DECEMBER 2019
Strategies for the Indo-Pacific: Perceptions of the U.S. and Like-Minded Countries
EDITED BY DR. SATORU NAGAO, VISITING FELLOW © 2019 Hudson Institute, Inc. All rights reserved.
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Cover: A combined formation of aircraft from Carrier Air Wing (CVW) 5 and Carrier Air Wing (CVW) 9 pass in formation above the Nimitz-class aircraft carrier USS John C. Stennis (CVN 74). The Nimitz- class aircraft carriers USS John C. Stennis and USS Ronald Reagan (CVN 76) are conducting dual aircraft carrier strike group operations in the U.S. 7th Fleet area of operations in support of security and stability in the Indo-Asia-Pacific. (Lt. Steve Smith/U.S. Navy via Getty Images) DECEMBER 2019
Strategies for the Indo-Pacific: Perceptions of the U.S. and Like-Minded Countries
EDITED BY DR. SATORU NAGAO, VISITING FELLOW
TABLE OF CONTENTS
Introduction 6
List of Contributors 8 U.S. 8 Regional Countries 8 Europe and Canada 9 Japan 10
I. U.S. 11 America’s Indo-Pacific Strategy by Patrick M. Cronin 11 American Sea Power in the Indo-Pacific by Bryan McGrath 19
II. Regional Countries 22 Vietnam and the U.S. Indo-Pacific Vision by Do Thanh Hai & Le Thu Ha 22 Singapore and the Indo-Pacific: The Relentless Quest for Balance by Swee Lean Collin Koh 26 A Quest for Strategic Centrality: The Sino-American Rivalry and ASEAN in the Age of the Indo-Pacific by Richard Javad Heydarian 29 Australia’s View of the Free & Open Indo-Pacific by John Lee 36 India-U.S. Relations in the Shadow of the Indo-Pacific by Aparna Pande 41 China’s Growing Influence in the Indian Ocean: Implications for Sri Lanka and its Regional Allies by Asanga Abeyagoonasekera 48
III. Europe and Canada 52 Britain and the Indo-Pacific by John Hemmings 52 France, a Power in the Indian Ocean by Jonas Parello-Plesner 56 Getting the Balance Right: Managing EU Relations with the U.S. and China by Liselotte Odgaard 57 Coming in from the Cold? Canada’s Indo-Pacific Possibilities & Conundrum by Stephen R. Nagy 60
IV. Japan 68 Implications of U.S.-China Tensions in The Indo-Pacific: Japan’s View by Yoji Koda 68 Does the Indian Ocean Matter for U.S.-Japan Relations? by Satoru Nagao 73 An Analysis of Japan’s Military Operations in the Indian Ocean by Satoru Nagao 80
Policy Recommendations 85
Endnotes 88
STRATEGIES FOR THE INDO-PACIFIC: PERCEPTIONS OF THE U.S. AND LIKE-MINDED COUNTRIES INTRODUCTION
The rise of China and its attitude towards the world forces the countries. During the U.S.-Soviet Cold War, the winning side United States to address the challenges posed by China’s had 54 countries, but the defeated comprised 26 countries. ambitions. As a result, the United States has clearly identified These facts indicate that the number of supporters correlates to China as a competitor; the latest National Security Strategy, the likelihood of winning the competition. released in December 2017, states that “China and Russia challenge American power.”1 That same year, Vice President In the case of the current U.S.-China competition, the U.S. has Mike Pence spoke at the Hudson Institute and said “Beijing is many formal allies including NATO, Central and South American employing a whole-of-government approach, using political, countries, Israel, Australia, New Zealand, Thailand, the economic, and military tools, as well as propaganda, to advance Philippines, Taiwan, South Korea, and Japan (52 in total), but its influence and benefit its interests in the United States.”2 China’s only formal ally is North Korea.3 Beyond formal allies, Now, U.S.-China competition is escalating, especially so since the U.S.’s circle of like-minded relations expands to include January 2018, when the U.S.-China “trade war” began. The countries like the UAE, Saudi Arabia, India, Vietnam, Singapore, United States needs to win the competition to protect the U.S.- Indonesia, and others. led rules-based order. In June 2019, the U.S. Defense Department published its Indo- Given the United States’ need to win the competition, Pacific Strategy Report.4 In this document, the U.S. expresses cooperation with allies and like-minded countries is key because its perception of which countries are allies and like-minded historically, the number of political partners has been a decisive partners in the Indo-Pacific region and explicitly names those factor in geopolitical struggles. For example, in World War I, the countries. Though Pakistan and Myanmar are cooperating with winning side comprised of 32 countries, but the losing side was China, the three are not formal allies. And currently, Myanmar composed of just 4 countries. In World War II, the winning side is rethinking its relationship with China. Presently, China has had 54 countries, but the losing alliance consisted of only 8 started many infrastructure projects under the Belt and Road Initiative, which have saddled countries accepting Chinese aid and investment with enormous debt. China then leverages this Figure 1: Military Success in Relation debt and makes those countries support pro-China policies. As to Alliance Size a result, when Sri Lanka turned away from its pro-China policy, China demanded payment of the debt and has taken control of The Number of Countries Sri Lanka’s Hambantota Port for 99 years. 60 50 Therefore, maintaining and improving collaboration with its 40 allies and like-minded countries in the Indo-Pacific will be key 30 for the U.S. However, when many countries try to cooperate, 20 challenges arise due to varying perceptions about capabilities, 10 strategies, and interests. It is of increasing importance to identify 0 and understand the perceptions of those cooperating in this WWI WWII The Cold region because the current security arrangement may not be War sufficient to address the challenges ahead. This report includes Source: Author the views of scholars studying the United States, Vietnam,
6 | HUDSON INSTITUTE Singapore, ASEAN, Australia, India, Sri Lanka, U.K., France, Vice President, Lewis Libby; Director of Studies, Joel Scanlon; EU, Canada and Japan. Even if what I can do is very limited, Director of Operations, Nick Mackey; Publications Director, I am hopeful that this report will promote understanding and Carolyn Stewart; Manager of Grants and Projects, Victoria contribute to the victory of the United States, its allies, and other Miller; and Hudson Institute intern, Riho Aizawa. Without like-minded countries. their efforts, it would have been impossible for me to publish this report. Finally, I would also like express my thanks for all the advice and support I received from the experts and staff at the Hudson Dr. Satoru Nagao Institute and the Japan Foundation, especially all contributors; Visiting Fellow President of the Hudson Institute, Dr. Ken Weinstein; Senior Hudson Institute
STRATEGIES FOR THE INDO-PACIFIC: PERCEPTIONS OF THE U.S. AND LIKE-MINDED COUNTRIES LIST OF CONTRIBUTORS
U.S. Richard Heydarian is currently a visiting fellow at National Patrick M. Cronin is the Asia-Pacific security chair at the Chengchi University, and formerly served as assistant professor Hudson Institute. Dr. Cronin has served as the senior director in political science at De La Salle University. He has written for of the Institute of National Strategic Studies, director of studies The New York Times, Washington Post, The Guardian, Foreign at the International Institute for Strategic Studies, senior vice Affairs, and is a regular contributor to Aljazeera English, Nikkei president and director of research at the Center for Strategic Asian Review, South China Morning Post, and The Straits Times. and International Studies, and senior director for Asia-Pacific He is the author of, among other books, The Rise of Duterte: A Affairs at the Center for a New American Security. He also served Populist Revolt against Elite Democracy (Palgrave Macmillan, as the third-ranking official at the U.S. Agency for International 2017) and The Indo-Pacific: Trump, China, and the New Development in the George W. Bush administration. Struggle for Global Mastery (Palgrave Macmillan, 2019). He has advised Philippine presidential candidates, presidential cabinet Bryan McGrath is the managing director of The FerryBridge members, senators, and the Armed Forces of the Philippines, Group LLC, a national security consultancy. He is a retired U.S. and is also a television host on GMA Network in the Philippines. Navy destroyer captain and the former deputy director of the Hudson Institute Center for American Seapower. He earned John Lee is a Senior Fellow at the Hudson Institute. He is also a B.A. from the University of Virginia and an M.A. from The a non-resident senior fellow at the United States Studies Centre Catholic University of America. and adjunct professor at the University of Sydney. From 2016 to 2018, he was senior national security adviser to Australian Regional Countries Foreign Minister Julie Bishop. In this role, he served as the Do Thanh Hai is the assistant director general and senior fellow principal adviser on Asia for economic, strategic, and political at the Diplomatic Academy of Vietnam. He obtained his doctorate affairs in the Indo-Pacific region. Lee was also appointed the from the Australian National University and his master’s degree Foreign Minister’s lead adviser on the 2017 Foreign Policy from Erasmus Mundus Global Studies Program. He is the author White Paper, the first comprehensive foreign affairs blueprint of the book Vietnam and the South China Sea: Politics, Security for Australia since 2003, which was written to guide Australia’s and Legality, published by Routledge in 2017. external engagement for the next ten years and beyond. He received his masters and doctorate in international relations Le Thu Ha is a research fellow at the Bien Dong Institute for from the University of Oxford and his bachelors of laws and arts Maritime Studies, Diplomatic Academy of Vietnam. She holds an (1st Class, Philosophy) from the University of New South Wales. M.A. from KDI School of Public Policy and Management, South Korea. Her research focuses on U.S. policy on South China Sea Aparna Pande is the director of the Initiative on the Future policy, maritime security issues and relations among big powers. of India and South Asia at the Hudson Institute, Washington D.C. Her major field of interest is South Asia, with a special Swee Lean Collin Koh is a research fellow at the Institute of focus on the foreign and security policy of India, Pakistan, Defense and Strategic Studies which is a constituent unit of Afghanistan. Born in India, Pande received her Bachelor’s and the S. Rajaratnam School of International Studies, based at Master’s degrees in history from St. Stephens College at Delhi Nanyang Technological University, Singapore. He has research University before receiving an M. Philosophy in International interests include naval affairs in the Indo-Pacific, focusing on Relations from Jawaharlal Nehru University. She completed Southeast Asia. her Ph.D. in Political Science at Boston University in the United
8 | HUDSON INSTITUTE States. Aparna Pande’s books include From Chanakya to Committee on security trends in Asia. Hemmings regularly Modi: The Evolution of India’s Foreign Policy (Harper Collins, writes and carries out research on the Indo-Pacific, British and 2017), Explaining Pakistan’s Foreign Policy: Escaping India Japanese foreign policy, alliances, grand strategy, and 5G and (Routledge, 2010), and Contemporary Handbook on Pakistan his views have been cited in a number of media, including the (ed.) (Routledge, 2017). BBC, The Telegraph, the Guardian, the Times, CNN, and Al Jazeera. The opinions presented in his article are his own, and Asanga Abeyagoonasekera is the director general of the do not reflect those of the U.S. government. National Security Think Tank the Institute of National Security Studies Sri Lanka (INSSSL) under the Ministry of Defense. He Jonas Parello-Plesner is a non-resident senior fellow at has been a visiting professor for geopolitics (Northern Kentucky the Hudson Institute and program director at the Alliance of University), International Security (University of Colombo), and Democracies in Copenhagen with former NATO secretary international political economy (University of London RIC). His general and Danish prime minister, Anders Fogh Rasmussen. latest book, Sri Lanka at Crossroads (2019), was published by Jonas has long-standing experience in the Danish Foreign World Scientific Singapore. He has 14 years of experience in Service, providing analysis of U.S., European, and Chinese government administration, serving as the former executive strategic thinking, and served in the French Ministry of Foreign director of the think tank on Foreign Policy at the Kadirgamar Affairs while studying at the Ecole Nationale d’Administration in Institute and was the advisor to the Minister of External Affairs Paris. Parello-Plesner has also worked at the European Council from 2012-2015. He was the director general of Bandaranayake on Foreign Relations (ECFR) as a senior policy fellow with a International Diplomatic Training Institute (BIDTI), a government focus on European-Chinese relations. He served as the Danish diplomatic training institute. Asanga is an Alumnus of the U.S. Foreign Ministry’s senior advisor on China and North East State Department International Visitors Leadership Program Asia from 2005-2009. His co-authored book, China’s Strong (IVLP), National Defense University in Washington, APCSS Arm: Protecting Citizens and Assets Abroad, was published (Hawaii), and Young Global Leaders (YGL) for the World in 2015 by IISS/Routledge and launched at the annual Economic Forum. Shangri-La Dialogue in Singapore. At Hudson he published a comprehensive report that conducted broad-based tracking of Europe and Canada Chinese Communist party interference and influence in the U.S. John Hemmings is an associate professor at the Daniel K. Jonas has contributed to Wall Street Journal, Financial Times, Inouye Asia-Pacific Center for Security Studies (DKI-APCSS), Newsweek, American Interest and writes an international a U.S. Department of Defense center under INDO-PACOM and column for Danish daily Berlingske. OSD guidance, which holds courses, workshops, and strategic dialogues with military officials and security practitioners from Liselotte Odgaard is a visiting senior fellow at Hudson across the Indo-Pacific region. In addition, he is a senior Institute. Her work focuses on U.S.-China-Europe relations. associate fellow at the Henry Jackson Society in London, Odgaard has been a visiting scholar at institutions such as where he founded the Asia Studies Centre in 2017 and ran Harvard University, the Woodrow Wilson International Center until late 2019. While he was at this post, he often briefed UK for Scholars, and the Norwegian Nobel Institute. She is the Government departments, including the Cabinet Office, the author of numerous monographs, books, peer-reviewed Foreign and Commonwealth Office, and Ministry of Defense, articles, and research papers on Chinese and Asia-Pacific and in 2019, gave evidence to the Parliamentary Defence security, and she is a frequent commentator on these issues in
STRATEGIES FOR THE INDO-PACIFIC: PERCEPTIONS OF THE U.S. AND LIKE-MINDED COUNTRIES the media. She regularly participates in policy dialogues such Japan as the Arctic Circle Assembly in Iceland and the Xiangshan Yoji Koda is a graduate of Japan Defense Academy (1972), Forum in Beijing. JMSDF Staff College, and the US Naval War College. As a surface officer, he took commanded of JS Sawayuki (DD-125) Stephen Nagy is originally from Calgary, Canada. He is and Fleet Surface Force at sea. His shore duty includes director a senior associate professor at the International Christian for Strategy, Plans and Operations, Maritime Staff. He retired University in Tokyo. Concurrently, he is a distinguished fellow from JMSDF as Commander in Chief, Self-Defense Fleet (Vice with Canada’s Asia Pacific Foundation and was appointed Admiral), in 2008. Then, he conducted in-depth research on China expert with Canada’s China Research Partnership. He China’s current naval strategy at Harvard University’s Asia- also holds fellowship positions with the Canadian Global Affairs Center from June 2009 to July 2011. He served as an advisor Institute (CGAI) and the Japan Institute for International Affairs to National Security Secretariat of the government of Japan until (JIIA). He was selected for the 2018 CSIS AILA Leadership March 2016. Fellowship in Washington. He was an assistant professor at the Chinese University of Hong Kong from December 2009 to Satoru Nagao is a visiting fellow at Hudson Institute. His January 2014. He earned his Ph.D. from Waseda University, research area is U.S.-Japan-India security cooperation. Dr. Japan, in international relations in 2008. His recent funded Nagao was awarded his Ph.D. by Gakushuin University in research project was “Sino-Japanese Relations in the Wake 2011 for his thesis titled “India’s Military Strategy.” He is also of the 2012 Territorial Disputes: Investigating Changes in research fellow at the Institute for Future Engineering (strategy Japanese Business’s Trade and Investment Strategy in China.” and defense policy); visiting research fellow at Gakushuin Currently, he is conducting a long-term research project entitled University’s Research Institute for Oriental Cultures; research “Perceptions and Drivers of Chinese Views on Japanese and fellow at the Japan Forum for Strategic Studies; associate at U.S. Foreign Policy in the Region” funded by the Japan Society the Society of Security and Diplomatic Policy Studies; research for the Promotion of Science (JSPS) and participating in a fellow at the Security and Strategy Research Institute for Japan; book project called Chinese International Relations Theory: As senior fellow at the Institute of National Security Studies, Sri Emerging from Practice and Policy. Lanka; and senior research fellow for the Indian Military Review.
10 | HUDSON INSTITUTE I. U.S.
America’s Indo-Pacific Strategy under the watchful eyes of National Security Advisor H. R. by Patrick M. Cronin McMaster and Deputy National Security Advisor Nadia Schadlow.7
Some 18 months after sharing the U.S. vision for a free and open Critics may fixate on the isolationist-sounding “America first” Indo-Pacific, the Trump administration finally released a lengthy focus of the NSS, but that strategy signals the first time since report on the subject.5 While the 55-page report emanates the end of the Cold War that the United States returned to a from the Department of Defense (DoD), rather than the White focus on major-power competition. The 2017 strategy report House, it looks at broad U.S. objectives, extant and emergent also shifts attention away from global terrorism, which has challenges in the region (especially China), and a typology of dominated security strategy since 2001. three lines-of-effort and a variety of specific activities.
If the Obama administration can be praised for giving serious Photo caption: Vietnamese military officers purchase souvenirs during a attention to the interagency process and deliberations, the Trump tour onboard the USS Carl Vinson at Tien Sa Port on March 5, 2018 in administration deserves credit for producing some consequential Danang, Vietnam. The USS Carl Vinson made a historic visit to Danang, strategy papers.6 A high standard was set early by the December marking the biggest U.S. military presence in Vietnam since the end of 2017 National Security Strategy (NSS), written and coordinated the Vietnam War in 1975. (Getty Images)
STRATEGIES FOR THE INDO-PACIFIC: PERCEPTIONS OF THE U.S. AND LIKE-MINDED COUNTRIES Although the strategy was seen as overdue in the United States, and displacement of the United States to achieve global leading voices in the region fear the tilt toward confronting China preeminence in the future.”9 could create conflict. As Singapore Prime Minister Lee Hsien Loong remarked in his opening address at the 2019 Shangri- More recently, in June 2019, under the supervision of La Dialogue, “There is a growing bipartisan consensus in the Assistant Secretary of Defense for Indo-Pacific Security U.S.: that China has taken advantage of the U.S. for far too Affairs Randall Schriver, the Pentagon produced the first-ever long; that China has overtaken, or will soon overtake the U.S. in Indo-Pacific Strategy Report (IPSR).10 This report, released areas of advanced technology…through underhanded means; during the annual assembly of regional defense secretaries that instead of opening up and becoming more like the U.S., at the Shangri-La Dialogue in Singapore, is an outstanding China has regressed in terms of political openness, and hence statement of U.S. strategic objectives, organized around represents a challenge to American values and leadership.”8 three pillars of preparedness, partnerships, and networked security architecture.11 Before distilling key points from that In other words, one of America’s key partners in Southeast Asia strategy, however, some background on earlier precedents is admonishing the United States not to force regional actors is warranted. to choose between neighbors and friends, between major economic and security partners, and, really, between China Evolution of the U.S.’s Asian Strategy Reports and the United States. However, the United States is telling While the new IPSR is preceded by four earlier Department of the region that it either needs to step up to the challenge of Defense reports on Asia-Pacific security, more than 20 years competition with China, preferably with the United States, or have elapsed since the last report. The George H.W. Bush risk losing independence and even sovereignty. This message administration published two East Asia Strategy Initiative (EASI) has been clear since the first year of the Trump administration, reports for Congress at the end of the Cold War, which forced which continues to work on implementing policies in response planners to think ahead to the twenty-first century. The first to this shift back to great-power competition. EASI report was published in April 1990 (A Strategic Framework for the Asian Pacific Rim: Report to Congress: Looking Toward On the heels of a substantial strategic pivot from post-9/11 the 21st Century)12 and the second, an updated version of the terrorism to resurgent major- power rivalry, the January 2018 inaugural report, in April 1992 (A Strategic Framework for the National Defense Strategy (NDS) under then-Secretary James Asian Pacific Rim: Report to Congress).13 Mattis translated the strategy into a Department of Defense (DoD) plan of action. The defense strategy remains mostly classified, During the Clinton administration, another pair of regional reports but the unclassified explanation makes clear that China’s bid is were published by the Pentagon. The first East Asia Strategy now the pacing threat against which to work on deterrence and Report (EASR) was published in 1995 (United States Security defense: “China is leveraging military modernization, influence Strategy for the East Asia-Pacific Region)14 and the sequel was operations, and predatory economics to coerce neighboring published in 1998 (The United States Security Strategy for the countries to reorder the Indo-Pacific region to its advantage. East Asia-Pacific Region).15 As China continues its economic and military ascendance, asserting power through an all-of-nation long-term strategy, Any attempt to follow up these reports by the George W. Bush it will continue to pursue a military modernization program administration was overtaken by the events of September 11, that seeks Indo-Pacific regional hegemony in the near-term 2001, and the strategic exigency of dealing with terrorism. But
12 | HUDSON INSTITUTE Asian dynamism never ceased, and by the end of President and 2) a large chasm between the strong defense-oriented George W. Bush’s second term, there was renewed bipartisan engagement of the United States and the lagging economic support for thinking about America’s role in the Asia-Pacific. strategy and engagement, especially relative to Beijing’s signature Belt and Road Initiative. When I was director of the Institute for National Strategic Studies at the National Defense University, I provided institutional support The report opens with a short message from then-Acting to a multi-think tank study, under the general leadership of former Secretary of Defense Patrick M. Shanahan, who highlighted Assistant Secretary of State James Kelly and former Deputy previous themes of the administration: America’s “enduring Assistant Secretary of Defense Kurt M. Campbell. The idea was commitment to uphold a free and open Indo-Pacific in which to draft a bipartisan statement that might be adopted by the all nations, large and small, are secure in their sovereignty and next administration, regardless of the winner of 2008 election, able to pursue economic growth consistent with accepted and become the basis for a fifth report. The result was published international rules, norms, and principles of fair competition.”18 by the Center for a New American Security in February 2009 under the title, The United States and the Asia-Pacific Region: Secretary Shanahan then implicated China as the main Security Strategy for the Obama Administration.16 Indeed, an challenge, stating, “The People’s Republic of China, under the official version of a similar report started to be drafted during leadership of the Chinese Communist Party, seeks to reorder the administration of President Barack Obama, but for myriad the region to its advantage by leveraging military modernization, bureaucratic and policy reasons, it never made it into print. influence operations, and predatory economics to coerce other nations.” The United States, he asserts, “will not accept In 2015, the DoD published a more narrow variant, the Asian- policies or actions that threaten or undermine the rules-based Pacific Maritime Security Strategy report, which explained international order” — a statement that is likely to concern enduring U.S. goals amidst a more assertive Chinese challenge as much as reassure smaller regional actors.19 A subsequent in maritime Asia, and it set out four basic lines-of-effort that section of the report highlights China as a “revisionist power,” a more or less continue to this day: enhancing military capabilities; phrase singled out by Singapore’s Prime Minister as illustrative building ally and partner capacities to reduce risk; and building of America’s hardening view of China.20 Moreover, the Chinese regional architecture and supporting the rule of law.17 are undoubtedly riled by the report’s reference to Taiwan as “a country;” the terms stopped short of calling Taiwan “a nation” Well into the third year of the administration of Donald Trump, but may still be seen in Beijing to erode America’s longstanding a fifth regional report has been issued — one that follows the one-China policy.21 National security experts throughout the broader geographical region of the Indo-Pacific set out by the region, however, probably accept the report’s identification White House in 2017. of China as “engaged in a campaign of low-level coercion to assert control of disputed spaces in the region, particularly in The Indo-Pacific Strategy Report the maritime domain,” but greater skepticism may abound as to The strength of the 2019 IPSR is that it integrates and amplifies what the United States is prepared to do about it.22 themes of preparedness, partnerships, and promoting a networked security. However, the report is hampered to some The report’s introduction underscores the Indo-Pacific region’s extent by two crucial gaps: 1) a widening disparity in threat economic centrality for the world and the United States: “The perception between the United States and parts of the region; Indo-Pacific contributes two-thirds of global growth in gross
STRATEGIES FOR THE INDO-PACIFIC: PERCEPTIONS OF THE U.S. AND LIKE-MINDED COUNTRIES domestic product (GDP) and accounts for 60% of global and promoting a networked region through minilateral coalitions GDP.”23 Moreover, “nine of the world’s 10 busiest seaports are and multilateral institutions centered on ASEAN. in the region, and 60 percent of global maritime trade transits through Asia, with roughly one-third of global shipping passing The preparedness section makes clear that despite China’s through the South China Sea alone.”24 With five Pacific states geographical advantage in maritime Asia, the United States and Pacific territories on both sides of the International Date retains an impressive force posture in the region and continues Line, “America’s annual two-way trade with the region is $2.3 to modernize its forces, too. “In the region, USINDOPACOM trillion, with U.S. foreign direct investment of $1.3 trillion in currently has more than 2,000 aircraft; 200 ships and the region — more than China’s, Japan’s, and South Korea’s submarines; and more than 370,000 Soldiers, Sailors, Marines, combined.”25 Airmen, DoD civilians, and contractors assigned within its area of responsibility.”29 However, uncertainty remains regarding Both economic weight and classical geostrategic rationales trends in Chinese military modernization, as well as future U.S. emerge in this opening section: “Our vision for a free and open defense spending which must make tough tradeoffs between Indo-Pacific recognizes the linkages between economics, modernizing legacy platforms and investing in potential game- governance, and security that are part of the competitive changing innovation. landscape throughout the region, and that economic security is national security… It is a vision which recognizes that no one The second major line of effort — focused on allies and partners nation can or should dominate the Indo-Pacific.”26 — highlights great continuity in U.S. policy, although some of that continuity has been called into question by the occasionally In recognition that “economic security is national security,” tougher tone taken toward uneven burden-sharing among administration initiatives are given early prominence.27 These allies and trade frictions spilling over into security.30 “The U.S.- include new investments in Indo-Pacific infrastructure, energy Japan Alliance is the cornerstone of peace and prosperity in markets, and digital economy; new development finance the Indo-Pacific,” and “U.S. forces in Japan are an essential partnerships with Japan, Australia, Canada, and the European component of our posture in the region.” Indeed, the “U.S.- Union; the BUILD (Better Utilization of Investments Leading Japan Treaty of Mutual Cooperation and Security” is “a key to Development) Act; and the recent announcement of $10 enabler for maintaining a free and open Indo-Pacific region.”31 billion in U.S.-Japan energy investment, a U.S.-ASEAN Smart Likewise, “The U.S.-ROK Alliance is the linchpin of peace and Cities Partnership, and a five-nation effort to provide Papua prosperity in Northeast Asia, as well as the Korean Peninsula,” New Guinea with electricity. An Indo-Pacific Transparency and “The U.S.-ROK combined force — unique among bilateral Initiative will help shine a spotlight on some of China’s opaque U.S. military relationships — is a robust deterrent to aggression and coercive investments. Moreover, the authorized — but not on the Korean Peninsula.”32 Australia-U.S. cooperation is appropriated — ARIA (Asia Reassurance Initiative Act) awaits longstanding: “For more than a century, we have conducted funding and implementation to broaden existing programs such joint and coalition operations, training and exercises, intelligence as the Maritime Security Initiative.28 cooperation, and capability development.”33 Among effective activities, the Marine Rotational Forces-Darwin is slated to The bulk of the report describes how the United States is grow to 2,500 U.S. Marines this year.34 Evidence that these enhancing its preparedness (including its readiness to deal with three allies are critical to the United States defense posture and any “fait accompli scenario”), strengthening its partnerships, strategy can be found in the two trilateral discussions the United
14 | HUDSON INSTITUTE States organized at the 2019 Shangri-La Dialogue: a strong 1980s over concerns about nuclear-power ship visits, now it is U.S.-Japan-Australia statement in support of a free and open helping Australia and the United States, as well as France and Indo-Pacific, and a salubrious U.S.-Japan-ROK discussion Japan, protect the sovereignty and well-being of Pacific Island to help attenuate recent tensions between America’s two nations.40 Finally, Mongolia is given unprecedented attention, Northeast Asian allies.35 and it regards the United States as “its most important ‘third neighbor’ and primary security partner.”41 The 1951 U.S.-Philippines Mutual Defense Treaty survived the departure of U.S. forces in the early 1990s, and after a 1998 Democratic India deserves an even higher billing, rather than Visiting Forces Agreement and the 2014 Enhanced Defense being situated as merely the lead point of discussion in a Cooperation Agreement (EDCA), the two allies currently conduct South Asia section that also touts relations with Sri Lanka, the some 280 bilateral defense activities, including “the most bilateral Maldives, and Bangladesh.42 Perhaps this muted praise for exercises in the USINDOPACOM area of responsibility.”36 Slow but such a substantial partner as India is a bureaucratic artefact nonetheless increasing activity began last year to make use of five of the ongoing transition of the U.S. government from thinking EDCA agreed locations. Omitted are the current challenges posed about not just an Asia-Pacific region, but an Indo-Pacific one. by President Rodrigo Duterte. In contrast, Thailand’s 2014 military coup created significant challenges for a major non-NATO ally and Likewise, the report skips back to East Asia by discussing a bilateral relationship that dates back to an 1833 Treaty of Amity “expanding partnerships” with three essential maritime and Commerce. Of course, the more recent 1954 multilateral Southeast Asian countries: Vietnam, Indonesia, and Malaysia. defense pact (SEATO) was never built on common interests or The report declares that “the United States is prioritizing new even geographical proximity. Even so, the IPSR stresses Thailand’s relationships with Vietnam, Indonesia, and Malaysia — key “key geostrategic role in the Indo-Pacific region,” including the players in ASEAN that remain central in our efforts to ensure “access provided to Utapao Royal Thai Naval Air Station and the peace and underwrite prosperity in the Indo-Pacific.43 But one associated deep-water port at Sattahip.”37 cannot help but wonder whether the United States should be doing more to draw attention to the 70th anniversary of The report then praises four Indo-Pacific democracies diplomatic relations with Indonesia and whether it will do enough — Singapore, Taiwan, New Zealand, and Mongolia — as in 2020 to mark 25 years of diplomatic relations with Vietnam. “natural partners.”38 This is an unusual grouping, even leaving Brunei, Laos, and Cambodia are each accorded a short a aside the blurring of Taiwan’s unique status. The 1990 MOU, paragraph suggesting sustained engagement.44 However the 2005 Strategic Framework, and 2015 Enhanced Defense report preceded news accounts that China signed a secret Cooperation with Singapore demonstrate a deep and serious agreement to use a Cambodian naval facility at Ream.45 security partnership. In September 2019, the strategic partners renewed for another 15 years the 1990 MOU giving the United Both the Pacific Islands and some NATO partners (the U.K., States the right to use defense facilities in Singapore.39 While France, and Canada) are rightfully given attention as expanding the commitment to a secure and confident Taiwan remains partnerships in the region.46 Regarding Europe, this year’s a focal point, it is also increasingly at the center of the U.S.- Shangri-La Dialogue offered a European voice that seemed China competition, even as Taiwan faces a bellwether election more engaged with the region than perhaps any time in recent in January. New Zealand relations continue to improve. decades, not least because both the U.K. and France have Although New Zealand left the trilateral ANZUS alliance in the elevated their narrative and engagement, while the European
STRATEGIES FOR THE INDO-PACIFIC: PERCEPTIONS OF THE U.S. AND LIKE-MINDED COUNTRIES Union remains active in largely complementary diplomacy and law through port visits and other defense-related activities that development. demonstrate every nation’s right to freedom of navigation and overflight… 51” When the report turns to promoting a networked region, it places trilateral relations ahead of ASEAN — something that is sure to The U.S.-Japan-ROK trilateral relationship remains vital but rankle some diplomats in Southeast Asia. But the United States strained by recent tensions between Seoul and Tokyo, including is also deeply engaged in bilateral diplomacy and cooperative the announcement by President Moon Jae-in not to renew a activities in a manner consistent with its report language, as vital intelligence-sharing agreement between South Korea affirmed by various official U.S. statements and ministerial- and Japan.52 Although this trilateral relationship received less level meetings during the Shangri-La Dialogue in Singapore on attention at Shangri-La, the meeting of the three defense May 31–June 2, 2019. But networked security revolves around chiefs was still helpful in managing the enduring threats and both minilateralism and working through ASEAN-centered opportunities posed by North Korea. institutions. One of the most effective demonstrations of U.S.- ASEAN defense cooperation hinting at a new level of networked In the Indo-Pacific Strategy Report, an earlier focus on the security was the complex maritime exercise conducted in Quadrilateral Security Dialogue among the United States, September 2019 and co-led by the U.S. Navy and the Royal Japan, India, and Australia was reduced to a paragraph extolling Thai Navy.47 the utility of talking among the four maritime democracies.53 This reduced profile, however, ought to have been a pleasant As intimated above, the defense ministers of the United States, development for most ASEAN members, who view the Japan, and Australia announced a “strategic action agenda” in Quad as another mechanism for enabling outside power support of “democracy, human rights, free trade, and the rules- management of internal Southeast Asian issues. Conversely, based international order.”48 The trio advocated engagement the new U.S. strategy underscores ASEAN centrality and U.S. with like-minded partners “to foster regional prosperity, resilience support for ASEAN mechanisms, such as the ASEAN Regional and transparency in a time of geostrategic change.”49 The three Forum, the ASEAN Defense Ministers’-Plus, and the East countries expressed their commitment not only to a free and Asia Summit. open Indo-Pacific, but to a “free, open, stable, and prosperous Indo-Pacific.”50 Combined with other configurations of cooperation — including the Quadrilateral Security Dialogue, as well as frequent The action plan calls for stepped-up trilateral cooperation in exercises and dialogues among some or all members of the maritime security, humanitarian assistance and disaster relief, Quad plus others, such as France, the United Kingdom, or peacekeeping, counter-terrorism, amphibious activities, and in the Philippines — Washington is invested in plurilateralism as the domains of space, cyberspace, and the electromagnetic another means of building the networked security architecture spectrum. Specific lines of trilateral effort will include: closer in the strategy document. coordination on building partner capacity through information sharing and complementary programs; better information The conclusion of the IPSR reiterates the U.S. commitment sharing among the three countries and with the region; more to preserving a free and open Indo-Pacific. But, importantly, sophisticated trilateral exercises to enhance interoperability; and it also declares Washington’s higher expectations of allies promoting “transparency, regional cooperation, and the rule of and partners:
16 | HUDSON INSTITUTE “The United States will uphold our commitments and will act took centerstage at the 2019 Shangri-La Dialogue. The major- to defend our interests and those of our allies and partners. At power-competition focus resulted from two developments: the same time, we maintain our expectation that our allies and for the first time in almost a decade, Beijing dispatched its partners will contribute their fair share to security by defense minister, thereby putting it on par with other countries; additionally, the hardening views between the two powers and • Resourcing and investing sufficiently for their own defense to the concern that heightened security and economic competition ensure deterrence and mitigate vulnerabilities; is creating in the region. The lines were drawn in the opening keynote speech by Prime Minister Lee Hsien Loong. • Cooperating in building partner capacity for third-party partners in the region; While Prime Minister Lee put down guardrails of behavior for • Upholding a rules-based international order (i.e., flying, sailing, both the United States and China, I interpret this year’s speech and operating to uphold international laws and norms); as a call for a course correction in Washington. He began by asserting, “Globalization is under siege. Tensions between • Providing access needed for contingency response and the U.S. and China are growing. Like everyone else, we in resiliency; Singapore are anxious.”55 He elaborated: “The U.S.-China
• Strengthening interoperability, including information sharing, bilateral relationship is the most important in the world today.” with the United States and other like-minded countries in How the two work out their tensions and frictions will define the region; and, the international environment for decades to come” (emphasis added).56 Prime Minister Lee declared that “China can no longer • Promoting and actively participating in region-led initiatives expect to be treated the same way as in the past when it was 54 (emphasis added). to uphold a free and open Indo-Pacific” much smaller and weaker” (emphasis added).57 In an indirect reference to U.S. disruptive policies, “The bottom line is that the All of these contributions are needed and expected by the United U.S. and China need to work together, and with other countries States, even if it might strike some as odd to end one’s national too, to bring the global system up to date, and to not upend strategy document with a list of what others ought to be doing. the system” (emphasis added).58 He also seemed to refer to the Perhaps a United States competing with emerging Asia has little possibility of falling into the so-called Thucydides Trap, asserting choice but to lean more heavily on its allies and partners. Even somewhat sensationally and without specifics, “Americans now so, reciprocity cuts both ways, and America’s allies are looking for talk openly of containing China…” (emphasis added).59 greater consistency and reliability from the United States. The tension between emphasizing the critical role of allies and simultaneously Beyond this latest iteration of a shifting balance of power and the engaging in hard-nosed bargaining with them detracts somewhat need for major powers to find a modus vivendi which allows for from what the report rightly calls its “asymmetrical advantage” vis- cooperation rather than zero-sum competition, Prime Minister à-vis other major powers: viz., staunch allies. Lee notably signaled that China’s economic investment in regional infrastructure and connectivity represented the right path U.S.-China Competition moving forward. The China-Singapore (Chongqing) Connectivity and the 2019 Shangri-La Dialogue Initiative was explicitly cited as a promising example. Conversely, The dueling narratives of the U.S. Acting Secretary of Defense America’s free and open Indo-Pacific vision lacks economic Patrick M. Shanahan and China’s Defense Minister Wei Fenghe weight and remains too nebulous. “I believe China appreciates
