras felt that this “serious and pestilential disease invaded humanity” from Scythia (southern Russia) before moving into the

Aegean.662 Further west, Italian chronicler Giovanni Villani believed that it had originated amongst the Mongols when a fire shooting from the ground failed to kill the entire army.663 cleric Louis Sanctus postulated that it had originated in India as part of various apocalyptic events including the spread of “venomous beasts,” violent storms, and rain of fire.664

Many believed the pestilence was a punishment from God for various violations of good Christian order. One English account noted that “Alas! Rectors and vicars have changed their ways, they’re hirelings now, not true shepherds, and their works are motivated by the desire for money. Such workers deserve to come to some grief.”665

Another wrote that

At this time violent disagreements, rebellions, conspiracies, plots and intrigues sprang up among both secular and regular clergy everywhere, just as the apostle foretold….At the same time there were also other

661 Abū Hafs, ‘Umar Ibn al-Wardī, “Risālah al-naba’ can al-waba [Essay on the Report of the Pestilence],” quoted in The Black Death: The Great Mortality of 1348-50, a Brief History with Documents, John Aberth (New York: Palgrave MacMillan, 2005), 16-18 662 Nicephorus Grecoras, “Historia Byzantina,” quoted in The Black Death: The Great Mortality of 1348- 50, a Brief History with Documents, John Aberth (New York: Palgrave MacMillan, 2005), 15-16. 663 Giovanni Villani, “Chronicle,” quoted in The Black Death: The Great Mortality of 1348-50, a Brief History with Documents, John Aberth (New York: Palgrave MacMillan, 2005), 19-20. 664 Louis Sanctus, “Letter, April 27, 1348,” quoted in The Black Death: The Great Mortality of 1348-50, a Brief History with Documents, John Aberth (New York: Palgrave MacMillan, 2005), 21-22 665 Thomas Wright, ed., Political Poems and Songs, Vol. I (1859), 280. 191

disturbances, of young against old, ignoble against noble, and an unusual degree of unrest (whether general or specific) in many cities, monasteries and congregations. The heresy of simony also grew so strong among the clergy, and overwhelmed them so completely, that everyone, of whatever degree (great, middling or humble) and for whatever status (secular or regular) in some fashion openly bought and sold spiritualities of all sorts.666

In a letter to a Norwich friar, an Englishman in Rome noted that the antichrist had been born, which would lead to the violent death of the pope and “more revolutions in the world than there have ever been before.”667

In England society itself was culpable, Henry Knighton argued, stating that women were dressing “in a variety of extraordinary male clothing” as they “neither feared God nor blushed at the criticism of the people, but took the marriage bond lightly and were deaf to the demands of modesty.”668 Another blamed disobedient children, believing that “it may be that it is in vengeance of this sin of dishonouring and despising fathers and mothers that God is slaying children by pestilence, as you see daily.”669

Others postulated more “scientific” explanations, one German chronicle noting that the heavens held the answer. It was the conjunction of the three planets in Aquarius, along with various other conjunctions and eclipses, which created a “deadly corruption of the air around us.”670 These “evil vapors” poisoned the air that was “pure and clean by nature,” leading to the spread of the disease. Simon de Covino backed these claims,

666 Liber de Rebus Memorabilioribus sive Chronicon Henrici de Hervordia quoted in The Black Death, Rosemary Horrox, ed., trans. (Manchester: Manchester University Press, 1994), 128 667 William of Blofield quoted in Robert E. Lerner, “The Black Death and Western European Eschatological Mentalities,” American Historical Review, Vol. 86 (1981), 552. 668 Henry Knighton, Chronicon Henrici Knighton vel Cnitthon monachi Leycestrensis quoted in The Black Death, Rosemary Horrox, ed., trans. (Manchester: Manchester University Press, 1994), 130. 669 Harleian Manuscript 2398, fos. 93-94 quoted in The Black Death, Rosemary Horrox, ed., trans. (Manchester: Manchester University Press, 1994), 134. 670 Der Schwarze Tod quoted in The Black Death, Rosemary Horrox, ed., trans. (Manchester: Manchester University Press, 1994), 159. 192 noting that Saturn, Jupiter, and Mercury, all in Aquarius as judged by Sol, signified

“great and amazing upheavals.”671

Some looked towards mortal culprits. A Spanish account claimed that “many beggars and mendicants of various countries” were found putting mysterious potions or poisonous substances into rivers, houses, churches, and food, while a German account noted that bags full of poison were found in many wells and springs.672 In Germany, however, it was believed that Jews were to blame, who upon capture, “confessed as much under torture that they had bred spiders and toads in pots and pans, and had obtained poison from overseas.”673 Jews were arrest and interrogated throughout Europe as a consequence to this theory, and those who did not convert through force were burned.674

Most chroniclers, however, agreed that plague spread to Europe when the Mongol army besieging Caffa in the Crimea flung plague-ridden bodies over the city walls.675

Italian chronicler Gabrielle de Mussis stated that Genoese merchants inside the city attempted to escape the carnage, carrying the pestilence to Constantinople in the spring of

1347 and then back to Italy by the spring of 1348. “We Genoese and Venetians bear the responsibility for revealing the judgment of God,” he wrote in his Historia de Morbo.

“Alas, once our ships had brought us to port we went to our homes… But, to our anguish,

671 Simon de Covino, De Judicio Solis quoted in The Black Death, Rosemary Horrox, ed., trans. (Manchester: Manchester University Press, 1994), 164. 672 Jaime Villanueva, Viage Literario a las Iglesias de Espana XI Viage a Gerona quoted in The Black Death, Rosemary Horrox, ed., trans. (Manchester: Manchester University Press, 1994), 223. Herman Gigas, Hermanni Gygantis, ordinis fratrum minorum, Flores Temporum seu Chronicon Universale ad Orbe condito ad annum Christi MCCCXLIX quoted in The Black Death, Rosemary Horrox, ed., trans. (Manchester: Manchester University Press, 1994), 207. 673 Gigas, Hermanni Gygantis, 207. 674 Samuel K. Cohn, “The Black Death and the Burning of Jews,” Past & Present, Vol. 196, Issue 1(August 2007), 3-36. In this article, Cohn argued that while the violence during the Black Death itself was characterized by religious persecution, afterwards it was motivated by general class tensions rather than attacks against specific moneylenders. 675 Aberth, The Black Death, 15. 193 we were carrying the darts of death. While they hugged and kissed us we were spreading poison from our lips even when we spoke.”676

All chroniclers also agreed that the death toll was catastrophic. In Venice,

Gabrielle de Mussis noted that it killed more than 70% of the people in Venice, with 20 out of 24 “excellent physicians” dying of the disease.677 In Florence, people throughout the city attempted to purify themselves from the “evil,” isolate themselves, or even flee from the disease, and yet “many people of each different persuasion fell ill here, there, and everywhere… dying more like animals than like human beings.”678 A group of chroniclers in Padua also noted that the disease “killed everyone; the infection was incurable; it could not be avoided; the wife fled the embrace of her husband, the father that of a son, and the brother that of a brother.”679

From Italy the plague reportedly swept through western Europe and “was especially violent in and around the Roman Curia at Avignon,” leaving “only a tenth of the human race alive.”680 By summer it reached the Channel, and then spread to Britain:

In 1348 two ships, one of them from Bristol, landed at Melcombe in Dorset a little before Midsummer. In them were sailors from Gascony who were infected with an unheard of epidemic illness called pestilence. They infected the men of Melcombe, who were the first to be infected in England. The first inhabitants to die from this illness of pestilence did so

676 Gabriele de’ Mussis, Historia de Morbo, quoted in The Black Death, Rosemary Horrox, ed., trans. (Manchester: Manchester University Press, 1994), 19. 677 de’ Mussis, Historia de Morbo, 20. 678 Boccaccio, Decameron, 30. 679 Cortusii Patavini Duo, sive Gulielmi et Abrigeti Cortusiorum, Historia de Novitatibus Paduae et Lombardiae ab anno MCCLVI usque ad MCCCLVIC quoted in The Black Death, Rosemary Horrox, ed., trans. (Manchester: Manchester University Press, 1994), 34-35. 680 Rudolf Higden, “Polychronicon,” quoted in The Black Death, Rosemary Horrox, ed., trans. (Manchester: Manchester University Press, 1994), 62. 194

on the Eve of St. John the Baptist [23 June], after being ill for three days at most.681

The Eulogium Historiarum sive Temporis recorded that from Melcombe “the cruel pestilence, hateful to all future ages” moved through the south killing “innumerable people in Dorset, Devon, and Somerset.”682 It then turned north, “leaving not a city, a town, a village, or even, except rarely, a house, without killing most or all of the people there…As a result, there was such a shortage of people that there were hardly enough living to look after the sick and bury the dead.”683

Traditionally historians estimated the actual death toll of the plague to be 1/3 of the European population but more recently historians have settled on an estimate of

50%.684 It had been preceded by the successive famines of the first and second decade of the century, and an animal panzootic that emerged in Bohemia between 1314 and 1316 before moving west.685 Both emerged during a time of environmental stress referred to as the Dantean Anomaly, which involved markedly lower temperatures throughout Europe.

The plague 30 years later occurred during another anomaly that affected the entire planet to such an extent that it stalled tree growth and caused what climatologists believe was

681 Antonia Gransden, ed., “A Fourteenth-Century Chronicle from the Grey Friars Lynn,” English Historical Review, Vol. 72 (1957), 274. 682 F.S. Haydon, ed., Eulogium Historiarum sive Temporis, Vol. 3 (London: 1863), 213-14. This chronicle noted that the disease actually reached England “at about the feast of the Translation of St. Thomas the martyr [7 July]” (213). 683 Haydon, ed., Eulogium, 214. 684 John Aberth, for example, is a proponent of this death toll (Abert, The First Horseman; Aberth, The Black Death). 685 Bruce M.S. Campbell, “Physical Shocks, Biological Hazards, and Human Impacts: The Crisis of the Fourteenth Century Revisited,” in Economic and Biological Interactions in Pre-Industrial Europe from the 13th to the 18th Centuries, S. Cavaciocchi, ed. (Florence: Firenze University Press, 2010), 13. 195 the coldest years of the millennia, 1348-1350.686 Given that the Little Ice Age had ushered in the century, Bruce M.S. Campbell rightfully observed that “cattle and humans may have been the victims of a joint physical and biological conspiracy of Nature, deadly in its collective human impact, and profound in its short-, medium- and long-term economic consequences.”687

In England as elsewhere, this short term impact was catastrophic. The plague burned through England from the spring into the fall, reaching London in October in

1348. Edward III, like many Crown officials and London inhabitants, abandoned the city in an attempt to escape the disease. In November, Edward III and Philip VI agreed to extend the Anglo-French truce until the end of 1349, and in January as the plague moved north, Parliament adjourned without sitting.688 As 2.5 million English subjects died of the

Great Pestilence, national and local administration ground to a halt.

As the graphs on the following pages show, the main government records that enroll Crown correspondence, appeals, commissions, legal judgments, and civil decisions experienced an immediate drop in business by 30% if not more, with military affairs as a percentage of this business decreasing as well. These include the Close Rolls, Fine Rolls,

Charter Rolls, and Scottish Rolls. The only exception to this rule is the Black Prince’s personal council register because as he grew older and developed personal political influence and control of Wales independent of his father, his council’s

686 Campbell, “Physical Shocks,” 13-15. Christian Pfister, Rudolf Brazdul, and Mariano Barriendos, “Reconstructing Past Climate and Natural Disasters in Europe Using Documentary Evidence,” PAGES Past Global Changes News, 10:3 (December 2002), 7. 687 Campbell, , “Physical Shocks,” 14. 688 W. Mark Ormrod, “The English Government and the Black Death of 1348-49,” in England in the Fourteenth Century: Proceedings of the 1985 Harlaxton Symposium, W. Mark Ormrod, ed. (Rochester, NY: Boydell Press, 1986), 175. Edward III, 323-324. 196

Calendar of Patent Rolls

3000 2719

2500 2324

2000 1539 1579 1500 1087 Total Entires 1000 CalendarEntries Military Affairs 859 500 671 202 95 351 0 1329 1346 1347 1359 1360 YEAR

Figure 10: Statistical Analysis of Patent Rolls689

Calendar of Close Rolls 2500 2145 2000

1498 1500 1271 1268 975 871 831 Total Entires 1000 741 784 812 623 945 498 Military Affairs

500 CalendarEntries 75 56 51 120 181

0

1329 1346 1347 1348 1349 1354 1355 1356 1357 1358 1359 1360 1361 YEAR

Figure 11: Statistical Analysis of Close Rolls690

689 CPR, 1327-1330; CPR 1345-1348; CPR 1348-1350; CPR 1350-1354; CPR, 1354-1358; CPR, 1358- 1361. 690 CCR, 1327-1330; CCR, 1346-1349; CCR, 1349-1354; CCR, 1354-1360; CCR, 1360-1364. 197

Calendar of Fine Rolls 1200 1021

1000

800 641 600 508 Total Entires

400 358 Military Affairs

CalendarEntries 449 229 243 247 190 209 200 2 136 18 34 0 1329 1346 1347 1356 1357 1358 1359 1360 1361 YEAR

Figure 12: Statistical Analysis of Fine Rolls691

Calendar of Charter Rolls 300

250

200

150

100

CalendarEntries 50

0

1355 1328 1329 1330 1345 1346 1347 1348 1349 1350 1351 1352 1353 1354 1356 1357 1358 1359 1360 1361 1362 1363 1364 1365 1366 1367 1368 YEAR

Figure 13: Statistical Analysis of Charter Rolls692

691 CFR, 1327-1337; CFR, 1337-1347; CFR, 1347-1356; CFR, 1356-1368. 198

Black Prince's Register 800 700

600

500 400 300 Total Entires

200 Military Affairs RegisterEntries 100 0

Year

Figure 14: Statistical Analysis of the Black Prince's Register693

Calendar of Documents Relating to Scotland 60

50

40

30 Total Entries 20

Military Affairs CalendarEntries 10

0

1356 1329 1346 1347 1348 1349 1350 1351 1352 1353 1354 1355 1357 1358 1359 1360 1361 1362 1363 1364 1365 YEAR

Figure 15: Analysis of the Calendar of Documents Relating to Scotland694

692 CChR, 1326-1341; CChR, 1341-1417. Because the charter rolls did not record military affairs, this chart includes a count of entries only. 693 RBP, 1346-1348; RBP, 1351-1365. It should be noted that there are no entries in the Black Prince’s Register for 1349 and 1350. 694 CDRS, 1307-1357; CDRS, 1357-1509. 199

administrative authority and workload steadily increased. It should be noted, however, that in 1349 and 1350, there were no entries in his rolls whatsoever due to the disaster.

