DOCSLIB.ORG

Taxation and Voting Rights in Medieval England and France

Total Page：16

File Type：pdf, Size：1020Kb

Download full-text PDF Read full-text
Taxation and Voting Rights in Medieval England and France TAXATION AND VOTING RIGHTS IN MEDIEVAL ENGLAND AND FRANCE Yoram Barzel and Edgar Kiser ABSTRACT We explore the relationship between voting rights and taxation in medieval England and France. We hypothesize that voting was a wealth-enhancing institution formed by the ruler in order to facili- tate pro®table joint projects with subjects. We predict when voting rightsand tax paymentswill be linked to each other, as well asto the projectsinducing them, and when they will become separated. We classify taxes into three types: customary, consensual and arbitrary. Customary taxes that did not require voting were dominant in both countriesin the early medieval period. Thesepay- ments, ®xed for speci®c purposes, were not well suited for funding new, large-scale projects. Consensual taxation, in which voting rightsand tax paymentswere tightly linked, wasusedto ®nance new, large-scale collective projects in both England and France. Strong rule-of-law institutions are necessary to produce such taxes. In England, where security of rule remained high, the rela- tionship between tax payments and voting rights was maintained. In France, an increase in the insecurity of rule, and the accompany- ing weakening of voting institutions, produced a shift to arbitrary taxation and a disjunction between tax payments and voting rights. These observations, as well as many of the details we con- sider, are substantially in conformity with the predictions of our model. KEY WORDS . medieval history . taxation . voting Introduction The relationship between taxation and voting rights has been a central issue in political philosophy and the cause of signi®cant poli- tical disputes, as `no taxation without representation' exempli®es. Yet social scientists have neither developed a theory nor conducted empirical analyses of the relationship. In this article, we spell out conditionsunder which the linksbetween voting rightsand tax Rationality and Society Copyright & 2002 Sage Publications (London, Thousand Oaks, CA and New Delhi), Vol. 14(4): 473±507. [1043±4631(200211)14:4; 473±507; 027740] 474 RATIONALITY AND SOCIETY 14(4) payments will be strengthened or weakened. We address several speci®c historical questions, including: (1) Why was consent via voting in medieval states required for some taxes but not for others? (2) What is the relationship between the decline of feudalism and the development of voting institutions? And, (3) Why did the French nobility ®rst pay direct taxes, then get an exemption from them, while their English counterparts paid throughout? Medieval taxation consisted of distinct types of taxes whose pur- pose changed dramatically during the period. Schumpeter ([1918] 1954) referred to this change as the transition from `domain states' to `tax states' and Weber ([1922] 1968) called it the transition from `traditional' to `rational-legal' formsof authority. Their typologies, however, do not suit our purposes, since they do not focus on the relationship between taxation and voting rights. We distinguish among customary taxes, which do not require voting rights, consen- sual taxes, for which voting isrequired, and arbitrary taxes, which the ruler can set at will. Schumpeter's `domain state' roughly matches our customary taxation, but his `tax state' does not differ- entiate between consensual and arbitrary taxation ± a distinction central to our analysis. Weber's `traditional authority' combines both our customary and arbitrary forms of taxation, and his `rational-legal' authority can include the arbitrary aswell asthe con- sensual form which he sees as dominant. Schumpeter (1954: 16) arguesthat rulers'needsto ®ght more frequent wars led to the transition from a domain state to a tax state. The ruler's increased need, however, does not explain why consensual taxation replaced customary taxation in some places but arbitrary taxation replaced customary taxation in others. In addition, it takestwo to ®ght. Schumpeter'sargument focuseson the response of one state but fails to explain why wars became more frequent. We address these issues and provide an explanation of the transitions from one type of taxation to another. Weber, mainly interested in typology, did not provide a causal analysis of the transition from traditional to rational-legal forms (Bendix 1960: 383). Studying the relationship between taxation and voting in medieval England and France in the early stages of the development of their voting institutions is relatively easy.1 The voting institutions and tax systems that exist in contemporary democracies are complex structures that have been modi®ed over the centuries. Both voting and taxes in most modern states encompass numerous state policies KISER & BARZEL: TAXATION AND VOTING RIGHTS 475 (projects), each of which affects different subsets of citizens. For that reason, it is dif®cult to disentangle the causal relations between tax payments, voting rights, and state projects. The number of projects initiated in medieval voting institutions is