STRATEGIES FOR THE INDO-PACIFIC: PERCEPTIONS OF THE U.S. AND LIKE-MINDED COUNTRIES the need for the Belt and Road Initiative to be inclusive,” he said, China, the Chinese military has no choice but to fight at all costs because “Chinese leaders stated clearly that the BRI would be for national unity.”64 He added that “any underestimation of the ‘open, green, and clean’” (emphasis added).60 PLA’s resolve and will is extremely dangerous” and that “we make no promise to renounce the use of force.”65 In a reference Prime Minister Lee thereby set the terms of reference for to the more distant past, General Wei, “The PLA has fought the two major speeches that would follow on Saturday and many battles and is not afraid of sacrifice.”66 Sunday, which came from the U.S. and Chinese defense secretaries. While there were no direct confrontations, there Limitations, Constraints, and Questions were notable moments. Almost three years into the Trump administration, a free and open Indo-Pacific vision is moving forward and unlikely to revert The next morning, Acting Secretary Shanahan addressed the back to a smaller geographical framework. But while there is first plenary session, and he succeeded in picking up where much to praise in both the U.S. strategy and regional diplomacy, Secretary James Mattis had left off: “The Free and Open Indo- there are also some fundamental constraints that will continue Pacific vision is an effective guide for regional contributions, to complicate implementation and the desired strategic impact because it is based on enduring principles of international sought by Washington decision-makers. Here are four gaps cooperation: respect for sovereignty and independence of policymakers will need to be mindful of: all nations, large and small; peaceful resolution of disputes; free, fair, and reciprocal trade and investment, which includes • The gap in threat perceptions (the U.S. and perhaps protection of intellectual property; [and] adherence to Japan and Australia are more closely aligned about the international rules and norms, including freedom of navigation comprehensive challenge posed by China than others, and overflight.”61 especially in Southeast Asia);
• The gap between rhetoric and reality (U.S. words, in print Shanahan emphasized that the United States cooperates and when delivered orally, are better than the effect on the with China “where we have an alignment of interests, from intended audiences — as at least one recent survey and military-to-military dialogue to develop risk-reduction Prime Minister Lee’s 2019 Shangri-La Dialogue keynote measures, to tackling transactional threats such as counter- address suggest);67 piracy, to enforcing United Nations sanctions on North Korea. And we compete with China where we must; but • The gap between defense activities and economic activities competition does not mean conflict.”62 He added that “China (the United States should not try to replicate the ambitions can and should have a cooperative relationship with the rest of China’s BRI, but it needs to better harness its many of the region, too, but behavior that erodes other nations’ economic, trade, investment, finance, and development sovereignty and sows distrust of China’s intentions must end” instruments of policy, including pulling them together into a (emphasis added).63 few visible showcase projects, in tandem with the private sector and with allies and partners); and On the third and last day of the dialogue, China offered its own • The gap between narrative and action (while some actions are narrative. Invoking Abraham Lincoln’s vital role in preserving the given too much attention — freedom of navigation operations unity of the United States, State Councilor and Defense Minister or FONOPs, e.g. — economic activities and the building of General Wei warned, “If anyone dares to split Taiwan from
18 | HUDSON INSTITUTE human capacity are overshadowed by China’s propaganda way Japan, Australia, and India create natural perimeter. One and use of economic and other instruments of policy). can also think of this arrangement as a baseball diamond, with Australia as “home plate”, Japan as “first base” and India as “third For all these deficiencies, however, the Indo-Pacific vision is base”. Growing references to “the Quad” nations — the U.S., here to stay, and is likely to become part of a future bipartisan India, Australia, and Japan — recognize the natural utility of this framework for engaging the world’s most consequential region geographic arrangement of like-minded maritime powers.69 in the 21st century. Deterring and if necessary, winning a conflict in the Western Pacific demands a strong U.S. naval presence in the region and active American Sea Power in the Indo-Pacific and powerful navies from the Quad nations. There should be no by Bryan McGrath mistaking what “winning” means in a potential conflict with China, as it is a powerful, nuclear nation of the first order. In the event of This essay is adapted from panel remarks made at the Indo- conflict, a return to status quo ante should be considered winning. Asia Pacific Panel held at the Hudson Institute on November 16, 2018. To generate the kind of naval presence necessary the United States has two options to choose from or to blend. First, it can The United States is a Pacific power, and as such, relies build a larger Navy and deploy a larger share of that Navy to the heavily on Seapower to protect and sustain its interests in South China Sea. This is the preferred option, because the United the region. American Seapower — for the purposes of this States needs a larger Navy to service its global responsibilities. essay — consisting of the Navy and Marine Corps operating Currently, naval presence is a shell game in which a two-hub Navy as an integrated whole, is essential to assuring regional friends is continuously attempting to service three operational hubs — and allies of continuing American commitment to the region. Europe, the Middle East, and the Western Pacific. With a return Additionally, forward deployed naval power acts as a deterrent to great power competition underpinning our National Defense to would-be disturbers of the peace. In the foreseeable future, Strategy, this means that the Middle East/CENTCOM Area of China is the focus of this deterrence. Responsibility presence will be harvested to service Europe and the Western Pacific. The 2018 National Defense Strategy explicitly While American Seapower is critical to the U.S. approach to the de-emphasizes the role of U.S. military force in the Middle East,70 region, it is only one part of a more comprehensive approach that but as recent events in which a U.S. aircraft carrier was sortied emphasizes trade and diplomacy at least as much as military from the Eastern Mediterranean to the North Arabian Sea in alliances. A recent essay entitled “Assessing America’s Indo- response to intelligence of Iranian terror threats demonstrate,71 Pacific Budget Shortfall” by Eric Sayers provides an excellent the Middle East continues to demand U.S. attention. America’s summary of the degree to which this important region is under- enduring interests in and around Europe, the Middle East, and the resourced at both the State Department and the Pentagon, in Western Pacific require a three-hub approach to forward naval addition to the multiplicity of programs that exist outside the presence, and the Navy must make the case more effectively for bounds of hard power.68 the force structure necessary to service these responsibilities.
Geography is not destiny, but it is important, and when considering In addition to a larger fleet, the Navy could forward base a larger China’s place in the Western Pacific, it is useful to think of the percentage of the fleet in the Western Pacific. Whether the Navy
STRATEGIES FOR THE INDO-PACIFIC: PERCEPTIONS OF THE U.S. AND LIKE-MINDED COUNTRIES grows or not, this option should be pursued. This would require misguided — the dialogue over operations in the South China access to forward bases, and it is not immediately apparent Sea is entirely too loose. Freedom of navigation operations in the how likely this access is to be granted. Clearly this would region should be conducted routinely and should be considered take some long-term diplomacy, but it is the most efficient routine. Excessive claims by any nation in the region should be method of generating forward based operational availability, challenged, but these challenges need only be accompanied as rotational transits to and from the continental United States by diplomatic communications that register the challenge. The require additional ships. The United States should also consider Defense Department’s propensity to issue press releases every forward basing more forces in Guam and other areas under time a U.S. ship challenges an excessive or disputed Chinese U.S. jurisdiction. maritime claim should be discontinued. And when such an operation does raise Chinese interest, reports stressing the Irrespective of how large the Navy is or what portion of it is dangers of “close aboard” operations among ships does little to devoted to operations in the Indo-Pacific, the ships that carry a message to the Chinese that the U.S. is not going to be do operate there must be more lethal, and they must be intimidated by such aggression. better supported by continuous intelligence, surveillance, reconnaissance and targeting (ISR&T). The Navy is making Second, the Navy needs to create a far more effective ISR&T strides in meeting the lethality goal, fielding longer range and complex in the region than it currently fields. A network of space- more energetic weapons, but the ISR gap — the difference in based, aerial layer, surface and subsurface based sensors that our ability to find, fix, track, target, and engage — between us provides the U.S. Navy with target quality information on every and the Chinese is real, and it must be addressed. Chinese Warship operating in the region continuously should be the goal. The range of the Navy’s anti-ship weapons exceeds And while more-- and more lethal-- forward deployed naval is ability to properly target them, and this gap must be closed. power is central to any coherent approach to security and stability China’s naval forces should understand that if they are targeted in the region, the degree to which the U.S. network of friends wherever they are. and allies in the region is the most effective deterrent to Chinese adventurism and aggression cannot be overstated. The United Third, the United States must make clear and unambiguous States must do more to lead and catalyze activities that present statements about what the consequences of aggression will operational problems for the Chinese while demonstrating the be. There is in the national security community, a great debate durability of its friendships and alliances. Additionally, the current as to whether the U.S. would attack the Chinese mainland in administration’s approach to regional free-trade agreements in the event of conflict. This debate should end. There should be the Western Pacific sends mixed messages to the region as to no doubt in China’s leader’s minds that mainland targets are on commitment on levels other than military. the list, and that furthermore, the islands and features that they have militarized were never part of this debate in the first place. In order to more effectively contribute to security and stability in the Indo-Pacific, the following recommendations are offered. Fourth — the U.S. should move the Third Fleet — currently First, the United States must understand that the new era of based in San Diego, forward. The Seventh Fleet based in Japan great power competition is being waged in a new era of media is simply too far out of the fight — and more importantly — too ubiquity. And while recent Department of Defense initiatives to busy with fights of its own — to provide operational level direction restrict the public statements of its leaders are in the main — in the broader Indo-Asia Pacific. A base in Northern Australia
20 | HUDSON INSTITUTE or Guam would be preferred, but where exactly it could land to operate in the region, but to create a similarly lethal level of remains to be seen. The “Third Fleet Forward” initiative of a few ISR/T coverage of the Chinese fleet in the area. Being there years ago was an interesting idea, but it appeared somewhat — in the region — with combat ready forces of upgraded insufficient and gimmicky.72 lethality whose locations may be well-known, serves the broad objective of conventional deterrence. For example, the system There is a commonly held — but flawed — assumption that of bases across Europe in the Cold War, and tens of thousands Chinese surveillance in the Indo-Pacific is ubiquitous, and that of troops in Korea for the past seven decades — served U.S. ships operating there are constantly targeted. The truth useful roles in conventional deterrence even though there is quite different. For instance, although the famed “DF-21” was little or no doubt where these military forces located. The “Carrier-Killer” missile has a reported range of about 1000 miles, growing sense that for a naval force to be effective, it must be China’s ability to find, fix, track, and target U.S. ships at this invisible, is simply incorrect. And while stealth and deception distance is subject to numerous environmental and operational play a significant role in the CONDUCT of war, we should not considerations. Those who paint China as “ten feet tall” tend underestimate the role that preponderant, visible force plays in to draw surveillance arcs emanating from the mainland that the avoidance of war. pre-suppose exquisite knowledge of the battlespace from seafloor to stratosphere, when if fact, wide gaps exist within It is crucial for the U.S. Navy to be where the nation’s interests the battlespace where the probability of detection is minimized. lie, and that means being in the Indo-Pacific in numbers with With sufficient knowledge of the battlespace and its atmospheric considerable capability. Assurance of friends and allies and conditions, those gaps can are both knowable and exploitable. deterrence of would-be aggressors both require visible, capable forces that can deter Chinese objectives by denying the fruit Even if China possessed these overwrought estimates of of aggression, rather than attempting to deny the aggression ISR/T fidelity, it would still make sense for the U.S. not only through the threat of future punishment.
STRATEGIES FOR THE INDO-PACIFIC: PERCEPTIONS OF THE U.S. AND LIKE-MINDED COUNTRIES II. REGIONAL COUNTRIES
Vietnam and the U.S. Indo-Pacific Vision the regional allies and partners, the U.S. Department of Defense by Do Thanh Hai & Le Thu Ha finally came up with a full paper titled “Indo Pacific Strategy Report” (IPSR) in June 2019. It is quite remarkable that for the Introduction first time, the U.S. put forward a largely hollow concept and calls The U.S.’s introduction of the “Free and Open Indo-Pacific” upon its allies and partners to give it shape. is one of the most difficult puzzles for the whole East Asian region. The concept of Indo-Pacific is not a new one. It was The Indo-Pacific strategy (IPS) is important, as it is the U.S.’s coined by the Japanese Prime Minister, Abe Shinzo, a decade response to a long-standing question of its commitment to the ago. However, the U.S. administration’s adoption has given it region. With a preponderance of power, the U.S. has long been greater geopolitical significance, as did its withdrawal from the considered the leader and mainstay for Pacific stability. Yet, there Trans-Pacific Partnership. President Donald Trump’s statement on the sideline of the November 2017 Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation Summit in Danang, Vietnam has indeed made it a Photo caption: Built on land reclaimed from the Indian Ocean and funded centrepiece of the U.S. attempt to preserve its primacy in the face with $1.4 billion in Chinese investment, the Colombo Port City project of an assertive China. Still, the Indo-Pacific has been an evolving is seen jutting out into the ocean that will eventually be 65 million cubic concept whose components have not been fixed from the very meters of sand. November 8, 2018 in Colombo, Sri Lanka. (Paula beginning. After almost two years of extensive consultation with Bronstein/Getty Images)
22 | HUDSON INSTITUTE has been enduring anxiety across the region that Washington affect Hanoi with regard to the Mekong River, cross-border may scale down its presence and engagements, leaving a trade flow, and maritime waters in the South China Sea. Though strategic vacuum for other powers to fill. So, the central question China’s behavior in the South China Sea and the Mekong River is how far the IPS reflects U.S. commitment to the rule-based are worrisome, overall Vietnam-China relations are in the best order of the region. The volatile nature of U.S. domestic politics shape ever in history. As a result, Hanoi tries to handle China in has made the IPS more a brainteaser than a definite riposte to a way to carefully constrain its aggressive intents, rather than regional concern. Vietnam is not an exception. Recognizing the rock the entire bilateral relationship. U.S. as a mainstay of Asia-Pacific stability, Hanoi is trying many ways to foster U.S. reassurance and constructive engagements To this end, Vietnam’s aim is to establish a viable multi- in order to maintain a viable balance of influence in the region, dimensional balance of influence (not just balance of power), not to incite confrontation. How Hanoi has responded to the IPS centered on Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) is a good topic to explore, as it is indicative of regional concerns to restrain abuse of power and foster peaceful settlements of and Vietnam’s own strategic calculations. existing disputes. In this vein, Hanoi eagerly forged partnerships with the U.S., and other powers, to offset the weight of a rising Vietnam-U.S. Relations China. That explains why Hanoi was largely responsive to the The end of the Cold War opened up a new chapter for Vietnam, Obama administration’s Pivot, later changed to “rebalancing the where it opted for an internationalist foreign policy aimed at Asia-Pacific,” which gives priority to engaging the region widely, establishing peaceful and stable neighborhood so as to focus voicing opposition to revisionism in multilateral forums, and on its own national development. Hanoi has moved beyond the assisting Southeast Asian countries to build capacities. The U.S. ideological division and past animosity to develop partnerships is of particular importance in the eyes of Vietnam because it is the with all major powers. Vietnam’s ties with U.S. were forged in key force underpinning regional peace and stability. Vietnamese 1995 and quickly expanded since June 2005, when then-Prime and U.S. interests converge on the maintenance of the status Minister Phan Van Khai made the first ever visit of a senior quo across the region. However, that does not mean Hanoi would Vietnamese leader to Washington, D.C. Importantly, Vietnam go to great lengths forging a military alliance with Washington to has openly recognized the U.S. as a Pacific power that plays counter China in peacetime. Many strategists in Hanoi are also a very important role maintaining regional security and stability. puzzled as to whether the U.S. would really risk a war with China The two countries entered a comprehensive partnership in to protect its allies’ and friends’ legitimate interests. December 2013, which prescribed high-level dialogue and cooperation in almost all fields. Hanoi’s Indo-Pacific Cautiousness In November 2017, the central city of Vietnam, Da Nang, Many analysts mistakenly view the Hanoi-Washington became the center of gravity as all Asia-Pacific leaders gathered partnership as primarily a means to balance to Beijing. China for the APEC summit. It came as a surprise that President certainty represents a significant security challenge for Vietnam, Trump also chose this forum to announce his administration’s as the two countries have a host of intractable sovereignty and “Free and Open Indo-Pacific” vision. The vision lays emphasis maritime disputes in its eastern maritime domain — called the on the maintenance of the existing international order based on East Sea in Vietnam and the South China Sea internationally. four principles: 1) respect for sovereignty and independence for However, Vietnam’s relations with China are complex and all nations; 2) peaceful resolution of the disputes; 3) free, fair, comprehensive to the extent that any change would directly and reciprocal trade based on open investment, transparent
STRATEGIES FOR THE INDO-PACIFIC: PERCEPTIONS OF THE U.S. AND LIKE-MINDED COUNTRIES agreements and connectivity; and 4) adherence to international In many ways, the Indo-Pacific vision is viewed as a geopolitical rules and norms, including those of freedom of navigation design to contain China and thwart its grand Belt and Road and overflight. A month later, the administration published the Initiative. That is not in Hanoi’s wish. There remain concerns in National Security Strategy and National Defense Strategy, Hanoi that the adoption of Indo-Pacific as a broad geographical which overtly labeled China as strategic competitor. unit would dilute attention away from the South China Sea which is the main ground for Chinese expansionism. Despite Such an articulation was a long overdue as Asia-Pacific uneasy relations with China, Vietnam does not desire to drum countries were concerned about U.S. commitment to the up confrontation in the region, which would easily polarize region. While other capitals remained reluctant and skeptical, the region into Cold War-styled conflicting camps. Like other Hanoi tried to engage with the Trump administration to establish Southeast Asian countries, Vietnam wants to drive a change a cordial and cooperative relationship. Vietnam’s Prime Minister in China’s behavior toward greater restraint, reliability, and Nguyen Xuan Phuc was the first Southeast Asian leader to have responsibility, rather than be an antagonist at its doorstep. a telephone conversation and a meeting with President Trump Standing on the eastern edge of the Eurasian landmass, the in person. Yet, the articulation of the Indo-Pacific vision is far last thing Hanoi wishes is for a fault line to emerge along its from reassuring. Instead, it is more a source of skepticism. coastline and extend both ways or to become entangled in a While appreciating greater willingness on the part of the U.S. fight between the titans. Consequently, in March 2018, during administration to consult regional partners, Vietnam joined his official visit to New Delhi, India, Vietnamese President Tran other ASEAN countries in their hesitancy to lend public political Dai Quang introduced the concept of Indo-Asia-Pacific, which support to the Free and Open Indo-Pacific initiative. boasts the idea of inclusivity and seamless connectivity. It was clearly an effort to bridge the gap in the Indo-Pacific vision Caution stems from several of perennial concerns. First, it is unclear how the Indo-Pacific strategy was linked to Obama’s The IPS as an Evolving Project rebalancing, which is centered upon the idea of comprehensive It is important to recognize that the U.S. administration has engagement. U.S. withdrawal from the Trans-Pacific identified extensive consultation and deliberation as the key Partnership was seen as a backstep in the U.S. commitment pathway for developing its strategy. Over the last few years, U.S. to shape regional economic order. Second, the U.S.-initiated officials and experts observably made frequent tours to the region, trade conflict with China is stirring up concerns about the talking with officials and think-tanks in many countries to seek prospect of protectionism and the collapse of the current liberal ideas and advice to substantiate the empty shell of Indo-Pacific trading system. The secretive nature of the U.S.-China trade vision. Through intense exchanges, the U.S. side is now aware negotiations poses many risks to other regional economies of the sensitivities over side-taking and has provided reassurance whose development prospects are built upon an open trading that the Indo-Pacific strategy does not amount to containing system. Third, the adoption of Shinzo’s concept and the revival China or forcing the Southeast Asian countries to make a choice. of the Quadrilateral gives an impression that the U.S. puts an A positive move in Asian eyes is that the U.S. fully understands emphasis on bilateralism and minilateralism with allies and rising comprehensive nature of the challenges in the Indo-Pacific region India, rather than relying on ASEAN as a means of multilateral and adopted a whole-of-government approach. engagement. Lastly, the amount of resources the U.S. will put into the Indo-Pacific, which is the clearest measure of its A number of initiatives have been put in place to foster a U.S. commitment, is still in doubt. economic presence in the region. In response to widespread
24 | HUDSON INSTITUTE concerns about the U.S.’s lackluster economic commitment China’s BRI. The intense competition between the U.S. and voiced at the Indo-Pacific Business Forum in July 2018, China put all Southeast Asia, including Vietnam, in a precarious U.S. Secretary of State Mike Pompeo vowed to work with situation, which is characterized by greater pressure from many partners to facilitate public and private investments in regional directions to articulate one’s standing on the two great powers’ infrastructure, energy markets, and the digital economy. In grand initiatives. Tragic modern history, fraught with wars and October 2018, President Trump signed the Better Utilization armed conflicts, has shaped Vietnam’s strategic thinking; it is of Investments Leading to Development Act, or BUILD Act. skeptical of geopolitics and disinclined to take sides in a power The U.S. administration also expressed interest in supporting struggle. As a result, it is not difficult to understand why Hanoi the ASEAN-led Smart Cities Partnership and promoting has been indisposed to give blanket support to any geostrategic transparency and good governance in investment activities. design to forge coalitions. In the Vietnamese perspective, Most importantly, the Asia Reassurance Initiative Act, or ARIA, connectivity is good when it promotes integration, but is bad was adopted to support sovereignty, rule of law, democracy, when it drives division and exclusivity. So, Vietnam’s position, economic engagement and regional security. The core notion vis-à-vis both IPS and BRI, remains ambivalent so long as they behind U.S. economic engagement with the region is to provide have not been fully and clearly sketched out. alternatives to other infrastructure development projects. While recognizing the importance of power in the near-term, The U.S. has made efforts to adapt its strategy to better reflect the Vietnam puts a premium on rules, principles, and ASEAN’s role complex reality in the Indo-Pacific region. The Indo-Pacific Strategy in regional structures as the key elements in regulating inter- Report of June 2019 aims to shed light on the strategic state-of- state relations. Instead of taking sides with any great power, play and map out sensible lines of actions to advance U.S. national Hanoi has sided with a set of rules and principles that it views and defense interests. In this document, the U.S. is committed as the best for maintaining peace, stability, and just order. To to working with its allies, expanding its partnership, supporting be exact, in the maritime domain, Hanoi repeatedly calls for ASEAN, and promoting a networked region. A significant portion the strict application of the United Nations Convention on of the report was dedicated to recognizing ASEAN’s centrality the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS), which provides zoning and in the regional security structure. The quadrilateral meeting is regulation of the maritime domain and activities at sea. In the regarded as merely a diplomatic consultation process. Yet, as trade realm, it seeks compliance with existing rules in the WTO a DoD document, the report largely focuses on strategic and framework. In security and political areas, Vietnam repeatedly security realms, falling short of devising a coherent grand strategy asserts its commitment to the principles enshrined in the United which would integrate different departments and agencies. At the Nations Charter and the ASEAN Charter, most importantly CSIS’s ninth South China Sea Conference, retired admiral Scott respect for sovereignty, territorial integrity, non-interference in Swift called for formulating a grand strategy that involves all fifteen another’s internal affairs, no threat or use of force, and peaceful portfolios of the U.S. administration. Still, the IPS should be seen settlement of disputes. In other words, Vietnam is interested in as an “evolving” venture of which the scope will eventually expand maintaining existing international order and utilizing ASEAN and to respond to the complexities in the region. its derivatives as the main platforms for shaping new rules or revising the existing ones as necessary. Under ASEAN’s Aegis Perhaps, debate within Vietnam over the Indo-Pacific strategy is In this vein, Vietnam supported the Indonesia-led initiative to flesh as intense as it is over other connectivity schemes, particularly out ASEAN’s own Indo-Pacific outlook to buffer great powers’
STRATEGIES FOR THE INDO-PACIFIC: PERCEPTIONS OF THE U.S. AND LIKE-MINDED COUNTRIES pressure, avoid intra-group division, and assert its common direct challenge to rules-based order, while downplaying or preference for prioritized areas of cooperation. Sensibly, ASEAN’s overlooking the longstanding American contributions to the outlook represents a common concern about geopolitical and region. The Chinese were visibly exhilarated at Lee’s speech. geostrategic shifts, an extension of ASEAN’s core principles At the question and answer session, a People’s Liberation and modus vivendi, and its priorities for cooperation. Obviously, Army official took the first comment to heap praise at Lee’s ASEAN has asserted its preference for an “inclusive regional speech. That is not all. The Chinese state media also rose architecture” in which ASEAN plays a central role and its long- to the same chorus.74 It is as if this year’s SLD had been a standing principles and mechanisms, such as the East Asian diplomatic coup for Beijing. Summit, ASEAN Plus One, the ASEAN Regional Forum, and the ASEAN Defense Ministerial Meeting Plus. ASEAN’s interests Contrasting Chinese Minister of National Defense General Wei are broader than infrastructural connectivity, energy security, or Fenghe’s firm, if fiery speech was the rather lacklustre speech freedom of navigation and overflight in the maritime domain; the day before by then Acting Secretary of Defence Patrick they include specifically maritime cooperation on the basis of Shanahan,75 which some would describe as “underwhelming,” UNCLOS, connectivity, UN Sustainable Development Goal especially after much anticipation had built up for an expected 2030, and economic cooperation. “new Indo-Pacific strategy.”76 Singapore, the host of SLD, did not find the aftermath to pass quickly. Commentators, Siding up ASEAN is one of Vietnams’ major policy initiatives in especially scholars in the West, not least of all American, not the post-Cold War period, where opening-up and integration only expressed disappointment at Shanahan’s speech, but have been the priority of its foreign affairs. However, it remains also criticized Singapore for shifting gears in favor of China, to be seen whether ASEAN’s version of the Indo-Pacific would to the point of suggesting that the rising Asian power ought work in current state of play in international politics. to be allowed the room to help make rules for the world. The criticisms were well-meaning but largely unfounded. Do Thanh Hai and Le Thu Ha are research fellows at the Bien Dong Institute for Maritime Studies at the Diplomatic Academy of Reading Beyond the Speech Vietnam. The opinions presented in the article are their own, and The context is important in order to understand Lee’s speech and do not necessarily reflect those of their institution or government. its intent. There is an ongoing, intensifying trade war between China and the U.S., which carries inevitable economic spill-over to Southeast Asia, a region that thrives socio-economically on Singapore and the Indo-Pacific: American investments and security presence, as well as access The Relentless Quest for Balance to Chinese infrastructure funding and vast market. Lee’s speech by Swee Lean Collin Koh pertained mainly to the idea of accommodating a rising China with an enlarged global economic stake. His comment about the Sino- Singapore Prime Minister Lee Hsien Loong’s keynote U.S. technological rivalry, specifically pointing to the whole saga address at the Shangri-La Dialogue (SLD) raised some over Chinese telecommunications giant Huawei, very much reflects eyebrows, especially within the U.S. Government, when he the angst experienced by not just Singapore but many Southeast mentioned the need for the United States to accommodate Asian countries seeking to develop their digital telecommunications a rising China.73 There were concerns that there is a shift in infrastructure cost-effectively. Notwithstanding latent security Singapore’s position that appears to favor Beijing, despite its concerns, Huawei presents an economical solution for Southeast
26 | HUDSON INSTITUTE Asian countries to keep in pace with an evolving global economic version that was spearheaded by Indonesia — the ASEAN landscape, especially the Industrial Revolution 4.0. concept, for Outlook on the Indo-Pacific (AOIP).79 That move was a politically which 5G telecommunications plays an important role. expedient one, insofar it was designed more for ASEAN to assert its continued centrality and strategic relevance in the However, it would be presumptuous to say that there is a regional security architecture. AOIP is merely a declaration of general shift in Singapore’s position. While the island city- common principles that the ten-member bloc agrees on, but it state wants China to play a larger global economic and is nothing akin to a common foreign policy directive that each technological role, holding onto the conviction that doing so government has to compulsorily follow. would benefit everyone, the same could not be said about the Asian power’s defense and security role. Without a doubt, An Indo-Pacific Strategic Consciousness, the growing diplomatic, economic, and military clout of Sans Strategy China, namely its expanding interests and influence across Instead of an Indo-Pacific strategy, Singapore possesses the region and worldwide, bring more strategic uncertainties a “strategic consciousness” of this concept.80 In fact, this because of its growing assertiveness and proclivity to flout strategic consciousness has been in-built since the beginning. international rules and norms, and resort to coercion — as One only needs to consider Singapore’s geostrategic location in seen in the East and South China Sea disputes. At the same between the Indian and Pacific Oceans. This geographical fact time, geopolitical rivalries are evidently intensifying, especially alone already ties Singapore to a maritime connectivity-based over competing visions of the “Indo-Pacific” — a concept that Indo-Pacific premise. Continued safe and secure access to the has been embraced by key regional powers such as Australia, sea lines of communications joining these two oceans forms Japan and the U.S., but largely opposed by China, which has the bedrock of the country’s national survival and prosperity. its own alternative vision in the form of the Belt and Road Even when seen from a strategic-political perspective, if one Initiative (BRI).77 argues that “Indo-Pacific” is not about the maritime connectivity between the two oceans, but rather India’s rising role, the Facing this ongoing competition between the giants, smaller and fact is that since the late 1980s and early 1990s, Singapore weaker countries in the region, especially those in Southeast has consistently brought India into the regional fold. In no Asia, generally feel a sense of trepidation. Singapore is not small part because of Singapore’s help, India has become a alone. Lee’s speech very much reflects the general sentiment dialogue partner with ASEAN. This enthusiasm was mainly of Singapore’s peers within the Association of Southeast Asian because Singapore believed that India could play a constructive Nations (ASEAN).78 To dwell upon a single speech in one evening countervailing role, especially in the post-Cold War context of would completely miss the point of how Singapore, among concerns about receding American strategic presence and the various ASEAN member states, has been trying assiduously to potential for China to fill this vacuum. balance competing geopolitical trends and national interests. If the whole discussion about ongoing geopolitical rivalries and As such, the Indo-Pacific strategic consciousness has always competing Indo-Pacific visions, Singapore appears to be an existed in Singapore’s outlook for the region. However, odd man in the room of these giants. The country has no Indo- Singapore has never elucidated its own Indo-Pacific strategy, Pacific vision or strategy to tout along the same lines asthe which therefore creates avenues for much speculation about “Free and Open Indo-Pacific” concept put forth by Japan and whether it may change gears, especially under Chinese the U.S. For example, ASEAN recently rolled out its collective influence or duress. For example, Joshua Kurlantzick wrote
STRATEGIES FOR THE INDO-PACIFIC: PERCEPTIONS OF THE U.S. AND LIKE-MINDED COUNTRIES “overall, it remains unclear whether China’s soft and sharp encourages Washington to continue its regional engagements.83 power approaches to the city-state are actually producing a On the other hand, Singapore continues to emphasize strategic Singaporean populace with more favorable views of China, cooperation with China via the economic and trade pathway, an environment in Singapore that would make the city-state chiefly focused on BRI.84 It is clear that Singapore continues to more willing to go along with Chinese foreign policy aims, or prioritize the U.S. as a primary security partner while seeing China really any shift in the receiving state (Singapore)’s long-term as an economic partner. This bifurcated approach has been views because of China’s actions.”81 Most commentators subject to much criticism about those contradictions at hand — often raise the 2016 debacle of Singapore Armed Forces’ the U.S. has been playing an immense economic and trade role Terrex armoured fighting vehicles detained in Hong Kong in the in the region, not just a military one. Meanwhile China’s growing context of bilateral tensions over Singapore’s open support for clout could mean Beijing is no longer satisfied to be viewed the Permanent Court of Arbitration ruling on the South China merely as an economic partner and would seek to promote a Sea, among other disagreements. Prime Minister Lee was also stronger military role commensurate with its growing clout. not on the guest list for China’s inaugural Belt and Road Forum, a move seen as Beijing’s snub to Singapore for failing to “toe In order to take these into consideration, Singapore has the line.” moved on various concurrent, parallel fronts. With China, the overall emphasis remains fixated on economic cooperation To be sure, Singapore has learned valuable lessons from these via BRI. Singapore took pains to point out that BRI will be incidents. The key lesson learned is to avoid “megaphone beneficial to parties who sign up for this initiative and tangibly diplomacy” — which could be somewhat grating upon Beijing’s strike new agreements under it, for example the Chongqing pride and prestige where it concerns “face” in the international Demonstration Initiative on Strategic Connectivity. In fact, arena. But fundamentally, Singapore’s position has never Singapore claims to be “an early and strong supporter” of BRI.85 changed. It continues to champion a rules-based order, and This should, at least plausibly in the minds of Singaporean even if it has been not so vocal about its views and quietly copes policy elites, placate Beijing and help to alleviate its suspicion with Indo-Pacific dynamics, the country has allowed its policy that Singapore is colluding with other major powers to contain actions speak louder than words. The ultimate objective has China.86 Considering Chinese complaints about sluggish always been to maintain that strategic balance between those progress made on the security front, when General Wei visited competing major powers and to manage their rivalries and find Singapore to attend the SLD, the two countries reached a possible avenues for them to work together within an inclusive deal to enhance defense cooperation.87 Moreover, Singapore, regional architecture, all while maintaining strategic autonomy in its capacity as ASEAN chair, helped facilitate the inaugural as a sovereign nation-state — and one not forced to take the ASEAN-China Maritime Exercise in August 2018. It is worth side of any major power.82 noting that bilateral military relations have begun from a low baseline, and the scope of cooperation has been tightly limited More Continuity Instead of Change to certain areas such as counter-terrorism, military medicine, In this strategic equation, one could observe more continuity and low-intensity naval exchanges. One practical reason than change in Singapore’s approach to the growing Indo- behind this slow development in military ties is because the two Pacific discourses. On the one hand, while acknowledging the militaries are diametrically different where it comes to doctrine, U.S. contributions to the region, both in terms of investments, training, and equipment — the Singapore Armed Forces is technological transfers and military presence, Singapore indoctrinated, trained, and equipped along Western lines,
28 | HUDSON INSTITUTE which makes it challenging to promote close interoperability preserve its strategic autonomy, and to seek ways to maximize with the PLA. its own national interests.