Prices for grain, livestock, and labor fluctuated wildly during this time as well.

They had been in steady decline after the hikes of the early part of the century, but when the disease swept through England and devastated the population, any regularity or stability was at an end. One account of the plague noted that horses that would have sold before the outbreak for 40s were only going for 6s, although “even at this price buyers were rarely found.”695

With temperatures colder than any in the entire millennium, near-constant warfare with the French (and the Scottish to some degree), widespread animal disease, and the introduction of the Black Death, it is no surprise that when looking for answers, many believed that “it is from divine wrath that the mortality of these years proceeds.”696

Despite this seemingly insurmountable disaster, the English government adapted.

Although many Crown staff fled the Chancery in London, they continued to meet at alternate locations. The Privy Seal office continued operations, moving their headquarters from Westminster to Woodstock. Even though the King’s Bench in the capital ceased operations, those in York and Lincoln continued to hear cases. As the entries in the many government rolls show, by August 1349 most offices had returned to a now-open

Westminster and by the fall, the Crown was operating at full capacity.697 In the words of

W. Mark Ormrod, the Crown “showed a stubborn determination to sit out the period of

695 Haydon, ed., Eulogium Historiarum sive Temporis, 213. 696 Sudhoff, “Pestschriften,” 47. 697 W. Mark Ormrod, “The English Government,” 175-177. 200 disruption and ensure that proprietary interests survived intact once the temporary emergency had passed.”698

There were, as one would expect, many casualties that had to be replaced for the

Crown to operate successfully once more. Chancellor Offord and 12 Chancery clerks died, as did two high-ranking officials in the Exchequer along with the clerk of pleas and the royal chamberlain in Receipt.699 Many royal attorneys in the King’s Bench were lost, along with nine clerks of Commons Pleas and ten clerks of the Bench itself.700 Many tax collectors were killed as well, prompting Edward III to appoint a range of new officials to the various offices of the Crown so that it could continue its normal operations.701

Economic stability was also quickly re-established. While commodity, livestock, and labor prices did fluctuate during the plague’s height, the graphs below show that they soon stabilized; inflation did occur, but the unpredictable fluctuations had ceased. Wheat, considered a luxury cereal, suffered the most increase in the years after the plague— certainly because it was labor-intensive to harvest—but we can see that in that time prices never reached the heights achieved during the famines in the early fourteenth century.702

Livestock prices functioned similarly, cart-horses seeing the most drastic price increase, perhaps due in part to their utility as a labor-saving device.703

698 W. Mark Ormrod, “The English Government,” 175. 699 W. Mark Ormrod, “The English Government,” 177. 700 W. Mark Ormrod, “The English Government,” 178. 701 W. Mark Ormrod, “The English Government,” 178. 702 David Farmer, “Prices and Wages, 1041-1350,” in The Agrarian History of England and Wales Vol. II: 1042-1350, Joan Thirsk, ed. (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1988), 734; David Farmer, “Prices and Wages, 1350-1500” in The Agrarian History of England and Wales Vol. III: 1350-1500, Edward Miller, ed. (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1988), 444. 703 Farmer, “Prices and Wages,” V. I, 248; Farmer, “Prices and Wages,” 457. 201

Grain Prices by Decade, 1300-1400 9 8 7 6

5 Wheat 4 3 Rye 2 Barley 1 Oats 0

Peas Shillings (s.)per quarter YEAR

Figure 16: English Grain Price Comparison, 1300-1400704

Livestock Prices by Decade, 1300-1400 30

25

20

Oxen

15 Cow 10 Plough-Horse

5 Cart-Horse Sheep 0

Pig Shillings animal per (s.)Shillings

YEAR

Figure 17: Analysis of English Livestock Prices, 1300-1400705

704 David Farmer, “Prices and Wages, 1041-1350,” in The Agrarian History of England and Wales Vol. II: 1042-1350, Joan Thirsk, ed. (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1988), 734; David Farmer, “Prices and Wages, 1350-1500” in The Agrarian History of England and Wales Vol. III: 1350-1500, Edward Miller, ed. (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1988), 444. 202

Labor Wages by Decade, 1300-1400 10 9

8 7 6 Threshing, Winnowing 5 Reaping, Binding 4 Mowing, Spreading 3 Pence (d.)Pence per day 2 Carpenter 1 Thatcher & Helper 0 Slater/ tiler & Helper

YEAR

Figure 18: Analysis of English Labor Wages by Decade, 1300-1400706

With heightened competition for a vastly contracted labor pool, wages increased markedly after the plague died out. Unskilled heavy laborers were in the highest demand, and the ability of the peasantry to command higher wages—and as a result elevate their lifestyles beyond what they could have achieved before the epidemic—created notable tension within . The Crown attempted to resolve this tension by instituting the 1349 Ordinance of Laborers and then the 1351 Statute of Laborers, which demanded workers create standard working contracts with those hiring them and most importantly, that they not get paid for their services at amounts higher than before the crisis. As the graph above shows such efforts were ultimately unsuccessful, and yet the

705 Farmer, “Prices and Wages,” V. I, 248; Farmer, “Prices and Wages,” 457. 706 Farmer, “Prices and Wages,” V. I, 768; Farmer, “Prices and Wages,” 471. 203

Ordinance set a legal precedent for the intervention of the Crown into societal affairs: it was an early instance of a government attempting to establish and then enforce the status quo.707 The debate surrounding the impact the Ordinance is a significant one, and while

Robert C. Palmer argued that the legal concept behind the statute was groundbreaking,

Ormrod believed that because labor wages increased on pace with foodstuffs, the

Ordinance was actually rather effective in its efforts to curb wage inflation.708 While this is a valid conclusion, for the purposes of this thesis it is important to emphasize that there was elevated competition for labor, particularly unskilled labor, which affected how the

Crown raised troops for war.

Military concerns reemerged swiftly as well. In the summer of 1349 Philip VI began planning to reopen the war, and in the winter Henry of Lancaster took a small force of 350 men to shore up English possessions in Gascony. When word reached

Edward in December that Geoffrey de Charny was preparing to launch an attack on

Calais, he raised a small force of retainers and sailed secretly to France in January 1350.

Once in Calais, he repelled the French offensive, an event which Ormrod believed

“[revived] Edward’s general appetite for war.”709 Philip VI then died in August, leaving

Edward to press his hereditary rights with Philip’s son John II.710

Edward III, however, had a problem. Although impressive, the recovery from the

Black Death still left the English Crown with problems that it had not needed to confront before the plague. The population was much smaller, prices for labor, livestock, and

707 Robert C. Palmer, English Law in the Age of the Black Death (Chapel Hill, NC: University of North Carolina Pres, 2001), 5. 708 Ormrod, “The English Government,” 178-179. 709 Edward III, 324, 327. 710 Edward III, 327. 204 commodities were rising, and significant debts lingered from the Crécy-Calais campaign.

While Edward had been granted a subsidy every year between 1344 and 1350, the 1346-

47 campaign amply demonstrates how these funds were not enough to support a major military expedition overseas. Moreover, the plague deprived the Crown of a crucial source of supplementary income: Edward III could no longer rely upon English merchants to provide him with loans in exchange for farming the custom on wool. The

Black Death had halted trade and as a consequence bankrupted first the cartel led by

Walter Chirton in 1349 and its successor group led by John Malwayn until early 1352.711

Again, the English government adapted effectively. In addition to the Ordinance, to minimize inflation the Crown passed the Statute of Purveyors in 1352, which promised to end any currency devaluation.712 It also established various policies in order to increase the domestic supply of bullion, demanding that foreign merchants in England pay customs fees in bullion and then enforcing laws that prevented its export.713 More importantly, the Exchequer attempted to establish, in Ormrod’s words, “comprehensive and definitive records of royal expenditure.”714 The English government had no established budget and as any historian studying fourteenth century Crown spending knows, there was no organized attempt to monitor, let alone regulate, royal expenditure.715 Yet due to the “colossal debts incurred by the king’s wars,” Exchequer

711 Edward III, 369. 712 John H.A. Munro, Wool, Cloth, and Gold: The Struggle for Bullion in Anglo-Burgundian Trade, 1340- 1478 (Toronto: The University of Toronto Press, 1972), 35. 713 Munro, Wool, Cloth, and Gold, 39. 714 W. Mark Ormrod, “The Protecolla Rolls and English Government Finance, 1353-1364,” The English Historical Review, Vol. 102, No. 404 (July 1987), 622. 715 G.L. Harriss, “Budgeting at the Medieval Exchequer,” in War, Government and Aristocracy in the British Isles, c. 1150-1500: Essays in Honour of Michael Prestwich, Chris Given-Wilson, et. al., eds. (Rochester, NY: The Boydell Press, 2008), 179-196. 205 treasurer “was keenly aware of the need to control revenue and expenditure if the Crown were to be saved from bankruptcy.”716 As such, he created the

Protecolla Rolls, which were a concerted effort to understand and centralize Crown financial obligations. It was one policy created in 1353, however, that would allow

Edward III to overcome his financial hardships and effectively prosecute the war for the rest of the decade.

Wool was England’s largest export commodity. As discussed in the previous chapters, this trade was so important to the English that they went to great lengths to ensure that they could conduct its trade unimpeded. Yet before the Black Death, the revenue from this pivotal commodity was moderate at best because the Crown had no efficient way of collecting customs.