small. Both English and French state taxes were con®ned mostly to war ®nance. These circumstances greatly simplify the empirical exploration of our argu- ments.1 Although reliable quantitative data on taxation in this period are lacking (Major 1960: 21; Henneman 1967: 295),2 qualita- tive data exist that allow us to test our model. Our central hypothesis is that consensual taxation emerged as a result of the cooperation between (individually maximizing) rulers and subjects when acting as business partners. By this view, new taxes, to be spent at the ruler's discretion, were not extortionary pay- ments but rather investments in particular projects. Ef®ciency requiresthat the partnersof joint venturesshareboth in the venture's decision-making and in its residual. Speci®cally, when the contributorsto a project have voteson itsmanagement propor- tional to their (marginal) contributions(taxeshere) and to their share in the reward, the expected net income from the project is maximized. The collaboration, then, isexpected to increasethe size of the pie to be divided between the ruler and his voting subjects. The formation of voting institutions is an unintended consequence of the collaboration. The agreementsbetween rulersand subjectsare enforced by long- term relations.3 Enforcement isespecially fragile in the formative stages of the voting institutions. In Barzel (2000) and Barzel and Kiser (1997), we single out three factors that reduce the value of voting institutions and cause their decline: (1) exogenous shocks, (2) increases in the heterogeneity of voters' interests in state projects (see also Hoffman and Norberg 1994: 310), and (3) increases in the insecurity of rulers. The ®rst two factors did not change signi®cantly in France relative to England during the study period. The third factor, however, is useful for us because it changed in France much more than in England and it affordsusthe opportunity to test the main propositions of this article. In sharp contrast to our approach, most explanations of the emer- gence of medieval voting institutions are based on a zero- or nega- tive-sum game. They assert that initially the rulers were able to impose taxes arbitrarily (Poggi 1978; Tilly 1990; Olson 1993). As the nobility and other groupsgained more power, they forced the king to transfer voting rights to them and to reduce their tax 476 RATIONALITY AND SOCIETY 14(4) burden. These writers also contend that both voting rights and tax paymentsre¯ect only the relative power of rulersand subjects(e.g. Tilly 1990: 64). They argue that assubjectsbecame more powerful they got voting rightsand were able to avoid paying taxes,while those becoming weaker were forced to pay taxes and were excluded from voting. For example, Poggi (1978: 36±42, 60±61) states that the development of medieval representative assemblies is caused by the increasing power of towns, and that their decline, and the resulting disjunction between tax payments and voting rights, is due to the increasing power of rulers. Viewing all taxesasthe consequenceof only relative power cannot account for the actual relationships between taxation and voting rightsin the medieval period (Hoffman and Norberg 1994). We agree that in the Middle Ages, as is the case in general, relative power determined the (initial) distribution of wealth and the cor- responding tax burden. Rulers' attempts to impose new taxes, however, required consent. Moreover, the rich and powerful sub- jects who voted for taxes imposed them almost exclusively on them- selves rather than on poor and powerless subjects who lacked voting rights. Our argument that in the medieval era rulersand subjectsmade certain agreements that set the relationships between taxes, voting, and state projects is illustrated in medieval maxims that sound like platitudesbut in fact re¯ect the agreed-upon behavior. One maxim regarding the relationship between the state and its subjects was that `what touchesall should be approved by all' (Strayer 1971). It wascommon to feudal law, customary law, and revived Roman Law in medieval Europe. We suggest that this maxim re¯ected real practicesand wasnot an empty exhortation. A ruler who sought an extraordinary service or payment for a project he pro- posed had to ask for the approval of those affected by it. This maxim indicatesa mode of behavior that correspondstoour basic premise: all asked to pay new taxes (i.e. beyond the initial customary payments) should have a say on it. One way of having a say is through voting rights. This maxim also implies that when the origi- nal `customary' taxes were set the ruler securely committed not to increase them or raise new ones without the consent of all taxpayers. Another maxim, one whose implementation would af®rm the previous one, was `when the cause ceases, the effect also ceases'. Tax payments in medieval Europe were linked to speci®c projects. The particular project is the `cause' for which a tax was requested, KISER & BARZEL: TAXATION AND VOTING RIGHTS 477 most often a looming war, and the `effect' was the tax collected for the project. If the war did not materialize, the investment shares were expected to be returned, and, in fact, they usually were (Brown 1972).