What is more interesting is that, around the same time it incrementally enhanced defense relations with China, A Quest for Strategic Centrality: The Singapore made prior and concurrent equivalent arrangements Sino-American Rivalry and ASEAN in the with other regional powers. In late 2017, Singapore and India Age of the Indo-Pacific agreed to enhance defense cooperation, including more port by Richard Javad Heydarian calls by Indian Navy ships and also provisions for mutual logistics support, and — perhaps of some concern to China Reflecting on the future of Asia’s rapidly evolving security — the proposal for a naval exercise involving India and ASEAN architecture, the late Singaporean Prime Minister Lee Kuan countries in the Strait of Malacca and Andaman Sea area.88 Yew cautioned, “The size of China’s displacement of the world Also around that same time, Singapore and the U.S. agreed to balance is such that the world must find a new balance. It is renew the 1990 Memorandum of Understanding (MOU) for the not possible to pretend that this is just another big player. This United States’ Use of Facilities in Singapore in 2020, which will is the biggest player in the history of the world.”91 In short, incorporate partnership elements of the U.S. National Defense China’s reemergence as the primary indigenous security actor Strategy.89 And in an apparent snub to China’s suggestion to in Asia does not only require a tactical “balance-of-power” exclude or limit foreign military exercises in the Single Draft readjustment, especially among immediate neighbors and rivals, Negotiating Text of the proposed Code of Conduct for the but instead portends an overhaul of the entire regional security South China Sea, ASEAN is planning its inaugural maritime architecture.92 With growing power, however, often comes exercise with the U.S. in September 2019 — and Singapore more aggressive ambitions, especially among revanchist former had a role to play in it as the ASEAN chair during the time of its empires, such as China, tinged with an expansionist impulse. announcement.90 Ever the wide-eyed realist, Lee maintained that there is a widely “held consensus that the U.S. presence in the region should Evidently, Singapore seeks to ensure that U.S. security be sustained” — crucially, not due to some irrational clamor for engagements in the region continue at a pace ahead of China’s militaristic containment of China, but instead because “military in order to preserve the predominant American stabilizing role. presence does not need to be used to be useful,” and that This is in no small measure attributed to Singapore’s continued American “presence [alone] makes a difference and makes for concerns about the strategic uncertainties brought about by peace and stability in the region.” first, China’s rise and growing assertiveness, and second, trepidation over the Trump administration’s policies towards The Singaporean leader saw this formula — namely, the need the region. While doing so, Singapore assiduously tries to for the U.S. to act as an “onshore balancer”93 — most relevant convince China that it is not joining any attempt at containing in the case of the South China Sea disputes, since “China it, as seen in its open support for the BRI — a flagship project will not let an international court arbitrate territorial disputes under President Xi Jinping. And it also acceded to Beijing’s in the South China Sea,” a claim that proved prescient, when requests by incrementally enhancing bilateral defense ties. All China categorically rejected the Arbitral Tribunal award at in all, it reflects Singapore’s longstanding and relentless quest The Hague years later as a piece of “trash paper.”94 In fact, to maintain a balance between the competing major powers, China unabashedly adopted the “three nos” policy of non-
STRATEGIES FOR THE INDO-PACIFIC: PERCEPTIONS OF THE U.S. AND LIKE-MINDED COUNTRIES participation, non-recognition, and non-compliance vis-à-vis a In many ways, this is also how one should understand the final and binding international ruling.95 ASEAN’s dilemma and approach vis-à-vis the Free and Open Indo-Pacific (FOIP) doctrine. On one hand, the FOIP signals For the Singaporean leader, the best antidote to Chinese growing American resolve, along with key allies and strategic revanchist instincts, and defiance of international law, is “the partners such as Japan, Australia and India, to check China’s [continued] presence of U.S. firepower in the Asia-Pacific” so revisionism. In the same breath, there is growing worry, if not that the “[United Nations] Law of the Sea [will] prevail.” In short, outright suspicion, among smaller Southeast Asian states that he saw international law, and by extension the observation the brewing Cold War, and the broader ‘Indo-Pacific’ discourse, of regional norms and principles, effective if, and only if, it’s is a direct threat to the “ASEAN centrality” (AC), namely anchored by American naval prowess. And it’s precisely within Southeast Asian nations’ collective effort to shape and preserve this context, namely Southeast Asian country’s desire for an an inclusive regional security architecture beyond the grip of any American counterbalance to Chinese hegemonic ambitions major power.99 After all, the very notion of AC, and its staunch that one should understand the relevance of recent initiatives advocacy by small and middle powers across the Asia-Pacific, such as, the inaugural ASEAN-U.S. Maritime Exercise (AUMX) was precisely about avoiding a return to bipolar and multipolar in early-September.96 The five-day exercise covered a vast rivalries following the end of Cold War in Asia. No wonder then, expanse of waters stretching from the Sattahip naval base in ASEAN is scrambling to reassert its centrality and shape the Chonburi province in Gulf of Tonkin to Cape Cà Mau on the Cà concept and operationalization of the Indo-Pacific paradigm in Mau Peninsula in Vietnam. There were also non-drill activities in its own image. archipelagic Southeast Asian nations of Brunei and Singapore, which permanently hosts American Littoral Combat Ships. The From Miracle to Stasis geographical pivot of the exercises was the South China Sea, Before his tragic death at the hands of German Nazism, the with both the U.S. and ASEAN signaling their shared interest in early-20th century philosopher Walter Benjamin famously keeping Chinese maritime ambitions at bay. warned, “Behind every fascism, there is a failed revolution.” In many ways, the ASEAN’s current predicament, namely China’s Interestingly, the first U.S.-ASEAN joint maritime drills came revanchism and its progressive peripherality in shaping the just a year after a similar exercise between ASEAN and regional security architecture, is a reflection of its collective China. Thus, the AUMX was less about the U.S. rallying failure to rise to the occasion. The whole region is suffering due smaller countries against China, but more of a reflection of the to what can be termed as a “Kantian deficit,” the absence of a ASEAN’s sophisticated policy of omni-balancing — namely, “perpetual peace” under the auspices of a robust and effective preserving maximum strategic autonomy through sustained, league of likeminded, pacifist nations.100 ASEAN is confronting non-committal engagement with (competing) major powers.97 what I termed as the “middle institutionalization trap,” namely This way, ASEAN aims to constrain a rising power’s (China) the institutional structure and decision-making processes, aggression though flexible cooperation with the status quo which allowed the regional body to establish a robust security power (America). In short, Southeast Asian nations prefer community in the twentieth century, is now painfully insufficient to outsource “hard balancing” to external powers in order to to address the new challenges of the twenty-first century.101 strengthen their bargaining chip when dealing with China. This is an essential element of ASEAN’s struggle for autonomy within Even prominent Southeast Asian expert Amitav Acharya has a competitive security environment.98 wondered if “ASEAN centrality is as much a product of external
30 | HUDSON INSTITUTE players in Southeast Asia as it is of the ASEAN members Malaysia and Singapore were at loggerheads, locked in a themselves,” since “one suspects that its emergence had more perilous Konfrontasi logic.105 Meanwhile, the Philippines and to do with the dynamics of Great Power relationships than with Malaysia teetered on the verge of war amid festering disputes any projection of ASEAN’s internal unity or identity.”102 over the oil-rich Sabah. At the same time, both the Western- aligned (Thailand and the Philippines) and ‘non-aligned’ To be fair, there is the undeniable element of tyranny of nations (Indonesia, Singapore and Malaysia) of Southeast Asia geography. It’s in Southeast Asia, the ancient backyard for confronted a menacing communist expansionism in the Indo- Beijing’s imperial machinations, where the rise of China is most China, as Laos, Cambodia and Vietnam fell behind the Asian pungent and disruptive. Equally, however, ASEAN also shares iron curtain and various communist insurgencies gained ground the blame for not embracing necessary institutional innovation in archipelagic Southeast Asia. ASEAN’s creation, thus, was a and strategic dynamism to confront the challenge head on. The largely defensive and visionary move to coalesce core Southeast implication is clear, either the regional body will have to reform Asian nations of Thailand, the Philippines, Indonesia, Malaysia, its operating principles or, alternatively, risk a fast fade into and Singapore around shared threat perceptions, while making irrelevance within an increasingly unstable regional environment. sure they didn’t sleep-walk into war among themselves. And Institutional decay, if left unchecked, disempowers Southeast the strategic result defied all expectations. Asian countries, leaving them with limited agency and means for protecting their core interests. Within a single generation, ASEAN went from a wild shot at peace into arguably the most successful regional integration The reality is that ASEAN, in its current form, is ripe for strategic experience in the post-colonial world, as even communist and hijack by external powers, especially China. The veteran post-communist Southeast Asian countries later joined the Singaporean diplomat Barry Desker rightly points out this regional grouping. Astonishingly, ASEAN achieved this with troubling dynamic103 when highlighting the “ability of external a skeletal bureaucracy and barely any Copenhagen Criteria- parties to shape the positions of ASEAN members on regional type of incentive system for aspiring members.106 To put things issues,” most especially when “China exerts its influence into perspective, while the EU enjoyed a 30,000-strong civil on ASEAN members to prevent any decisions which could service staff,107 which focused on crafting and implementation affect its preference for bilateral negotiations” over multilateral of integration policies, with a multi-billion-dollar budget (equal engagement with the ASEAN collective. In recent years, China to 1% of EU budget), the ASEAN secretariat has had just over has rapidly transformed from a strategic partner to a de facto 200 staff operating on, until recent years, a meager $10 million veto-player within the ASEAN. How did it achieve this? The budget.108 Even more impressively, ASEAN established a peace answer partly lies in the regional body’s own institutional design, regime, or a de facto “security community,” where even the particularly its (mis)conception of the notion of “consensus.” threat of use of force, never mind actual military mobilization, became unthinkable as an instrument of inter-state relations. Since its inception, ASEAN relied on two key principles to This is most evident in the decision of Southeast Asian cajole the most fractious and diverse nations — along ethnic, countries to either place their territorial disputes on the back religious, political, and developmental fautlines — into a security burner (Philippines and Malaysia) or take them to international community: The twin pillars of the ASEAN experiment were arbitration, as in the case of Indonesia-Malaysia maritime the principles of consultation (Mushawara) and consensus disputes (Pulau Ligitan and Pulau Sipadan)109 and Thailand- (Muafakat).104 At the dawn of the Cold War, Indonesia, Cambodia border disputes, particularly over the Temple of
STRATEGIES FOR THE INDO-PACIFIC: PERCEPTIONS OF THE U.S. AND LIKE-MINDED COUNTRIES Preah Vihear.110 Contrast the “perpetual peace” among the ASEAN chairmanship, and, four years later, complained, with ASEAN nations with the “perpetual war,” Game of Thrones-like genuine frustration, amid the South China Sea arbitration at relations among West Asian nations, which have only half the The Hague: “It is very unjust for Cambodia, using Cambodia population of Southeast Asia. In recent years, even Persian Gulf to counter China. They use us and curse us…this is not about sheikhdoms have been at loggerheads amid the protracted laws, it is totally about politics….”116 Saudi-led siege on Qatar.111 The situation has further deteriorated under the Rodrigo Duterte Yet, as Hegelian dialectics would suggest, success can presidency, as the Philippines pivoted away from the U.S. in an also sow the seeds of defeat, especially when strategic unabashed embrace of China, especially within the ASEAN. complacency sets in. The Original Sin of ASEAN is its willful During his chairmanship of the regional body, the anti-Western misinterpretation of the concept of consensus, which operates Filipino leader effectively toed China’s line in blunt language, as unanimity. This (mis)interpretation has profound implications, telling external powers such as the U.S., Australia, and Japan, especially amid the evolving Indo-Pacific security environment. that the South China Sea disputes are “better left untouched.”117 Unanimity-based decision-making on critical strategic issues, Even more, he has effectively ignored the Philippines’ own especially concerning territorial disputes in the South China arbitration award victory against China, insisting that it’s Manila’s Sea, means that Beijing will have to only coax and cajole (or sovereign right not to assert its sovereign rights against Beijing.118 rather bribe) a single member-state to undermine ASEAN unity, Under Duterte, ASEAN is turned into a Chinese shield against and, by extension, AC. On a more fundamental level, this is multilateral efforts to hold Beijing to account for its militarization an unsustainable decision-making mechanism, since it treats of high seas and maritime disputes in Asia’s maritime heartland. unequal nations equally, precisely what philosophers such as The upshot is ASEAN peripherality on one of the most important Aristotle considered as a primordial form of injustice.112 A single strategic questions of the century. This is a strategic travesty of nation, regardless of size or degree of interest, has an equal say titanic proportions. As Singaporean diplomat Bilahari Kausikan on any major issue confronting the ASEAN. In effect, this gives memorably remarked, the South China Sea dispute is “where each member state a de facto veto-power. the parameters of U.S.-China competition and their interests are most clearly defined.” For Harvard University’s Graham Allison, Upon closer examination, the situation is even more complex and the disputes represent a potential “Thucydides trap,” where the problematic: the unanimity-based decision-making process is next global conflict could erupt.119 also unfair to weaker member states, which are most vulnerable to external coercion.113 The very fact that China knows it has to ASEAN’s basic illusion, namely the wishful thought that just convince one country to disrupt ASEAN unity on an issue unanimity-based decision-making, is a sufficient institutional of direct interest, it will inevitably pressure the weakest link arrangement for 21st century geopolitics has now been fully within the region to toe its line. This is precisely why countries exposed. As the playwright Arthur Miller memorably observed, such as Cambodia, who heavily relies on Chinese largesse,114 “An era can be considered over when its basic illusions have have sought to expunge the South China Sea disputes from been exhausted.” Naturally, the way forward is for the regional regional discussions altogether or, at least, extricate themselves body to reconfigure its institutional arrangements or adopt from making any major statement on it. This is precisely why new decision-making modalities altogether. For instance, the the Cambodian Prime Minister Hun Sen has tried to block the effective and time-tested “ASEAN Minus X” formula, whereby discussion of the disputes,115 most controversially during his unanimity isn’t a prerequisite for collective action, can be applied
32 | HUDSON INSTITUTE in politico-security matter.120 The appropriately majoritarian adopted on a collective, multilateral level.124 Maybe ASEAN formula was immensely effective during trade negotiations claimant states can apply the same logic on a South China Sea within the ASEAN. No wonder then, as early as 1992, Southeast COC by elevating it to negotiations with China. Asian nations signed the ASEAN Free-Trade Area Agreement (AFTA), with the stated goal of reducing tariff barriers between The ultimate goal is to avoid the hijacking of the ASEAN by member states. And the region was successfully able to bring external powers and weak links due to a suboptimal unanimity- tariffs down to 0-5% within a relatively short period.121 By 2003, based decision-making process on the collective level. ASEAN leaders, under the Bali Concord II, decided to push the ASEAN can also discuss other minilateral arrangements such envelope and contemplate an ASEAN Economic Community as Indonesia President Joko Widodo’s call for joint patrols125 (AEC). Having achieved its AFTA target ahead of time, the region in disputed waters, or Malaysian Prime Minister Mahathir presented a more ambitious plan in 2007, when members Mohamad’s call for demilitarization, multilateral, rather than agreed to create an ASEAN Economic Community by 2015. bilateral, negotiations,126 and clarification of China’s precise The AEC is likely to take the form of an “Free trade agreement- claims in the disputed area.127 Down the road, ASEAN should plus” arrangement, which allows for greater intra-regional factor also consider greater integration with proximate, likeminded mobility (capital and labor), a more comprehensive zero-tariff powers, including associate membership arrangements with policy on intra-regional trade, and further coordination on Australia and New Zealand in coming decades. Desperate economic policies with regard to infrastructure, investments, times call for dizzyingly creative solutions.128 services, financial markets. Competing Visions for the Indo-Pacific Alternatively, the ASEAN could go a step further and adopt Despite signs of institutional decay, the ASEAN retains a major the European Union’s often-used weighted qualified majority strength: its “convening power.”129 ASEAN meetings and voting modality, where geopolitical heft and population density mechanisms, including the ASEAN Regional Forum (ARF), of member-states are properly taken into consideration.122 remain as few multilateral platforms where all major Indo-Pacific As an interim measure, the ASEAN can move towards powers and actors, including North Korea, can directly engage “minilateralism,” whereby likeminded core ASEAN members each other. ASEAN is the closest we’ve come to an omni- can cooperate on specific issues on a flexible basis in multilateral avenue for negotiating the future of the region. And parallel to multilateral decision-making within the ASEAN. For despite all the “talk-shop” criticisms, the regional body provides instance, active Southeast Asian claimant states such as the an important alternative to direct conflict. As Winston Churchill Philippines, Malaysia, and Vietnam can adopt their own Code reportedly said, “to jaw-jaw is always better than to war-war” of Conduct (COC) in the South China Sea based on ASEAN (though apparently, he less quotably said “to jaw jaw is better norms of peaceful dispute-settlement and the United Nations than war”).130 Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS). This way, the ASEAN can transcend the COC negotiations with China, which Moreover, ASEAN members, such as Singapore, have also have been bogged down by Beijing’s notorious delaying tactics, become a global platform and hub in their own right. This is unreasonable demands, and outright belligerence.123 Moreover, most palpable in the case of the Shangri-La Dialogue (SLD), the minilateral can bleed into the multilateral overtime; we have among the most prestigious defense fora in the world, which already observed what I call the “osmotic integration” process, annually brings together leading experts and defense officials whereby a minilateral Counter-Terrorism Convention was later from across the Indo-Pacific and beyond. The 2018 edition of
STRATEGIES FOR THE INDO-PACIFIC: PERCEPTIONS OF THE U.S. AND LIKE-MINDED COUNTRIES the SLD, however, stood out for one key reason: It effectively Indo-Pacific, China is a clear and present danger to freedom declared the official beginning of the Indo-Pacific era. Inhis and prosperity.137 In both its National Security Strategy (NSS)138 keynote speech,131 the Indian Prime Minister Narendra Modi and National Defense Strategy (NDS) papers139, the Trump confidently marked the emergence of the South Asian nation administration made it clear that confronting a revisionist China as a global power — and pillar of peace and prosperity at is going to be a defining feature of 21st century geopolitics, the crossroads of the Pacific and Indian Oceans. Presenting especially in the Indo-Pacific. Mattis portrayed China as a his country as a global “swing state,” Modi underscored New direct menace, thanks to its “militarization of artificial features Delhi’s commitment to use its burgeoning naval and commercial in the South China Sea” through the “deployment of anti-ship power to preserve a “free and open” Indo-Pacific anchored by a missiles, surface-to-air missiles, electronic jammers and, more Rules-Based Order (RBO).132 In a (rare) expression of fidelity to recently, the landing of bomber aircraft at Woody Island [in the the Nehruvian tradition,133 the Indian leader touted his country’s Paracels].”140 The former defense secretary underscored the deftly-managed and sophisticated strategic non-alignment, as indispensability of American power to regional stability, touting evident in the “maturity and wisdom” of Sino-Indian relations, the importance of the U.S. Navy’s “freedom of navigation for all in the “extraordinary breadth” of U.S.-Indian relations, and the nations” across the Pacific and Indian Oceans. “special and privileged” strategic partnership with Russia. Months later, U.S. Vice-President Mike Pence made a historic At the heart of Modi’s message was the principle of speech at The Hudson Institute, which left no room for “congagement” towards a rising China,134 whereby India, along speculation as to the Trump administration’s commitment to a with other likeminded middle powers Australia, Japan, South “constrainment” strategy against China.141 As the late political Korea, and the ASEAN, should engage China where they scientist Gerald Segal explained, a constrainment strategy “is should, but also draw the line when necessary. In his paradigm, intended to tell [China] that the outside world has interests that the middle powers will usher in a post-American era, which will be defended by means of incentives for good behavior, is not dominated by Beijing, but instead anchored by shared deterrence of bad behavior, and punishment when deterrence values of freedom, peace, and prosperity. He envisioned a fails.”142 In his Washington Post Op-Ed before the end of the rules-based Indo-Pacific order, with the middle powers as its year, Pence warned revisionist powers such as China that the ultimate guarantors, without excluding either the U.S. or China U.S. and its allies “will stand up to anyone who threatens our from the equation. interests and our values.” Beginning with former Indo-Pacific Commander Admiral Harry Harris,143 who is now the U.S. Equally important, however, was the speech of then-U.S. Ambassador to South Korea, the Pentagon has stepped up Defense Secretary James Mattis, who forwarded a more its call on likeminded countries, especially the Quadrilateral muscular vision of a FOIP, where China’s revanchist ambitions (QUAD) grouping of Australia, India, U.S. and Japan, to jointly must be checked lest we compromise peace and freedom in contribute to a FOIP, whether through economic measures, Asia. While China forges ahead with dominating continental naval drills and freedom of navigation operations, or diplomatic Eurasia, thanks to its ambitious and neo-imperial Belt and coordination.144 Road Initiative (BRI) across semi-democratic and authoritarian regimes from Central Asia to Eastern Europe,135 Washington To this end, Washington also launched the Indo-Pacific seems intent on checking Beijing’s march in the Eurasian Transparency Initiative to monitor, expose, and counter threats rimlands and the high seas.136 According to this vision of the to basic freedoms in international waters and China’s “debt trap”
34 | HUDSON INSTITUTE diplomacy, which threatens the sovereignty of smaller nations, in the regional security architecture; thus, it has to be engaged from Sri Lanka and Maldives to Malaysia and Pakistan.145 In largely through ASEAN mechanisms, rather than seen primarily this sense, the Trump administration’s vision for the Indo- through the prism of Cold War rivalry and strategic threat.152 Pacific leaves less space for passive strategic engagement ASEAN wants to focus more on money (trade deals with China) while emphasizing the needed for proactive dissuasion and than missiles (in the South China Sea). The upshot of Indonesia’s deterrence against Chinese revisionism.146 Predictably, China effort was the ASEAN Summit in Bangkok in June 2019, where has dismissed the whole Indo-Pacific discourse as a hostile the regional members adopted the ASEAN Outlook on the Indo- rhetoric and poor cover for new containment designs. The Pacific (AOIP).153 Chinese Foreign Minister Wang Yi derisively characterized it as an “attention-grabbing idea,” which will “dissipate like ocean At its core, the AOIP is a reiteration of AC, where ASEAN will foam.”147 The question now is: What about ASEAN? “continue to maintain its central role in the evolving regional architecture in Southeast Asia and its surrounding regions” and Both the Modi and Trump administrations’ visions of the Indo- remain an “an honest broker within the strategic environment Pacific, however, have not been fully welcomed by ASEAN and of competing interests,” promoting an “open,” “transparent,” its core members. There is a lingering sense among Southeast “inclusive,” “rules-based” order built on “respect for international Asian countries that the whole Indo-Pacific discourse is a thinly- law.”154 It calls on ASEAN, or rather other countries which are veiled cover for a containment strategy by the QUAD against doubtful of the regional body’s relevance, to “lead the shaping China and, even more crucially, at the expense of ASEAN of their economic and security architecture and ensure that centrality.148 In short, the implicit message is: “Step aside [little] such dynamics will continue to bring about peace, security, guys, let the big boys take care of the [China] problem!” stability and prosperity for the peoples in the Southeast Asia as well as in the wider Asia-Pacific and Indian Ocean regions or the At the most fundamental level, there is simply confusion and Indo-Pacific.” It reiterates the need for “avoiding the deepening perplexity vis-à-vis the whole Indo-Pacific concept, as Hoang of mistrust, miscalculation, and patterns of behavior based on Thi Ha of the Institute for Southeast Asian Studies explains, a zero-sum game.” “there is no common understanding or authoritative definition of the term even among its proponents.”149 Indonesia, ASEAN’s At times, the AOIP looks both defensive and, in less charitable undeclared leader and the cradle of the global Non-Aligned terms, a vacuous attempt at demanding centrality rather Movement, has scrambled to respond. In recent years, it has than demonstrating it. Moving forward, ASEAN should pushed for an alternative ASEAN-centered conception of the simultaneously contemplate institutional innovations and Indo-Pacific. The Indonesian Foreign Minister Retno Marsudi, reforms, which will allow it to effectively draw the line vis-à-vis for instance, unveiled a more inclusive version of the Indo- Chinese expansionism; it also should welcome closer strategic Pacific, which promotes an “open, transparent, and inclusive” cooperation with middle powers of Japan, Australia and India, order based on “the habit of dialogue, promoting cooperation which aid capacity-building in ASEAN and have maintained and friendship, and upholding international law.”150 Her ideas robust communication channels with Beijing.155 This is the best build on earlier efforts by former Indonesia diplomatic chief way for smaller nations to preserve their strategic autonomy Marty Natalegawa, who tirelessly advocated for AC in shaping in the age of Chinese revisionism. Preserving freedom and the pan-regional security architecture.151 From the Indonesian, prosperity in the Indo-Pacific will ultimately have to bea and more broadly ASEAN, standpoint, China is a critical element collective effort, with ASEAN as a proactive contributor.