The system seemed effective enough: the Crown had long-established Staples, which were selected ports at which all English wool, woolfells, and hides had to be sold by law. It was to these Staples that wool merchants would take their goods, and once there, the wool was wetted, measured, and weighed. Customs were then assessed based upon these measurements, and once the tax was collected, the items were cocketted (or marked with an official seal), making them legal for purchase. Yet before the plague, the officials in charge of performing this service were a problematic mix of Crown and local officials, as well as merchant groups hired to farm the custom in exchange for lump-sum loans (the Bardi, Peruzzi, and then various English cartels). More importantly, the Staples were not in England; they were on the Continent. Not only was transporting this customs revenue back to England problematic—the system practically invited regular

716Ormrod, “The Protecolla Rolls,” 627. 206 corruption—but wool merchants could simply avoid the Staples altogether. This is why prior to the Black Death, with few exceptions, the average customs yield was approximately £22,650.717

In 1352 that changed. At Michaelmas the Crown instituted a measure that Ormrod called “the fourteenth century’s most successful scheme for the promotion and exploitation of oversees trade.”718 The King’s Council banned English wool merchants from exporting their wool and moved the wool Staple back to England, specifically at the ports of Newcastle, York, Lincoln, Norwich, Westminster, , Exeter, and

Bristol. The King’s Council then created the Ordinance of the Staple, which outlawed wool export by denizen merchants (foreign merchants living in England), forcing foreign merchants to come to England to purchase wool under the direct observation of newly- appointed, Crown-selected customs officials.719

In 1351, the King’s Council had instituted “a clean sweep of personnel of the customs, in an attempt to eradicate the connexions and influences which had built up while the farmers had held control of appointment at the ports.”720 These officials standardized weighing, measuring, and cocketting procedures; they cracked down on smuggling through a specially-appointed council meant to persecute the crime; and collected 50s on every sack of wool exported.721 The system was so effective that foreign merchants “flooded into England,” causing the customs yield to increase to an averaged

717 James H. Ramsay, A History of the Revenues of the Kings of England 1066-1399, Vol. II (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1925), 292. 718 Edward III, 369. 719 Edward III, 369. 720 Ormrod, “The English Crown,” 29. 721W. Mark Ormrod, “The English Crown and the Customs, 1349-63,” EcHR, New Series, Vol. 40, No. 1 (February 1987), 28-29. After a high yield due to the resumption of trade in 1351, the revenue jump in 1352 is likely due to the increase in efficiency from this reform alone. 207 of £75,000 between 1351 and 1360.722 As Ormrod pointed out, while traditionally this move was thought to be forced upon the Crown against its will as an act of financial desperation, “all the changes in trade were in fact instigated by the government in its own specific interests.”723

Customs Yield, 1340-1360 120,000

100,000

80,000

60,000 Yield (£) Yield 40,000

20,000

0

YEAR

Figure 19: English Customs Yield, 1340-1360724

This significant increase in revenue, when coupled with clerical subsidies in 1350,

1351, 1355, and 1356, put the English Crown firmly in the black. The King used these funds to repair English military instillations and discharge many debts lingering from before the plague. He spent nearly £100,000 on building and maintaining castles in

722 Ormrod, “The English Crown,” 29. Ramsay, A History of the Revenues, 292. 723Ormrod, “The English Crown,” 29. 724 Ramsay, A History of the Revenues, 292. 208

Wales, paid out £15,293 for the construction and maintenance of defensive works for

Calais, and paid £86,227 to the Constable of Bordeaux for the maintenance of

Gascony.725 Additionally, he discharged £73,000 from both the 1338-1340 and 1341-

1343 Scottish and Breton campaigns, reimbursed various lords £11,000 for expenses incurred while on campaigns, and retire the last remaining debt from 1346-47, Wardrobe clerk Walter de Wetewang’s £16,105.726

More importantly, Edward III used these funds to continue his war effort on the

Continent. But rather than employing the same capital extensive methods used before the plague, with more funds and less available manpower, he shifted to capital intensive methods. He abandoned the large armies of the 1340’s gathered, paid, and fed in the aforementioned ways to military forces that were nearly all volunteers serving in retinues paid for directly by the Exchequer. The Black Death forced this shift because it created an intense competition for labor that made array and purveyance impractical, if not entirely inefficient; these last vestiges of feudalism, so important to the raising of armies before the plague, disappeared forever after it. A “landmark” 1352 statute only enforced this change by outlawing the conscription of soldiers based upon property and wealth assessments.727 Soldiering, as a consequence, progressively became an independent occupation, which increased the “professional” nature of the English military.

725 R.A. Brown and H.M. Colvin, “The King’s Works 1272-1485,” in The History of the King’s Works, Vol. I, H.M. Colvin, ed. (London: Her Majesty’s Stationary Office, 1963), 228; H.M. Colvin, “Calais,” in The History of the King’s Works, Vol. I, H.M. Colvin, ed. (London: Her Majesty’s Stationary Office, 1963), 431; Harriss, King, Parliament, and Public Finance, 330. 726 Tout, Chapters in Administrative History, 105, n.1, 111-112, 118; E403/344, E403/347, E403/349; E403/347, E403/349; E403/347; Calendar of Close Rolls, 1349-54, 32-33, 39; E403/347. 727 Edward III, 342. 209

The consequences of these changes can be seen when examining the next large

English military operation in 1355-56. The English had made small gains on the

Continent until 1354, when French and English diplomats met at Avignon in a failed attempt to negotiate a permanent truce. As a consequence Edward III renewed his plans to take the French throne and had reason to believe that he had many sympathizers among the French aristocracy: upon being crowned John II made himself as unpopular as his father by executing Raoul de Brienne, Count of Eu, for treason without trial when he returned to France to raise money for his ransom; the highly popular Raoul had been captured by Henry of Lancaster during the 1346 campaign and John believed that he had conspired against the French while imprisoned in England.728 Edward therefore believed that he would win aristocratic support with a two-pronged venture into France, which was launched in late 1355 and paid for directly by the Exchequer at a cost of over

£100,000.729

While Edward III had to abandon his chevauchée launched from Calais in order to return to England to suppress the Scottish seizure of Berwick, his son met with great success in Gascony. There Edward, Prince of Wales, conducted a chevauchée into the region as far as , and then turned back towards the French coast, eventually facing an army led by John II at Poitiers.730 Historians estimate that the English army at this time was approximately 6,000-8,000 men while the French force was potentially

728 Edward III, 327, 341. 729 Edward III, 342. 730 Peter Hoskins, In the Steps of the Black Prince, The Road to Poitiers, 1355–1356 (Rochester, NY: Boydell & Brewer, 2011). This recent work is an excellent look at the Black Prince’s campaign because the author retraced the Black Prince’s campaign trail before writing his analysis. 210 twice that size. The French were fragmented internally, however, which contributed to the English victory and the capture of King John himself.731

The English made further gains on the Continent in the late 1350’s and after the failed negotiations surrounding the attempted 1358 Treaty of Paris—which would have placed nearly 2/3 of France in the hands of the English—Edward III began to prepare for another operation on the Continent.732 The 1359-60 Reims campaign was Edward III’s next, and ultimately last, military expedition, and would demonstrate the full effects of the Black Death upon logistical organization.

CONCLUSION

As this chapter has argued, the “Great Pestilence” was a devastating pandemic that had a marked effect upon medieval England. Despite the chaos wrought by Y. pestis, the Crown efficiently adapted by instituting several reforms in order to adjust to the limitations the disease imposed. It turned to its most profitable export, wool, in order to avoid bankruptcy and the resulting Ordinance of the Staple not only increased Crown revenue but central political authority. Edward III used these funds to continue his war with France, the accompanying manpower shortage causing a shift from capital extensive to capital intensive warfare. The 1359-60 Reims campaign, when compared to Crécy-

Calais, illustrates this change, and more generally how the Black Death effected logistical organization in medieval England.

731 Edward III, 347-353. 732 Edward III, 396. 211

Chapter 7: The Reims Campaign, 1359-60

All this season the king of England made great provision to come into France, such as had not been seen the like before. Certain lords and knights of the empire, such as had served the king before, provided the same year greatly for horse and harness, and other things necessary for their use. Jean Froissart733

INTRODUCTION

While in the 1350’s the Crown was prospering from the windfall caused by the wool custom, France was in turmoil. When King John was captured at the Battle of

Poitiers in 1356, his kingdom was left in the hands of his son, the Dauphin and future king Charles V.734 The Black Death had devastated the country, and without an effective taxation system and constantly-varying territorial borders, attempts at economic recovery were unsuccessful. As a result, French garrisons went without pay, populations were starving, and the English soldiers pillaging unrestrained in Brittany, Normandy, and

Gascony were tearing the kingdom apart.735

The nobility was also facing both intra-and inter-. In 1351 King

Charles of Navarre had married John’s daughter Joan and despite this alliance,

733 Chroniques, V: 190. 734 This was the first association of the title of “Dauphin” with the heir to the French throne. In 1349 Charles inherited the Dauphiné (in southeast France) from Philip VI, which gave him the title “Dauphin”. 735 Trial by Battle, 351-404. 212 continually pitted King John and Edward III against each other in order to further his own territorial ambitions.736 In 1354 Charles had the king’s constable assassinated; a year later he supported the Dauphin in a failed coup against John; and in 1357 when Parisian mobs imprisoned the Dauphin, he pressed his advantage by marching an army into the city and pushing the prince to return to him previously-seized territory. The Dauphin was able to flee captivity and gather his own army to attack Navarre’s forces in February 1358, which led to an outpouring of violence against the French nobility known as the

Jacquerie. In June Charles allied with French nobles to suppress the revolt—which led to a massacre of the Parisian peasantry and the election of Charles as Captain of Paris—but when he hired English mercenaries to establish marshal law within the city, the French nobility withdrew their support, mobs forced him to suppress his own plundering retinues, and by June he was forced to flee Paris for the safety of the countryside.737

King John and Edward III, meanwhile, were attempting to negotiate a more permanent peace agreement. After his capture at Poitiers in 1356, John was transported back to England, where he and Edward agreed upon a temporary peace in the spring of

1357.738 Negotiations for the war’s cessation began thereafter, culminating in the First

Treaty of London in the spring of 1358. Under the terms of this treaty Edward did not surrender his claim to the French throne but requested a ransom for John of 4 million

écus, which was abandoned later in the year when the French did not make their first ransom payment. The 1359 Second , agreed to in March, restored to

Edward most of the territory belonging to the former “Angevin Empire” along with

736 Trial by Battle, 294-302. 737 Trial by Fire, 294-302, 314-315, 317-337. 738 Trial by Fire, 294-302. 213

Ponthieu, Boulogne, and Guînes. More importantly, these territories would no longer belong to France, ceasing Edward’s vassalage to his Valois cousins. In exchange John could return to France and Edward would renounce his claim to the French throne, which given what he received in exchange, would be rather superfluous.739

While some historians have argued that Edward’s willingness to surrender his claim to the French throne indicates that he never took his avowed reason for the war seriously, others like John le Patourel rightfully pointed out that the terms of the treaty were so extreme that Edward never expected them to be ratified. If anything, it was an attempt to negotiate John’s ransom and maintain the peace long enough to allow Edward to gather his resources for another large military campaign. Even if he was willing to surrender his bid for the throne itself, no Parliament was called between February 1358 and May 1360 to ratify the treaties drafted. This could indicate, as Ormrod argued, that

Edward never believed the negotiations would be final, and intended at the outset to launch another expedition into France to secure his hereditary claim.740

As this chapter will discuss, that expedition was the 1359-60 Reims campaign, which demonstrates the changes made to logistical preparations in the wake of the Black

Death. The wool subsidy had helped the Crown emerge from the pandemic intact and thrive in the height of the 1350’s, especially in comparison to the French. The surplus was so great that it allowed Edward III to pay for the entire campaign with the profits.

Yet rather than focusing on capital extensive methods—namely going into substantial debt in order to amass as many resources as possible through various means to support as

739 John Le Patourel, “Edward III and the ,” in The Wars of Edward III: Sources and Interpretations, Clifford J. Rogers, ed. (Rochester, NY: Boydell Press, 1999), 252. 740 Edward III, 397. 214 large an army as could be either arrayed or hired—Edward III used cash to hire a smaller, entirely mounted army organized into military companies staffed with men who provided their own weaponry. The supplies they required, and horses not supplied by the company captains, were mostly purchased once in France, which in turn lessened the number of ships required to transport the army to the Continent. This capital intensive method made the most of the smaller population, lessened surplus in agricultural goods, and the boom in Crown wool profits after the Black Death.

As we will see, however, the system that pulled the Crown out of the disaster at the beginning of the decade was beginning to crack under the strain of consistent heavy spending. This spending, along with increasing inflation and decreasing amounts of bullion, affected the preparation, course, and outcome of the Reims campaign.

