Developing Innovative Geospatial Tools for Land Rights Mapping
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RNI: DELENG/2005/15153 No: DL(E)-01/5079/17-19 Publication: 15th of every month Licensed to post without pre-payment U(E) 28/2017-19 Posting: 19th/20th of every month at NDPSO Rs.150 ISSN 0973-2136 Volume XIV, Issue 11, November 2018 THE MONTHLY MAGAZINE ON POSITIONING, NAVIGATION AND BEYOND Developing innovative geospatial tools for land rights mapping GNSS authenticity verification in covered spoofing attack COLOPHON AND CONTENTS Authentic 2 1.5 PRN4 PRN11 1 PRN14 0.5 PRN18 PRN19 0 PRN22 PRN31 -0.5 PRN32 -1 Relative phase (radian) -1.5 -2 -2.5 0 10 20 30 40 50 60 Time (s) In this issue Coordinates Volume 14, Issue 11, November 2018 Articles GNSS authenticity verification in covered spoofing attack using antenna arrayA LI BROUMANDAN AND JAMES T CURRAN 6 Segmentation of 3D photogrammetric point cloud E OZDEMIR AND F REMONDINO 13 Deformation analisys of modern crustal strain NIKOLAY DIMITROV 20 Its4land - Developing innovative geospatial tools for fit-for-purpose land rights mappingM ILA KOEVA, SOPHIE CROMMELINCK, CLAUDIA STÖCKER, JOEP CROMPVOETS, SERENE HO, INE BUNTINX, ANGELA SCHWERING, MALUMBO CHIPOFYA, SAHIB JAN, TAREK ZEIN, CHRISTIAN TIMM, KASPAR KUNDERT, PLacIDE NKERabIGWI, BERHANU ALEMIE AND ROBERT WAYUMba 31 Columns My Coordinates EDITORIAL 4 Old Coordinates 22 News IMAGING 39 LBS & AUTONOMOUS DRIVING 40 GNSS 42 GIS 44 UAV 46 INDUSTRY 47 GALILEO UPDatE 48 Mark your calendar JANUARY 2019 TO OctOBER 2019 50 This issue has been made possible by the support and good wishes of the following individuals and companies Ali Broumandan, Angela Schwering, Berhanu Alemie, Claudia Stöcker, Christian Timm, E Ozdemir, F Remondino, James T Curran, Ine Buntinx, Joep Crompvoets, Kaspar Kundert, Malumbo Chipofya, Mila Koeva, Nikolay Dimitrov, Placide Nkerabigwi, Sahib Jan, Serene Ho, Sophie Crommelinck, Robert Wayumba and Tarek Zein and; EOS Positioning, Javad, Labsat, MicroSurvey, Pentax, SBG System, and many others Mailing Address Coordinates is an initiative of CMPL that aims to broaden the Printed and published by Sanjay Malaviya on behalf of A 002, Mansara Apartments scope of positioning, navigation and related technologies. Coordinates Media Pvt Ltd C 9, Vasundhara Enclave CMPL does not neccesarily subscribe to the views expressed Published at A 002 Mansara Apartments, Vasundhara Delhi 110 096, India. by the authors in this magazine and may not be held liable for Enclave, Delhi 110096, India. Phones +91 11 42153861, 98102 33422, 98107 24567 any losses caused directly or indirectly due to the information Printed at Thomson Press (India) Ltd, Mathura Road, provided herein. © CMPL, 2018. Reprinting with permission is Faridabad, India Email encouraged; contact the editor for details. [information] [email protected] Editor Bal Krishna [editorial] [email protected] Annual subscription (12 issues) Owner Coordinates Media Pvt Ltd (CMPL) [advertising] [email protected] [India] Rs.1,800 [Overseas] US$100 [subscriptions] [email protected] Web www.mycoordinates.org This issue of Coordinates is of 52 pages, including cover. 4 | Coordinates November 2018 MYCOORDINATES Let's map together! Mapping millions of land rights That remains unrecorded in East Africa Poses major challenge. Its4land, a European Commission Horizon 2020 project Aims to develop tools With a multi-disciplinary approach in diverse cultural set-ups Utilizing latest technologies Like smart sketch maps, UAVs, automated feature extraction Those are innovative, scalable and transferable. However, the key spirit is collaboration. Collaboration for a cause, For a purpose (read page 31). Let’s Map together! Bal Krishna, Editor [email protected] ADVISORS Naser El-Sheimy PEng, CRC Professor, Department of Geomatics Engineering, The University of Calgary Canada, George Cho Professor in GIS and the Law, University of Canberra, Australia, Professor Abbas Rajabifard Director, Centre for SDI and Land Administration, University of Melbourne, Australia, Luiz Paulo Souto Fortes PhD Associate Professor, University of State of Rio Janeiro (UERJ), Brazil, John Hannah Professor, School of Surveying, University of Otago, New Zealand Coordinates November 2018 | 5 GNSS GNSS authenticity verification in covered spoofing attack using antenna array A covered spoofing scenario is considered in this research where the reception of the authentic signals are blocked and the receiver antenna only receives counterfeit signals Ali Broumandan ue to rapidly increasing applications of which may be caused by the presence of Senior Research Associate, DGNSS dependent systems, motivation both genuine and counterfeit signals [14- PLAN group, University has increased to spoof these signals for 15]. The interaction between authentic of