STRATEGIES FOR THE INDO-PACIFIC: PERCEPTIONS OF THE U.S. AND LIKE-MINDED COUNTRIES Australia’s View of the In making the case for a Free and Open Indo-Pacific, Bishop Free & Open Indo-Pacific further argues,158 by John Lee One reason why the rules-based order underwrites In a series of speeches from March 2017 onward, leading stability in power and wealth is that such an order up to the release of the Foreign Policy White Paper (FPWP) does not privilege previous winners nor constrain in November 2017, Australian Foreign Minister Julie Bishop opportunity for newcomers. Its basic principle articulated key aspects of the Free and Open Indo-Pacific, is the rule of law where governments, firms, and which was subsequently endorsed by Prime Minister Malcolm individuals enjoy rights and fulfill obligations Turnbull in his 2017 Shangri La Dialogue address three months regardless of wealth or power. In a world of later, and by counterparts in the U.S. and Japan.156 [increasing competition], it becomes more important that countries abide by the rules rather than break Bishop stated in her March 2017 Fullerton Lecture in them. Singapore:157 The classic reiteration of the liberal international worldview is It is a fact of life that we compete or we fall not new ground for the Tony Abbott and Turnbull governments. behind. It is how nations choose to compete Even so, there are several noteworthy and novel aspects to the that really matters….There has been a concerted contemporary Free and Open Indo-Pacific being championed international effort to ensure that more powerful and pursued under the Trump/Abe/Turnbull governments. nations do not bully their neighbours. History tells us then when “Might Makes Right” prevails, it sets From “Asia-Pacific” to “Indo-Pacific” humanity on a dark path towards conflict in our Japan has transitioned from “Asia-Pacific” to “Indo-Pacific” international relations. terminology since the early years of Abe’s second term in office in 2012, onward. In Australia’s 2016 Defence White When the strong impose their will on the weaker Paper, the Indo-Pacific terminology was used to describe the state, it invariably leads to the latter’s resentment country’s primary areas of responsibility and interest from a of unfair agreements imposed on them. The better defense acquisition, planning, and force posture point of view alternative is the existing rules-based order which has — terminology reaffirmed in the FPWP.159 served the region remarkably well… The evidence is overwhelming that countries buying into the system There are several reasons why Australia decided to focus on the of rules have fared much better than those which Indo-Pacific. The most obvious is to bring India into the strategic have not. equation. The Australian support for the revival of the Quad meetings between officials from the U.S., Japan, Australia, and Nevertheless, the regional order is under strain as India should be understood in this light. nations occasionally use their military or economic weight to push the envelope, while accusing Moreover, China has moved toward a “Two-Ocean” strategy, the rules-based order of being a relic from a consisting of the Pacific and Indian Oceans.160 The Indian Ocean different era. contains what China calls its “far-seas operations,” a concept that
36 | HUDSON INSTITUTE has been in place since the middle of the previous decade and Balance of Power and the arose out of China’s desire to guarantee the security of energy “Free and Open Indo-Pacific” and other imports into the mainland.161 Its 2015 Defense White The U.S.-centric hub-and-spokes system, which has its roots Paper states that the “traditional mentality that land outweighs in the early days of the Cold War, remains the backbone of the sea must be abandoned…great importance has to be attached security architecture in the region. In the absence of a North to managing the seas and oceans and protecting maritime rights Atlantic Treaty Organisation-style collective security architecture, and interests.”162 As an authoritative 2013 People’s Liberation the U.S. has been far more successful in forging robust alliances Army (PLA) document explains, the PLA Navy’s area of interest with Northeast Asian powers (Japan and South Korea) than is an “arc-shaped strategic zone that covers the Western Pacific with Southeast Asian states, which remain significantly smaller Ocean and Northern Indian Ocean” and includes the littoral military players than Japan or South Korea. regions of Asia, Africa and Oceania.163 In more recent times, the “21st Century Maritime Silk Road” component of Xi’s Belt and The U.S. is committed to Japan and South Korea, and the Road Initiative (BRI) has ensured that additional economic and alliances’ strategic planning and military interactions are strategic importance is placed on the Indian Ocean.164 extensive, formalised and entrenched. However, the U.S.’s strategic and military interactions with Southeast Asian allies Given China’s growing interest and presence in the Indian (the Philippines and Thailand) and security partners (Singapore Ocean, it makes sense to compete in the same space rather and Malaysia) are less formalized or extensive. than vacate that space. India is not a major strategic player in East Asia but does view the Indian Ocean as its primary area of In recent times, U.S. alliances with Japan and Australia have interest and responsibility and sees itself as a “power maximizer” become more important from the perspective of regional in that ocean. stability in the period since the end of the Cold War and in the contemporary era of China’s rise (with the U.S.-South Any joint military action with India and the U.S., Japan, or Korea alliance having major relevance for affairs in the Korean Australia, against a common naval competitor (i.e., China), Peninsula rather than the broader region). This stems from the would require an immense shift in strategic thinking and fact that the Japanese and Australian militaries (especially their culture. However, a low-cost option for these three countries navies) are among the most formidable in the region, have a would be to build the foundations for enhanced maritime high degree of inter-operability with the American Seventh Fleet, cooperation with India. At the least, courting India lowers the with the inter-operability of the Japanese and Australian fleets chance that an isolated New Delhi will seek to join the Beijing improving rapidly, and the high degree of trust the Americans bandwagon. place in the Japanese and Australians when it comes to sharing strategic intelligence and information. As the strategic rivalry between New Delhi and Beijing will only increase over time, the permanent and increasing weight and Although Washington did not necessarily foresee the more role of New Delhi in the Indian Ocean will complicate matters proactive strategic posture of the Shinzo Abe era, a greater for Beijing. Even if strategic and maritime coordination, let strategic role for Japan is welcomed and greatly encouraged. alone cooperation, with New Delhi is ad hoc and inconsistent, While there is constant public debate within Australia with expanding possibilities for any greater role by India will serve respect to whether it should adopt a more independent foreign American, Japanese and Australian interest in structural terms. policy, governments of both Coalition and Labor Parties
STRATEGIES FOR THE INDO-PACIFIC: PERCEPTIONS OF THE U.S. AND LIKE-MINDED COUNTRIES continue to view the alliance with the U.S. as the bedrock of with regional countries, soft multilateral institutions to support Australian and regional security and stability — a policy position the American role and presence in the region, and U.S. support clearly articulated in the 2000,165 2009,166 2013,167 and 2016168 for economic and political liberalisation. Defence White Papers. During the decades after the Second World War, “winning the Over the past decade, the U.S. has urged and welcomed the peace” largely meant checking the spread of communism in development of closer strategic, defense, and intelligence East Asia. The U.S. National Security Strategy (NSS) makes cooperation between Japan and Australia. It is now clear that while there is no longer a communist threat, the U.S. commonplace for Australia to characterise Japan as our is in another era of competition:171 closest and most mature partner from the region.169 In terms of formal compacts, key agreements include the 2007 Joint The United States will respond to the growing Declaration on Security Cooperation, which provides for political, economic, and military competitions we cooperation on issues such as maritime and aviation security face around the world. China and Russia challenge and non-proliferation of weapons of mass destruction, the American power, influence, and interests, attempting Acquisition and Cross Services Agreement on defence to erode American security and prosperity. logistics cooperation, which entered into force in 2013, and an Information Security Agreement on sharing intelligence and Furthermore, and with respect specifically to the Indo-Pacific, other classified information, which entered into force in 2017. the NSS argues:172
Both countries are working to conclude a “Reciprocal Access A geopolitical competition between free and Agreement” which would specify terms for allowing the military repressive visions of world order is taking place forces of these countries to conduct joint operations and in the Indo-Pacific… Although the United States exercises.170 The agreement is expected to be completed over seeks to continue to cooperate with China, China the next year or so and Australia would join the U.S. as the only is using economic inducements and penalties, other country with whom Japan has signed such an agreement influence operations, and implied military threats in the post-war period. to persuade other states to heed its political and security agenda… The closer strategic, military, and intelligence cooperation between the U.S., Japan, and Australia is explicitly framed in This is recognition that the challenge China poses is vastly the context of advancing a Free and Open Indo-Pacific. The different from that posed by the Soviet Union. While the NSS deepening cooperation between these three countries and its acknowledges “The U.S. interest in a free and open Indo-Pacific connection to the Free and Open Indo-Pacific concept can be extends back to the earliest days of our republic,”173 the U.S. is placed in the following contexts. facing a Chinese authoritarian competitor from within the liberal order. It is a competitor that has “exploited the international In the post-war period, General MacArthur’s call to “preserve in institutions we helped build” and is selectively circumventing, peace what we won in war” was achieved through a combination ignoring, or else challenging the rules-based order and many of of military alliances and security relationships, economic support its core principles, even as it has benefitted as a participant and for post-war economies, and increasing economic integration free-rider within it.
38 | HUDSON INSTITUTE There is little doubt Japan and Australia agree with this Pacific region, China and to a lesser extent Russia are the two assessment even if Tokyo and Canberra have not expressed authoritarian powers that have been named by the U.S. and are such concerns about China and the latter’s challenge to unnamed by Japan and Australia. the rules-based order in the same stark terms.174 In official documents and pronouncements, Australia comes closest. There are three aspects to creating a balance of power favorable to a Free and Open Indo-Pacific that are worth noting — and In her Fullerton Lecture in March 2017, Australian Foreign which critics of the concept often ignore or misunderstand. Minister Bishop made the following comments:175 First, a favorable balance of power is conceptually and [T]he domestic political system and values of the operationally different to containment, as was the case in the United States reflect the liberal rules-based order first few decades after the end of the Second World War. that we seek to preserve and defend. Containment seeks to restrict the growth in the absolute power While non-democracies can thrive when and influence of the adversary or competitor. In contradistinction, participating in the present system, an essential a favorable balance of power supporting a Free and Open Indo- pillar of our preferred order is democratic Pacific seeks to combine the weight of those adhering to the community. Democratic habits of negotiating and liberal, rules-based order to ensure that there are stable and compromise are essential to countries resolving enduring incentives for all nations to play by the rules and their disagreements according to international law disincentives for nations to break them. In the case of the and rules. Indo-Pacific, the three democratic countries are not seeking to contain Chinese power. They are seeking to ensure sufficient In the 2017 Foreign Policy White Paper (FPWP), which was collective power and will to ensure that growing Chinese power launched eight months later, the following passage justifiably is not used to challenge, circumvent, or ignore, the rules-based generated much interest:176 order. This is reaffirmed in the NSS. Ultimately, the objective is to encourage China and other powers to champion the same To support a balance in the Indo-Pacific favourable rules and principles. to our interests and promote an open, inclusive and rules-based region, Australia will also work more Second, the focus on working with other powerful liberal closely with the region’s democracies, bilaterally democracies is significant. It represents a stronger collective and in small groupings. In addition to the United reaffirmation of the importance of the liberal characteristics States, our relations with Japan, Indonesia, India of the current regional rules-based order and a refocusing on and the republic of Korea are central to this agenda. “democratic community.”
This brings us to a major rationale for Australia’s joining the This was spelled out by Foreign Minister Bishop:177 U.S. and Japan in promoting a “Free and Open Indo-Pacific” — it is a response to the tendency of powerful authoritarian History shows democracy and democratic states to challenge, circumvent, or ignore aspects of the current institutions are essential for nations if they are to order when it is convenient for them to do so. In the Indo- reach their economic potential.
STRATEGIES FOR THE INDO-PACIFIC: PERCEPTIONS OF THE U.S. AND LIKE-MINDED COUNTRIES The only countries in the world who have escaped The regulation of such competition takes several forms. One the middle-income trap to become high-income aspect is to promote greater separation between economic and and advanced economies are democracies — with political agency and objectives. As Bishop argues in an address the exception of a small number of oil-rich Middle in October 2016,178 Eastern states. The power and force-projection capabilities of Liberal-democratic institutions such as rule-of-law, the American Pacific Fleet throughout the Indo- rather than rule by executive privilege, independent Pacific is not leveraged to coerce or have any and competent courts, protection of property and bearing on the operation of economic activity and intellectual property rights from state appropriation competition in the region. If Exxon Mobile loses or theft, and limitations on the role of the state in out to a foreign petroleum company in a legitimate commercial and social affairs remain the prerequisites economic transaction, the liberal rules-based for stable and prosperous societies, as they do for order means the United States cannot use its the creation of a vibrant and innovative private sector. military or economic power to intervene. Powerful countries can legitimately use their political or Note that these sentiments do not entail a new era of aggressive military power to protect their citizens abroad. democracy promotion by the U.S. and its two allies. It is However, they cannot threaten or force foreign more a reassertion of the importance of strengthening liberal governments and other entities to achieve some institutions, emphasising the separation of powers, limits on desired economic result. executive privilege and the rule of law. The three governments are more interested in institutions and practices of governments Operationalizing a Free and Open Indo-Pacific that encourage habits of compromise, negotiation and The Free and Open Indo-Pacific concept delivers a moral and transparency than they are in the number of parties contesting strategic reason and rationale for greater cooperation between domestic elections. the U.S., Japan, and Australia. As with any framework involving multiple countries, misalignment and inconsistency of policies “Democratic community” should not be viewed with the level of make operationalizing that framework a challenge. discomfort that is often the case in the region. It is worth noting that the ASEAN Charter itself includes aspirations to strengthen While there seems to be little alignment of economic and trade democracy, enhance good governance and the rule of law, and policies, the operationalizing of the Free and Open Indo-Pacific to promote and protect human rights and fundamental freedoms. is more promising in other areas.
This leads to a further point about the economic aspects of a Trilateral defense cooperation between the three countries Free and Open Indo-Pacific. is based on ever closer inter-operability of air, maritime and cyber capabilities, improvements in strategic intelligence and The concept accepts the reality of economic competition and information sharing, and establishing the future foundations for competition between nations carried out in the economic realm. joint exercises between Japanese and Australian forces, which However, economic and other forms of competition should would easily evolve into trilateral exercises with the addition of be regulated. the U.S.
40 | HUDSON INSTITUTE One particularly important area for cooperation is submarine terms of each BRI agreement is negotiated between China and and anti-submarine warfare, given collective concern these another country, with Beijing generally enjoying overwhelming three countries have about Chinese underwater activities leverage during these negotiations. in the Western and South Pacific Ocean. Indeed, the three countries have plans for the joint development of amphibious The point is that the BRI is seen to undercut the Free and Open capabilities.179 Another is the acquisition of F-35s by Japan and Indo-Pacific in a number of ways: it weakens the capacity of Australia, which is a significant step in an integrated, networked indebted countries to exist as sovereign nations when these air capability for the three countries. More broadly, greater overbearing debts are called in; it lowers common standards cooperation in the maritime, air, underwater and cyber domains for economic governance and transparency through the between the three countries is seen by all three countries conclusion of opaque agreements; it promotes investment for as essential to counter almost every aspect of the potential political rather than commercial purposes, thereby conflating military threat posed by the rapid modernization of the People’s commercial and political agency in the region; and it promotes Liberation Army.180 a closed economic and supply chain system that prioritizes the long-term interests of China over other countries. Despite the mixed messages and misalignment on economic and trade policy, there seems to be agreement on countering China’s use of economic incentives and largesse to reshape the India-U.S. Relations in the rules of interstate commerce in the region. Shadow of the Indo-Pacific by Aparna Pande The reluctance of the U.S., Japan, and Australia to sign on to the BRI is a case in point. There is strong suspicion within the three Since the end of the Second World War, American grand countries that the BRI is largely motivated by China’s desire to strategy for Asia and the Pacific has centered on creating bind BRI economies to terms that are beneficial to Beijing and an Asian diplomatic and security architecture that ensures less so for other countries — at the expense of the economic stability and security in the region. American preeminence interest and regional influence of the U.S. and its allies.181 has ensured a rules-based order, which opposes notions of ideological dominance (such as the rise of communism) or Canberra has consistently expressed concerns about arbitrary assertions of territorial claims and disputes (such as countries falling into debt traps and subsequently having their those relating to the status of Taiwan). The post-World War II national interests compromised and sovereignty undermined Asian security structure has rested on American economic and by creditor countries (i.e., China)182 — a situation that has military might, combined with a network of partners and allies played out in Sri Lanka, Laos, and Cambodia and potentially across the region. in other countries.183 The economic and military rise of China over the last two Unlike the Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank (AIIB), which decades poses a challenge to American pre-eminence. China is has a set of governance principles broadly consistent with those gradually creating a new Asian order with Chinese primacy at its of multilateral institutions like the World Bank, the BRI is a set of heart. U.S. strategy needs to be one of renewed engagement bilateral arrangements between China and individual countries. with its partners and allies across the region — India, Japan While China has just over one quarter of the votes in the AIIB, and South East Asia — to construct a configuration that will be
STRATEGIES FOR THE INDO-PACIFIC: PERCEPTIONS OF THE U.S. AND LIKE-MINDED COUNTRIES able to counter Chinese might. Currently, China’s economic and The end of the Cold War, along with economic liberalization military rise faces no structured challenge. Japan’s military role within India and a changing global situation, has allowed New is inhibited by its Constitution, while for years, many in Australia Delhi to start rebuilding relations with countries in Asia, especially and the United States have assumed China to be a benign in the Indo-Pacific.185 In recent years India’s, economic growth power and instead have invested in economic relationships and military modernization have led to rising ambitions in favoring their potential challenger. international politics as well as a new set of more prominent security concerns for New Delhi, namely China’s expansion into Like many other Asian countries, India has consistently viewed India’s backyard. China’s expanding influence with suspicion. This is partly a function of historical experience. India had engaged Communist India’s antagonistic relationship with China — its northern China as an Asian brother from 1949 to 1962, only to become neighbor and rival for leadership in Asia — dates back decades. victim of its military aggression over a border dispute. Since However, it is the not-so-peaceful rise of China that lies at the 1962, India has noted China’s efforts to build close ties with core of today’s situation. After building its economic and military countries on India’s periphery, thereby trying to encircle it, as potential over many decades, China has begun encroaching on well as its efforts to lay the groundwork for military and naval a region that India has always considered its own sphere of bases throughout the Indian Ocean.184 influence: South Asia and the Indian Ocean region.
With a population of more than one billion, India has sufficient New Delhi has long sought to compartmentalize its disputes manpower to match that of China. Thus, India would have to with all its neighbors, hoping that economic ties and people- be central to any security architecture designed to contain to-people relations would over time build trust that would China or aimed at ensuring that China does not transform its help resolve potential border disputes. Since the 1990s, India considerable economic clout into threatening military muscle in and China have sought to build relationships and economic the Asia-Pacific. partnerships in order to keep the border issue on the backburner. Today, China is one of India’s top economic partners, and the India’s Foreign Policy two countries collaborate globally on issues such as climate Indian leaders have always seen their country as one that will change and in the World Trade Organization (WTO). play a significant role in Asia, as well as on the global stage but, more notably in Asia. The belief in India as an Asian leader has While it has worked with some of its immediate, smaller South been deeply ingrained in Indian thinking for centuries. Asian neighbors, this policy will not necessarily continue to work with China. China used the last four decades of peace with Immediately after independence, India’s policy-makers chose India to create its economic miracle and modernize its military. not to join either of two Cold War blocs, despite global political However, India’s economy has not grown consistently at double ambitions. Instead they adopted the policy of nonalignment. digits (which is critical), and its military modernization is decades For decades, India also remained bogged down with regional behind what it should be. security challenges, first from Pakistan and later from China. Slow economic growth also impeded a greater international India and the Chinese Challenge role and resulted in India’s inward orientation for more than four Since 1989, China’s annual gross domestic product (GDP) growth decades. rate has averaged almost 10 percent.186 Over the same period,
42 | HUDSON INSTITUTE India’s growth rate averaged just half that (5.5 percent during Indian leaders have resented the presence of any external the 1990s and early 2000s and around 7 percent over the last power in the region unless that power accepted Indian decade). China is an $11 trillion economy while India is an $2.3 predominance. Beijing’s refusal to do so has repeatedly irked trillion economy. In 2018, China’s military budget of $175 billion New Delhi. is significantly larger than India’s military budget of $45 billion.187 China’s rise has forced New Delhi to take a more active stance India’s immediate neighborhood of South Asia has always been in containing its rival. Indian analysts have long viewed China’s India’s first line of defense, but for decades, India’s policy was policy as one of strategic encirclement, which is often called simply to presume that this was its sphere of influence and that the string-of-pearls theory. It is designed to give the Peoples India’s neighbors would accept that ‘Delhi knows best.’ The Liberation Army an advantage in a potential conflict and more growing Chinese presence, however, has made Indian leaders leverage in negotiations over disputes. aware that managing a sphere of influence is not only a function of telling others what to do but being able to expend resources New Delhi is wary of Chinese bases and ports especially in the that deny space to competitors. Indian Ocean from Hambantota in Sri Lanka, to Gwadar and Jiwani in Pakistan on the Persian Gulf, as well as potential bases China is aware that New Delhi’s smaller South Asian neighbors in the Maldives and in Djibouti in the Horn of Africa. New Delhi bear a latent resentment against Indian predominance views the One Belt, One Road or the Belt and Road Initiative as in the region — a function of the circumstances from a continuation of China’s planned encirclement of India. which several countries emerged from a unified India after colonial rule. Thus, Beijing has always used the India- In Pakistan alone, China has financed over $62 billion of development card in its relations with these countries. India, on the projects.189 Through a combination of readily available low-interest other hand, has been impeded by its inability to allocate loans, gifts to those in power, as well as generous clearance of resources comparable to those of China in India’s immediate unpaid debts, Beijing has created a strategic network across large neighborhood. parts of Asia, and even Africa and Latin America. In some cases, the huge quantity of lending seems designed to lure nations into a While the majority of India’s developmental assistance (over debt trap, leaving them beholden to China for years to come. 85 percent) is provided to its immediate neighbors in South Asia, India has never expended enough to compete with Over the last two decades, China has also strengthened its China’s assistance programs.188 Further, India’s ability to deliver activities in the Indian Ocean by building military bases, securing projects on time has been hurt by complacence, bureaucratic access to ports and islands, and even sending its submarines negligence, and political indifference. into a region that India sees as Indian domain. Since 2012, Chinese submarines have been sighted, on an average, four China’s deep strategic and economic relationship with Pakistan times every three months in the Indian Ocean region, and in is exemplified in the China-Pakistan Economic Corridor (or 2016 a Chinese submarine called at the Pakistani port of CPEC). China’s assistance to Sri Lanka, Bangladesh and Karachi, just off India’s coast.190 Nepal are all China’s attempts to create friction between India and Bhutan. Finally, Chinese actions in the Maldives are seen India may have been slow initially to respond to Chinese by India as impinging on India’s sovereignty and security. presence, but it is finally deploying its capabilities and resources.
STRATEGIES FOR THE INDO-PACIFIC: PERCEPTIONS OF THE U.S. AND LIKE-MINDED COUNTRIES In early May 2018, for the first time since the Second World Regional Comprehensive Economic Partnership (RCEP) free- War, India has decided to station fighter planes in the Andaman- trade agreement.192 India has also deepened partnerships with Nicobar Islands with the aim of strengthening India’s hold over South East Asian countries aimed at bolstering their defense the crucial Malacca, Sunda, and Lumbok Straits, the Straits of capabilities and making them strategically useful partners. Ombai Wetar, and the eastern Indian Ocean region. In 2015, India and Singapore signed defense cooperation and For some years, New Delhi had contemplated leveraging these strategic partnership agreements. The Indian armed forces strategically located island chains as its line of defense against helped build the capacity of their Vietnamese counterparts, China. India has also identified locations in Car Nicobar and and in February 2017, the two sides held discussions on the Campbell Bay as bases for fighter planes. The Indian Navy has sale of Surface-to-Air Akash and supersonic Brahmos missiles. positioned warships in the region and also built two floating New Delhi has provided over $500 million in credit to Vietnam to docks to repair and refurbish warships. New Delhi also plans modernize their armed forces, and since 2016, India has trained to bestow tri-service command on the commander-in-chief of Vietnamese navy submariners at its naval training school.193 Andaman and Nicobar Command (CINCAN) so that he can exercise direct control over all assets and men, including those The Malacca straits are critical for India, as they are for China, with of the Indian Air Force and the Indian Army. almost 40 percent of India’s trade passing through these straits. In mid-May 2018, Indonesia and India signed an agreement India, the Association of Southeast Asian Nations whereby Indonesia gives India access to the strategically (ASEAN), and the Indo-Pacific located island of Sabang at the northern tip of Sumatra and On the eve of India’s Republic Day in January 2018 — when less than 300 miles from the Malacca Straits.194 India will invest India hosted the leaders of all ten ASEAN states for the first time in the dual-use port and economic zone of Sabang, as well as — Prime Minister Narendra Modi wrote in an opinion-editorial build a hospital. Indian naval ships will also visit the port, which that, “Indians have always looked East to see the nurturing is deep enough for submarines to travel through. sunrise and the light of opportunities. Now, as before, the East, or the Indo-Pacific region, will be indispensable to India’s future New Delhi has also boosted relations with the Pacific islands, and our common destiny.”191 again a region with which India shares civilizational ties and a large Indian diaspora. Since 2014, the Forum for India-Pacific India’s historical and civilizational ties with South East Asia date Islands Cooperation has convened annually, either in India back centuries reflected in long-standing trade ties, the spread or in the region itself, and New Delhi has offered assistance, of Hinduism and Buddhism from the Indian subcontinent, and including annual grant-in-aid to each of the 14 Pacific countries, an ancient Indian empire that extended its presence to South in amounts ranging from $125,000 to $200,000. India has East Asia (the Chola Empire). However, it is only from the 1990s also set up a fund for adapting to climate change, building the that India adopted its ‘Look East’ policy, aimed at building closer capacity of coastal surveillance systems, and technical training economic ties with the region, and only in the last decade has and educational fellowships.195 India added a security dimension to this relationship. Across the Indian Ocean, India has deepened relations with Reflective of this ‘Act East’ policy, India’s trade with the region island nations like Seychelles, Maldives, and Mauritius, as well stands at $ 76 billion, with India being a member of the proposed as with strategically located countries like Oman and the United
44 | HUDSON INSTITUTE Arab Emirates. In January 2018, India and Seychelles signed a East Asia, primarily with countries like Nepal, Bangladesh and 20-year pact whereby India would build an airstrip and a jetty Myanmar. India will help with the development of ports, Japan for the Indian navy on Assumption Island. In February 2018, with building industrial parks, and the U.S. will focus on building during Mr. Modi’s visit to Oman, a country with which India power plants.198 has historic ties dating back to the colonial era, New Delhi and Muscat finalized an agreement by which India gained access India is also deepening its relationship with the United States. For to the strategically located port of Duqm, located on Oman’s decades the United States was the predominant maritime power southern coast. India and the UAE conducted their first naval in the Indian and Pacific Ocean regions. The U.S. established exercise in February 2018.196 a network of alliances with countries in the region, built the economies and defense establishments of a number of these India’s Emerging Partnerships countries, and ensured it had partners and bases to secure India has also sought to build deeper strategic relations with freedom-of-navigation and protect national security interests. Japan, another like-minded country that seeks a similar security architecture in the Indo-Pacific region and views the rise of Today China has created a counter model through its Belt China as a challenge. and Road Initiative whereby it initially provides high-interest loans to countries across Asia and Africa to help build their India and Japan have historical and civilizational ties, as Japan infrastructure, from highways to ports. Then, once the is the largest bilateral donor to India. In 2011, the two countries countries are indebted to China, China is able to use the ports signed a Comprehensive Economic Partnership Agreement as potential bases and ensure the country’s economy is tied to (CEPA), and bilateral trade now stands at $14 billion. the Chinese economy.199
New Delhi understands the need to build infrastructure, not The United States and India only within India but also in its immediate neighborhood and The rise of China means that Washington needs regional powers throughout the Indian Ocean region. New Delhi views Tokyo as to buttress its own strength more than it did in the past. As a a key partner for the development of infrastructure, particularly populous, democratic, market economy, India’s size and values through the Expanded Partnership for Quality Infrastructure make it a natural partner for the United States. Initiative, which is an alternative to the Belt and Road Initiative and co-sponsored by Japan and the Asian Development Bank. India’s rapid economic growth, around seven percent per year for the last few years, makes it a contender for the world’s fastest Hence, instead of accepting Chinese investment in the expanding economy.200 The average income in India has nearly much-needed development of Indian infrastructure, India has doubled in the past ten years, and economic modernization preferred Japanese investment. In 2014, Japan offered to invest promises to bring more jobs and advanced industry. $35 billion in infrastructure projects aimed at building industrial corridors and highways. Japan also offered an additional $17 From being ‘estranged’ democracies during the Cold War, India billion for a bullet-train project, which was announced in 2017.197 and the U.S. today are, in the words of former Secretary of State Rex Tillerson, the “two bookends of stability — on either In April 2018, Japan, United States, and India agreed to side of the globe — standing for greater security and prosperity collaborate on infrastructure projects in South and South for our citizens and people around the world.”201
STRATEGIES FOR THE INDO-PACIFIC: PERCEPTIONS OF THE U.S. AND LIKE-MINDED COUNTRIES This was, however, not always the case. Despite American the two countries have come a long way. The designation of support for Indian independence, and a common appreciation “Major Defense Partner” allows India to purchase advanced and for democracy between the two nations, India’s first Prime sensitive technologies on par with many of America’s closest Minister, Jawaharlal Nehru, opted for nonalignment. While the allies and partners. At $20 billion in bilateral trade in 2000, the United States provided economic and developmental aid to figure now stands at $115 billion in 2018.202 India, New Delhi perceived American support to Pakistan as detrimental to Indian interests. When the United States looks to Asia, it no longer sees the peaceful rise of China; instead it sees an economic and military India’s close relations with the Soviet Union was another rival that seeks to undermine the international liberal order that the factor that kept New Delhi and Washington estranged. Right United States helped establish after the World War II. Washington from independence, India’s, leaders sought to build domestic now seeks like-minded, democratic, free-market societies as capabilities, whether economic, military or even educational. allies and partners in upholding this rules-based order. During the Cold War, India welcomed aid from both blocs. The United States’ developmental aid in the form of PL-480 The U.S. views India as a counterweight to a rising China. As loans and assistance in establishing India’s higher-education the world’s largest democracy with a multicultural society and institutions, was deeply appreciated. expanding military heft, New Delhi has the potential to balance China’s expansion westward. As China’s navy moves into the However, American companies were not keen on manufacturing Indian Ocean and builds a blue-water fleet, the United States in India, in either the economic or military arena. The Soviet sees India as a valuable partner in balancing China at sea. Union, on the other hand, was more willing to help set up coal and steel mills and provide assistance to India’s infant domestic Going Forward military-manufacturing-complex. India and the United States agree on the need for an open and inclusive Indo-Pacific and upholding a rule-based liberal Further, New Delhi perceived Moscow as an ally in the United international order. The January 2015 “U.S.-India Joint Nations Security Council (UNSC), especially when it came to Strategic Vision for the Asia-Pacific and Indian Ocean Region” issues relating to Pakistan and Kashmir. The United States, spoke of how the two countries seek “a closer partnership” on the contrary, was viewed as being more sympathetic to promote “peace, prosperity and stability” by boosting to Pakistan. regional economic integration, connectivity, and economic development.203 The U.S. has gone from being an offshore balancer in South Asia during the Cold War and enabling Pakistan’s desire for India’s growing economic and security relationships and parity with India, to championing a serious strategic partnership interest in the Indo-Pacific region are aligned with its deepening with India in the last two decades. Washington has also partnership with the United States. Two years after signing acknowledged India as the dominant regional power, and as an the U.S.-India Joint Strategic Vision of 2015, India joined the emerging global power. Quad (a strategic grouping of the United States, India, Japan and Australia), and there is hope of making the grouping From having almost no military relations during the Cold War to something more than an annual talk-shop. In February 2018, India becoming a “Major Defense Partner” of the United States, during French President Emanuel Macron’s visit to India,
46 | HUDSON INSTITUTE New Delhi and Paris signed an agreement whereby the two South Africa economic association (BRICS), the trilateral Russia, countries would open their bases to warships from each India, and China grouping (RIC), and the Asian Infrastructure other’s navies. Investment Bank (AIIB), in which China is the main investor. At the same time, India is against the Belt and Road Initiative, supports Despite being “estranged” democracies during the Cold Japan’s Quality Infrastructure Initiative, is a member of the Quad, War, today India and the U.S. share, in the words of former and views the United States as a natural ally.204 Secretary of State Tillerson, a “growing strategic convergence.” Though the two had almost no military relations during the India is pursuing more global engagement while also retaining Cold War, India is now a Major Defense Partner of the United strategic autonomy. India seeks to be a part of multilateral States. The United States also increasingly views India organizations but prefers bilateral relationships. So, it would as a potential regional security provider and seeks to build prefer bilateral relationships with the U.S. and other allies and India’s security capacity through commercial and defense is not in favor of arrangements like the Quad becoming formal cooperation. military alliances.
Even though the India-U.S. relationship is much deeper and Indians believe in the promise of India as an Asian power multi-dimensional today than it has ever been, there is still a and future great power. They seek strong economic growth gap in expectations on both sides, and the two countries are not only to become China’s rival but also for socio-economic still in the process of adjusting and adapting. development at home. India’s long drawn-out military modernization is not only directed towards China, but also to Despite closer relations with the United States, India is ensure the territorial integrity of India from both domestic and still reluctant to join any formal alliance structure. India is external threats. practically America’s ally but is still reluctant to formalize that alliance. India is hesitant to cede power to a collective security India wants recognition of its preeminence in the Indian Ocean mechanism, and so is reticent to join anything resembling a region and in South Asia but is reticent to openly confront China. formal military alliance. New Delhi understands the threat China poses to India’s land and sea borders, but there is also a recognition of the limitations India has consistently sought freedom from external pressures. of its economic and military capabilities. Further, India has a While every country seeks this kind of autonomy, for India it Hobbesian outlook, believing it must be able to counter China has been a matter of principle. The colonial experience left an on its own and distrusting promises that any country would indelible mark on India’s collective identity. More than seven come to its assistance. decades after Independence, seeking freedom from outside influence is as much at the core of India’s external relations as At the end of the day India’s concerns about threats in its it was when India was a colony. During the Cold War, the policy immediate neighborhood remain paramount to the perceptions was referred to as nonalignment, and now it is called strategic of India’s leaders and strategists. For India, South Asia is autonomy. more important than the South China Sea; thus, differences between Washington and New Delhi may arises from concerns Reflecting its pursuit of autonomy and maximum options in foreign about American support with respect to Pakistan and relation, India is a member of the Brazil, Russia, India, China and Afghanistan.