PREPARING FOR WAR

It is clear through analysis of Crown records that despite the ongoing negotiations between the two monarchs, Edward III was expecting, in the end, to launch another military expedition into France. In October 1358 orders for gathering ships were distributed naming Sandwich as the army’s embarkation point, set to depart after the truce between the two kingdoms expired in April.741 On January 2, 1359 Edward ordered sheriffs in ten counties to purchase bows and arrows and send them to the Tower:

741 Kamer, “The Management of the Mobilization,” 169. 215

COUNTY BOWS ARROWS COUNTY BOWS ARROWS Lincoln 80 50 Essex 300 200 Warwick & Leicester 500 300 Gloucester 400 200 Northampton 300 200 Kent 40 200 Bedford & Buckingham 300 100 Surrey & Sussex 0 200 Oxford 200 100 2,120 1,550 Table 20: Bows and Arrows requisitioned for the Tower of London in January 1359742

Ten days later, officials were selected to raise 2,600 archers in 28 counties, and the local areas were required to furnish the men with the proper clothing and weaponry:

COUNTY ARCHERS COUNTY ARCHERS Bedford 60 Norfolk 140 Berks 80 Northampton 160 Buckingham 100 Oxford 100 Canterbury 100 Rutland 40 Devon 60 Salop 120 Dorset 80 Somerset 80 Essex 140 Southampton 40 Gloucester 110 Stafford 100 Hereford 120 Suffolk 80 Hertford 60 Surrey 60 Huntingdon 60 Sussex 120 Kent 150 Warwick 120 Leicester 100 Worcester 80 Middlesex 40 Wiltshire 100 1,260 Table 21: Archers Requested from 28 Counties in January 1359743

742 Foedera, III:414. 743 Foedera, III:415-416. Note again that these requests were only sent to counties south of the River Trent because resources north of the river were allocated to offensive and defensive military actions against the Scots. 216

An order also went out to the noble landholders in Wales including Henry of Lancaster and the young Roger Mortimer to provide 40 archers, 60 lancers, and 1,520 Welshmen from their demesnes.744 On February 1 any men-at-arms, archers, or hobelars were forbidden from leaving England and Guy de Bryan, the keeper of the Forest of Dean, was amongst those asked to provide four smiths and 40 miners for the king’s service.745

These orders were seemingly postponed, however, as on March 24 Edward and

John signed the new Treaty of London, extending the established truce until June.746

Preparations continued with a potential late June or early July departure as on the same day smiths from Kent and Sussex were ordered to forge 500 steel-tipped arrows under pain of imprisonment.747 Further orders for arrows were distributed in Wales: on April 11

John de Kendale was asked to send 300 sheaves of arrows and 1,000 bowstrings to

London and two days later various officials is were ordered to send sheaves of arrows and arrow-heads to the capital for the coming campaign.748 Yet the writs to 16 sheriffs on April 16, in conjunction with a May 16 writ to the sheriffs listed in January reinforcing their heretofore unfulfilled allocations, indicate that collecting the requested weaponry was proving difficult for the Crown.749 This is surely why also on May 16 a further six sheriffs were ordered to send 4,000 sheaves of arrows to the Tower; despite the repeated requests, the Crown was not receiving the supplies it requested.750

744 Foedera, III: 416. This is significant because even if the magnates used array methods, they were doing so in Wales, where array war far less political contentious. 745 Foedera, III: 417. CLBL, G: 105. 746 Trial by Fire, 400-401. Foedera, III: 422. 747 CPR, 1358-1361, 222. CLBL, G: 108. 748 RBP, II: 155. RBP, III: 333. 749 Foedera, III: 425. TNA C76.37 m. 17. Kaner, “The Management of the Mobilization,” 175. 750 TNA C76.37 m. 17. Kaner, “The Management of the Mobilization,” 175. 217

On orders were sent out to prepare ships for a July 6 departure, and on

June 10, 50 archers from North Wales were ordered to London for Prince Edward’s departure.751 Yet another request for 1,000 sheaves of arrows and 3,000 bowstrings was issued in Chester, indicating the weapons should be sent to London. On June 26 the sheriffs of Kent, Sussex, and Essex were asked to each provide 1,000 hurdles to assist in the shipment of horses to the Continent for the king’s passage.752 On June 28 the chamberlain of Chester was asked to buy green and white cloth for short coats and hats for 400 Welsh archers (to depart on August 1), and on July 1 William de Rothewell, the king’s clerk, was ordered to send all bows, arrows, bowstrings, and winches for stretching crossbows held at the Tower to Sandwich.753

Yet again, the army’s departure was delayed. On July 7 all Frenchmen were ordered to leave the country by July 20, “taking with them neither bows nor arrows…, horses, nor any kind of armour.”754 Other orders gave the departure date as July 14, July

22, while on July10, 50 carpenters, 30 masons, 80 smiths, and 4 farriers were ordered to

Sandwich by August 16.755 This latter date is supported by the August 4 orders distributed to various counties to provide a total of 930 mounted archers for the coming expedition, a notable reduction from the 2,600 quota set in January

Crown indecision and the clear difficulty in obtaining the goods requested from various officials allowed time for French spies to obtain Edward’s invasion plans and pass them to the Dauphin. When Charles of Navarre learned of the coming expedition, he

751 RBP, III: 347. 752 RBP, III: 348. CCR, 1354-1360, 564. 753 RBP, III: 349. CCR, 1354-1360, 574. 754 CLBL, G:109. 755 TNA C76/37, mm. 15-16. Foedera, III: 431. 218

COUNTY # REQUESTED COUNTY # REQUESTED Bedford 20 Norfolk 40 Berkshire 30 Northampton 40 Buckingham 30 Oxford 40 Caterbury 30 Rutland 10 Devon 20 Salop 40 Dorset 20 Somerset 30 Essex 40 Southampton 20 Gloucester 40 Stafford 40 Hereford 40 Suffolk 30 Hertford 20 Surrey 20 Huntingdon 20 Sussex 40 Kent 60 Warwick 40 Leicester 40 Wiltshire 40 Lincoln 60 Wygorn' 30 470 Table 22: Mounted Archers Requested756

entered negotiations with the Dauphin and on August 20, he surrendered his previous territorial claims and agreed to support the French in the coming conflict. The delays also caused the 1,000 soldiers from various principalities in the Holy Roman Empire who arrived at Calais at the end of August to riot when they did not receive their promised pay and the support they were expecting.757

Despite these developments, Edward continued his preparations. On August 16 the prince’s clerk in Chester accepted £230 6s 4d in fees in lieu of military service and eight men-at-arms appointed to head a contingent of 400 archers were to report to

756 Foedera, III: 440-441. 757 Trial by Fire, 419, 426. 219

Sandwich by September 5.758 On August 24 further bows, arrows, and bowstrings from

Chester were to be sent to the Black Prince in Sandwich.759

As the above writs show, one major difference between this campaign and the

Crécy-Calais campaign is that the use of commissions of array to gather soldiers was almost entirely abandoned. Array, a vestige of feudal manpower acquisition, was no longer capable of providing the soldiers required for a substantial military expedition because it required large excess populations that could be easily removed from domestic life and sent to war. The decrease in population after the Black Death eliminated this resource, and the rising wages for labor (particularly unskilled labor) meant that the

Crown became yet another contender in the labor market. This is why the only soldiers arrayed were archers—who were one of the earliest semi-“professional” soldiers in

England because firing longbows required years of training—and most were raised in

Wales (not England).760 Even these requests were relatively unsuccessful, as January arrays were reduced by nearly 2/3 when they failed to gather the troops required.

This limitation led to one of the logistical innovations of the Reims campaign: the majority of the 5,000 men-at-arms and 3,000 archers who participated in the expedition were members of retinues raised by nobles or other military figures; only 1,500 were

Welshmen arrayed by the Prince.761 The king’s clerk William de Farley kept track of these retinues, who (in another logistical innovation) were paid for by Farley directly

758 RBP, III: 354. 759 RBP, III: 357. , II: 161. 760 Jim Bradbury’s The Medieval Archer contains an excellent analysis of the medieval English longbowman and how a lifetime of training was required to handle the weapon effectively (Jim Bradbury, The Medieval Archer (New York: St. Martin’s Press, 1985)). 761 Ayton, Knights and Warhorses, 268. TNA E101/393/11, m.115d. 220 from the Exchequer.762 Andrew Ayton argued there were nearly 400 retinues in Edward

III’s Reims army, and no formal indenture contracts were drafted because they were paid by the Wardrobe directly, which traveled to the Continent with the king.763 The companies still functioned like indentured companies, however, which would be the model for all future military expeditions.

Farley’s accounts also show that these retinues took with them 4,354 horses, with the Prince of Wales accounting for the biggest contingent of 1,369.764 This number does not include the king’s horses, and given that the entire expedition force was mounted (a tactical innovation of the campaign), that means at least 3,640 horses (not including those required to pull carts) either went undocumented or were obtained in Calais.

This likelihood is yet another logistical innovation of the Reims campaign: rather than purvey the supplies it required in England, the Crown purchased most of what it needed with cash in theater. Like array, purveyance relied upon large excess stores of victuals and other supplies to be successful, and with the shortages caused by the Black

Death, these were no longer accessible. The only items purveyed were the accoutrement of archers, namely bows, arrows, and bowstrings, and the above repeated requests make clear that these requests went largely unfulfilled. The Crown therefore had to rely upon stores in the Tower or those purchased directly. Other weapons were not their concern because the hired companies provided their own tools of war.

More importantly, the victuals required were purchased in Calais once the army reached the Continent. Unlike Crécy-Calais when the majority of the victuals required

762 Ayton performed an extensive evaluation of William de Farley’s account book, TNA E101/393/11. 763 Ayton, Knights and Warhorses, 268. Tout, Chapters in the Administrative History, III, 224. 764 TNA E101/393/11, mm. 79-115d. Ayton, Knights and Warhorses, 265-267. 221 were purveyed throughout the campaign and transported to France in waves, after the

Black Death there was not enough agricultural surplus in England to make purveyance successful without creating widespread animosity.

While the manpower required for the campaign was gathering at Sandwich, the king ordered any merchants in the areas of Sandwich, Dover, and Canterbury to send their goods to those markets for the soldiers to buy with their wages provided by the company commanders.765 Once the army landed in France, goods were purchased in

Calais from merchants who were ordered by the Crown to transport their goods to the city; by royal proclamation any victuals were forbidden to be exported elsewhere, creating a wealth of supplies for the army’s use.766

The chart below displays the provisions required per day by the 8,000-man Reims army. It must be remembered that these are merely estimates as no records exist indicating what the army purchased from private merchants either when still in England or once in Calais. There is a record of shipping 1,770 quarters wheat, 180 tuns ale, 180 quarters beans & peas, 350 quarters barley, and 60 quarters malt to Holland and Zeeland, but these were sold for cash, not sent with the army to France.767 The Crown did, however, collect 1,000 baggage carts that carried hand-mills to grind grain, ovens, hunting equipment, and leather boats from which to fish.768

765 Foedera, III: 448. CCR, 1354-1360, 647. 766 CLBL, G: 111-112. 767 CPR,1358-1361, 312, 415, 432; Calendar of Patent Rolls, Vol. XII, 339, 343. 768 Chronica Angliae 1328-1388 Auctore Monacho Quodam Sancti Albani, E. M. Thompson, ed. (London: Longman & Co., 1874), 40; CJB, 299. 222

4000 men, 4 1000 men/ Reims Total Weight/ ITEM 1 man/day Total (lbs) months769 1 month Manpower Supplies/Day Unit (lbs) wheat (qtr) 5,400 337.5 0.011 qtrs 8,000 men 88 qtrs 480 42,240 barley (qtr) 8,250 515.63 0.0169 qtrs 8,000 men 135.2 qtrs 476 64355.2 beans & peas 2,400 150 0.00492 qtrs 8,000 men 39.36 qtrs (qtrs) 430 16924.8 0.000123 (0.5 ale (tons) 60 3.75 8,000 men 1 ton cup) 216 216 bacons 12,960 810 0.0266 bacons 8,000 men 212.8 bacons 60 12768

45 2.8125 0.0000922 lasts 0.7376 lasts herrings (= 594,000 (=37,125 8,000 men

2 (lasts) (1.22 herring) 9760 herring 23 herring) herring) 0.5 4880

531.2 stockfish 32,400 2,025 0.0664 stockfish 8,000 men stockfish 6.6 3505.92 cheese 0.0186 stones 9,072 567 8,000 men 148.8 stones (stones) (0.26 lbs) 14 2083.2 TOT lbs 146,973 Carts/Day 133.6 Table 23 : Victuals and Carts required Per Day for the Reims Army

769 See Table 12: this allotment was provided by the Crown to feed a 4,000-man naval fleet in 1338-39. This allotment has been used to estimate potential consumption values for both the 1346-47 and 1359-60 campaigns. 223

Given the above estimates, the 1,000 carts collected could carry enough provisions to feed the Reims army for just over a week. Historical accounts indicate that

Edward’s baggage train included 5,000-6,000 carts reportedly loaded with everything the army might need while on campaign; if 80% of the carts were allocated for victuals, this means that the victuals purchased could last from four to five weeks without forage as a supplemental source of food.770 This would also indicate that more carts were purchased in England without being recorded or in Calais once the army arrived and bought the provisions for the coming campaign.