Load more

Recommended publications
  • Accounts of the Constables of Bristol Castle
    BRISTOL RECORD SOCIETY'S PUBLICATIONS General Editor: PROFESSOR PATRICK MCGRATH, M.A., Assistant General Editor: MISS ELIZABETH RALPH, M .A., F.S.A. VOL. XXXIV ACCOUNTS OF THE CONSTABLES OF BRISTOL CASTLE IN 1HE THIRTEENTH AND EARLY FOURTEENTH CENTURIES ACCOUNTS OF THE CONSTABLES OF BRISTOL CASTLE IN THE THIR1EENTH AND EARLY FOUR1EENTH CENTURIES EDITED BY MARGARET SHARP Printed for the BRISTOL RECORD SOCIETY 1982 ISSN 0305-8730 © Margaret Sharp Produced for the Society by A1an Sutton Publishing Limited, Gloucester Printed in Great Britain by Redwood Burn Limited Trowbridge CONTENTS Page Abbreviations VI Preface XI Introduction Xlll Pandulf- 1221-24 1 Ralph de Wiliton - 1224-25 5 Burgesses of Bristol - 1224-25 8 Peter de la Mare - 1282-84 10 Peter de la Mare - 1289-91 22 Nicholas Fermbaud - 1294-96 28 Nicholas Fermbaud- 1300-1303 47 Appendix 1 - Lists of Lords of Castle 69 Appendix 2 - Lists of Constables 77 Appendix 3 - Dating 94 Bibliography 97 Index 111 ABBREVIATIONS Abbrev. Plac. Placitorum in domo Capitulari Westmon­ asteriensi asservatorum abbrevatio ... Ed. W. Dlingworth. Rec. Comm. London, 1811. Ann. Mon. Annales monastici Ed. H.R. Luard. 5v. (R S xxxvi) London, 1864-69. BBC British Borough Charters, 1216-1307. Ed. A. Ballard and J. Tait. 3v. Cambridge 1913-43. BOAS Bristol and Gloucestershire Archaeological Society Transactions (Author's name and the volume number quoted. Full details in bibliography). BIHR Bulletin of the Institute of Historical Research. BM British Museum - Now British Library. Book of Fees Liber Feodorum: the Book of Fees com­ monly called Testa de Nevill 3v. HMSO 1920-31. Book of Seals Sir Christopher Hatton's Book of Seals Ed.
    [Show full text]
  • King John's Tax Innovation -- Extortion, Resistance, and the Establishment of the Principle of Taxation by Consent Jane Frecknall Hughes
    View metadata, citation and similar papers at core.ac.uk brought to you by CORE provided by eGrove (Univ. of Mississippi) Accounting Historians Journal Volume 34 Article 4 Issue 2 December 2007 2007 King John's tax innovation -- Extortion, resistance, and the establishment of the principle of taxation by consent Jane Frecknall Hughes Lynne Oats Follow this and additional works at: https://egrove.olemiss.edu/aah_journal Part of the Accounting Commons, and the Taxation Commons Recommended Citation Hughes, Jane Frecknall and Oats, Lynne (2007) "King John's tax innovation -- Extortion, resistance, and the establishment of the principle of taxation by consent," Accounting Historians Journal: Vol. 34 : Iss. 2 , Article 4. Available at: https://egrove.olemiss.edu/aah_journal/vol34/iss2/4 This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the Archival Digital Accounting Collection at eGrove. It has been accepted for inclusion in Accounting Historians Journal by an authorized editor of eGrove. For more information, please contact [email protected]. Hughes and Oats: King John's tax innovation -- Extortion, resistance, and the establishment of the principle of taxation by consent Accounting Historians Journal Vol. 34 No. 2 December 2007 pp. 75-107 Jane Frecknall Hughes SHEFFIELD UNIVERSITY MANAGEMENT SCHOOL and Lynne Oats UNIVERSITY OF WARWICK KING JOHN’S TAX INNOVATIONS – EXTORTION, RESISTANCE, AND THE ESTABLISHMENT OF THE PRINCIPLE OF TAXATION BY CONSENT Abstract: The purpose of this paper is to present a re-evaluation of the reign of England’s King John (1199–1216) from a fiscal perspective. The paper seeks to explain John’s innovations in terms of widening the scope and severity of tax assessment and revenue collection.