STRATEGIES FOR THE INDO-PACIFIC: PERCEPTIONS OF THE U.S. AND LIKE-MINDED COUNTRIES Policy Recommendations China’s Growing Influence in the India is different from traditional American allies, whether in Indian Ocean: Implications for Europe, Latin America or Asia for whom the United States Sri Lanka and its Regional Allies is the key security provider. India would never want that kind by Asanga Abeyagoonasekera of a relationship. Instead, India seeks a relationship in which Washington does for India what the United States did for The Indian Ocean has become a friction point for tension China decades ago, namely help build China’s economic, between the United States, China, and India. Such tension technological, and military might with the hope that China would intensifies as each state takes measures to counter the others become a more responsible global player and maybe even a and project dominance within the region. Because of its central free-market democracy. location, Sri Lanka often experiences the ripple effect of these regional power dynamics. Currently, Sri Lanka feels the impact If the U.S. wants India to play a bigger role in the Indo-Pacific, of China’s growth, particularly as a result of its Belt and Road New Delhi seeks more economic investment, technological Initiative. The effects are so significant that one cannot examine expertise, and the sale and manufacture of state-of-the-art Sri Lanka’s strained relationship with India without considering it defense equipment. in the context of China’s rise.
U.S. policy toward India must include the following Geostrategic Significance of Sri Lanka considerations: Sri Lanka’s location is a major reason for its geopolitical significance. Over the years, many Sri Lankan governments 1. The U.S. must recognize that India’s size and history makes have promoted Sri Lanka as a maritime hub, an identity that it different from other, smaller American allies in Asia. extends back to ancient times. Even in the earliest maps, cartographers like Ptolemy and Henricus Martelleus drew 2. Instead of subjecting the India-U.S. relationship to a one- Sri Lanka in oversized proportion.205 Such representation of size-fits-all policy towards allies, the United States should the island points toward its rich civilization and strong trade consider a special partnership with India, which exempts relationships with the rest of the world. Sri Lanka’s foreign India from export control regulations governing military sales. diplomatic relations date back many centuries, and recorded U.S. trade policies should also be adjusted to enable the 3. history speaks of emissaries between Sri Lanka and Rome in rise of India as a strategic competitor to China. the 1st century. According to historian Pliny, there were four 4. Attempts to balance ties between India and other South members from Sri Lanka who visited the Court of Emperor Asian states, notably Pakistan, should be abandoned to Claudius Caesar circa 50 AD. enhance India’s capacity to confront China. An ancient map by Sir Halford Mackinder depicts two islands Any short-term loss in dollars and cents or other, less significant located in the outer rim of the mainland: the United Kingdom nominal alliances, would be offset by the immense benefit to in the Atlantic and Japan in the Pacific, since each performs a the United States of having a major, one-billion-strong nation pivotal role in its respective region. Sri Lanka has a similar position standing by its side to ensure that China and its closed as an island on the outer rim of Indian subcontinent and facing system do not emerge dominant in the Asia-Pacific for years the Indian Ocean. Hence, Sri Lanka could one day play a role in to come. the India Ocean similar to that of the United Kingdom and Japan.
48 | HUDSON INSTITUTE Currently, scholars and leaders around the world are discussing the globe.210 These economic corridors share a stark similarity Sri Lanka’s geopolitical significance. In his book Monsoon, Robert with Mackinder’s map and is a modern-day depiction of China’s Kaplan recognizes that Sri Lanka is “part of the new maritime projection of power. This Belt and Road Initiative promises to geography, and that makes it very important.”206 Furthermore, boost the economies of the countries involved, and Sri Lanka the U.S. Senate Committee on Foreign Relations, under the was one of the first countries to support it. Under this initiative leadership of John Kerry, released a report in 2009 that highlighted the Chinese government is assisting countries through loans, the strategic importance of Sri Lanka and urged the U.S. and through this support, Sri Lanka was able to build many government to prevent it from drifting into the Chinese sphere of infrastructure projects. Chinese aid to Sri Lankan infrastructure influence.207 Admiral Harry Harris, during his tenure commanding projects is particularly evident Colombo, the country’s U.S. Pacific Command from 2015-2018, remarked that “the commercial hub. Hambantota Port, Mattala International Indian Ocean matters to the U.S., Sri Lanka matters to the U.S., Airport, Colombo Port City, and the Lotus Tower are a few of and the U.S. matters to Sri Lanka.”208 According to Harsh V. Pant, such projects initiated by China. Many analysts have warned China is rapidly catching up, and its ties with Sri Lanka are aimed Sri Lanka that these loans are predatory, and that China has at expanding its profile in this crucial part of the209 world. He created a debt trap for the island. Subhashini Abeysinghe, the observes that Indian policy-makers should realize, that if they are research director of Verite Research, countered this notion, more proactive, they might lose the game for good. Historically, stating that Sri Lanka has more loans with other institutions, there have been rich cultural and socio-political ties between Sri including IMF sovereign bonds, that exceed Chinese loans. Lanka and India. In particular, southern India has tremendous Comparatively, nations like Pakistan have borrowed five times influence in the northern regions of Sri Lanka, and this is known more than Sri Lanka. Thus, claims that China has Sri Lanka in as “Cauvery Delta Influence.” However, as Sri Lanka’s erudite, a debt trap are overstated. Sri Lanka will continue to borrow former foreign minister Lakshman Kadirgamar rightly observed, from China, and the bilateral relationship will continue to grow India-Sri Lanka relations are getting lost in the mist of time. stronger in the near future. However, this does not mean Sri Despite once having such strong ties, the relationship between Lanka should not negotiate better terms for all commercial Sri Lanka and India has been strained over the past thirty years. loans; nor should Sri Lanka rush into certain projects without public consultation and debate. In fact, the 99-year lease of China’s Sphere of Influence Hambanthota Port was hurriedly signed on a Sunday, despite and Sino-Lankan Relationships President Sirisena’s advice to discuss the plan further in Recently, Sri Lanka has been caught in three overlapping Parliament. The President’s coalition ignored him, and Prime spheres of influence, namely that of India, its closest neighbor; Minister Wickramasinghe rushed to sign the agreement without China, its largest trading partner; and the United States of much debate. America. Thus, Sri Lanka has very much felt the effects of the increasing tensions in this region. In this context, it is necessary Indo-Lanka Relationship vs. to understand the strategic position of Sri Lanka in order to the Chinese Sphere of Influence assess the long-term consequences of such regional tension. Swedish political scientist Rudolf Kjellen observed that Foresight analysis is essential with this regard. spaciousness, freedom-of-movement, and internal cohesion are three main attributes of a “great power.”211 In the recent past, China’s Belt and Road Initiative, which is often compared to the China has essentially acquired the attributes mentioned above, “Marshall Plan,” has identified six economic corridors across which has significantly affected the Indo-Lanka relationship.
STRATEGIES FOR THE INDO-PACIFIC: PERCEPTIONS OF THE U.S. AND LIKE-MINDED COUNTRIES With respect to Sri Lanka, China’s growing power has become organized by the Indian Council of World Affairs (ICWA) a few somewhat problematic for India. For an instance, China has years ago, which coincided with India’s vote against Sri Lanka expanded its international trade and has become the largest at the Human Rights Council in Geneva on March 22, 2012. trading partner of Sri Lanka, overtaking India in the last year. Speaking at the ICWA conference, Salman Khurshid (India’s Further, the position of Mattala International Airport, which minister of external affairs, an eminent lawyer, and a member received financial assistance from the Chinese government, is of the Indian National Congress) explained to participants particularly important. India has since come forward to take over how a regional government can dictate terms to the central the airport’s operation. Some strategists opine that India was government, further adding that he is like Muhammad Ali the politically motivated to counter the growing Chinese influence in boxer, allowing his opponent to punch him but waiting for the the island. Similar controversy has arisen regarding the antenna right moment to strike him down. This is a clear example of how installed at the top of Lotus Tower, which is suspected have strong the Tamil Nadu factor is in Indo-Sri Lanka relationship. the purpose of intercepting Indian communications. Further, Hambantota Port has been on center-stage because it is The competition between China and India to influence Sri situated at the southern tip of Sri Lanka; its position is just a Lankan politics substantiates Sri Lanka’s significance. This is few nautical miles from the busiest shipping lanes in the world. on display in the words of former president Mahinda Rajapaksa. Some experts view this as a Chinese strategy to establish a In a statement to the South China Morning Post, he asserted military presence in the Indian Ocean; both China and Sri Lanka that Indian intelligence was behind his defeat in the 2015 deny this, stating that the port project is purely for economic presidential election. Further, he alleges that U.S. and India and trade purposes. However, none of these assertions have used their embassies in Sri Lanka to bring him down. Of note, been substantiated by evidence. all the Chinese infrastructure projects mentioned above were initiated during the Rajapaksa administration. This suggests Despite China’s efforts to supplant India’s influence in Sri that Sri Lanka’s regional importance is affecting both the foreign Lanka, India’s foreign policy decisions have been impactful. policy and internal dynamics of the country. It also serves as an According to Ambassador Shivshankar Menon’s latest book, indication that India would do well to recalibrate and strengthen Choices: Inside the Making of India’s Foreign Policy, India its relationship with Sri Lanka. made “minimax” foreign policy decisions at the last stage of Sri Lanka’s protracted civil war in 2009.212 The author defines China and India are two players at a chessboard with different minimax decisions as those aimed at minimizing the harm and strengths and weaknesses. China has economic strength, but maximizing the gain. Though the success of those decisions India’s strengths are the historical and socio-cultural ties it has was not immediately apparent, Ambassador Menon asserts with Sri Lanka. India and Sri Lanka share a common colonial that no matter what one might think of its internal politics, Sri experience, post-colonial institutions, and political culture, all Lanka is a better place today without the Liberation Tigers of of which have ensured the mutual confidence of two strong Tamil Eelam (a separatist group known as LTTE) and the civil democratic governments. Moreover, Sri Lanka is one of India’s war. And India contributed to making that outcome possible. closest neighbors, a fact that also helps pave the way for the two countries to share a particularly unique bond. Hence, Indo- However, Ambassador Menon also explains the limitations of Lanka relations should be better at all levels including political, India’s foreign policy decisions in the Sri Lankan context. They economic, social, and cultural, even while Sri Lanka continues are the same limitations voiced at a New Delhi conference to engage in extra-regional relations with China and the U.S.
50 | HUDSON INSTITUTE The Way Forward failure of the South Asian Association for Regional Cooperation Given Sri Lanka’s geopolitical situation, the following (SAARC); thus, it is essential for India to consider playing a recommendations aim to maintain ties with the great powers more active role. India’s lack of involvement can probably be within and beyond the Indian Ocean region. Sri Lanka certainly attributed to the Monroe-doctrine-mentality, or rejection of has the potential of playing a pivotal role both regionally and foreign intervention, perpetuated by President Nehru in the globally, given its position. Sri Lanka records the highest human fight against colonialism.216 Such hostility towards foreign development index in South Asia, with a literacy rate of 98%.213 relationships was evident in 1977, when India was perturbed by Moreover, according to the World Economic Forum, Sri Lanka Sri Lanka’s open economic policy that President Jayawardene’s has moved from a factor-driven economy to efficiency-driven government adopted. economy.214 U.S. has observed that Sri Lanka is a contributor to the rules-based-order and is a good example of a like-minded In 1971, seven European members of the UN General partner in the Indian Ocean. Assembly formed an ad hoc committee and wrote the Declaration of the Indian Ocean as a Zone of Peace.217 This Further Sri Lanka should cultivate its role as a regional stabilizer declaration, which Sri Lankan Prime Minister Madam Sirimavo in the Indian Ocean. Balancing New Delhi, Washington, and Bandaranaike helped shape, called for the great powers to Beijing will be a priority for President Sirisena, who is rightly curb further military escalation and expansion in the Indian promoting a “balanced, Asia-centric” foreign policy.215 Clearly Ocean. The document also stated the need for a system an equitable foreign policy is what Sri Lanka should have with of universal collective security. This declaration is especially global powers. However, if Sri Lanka is to play the role of a relevant today, due to the tension among the great powers regional stabilizer, it will require the assistance of countries operating in the Indian Ocean — tensions that have made the such as India and Japan. The active participation of India is region unstable. Therefore, ensuring a rules-based order in extremely important in this venture. Under the leadership of the Indian Ocean is of the utmost importance, as is balancing Prime Minister Modi, the Indian government’s role in regional the relationships among India, China, U.S. and Sri Lanka, stabilization has appeared indolent, particularly given the who may well be the lynch-pin of this endeavor.
STRATEGIES FOR THE INDO-PACIFIC: PERCEPTIONS OF THE U.S. AND LIKE-MINDED COUNTRIES III. EUROPE AND CANADA
Britain and the Indo-Pacific to the heartland, following the realization that it remains crucial by John Hemmings to deciding a nation’s overall power capabilities. For the U.K., Brexit has certainly been about recapturing identity and power The current “received wisdom” that one hears in international from the political structures in Brussels. conferences is that the United States and the United Kingdom are showing increasingly isolationist tendencies in their foreign However, rather than moving towards a “Little Britain” (one of policy. The U.S. — by pursuing a Trumpian “America First” policy three possible post-Brexit postures I’ve written about in the — and the U.K. by withdrawing from the European Union — past), Britain’s foreign policy elites have sought to project the the “dreaded” Brexit. While it is true that both leading Western liberal democracies are undergoing major domestic re-ordering and shifts from neoliberal policies that have been considered Photo caption: Commanding Officer of the HMS Albion Captain Tim mainstream since the end of the Cold War, it would be foolish to Neild greets children during the welcoming ceremony at Terminal 2 conclude that either of these powers is in any way withdrawing Port of Tanjung Priok, Jakarta on April 22, 2018, as part of an exercise from the world or its events. For the U.S., “America First” has strengthening cooperation between the British and Indonesian military. been about bringing back industrial and manufacturing might (Aditya Irawan/NurPhoto via Getty Images)
52 | HUDSON INSTITUTE country further into the world, not withdraw from it. 218 The coalitions can develop sharply delineated responses to the Global Britain policy and its regional variant “All of Asia” have changes in the international system and vie for control over a actually indicated that Britain that is more interested in distant state’s foreign policy direction. shores, rather than less. Indeed, as I will argue in this chapter, Britain’s strategic approach toward the Indo-Pacific is actually Looking back to 2013 and 2014, one can see the outlines of in sympathy with the U.S. Indo-Pacific Strategy Report, with Britain’s two Asia strategies taking shape during this period. In both emphasizing respect for the rules-based order and both 2013, Xi Jinping announced the One Belt One Road (OBOR) emphasizing collective approaches with allies and partners in policy, in which the PRC promised a global infrastructure the region. Together, both states are showing a deeply strategic and investment strategy, involving $4-8 trillion in 62 countries response to events in Asia, though the U.K.’s approach – as I across four continents. That same year, Prime Minister David will seek to argue – is somewhat divided. Cameron visited China in what some called a groveling attempt to remove Britain from the “freeze” caused by his meeting with Britain’s Two Asia Strategies the Dali Lama in 2012. In a leader for the Guardian newspaper, The U.K. policy approach towards Asia has changed the British Prime Minister promised that an upcoming visit to significantly over the past five years, but it remains a muddled China, accompanied by more than one hundred business one, and there is good reason that it provokes such debate leaders, “would build a lasting friendship…a partnership for and discussion among international observers. However, growth and reform that can help deliver the Chinese Dream — the argument that one occasionally hears — that the U.K. is and long-term prosperity for Britain too.”220 It should be noted without an Asia strategy — is simply incorrect. In fact, the U.K. that 2013 also saw a huge push for infrastructure in the U.K., actually has not one but two strategies that sit side by side, with with a widely-cited report noting that a shortfall in investment different foreign policy coalitions seeking to grapple with the since 2003 contributed to losses of $85 billion a year between shifting balance of power in Asia. The first of these is its Indo- 2003 and 2010.221 John Ross, a British Marxist based at the Pacific strategy219, primarily held by the security establishment, Renmin University in China, crowed in the same newspaper that elements of the Royal Navy, and security-oriented Members Cameron’s visit to the PRC was a “humiliating climb-down”,222 of Parliament. The second is its China strategy, held by the noting that Britain needed the Chinese market for its exports economic and trade establishment, the Treasury, the City, and and investment in its infrastructure and could ill-afford such investment-oriented Members of Parliament. The two are, at “exaggerated pretensions.” By 2014, the PRC had already first appearance, mutually exclusive, since the first treats the replaced Japan (2011) as the world’s second largest economy People’s Republic of China (PRC) as a potential challenger to and had become by 2013, the world’s largest trading nation. the rules-based system, while the second treats the PRC as George Osborne, the Chancellor, was already attempting to a source of investment and as a potential strategic partner. make London the primary trading hub for the renminbi in a bid However, if one looks at them closely, it is easy to see that both to satisfy Beijing’s strategic need to internationalize its currency. are rooted in the U.K.’s deep reliance on trade, with the first emphasizing a Mahanian mix of naval power and trade, and the At the same time, a different story began to emerge in-region: second emphasizing foreign investment into the UK: both have in June 2014, the Philippine Star reported that reclamation been the basis of British power for nearly five hundred years. activities were being carried out by the PRC in five areas of What is remarkable about them is their near-simultaneous rise the Spratley Islands.223 It quickly became apparent that these in Whitehall’s corridors of power, a testimony to how policy activities were immense and might pose a downstream threat
STRATEGIES FOR THE INDO-PACIFIC: PERCEPTIONS OF THE U.S. AND LIKE-MINDED COUNTRIES to freedom of navigation in the region. The most important international system based on the rule of law and international document to emerge from that time that noted this was the 2014 norms.”226 In the 2016 Shangri-La Dialogue, Sir Michael U.K. National Strategy for Maritime Security (NSMS), which was Fallon reiterated the U.K.’s commitment to “the rules-based cosigned by four ministries: the Foreign and Commonwealth international system, international law, and the maintenance Office, the Home Office, the Ministry of Defence, andthe of freedom of navigation and overflight — both of which we Department of Transport. In the document, Britain’s national consider non-negotiable.”227 In 2017, the Foreign Secretary, interests in the maritime space are reaffirmed, noting that 95% of Boris Johnson, emphasized the U.K.’s “belief in the rules- British trade is shipborne, with more than $600 billion of goods based international system and in the freedom of navigation going into or out of British ports per annum. It lists “disruption through those waterways which are absolutely vital to world to vital trade maritime routes” as a security threat second only trade,”228 promising that its new aircraft carriers would be to terrorism.224 It advocated support for the international rules- deployed to the region, including the South China Sea.229 This based system and United Nations Convention on the Law of was followed by a memorandum of understanding with Oman, the Sea, and capacity-building for “partner nations.” Shortly which allowed for the establishment of a U.K. Joint Logistics after this, Prime Minister Cameron noted Britain’s need for “the Support Base at Duqm. According to the Foreign Office, the sea-lanes to stay open and the arteries of global commerce to base at Duqm would allow Britain’s aircraft carriers to “project remain free flowing,” while also stating an ambition for China influence across an important region.”230 This was followed by to become Britain’s “second largest export destination” in the the opening of HMS Juffair in Bahrain in 2017, where the Royal following decade. It must be noted that 2015 was the year that Navy will deploy five ships and provide facilities to those going Xi Jinping was given a State visit to the U.K. and treated to a to the Pacific Ocean. At the same time, Britain has sought to horse-drawn carriage ride down the Mall to meet the Queen have its cake and to eat it too. The 2016 Brexit Referendum at Buckingham Palace, a year that both nations hailed as a empowered those in the “China strategy” coalition by “Golden Era” of relations. The gap between the U.K.’s two Asia emphasizing Britain’s need for non-EU trade and investment. strategies would only grow from this stage onwards. In January 2018, Prime Minister Theresa May visited the PRC with the explicit intention to set up a post-Brexit trade deal and Over the next four years, nearly every Foreign Secretary or push forward the “Golden Era,” taking with her more than forty Defence Secretary spoke in favor of defending the rules- senior business leaders and Liam Fox, the Secretary of State based order while nearly every Chancellor of the Exchequer for International Trade231. of Minister for Trade spoke of welcoming investment from the PRC. In 2015, Sir Michael Fallon, the then-Secretary of However, 2018 also saw the Indo-Pacific Strategy begin to State for Defence said that while Britain takes no position develop teeth, with a surge in the number of Royal Navy on underlying sovereignty claims, it was “disturbed by the deployments to the region taking place and the first military scale and speed of current land reclamation activities and exercises with Japan. In December 2018, Gavin Williamson, the risk that these actions might pose to maritime freedom the Secretary of State for Defense said, “For the first time of navigation and to the stability of the South China Sea.”225 since 2013, Britain has been deploying ships to the Pacific The UK also began a foreign and defence ministerial meetings region. We have three this year, and this isn’t something we with Japan, which produced a Joint Statement outlining both want to see as a flash in the pan but actually a commitment countries desire to “work together to defend and protect to the region that goes forward over the coming years.”232 the global commons, on the high seas…to support an HMS Sutherland, HMS Argyll, and HMS Albion all made
54 | HUDSON INSTITUTE deployments to the region, with the HMS Albion carrying out a pursuit of “policies that, on one hand, stress engagement and freedom of navigation maneuver in the South China Sea in the integration mechanisms and, on the other, emphasize realist- summer of 2018. As James Rogers and I wrote for the Henry style balancing in the form of external security cooperation with Jackson Society in January 2019, the deployment, along with Asian states and national military modernization programs.”237 the maneuver, has shown Britain’s commitment to the region With the small exception of a few states, many European and as the Royal Navy is – thus far – the only non-US naval force Asian states could be said to have hedging strategies toward to carry out such a maneuver. Given the need for PRC-linked the PRC. The problem with Britain adopting the current investment, how can the U.K.s uptick in naval operations be approach, however, is that it is becoming increasingly out-of- explained? Primarily, it has been a gradual realization of the kilter with the U.S. strategic shift toward the PRC, as outlined strategic importance of the South China Sea (12% of U.K. in the 2017 National Security Strategy. The U.S. remains trade transits the waterway according to China Power233), but Britain’s most important ally, largest national export market238, it is clear that Britain’s other Asia strategy, the China Strategy and the lead nation for European security. As the US position will continue to play a strong role in Whitehall.234 This was evolves, the UK – as America’s closest ally – will likely consider most recently evident in February 2019, in the furor that arose its own position in relation to its two approaches, economic after Defence Minister Williamson gave a speech at the Royal and strategic, placing emphasis on the former. As with all United Services Institute, a defense think tank in London. In matters relating to trade and security, finding the balance is his speech, the Defence Minister spoke of the rise of great the trick. However, it could find this balance if it began to really power competition, and Britain’s willingness to compete for think through the inconsistencies in its current approach. As it its interests and values far from home by deploying a “littoral stands, it is not apparent that Britain is deliberately choosing strike group East of Suez in the Indo-Pacific.”235 George to hedge. Rather it is being pulled between two different policy Osborne, the former Chancellor and creator of the U.K.- baskets, held by different policy coalitions within London. PRC “Golden Era,” called the speech “gunboat diplomacy of a quite old-fashioned kind” in the Financial Times.236 And it will continue to do so, see-sawing back and forth, until This framing of the Defence Minister’s remarks, and the one side or another is able to dominate the other. Policy changes PRC’s cancellation of trade talks shortly thereafter, created may even occur at the personnel level as different ministers a storm of controversy across Whitehall and hinted at the prioritize security and trade differently. This is hardly a recipe increasing power that Beijing had inside Britain’s strategic for showing commitment and reliability to Britain’s potential circles. Williamson’s eventual fall from power — accused of partners in the region — including the Quad member states, leaking a vote in the National Security Council on Huawei’s India, Japan, Australia, and the U.S., who look to Britain to help role in Britain’s infrastructure — shows clearly that the debate them stabilize the region. At present, Boris Johnson, Britain’s between Britain’s Indo-Pacific-leaning elites and its China- current Prime Minister, is on record as having once promised to leaning elites is not yet over. deploy Britain’s aircraft carriers to Indo-Pacific region and there are now indications that this will occur sometime in 2021239. In adopting a split approach toward Asia, the U.K. is hardly More recently, he has expressed interest in the PRC’s strategic alone. Many states — the United States among them — infrastructure project, the Belt and Road Initiative, eschewing have in the past adopted a two-handed approach toward a trade alliance with President Trump against Beijing. As we the PRC. Evan Medeiros, President Obama’s China advisor, approach a General Election in late 2019, it is clear that see- once referred to this as “hedging,” noting it involved the sawing is not yet over.
STRATEGIES FOR THE INDO-PACIFIC: PERCEPTIONS OF THE U.S. AND LIKE-MINDED COUNTRIES France, a Power in the Indian Ocean to the audience at last year’s Shangri-La Dialogue in Singapore, by Jonas Parello-Plesner “France is not part of the territorial disputes in the area; nor will it be. But we insist on two tenets of the rule-based international U.S. security interests in the Indian Ocean have grown in recent order: disputes should be resolved by legal means and years. The Trump administration’s Indo-Pacific strategy reflects negotiation, not by fait accompli, and freedom of navigation this trend. From a defense perspective, this strategy has led must be upheld.”242 But other priorities such as terrorism, piracy, to the establishment of the U.S. Indo-Pacific Command, which illegal fishing, environmental damage and climate change are combines East Asia and India, including the Indian Ocean, into also part of the French strategic vocabulary for the region. one strategic unit. Meanwhile, India and China are both rising military powers, and this includes their maritime capabilities. For “This region, for us too, is home,” as Defense Minister Parly put India, the ocean which bears its name is home turf. India’s Prime it. More specifically, France is part of the Indian Ocean, with Minister Narendra Modi has talked about the Indian Ocean as the Mayotte and La Réunion islands situated in the southwest being key to India’s future. For China, the Indian Ocean is a Indian Ocean close to the African continent. Over one million component of its blue-water ambitions, and a basing option in French citizens live on those islands; they are the outer reaches Djibouti enhances its expanding naval reach. The Indian Ocean is of the European Union and use euros as their currency. These also part of the Maritime Silk Road, which is the sea component French territories compose part of an extensive exclusive- of China’s Belt and Road Initiative. Chinese investment in Sri economic-zone in the Indian Ocean. Lanka and its port of Hambantota are examples of this. France has a broad-based military presence in the Indian France’s long-standing naval presence is also woven into this Ocean as well. In the north, it has a presence in the United strategic tapestry. As the Indo-Pacific strategy is fleshed out Arab Emirates and in Djibouti. In the south, the French armed in Washington, New Delhi, and Tokyo, France’s participation is forces cover both La Réunion and Mayotte islands with naval pertinent as the only European power with a permanent naval capabilities such as surveillance frigates, patrol vessels, and presence in both the Indian and Pacific Oceans. helicopters. As an engaged maritime power, France is involved in various regional cooperation fora such as the Indian Ocean President Macron has also emphasized France’s role in the Indo- Naval Symposium. Furthermore, France is a founding member Pacific. He has talked about a “new, strong Indo-Pacific Axis” of the Indian Ocean Commission and a dialogue partner of the when he visited Australia last year. Beyond Australia, France has Indian Ocean Rim Association. increased cooperation with the U.S., India, and Japan, whom official French government papers also underline as allies.240 With India, France has been developing a strategic partnership since 1998. This goes far beyond the naval domain, and Macron has spoken honestly about the increased Chinese France is active both with civil nuclear cooperation and trade presence as a “game changer” in the region. Further, he and investments. France has held military exercises with India expressed the need to defend and uphold freedom of navigation including army, air force and navy components. The naval and the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea. In this exercises have included the French aircraft carrier Charles de regard, France maintains an active naval presence throughout Gaulle, which demonstrates that the exercises have grown in the South China Sea to protect freedom of navigation.241 As scope and capability. French arm sales, such as submarines Florence Parly, France’s minister of the armed forces, explained and fighter planes, are aiding India’s military modernization.