This also means that in addition to horses not accounted for in Farley’s accounts

(at least 3,640 if not more given that soldiers were generally provided with two mounts),

268 cart horses were needed for each day the army was on campaign to transport the required supplies. If the army included 5,000-6,000 carts, this would indicate a demand for 10,000-12,000 horses. The feed and fodder demands for that many animals would be substantial, but instead Edward planned for his livestock to subsist on grass and foraged foodstuffs obtained while on the campaign trail.771

To pay for these goods, the Crown primarily relied upon the wool subsidy, which as the previous chapter showed totaled £95,193 12s 10.25d in 1358 and £66,087 14s

1.25d in 1359.772 On June 5 Farley was given £2,333 6s 8d to begin paying military expenses, followed by £2,000 two days later.773 Many more payments for military expenses followed, so much so that by August £53,588 17s 1.5d of customs revenue had

770 At one point Froissart put the number at 5,000 and another he listed it at 6,000 (Chroniques, V: 200. Chroniques, V: 226-227). Harari, “Strategy and Supply,” 318 771 Harari, “Strategy and Supply,” 318. 772 Ramsay, A History of the Revenues, 292. 773 Ormrod, “The English Crown,” 37. 224 gone directly to military expenses.774 Added to this were a clerical tenth granted in

February 1360, totaling £22,000, and ransom payments from King David of Scotland in

December 1359 and June 1360, totaling 12,500 marks, or £8,333 6s 8d.775

The problem, however, was bullion. Although the Crown had adequate funds at its disposal, it had difficulty obtaining enough cash to cover Crown expenses. In the summer of 1359, £28,701 in customs revenue was paid out in tallies and various loans were accepted from magnates just so that the Crown could get its hands on specie.776

Edward also granted various individuals parts of the wool subsidy collected in London in

September 1359 in exchange for a loan of £10,000, 2/3 of which was earmarked for military expenses.777 Parliament then granted a tax similar to the lay subsidy in 1360, but the tax was only collected in port towns along the southern coast of England and it was kept in those areas, specifically earmarked for local defense costs should a French invasion occur.778

This problem was compounded by the issues Edward faced once he reached

France. Although 1347 was the coldest year of the century, the 1350’s were not much improved. Cooler temperatures benefitted the wool trade (because cold weather caused sheep to generate denser coats), but in the autumn of 1359, the northern French countryside was battered with heavy rains that caused widespread crop destruction and

774 Ormrod, “The English Crown,” 37. 775 Ramsay, A History of the Revenues, 294. Foedera, III: 465, 500. David had been captured by the English at the Battle of Neville’s Cross in October 1346 when the Scots invaded England. He was imprisoned at the Tower and it was not until 1357 that his ransom was successfully negotiated. 776 Harriss, King, Parliament, and Public Finance, 347. For example, on September 12, Edward received a loan of £200 from the Prior of Durham (CPR, 1358-1361, 266). 777 CCR, 1354-1360, 591. 778 Harriss, King, Parliament, and Public Finance, 347. 225 the failure of Burgundy’s wine vintage.779 The resulting inflation, which followed the significant political and social upheaval discussed above, meant that, as Clifford J.

Rogers pointed out, France was on the verge of collapse.780 It can easily be said that the countryside Edward III traversed once he departed Calais was nothing like what he had seen 12 years prior: it was a land of total devastation. Froissart, an eye-witness, observed:

… the country had been long poor and sorely wasted, and it was a dear season in the realm of France, and reigned generally through all the country, for the earth had not been labored of three years before: for if oats and wheat had not come to them out of Heynault and Cambresis, the people of Arthoyes, Vermandoys, and in the bishopric of Laone and Reynes, had died for hunger.781

The implications of these circumstances are manifold. First, while arriving in

October would normally indicate that the fields had been cultivated, leaving stores of goods available for forage by an invading army, the failure of any crops that had been planted left no stores for the army to take for either themselves or their horses. Second, given the recent inflation, the Dauphin could not afford to hire an army and so relied on a strategy Jonathan Sumption called “simple, cheap and effective” 782: the population, along with the Dauphin and the meager force he could afford, took what supplies were available and went into walled cities throughout the territory, burning anything they left behind. The result, as Sumption observed, was that “the course of the campaign was determined from the outset by the problems of supply. Not even Edward’s great wagon- train could supply the army’s needs for more than a week or two. At best it could even

779 Trial by Fire, 424. 780 Rogers, War Cruel and Sharp, 386. 781 Chroniques, V: 201-202. 782 Trial by Fire, 426-427. 226 out the alternating periods of feast and famine.”783 And yet Edward III launched his campaign, as Yuval Hariari observed, “into this desert… in the dead of winter,” with the hope of ending the war once and for all.784

NEXT GREAT ENDEAVOR

Edward III shipped his army to France in six separate crossings between August and October.785 The Scalachronica noted that this was due to a lack of available ships: just as the Black Death had forced a change in how the Crown gathered soldiers, Craig

Lambert’s study of Edwardian shipping indicated that it also had difficulty locating sailors. This means that smaller ships had to be used to transport the army since medieval ships did not have advanced rigging systems which allowed large ships to be operated by relatively small crews.786

Those companies hired directly by the King’s household were the first sent to

Calais in August in two trips in 446 ships, followed by Henry of Lancaster and his men in eight ships in September.787 While Lancaster organized the troops already in Calais, those same eight vessels carried over Roger Mortimer, earl of March, 350 men-at-arms, and

600 archers in early October.788 On October 28 those eight ships returned to England for

Edward III and his household, reaching Calais after Henry of Lancaster began his chevauchée out of Calais and into the French countryside.789

783 Trial by Fire, 426-427. 784 Harari, “Strategy and Supply,” 318. 785 TNA E101/393/11, mm. 81, 82d, 84, 85-85d. Lambert, Shipping the Medieval Military, 148. 786 Scalachronica, 171. Lambert, Shipping the Medieval Military. 787 , War Cruel and Sharp, 401 n.84. Lambert, Shipping the Medieval Military, 148. 788 Lambert, Shipping the Medieval Military, 148, n.245, 149. 789 Scalacronica, 171. 227

While Henry of Lancaster “rode through and Artois, and devastated the countryside all around,” Edward III prepared his baggage trains and then set out from

Calais on November 4.790 The army marched in three columns: Henry of Lancaster was the advanced force with Edward leading the main body through the Cambrésis and the

Black Prince leading the other through the Somme.791 Many magnates of the realm were in these companies, including (according to the Anonimalle) the earl of Cambridge, the duke of Montfort, the earl of Warwick, the , the , the earl of Oxford, the earl of Northampton, the earl of Stafford, the earl of Richmond, “and other grand lords.”792 There were also German and Flemish troops in Edward’s column initially but they were soon discharged because they did not provide their own provisions. Given the state of the countryside, Edward surely realized that his baggage train could not support them. 793

The campaign’s grand strategic plan was the same as in 1346-47: draw the French army into a destructive battle and if that failed, besiege a key city and force a favorable treaty. This city was Reims, which Clifford J. Rogers pointed out could not easily be taken by force, but would have to fall through attrition.794 Reims was a significant city to the French as it was the location where all Capetian kings were crowned. As Ormrod argued, Edward likely picked that target because if he took the city, he could force

Archbishop Jean de Craon to perform a similar ceremony, which would reinforce

790 Knighton, 169. Trial by Fire, 427. 791 Trial by Fire, 426-427. 792 Anon, 1333-1381, 44. 793 Trial by Fire, 427. 794 Rogers, War Cruel and Sharpe, 407, n.118. 228

Edward’s claim to the French throne. This is also why Edward prohibited his men from looting the city or committing any acts of violence against its inhabitants.795

Figure 20: The 1359-60 Campaign796

795 Edward III, 400 796 This map is an edited version of the map provided by Clifford J. Rogers in War Cruel and Sharp, 404. 229

As the English army marched towards its goal, rain-drenched and slogging over muddy roads, they found forage nearly impossible. Militarily they faced only minor opposition from small sorties launched from the fortifications they passed.797 These engagements were so trivial that along the entire campaign trail only one soldier was killed, namely Sir Thomas Morrieux, who in an early example of a recorded death by a gunpowder weapon, was “struck down by a gun.”798

Back in England on November 8, 21 sheriffs were ordered to collect further bows, arrows, and bowstrings then send them to the Tower for shipment to France. Yet in an interesting innovation indicating that the Crown had learned from the problems earlier in the year, the sheriffs were given the option of either collecting the requested materials or submitting the equivalent payment for their allocations. As the chart below shows, in most cases the sheriffs opted to make these payments rather than attempt to obtain the requested materials. The £612 5s 8d collected was turned over to William de Rothewell on November 14 to purchase or create with purchased timber “1,000 bows (painted and white), 10,000 sheaves of arrows and 1,000 sheaves of the best arrows (heads hard and well steeled), 100 gross bow strings, 24 haucepees for drawing crossbows, feathers of the wings of gees and other necessaries.”799

Back in France, the English army gathered 30 miles west of Reims between

November 28 and 30 before moving to the city itself by December 4. As Edward established his camp at the nearby Benedictine monastery of Montagne de Reims, the

797 Trial by Fire, 427. 798 Knighton, 171. 799 CPR, 1358-1361, 323. 230

Painted White County/City Sheaves/Arrows £ s d Bows Bows Lincoln 40 200 (200) 800 130 12 9 Gloucester 200 40 (700) 109 10 0 Nottingham & Derby (800) 56 13 4 Warwick & Leicester (600) 42 10 0 Worchester (600) 42 10 0 Northampton (600) 42 10 0 Salop (500) 35 6 8 Stafford 400 28 6 8 Hereford (400) 28 6 8 Oxford & Berkshire (400) 28 6 8 Canterbury & 600 42 10 0 Huntingdon Bedford & (500) 35 8 8 Buckingham Essex & Hertford (500) 35 8 8 Norfolk & Suffolk (900) 63 13 4 Surrey & Sussex (800) 56 13 4 Wiltshire (300) 21 5 0 Southampton 300 21 5 0 Somerset & Dorset 400 28 6 8 Devon 400 28 6 8 TOTALS 240 240 2,900 612 5 8 Table 24: Bows and Sheaves of Arrows Collected, November 1359800

army settled in around the newly-build city walls.801 According to Knighton, the king

“came with his whole force to Rheims, and they took up their quarters all round the town, and stayed there peacefully without doing harm or injury to anyone; and every lord made

800 In this table, the parenthases indicate bow/arrow sheave requests that were answered with cash payments. Those cash values that are italicized indicate allocations that were filled with the requested amounts rather than in their cash equivalents (CPR, 1358-1361, 323.). 801 Trial by Fire, 427-429. According to Sumption, the city’s walls had only been completed in 1358, although military efforts organized by the residents were problematic since Church officials would not contribute funds to assist in the raising of a defense force. 231 merry with others as though he were on his own estates in England.”802 The reality was far more frustrating as requests to surrender were denied and the one attempt at taking the city by force failed to breach the walls. Although a messenger was able to escape the city and take an appeal for assistance to the Dauphin, the prince did not respond.803

By the end of the month supplies were running low so Edward detached several contingents from the siege lines and sent them elsewhere to forage for supplies. Henry of

Lancaster and his company attacked Cernay-en-Dormois, “which was a very strong town, fortified with a double ditch and huge walls, bristling with turrets, and packed with men- at-arms.”804 Once they took the city and obtained supplies, they attacked Autry-en-

Dormois, “about three leagues from Cernay, which was a well-fortified town even stronger than Cernay.”805 Meanwhile Sir Bartholomew Burghersh, Sir Baldwin Buttore, and members of the both the Black Prince and the earl of Richmond’s households attacked Cormicy, successfully taking the city in the first week of January.806

The Dauphin, meanwhile, was approached by Jean de Neuville, who proposed an invasion of England to free John II. Although Knighton argued the Dauphin was behind the subsequent attack, Sumption pointed out that he merely supplied funding for the enterprise.807 When they learned of it, Chancellor William de Eddington and Treasurer

John Sheppey, Bishop of Rochester, used the proposed French-Scottish-Danish invasion to request money, manpower, and supplies from the population in hopes of reallocating

802 Knighton, 171. 803 Trial by Fire, 429-431. 804 Knighton, 171. 805 Knighton, 171, 173. 806 Knighton, 173. Trial by Fire, 432. 807 Knighton, 173, 175. Trial by Fire, 431. 232 the resources to France.808 These attempts failed, however, as orders were distributed to send “all laymen, of whatsoever condition, aged between sixteen and sixty” to the coast for its defense.809 The “subsidy” raised, as discussed above, was not sent to the Crown but left in the localities along the coast to aid in this defense.

Back in France, various disaffected Burgundian nobles came to Edward III and offered an alliance. As Ormrod pointed out, they wished to decrease John II’s influence in the duchy and felt an English alliance was the way to accomplish that.810 They were also arranging a marriage between the young Philip de Rouvers (the younger brother of Charles V) and the count of Flanders Louis de Mâle’s heiress, which meant that Edward could both establish a strong alliance with an important duchy and possibly re-established strong ties with Flanders.811 The relationship had suffered after the Flemish reaffirmed their loyalty to Philip VI after Crécy-Calais, and became even more tenuous when Edward moved the Staple back to England. In the face of a booming wool trade, Edward surely found the prospect of fixing that alliance a compelling one.