    [Show full text]
  • Gunpowder Empires
    Gunpowder Empires James Gelvin “Modern Middle East” Part 1 - Chapter 2 expanded lecture notes by Denis Bašić Gunpowder Empires • These empires established strong centralized control through employing the military potential of gunpowder (naval and land-based siege cannons were particularly important). • The major states of the Western Hemisphere were destroyed by European gunpowder empires while throughout the Eastern Hemisphere, regional empires developed on the basis of military power and new centralized administrations. • The world gunpowder empires were : the Ottoman, Safavid, Moghul, Habsburg, Russian, Chinese, and Japanese. • Emperor vs. King Military Patronage State • brought to the Middle East by Turkic and Mongolian rulers • Their three main characteristics are : • they were essentially military • all economic resources belonged to the chief military family or families • their laws combined dynastic laws, local laws, and Islamic law (shari’a) Ottoman Empire - 1st Islamic gunpowder empire • The Ottoman Empire was the first of the three Islamic empires to harness gunpowder. • Most probably the Ottomans learned of gunpowder weapons from renegade Christians and used it to devastating effects in the Battle of Kosovo in 1389. • The Ottomans used the largest cannons of the time to destroy the walls and conquer Constantinople in 1453. They conquered Constantinople the same year when the Hundred Years’ (116-year) War in Europe ended. The Siege of Constantinople (painted 1499) Sultan Mehmed II (1432-1481) on the road to the siege of Constantinople painter : Fausto Zonaro (1854-1929) The Great Ottoman Bombard Prior to the siege of Constantinople it is known that the Ottomans held the ability to cast medium-sized cannon, yet nothing near the range of some pieces they were able to put to field.
    [Show full text]
  • The Inward Investment and International Taxation Review
    The Inward Investment and International Taxation Review Third Edition Editor Tim Sanders Law Business Research The Inward Investment and International Taxation Review THIRD EDITION Reproduced with permission from Law Business Research Ltd. This article was first published in The Inward Investment and International Taxation Review, 3rd edition (published in January 2013 – editor Tim Sanders). For further information please email [email protected] The Inward Investment and International Taxation Review THIRD EDITION Editor Tim Sanders Law Business Research Ltd The Law Reviews THE MERGERS AND ACQUISITIONS REVIEW THE RESTRUCTURING REVIEW THE PRIVatE COMPETITION ENFORCEMENT REVIEW THE DISPUTE RESOLUTION REVIEW THE EMPLOYMENT LAW REVIEW THE PUBLIC COMPETITION ENFORCEMENT REVIEW THE BANKING REGUlatION REVIEW THE INTERNatIONAL ARBITRatION REVIEW THE MERGER CONTROL REVIEW THE TECHNOLOGY, MEDIA AND TELECOMMUNICatIONS REVIEW THE INWARD INVESTMENT AND INTERNatIONAL TAXatION REVIEW THE CORPORatE GOVERNANCE REVIEW THE CORPORatE IMMIGRatION REVIEW THE INTERNatIONAL INVESTIGatIONS REVIEW THE PROJECts AND CONSTRUCTION REVIEW THE INTERNatIONAL CAPItal MARKEts REVIEW THE REAL EstatE LAW REVIEW THE PRIVatE EQUITY REVIEW THE ENERGY REGUlatION AND MARKEts REVIEW THE INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY REVIEW THE ASSET MANAGEMENT REVIEW THE PRIVATE WEALTH AND PRIVATE CLIENT REVIEW THE MINING laW REVIEW THE ANTi-BriBERY AND ANTi-CORRUPTION REVIEW THE EXECUTIVE REMUNERatION REVIEW www.TheLawReviews.co.uk Contents PUBLISHER Gideon Roberton BUSINESS DEVELOPMENT MANAGERS Adam Sargent, Nick Barette MARKETING MANAGER Katherine Jablonowska PUBLISHING ASSISTANT Lucy Brewer PRODUCTION CO-ORDINatOR Lydia Gerges HEAD OF EDITORIAL PRODUCTION Adam Myers PRODUCTION EDITOR Anne Borthwick SUBEDITOR Caroline Rawson EDITor-in-CHIEF Callum Campbell MANAGING DIRECTOR Richard Davey Published in the United Kingdom by Law Business Research Ltd, London 87 Lancaster Road, London, W11 1QQ, UK © 2013 Law Business Research Ltd No photocopying: copyright licences do not apply.