56 | HUDSON INSTITUTE France sees India as a strategic and democratic partner in In conclusion, France is the most relevant European ally for the the region, and President Macron’s March 2018 visit to India U.S. as it fleshes out its strategy for the Indian Ocean, both reinforced this partnership. Macron mentioned in an interview because France has a unique and historical presence and with India Today that he would like to see France become India’s because France is best able to garner EU support for a more preferred European partner in this century, replacing the U.K. active role in the Indian Ocean. and its historic role with India, and for India to see France as the new gateway to the EU after U.K.’s expected departure.243 India and other Asian democratic partners, such as Japan and Still, France continues to trail Germany and the U.K. as a trading Australia, should actively integrate France into their regional partner for India. strategies as a maritime security partner and to ensure freedom of navigation. While an ally of the U.S., France does retain a During Macron’s the visit of to India, the leaders agreed to certain dose of strategic autonomy. In contrast to its business- a strategic vision document which outlines shared emerging oriented predecessors, the Macron government has been very challenges, including “maritime traffic security in the face of clear-eyed about the challenges China represents, stating that the threats of terrorism and piracy, especially in the Horn of China’s Maritime Silk Road threatens the equilibrium in the Indian Africa; respect of international law by all States, in particular Ocean, as the new Silk Road should be a two-way street, not a freedom of navigation and overflight; fight against organized one-way road to Beijing.247 This stands in contrast to prior, more crime, trafficking, including in weapons of mass destruction, business-oriented French governments that mostly perceived smuggling and illegal fishing (IUUs); combating climate change China’s rise as a business opportunity and were keen to lift the and its consequences on security, particularly in terms of EU arms embargo on China. natural disasters; protection of the environment and natural resources, including tackling oil spills; and aid to victims of disasters.”244 Getting the Balance Right: Managing EU Relations with the U.S. and China France has also sought to connect the EU and India on EU by Liselotte Odgaard projects for the Indian Ocean. France worked to secure EU funding for maritime information centers in Madagascar and Paradoxically, the European Union has become more active in the the Seychelles as part of the program to Promote Regional Indo-Pacific than ever, at a time when it is facing serious internal Maritime Security.245 France also directly participates in and external challenges. Brexit, growing authoritarianism, and the EU’s Operation Atalanta, which aims to curb piracy in migration are all issues that have caused great turmoil between the Western part of the Indian Ocean. Furthermore, France the EU member states as they try to address how to secure the could elevate the strategic debate within the EU about the future of the union as a coherent international actor based on Indian Ocean to help define what the new multipolar security a commitment to liberal democracy, market economy, and the environment means for the EU and how the EU can strengthen rule of law. From across the Atlantic, Washington has opened multilateralism and respect for international law. Additionally, trade disputes with the EU, ignored European interests in the as the EU rolls out its EU-Asia Connectivity strategy, launched Intermediate-range Nuclear Forces Treaty, and complains about at the Asia-Europe Meeting (ASEM) summit in Brussels in free-riding European military forces. Beijing is proceeding with October 2018, the EU could become an alternative to China’s implementation of its Belt and Road Initiative in Eastern and Maritime Silk Road for smaller nations such as Sri Lanka.246 Southern Europe despite the EU’s reservations concerning
STRATEGIES FOR THE INDO-PACIFIC: PERCEPTIONS OF THE U.S. AND LIKE-MINDED COUNTRIES China’s global development strategy. How do these challenges addressing the distortive effects of foreign state-ownership and influence EU policies in the Indo-Pacific and the EU’s relations state financing on Europe’s internal markets, which fills existing with the U.S. and China? gaps in EU law. In addition, a common EU approach to the security of 5G networks will be worked out to safeguard against The internal challenges facing the European Union have, by potential serious security threats to critical digital infrastructure, many, been pronounced symptoms that the grand project of and the EU is placing screening mechanisms to detect and raise a united Europe is failing. For example, Walter Russell Mead awareness of security risks posed by foreign investment in critical comments that, “If Paris and Berlin could devise a program assets, technologies, and infrastructure.250 to reignite European growth, secure its frontiers, and satisfy the nationalist emotions now roiling the bloc, Europe could The strategy is in line with the Trump administration’s call for arrest its decline. So far at least, such an outcome seems reciprocity in economic relations with China. However, the unlikely.”248 Despite doomsday prophecies, support for the EU’s intention to cooperate with Beijing on climate change, European Union appears to be stronger than ever. Not even on implementing the EU’s Strategy on Connecting Europe and the illiberal Hungarian Prime Minister Victor Orban and his Asia, and on continuing joint efforts to implement the Joint Fidesz Party have leaving the EU on the agenda, although Comprehensive Plan of Action for Iran defines a platform for the European Parliament’s center-right grouping decided Europe-China relations that is distinct from U.S. policy. The in March 2019 to suspend Fidesz from the group on the independent policy line was reflected in the EU-China summit grounds that it has violated EU principles on the rule of law. statement of April 2019. The EU and China firmly support the If anything, the consecutive internal crises have encouraged rules-based multilateral trading system with the World Trade the EU to take initiatives to strengthen Europe’s footprint in Organization (WTO) at its core, fight against unilateralism and the Indo-Pacific, recognizing the need to focus not only on protectionism, and commit to complying with WTO rules. The the United States and China, but on creating solid links with two sides reaffirmed their joint commitment to cooperate on like-minded countries in the Indo-Pacific, which is necessary WTO reform, including strengthening the rules on industrial for Europe’s continued economic, social and political subsidies.251 This testifies to the EU’s determination to hold well-being. China to behaving in accordance with the international regimes it has signed on to, which aligns with the U.S. The EU supports the continued preeminence of the U.S. alliance stance on Chinese economic practices. However, the EU system in the Indo-Pacific. However, the growing regional role of also subscribes to working with China on WTO reform and China and Washington’s enhanced focus on U.S. national interests emphasizes that Europe considers multilateral institutions rather than alliance interests have encouraged the EU to maintain fundamental to upholding a liberal market-economic order; and strengthen a broad array of connections with Asian countries additionally, adjusting the institutions to encompass China, and multilateral institutions. This effort was reflected in President without violating key liberal values, is a key priority for the EU. of the European Council of Ministers Donald Tusk’s remark in May This position parts company with Washington’s preference 2018 that the EU had to be prepared to act alone, without the for bilateral agreements with China outside of existing global United States.249 The EU has adopted an equally independent institutional frameworks. approach to China lately. The European Commission’s Report, EU-China — A Strategic Outlook, seeks reciprocal conditions A more self-reliant attitude toward relations with Washington governing its economic relations with China. This involves has encouraged Europe to seek closer ties with Asian
58 | HUDSON INSTITUTE states that are considered compatible with European liberal The EU has had a long-standing strategic partnership economic and political values. The EU and Japan agreed with India since 2004. From 2019, Brussels and New Delhi on an economic partnership agreement in December 2017, have begun discussing common security interests in the sending a powerful signal against protectionism at a time Indian Ocean. Maritime security is a priority for the EU, when Washington is renegotiating trade agreements with as the world’s largest trading bloc and as a global security both Brussels and Tokyo, and China, thereby threatening to provider. In November 2018, the EU published a strategy undermine European market-economic principles. Europe on India, confirming their mutual commitment to a liberal, sees free-trade agreements as an instrument to uphold a democratic, human rights, and rules-based order centered on rules-based liberal order at a time when the United States multilateralism.254 Cooperation was given a significant defense has opted out of multilateral trade agreements, pulling the component on this occasion, with maritime security as a focus plug on the Trans-Pacific Partnership (TPP) agreement in area. It includes Indian escorts for humanitarian aid deliveries January 2017. from the EU, cooperation on fighting piracy, and strengthening the links between the EU’s naval forces and India’s navy.255 Japan kept TPP alive, creating a trade pact among 11 Pacific The expansion of European cooperation with India is in line Rim nations called the Comprehensive and Progressive Trans- with the U.S. rapprochement towards India, but the emphasis Pacific Partnership (TPP-11) that went into force on December on multilateralism, humanitarian aid, and piracy as means of 30, 2018. On February 1, 2019, the EU-Japan Strategic strengthening relations is different. Partnership provisionally entered into force between the two entities, who already has strong economic relations.252 The The EU began negotiating a free-trade agreement with Australia partnership agreement is the first-ever bilateral framework on June 18, 2018. The EU is Australia’s second largest agreement between the EU and Japan. It provides a framework trade partner, and the EU was Australia’s largest source of for enhanced political cooperation and joint action on issues of foreign direct investment in 2017. Moreover, they too share common interest — on bilateral as well as regional and global a commitment to a rules-based order, the rule of law, global challenges. The agreement demonstrates that the EU considers normative frameworks, and free and open markets.256 Japan a key component of ensuring the long-term preservation of a global political framework based on liberal economic, Europe’s embrace of the Asian members of the Quadrilateral democratic, and human rights principles. Security Dialogue, the informal strategic dialogue between the United States, Japan, Australia, and India, and its enhanced The EU and the Association of South-East Asian Nations cooperation with ASEAN, complements U.S. efforts to expand (ASEAN) are negotiating free trade agreements, hoping its relations with Indo-Pacific democratic and market-economic to profit from the EU’s position as the second largest trade states. However, Europe’s strengthening of its Asian links partner of ASEAN after China. ASEAN is the EU’s third largest occurs because of an independent position that prioritizes trade partner. In October 2018, the EU and Singapore signed multilateral institutional cooperation and comprehensive free a landmark free-trade agreement, which Europe sees as a trade agreements. This deviates from U.S. priorities as of late pathfinder to a wider free-trade agreement with ASEAN.253 The — of bilateral negotiations and ad hoc institutional frameworks. EU’s priority of addressing ASEAN is another manifestation of This is not necessarily a drawback, but could be utilized as a Europe’s preference for multilateral institutions as the basis for division of labor, focusing on the complementarity of efforts that international cooperation. are carried out with the same common fundamental objective
STRATEGIES FOR THE INDO-PACIFIC: PERCEPTIONS OF THE U.S. AND LIKE-MINDED COUNTRIES of preserving a liberal economic and democratic world order, wants to preserve its beneficial trading relationship with China, governed by the rule of law. and it is concerned that China could retaliate by complicating Indian-Pakistani relations.263
Coming in from the Cold? Canada’s ASEAN shares India’s concerns about any Indo-Pacific Indo-Pacific Possibilities & Conundrum framework position that would be seen by China as exclusive by Stephen R. Nagy and thus negatively affect their economic ties.264 Where they differ is that ASEAN’s Outlook for the Indo-Pacific aims to Converging and Diverging Interests inculcate ASEAN centrality into the Indo-Pacific framework.265 in the Indo-Pacific257 The Indo-Pacific region has garnered considerable interest in Japan and the United States, despite their long-standing many nations, including Canada. Japan’s conceptualization is alliance, also have diverging views as on what should be through the Free and Open Indo-Pacific Vision,258 whereas the prioritized in any formulation of the Indo-Pacific. Tokyo pledges United States’ Defense Department has formulated the Indo- “nation-building support in the area of development, as well as Pacific Strategy,259 which was released June 1, 2019. Australia, a politics and governance,” and to “promote quality infrastructure state that is situated in the two oceans that give the Indo-Pacific development, trade and investment, and enhance business its name, has been a forerunner in utilizing the term of Indo- environment and human development, strengthening connectivity Pacific, as seen in its 2017 Foreign Policy White Paper.260 Even in ASEAN region.”266 In contrast to this development-focused ASEAN has released the ASEAN Outlook on the Indo-Pacific.261 Indo-Pacific vision, the United States strategy, as outlined in the 2019 Department of Defense Indo-Pacific Strategy Report Each vision, outlook, or strategy (hereafter framework) (IPSR) “affirms the enduring U.S. commitment to stability and has converging and diverging components. Examining prosperity in the region through the pursuit of preparedness, convergences, all four of the frameworks highlight the partnerships, and the promotion of a networked region.” importance of creating a rules-based region with a focus on the maritime domain. There is also more or less convergence on Stressing “peace through strength and employing effective the idea of the Indo-Pacific being “open” and “inclusive.” These deterrence requires a Joint Force that is prepared to win any convergences are related to guarding sea lines of communication conflict from its onset,” and “allies and partners are aforce (SLOCs) from disruption by one of more powers. multiplier to achieve peace, deterrence, and interoperable warfighting capability. The Department is reinforcing its With at least $3.37 trillion in trade transiting key arteries in the commitment to established alliances and partnerships, while Indo-Pacific, such as in the South China Sea, securing SLOCs also expanding and deepening relationships with new partners in the Indo-Pacific through a shared rules-based maritime who share our respect for sovereignty, fair and reciprocal trade, understanding is the major pillar of commonality formulated in and the rule of law,” the United States Indo-Pacific Strategy has the various Indo-Pacific frameworks.262 a strong security and deterrence focus.
The degree of inclusivity within the Indo-Pacific frameworks is Emerging Canadian Role in the Indo-Pacific? where we see diverging views. ASEAN and India are both hesitant Where do close partners and allies, such as Canada, fall within to articulate an Indo-Pacific framework that is not inclusive. India this continuum of converging and diverging interests in the
60 | HUDSON INSTITUTE Indo-Pacific, and does Canada have its own perspective of the a vital role in Asia, including participation in the Colombo Plan Indo-Pacific? in the 1950s, establishing a dialogue partnership with ASEAN in the late 1970’s, being a founder of APEC’s predecessor (the As a self-defined middle power, Canada’s long-standing track Pacific Economic Cooperation Council, or PECC) in 1980, and record in buttressing international law parallels the broader becoming one of the economies to establish APEC in 1989.270 convergence of Indo-Pacific stakeholders’ interest in a rules- based Indo-Pacific, as does the broader objective of ensuring Canada’s long-standing and comprehensive relationship with the region does not bifurcate into a Chinese sphere of influence the U.S., its limited capacity owing to the size of Canada, and a and a U.S. sphere of influence. lack of necessity to invest its diplomatic and financial resources into the region partially explains the above criticisms. An inability The questions we are left with considering is what is Canada’s to rationalize and then articulate to citizens as to why Canada position on the Indo-Pacific? What are Canada’s interests in the should be investing in the region is the other explanation. region? What kind of role does Canada wish to play in the region? What are its comparative advantages that can be deployed to the Canadian Middle-Power region to add value to any kind of multilateral cooperation in the Diplomacy in the Indo-Pacific region, either between other middle powers such as Australia, Canada’s limited capacities to effectively engage in the Indo- Japan, South Korea, and India, or with the U.S. or China? Pacific demand that it leverages the normative, functional, and hierarchical aspects of middle power diplomacy to use its As of August 2019, Canada’s stance on the Indo-Pacific has been comparative advantages for maximizing its influence in shaping under-researched and ill-defined.267 To illustrate, on April 28th, the Indo-Pacific region. 2019, on the occasion of PM Shinzo Abe’s visit to Canada, PM Justin Trudeau alongside PM Abe discussed “their shared vision for Here, Canada and other countries need to be clear that their maintaining a Free and Open Indo-Pacific region based on the rule interests in the region will not solely be economic and security in of law — something Canada and Japan will continue to advance nature. Non-traditional security challenges associated with food through a range of initiatives.”268 At the same time, PM Trudeau’s security, climate change, and increasing levels of extremism homepage sends an Asia-Pacific message that “Canada and are likely to be defining features of a region. These challenges Japan are partners in the CPTPP, a free trade agreement between will be highly destabilizing and will necessitate cooperation and Canada and ten other countries in the Asia-Pacific region.”269 This coordination with stakeholders in the region. bipolar approach echoes Patrick’s view that Canada has still not formulated a vision about the region and its place in it. Canada’s ability to negotiate any of these problems in the Indo- Pacific era is limited due to geography, limited capacity, and More critical views of Canada’s earlier contributions to the comparative advantages. Canada will be negatively affected if region suggest that opportunities have been squandered and it does not carve out a role within the region and establish a lacked a vision of what Canada’s place was in the region. platform and a role to shape the region’s evolution that suits Canada’s national interests. The legacy of our earlier engagement with the region was largely squandered through a decade or more of neglect in the late 1990s Realistic about Canada’s capabilities, Canada needs to align and the first decade of this century. In the past, Canada played itself with other middle powers in the region and globally to
STRATEGIES FOR THE INDO-PACIFIC: PERCEPTIONS OF THE U.S. AND LIKE-MINDED COUNTRIES contribute to the evolution of the Indo-Pacific region. This is them to receive the benefits of free trade but also ensure that a hierarchical approach to middle power diplomacy in that it their respective trade portfolios are diverse enough to protect recognizes that there is a power hierarchy in the international themselves against economic coercion by larger states. system, and in order to realize Canadian natural interests in the Indo-Pacific, it must align itself with other middle powers. To illustrate, growing economic entanglement with China has led to many cases of economic coercion to change the behaviour This alignment will necessarily be based on a common of states. The most recent cases of economic coercion by relationship with the United States but not necessary solely with China include, but are not exclusive to, the nationalization of the United States. At times, a middle power alignment could the Senkaku Islands in 2012, the THAAD installment in South and should be utilized to curb or shape Washington’s behavior Korea in 2017, and the arrest of Huawei executive Ms. Meng so that unilateral actions do not go against Canadian and other Wanzhou. Economic diversification through active involvement middle power interests. This would reflect a normative form of in multilateral trade agreements helps middle powers to diversify middle power diplomacy in that an alignment of middle powers their trade portfolio such that they are better situated to resist would actively try to shape the behavior of states in a region economically coercive behaviour. (including China and the United States) such that they reflect desired international behavior. The Comprehensive and Progressive Transpacific Partnership (CPTPP) is a case in point. This 21st century trade agreement Concurrently, middle power alignment should also be used as would be an excellent platform for Canada to work with other a tool to insulate each other from other states as well. With middle powers to advocate for other states to join the agreement this objective in mind, Canada and its middle power partners but also make a collective effort to lobby the U.S. to re-join the need to identify their converging and diverging interests in the agreement. Indo-Pacific region and develop intelligent forms of cooperation. This represents the functional side of middle power diplomacy, In the region there are many candidates including South Korea, the selection of areas of cooperation that reflect the collective Thailand, and the U.K. An intelligent case that Canada and comparative advantages of aligned middle powers. other middle powers should and could advocate for is Taiwan becoming an associate member of CPTPP based China’s own While not an exhaustive list, the following section highlights Belt Road Initiative’s (BRI) practice of having sub-state actors the functional middle power cooperation that Canada can and join the BRI without their national government joining. The case should engage in the Indo-Pacific region. What is clear from of the state of Victoria in Australia serves as a useful example of the examples below is that the middle power cooperation that how Taiwan could be part of the CPTPP based on its advocacy Canadian can engage in in the Indo-Pacific is normative in through a pre-existing Chinese practice of incorporating sub- nature in some areas, such a humanitarian disaster relief (HDR) state actors into Chinese-led international agreements. or buttressing rules-based behavior in the maritime domain, while others are preventative in nature. By enlarging the CPTPP to include complimentary economies like Taiwan, Canada can strengthen its economic foothold in the Middle-Power Coordination in Trade and Economy region while not challenging the One China Policy that China Middle powers such as Canada have an interest in enmeshing uses as a basis for bilateral relations. This is not a panacea themselves into multilateral trade agreements. This enables for resisting coercive economic tactics. Notwithstanding, an
62 | HUDSON INSTITUTE expansion of CPTPP stakeholders can act as a middle-power shorten supply chains as businesses would look for suppliers firewall against economic coercion, weaponizing trade and within each respective digital system resulting in the breakdown tourism. Simultaneously, an alignment of middle powers that of global supply chains. Increased costs would be passed on to includes Canada can contribute to shaping the Indo-Pacific’s the consumer, likely lowering consumption levels and economic traditional and digital economies. This would ensure that Indo- growth globally. Pacific economic growth will be based on innovation, the protection of intellectual property rights, and high environmental A second aspect of bifurcating digital economies is related to and labour standards. Importantly, there would be limitations the role of the state in the digital economy and what that means on the role of state-owned enterprises in international trade to for privacy, data localization requirements and the intellectual ensure market forces are not hindered. property rights protection. Currently, there are concerns and suspicions related to the role of the Chinese government in the Contributing to the interregional economic architecture, aligning digital economy. middle powers to enlarge the CPTPP is a normative exercise in which Canada is instrumental in creating 21st century trade More specifically, suspicions stem from China’s National rules that maximize Canadian national interests through rule- Security Law and Cyber Security Law, which came into effect making and rule-advocacy in the Indo-Pacific region. in 2015 and 2016, respectively. Article 11 in the National Security Law states, “All citizens of the People’s Republic of Middle-Power Coordination in the Digital Economy China, state authorities, armed forces, political parties, people’s Digital connectivity is another area in which aligned middle groups, enterprises, public institutions, and other social powers can work synergistically to promote shared standards, organizations shall have the responsibility and obligation to rules and good governance. It is an example of normative middle maintain national security,”274 while Article 28 in Cyber Security power diplomacy in that it focuses on rule-making. Working Law stated, “Network operators shall provide technical support closely with Japan and other middle powers to realize the Free and assistance to public security organs and national security Trade and Data Free Flow with Trust (DFFT), as proposed by PM organs that are safeguarding national security and investigating Abe at the G-20 Summit in Osaka, will be crucial in keeping the criminal activities in accordance with the law.”275 global production network and existing supply chains intact. 271 In the digital economic arena of the Indo-Pacific region, Canada This will become even more salient as the United States and will need to work alongside its middle power partners and in China compete for dominance in the technology sphere and concert with the United States and China to develop a shared digital economy.272 Current trends suggest that competition regulatory mechanism similar to the Japanese G-20 proposal between the two superpowers is leading towards a bifurcation of or some kind of evocation of that initiative. Without doing so, digital systems, a closed system led by China sometimes called the region’s economic potential will be negatively affected and the Chinanet and an open system led by the United States.273 likely to slow, making it increasingly difficult for the plethora of emerging states in the region to get to or escape the middle- The impact of this divergence of digital economies would income trap. require businesses two duplicate and then localize their business platforms for each digital economy. This would have Not doing so would result in a cascade of developmental issues the effect of increasing costs for businesses. It would also such as extremism, poverty, corruption, and poor governance
STRATEGIES FOR THE INDO-PACIFIC: PERCEPTIONS OF THE U.S. AND LIKE-MINDED COUNTRIES that would be destabilizing to the region at the economic, which remain regulated by international law and not any state’s security and human security levels. military forces. The Taiwan Straits, East China Sea (ECS) and South China Sea (SCS) are illustrative cases, with China Middle-Power Security Coordination building and then militarizing islands in the SCS, the rejection of While economic and digital coordination among middle the Permanent Court of Arbitration’s July 2016 decision against powers is important in the Indo-Pacific, security coordination China’s claims in the SCS, and aggressive fly-bys by Chinese among middle powers can create a critical mass of capacity fighters when ships pass through the Taiwan Straits. We also and capability that can serve each respective middle power’s have so-called grey zone tactics in the form of merchant individual security interests as well. vessels violating Japan’s exclusive economic zone around the Senkaku Islands as a longer-term strategy to erode legal basis Areas of alignment in the Indo-Pacific include stemming weapons for sovereignty in the ECS. proliferation in Northeast Asia and South Asia, bolstering rules- based behavior in the maritime domain, strengthening ASEAN Acting independently, Canada has little capacity to enforce intra-regional integration, among others. This is representative rules-based maritime behaviour in the Indo-Pacific region. of the functional, hierarchical, and normative aspects of middle However, collectively with aligned middle powers, Canada power diplomacy, in that middle power alignment is necessary can contribute in a more meaningful to the shared interest in and useful to enforce rules. The focus on creating a critical ensuring SLOCs remain internationalized. With a long-term mass of capabilities to enforce rules is a realism about the limits track record of cooperation within NATO and participating in of acting alone, reflecting both the hierarchical and functional Rim of the Pacific (RIMPAC) exercises, Canada already has nature of middle powers’ capabilities, where each middle a platform to expand the quality and nature of middle-power power has a comparative advantage that can be leveraged cooperation in the Indo-Pacific to further focus on enforcing when aligned. rules-based maritime behavior.
Canada has been engaged in monitoring and surveillance Working with Japan, Australia, and the U.S., Canada should activities since 2018, using aircraft based at Kadena Air advocate for the formation of a new Quadrilateral Security Base, and subject to a UN Status of Force Agreement, to Dialogue (Quad 2.0) that includes the states with a pre-existing counter illicit maritime activities, including the ship-to-ship track record of security cooperation and similar capabilities. transfers of North Korean-flagged vessels that are prohibited The obvious candidates include the U.K., France, New by United Nations Security Council Resolutions.276. Here, Zealand, Germany, and possibly South Korea and Singapore. Canada is not alone; other middle powers, such as Australia, The group would function as an alignment of states with a New Zealand, France, and the U.K., are also contributing convergence of interest in maintaining rules-based behavior in to the monitoring and surveillance process. Formalizing and the maritime domain. expanding the number of middle power states involved in these activities can and will stem weapons proliferation in the The manifestation of this middle power cooperation could Indo-Pacific region. vary. Regularized humanitarian disaster relief (HDR) activities in the SCS, ECS, Taiwan straits and Indian Ocean would Aside from monitoring and surveillance, middle power partners serve to increase interoperability and a joint presence in the have a role in securing sea lines of communication (SLOCs), region. Focusing on HDR rather than security cooperation or
64 | HUDSON INSTITUTE more overt military activities, such as freedom of navigation Middle-Power Non-Traditional Security operations (FONOPS), means that many states can participate (NTS) Cooperation in the HDR activities because they are in the interests NTS cooperation in the Indo-Pacific is another area where of all stakeholders in the region, this could and should Canada should be proactive about middle-power alignment — include China. both to mitigate NTS issues and deal with situations as they arise. Specific areas of concern include piracy, human trafficking, food Other forms of more security-focused activities could be joint security, and human security associated with climate change transits in parts of the Indo-Pacific that are being challenged in and the tangential and non-tangential challenges associated terms of their international nature. The SCS and Taiwan Straits with overpopulation and demographics. The examples given are at the forefront of these activities. Counter-grey-zone tactics are illustrative of the functional middle-power opportunities to of middle powers transiting Japan’s EEZ around the Senkaku cooperate in the Indo-Pacific. Islands with the appropriate permission serves to recognize Japan’s claims under international law. In the case of climate change for example, areas such as the Mekong Delta, South Asia (Bangladesh in particular) are going to This serves Canada’s longstanding middle-power interests be zones of massive disruption as sea levels rise. In the case of globally and in the Indo-Pacific region of buttressing international the Mekong Delta, food security will become a chronic problem institutions and demonstrates solidarity with allies and partners as watersheds are salinized by rising sea levels, effecting the whose national interests are being infringed upon by states who region’s ability to act at the rice basket for Southeast Asia.278 reject or ignore international law. There are also concerns about the effects on fisheries and other resources that feed hundreds of millions of ASEAN citizens.279 The Vancouver Foreign Ministers’ Meeting on Security and Stability on the Korean Peninsula in January 2018 is an example This is not merely a food security issue; a collapse of the of another way Canada can and should contribute to security, Mekong Delta eco-systems would also be devastating to the but also trade and economic issues in the Indo-Pacific. At the region’s economy and its ability to export internationally. meeting, the “Vancouver group of foreign ministers from across the globe met to demonstrate solidarity in opposition to North Similarly, Bangladesh and other parts of South Asia would face Korea’s dangerous and illegal actions and declared that they a crisis of enormous proportion as sea levels rise. South Asia’s would work together to strengthen diplomatic efforts toward a food basket would face many of the challenges of the Mekong secure, prosperous and denuclearized Korea.”277 Delta countries as well as pressures from forced migration as millions migrate in land to areas less effected by climate change. Canada should proactively sponsor regularized middle-power How the most densely populated cities in the world such as diplomacy on North Korea and other issues in the region, such Dakar will manage this flood of domestic climate-refugees is as rules-based maritime law in the SCS and Indian Ocean, an open question, but what is clear is that climate change will militarization of the region, etc., to forge consensus on issues be a food security challenge that destabilizes economies and in the Indo-Pacific. This would not replace forums such as the social structures. Shangri-La Dialogue held in June every year; rather, it would be a forum in which middle powers discuss their converging As a human-security champion and destination for refugees, interests in the region. NTS issues such as food security in the Indo-Pacific will
STRATEGIES FOR THE INDO-PACIFIC: PERCEPTIONS OF THE U.S. AND LIKE-MINDED COUNTRIES challenge Canada’s commitment to its fundamental values. are destabilizing forces in states were human trafficking Staying wedded to these values will require working with a is prevalent. critical mass of middle powers alongside and in partnership with China and the U.S. It will be the collective resources of Notwithstanding that these cases are located a large aligned states that will be able to lessen the effect of climate in geographical distance from Canada, a NIMBY approach the region and at a global level. would not serve Canadian or middle-power interests in the region. Their destabilizing nature has a negative cascade of Working with other middle powers, Canada should strengthen downstream effects on Canada’s interests in a stable region good governance within the region, promote development that is economically dynamic and sustainable, free of corruption through infrastructure and connectivity, and continue to cultivate and developing. human capital in the region, such that leaders can act with local knowledge to lessen the impact of climate change. It would not be difficult to conceive that if instability becomes the defining feature of the region that we could see an Indo- In concert, middle powers need to lobby and find opportunities Pacific version of the mass exodus of refugees and migrants to be a bridge for the U.S. and China to work together in the that left Syria and the associated instability and extremism that region. Cooperation should not be a zero-sum equation, and came in the wake of the Syrian conflict. middle powers can use their critical mass to influence these two great powers. In the case of the Indo-Pacific, a middle power alignment would be both proactive and reactive in nature. In terms Anti-piracy, anti-human trafficking operations, and humanitarian of reactivity, responding to HDR associated with natural disaster relief are other areas in which middle powers can work disasters such as the 2004 Aceh Tsunami or March 11, 2011 together, or in cooperation with China and the U.S. In the case Great East Japan Earthquake is unpredictable. Nonetheless, of anti-piracy operations, Canada can work with its partners preparation through inter-operability exercises in the region, with naval vessels or using its intelligence operations as a force- joint preparation of emergency resources, and a track record multiplier to provide first-rate intelligence as to how, where and of pre-existing institutional coordination would diminish to what pirates are doing in the Indo-Pacific region. This kind possibility that a large-scale disasters cascades into a large- of role of role leverages Canada’s track record of intelligence scale humanitarian disaster. cooperation within the five-eyes network to provide a public good for the region through cooperation with other middle Coming in From the Cold? Canada’s Indo-Pacific powers. This is important in terms of securing SLOCs in the Possibilities & Conundrum region, and it is the kind of role that would not receive push Canada’s converging interests with its long-standing partner the back from stakeholders in the region as it benefits all. U.S. and other middle powers stakeholders in the Indo-Pacific region are clear. So is Canada’s existing track record of activities Intelligence operations can also be used to deal with human in the region, despite not being formally labelled Indo-Pacific trafficking in the region. By some estimates, approximately activities or falling under the rubric of an Indo-Pacific framework 40 million individuals are trafficked every year.280 Aside like its allies and partners. The possibility and necessity to from the human rights aspect of human trafficking, there expand Canadian contributions in the emerging region needs are the associated criminal networks and facilitators that to be based on a realistic assessment of its existing capabilities.
66 | HUDSON INSTITUTE Overcoming this conundrum requires an assessment of perspective, rather than formulating a Canadian Indo-Pacific Canadian comparative advantages and how they can work vision or strategy, Canada needs to identify where it can synergistically with other middle powers and the U.S. in the contribute and which partners it can work with to contribute to Indo-Pacific such that they can contribute to the Indo-Pacific’s the region’s institutionalization. evolution towards an open and rules-based region. From this
STRATEGIES FOR THE INDO-PACIFIC: PERCEPTIONS OF THE U.S. AND LIKE-MINDED COUNTRIES IV. JAPAN
Implications of U.S.-China As a paramount leader of rising China, it is not unusual, but rather Tensions in The Indo-Pacific: a natural and appropriate action for President Xi to proclaim such Japan’s View a national objective to over 1.3 billion Chinese people. by Yoji Koda At the same time, however, from the eyes of most international Preface community members, China, under the new national objective In 2012, President of People’s Republic of China, General of its Great Revival, seems to have started serious challenges Secretary of the Communist Party of China, and Chairman of against today’s long-familiarized and firmly-established the Central Military Commission, Xi Jinping, set forth “the great revival of the Chinese nation” — a clear national goal of China. The national goal is to build a Great Modern Socialist Country Photo caption: A P3-C aircraft of the Japan Maritime Self-Defense Force by communist China’s centennial year of 2049, with socialistic patrols near the natural gas field Kikyo on March 4, 2005, in the East core values. China Sea. (The Asahi Shimbun via Getty Images)
68 | HUDSON INSTITUTE international norms and customs — especially the overwhelming a scenario, it would be clear that the hunter is the PLA and the global dominance of the United States (U.S.). sitting ducks are disabled the USF.
In this paper, I would like to examine some key elements So, for PLA, building up its force to fully meet the requirements that would affect the current and future rivalry of China and of this strategy has been a matter of highest priority, and China the U.S. and the PLA have been developing many military capabilities for A2AD operations. These include anti-ship ballistic missiles China’s Military Strategy Against the U.S.: (ASBM), hypersonic anti-ship/land attack missiles, submarine Anti-Access and Area Denial (A2AD) forces, and offensive seabed mine capabilities, as conventional It is well known that “A2AD” is a term used by Western security high-end equipment and systems. thinkers to describe and explain China’s military strategy against the U.S. One thing to note at this point is the fact that Along with this, there are unconventional and asymmetric the concept of denial is not just specific to China. In other A2AD operations; China and the PLA have been building anti- words, denial is, in general, a strategic concept used by an satellite capabilities (including satellite-killer missiles), cyber– inferior power towards a superior power. A typical example of attack capabilities, destruction of the seabed network of this concept was the “Sea Denial” strategy of Admiral Sergey fiber-optical cables for internet connections, electromagnetic G. Gorshkov of the Cold-War era’s Soviet Navy, which was pulse capabilities, and others that will aim to neutralize USF clearly inferior to the U.S. Navy (USN), to deter and suppress command, control, communications, computers, intelligence, USN and other allied European navies in the Atlantic theater, surveillance, and reconnaissance (C4ISR) capabilities. These well as Japan’s Maritime Self Defense Force (JMSDF) in the specialized PLA capabilities, so to speak, are the ones that Pacific Ocean areas. would disable the nerve networks which connect the “brain” (headquarters) and the “muscles” (front-line fighting forces), as The key objectives of China’s A2AD strategy are to keep U.S. well as all of the sensors, which function for USF like the eyes military forces (USF) out of the Indo-Pacific region during peace- and ears of the body. time and crisis periods (i.e., “A2”); as well as to deny USF from conducting free and unimpeded military operations against China’s ultimate objective of A2AD is to convince the U.S. to China (i.e., “AD”) in war time. abandon its long-maintained policies of engagement in Indo- Pacific matters by successfully demonstrating these capabilities However, for China and its military, i.e. People’s Liberation to U.S. leadership and the American people, in hopes that it will Army (PLA), it is extremely difficult — practically impossible weaken the will of U.S. — to establish these goals by winning an all-out and head-on war against superior USF. So, a key tenet of A2AD is to build As indicated above, a key element of A2AD is that China could sufficient capabilities to attack and neutralize some of USF’s achieve its military objective of always “keeping the USF out” of key weak points, or Achilles’ Heels, that would entrap robust key operational areas without ever fighting the U.S. When crises a USF into the most difficult situations, where USF war-fighting occur, China would demonstrate the aforementioned unique capabilities would be substantially reduced. Thus, in theory, military capabilities of PLA to the American public to deter U.S. PLA will gain victory over constrained USF by conducting strike involvement. In other words, China is expected to use A2AD to operations against “sitting-duck”-type targets. That is, in such deprive the U.S. of its determination to keep a military presence
STRATEGIES FOR THE INDO-PACIFIC: PERCEPTIONS OF THE U.S. AND LIKE-MINDED COUNTRIES in Indo-Pacific and to signal that a fight against the PLA would following: first, the PLA-N has poor underway logistic-support entail an extremely high cost. capabilities in waters distant from the mainland; second, it has a serious lack of full-sized overseas naval bases to support Main Elements of A2AD: The Characteristics PLA-N distant-water operations; and third is China’s maritime of the PLA geography, i.e., it is surrounded by the South China Sea (SCS) From the view point of its capacity to support China’s foreign and East China Sea (ECS) and circumferential Pacific island policies, such as the Belt and Road Initiative (BRI), it is chains stretching in an ark from Japan to Taiwan, from the necessary to examine each component of the PLA, which has archipelagos of the Philippines and Indonesia/Malaysia to the been rapidly growing due to two decades of special budget Malay peninsula, and finally to Vietnam. allocations, The PLA-N is also not capable of effectively protecting China’s The 1.5 million-strong the PLA Army still lacks U.S.-style vast and globally-spread Sea Lines of Communications (SLOCs) expeditionary capabilities that would fully support China’s for national survival. However, the PLA-N is in fact capable overseas foreign policy. The PLA Army is second-to-none of strongly supporting PLA Army and Marines’ amphibious homeland defense force that can deliver a crushing blow operations in the ECS and SCS, and also against Taiwan or to any invader, including USF. The Army, together with the Japan’s Southwest Islands. Marines, also has the capability to attack and occupy Taiwan, in the absence of U.S. intervention. Additionally, the Army The PLA Air Force is, in general, a subordinate force to the and Marines are capable of invading and seizing Japan’s PLA Army; so, like the Army, PLA Air Force has poor out-of- Southwest (Ryukyu) Islands. But, taken as a whole, the PLA area operations capabilities. This is especially due to the same Army is too weak to support China’s other, larger, foreign constraints that PLA-N has, and it will be extremely difficult to policy objectives. improve its expeditionary capabilities in the near term. In this regard, the PLA Air Force’s ability to support China’s foreign In recent years, PLA Navy (PLA-N) has become a top service, policy in air spaces distant from the mainland is, and will with the highest national priority. PLA-N has been pursuing an continue to be, extremely limited aggressive force build-up program for almost two decades. Depending on the source of estimates, the size of PLA-N, with Note: Because of the objective of this article, an examination of its three fleets, is ranked as the second or third largest navy the capabilities of PLA Rocket Force is not included. in the world today. The inventory of major PLA-N equipment includes aircraft carriers (CV), large surface combatants, both The Effect of A2AD on Japan’s Maritime Strategy diesel-electric and nuclear-powered submarines, and various Japanese Maritime Self-Defense Force (JMSDF) types of amphibious ships and watercraft, as well as a fair Strategy to Counter A2AD number of fixed-wing and rotary-wing naval aircraft. A current key focus of JMSDF strategy is to maintain sufficient capability to meet the various challenges of the PLA-N. This will However, despite its growing size and the improving qualities surely contribute to protecting Japan’s vital SLOCs and allow of the above-mentioned naval assets, PLA-N’s capabilities to Japan to conduct support operations for USN forces, as well support China’s oversea policies are limited, and will continue to as contribute to Japanese Self-Defense Force’s (JSDF) Island be so into the near future. The reasons behind this include the Defense Joint Operations.