This is likely why, on January 11, 1360 after only six weeks, the English withdrew from

Reims and marched south.812 Rogers argued that the actual goal was Paris, but Ormrod’s explanation seems more likely given the army moved, not straight to Paris, but south into

Burgundy without major opposition.813

808 Trial by Fire, 435. 809 Knighton, 175. 810 Edward III, 402. 811 Edward III, 402. 812 Trial by Fire, 432. 813 Rogers, War Cruel and Sharp, 408. 233

Supplies were running low so Edward had his men conduct a chevauchée as he moved south, Froissart recounting that the king’s marshals wasted the countryside as they marched and foraged provisions where possible814 Once they reached Guillon on

February 19 Edward began negotiations with the Burgundians, which lasted until

March.815 Under the terms of the established agreements, the Burgundians would pay

Edward 200,000 moutons (£40,000) and provide military support for Edward’s endeavor in exchange for protection and privileges should Edward win the coming contest.816 As

Ormrod pointed out, another interesting aspect of the agreement stated that if Edward became king of France and refused to acknowledge the duke as a peer of the realm, the agreement would be voided. Once these terms were established in late March, Edward and his army departed for Paris.817

Back in England a French military force landed at on March 15.818

The next day officials in various counties were ordered to raise troops for the kingdom’s defense and given quotas for 710 men-at-arms and 1,170 archers. Knighton wrote that the force numbered 20,000 men and once they landed, killed 35 townspeople before reinforcements could arrive and repel the invasion.819 The army was in fact much smaller—numbering between 1,500 and 2,000 archers and men-at-arms—and landed at

Rye Bay in Sussex before marching along the coast to Winchelsea. Once there they raided the city and surrounding areas, but were soon repelled by 300 men-at-arms from

814 Chroniques, V: 226. 815 Edward III, 403. 816 Knighton, 177. Edward III, 403. 817 Edward III, 403 818 Trial by Fire, 436. 819 Knighton, 175. 234

Men-at- Archers COUNTY Arms (foot) Essex 100 50 Hertford 40 100 Bedford 40 100 Buckingham 50 100 Middlesex 20 100 Canterbury 30 60 Huntingdon 30 60 London 400 600 710 1,170 Table 25 : Men-at-Arms and Archers raised in March 1360820

Sussex. According to Sumption, these men correctly told their French adversaries that

English reinforcements were on their way to the area, but lied when they informed the

French that John II had been moved to Wales.821 The French chose to withdraw as a result, and were set upon by reinforcements who cut down the Frenchmen as they fled to their ships. The army not only took heavy losses in what amounted to a minor disturbance along the southern coast, but English men-at-arms succeeded in destroying two beached ships before the French retreated across the Channel.822

Back in France, Edward moved north to besiege the French capital with its population of 100,000 defended by 3.5 miles of wall. A successful siege posed a formidable challenge for a fully prepared military force, let alone once that had been in

France through a harsh winter and had been suffering from supply problems since the

820 Foedera, III: 478. 821 Trial by Fire, 436. 822 Trial by Fire, 436-437. 235 outset.823 Edward did not waver, however, and on April 1 he arrived at Châtillon. A week later, his army encircled the capital. According to Knighton,

the king arrayed his army before the city in three battalions, sounding trumpets and bugles, and other instruments. The king was in the second battalion, with his household, the duke of Lancaster and the earls of Northampton and Salisbury, with their men, in the first. In the third was the prince and the barons, and the rest of the force, expecting to do battle with those in the city of Paris, as they had previously promised.824

Yet as Ormrod observed, the Dauphin, “wisely resisting the impetuosity that had driven both his father and his grandfather to seek honourable outcomes through battle,” chose not to answer Edward’s calls for battle.825

Either to regroup or retreat, Edward began punitive raids around the city when “a terrible tempest burst upon [the army], with thunder and hail,” killing horses and destroying most of the remaining baggage train.826 The destruction wrought by the storm earned the title “” and was the death knell to Edward’s ambitions in

France. Between disease, desertion, and battlefield deaths in various small skirmishes around the capital, Edward at last abandoned his siege. On April 18 he established a camp northwest of Orléans and at the end of the month, he opened negotiations.827

A temporary settlement was reached on May 8, which gave Edward control of

Aquitaine, , Saintonge, and . John II’s ransom was set at 3 million écus

(£500,000) and Edward agreed to surrender his claim to the French throne. The French also agreed to cease supporting Scottish antagonism in northern England while Edward

823 Trial by Fire, 438. Edward III, 403. 824 Knighton, 177. 825 Edward III, 403. 826 Knighton, 179. 827 Trial by Fire, 444. 236 agreed to stop supporting the Flemish in their resistance of French authority.828 Once this

Treaty of Brétigny was established, Edward had his army burn whatever supplies remained and then headed north to Honfleur with his sons to return to England. Despite the logistical innovations untaken to conduct the campaign, he left the Continent without the lands and Crown for which he had begun the war in the first place.829

CONCLUSION

On October 24, 1360, the Treaty of Brétigny was ratified at Calais. The text omitted the phrase “sovereign” because a separate agreement, the clausula Cest assavoir, indicated that Edward would surrender his claim to the French throne when the agreed- upon territories were officially turned over to him the following year.830 The Crown received a small portion of the ransom for John II that same month, 400,000 écus total

(£66,666 13s 4d), which in addition to the 10,000 marks (£6,666 13s 4d) received in June from King David II of Scotland and customs reaching £86,489 6s 8.5d, meant that the

Crown was able to pay off many of its lingering debts.831 Between 1360 and 1363 the

Exchequer paid out £275,356 11s 10.5d, and a significant portion of that was brought on by the war and the capital intensive methods employed to wage it.832

Yet in October 1361 when envoys traveled to England to finalize the peace negotiations, disagreements over the minutia of surrendering territory meant that the

828 Edward III, 405. 829 Trial by Fire, 447-448. 830 Pierre Chaplais, ed., “Some Documents Regarding the Fulfilment and Interpretation of the Treaty of Br tigny,” in Camden Miscellany Vol. XIX, Camden Third Series Vol. LXXX (London: The Royal Historical Society, 1952) 6. 831 Trial by Fire, 453. Ormrod, "The English Crown and the Customs," 33. Foedera, III: 500. 832 T.F. Tout and Dorothy M. Broome, “A National Balance Sheet for 1362-3, with Documents Subsidiary Thereto,” The English Historical Review, Vol. 39, No. 155 (July 1924), 406. 237

French left the country without an agreement in place.833 English soldiers who did not return to England began forming mercenary groups in France, called Free Companies, and wreaked havoc across the French countryside.834 When the French Royal army attempted to curb the violence in 1362 by drawing these companies into battle at

Brignais, not only was the French army destroyed but its commander, Jacques de

Bourbon, was killed in combat.835

Despite these potential problems, along with the continued difficulty the French had with raising John II’s ransom, negotiations continued until 1364 when John II died.836 Yet his son the Dauphin, now Charles V, did not want to maintain the peace; as

Ormrod noted, Charles was said to have told his secretary that once the French hostages still in English custody were brought home, “he would ally with the Scots and wreak a terrible vengeance on the English in France.”837 It was clear then that Reims had done little more than line English pockets and create a period of truce during which Edward could prepare to return to France for another try.

In addition to these issues, the wool staple underwent a series of changes in the early part of the decade. In 1362 the ordinance that allowed the Crown to gain 40s on every sack of wool exported expired and Parliament took the opportunity to reduce this amount to 20s.838 The Crown, moreover, was required to obtain Parliamentary consent to collect the subsidy, as well as limit any further acts of purveyance in order to prevent the

833 Edward III, 417. 834 Kenneth Fowler, Medieval Mercenaries, Vol. I (Malden, MA: Blackwell Publishers, 2001). 835 Fowler, Medieval Mercenaries, I: 46-52. 836 Edward III, 416-423. 837 Edward III, 423-424. 838 Ormrod, “The English Crown,” 38. 238 abuses the public saw as endemic to the practice.839 In reaction Edward moved the staple to Calais in 1363, “apparently eager to reestablish the idea of a royal monopoly over the wool trade based on a foreign staple controlled by a syndicate of English merchants.”840

Although this meant that Calais could be maintained by the funds controlled by the newly-established Merchants of the Staple (at least in part), it also ended the Crown’s unfettered access to massive customs revenue from its largest export commodity.

Most importantly, in 1361 the Great Pestilence returned. Robert D. Gottfried argued that by 1360 populations had nearly reached their pre-plague levels, but when the bubonic plague broke again this growth ended.841 It was called “The Pestilence of

Children” in England, and it killed between 20% and 25% of the European population.

Many of these were either very young or very old, and ushered in demographic stagnation from which Europe would not recover for another 100 years.842

This ecological disaster, when coupled with the aforementioned political and economic circumstances after the end of the 1359-60 campaign, meant that Edward III thoroughly failed in his attempt to end the war with one more great military expedition.

The capital intensive methods developed after the Black Death he employed to gather the manpower, supplies, and victuals required for war, while successful, were undercut by logistical delays and a lack of available specie. The Reims campaign, while the best the

Crown could accomplish in the wake of the pandemic, failed to end this bloody and

839 Ormrod, “The English Crown,” 38. E.E. Rich, The Ordinance Book of the Merchants of the Staple (Cambridge: Cambridge University press, 1937), 840 Knighton, 187. Ormrod, “The English Crown,” 38. 841 Robert S. Gottfried, The Black Death: Natural and Human Disaster in Medieval Europe (New York: The Free Press, 1983), 129. 842 George Holmes, The (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1975), 92. Elisabeth Carpentier, “The Plague as a Recurrent Phenomenon,” in The Black Death: A Turning Point in History?, William M. Bowsky, ed. (New York: Holt, Rinehart and Winston, 1971), 37. 239 costly international conflict as Edward and his subjects had hoped. In fact, as Ormrod pointed out, it was Edward’s “tragic legacy that a settlement intended to draw to a close one century of Anglo-French hostility would end up merely provoking another hundred years of war.”843

843 Edward III, 413. 240

Chapter 8: Conclusion

Indeed it raged so strongly that scarcely a tenth of mankind was left alive. A mortality of animals followed in its footsteps, then rents dwindled, land fell waste for want of the tenants who used to cultivate it, and so much misery ensued that the world will hardly be able to regain its previous condition. Ranulf Higden844

The Black Death was one of the most deadly in human history. In less than five years it swept from Asia to Europe, killing the majority of those who contracted it and causing the population to believe they were witnessing the end of the world.

And yet, in the face of this seemingly insurmountable disaster, humanity endured.

In England the government was operating at full capacity within two years of the plague’s height, and a series of new economic policies allowed Edward III to continue, quite effectively, his efforts in the regain the hereditary rights lost by his ancestors. The

Ordinance of the Staple allowed the Crown to harness the power of England’s most profitable export commodity, discharge many lingering debts, and effectively continue the war with France.

This thesis has traced these developments, using the logistical preparation for the pre-plague Crécy-Calais campaign in 1346-47 as a point of comparison to the post-plague

1359-60 Reims campaign. Logistics is the best lens through which to analyze potential

844 Higden, “Polychronicon,” in Horrox, The Black Death, 62. 241 institutional adaptations because, as Michael Prestwich once observed, success in medieval warfare was often achieved “by pen-pushing clerks in military headquarters, by officials requisitioning victuals, and by the men who ensured that the supplies reached the men who did the fighting.”845

By using the non-campaign year of 1329 as a basis for comparison, we can see that Crécy-Calais was a capital extensive campaign during which the English Crown accrued a debt of over £200,000 and bankrupted several merchant companies to amass as many men and materials as possible. In contrast, the Black Death caused significant labor shortages, mounting inflation, and a dearth of agricultural surplus that could be purveyed without causing significant social conflicts. The Crown therefore transitioned to capital intensive logistical methods, using privately-hired military companies and supplies purchased directly by the Exchequer primarily in the theater of operations to execute what was intended to be the last great campaign of the war. Although the outcome of the campaign was not as Edward III intended—due to embarkation delays, bullion shortages, and a northern French countryside laid waste by nearly two decades of war—that does not change the fact that these capital intensive methods were a significant innovation in social, political, and economic affairs.