    [Show full text]
  • This Electronic Thesis Or Dissertation Has Been Downloaded from the King’S Research Portal At
    This electronic thesis or dissertation has been downloaded from the King’s Research Portal at https://kclpure.kcl.ac.uk/portal/ The Honour of Wallingford, 1066-1300 Tilley, Christopher Awarding institution: King's College London The copyright of this thesis rests with the author and no quotation from it or information derived from it may be published without proper acknowledgement. END USER LICENCE AGREEMENT Unless another licence is stated on the immediately following page this work is licensed under a Creative Commons Attribution-NonCommercial-NoDerivatives 4.0 International licence. https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/4.0/ You are free to copy, distribute and transmit the work Under the following conditions: Attribution: You must attribute the work in the manner specified by the author (but not in any way that suggests that they endorse you or your use of the work). Non Commercial: You may not use this work for commercial purposes. No Derivative Works - You may not alter, transform, or build upon this work. Any of these conditions can be waived if you receive permission from the author. Your fair dealings and other rights are in no way affected by the above. Take down policy If you believe that this document breaches copyright please contact [email protected] providing details, and we will remove access to the work immediately and investigate your claim. Download date: 25. Sep. 2021 This electronic theses or dissertation has been downloaded from the King’s Research Portal at https://kclpure.kcl.ac.uk/portal/ The Honour of Wallingford, 1066-1300 Title: Author: Christopher Tilley The copyright of this thesis rests with the author and no quotation from it or information derived from it may be published without proper acknowledgement.
    [Show full text]
  • The Medieval English Borough
    THE MEDIEVAL ENGLISH BOROUGH STUDIES ON ITS ORIGINS AND CONSTITUTIONAL HISTORY BY JAMES TAIT, D.LITT., LITT.D., F.B.A. Honorary Professor of the University MANCHESTER UNIVERSITY PRESS 0 1936 MANCHESTER UNIVERSITY PRESS Published by the University of Manchester at THEUNIVERSITY PRESS 3 16-324 Oxford Road, Manchester 13 PREFACE its sub-title indicates, this book makes no claim to be the long overdue history of the English borough in the Middle Ages. Just over a hundred years ago Mr. Serjeant Mere- wether and Mr. Stephens had The History of the Boroughs Municipal Corporations of the United Kingdom, in three volumes, ready to celebrate the sweeping away of the medieval system by the Municipal Corporation Act of 1835. It was hardly to be expected, however, that this feat of bookmaking, good as it was for its time, would prove definitive. It may seem more surprising that the centenary of that great change finds the gap still unfilled. For half a century Merewether and Stephens' work, sharing, as it did, the current exaggera- tion of early "democracy" in England, stood in the way. Such revision as was attempted followed a false trail and it was not until, in the last decade or so of the century, the researches of Gross, Maitland, Mary Bateson and others threw a fiood of new light upon early urban development in this country, that a fair prospect of a more adequate history of the English borough came in sight. Unfortunately, these hopes were indefinitely deferred by the early death of nearly all the leaders in these investigations.
    [Show full text]
  • The Saladin Tithe
    1916 THE ABBEY OF ST. RIQUIER 447 quidam nobilis, natione Britto ',M puts his identity with the earl of Norfolk out of doubt, whilst reviving the problem of his birth. It is probable, however, that he is imputing Breton birth to Ralph the Staller on the strength of the lands in Brittany (Gael and Montfort) which his Breton wife brought him, and we need not reject the statement of the Anglo-Saxon Chronicle that Downloaded from https://academic.oup.com/ehr/article/XXXI/CXXIII/447/363122 by guest on 30 September 2021 he wae an Englishman born in Norfolk.38 The charter also goes to show that Ralph the Staller was alive in February 1068, and hence to help in fixing the date of his death, which, according to Mr. Round,37 must have occurred before April 1Q70. On "the other hand, the charter raises the question why an Englishman holding lands in Brittany should confer gifts on an abbey of Ponthieu. Stapleton M provides the connecting link by supposing that Ralph the Staller, like Frederick the lord of Palgrave, was a Fleming by birth, but he gives no evidence in support of his conjecture beyond that which has been already considered, and there Beems no reason to accept the suggestion. HELEN M. CAM. The Saladin Tithe ALTHOUGH Sir James Ramsay has made a special study of the financial side of our twelfth-century history, from the Pipe Rolls and all available sources, he has to write : It would have been interesting to know what the proceeds of the Saladin tithe came to ; but no accounts of the yield seem to be forthcoming.1 The other modern historians of the period seem to be equally at a loss, though Mr.