70 | HUDSON INSTITUTE At the same time, however, there should be additional carriers (CVN) or large amphibious ships, would be heavily considerations to cope with the PLA-N’s new maneuvers under damaged (with enormous casualties) by Chinese ASBM strikes, the A2AD strategy. For example, there are several key elements, it is possible that both U.S. leadership and the American public which are listed below, in PLA’s A2AD strategy. JMSDF should would lose their determination to keep USF in that area to fight develop its countermeasures to match future maritime security against the PLA to restore the peace and stability of the Indo- challenges. Pacific region.
• ASBMs As it was mentioned before, weakening, or getting the U.S. to abandon its intent to stay forward-deployed in the Indo-Pacific • New naval base on Hainan Island and Artificial Islands in region, especially without actually fighting USF, is a primary SCS objective of China’s A2AD strategy, and will continue to be so in • Naval Build-up Program, including aircraft carrier (CV) and the future. As it currently stands, if a crisis comes to fruition at some Naval Strategic Arms (Ballistic missile-carrying submarine point in the future, China will establish its strategic objectives with (SSBN)) relative ease, and this would be the least advantageous situation for Japan and the U.S. In this regard, Japan and the U.S. should • Asymmetric warfare prevent that scenario from emerging at any cost.
Joint Efforts of JMSDF and USN China’s development of increasingly potent A2AD weapons to Match China’s Challenges is the primary reason for Japan and the U.S. to jointly develop In order for JMSDF to fully respond to the China’s new new ASBM defense capabilities. One favorable condition for our strategies, the most important thing is to develop and maintain two nations is that fact that Japan and U.S. are already fully and is sufficient operational capabilities against PLA-N. In this jointly involved in development and deployment of Ballistic Missile process, JMSDF should closely cooperate with USN because Defense (BMD) systems for national defense. If Japan and U.S. the main objective of China’s strategy is directed against will wisely use the momentum of current BMD efforts, it would be USN forces in the region. China strongly intends to create much easier to develop and complete additional countermeasures situations favorable to itself, which will erode Washington to ASBMs, especially in their terminal-homing-phase. D.C.’s determination to intervene in Asian issues or deploy USN forces. So, there is a lot for JMSDF and USN to do in For the purposes of this article, this concept of countering order to deter PRC’s strategic attempts. China’s A2AD weapons, such as ASBMs, is designated Fleet Ballistic Missile Defense (F-BMD). A Key Initiative: JMSDF-USN Fleet Ballistic Missile Defense Capability China’s Achilles Heel and the “God-Given Treasure” Among them, one key initiative for Japan and JMSDF is to jointly for Deterrence and Victory: Island Choke Points develop functioning ASBM defense systems with the U.S. to All PLA-N forces are contained in two semi-enclosed ocean neutralize China’s so-called a “carrier-killer” missiles, such as areas, i.e. the ECS and SCS. So, for the PLA-N forces to the DF-21 and DF-26, which will target ocean areas distant operate outside of China’s immediate littoral waters, their units from the mainland. If any of the USN’s capital ships operating have to pass through straits and channels — choke points — in in the Western Pacific Ocean, such as nuclear-powered aircraft order to enter and depart the outer, open-ocean waters.
STRATEGIES FOR THE INDO-PACIFIC: PERCEPTIONS OF THE U.S. AND LIKE-MINDED COUNTRIES This complicates the PLA’s strategy. It is very difficult for the Implications of New Technologies PLA-N to operate freely in the blue-water ocean. In particular, In order for Japan and JMSDF to deter the PLA-N from deployments of the PLA-N’s units in contingency and wartime conducting aggressive operations against Japan and the U.S., scenarios could become extremely difficult and troublesome. new and innovative technologies for JMSDF’s anti-submarine Thus, the existence of several choke-points in the First Island warfare (ASW) operations will be vital for future success. Chain, which surrounds PLA-N’s areas of operations in the There are several existing programs in JMSDF to improve ECS and SCS, is surely a second-to-none deterrent to Chinese its ASW capabilities for SLOCs protection, such as bi- and force projection and will also continue to be so in the future. For multi-static sonar operations and new non-acoustic sensors. China, the choke points are real obstacles for its naval strategy The below three areas are examples of new technologies and to overcome. Posing additional challenges to PLA-N activity is challenges. the fact that all of these choke-points belong to other nations, and China has no control over them. 1. Command, Control, Communications & Computers, and Intelligence, Surveillance & Reconnaissance (C4ISR) In this regard, the PLA-N cannot count on the luxury of free In all military operations, C4ISR capabilities are key factors for transit of its operational units in war time. Therefore, choke- success. In any theater or domain, implications of new C4ISR point control operations by the U.S.’s allies could inflict technologies, such as surveillance from space, intelligence substantial difficulties on China. For example, Japan can collection by extremely long-endurance unmanned aircraft, physically block chokepoints in its Southwest (Ryukyu) Islands sea-bed acoustic devices, and deployable and expandable Chain, thereby preventing PLA-N transit out to the open sea to sensors, which are supported by artificial intelligence (AI), and fight USN forces. advanced data processing systems, will be game-changers for JMSDF’s future maritime operations — especially ASW for Additionally, JSDF is capable of controlling the Bashi Strait, and SLOCs protection and choke-point operations. Australian forces, if the nation agrees, may block and control high-sea areas around southern choke-points in the Philippines 2. Unmanned Vehicles and Indonesian archipelagos. Similarly, India and its navy will be Long endurance, large and small in size, unmanned air (UAV), the other potential controllers of some choke-points to and from unmanned surface (USV), and unmanned underwater (UUV) the SCS and the Indian Ocean. vehicles have a huge potential to complement, but not to replace, conventional manned systems and platforms. The deployment So, for China and the PLA-N, the constrictive geographic of low-cost, medium- to high-performance unmanned vehicles nature of its home-waters could be the most difficult obstacle to in large numbers, will extensively make up for the inherent becoming a real blue-water navy to support its A2AD strategy. personnel risks involved in using existing manned systems. At Of course, China has many options to solve or reduce this the same time, the use of AI will substantially improve the latest problem, but China will have to pay large costs for any solution. unmanned vehicles’ autonomous capabilities, independent For Japan and the U.S., and perhaps Australia and India as from controlling (mother) units at sea or on land. well, choke points around China have been, and will be, “God- given treasures” to deter China and the PLA-N. Of note, JSDF’s 3. Naval Mines new Island Defense posture is a part of Japan’s strategy of Since the end of the Cold War, one almost-forgotten combat future deterrence. system has been the naval mine. AI and new sensors, supported
72 | HUDSON INSTITUTE by the latest sensor and data-processing technologies, have strategy and mutual capability at the earliest opportunity to the potential to transform not only mine laying and sweeping, deter China’s adventurism. but also overall naval operations — especially those conducted at choke points, changing mines from seemingly obsolete This article represents the personal opinions of the author warfare devices fully meeting future maritime high-end war and not any official position of the JMSDF or the Government requirements. These types of advanced mines will enable any of Japan. navy to deploy a much smaller number of mines to establish its operational objectives, i.e., much more efficiently than in the past. These AI-mines will be most suitable for offensive mining Does the Indian Ocean Matter at the mouth of enemy ports, and defensive mine-operations at for U.S.-Japan Relations? strategic choke points. These mines will be able to attack the by Satoru Nagao right target, at the right place, at the right time. Historically, the Indian Ocean has been a low priority for Japan. Conclusion In 2017, there were only 7,000 Japanese living in India — in a The PLA-N has the potential to become a real “blue-water” country of one billion.281 If it is hard to find Japanese nationals in navy, and could thereby become a strong peer-competitor for India, it is even harder to find them in the area surrounding the the USN and JMSDF. In order for the JMSDF and USN to cope Indian Ocean. However, in recent years, there has been a shift with China’s new challenges, our two nations, and two best in its importance. maritime forces, have to start new initiatives now. In particular, the aforementioned joint development efforts focused on Fleet Notably, Japan has started to promote a vision of a “free and BMD (F-BMD) systems are a matter of urgency for both Japan open Indo-Pacific” instead of a narrower focus on the “Asia- and the U.S. as leading naval powers. Pacific.” The largest warships of Japan, the helicopter carriers Izumo and Kaga, have called at ports in India and Sri Lanka since At the same time, however, it is true for China that there will be 2017. Japan donated two patrol ships to Sri Lanka and is also many problems involved with trying to build the PLA-N into a planning to donate used P-3C anti-submarine patrol planes.282 force that can operate powerfully on the open seas. Therefore, Japan and the U.S. will need to prepare to counter China’s These developments are likely due to the changing security strategy with precise coordination and focus on the PLA-N’s situation near Japan, which has caused Japan to reevaluate most difficult challenge, which is the semi-enclosing nature of the importance of the Indian Ocean region. This raises three the ECS and SCS. questions: What are the security changes that have occurred around Japan? To adjust this new situation, what kind of A key question for Tokyo and Washington D.C. is how to assure security system is Japan seeking? And, what can cooperation wartime control of these strategic chokepoints. In order for among Japan, the United States, India, and Sri Lanka achieve JSDF and USF to maintain an advantageous position over the in the Indian Ocean? PLA, both will have to retain the capability to keep the big “wild birds” (i.e., PLA-N and PLA Air Force) in their naturally-formed What Changes Have Occurred Around Japan? “God-given” cages of the First Island Chain surrounding ECS Recently, China has started to expand its military activities and SCS. Both Japan and the U.S. need to develop an aligned around Japan. Figure 1 shows the air and naval routes China
STRATEGIES FOR THE INDO-PACIFIC: PERCEPTIONS OF THE U.S. AND LIKE-MINDED COUNTRIES Figure 2. Expansion of Chinese Military Activity in the Vicinity of Japan
Defense line of China
Chinese naval and air route
Senkaku Islands East China Miyako Island Sea
First island chain Okinotori Island
Guam South China Sea
Palau
Second island chain
Source: Graphic by Satoru Nagao. Data: Ministry of Defense, Government of Japan, Defense of Japan, annual white paper (2018): p.108, http://www.mod.go.jp/e/publ/w_paper/pdf/2018/DOJ2018_1-2-3_web.pdf
is using around Japan. The area of its military activities has China’s military activities have also been very aggressive expanded from the first island chain to the second island chain, in the South China Sea and the Indian Ocean, as well as at which constitutes the defense lines of China now. In the air, the Indo-China border (figure 4). History may explain China’s Japan increased the number of scrambles against Chinese recent assertiveness, as China’s tendency toward maritime military aircraft every year since 2008, to a high of 851 in 2016 expansion has coincided with a shifting military balance (figure 2). in the region. When France withdrew from Vietnam in the
74 | HUDSON INSTITUTE 1950s, China occupied half of the Paracel Islands, and in However, in the current security environment, the military 1974, immediately after the US withdrew from the region, it balance of power is tipping toward China and away from the occupied the other half. In 1988, after the Soviet withdrawal U.S. For example, from 2000-2017, the U.S. commissioned 15 from Vietnam, China attacked the Spratly Islands, which new submarines. During the same period, China commissioned were controlled by Vietnam. Similarly, after the US withdrawal at least 44 submarines. Vice Admiral Joseph Mulloy, then Deputy from the Philippines, China occupied Mischief Reef, claimed Chief of Naval Operations for Capabilities and Resources of by both the Philippines and Vietnam. Therefore, historical the U.S. Navy, reported that China had more diesel-powered precedent suggests that counter-balancing China’s military and nuclear-powered submarines than the United States, as may halt China’s expansion. of February 2015. This has allowed China to expand its military activities. In response, U.S. allies and friendly countries need to In Response to China’s Rise, What Kind fill the power vacuum to counter-balance China. of Security System Is Japan Seeking? For a long time, the “hub-and-spoke” system has maintained A new security framework is being developed — one that relies order in the Indo-Pacific region. Under this system, Japan and more on a network of U.S. allies and friendly countries (figure Australia are each U.S. allies but share no close bilateral security 5). This framework includes not only U.S.-led cooperation, relations between themselves. Thus, this system is heavily but trilateral partnerships that do not include the U.S., such dependent on U.S. military power. as Japan-India-Australia, India-Australia-Indonesia and India- Australia-France. Increasingly, U.S.-Japan-India-Sri Lanka cooperation in the Indian Ocean will be key. Figure 3. Frequency of Japanese Fighter-jet Scrambles from 2008-2018 What Can U.S.-Japan-India-Sri Lanka Cooperation Achieve in the Indian Ocean? against China against Russia against other The U.S. became an influential country in the Indian Ocean after Number of Scrambles the 1970s. However, since the middle of the 2000s, China’s 900 naval activities in the Indian Ocean have been expanding. 800 Chinese submarines threaten vital sea lines of communication in 700 the Indian Ocean. Through its arms exports, port development, 600 and expanding submarine activities, China will soon become 500 the leading power in the Indian Ocean instead of the U.S. Japan 400 cannot accept this situation. 300 200 In response, the U.S. and Japan must look to India. If India 100 has the will and capability, the U.S. and Japan would be able 0 to release themselves from the heavy burden of safeguarding ‘08 ‘09 ‘10 ‘11 ‘12 ‘13 ‘14 ‘15 ‘16 ‘17 ‘18 security in the Indian Ocean and could deploy more military Source: Chart by Satoru Nagao. Data: Ministry of Defense, force in the East China Sea and the South China Sea. While Government of Japan, Joint Staff press release, April 2019, https:// Indian participation in the region has been a problem in the www.mod.go.jp/js/Press/press2019/press_pdf/p20190412_06.pdf. past, recently India has shown an active presence in the
STRATEGIES FOR THE INDO-PACIFIC: PERCEPTIONS OF THE U.S. AND LIKE-MINDED COUNTRIES Figure 4. Chinese Military Presence in the Indo-Pacific Region
Chinese troops in Pakistan occupied Kashmir
Bangladesh (exporting submarines)
Sonadia
Kyaukyu
Coco islands Gwadar (military facility) Djibouti (naval base) Kuantan
Karach Klang Duqm Kuala Linggi
Marao Atoll or Hambantota Darwin Bagamoyo Gaadhoo island in Laamu Atoll Dar es Salaam Colombo Tanjung Priok
白地図 http://www.freemap.jp/
Source: Satoru Nagao
Indian Ocean. For the U.S. and Japan, India represents a Nicobar Islands, Japan and the U.S. are planning to support new hope. infrastructure projects that would enhance India’s naval capability to detect Chinese submarine activities. Not only Defense cooperation among the U.S., Japan, India, and do the Andaman-Nicobar Islands provide important strategic Sri Lanka would offer unique contributions to the security locations for submarine detection, but so would Sri Lanka situation in the Indian Ocean. For example, the U.S. and (figure 6). Japan could contribute to India’s shipbuilding capabilities to build more warships. Providing anti-submarine know-how and Furthermore, infrastructure development in countries neighboring equipment for India is another possibility. In India’s Andaman– India is useful for Japan-U.S.-India cooperation too. For example,
76 | HUDSON INSTITUTE Figure 5: Old “Hub-and-spoke” Alliance System Vs. New Alliance System of Networks
“Old Alliance”: “New Alliance”： US and its bilateral relations Network of allies and friendly countries
Japan Japan India
Australia US Australia US
Source: Satoru Nagao, “The Japan-India-Australia ‘Alliance’ as Key Agreement in the Indo-Pacific,” ISPSW Strategy Series: Focus on Defense and International Security, no. 375 (September 2015), https://www.files.ethz.ch/isn/193713/375_Nagao.pdf.
Bangladesh has already chosen Japan’s Martabali port project China. Those whose interests align with the U.S. and its allies instead of China’s Sonadia port project. There is a possibility that should respond to this situation by developing a new security Japan and India could follow a similar pattern in Sri Lanka. Thus, framework. Under such a framework, cooperation among the if the Trincomalee port project succeeds, then the importance U.S., Japan, India, and Sri Lanka in the Indian Ocean will have of China’s Hambantota port for Sri Lanka will decline. It is also ramifications in the East China Sea, the South China Sea, and possible that the Chabahar port project in Iran could diminish throughout the Indo-Pacific region. Indeed, the Indian Ocean is the importance of China’s Gwadar port in Pakistan (figure 6). of increasing importance to U.S.-Japanese relations, and the Additionally, regional partners can utilize the Asia-Africa Growth time has come to proactively further this cooperation to ensure Corridor to impede China’s Growing influence in Africa. prosperous stability across the Indo-Pacific.
Conclusion China has recently started to expand its military activities around Japan due to the changing power balance between the U.S. and
STRATEGIES FOR THE INDO-PACIFIC: PERCEPTIONS OF THE U.S. AND LIKE-MINDED COUNTRIES Figure 6. Strategic Military Locations for Multilateral Cooperation
Map(http://www.freemap.jp/ ) Iran (Chabahar Port, submarine training) UAE (oil storage cooperation)
Oman (navy Bangladesh can use Duqm (air force capacity Port) building) Myanmar (Sittwe Port, arms export) Thailand Seychelles (naval (joint patrol, naval base in India capacity building) Assumption islands (planned), Malaysia capacity building) (joint patrol training for their air force)
Mauritius (naval communication Singapore facility) (joint patrol, leasing training facilities in Madagascar India) (naval communication Indonesia facility, navy can (joint patrol, use port) maintenance for their fighter jets) Maldives Mozambique Andaman and (surveillance Australia (surveillance Nicobar Islands in capacity (joint infrastructure capacity building) India (fortification building) projects in third with Japan and US) Sri Lanka countries, joint US (India can access (surveillance France (India can exercises) the base in Diego capacity access to the base in Garcia Island) building) Reunion, Djibouti)
Source: Satoru Nagao
78 | HUDSON INSTITUTE Figure 7. Opportunities to Provide Alternatives to Chinese Ports in the Indian Ocean
Northeast India
Hainan island
Sonadia Chabahar Matarbari Gwadar
Colombo Andaman & Nicobar islands Hambantota
Trincomalee
白地図 http://www.freemap.jp/
Source: Satoru Nagao
STRATEGIES FOR THE INDO-PACIFIC: PERCEPTIONS OF THE U.S. AND LIKE-MINDED COUNTRIES An Analysis of Japan’s Military Operations Britain offered Japan, at that time a British ally, the opportunity in the Indian Ocean to join the mission to safeguard SLOCs in the Pacific, the Indian Ocean, and the Mediterranean Sea. Japan dispatched by Satoru Nagao one battle cruiser and three cruisers to assist Australia with an Recently, Japan has been increasing its focus on the Indian escort convoy. In 1916, German naval activities in the Indian Ocean, and relatedly, Japan has ramped up its security Ocean (which included the disguising of a cruiser) prompted cooperation with the U.S., India, Australia, and Sri Lanka in Japan to add four cruisers and four destroyers to safeguard the that region. Japan has started to use the phrase “Indo-Pacific,” SLOCs throughout the Indian Ocean.283 which focuses on both the Pacific and the Indian Ocean, instead of “Asia-Pacific,” which focuses on the Pacific only. And since 2. The Battle of Ceylon in World War II 2017, Japan’s largest warships, Izumo and Kaga, have called at Japan’s second operation in the Indian Ocean was its biggest. ports in India and Sri Lanka. This indicates that Japan has the At war with U.S.- and British-allied forces, Japan dispatched five potential to be a major security actor in the Indian Ocean. If this aircraft carriers with 315 carrier-based planes, four battleships, is so, what kind of actor will Japan be? How can we analyze two cruisers, 11 destroyers and nine tankers. Further, against Japan’s future strategy? the British, it sent three aircraft carriers with 93 carrier-based planes, five battleships, seven cruisers, 14 destroyers, and In the past, Japan has engaged in military operations in the about 70 land-based planes. The purpose of this operation Indian Ocean region, with naval operations — rather than air or was to support land operations in Burma (Myanmar). During the land operations — being the most important to Japan’s ability to battle of Ceylon, Japan sank one aircraft carrier, two cruisers project power. Thus, in examining Japan’s past naval operations and other ships, and shot down 50 planes. The British shot in the Indian Ocean, the direction of Japan’s future strategy in down 13 airplanes. It was the first time in history that an aircraft the region may become apparent. The focus of this paper is carrier sank another aircraft carrier.284 to analyze these naval operations in order to understand and anticipate the nature of Japan’s continuing military activity in the 3. Attacking Sea Lines of Communication in WWII India Ocean. Japan had attacked SLOCs in the Indian Ocean during WWII. Table 1 shows the list of dispatched warships. The purpose of Nine Naval Operations this operation was to attack the SLOCs and transport people Japanese naval forces have implemented eight past military and other goods between Germany and Japan, including the operations in the Indian Ocean. Due to threats over the last Indian nationalist Subhash Chandra Bose. Japan sent up to ten decade in the Strait of Hormuz, Japan’s ninth operation submarines with three small submarines, two decorated cruisers, comprises plans to escort tankers in the Persian Gulf to defend or one submarine tender. The entire Indian Ocean was an arena against a potential blockade. for war. Japan’s operations also included attacking a port in Madagascar. Japan sank 102 ships, including one battleship, 1. Safeguarding Sea Lines of Communication (SLOC) in and destroyed 15. It lost three submarines in the Indian Ocean.285 World War I Japan implemented its first naval operation in the Indian Ocean 4. Minesweeping After the Gulf War during World War I. When German cruiser Emden attacked After WWII, 45 years passed before Japan was willing to Chennai and the SLOCs in the Indian Ocean in 1914, Great perform military activities in the Indian Ocean. However, when
80 | HUDSON INSTITUTE Table 1: Dispatched Warships in the Indian Ocean During WWII
YEAR JAPAN’S WARSHIPS SINK (+DESTROY) LOST
December 1941–March 1942 5 submarines 21
March 1942–April 1942 6 submarines 5 (+1)
5 submarines 22 (+2) April 1942–June 1942 3 small submarines (+1 battleship) 2 decorated cruisers
6 submarines August 1942–November 1942 10 (+2) 1 submarine tender
8 (+1) February 1943–July 1943 5 submarines Transport Shubosh Chondro Boshu
9 submarines 11 (+4) August 1943–December 1943 (2 German submarines) (Germany 5 (+1))
March 1943–April 1944 10 submarines 23 (+4) 2 submarines
May 1944–February 1945 3 submarines 3 1 submarine
Source: Author
Saddam Hussein invaded the Iraq, Japan needed to show the end of the first phase of the mission, on February 24, 2007, will to contribute to the world order and prove its commitment Japan replenished warships belonging to 11 navies, 727 to its alliance with the U.S. Japan’s Maritime Self-Defense times. Japan refueled a total of 470 thousand liters of oil. After Force planed four missions: transporting multinational forces, that, Japan began its second phase of refueling, which lasted sweeping mines, escorting ships, and dispatching warships until 2010. And in this mission, Japan sent a state-of-the-art to transport Japanese nationals. After the Gulf War, in April naval destroyer equipped with AEGIS radar as one of the two 1991, Japan decided to send one minesweeper tender, four destroyers escorting replenishment ships in 2002. In addition, minesweepers, and one supply ship to the Gulf region. Japan sent another destroyer and minesweeper tender to These warships swept 34 mines by the end of the mission in transport daily necessities to Afghanistan (through Pakistan).287 September 1991. It was the first time that Japan independently decided to dispatch military forces after WWII.286 6. Disaster Relief for the 2004 Earthquake and Tsunami Near Sumatra, Indonesia 5. Refueling Missions After 9/11 (2001-2010) When a large earthquake and tsunami struck countries around In October 2001, just after the terrorist attacks on 9/11, Japan the Indian Ocean on December 26, 2004, Japan sent its two sent one replenishment ship and two destroyers to the Indian destroyers and one supply ship, which were returning to Japan Ocean to support the U.S. operation in Afghanistan. By the after a refueling mission supporting U.S. operations in Afghanistan.
STRATEGIES FOR THE INDO-PACIFIC: PERCEPTIONS OF THE U.S. AND LIKE-MINDED COUNTRIES The three ships and the ship-borne helicopter began searching June 2019, similar discussions occurred when tankers with ties for disaster victims and conducting rescue operations with other to Japan were attacked in the Strait of Hormuz.293 navies, including the U.S., India, and Australia. On January 12, 2005, Japan dispatched another destroyer, transport ship, and Defining Features of the Nine Naval Operations supply ship to provide maritime transport for Japan’s Ground Self- In these operations, there are three important features to note. Defense Force that would be implementing relief operations.288 1. Motivations: The Security Situation in Northeast Asia 7. Disaster-relief Operations in Pakistan in 2010 and U.S. Policy When an earthquake devastated Pakistan in 2010, Japan sent First, the security situation in Northeast Asia has prompted the one amphibious ship carrying two helicopters belonging to dispatch of warships in the Indian Ocean. Additionally, relations Japan’s Ground Self-Defense Force to provide disaster relief.289 with the U.S. strongly influence Japan’s decisions to send fleets to the Indian Ocean. In WWII, Japan’s war with the U.S. was the 8. Anti-piracy Operations Since 2009 reason for both the battle of Ceylon and for attacking SLOCs in To defend ships against pirates in the Red Sea, Japan’s Maritime the Indian Ocean. After WWII, when Japan sent minesweepers Self-Defense Force started escorting ships in March 2009 using or replenished ships, it was primarily due to Japan’s significant two destroyers with two helicopters and two anti-submarine alliance with the United States. patrol planes. Japan’s Ground and Air Self-Defense Forces support these operations with a small group of ground troops The reason why the U.S. figures so importantly is related to U.S. and transport airplanes. At first, these forces were located at the influence on Japanese history. The industrial revolution in Japan U.S. base in Djibouti. started after four U.S. warships came to Uraga, near Tokyo, in 1853. After that, Japan faced two wars with China and Russia. Later, Japan set up a permanent base in Djibouti in 2011. This In the Japan-Russia War, U.S. mediation contributed to Japan’s is Japan’s first permanent base outside of Japan since WWII.290 victory. But in WWII, Japan lost the war with U.S. In Japan’s two- thousand-year history, the U.S. has been the only foreign power In this mission, Japan joined the multinational Combined Task to have successfully occupied the country. Then, during the Cold Force 151 (CTF-151), which, since 2013, has included the U.S., War, Japan could concentrate on building its economic power Australia, the U.K., France, Canada, Netherlands, and Pakistan. under the Japan-U.S. alliance. The U.S. worked with Japan to Japanese admirals took command of CTF-151 in 2015, 2017, contain USSR submarine forces, and Japan has possessed and 2018.291 Japan also communicates with India, EU Naval first-class anti-submarine capabilities ever since. And now, to Force Somalia, South Korea, and China. As of May 31, 2018, correct the military balance with China and tackle the threat from Japan has escorted 3,826 vessels, and its airplanes have flown North Korea, Japan again collaborates with U.S. military power. 1,951 missions.292 These operations are still on-going. Therefore, the U.S. has been the most important factor in Japan’s decision to do something security-related in the late-modern age. 9. Escort Tankers in the Persian Gulf (Future Plans) As its ninth operation, Japan plans to dispatch two destroyers Recently, Japanese activities have been expanding in the to escort tankers in the Persian Gulf, if Iran blocks the Strait of Indian Ocean region because the U.S. expects Japan to Hormuz, which Iran has threatened both recently and in 2012. play an active role to counter China’s assertiveness. China And after such a conflict, Japan would also sweep for mines. In has drastically increased its defense budget and expanded
82 | HUDSON INSTITUTE military activities both in the Pacific and the Indian Ocean.294 so. Japan is not located in the Indian Ocean and does not have According to Admiral Sunil Lanba, chief of the naval staff of the much motivation to deploy a fleet to the region because of its Indian Navy, Beijing has deployed six to eight warships in the distance. But when the international community asks Japan to Indian Ocean.295 However, after the Cold War, the U.S. lost the do so, Japan has responded with support. Recently, China has need to maintain a large naval and air force. The number of been increasing its military presence in the Indian Ocean, and warships that the U.S. possesses has decreased from about Japan has been increasing its presence in response. However, 600, during the Cold War, to less than three hundred in 2019.296 Japan’s moves are in cooperation with the U.S., India, and Hence, the U.S. needs the cooperation of its allies and other Australia, as well as other regional countries. Thus, the purpose friendly countries. As a result, to safeguard Japan’s SLOCs, of Japan’s naval activities in the Indian Ocean is the promotion Japan needs to contribute more as a U.S. ally. Because of of cooperation with other countries. this situation, Japan has promoted cooperation with the U.S., India, and Australia in the Indian Ocean, and Japan has also 3. The Size of Dispatched Fleets Were Small cooperated with many countries in the region, like Sri Lanka. The third feature of Japan’s military operations is size. The Therefore, the combination of the security environment in size of dispatched fleets has been small, except in one case: Northeast Asia and U.S. security policy in this region shaped the battle of Ceylon. In the battle of Ceylon in the WWII, Japan’s naval operations in the Indian Ocean. Japan sent five aircraft carriers to the Indian Ocean, which constitutes a large fleet. But in the rest of its operations, 2. Japan Collaborates Well With Other Countries Japan sent only up to 12 warships to the Indian Ocean. A second feature to consider when assessing Japan’s military Before WWI, Japan possessed 65 warships. Thus, the use activity is the type of operation: whether it is a unilateral or of 12 warships dispatched did not account for a big share cooperative operation. Indeed, except WWII, all Japan’s military of Japan’s naval forces. Likewise, in 1941, when Japan operations have been international, cooperative endeavors. In possessed 64 submarines, 3–10 submarines were not a large WWI, Japan escorted ships as part of a multinational effort. In share either. Minesweepers and amphibious ships are not a its minesweeping role after the Gulf War, and refueling missions major component of the Japanese naval force. Two destroyers after 9/11, Japan was supporting the U.S. and Gulf countries. with one replenishment ship, which Japan dispatched after Japan’s operations after the earthquake and tsunami in 2004, 9/11, also composed a smaller force. And in 2009, Japan as well as the earthquake in Pakistan in 2007, were also part possessed one helicopter carrier, 52 destroyers, and 80 anti- of international disaster-relief efforts. The on-going anti-piracy submarine patrol aircraft. Thus, the two destroyers and two measures are an international effort too. In current discussions anti-submarine patrol aircraft, dispatched in 2009 for the anti- of whether to provide tanker escorts in the Gulf, Japan is piracy mission, amounted to a small fleet for Japan. Because weighing how to cooperate with the international community. of the geographical distance, Japan cannot send a big fleet to Thus, all Japan’s operations, with the exception of those in the Indian Ocean easily. WWII, have been part of international efforts. Compared with China, who chooses unilateral naval deployments in the Indian Conclusion Ocean, Japan’s efforts are significantly multilateral in nature. Will Japan be a major actor in the Indian Ocean? If so, what kind of strategy will Japan choose? What can Japan do in Why has Japan not chosen unilateral action in the Indian the Indian Ocean? Analyzing Japan’s naval operations in the Ocean? Most likely, Japan does not have a strong reason to do Indian Ocean leads to three conclusions. First, Japan could
STRATEGIES FOR THE INDO-PACIFIC: PERCEPTIONS OF THE U.S. AND LIKE-MINDED COUNTRIES Table 2. Defining Features of Japan’s Nine Indian Ocean Operations
OPERATION STRATEGIC REASON ROLE OF FLEET SIZE OF FLEET
Safeguard SLOCs in WWI Alliance with Britain Defensive combat Small (4-12+)
War with the U.S. The battle of Ceylon in WWII Offensive combat Big (31+) (Pacific theater)
War with the U.S. Attacking SLOCs in WWII Offensive combat Small (3-10) (Pacific theater)
Minesweeping after the Gulf War Alliance with the U.S. Support Small (6)
Refueling missions after 9/11 (2001-2007) Alliance with the U.S. Support Small (2 or 3)
Disaster relief for the 2004 earthquake and Humanitarian mission Disaster relief Small (3) tsunami near Sumatra, Indonesia
Disaster relief in Pakistan in 2010 Humanitarian mission Disaster relief Small (1)
Anti-piracy measures since 2009 Protecting its own SLOCs Defensive combat Small (2+)
Escort tankers in the Gulf (future plans) Protecting its own SLOCs Defensive combat Small (1+)
Source: Author
be an important security actor in the Indian Ocean. As China have a strong inclination to be an independent actor in this continues to show a military presence in the region, Japan’s region. Third, what Japan can do is limited because of the presence has also been expanding. However, secondly, small size of its naval force. Ultimately, the kind of influence Japan’s influence will be limited because the security situation Japan can wield in this region will depend on cooperation with in Northeast Asia as well as U.S. policy are the main sources the U.S., India, Australia, and other U.S. allies and like-minded of its motivation. Japan’s deployment of forces will be part countries. Japan will participate in the Indian Ocean, and its of international efforts, which indicates that Japan does not influence will be cooperative.