As devastating as the Great Pestilence and subsequent outbreaks were, however, as John Aberth noted, “Europe’s rebirth was forged in the crucible of its terrible yet transcendent ordeal with the Black Death.”846 The plague of 1361-1362 killed 10%-20% of the European population, while the 15 subsequent outbreaks between 1369 and 1479

845 Prestwich, Armies and Warfare, 10. 846 Aberth, The First Horseman, 25. 242 were responsible for 10-15% during each wave. While not as significant as the Black

Death, the successive outbreaks that occurred nearly every generation caused population stagnation from which Europe would not recover until the sixteenth century.847

The prolonged failure to recover was pivotal to “the Great Transition” because in the words of historian Robert S. Gottfried, “shortage was the mother of medieval invention.”848 After the Black Death, the value of windmills and watermills in England,

France, and the Netherlands doubled. The development of water pumps and new mining methods in the 1400’s allowed for more efficient and widespread mining. Shortage in those available to perform unskilled hard labor led to the use of more efficient agricultural techniques and the introduction of better machines of manufacture. Factoring in inflation, skilled workers earned double what they did in 1300.849 Overall higher wages gradually liberated workers from their manorial lands so that they could become members of a larger, more influential, and better-educated middle class.850 This in turn caused a change in the functional distribution of income and a growth in the western

European per capita GDP.851 The resulting demand for increased international trade,

847 Gottfried, The Black Death, 130-131. 848 Gottfried, The Black Death, 142. 849 Campbell, “The Great Transition.” Gottfried, The Black Death, 142. 850 Aberth, The Black Death, 4, 70. Aberth, The First Horseman, 21-22. 851 The economic impact of the plague constitutes a major argument regarding the effect of the Black Death. This specific thesis was proposed most notably by M.M. Postan, who stated that the plague led to the “commutation of labour services and the emancipation of serfs” (Medieval Economy and Society: An Economic History of Britain in the Middle Ages. London: Pelican, 1975). Historians such as Robert C. Palmer (English Law in the Age of the Black Death, 1348-1381 (Chapel Hill, NC: The University of North Carolina Press, 1993)), Colin Platt (King Death: the Black Death and its aftermath in late-medieval England (London: University College London Press, 1996)), and Jim Bolton (“‘The World Upside Down’. Plague as an Agent of Economic and Social Change,” in The Black Death in England, E.M. Ormrod and P.G. Lindley, eds. (Stamford: Paul Watkins, 1996), 17-78), have qualified but generally upheld this conclusion. See also John Hatcher, “England in the Aftermath of the Black Death,” Past & Present, No. 144 (August 1994), 3-35. 243 when coupled with the need for larger ships to transport agricultural produce in the face of manpower shortages, led to the development of more advanced rigging systems that could allow Europeans to traverse greater distances with fewer sailors at a lower cost. It is also likely that the labor-saving technology that was the printing press, together with the high mortality rate of Latin-educated clergy and the perceived shortcoming of their vernacular replacements, laid the groundwork for the Reformation.852

It was not until the nineteenth century that the Black Death was treated as anything other than an extremely destructive biological disaster.853 It was then that historians began to contemplate its importance, and nearly all since then have agreed that while it was a highly traumatic event in European history, it was also highly impactful. In

1861 Charles Creighton believed the plague helped establish the middle class and later in

1893 G.G. Gasqute argued it ushered in a social revolution throughout Europe.854 Egon

Friedell asserted that it created the modern man in 1927 while two years later George C.

Coulton believed it shattered medieval society and ushered in both the Renaissance and

851 Aberth, The First Horseman; Aberth, The Black Death; Philip Ziegler, The Black Death (Stroud, Gloucestershire: Sutton Publishing Ltd., 1969). Robert S. Gottfried (The Black Death: Natural and Human Disaster in Medieval Europe (New York: The Free Press, 1983)) discusses the advancements in metallurgy as well as the advancements of water pump technology, permitting the expansion and increased safety of mining, particularly in England.Paolo Malanima, “The Economic Consequences of the Black Death,” in L’impatto della ‘peste antonina, Elio Lo Cascio, ed. (Bari: Edipuglia, 2012), 311-328. 852 Aberth, The First Horseman, 23-24. 853 For examples of histories that pay little attention to the Black Death: Robert Henry, The History of Great Britain(London, 1788); E. R. Hume, History of England(London, 1796); J.R. Green, History of the English People (London, 1877). 854 Charles Creighton, A History of Great Epidemics in Britain (New York: Macmillan and Co., 1861). G. G. Gasqute, The Great Pestilence (London: S. Marshall, Hamilton, Kent & Co., 1893). 244

Reformation.855 G.M. Trevelyan in 1942 even claimed that it was as influential as the

856 Industrial Revolution.

In 1969 Philip Ziegler proposed a more moderate approach, believing that historians should consider all of the plague outbreaks between 1348 and 1400 to truly understand its impact. He felt that it had a large effect in some areas of Europe but not others, and that overall “the Black Death did not initiate any major social or economic trend but it accelerated and modified—sometimes drastically—those which already existed.”857 This revisionist approach was explored in the 1971 edited volume The Black

Death: A Turning Point in History?, in which editor William M. Bowsky felt that anyone who believes the plague did not influence European history is trying erroneously to claim hindsight bias.858 Although some contributors did believe it merely exacerbated pre- existing trends, those such as George A. Holmes felt it was “once of the few decisive turning points in history.”859

Since this volume, historians have moved back towards the trends of the early twentieth century. Contemplating its social impact, Jim Bolton in 1996 felt the Black

Death created a “mass realignment within the peasantry” and shifted wealth to urban centers rather than rural estates.860 In the same year Colin Platt felt that the plague was responsible for an increased concern with death and the afterlife while Joseph P. Byrne

855 Egon Friedell, Kulturgesicht der Neuzeit (, 1927). George C. Coulton, The Black Death (London, 1929) 856 G.M. Trevelyan, English Social History (London, 1942 857 Ziegler, The Black Death, 202. 858 William M. Bowsky, The Black Death: A Turning Point in History? (New York: Holt, Rinehart and Winston, 1971). 859 George A. Holmes, “England: A Decisive Turning Point,” in The Black Death: A Turning Point in History?, William M. Bowsky, ed. (New York: Holt, Rinehart and Winston, 1971), 91. 860 Jim Bolton, “‘The World Upside Down’. Plague as an Agent of Economic and Social Change,” in The Black Death in England, E.M. Ormrod and P.G. Lindley, eds. (Stamford: Paul Watkins, 1996), 45. 245 argued that the plague broke down any remaining vestiges of feudalism and lowered standards for entry into the Church due to the high death rate of Latin-educated clergy.861

A year later David Herlihy believed that the plague improved women’s rights, increased the living standards of the lower classes, bettered health practices vis-à-vis quarantine methods, and revolutionized maritime travel because large ships had to invent the technology to operate with less manpower.862

John Aberth’s work on the Black Death embodies this post-revisionist interpretation, and in The First Horseman asserted that the Black Death ushered in the development of labor-saving devices (such as the printing press), promoted secular patronage in Renaissance art, increased wages for agricultural workers, and may have laid the groundwork for the Reformation. As he wrote, “no longer can we afford to write off Europe at the end of the Middle Ages as a wasted society waiting for the modern era to begin. Rather, Europe’s rebirth was forged in the crucible of its terrible yet transcendent ordeal with the Black Death.”863

Although military historians have not yet contemplated the Black Death’s impact upon military affairs, I argue that the plague laid the groundwork for the period of momentous military change known of as the Military Revolution. Although the concept was first mentioned by C.W.C. Oman, the theory was initially put forward by Michael

Roberts in a 1955 lecture at Queen’s University of Belfast that became the article “The

861 Colin Platt, King Death: the Black Death and its aftermath in late-medieval England (London: University College London Press, 1996). Byrne, The Black Death, 66, 69. 862 David Herlihy, The Black Death and the Transformation of the West (Cambridge, MS: Harvard University Press, 1997). 863 Aberth, The First Horseman, 25. 246

Military Revolution, 1560-1660.”864 Roberts postulated that the changes instituted by

Maurice of Orange and Gustav Adolf led to the rise of innovative tactics such as linear formations. Drill was emphasized and light field guns were adopted to boost mobility.

Strategically, the scope of warfare increased with the growth of army size, which in turn fueled the centralization of state authority due in large part to the fiscal burdens necessary to sustain such unprecedented growth.

Roberts’ theories were later challenged by Geoffrey Parker, initially in his 1976 journal article “The Military Revolution, 1560-1660—A Myth?” and then in his 1988 book The Military Revolution.865 Parker argued that it was the development of the trace italienne in response to the creation of effective cannon that became a driving force of change. The amassing of large armies and the construction of these complex fortresses not only led to the dominance of the siege over open battle and the ascendancy of infantry over cavalry, but, just as Roberts stated, it depended upon the growth of centralized government power capable of supporting the financial burden of these new circumstances. With the growth of this centralized military-fiscal state, technological innovation on both land and sea generated a feedback loop with social change that constituted the Military Revolution.

Providing an alternate paradigm to the early modern Military Revolution , medieval military historian Clifford J. Rogers asserted in his edited volume The Military

Revolution Debate that, instead of Western European dominance emerging from one

864 Michael Roberts, “The Military Revolution, 1560-1660,” Essays in Swedish History (University of Minnesota Press, 1967). 865 Geoffrey Parker, The Military Revolution: Military innovation and the rise of the West, 1500-1800 (Cambridge, New York: Cambridge University Press, 1988). 247 military revolution, it was the result of a series of sequential military revolutions, each attempting to reverse a disequilibrium introduced by the previous one.866 Using his concept of the “punctuated equilibrium evolution,” he believed that two revolutions occurred during the 100 Years’ War, an artillery revolution and an infantry revolution.

Although the implementation of gunpowder was initially limited in Western Europe, by the end of the 100 Years’ War, artillery was developed that could effectively to pull down the walls of the medieval fortress. In regards to infantry, Rogers believes that, after the medieval dominance of heavy cavalry, the fourteenth century saw the ascendance of infantry over cavalry beginning at the battle of Courtrai in 1302. Espousing an outlook shared by many medieval military historians such as Kelly DeVries, Susan Rose, and

Michael Prestwich, he ultimately supported the theory that the rise of global European supremacy began in the medieval period.

“Military Revolution” is certainly a problematic phrase to employ given that, as

Bruce M.S. Campbell pointed out, “as the Great Transition unfolded, interactions and feedback, both environmental and human, occurred at a range of nested temporal and spatial scales—from the short-term to the long-term and the micro to the macro—as change cascaded through the prevailing social-economic system in complex ways.”867 As such, “this cascading process defies any simple law of ‘cause and effect’ and is a reminder that each stage in the ‘transition’ was unique.”868

866 Clifford J. Rogers, “The Military Revolutions of the Hundred Years War” in The Military Revolution Debate: readings on the military transformation of early modern Europe (Boulder: Westview Press, 1995), 55-93. 867 Campbell, “The Great Transition.” 868 Campbell, “The Great Transition.” 248

Because of the labor-saving technologies on land and sea, a change in the functional distribution of income, a growth in the western European per capita GDP, and the increase in government authority that had to accompany these changes, European powers were able to improve their military technologies and abilities. Smelting, metallurgy, mining, the need for larger vessels, and increased competition in a protracted labor market led to more efficient gunpowder weapons, tactical innovations on the battlefield, the development of more professional soldiers, and the invention of larger fortifications that could withstand these challenges. Such developments saw their expression in the latter half of the Hundred Years War and found their pinnacle in the

European wars of the 1600’s.

Certainly this is a long period for a revolution, and yet historians do not debate the efficacy of the Neolithic Revolution, which may have taken as long as 2,000 years to fully express itself.869 Even so, the term evolution might be more appropriate, especially considering that the medieval period was certainly not a time of developmental stagnation; the water wheel, the horse collar, and the pivoting front axle had large implications for agricultural production and were inventions firmly planted in the Middle

Ages, as were the creation of the cannon and the emergence of an effective gunpowder mixture.870 As Philip Zeigler noted, in many ways the plagues “accelerated and modified—sometimes drastically—[trends] which already existed.”871

869 Mark Nathan Cohen, The Food Crisis in Prehistory: Overpopulation and the Origins of Agriculture (New Haven, London: Yale University Press, 1977). Although I do not agree with his ultimate conclusions regarding the cause of military change in the early modern era, the impact of the Neolithic Revolution is also discussed by Jared Diamond in Guns, Germs, and Steel: The Fates of Human Societies (New York: Newton, 2005). 870 Lynn, Feeding Mars, 36. White, Military Technology and Social Change. Brenda J. Buchanan, ed., Gunpowder: The History of an International Technology (Bath, England: Bath University Press, 1996). 249

But it must be remembered that this acceleration or evolution began during a time of endemic warfare throughout Europe, and as in the case of the development of capital intensive warfare after the Black Death in England discussed in this thesis, the need to win wars spurred states to develop more efficient ways to wage it. These developments ushered in a period of change—whether it be acceleration, evolution, or revolution— called the Military Revolution, which allowed Europeans to project their power externally and gain control of 35% of the global landmass in 1600. 872 The Black Death was therefore an impetus for change that should not be discounted, and without the initial challenges the Black Death imposed, the course of European history would not have been the same.

DeVries and Smith, Medieval Military Technology. White’s military conclusions have been refuted but his discussion of medieval technological developments is sound. 871 Ziegler, The Black Death, 202. 872 This percentage was calculated using the total global landmass in square miles vs. tangible land holdings (rather than theoretical imperial territorial claims) as of 1600. 250

Appendix A: Glossary of Terms

Non-English persons residing/working in England. They could purchase the right to be “denizens” and avoid paying the high alien customs duties owed by foreign merchants. They were often forced to give loans to the Crown under threat of expulsion.

Custom due on any good exported from England (antiqua custuma). The value, intrinsic or specific, of any portion of the Custom-revenue was adjusted at the discretion of the Crown. ancient custom When the custom was formalized and then confirmed by the Carta Mercatoria, it was valued at either ⅓ (13s.4d.) or ½ (6s.8d.) of a . The latter value was assigned to sacks of wool.

Armed men on foot (homines armato) also called foot soldiers. These men generally wore chainmail and were armed with pikes, daggers, knives, or swords. In the fourteenth century, Froissart armed men referred to these men as ribaudaille (looters/vagabonds) and in the English army, they began to travel on horseback before dismounting for pitched battle.