    [Show full text]
  • Zbwleibniz-Informationszentrum
    A Service of Leibniz-Informationszentrum econstor Wirtschaft Leibniz Information Centre Make Your Publications Visible. zbw for Economics Herlin-Giret, Camille Article Avoiding and protesting taxes: Wealthy people and tax consent economic sociology_the european electronic newsletter Provided in Cooperation with: Max Planck Institute for the Study of Societies (MPIfG), Cologne Suggested Citation: Herlin-Giret, Camille (2017) : Avoiding and protesting taxes: Wealthy people and tax consent, economic sociology_the european electronic newsletter, ISSN 1871-3351, Max Planck Institute for the Study of Societies (MPIfG), Cologne, Vol. 19, Iss. 1, pp. 29-37 This Version is available at: http://hdl.handle.net/10419/175569 Standard-Nutzungsbedingungen: Terms of use: Die Dokumente auf EconStor dürfen zu eigenen wissenschaftlichen Documents in EconStor may be saved and copied for your Zwecken und zum Privatgebrauch gespeichert und kopiert werden. personal and scholarly purposes. Sie dürfen die Dokumente nicht für öffentliche oder kommerzielle You are not to copy documents for public or commercial Zwecke vervielfältigen, öffentlich ausstellen, öffentlich zugänglich purposes, to exhibit the documents publicly, to make them machen, vertreiben oder anderweitig nutzen. publicly available on the internet, or to distribute or otherwise use the documents in public. Sofern die Verfasser die Dokumente unter Open-Content-Lizenzen (insbesondere CC-Lizenzen) zur Verfügung gestellt haben sollten, If the documents have been made available under an Open gelten abweichend von diesen Nutzungsbedingungen die in der dort Content Licence (especially Creative Commons Licences), you genannten Lizenz gewährten Nutzungsrechte. may exercise further usage rights as specified in the indicated licence. www.econstor.eu 29 wealthy people, little is known about it except for what we find in a few book-length studies.
    [Show full text]
  • Domesday Book and Beyond: Three Essays in the Early History of England Frederic William Maitland
    Domesday Book and Beyond: Three Essays in the Early History of England Frederic William Maitland Essay One Domesday Book At midwinter in the year 1085 William the Conqueror wore his crown at Gloucester and there he had deep speech with his wise men. The outcome of that speech was the mission throughout all England of 'barons,' 'legates' or 'justices' charged with the duty of collecting from the verdicts of the shires, the hundreds and the vills a descriptio of his new realm. The outcome of that mission was the descriptio preserved for us in two manuscript volumes, which within a century after their making had already acquired the name of Domesday Book. The second of those volumes, sometimes known as Little Domesday, deals with but three counties, namely Essex, Norfolk and Suffolk, while the first volume comprehends the rest of England. Along with these we must place certain other documents that are closely connected with the grand inquest. We have in the so-called Inquisitio Comitatus Cantabrigiae, a copy, an imperfect copy, of the verdicts delivered by the Cambridgeshire jurors, and this, as we shall hereafter see, is a document of the highest value, even though in some details it is not always very trustworthy.(1*) We have in the so-called Inquisitio Eliensis an account of the estates of the Abbey of Ely in Cambridgeshire, Suffolk and other counties, an account which has as its ultimate source the verdicts of the juries and which contains some particulars which were omitted from Domesday Book.(2*) We have in the so-called Exon Domesday
    [Show full text]
  • Matthew Paris's Chronica Majora and Allegations Of
    2018 HAWAII UNIVERSITY INTERNATIONAL CONFERENCES ARTS, HUMANITIES, SOCIAL SCIENCES & EDUCATION JANUARY 3 - 6, 2018 PRINCE WAIKIKI HOTEL, HONOLULU, HAWAII MATTHEW PARIS’S CHRONICA MAJORA AND ALLEGATIONS OF JEWISH RITUAL MURDER MEIER, DAVID DEPARTMENT OF SOCIAL SCIENCES DICKINSON STATE UNIVERSITY DICKINSON, NORTH DAKOTA Dr. David Meier Department of Social Sciences Dickinson State University Dickinson, North Dakota Matthew Paris’s Chronica Majora and Allegations of Jewish Ritual Murder Synopsis: Robert Nisbet recognized Matthew Paris as “admittedly one of the greatest historians, if not the greatest in his day.” Matthew provided “the most detailed record of events unparalleled in English medieval history” from 1236-1259. Within the chronicle, allegations of Jewish ritual murder rested alongside classical sources in various languages, including Greek, Latin, Arabic, and Hebrew. Matthew Paris’s Chronica Majora and Allegations of Jewish Ritual Murder David A. Meier, Dickinson State University Allegations of Jewish ritual murder in medieval European chronicles rested alongside classical sources in various languages, including Greek, Latin, Arabic, and Hebrew. Hartmann Schedel’s Weltchronik 1493 (2001) depicted Simon of Trent’s alleged murder by the local Jewish community in 1475 in a manner that mirrored alleged Jewish ritual murders in England in 1144 and 1255.1 Between 1144 and 1493, allegations of Jewish ritual murder spread and flourished. Matthew Paris’s Chronica Majora emerged at historical crossroads where allegations of Jewish ritual murder spread beyond England and into continental Europe. Before the century finished in 1290, England had expelled its Jewish population inspiring many regions on the continent to follow suit in the coming years.2 In offering a written record, chroniclers bridged narrative history from ancient times (largely Biblical) with contemporary culture, history, society, politics and nascent legal systems, employed, in turn, by both church and state in the High Middle Ages.