Calgary, Canada illegal or concealed transportation and to and counterfeit signals causes distortion mislead receiver timing used by critical on the shape of the correlation function. infrastructure. Detection and mitigation Signal Quality Monitoring (SQM) tests of spoofing attacks on GNSS receivers focus on this feature in order to detect has become an important research topic any asymmetry and/or abnormally sharp James T Curran [1-5]. Spoofing countermeasure methods or elevated correlation peaks due to the Radionavigation Engineer, analyse specific features of the counterfeit presence of undesired signals [15]. European Space Agency, signals which may enable a receiver to ESTEC , The Netherlands distinguish them from authentic signals. It is important to note that these methods make the ctitical assumption that both The spoofing detection techniques authentic and spoofing signals are present implemented at the pre-despreading and and the receiver is initially tracking post-despreading signal processing layers authentic signals. Hence, in absence of of a GNSS receiver are effective and can authentic signals, when only counterfeit detect spoofing attacks in presence of signals are received, these two assumptions authentic signals [6-11]. Pre-despreading are invalidated, and so these methods metrics have been employed to detect the may no longer work. This may occur, presence of excessive amount of power for example, when the GNSS antenna is in GNSS bands [12-13] and [16]. The covered and only exposed to counterfeit received signal strength (RSS) spoofing signals, or overpower non-overlapped detection approaches generally rely on spoofing attack and the receiver is exposed the assumption that spoofing signals are to counterfeit signals during cold start. more powerful than the authentic ones and a successful spoofing attack transmits An antenna array processing is another several counterfeit GNSS-like signals. approach to detect and mitigate spoofing These methods evaluate the overall attacks [14],[17-20]. Under the assumption power of the received signal set without that all counterfeit signals are broadcast separately analyzing different signals. This from a single spoofing source, this category of spoofing detection analyse any approach takes advantage of the similarity abnormal variation in the received signal between the angle-of-arrival (AoA) of power prior to the despreading process in counterfeit signals. Algorithms applied the receiver. The power-based spoofing to the signals received using an antenna detection methods requires calibration array can classify signals according to to be performed under the non-spoofed their respective AoA and to steer a null in condition. Post-despreading methods the directions from which the counterfeit are employed to detect an abnormal signals arrive. At the pre-despreading behaviour of cross-correlation function level antenna arrays can be also used to 6 | Coordinates November 2018 extract the spatial signature of counterfeit post-despreading techniques [3]. In the Structural Power Content signals without acquiring and tracking following some of them are introduced. Analysis (SPCA) the counterfeit and authentic signals [21- 22]. The receiver structure in the antenna Pre-despreading spoofing detection SPCA takes advantage of the cyclo- array case consists of several antennas stationarity of GNSS signals in order to each connected to a separate radio Different spoofing detection methods based detect excessive amount of structured frequency down-conversion channels and on monitoring the received signal strength signal power in the received sample set digitizers in a phase coherent mode usually are discussed here. These techniques [3]. In this approach, the received IF utilizing a single reference oscillator and rely on the assumption that counterfeit samples are first filtered within the GNSS synchronized voltage controlled oscillators. signals are more powerful than the signal bandwidth and then multiplied by The antenna elements separation in authentic ones. Pre-despreading methods their one-chip delayed version in order to such cases is about half of the carrier analyse the overall power content of the remove the effect of Doppler frequency. wavelength and the antenna array is received signal set without separately The resulting signal has a line spectrum generally considered a single receiver analyzing different signals. This type of since it is generated by multiplication of unit for a specific application [23-24]. counterfeit signal detection examines cyclo-stationary signals. In the next stage, any abnormal variation in the baseband the signal and noise components are filtered The counterfeit signals sourced from signal power prior to further processing by suitably designed comb filters [3]. A a single antenna