Gathering of able-bodied men for military service. The obligation of men to prepare for war and serve in the defense of the realm was considered an “ancient obligation” in England. Due to the statute of Winchelsea in 1285, individuals thus armed and prepared were obligated to succumb to array in troops called centenaries or vintenaries. This process in each hundred was combined under the sheriff of the county, and the force formed array (posse comitatus) was available, technically, for both civil and military uses. For armies, the Crown would issue letters patent for commissioners ( generally from the knight class, feudal sub- tenants, minor tenants-in-chief, and wealthy landowners distrained into knighthood) who would supervise the array and were responsible for bringing the troops to designated assembly points for embarkation. Until then, local populations were responsible for wages, victuals, and arming men for military service.

251

Regular knights, so called to differentiate them from banneret knights. They were often drawn from the minor tenant class and bachelor then distrained into knighthood. They were not eligible to carry and fight under their own banners.

A medieval knight (banneretus) who captained castle garrisons, supervised troop arrays, served as government administrators, and led a company of troops in war under his own banner. The banner banneret itself was square-shaped in contrast to the tapering standard or the pennon flown by the lower-ranking knights. Bannerets were in rank higher than knight bachelors, who fought under another's banner, but they were generally not members of the nobility.

Agreement concluded in 1303 between the Crown and leading alien merchants in England. This agreement laid out all of the Carta Mercatoria liberties and prohibitions for their occupation, setting standards for the New Custom, the Ancient Custom, and other elements derived from the traditional prerogative of the Crown.

centenaries Men in charge of 100 men on foot.

A seal confirming that a sack of wool had been weighed and the customs paid. Sacks or serplers of wool were placed under the custody of the collectors of wool at the wool-quay, and were weighed at the beam by a special officer (tronager or tronour). cocket The weigher received a fee of 2d. from every merchant whose wools or leather passed the beam. When satisfactorily weighed, the sacks and bales were sealed with the collector's coket, and after the amount assessed on each according to the rate had been discharged, were handed over to the owners as “cocketted” Medieval currency derived from the libra (livre or pound) of pure silver from which 240 silver were struck. Later 12 pennies (d) were to the shilling (or sous) and 20 shillings or sous to the pound or livre. The florin, ducat, franc, livre, écu, mark, and English pound were all theoretically more or less equivalent, although over time their weight and gold content varied. The nearest standard was the coin containing 3.5 grams of gold minted currency by Florence (the florin) and Venice (the ducat) in the mid-. Although not a universal practice, generally when the word “gold” was attached to the name of a coin (franc d'or, écu d'or), this signified a physical coin. When the name was expressed by the title of the currency alone, or, in France, as a livre in one of its various forms−parisis, tournois, brodelaise−the money existed only on paper.

252

A foreigner who paid a fee to be considered an English “citizen”. While they were not considered English, they had more rights than denizen aliens. However, like aliens, these individuals were often subject to forced loans to the Crown under threat of expulsion.

The seizure of someone’s property in order to obtain payment of rent or other money owed. This typically involved the seizure of distraint goods (chattels) belonging to the tenant by the landlord to sell the goods for the payment of the debt. The term could also refer to men “distrained” into service in lieu of paying debts to landlords.

Men who marched and fought on foot, typically with a longbow. These soldiers generally wore a hacqueton (padded doublet of buckram, linen, or leather), a bracer (a guard for the arm to catch the strong when the shaft was loosed), a knife, a shirt sword, a foot archer bow, and 1-2 sheaves of arrows, each generally with two dozen shafts. Although longbowmen were typically recruited through commissions of array, Welshmen (those from Ghent in particular) were well-known for their proficiency with the longbow. Semi-professional “infantry” garrison troops who carried shields foot sergeant and swords (servientibus peditibus). They could also carry pikes.

glaive A lance used by men-at-arms or infantry. Also known as demi-lancer (sagittarii equites). These men were mounted on lighter horses (ambling pony or hobyn), wore steel caps, a haqueton, and coats of mail. They carried a lance, a knife, hobelar and a sword. By the fourteenth century, they were used for intelligence transport, reconnoitering, and harassing enemy troops while on the march. In battles, they often dismounted and flanked foot archers. A tax levied against those who pastured cattle in forests. This tax horngeld was not regular but rather imposed in special circumstances (hornyeld, cornage).

impôt Tax, direct or indirect, related to the phrase “maltot.”

In the early fourteenth century, a vigier, the highest official in the local administration in Provence earned £100/year. A judge made £70/year. A clavarius, who was responsible for keeping local income records, made £20/year. Individuals who had a right to an annual pension on account of merit (e.g. for being wounded in military service) got a standard 6d/day, amounting to about £9/year.

253

Formal contract for military service by either foreign or domestic soldiers. Indentures were first seen in the reign of Edward I and Edward II but replaced all feudal service by the . The contract outlined time length and geographic scope of service, terms for payment and wages and service indenture bonuses, victualling expectations, recourse for grievances by both the soldier and owner of the indenture, and the restauratio equorum, whereby it was stipulated that warhorses should be valued at the outset of a campaign and the owner of the indenture would compensate the signee in the event that any were lost on active service. Mounted heavy cavalry in medieval warfare. If referred to as a knight, men were not generally from the noble class but from the higher or lower tenant class. These men traditionally fought in the kȇre formation and wore : haqueton (padded doublet of buckram, knight linen, or leather), hauberk (chainmail shirt), gambeson (padded defensive wool/linen jacket), cyclas (long thin cloth over-coat), a helmet, a sword, a lance, and a dagger in sheath. Each knight had one or more pages to upkeep their equipment and traveled with 3- 4 horses included 1-2 destriers, or war horses.

“Evil tax” levied as an extraordinary Custom upon the chief staple commodities exported from England. The assessment of the duty maltot was often a fifth, a fourth, or a third of the gross value of the commodity. It was generally priced at 40s. per sack exported and described as a “mala tolta”, or an unconstitutional toll or due.

Knights or squires clad in armor and mounted on large horses (homines-ad-arma, hominibus armatis equitibus). These included earls, barons, knights, and esquires who were hereditary owners of men-at-arms land. Sometimes, however, the term was used to denote heavy cavalry less armed than knights. These soldiers wore body armor similar to a knight’s army and in the later 14th century, would also provide mounted archers.

A military implement maker was a maker of the engines of war in military the Tower of London (attiliatoris). These included, but were not implement maker confined to, the trebuchet, catapult, and ballista.

254

Men who fought with bow and arrow and traveled on horseback. Their use grew rapidly in the late 13th and early 14th centuries and were eventually assigned to the king’s retinue for protection. Like foot archers, these soldiers generally wore a hacqueton (padded mounted archer doublet of buckram, linen, or leather), a bracer (a guard for the arm to catch the strong when the shaft was loosed), a knife, a shirt sword, a bow, and 1-2 sheaves of arrows, each generally with two dozen shafts. Similar to hobelars, they traveled on lighter horses (ambling pony or hobyn) and then would dismount in battle.

Tax on imports and exports paid by aliens and denizen merchants (nova customa). This rate was also confirmed by the Carta Mercatoria and added to the old custom as an additional charge. new custom This value ranged from 1s. for a quintal of wax to 6s. 8d. for a last of leather. The most popular and profitable English export, wool, was charged 3s. 4d..

Advance, usually against wages. This was an ordinary occurrence prest once military contracts were a common practice and with them, regularized soldiers’ wages and terms of service. The taking from the subject or stranger merchant, either forcibly or by his consent, as the circumstances of the case allowed, for the prise King’s need (ad opus Regis), or for his use (al use le Roi). Purveyance, customs dues, and other seizures by the Crown for its use were designated as prises.

The right of the Crown, as an extension of its feudal rights of the household, to seize or purchase at its need, for its use, any determined bulk of cargo, at such prices and on such terms of purveyance payment as the circumstances of the case might warrant. This system of caption and emption was a form of prise exercised in the case of produce at large.

A bonus paid quarterly, the normal rate being 100 marks for the service of thirty men-at-arms. This was added as a clause to regard indenture contracts once the practice of formal military contracts became common in the early fourteenth century.

route A company of men-at-arms, called , who fought for pay Standard weight of wool exports. One sack was usually 364lbs of sack wool from an estimated 260 sheep. Payment made by a knight or member of the nobility in lieu of scutage performing military service. There is evidence that scutage was 255

collected as early as the 11th century.

Officially designated port where merchants were required to trade their wares, especially wool. The staple system made it easier for staple the Crown to collect customs revenues and enforce quality, but it also became a diplomatic tool as different foreign powers vied to be designated the official staple for English exports. Term used to refer to large international trading companies in the High Middles Ages such as the English financiers, the Bardi and Peruzzi. These companies had large administrative structures and positioned merchants in every major European country to locally super-company control international trading. These companies were based out of the northern Italian city-states and while they functioned as money-lenders, their main source of revenue was generated by the grain trade. These would cease to exist after the Black Death. taille A general term for a tax. Measure of capacity in the form of a cask or barrel used for wine tun and other liquids. See Weights & Measures Chart for capacity. Soldier’s uniform, or the practice of dressing men “in a uniform una secta manner” (de una secta). This practice became prevalent in the 14th century, especially amongst Welsh soldiers or a lord’s retinue.

“Officer” in charge of 20 men, generally men-at-arms. This vintenars position would roughly correspond to a modern military captain.

Foodstuffs of various kinds. As goods could be collected far in advance of a campaign, preservation methods were essential. In victual many cases, salting was carefully applied, while wheat, ground into flour, was packed into thick barrels with salt and tree twigs on top. If properly stored, victuals could survive for a year or more. Clerks responsible for collecting supplies. These men were typically clerks for the king and were often associated with the king’s household and wardrobe. A position created only in times of war, the victualler was appointed to receive by indenture the victualler victuals collected by purveyors, to store them, and to make disbursements of quantities of them when required by his instructions. Victuallers were given a standard, made of linen and black and red lawn, and were often also responsible for maintaining storage spaces and hiring vessels for supply transport.

256

Appendix B: Weights & Measures

10 hundred herrings 1320 herrings peck of flour 14 lbs anker 10 gallons pig of ballast 56 lbs barrel 36 gallons pipe of madeira 92 gallons bushel of barley 47 lbs pipe of port 115 gallons bushel of coal 80 lbs pipe of sherry 108 gallons bushel of oats 39 lbs pocket of hops 168 to 224 lbs bushel of rye 60 lbs puncheon(2 barrels) 72 gallons bushel of wheat 60 lbs quarter of wheat 480 lbs butt of ale(3 barrels) 108 gallons sack of coal 224 lbs chaldron of coal 85 lbs sack of flour 280 lbs chest of cloves 200 lbs sack of potatoes 168 lbs cord of wood 128 cubic feet sack of wool 364 lbs cran of herrings 37 1/2 gallons stack of wood 108 cubic ft firkin(1/2 barrel) 9 gallons stone of meat 8 lbs hogshead of brandy 60 gallons tierce 42 gallons hogshead of claret 45 gallons ton of hay 36 trusses hogshead of madeira 46 gallons truss of new hay 60 lbs hogshead of port 57 gallons truss of old hay 56 lbs hogshead of sherry 54 gallons truss of straw 36 lbs hogshead of sugar 13 to 16 ctw warp of herrings 4 herrings hogshead of tobacco 12 to 18 ctw wey of cheese (14 stone) 364 lbs hogshead(1 1/2 barrels) 54 gallons £1 20s kilderkin(1/2 barrel) 18 gallons 1s 12d last of herrings 13,200 herrings £1 240d last of hides 12 dozen 1 mark 2/3 £ or 13s 4d last of wool 12 sacks 1 mark 160d load of hay or straw 36 trusses 1 quarter 8 bushels of herrings 132 herrings 1 bushel 4 pecks matt of cloves 80 lbs 1tun 2 pipes/ 4 quarters 1 empty tun 252 gal max

257

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UNPUBLISHED THESES

Candy, Christopher A., “The Scottish Wars of Edward III, 1327-1338” (Unpublished PhD thesis, University of Durham, 2004).

Ditcham, Brian G.H., “The Employment of Foreign Mercenary Troops in the French Royal Armies- 1415-1470” (Unpublished PhD thesis, University of Edinburgh, 1978).

Kaner, Ralph A., “The Management of the Mobilization of English Armies: Edward I to Edward III” (Unpublished PhD thesis, University of York, 1999).

Lambert, Craig L., “Taking the War to Scotland and France: The Supply and Transportation of English Armies by Sea, 1320-60” (Unpublished PhD thesis, University of Hull, 2009).

Thorn, Linton S., “The Colonization of Calais under Edward III, 1347-1377” (Unpublished MA thesis, Oxford University, 1953).

Vaughn, M. K., “For the circumstances must dictate the proper means: a study in the history of logistics with special reference to thirteenth century England” (Unpublished PhD thesis, University of Reading, 1999).

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