    [Show full text]
  • The Salisbury Oath: Its Feudal Implications
    Loyola University Chicago Loyola eCommons Master's Theses Theses and Dissertations 1943 The Salisbury Oath: Its Feudal Implications Harry Timothy Birney Loyola University Chicago Follow this and additional works at: https://ecommons.luc.edu/luc_theses Part of the History Commons Recommended Citation Birney, Harry Timothy, "The Salisbury Oath: Its Feudal Implications" (1943). Master's Theses. 53. https://ecommons.luc.edu/luc_theses/53 This Thesis is brought to you for free and open access by the Theses and Dissertations at Loyola eCommons. It has been accepted for inclusion in Master's Theses by an authorized administrator of Loyola eCommons. For more information, please contact [email protected]. This work is licensed under a Creative Commons Attribution-Noncommercial-No Derivative Works 3.0 License. Copyright © 1943 Harry Timothy Birney THE SALISBURY OATH - ITS FEUDAL IMPLICATIONS by HARRY TIMOTHY BIRNEY, S.J., A.B. A THESIS SUBMITTED IN PARTIAL FULFILLMENT OF THE REQUIREMENTS FOR THE DEGREE OF MASTER OF ARTS IN LOYOLA UNIVERSITY J~e 1943 TABLE OF CONTENTS INTRODUCTION • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • 1 CHAPTER I FEUDALI SM - IN THEORY • • • • • • • • • • • 3 II FEUDALISTIC TENDENCIES IN ENGLAND BEFORE 1066 ••••••••••••••••••••• 22 III NORMAN FEUDALISM BEFORE 1066 • • • • 44 IV ANGLO - NORMAN FEUDALISM PRECEDING THE OATH OF SALISBURy........... 62 V THE SALISBURY OATH • • • • • • • • • • • • • • 81 CONCLUSION • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • 94 BIBLIOGRAPHY • • • •
    [Show full text]
  • How Taxation Can Increase Inequality
    11. FRANCE: HOW TAXATION CAN INCREASE INEQUALITY Nicolas Frémeaux and Thomas Piketty Abstract The evolution of inequality in France is specific compared with most OECD countries. Inequality only started to rise at the end of the 1990s after a period of decline during the 1970s and the 1980. This late increase partly explains the limited effects of inequality on social, political and cultural outcomes. However, social gradients like income or education play a considerable role for fields such as health, housing, political participation or trust in institutions. France is also particular with regard to the role of taxation. This chapter provides evidence about the absence of progressivity in the tax system. We conclude that the reforms implemented during the past decade have contributed to the increase in income inequality. 1 Introduction In this chapter, we describe the evolution of inequality in France and its impact on social, political and cultural outcomes. Three points make France distinctive with respect to other rich countries. First, the increase in inequalities in France occurred later than in many countries. More specifically, income inequality declined during the 1980s. Then, inequality started to rise at the end of the 1990s and this offset the decrease observed at the beginning of the period. Second, this difference in terms of timing also influences the study of its effects since it may take time for changing inequalities to lead to social, political or cultural impacts. Third, the role of taxation is rather specific in France. The absence of progressivity in the tax system has contributed to the recent increase in income inequality.
    [Show full text]