84 | HUDSON INSTITUTE POLICY RECOMMENDATIONS
As the authors of this report demonstrate, there is widespread intervened in eastern Ukraine and Syria after that. And awareness across the Indo-Pacific about the problems created China has also been building artificial islands in the South by a rising China. However, there are different approaches about China Sea since 2015. All of these incidents took place how to tackle the situation. The United States, India, Australia, after Russia and China perceived weakness in the U.S.-led and Japan have chosen a relatively strong stance toward China. security system. And the U.K., France, the EU, and Canada, as U.S. allies, are trying to cooperate with U.S. efforts. On the other hand, Now, in the Indo-Pacific, the regional countries have started Vietnam, Singapore, ASEAN, and Sri Lanka are worried about to worry that the U.S. will not adequately support them. This the side effects of U.S.-China competition. How can affected is especially true when China uses fisheries and paramilitary parties respond? to obscure aggressive activity, instead of overt military operations. In those cases, can the U.S. find legitimate reasons 1. Use Test-Case Scenarios to to intervene militarily? Demonstrate Various Kinds of U.S. Intervention in a Variety of Situations. In order to maintain a strong image, the U.S. should use Regional countries like Vietnam, Singapore, ASEAN, and Sri test-case scenarios to indicate what kind of intervention Lanka are worried about one situation: even if they adopt a might occur in various situations. For example, if China were strong stance toward China, the U.S. and other like-minded planning a small-scale limited attack on India in the Indo-China countries might not support them in a crisis. These regional border area, what could the U.S. do? If the U.S. and Japan countries know what happened in WWII. When Germany were to gather maritime and air forces around the Senkaku bombed London in 1940, the U.S. president was planning to join Islands in the East China Sea, China would be unlikely to the war to support the British, but he lacked legitimate reasons attack India in the Indo-China border area because China to persuade the U.S. citizenry to mobilize and reorganize their wants to avoid simultaneous conflicts on two fronts. Such a military for war. Before German’s ally, Japan, attacked Pearl persuasive scenario would assure others of the strength of Harbor at the end of 1941, the U.S. could not justify direct the U.S.’s security system. The U.S. should develop many intervention in the British-German war. examples of such scenarios and start joint training exercises based on these scenarios with its allies and like-minded Because regional countries are worried that similar situations countries. will happen again, the U.S. needs to maintain the strong image of a U.S.-led security system. The strength of this 2. Create a New Economic system rests on the assumption that the U.S. will intervene Development System That Is militarily if regional allies face emergencies. But the credibility Not Dependent Upon on China. of the U.S.-led security system is facing serious challenges in A second concern of Vietnam, Singapore, ASEAN, and Sri some cases. One unfortunate example of such a credibility Lanka is related to their economy. Currently, a U.S.-China “trade gap occurred in the Obama administration’s Syria policy. war” is ongoing. Because money is enabling China’s current Though President Obama declared the Assad regime’s use assertiveness, this trade war is beneficial. When China has of chemical weapons to be “a red line for us” in 2012, the enough money, it can rapidly modernize its military. China’s wealth U.S. did not attack when the regime used chemical weapons also allows it to invest a great deal of money in small countries; the in 2013.297 The following year, Russia annexed Crimea and small countries’ indebtedness allows China to expand its influence
STRATEGIES FOR THE INDO-PACIFIC: PERCEPTIONS OF THE U.S. AND LIKE-MINDED COUNTRIES there. Countries with significant Chinese investment (and debt) are if the U.S. can integrate both security and economic efforts, it hesitant to criticize China, even if it does not follow international will remain very powerful. rules. Thus, if the current trade war reduces China’s income, it is the right way for the U.S. to deal with China. However, it is For example, when we talk about safeguarding energy also true that the U.S. needs to assure its allies and like-minded supplies against Chinese submarine threats, we could try to countries that its strong position toward China will not impede the build a stronger naval power. But under the current budget economic development of those siding with the U.S. it is not feasible to prepare enough naval ships to safeguard extensive sea lines of communications (SLOCs). From 2000 Indeed, the current economic system in the Indo-Pacific is to 2017, China acquired at least 44 new submarines, while dependent upon China. Many global companies built their the U.S. acquired 15. Even if U.S. submarines are far better factories and sell their products in China. Thus, the economic than Chinese ones, the Chinese are catching up to the U.S. structure itself needs to change. The U.S., its allies, and like- quickly. Thus, the U.S. side needs to establish a new security minded countries should relocate their factories and find new system, supported not only by the military, but also by an markets elsewhere. economic system. Case in point, India-UAE cooperation demonstrates this new idea. In 2018, India and the UAE In the case of Japan, the number of Japanese staying in China signed an agreement allowing the UAE to set up strategic has dropped from 150,399 in 2012 to 124,162 in 2017 because oil storage facilities in India.300 This agreement benefits both many factories have relocated from China to other countries like parties. India can use the stored oil in an emergency. For the Vietnam and India.298 If similar moves occur in other countries, UAE, even if tankers cannot go through the Strait of Hormuz, it will create a new economic structure that is not dependent the UAE can sell oil from this storage. And because the on China. UAE can sell oil from this facility regularly, the high cost of maintaining this facility is offset. This economic effort helps Though the U.S. is no longer a member, what was originally known safeguard SLOCs. as the Trans-Pacific Partnership is a project that could create a new regional economic system that would not include China. The The U.S. and its allies can apply a similar method to deal with U.S.-Japan “Free and Open Indo-Pacific” strategy is also creating China’s submarine threat to SLOCs. Countries siding with the U.S. a new image of the economic system in this region. In September could set up strategic oil reserve facilities in like-minded countries 2019, Japan and the EU also agreed to start joint infrastructure throughout the Indo-Pacific and share oil storage in peace and projects.299 The Japan-India Asia-Africa Growth Corridor could in emergencies. Because submarines cannot easily disrupt this contribute to creating that new economic image too. Using these network of oil facilities, it will be hard to threaten the supply lines projects, the U.S., its allies, and like-minded countries need to of countries siding with the U.S. This defensive measure would create a version of the Belt and Road Initiative that is better than assure the strong image of a U.S.-led security system. the current China-dependent economic system. The U.S. side will win the competition with China, but 3. Accept a New Approach That collaboration with its allies and like-minded countries— Combines Security and Economics. including Vietnam, Singapore, ASEAN, Australia, India, Sri The problem of China is caused in part by the image that China Lanka, the U.K., France, the EU, Canada, and Japan—will be is a “rising power” and the U.S. is a “declining power.” However, key. Therefore, we should understand each other and maintain
86 | HUDSON INSTITUTE the strong image of a U.S.-led security system. Now is the time to “Make America a Great Leader Again.”
Dr. Satoru Nagao Visiting Fellow Hudson Institute
STRATEGIES FOR THE INDO-PACIFIC: PERCEPTIONS OF THE U.S. AND LIKE-MINDED COUNTRIES ENDNOTES
1 The White House (U.S.), National Security Strategy of the 13 U.S. Department of Defense, A Strategic Framework for the Asian United States of America, December 2017, p. 2, https:// Pacific Rim: Report to Congress, April 1992, https://babel.hathi- www.whitehouse.gov/wp-content/uploads/2017/12/NSS-Fi- trust.org/cgi/pt?id=uc1.31822015339674&view=1up&seq=1. nal-12-18-2017-0905.pdf. 14 U.S. Department of Defense, United States Security Strategy for 2 Mike Pence, Vice President of the United States, “Remarks the East Asia-Pacific Region, February 24, 1995, https://nauti- on the Administration’s Policy Towards China,” speech at the lus.org/napsnet/napsnet-special-reports/east-asia-strategy-re- Hudson Institute, October 4, 2018, https://www.hudson.org/ port/. events/1610-vice-president-mike-pence-s-remarks-on-the-ad- ministration-s-policy-towards-china102018. 15 U.S. Department of Defense, The United States Security Strategy for the East Asia-Pacific Region, 1998, http://ryukyu-okinawa.net/ 3 The U.S. Department of State, “U.S. Collective Defense Arrange- downloads/usdod-easr98.pdf ments,” https://2009-2017.state.gov/s/l/treaty/collectivedefense// index.htm.. 16 R.A. Cossa and B. Glosserman, et al., The United States and the Asia-Pacific Region: Security Strategy for the Obama Adminis- 4 The U.S. Department of Defense, Indo-Pacific Strategy tration, Washington, DC: Center for a New American Security, Report, June 1, 2019, https://media.defense.gov/2019/ February 2009, https://csis-prod.s3.amazonaws.com/s3fs-pub- Jul/01/2002152311/-1/-1/1/DEPARTMENT-OF-DEFENSE-IN- lic/legacy_files/files/media/csis/pubs/issuesinsights_v09n01.pdf. DO-PACIFIC-STRATEGY-REPORT-2019.PDF. 17 U.S. Department of Defense, Asia-Pacific Maritime Security Strat- 5 Donald Trump, “Remarks by President Trump at APEC CEO egy, 2015, https://dod.defense.gov/Portals/1/Documents/pubs/ Summit,” transcript, Da Nang, Vi1etnam, November 10, 2017, NDAA%20A-P_Maritime_SecuritY_Strategy-08142015-1300-FI- https://www.whitehouse.gov/briefings-statements/remarks-presi- NALFORMAT.PDF. dent-trump-apec-ceo-summit-da-nang-vietnam/. 18 U.S. Department of Defense, Indo-Pacific Strategy Report: 6 K. DeYoung, “How the Obama White House runs foreign Preparedness, Partnerships, and Promoting a Networked policy,” The Washington Post, August 4, 2015, https://www. Region, June 1, 2019, https://media.defense.gov/2019/ washingtonpost.com/world/national-security/how-the-obama- May/31/2002139210/-1/-1/1/DOD_INDO_PACIFIC_STRATE- white-house-runs-foreign-policy/2015/08/04/2befb960-2fd7- GY_REPORT_JUNE_2019.PDF. 11e5-8353-1215475949f4_story.html?noredirect=on&utm_ter- m=.8e8b937f6abb. 19 Ibid.
7 The White House. National Security Strategy of the United States 20 Ibid., 7. of America, December 2017, https://www.whitehouse.gov/ wp-content/uploads/2017/12/NSS-Final-12-18-2017-0905.pdf. 21 Mark Magnier, “Taiwan Put on U.S. Defense Department List of ‘Countries’ In Latest Move Likely to Goad China,” South China 8 H.L Lee, “The IISS Shangri-La Dialogue Keynote Address,” Morning Post, June 7, 2019, https://www.scmp.com/news/chi- transcript, 18th Asia Security Summit, May 31, 2019, https:// na/diplomacy/article/3013497/latest-move-likely-goad-beijing-us- www.iiss.org/events/shangri-la-dialogue/shangri-la-dia- defence-department-report. logue-2019. 22 U.S. Department of Defense, Indo-Pacific Strategy Report: 9 U.S. Department of Defense, Summary of the 2018 National De- Preparedness, Partnerships, and Promoting a Networked fense Strategy of The United States of America, January 1, 2018, Region, June 1, 2019, 8, https://media.defense.gov/2019/ https://dod.defense.gov/Portals/1/Documents/pubs/2018-Na- May/31/2002139210/-1/-1/1/DOD_INDO_PACIFIC_STRATE- tional-Defense-Strategy-Summary.pdf. GY_REPORT_JUNE_2019.PDF.
10 U.S. Department of Defense, Indo-Pacific Strategy Report: 23 Ibid., 2. Preparedness, Partnerships, and Promoting a Networked Region, June 1, 2019, https://media.defense.gov/2019/ 24 Ibid., 1. May/31/2002139210/-1/-1/1/DOD_INDO_PACIFIC_STRATE- GY_REPORT_JUNE_2019.PDF. 25 Ibid.
11 IISS, IISS Shangri-La Dialogue 2019, https://www.iiss.org/events/ 26 Ibid., 4. shangri-la-dialogue/shangri-la-dialogue-2019 27 Ibid. 12 U.S. Department of Defense. A Strategic Framework for the Asian Pacific Rim: Report to Congress: Looking Toward the 21st Centu- 28 Ibid., 6. ry, April 1990, https://babel.hathitrust.org/cgi/pt?id=uc1.3182201 8798785&view=1up&seq=1. 29 Ibid., 19.
88 | HUDSON INSTITUTE 30 For the author’s analysis on U.S. alliances with Japan and South 45 Jeremy Page, Gordon Lubold, and Rob Taylor, “Deal for Naval Korea, see Patrick M. Cronin, The Cornerstone and the Linchpin: Outpost in Cambodia Furthers China’s Quest for Military Net- Security America’s Northeast Asian Alliances (Washington, D.C.: work,” Wall Street Journal, July 22, 2019, https://www.wsj.com/ Hudson Institute, October 2019), https://s3.amazonaws.com/me- articles/secret-deal-for-chinese-naval-outpost-in-cambodia-rais- dia.hudson.org/Cronin_The%20Cornerstone%20and%20the%20 es-u-s-fears-of-beijings-ambitions-11563732482. Linchpin%20-%20Securing%20America%27s%20Northeast%20 Asian%20Alliances.pdf . 46 U.S. Department of Defense, Indo-Pacific Strategy Report: Preparedness, Partnerships, and Promoting a Networked 31 Ibid., 22. Region, June 1, 2019, 42-44, https://media.defense.gov/2019/ May/31/2002139210/-1/-1/1/DOD_INDO_PACIFIC_STRATE- 32 Ibid., 24. GY_REPORT_JUNE_2019.PDF.
33 U.S. Department of Defense, Indo-Pacific Strategy Report: 47 Wassana Nanuam, “First U.S.-ASEAN Naval Exercise Beings,” Preparedness, Partnerships, and Promoting a Networked Bangkok Post, September 2, 2019, https://www.bangkokpost. Region, June 1, 2019, 26-27, https://media.defense.gov/2019/ com/thailand/general/1741184/first-us-asean-naval-exercise-be- May/31/2002139210/-1/-1/1/DOD_INDO_PACIFIC_STRATE- gins . GY_REPORT_JUNE_2019.PDF. 48 U.S. Department of Defense. Australia-Japan-United States 34 Ibid., 27. Strategic Action Agenda, June 1, 2019, https://dod.defense. gov/News/News-Releases/News-Release-View/Article/1863425/ 35 J. Berkshire Miller, “China-U.S. Tensions Loom Large as australia-japan-united-states-strategic-action-agenda/source/ Shangri-La Dialogue Addresses Asian Security Issues,” GovDelivery/. The Japan Times, May 30, 2019, https://www.japantimes. co.jp/news/2019/05/30/asia-pacific/politics-diploma- 49 Ibid. cy-asia-pacific/u-s-china-tensions-loom-large-shangri-la-dia- logue-addresses-asian-security-issues/#.Xbi5sy2ZNQI. 50 Ibid.
36 U.S. Department of Defense, Indo-Pacific Strategy Report: 51 Ibid. Preparedness, Partnerships, and Promoting a Networked Region, June 1, 2019, 28, https://media.defense.gov/2019/ 52 Josh Smith and Hyonhee Shin, “Scrapped Intelligence Pact May/31/2002139210/-1/-1/1/DOD_INDO_PACIFIC_STRATE- Draws United States into Deepening South Korea-Japan GY_REPORT_JUNE_2019.PDF. Dispute,” Reuters, August 29, 2019, https://www.reuters.com/ article/us-southkorea-japan-usa/scrapped-intelligence-pact- 37 Ibid., 29. draws-united-states-into-deepening-south-korea-japan-dispute- idUSKCN1VJ0J6. 38 Ibid., 30. 53 U.S. Department of Defense, Indo-Pacific Strategy Report: 39 Prashanth Parameswaran, “What’s in the Renewed U.S.-Sin- Preparedness, Partnerships, and Promoting a Networked gapore Military Facilities Agreement?” The Diplomat, December Region, June 1, 2019, 48, https://media.defense.gov/2019/ 28, 2019, https://thediplomat.com/2019/09/whats-in-the-re- May/31/2002139210/-1/-1/1/DOD_INDO_PACIFIC_STRATE- newed-us-singapore-military-facilities-agreement/ . GY_REPORT_JUNE_2019.PDF.
40 Alan C. Tidwell, “With Pacific Step Up, A Chance to Step In,” The 54 Ibid., 54. Interpreter, Lowy Institute, September 30, 2019, https://www. lowyinstitute.org/the-interpreter/with-pacific-step-up-chance- 55 “Singapore Prime Minister Lee Hsien Loong Keynote Address step-in. at the International Institute for Strategic Studies (IISS) Shan- gri-La Dialogue,” May 31, 2019, https://www.pmo.gov.sg/ 41 U.S. Department of Defense, Indo-Pacific Strategy Report: Newsroom/PM-Lee-Hsien-Loong-at-the-IISS-Shangri-La-Dia- Preparedness, Partnerships, and Promoting a Networked logue-2019. Region, June 1, 2019, 32, https://media.defense.gov/2019/ May/31/2002139210/-1/-1/1/DOD_INDO_PACIFIC_STRATE- 56 Ibid. GY_REPORT_JUNE_2019.PDF. 57 Ibid. 42 “Expanding Parnterships in the Indian Ocean Region” section in ibid., 33-36. 58 Ibid.
43 Ibid., 36-39. 59 Ibid.
44 Ibid., 39-40. 60 Ibid.
STRATEGIES FOR THE INDO-PACIFIC: PERCEPTIONS OF THE U.S. AND LIKE-MINDED COUNTRIES 61 “Acting Secretary Shanahan’s Remarks at the IISS Shangri-La The Shangri-La Dialogue, organized by the International Institute Dialogue 2019,” June 1, 2019, https://www.defense.gov/NEWS- for Strategic Studies, June 1, 2019, https://www.iiss.org/events/ ROOM/TRANSCRIPTS/TRANSCRIPT/ARTICLE/1871584/ACT- shangri-la-dialogue/shangri-la-dialogue-2019. ING-SECRETARY-SHANAHANS-REMARKS-AT-THE-IISS-SHAN- GRI-LA-DIALOGUE-2019%20/ . 76 The author detected this sentiment from fellow participants, both Asian and Western, at the SLD right after the speech in the 62 Ibid. course of the discussions.
63 Ibid. 77 BRI, originally known as the One Belt, One Road (OBOR) when it was first unveiled in 2013, covers as its geographical scope more 64 “Speech at the 18th Shangri-La Dialogue by Gen. Wei Fenghe, than just the Indian and Pacific Oceans. Its outreach towards State Councilor and Minister of National Defense, PRC,” Global Europe and South America makes it more a global initiative. Times, June 2, 2019, http://eng.chinamil.com.cn/view/2019- 06/02/content_9520790.htm . 78 In fact, at the SLD, several Southeast Asian policy elites who took the podium referred to Lee’s speech when they proffer their views 65 Ibid. on the regional geopolitical dynamics. It appears as if the speech has been welcomed by ASEAN policy elites, even if the speech 66 Ibid. was not crafted in consultation with them in the first place to reflect an intramural consensus. 67 John Berthelson, “Asia Loses Confidence in U.S. Leadership,” Asia Sentinel, June 4, 2019, https://www.asiasentinel.com/ 79 See: Association of Southeast Asian Nations, ASEAN Outlook on econ-business/asia-loses-confidence-usa-leadership/. the Indo-Pacific, June 23rd, 2019, https://asean.org/asean-out- look-indo-pacific/. 68 “Assessing America’s Indo-Pacific Budget Shortfall,” Premium Official News, Plus Media Solutions, November 16, 2018, https:// 80 See for instance, Transcript of the Remarks by Senior Minister of warontherocks.com/2018/11/assessing-americas-indo-pacif- State, Ministry Of Defense and Ministry of Foreign Affairs Dr. Mo- ic-budget-shortfall/. hamad Maliki Bin Osman at “Strat-Con: Discussing the Emerg- ing Security Dynamics in the Indo-Pacific” Panel at the Raisina 69 Alyssa Ayres, “The Quad and the Free and Open Indo-Pacific,” Dialogue 2018 Wednesday, January 17, 2018 New Delhi, Ministry Council for Foreign Relations, November 20, 2018, https://www. of Foreign Affairs of Singapore, January 18, 2018. cfr.org/blog/quad-and-free-and-open-indo-pacific. 81 Joshua Kurlantzick, “China’s Soft and Sharp Power Strategies in 70 Jim Mattis and the U.S. Department of Defense, Summary of the Southeast Asia Accelerating, But Are They Having an Impact?” 2018 National Defense Strategy of the United States of America, Council of Foreign Relations (CFR) Asia Unbound, blog, July 29, January 1, 2018. https://dod.defense.gov/Portals/1/Documents/ 2019, https://www.cfr.org/blog/chinas-soft-and-sharp-power- pubs/2018-National-Defense-Strategy-Summary.pdf. strategies-southeast-asia-accelerating-are-they-having-impact.
71 Amanda Macias, “The U.S. is sending another warship and more 82 Singaporean policy elites have elucidated those views in public. missiles to the Middle East amid Iran tensions.” CNBC, May 10, Read for example,Goh Chok Tong, Singapore Emeritus Senior 2019, https://www.cnbc.com/2019/05/10/the-us-is-sending-an- Minister, Keynote Address at the Official Dinner of Chosun Ilbo’s other-warship-and-more-missiles-to-the-middle-east-amid-iran- 10th Asian Leadership Conference at the Shilla Seoul, Ministry tensions.html. of Foreign Affairs of Singapore, May 14, 2019, https://www. mfa.gov.sg/Newsroom/Press-Statements-Transcripts-and-Pho- 72 Megan Eckstein, “Carl Vinson Strike Group Departs for Second tos/2019/05/20190514_ESM-Keynote-Address; “The Latest: ‘3rd Fleet Forward’ WESTPAC Deployment.” USNI News, Janu- Singapore PM says China-U.S. rivalry ‘awkward’,” Associated ary 5, 2018, https://news.usni.org/2018/01/05/30428. Press, November 15, 2018, https://www.apnews.com/3d18b- 2d74893438ab84eb907cc299372. 73 Lee Hsien Loong, Prime Minister of Singapore, “Keynote Address at the 18th Asian Security Summit,” The Shangri-La Dialogue, 83 See for instance, Heng Swee Keat, Minister for Finance, “U.S. organized by the International Institute for Strategic Studies, May Engagement in Asia: A Conversation with Minister Heng Swee 31, 2019, https://www.iiss.org/events/shangri-la-dialogue/shan- Keat,” speech at The Brookings Institution, April 15, 2019. gri-la-dialogue-2019. 84 “Belt and Road Initiative main focus of Singapore-China’s 74 For example, Mingmei, “China appreciates Singaporean PM’s further development: Singaporean ambassador,” Xinhua remarks at Shangri-La Dialogue.” Xinhua News, June 3, 2019, News, May 15, 2018, http://www.xinhuanet.com/en- http://www.xinhuanet.com/english/2019-06/03/c_138113673. glish/2018-03/15/c_137041543.htm. htm. 85 People’s Daily Interview with PM Lee Hsien Loong, Prime Minister 75 Patrick Shanahan, Secretary of Defense of the United States of Office of Singapore, April 8, 2018, https://www.pmo.gov.sg/ America, the First Plenary at the 18th Asian Security Summit: Newsroom/peoples-daily-interview-pm-lee-hsien-loong.
90 | HUDSON INSTITUTE 86 In fact, China appears sufficiently satisfied with the future trajecto- curity 32, no. 3 (Winter, 2007/2008): 113-157, https://www.jstor. ry of ties with Singapore being primarily premised on BRI. For ex- org/stable/30130520?seq=1#page_scan_tab_contents ample, see: “China, Singapore enter new era of greater opportu- nities, says Chinese ambassador,” Xinhua News, March 29, 2018, 98 Donald E. Weatherbee, International Relations in Southeast Asia: http://www.xinhuanet.com/english/2018-03/29/c_137075229. the Struggle for Autonomy 2nd ed. Lanham, Md: Rowman and htm. Littlefield Publishers, 2009.
87 Ministry of Defense of Singapore, Singapore and China to Step 99 Amitav Acharya, “The Myth of ASEAN Centrality?” Contemporary Up Defense Cooperation through Enhanced Defense Interac- Southeast Asia: A Journal of International and Strategic Affairs tions, May 29, 2019, https://www.mindef.gov.sg/web/portal/ 39, no. 2 (2017): 273-279. https://www.muse.jhu.edu/arti- mindef/news-and-events/latest-releases/article-detail/2019/May/ cle/667776. 29may19_nr. 100 Ganguly, Sumit, Scobell, Andrew, and Liow, Joseph Chin- 88 “India, Singapore favour multilateral naval drill with Asean,” yong. The Routledge Handbook of Asian Security Studies Sec- Deccan Herald, November 29, 2017, https://www.deccanherald. ond edition. Milton Park, Abingdon, Oxon ;: Routledge, 2018. com/content/645399/india-singapore-favour-multilateral-naval. html 101 Richard Javad Heydarian, “ASEAN needs to move to minilat- eralism,” EASTASIAFORUM, December 5, 2017, https://www. 89 Ministry of Defence of Singapore, Singapore and U.S. to Renew eastasiaforum.org/2017/12/05/asean-needs-to-move-to-minilat- Defence Memorandum of Understanding, May 31, 2019, https:// eralism/ www.mindef.gov.sg/web/portal/mindef/news-and-events/lat- est-releases/article-detail/2019/May/31may19_nr. 102 Amitav Acharya, “The Myth of ASEAN Centrality?” Contemporary Southeast Asia: A Journal of International and Strategic Affairs 90 Ministry of Defence of Singapore, “ASEAN and U.S. to Conduct 39, no. 2 (2017): 273-279, https://www.muse.jhu.edu/arti- Joint Maritime Exercise In 2019,” press release, October 19, cle/667776. 2018, https://www.mindef.gov.sg/web/portal/mindef/news-and- events/latest-releases/article-detail/2018/october/19oct18_nr2/. 103 Barry Desker, “ASEAN integration remains an illusion,” Strait Times, March 4, 2015, https://www.straitstimes.com/opinion/ 91 Graham Allison and Robert Blackwill, “Interview: Lee Kuan Yew asean-integration-remains-an-illusion. on the Future of U.S.- China Relations,” the Atlantic, March 5, 2013, https://www.theatlantic.com/china/archive/2013/03/inter- 104 Rodolfo C. Severino, Secretary-General of the Association of view-lee-kuan-yew-on-the-future-of-us-china-relations/273657/. Southeast Asian Nations, Address at the International Law Con- ference on ASEAN Legal Systems and Regional Integration, the 92 Daniel H. Nexon, “Review Articles: The Balance of Power in the Asia-Europe Institute and the Faculty of Law, September 3, 2001, Balance,” World Politics 61, no. 2 (Apr., 2009): 330-359, https:// https://asean.org/?static_post=the-asean-way-and-the-rule-of- www.jstor.org/stable/40263485?seq=1#page_scan_tab_con- law. tents. 105 Adam Leong Kok Wey, “The War That Gave Birth to ASEAN,” The 93 Camille Lons, “Onshore balancing: The threat to Oman’s neu- Diplomat, September 9, 2016, https://thediplomat.com/2016/09/ trality,” Council on Foreign Relations, April 3, 2019, https://www. the-war-that-gave-birth-to-asean/. ecfr.eu/article/commentary_onshore_balancing_the_threat_to_ omans_neutrality. 106 “European Neighbourhood Policy And Enlargement Negotia- tions,” European Neighbourhood Policy And Enlargement Negoti- 94 Sherrie Ann Torres, “China still rejects PH arbitral win in South ations, https://ec.europa.eu/neighbourhood-enlargement/policy/ China Sea case,” ABSCBS News, August 9, 2019, https://news. glossary/terms/accession-criteria_en . abs-cbn.com/news/08/09/19/china-still-rejects-ph-arbitral-win- says-envoy. 107 Economist Corporate Network Asia, “Riding the ASEAN elephant: How business is responding to an unusual animal,” The Econo- 95 Richard Javad Heydarian, “The day after: Enforcing the Hague mist, 2013, http://ftp01.economist.com.hk/ECN_papers/ridingA- verdict in the South China Sea,” July 25, 2019, https://www. SEAN.pdf brookings.edu/opinions/the-day-after-enforcing-the-hague-ver- dict-in-the-south-china-sea/. 108 Ibid.
96 “ASEAN, U.S. to hold first ever joint maritime drill,” RAPPLER, 109 “Sovereignty over Pulau Ligitan and Pulau Sipadan (Indonesia/ August 24, 2019, https://www.rappler.com/world/regions/asia- Malaysia),” International Court of Justice, https://www.icj-cij.org/ pacific/238469-asean-united-states-hold-first-ever-joint-maritime- en/case/102/summaries. drill. 110 “Temple of Preah Vihear (Cambodia v. Thailand),” International 97 Evelyn Goh, “Great Powers and Hierarchical Order in Southeast Court of Justice, https://www.icj-cij.org/en/case/45. Asia: Analyzing Regional Security Strategies,” International Se-
STRATEGIES FOR THE INDO-PACIFIC: PERCEPTIONS OF THE U.S. AND LIKE-MINDED COUNTRIES 111 “What’s left of the Qatar siege?” Middle East Monitor, February at the ASEAN-China Single Draft South China Sea Code of 21, 2019, https://www.middleeastmonitor.com/20190221-whats- Conduct,” The Diplomat, August 3, 2018, https://thediplomat. left-of-the-qatar-siege/. com/2018/08/a-closer-look-at-the-asean-china-single-draft- south-china-sea-code-of-conduct/. 112 “Aristotle’s Political Theory,” Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy, Nov 7, 2017, https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/aristotle-politics/. 124 Ralf Emmers, “CO17199 | ASEAN minus X: Should This Formula Be Extended?” RSiS, October 24, 2017, https://www.rsis.edu.sg/ 113 Somethea Tann, “How Chinese money is changing Cambo- rsis-publication/cms/co17199-asean-minus-x-should-this-formu- dia,” DW, August 22, 2019, https://www.dw.com/en/how-chi- la-be-extended/#.XZemrLvsYRY. nese-money-is-changing-cambodia/a-50130240. 125 “Jokowi to discuss S China Sea joint patrols with Turnbull,” 114 Nem Sopheakpanha, “China Pledges $10 Billion in Support to TODAY, February 24, 2017, https://www.todayonline.com/world/ Cambodia as Relations With West Deteriorate,” VOA, January 23, asia/jokowi-discuss-s-china-sea-joint-patrols-turnbull. 2019, https://www.voacambodia.com/a/china-pledges-10-bil- lion-in-support-to-cambodia-as-relations-with-west-deterio- 126 Tashny Sukumaran, “Mahathir to update Malaysia’s foreign policy, rate/4755548.html. including on South China Sea and international Muslim cooper- ation,” South China Morning Post, September 18, 2019, https:// 115 Ananth Baliga and Vong Sokheng, “Cambodia again blocks ASE- www.scmp.com/week-asia/politics/article/3027949/mahathir-up- AN statement on South China Sea,” The Phnom Penh Post, July date-malaysias-foreign-policy-including-south-china; Catherine 25, 2016, https://www.phnompenhpost.com/national/cambodia- Wong, “‘Divide and conquer Asean’: China tries to go one on one again-blocks-asean-statement-south-china-sea. with Malaysia to settle South China Sea disputes,” South China Morning Post, May 18, 2019, https://www.scmp.com/news/chi- 116 Agence France-Presse, “Furious Cambodian premier Hun Sen na/diplomacy/article/3010790/divide-and-conquer-asean-china- highlights Asean splits over South China Sea dispute,” South tries-go-one-one-malaysia. China Morning Post, June 20, 2016, https://www.scmp.com/ news/asia/east-asia/article/1978092/furious-cambodian-pre- 127 Jim Gomez, “Mahathir: China should define claims in South China mier-hun-sen-highlights-asean-splits-over Sea,” Arab News, May 8, 2019, https://www.arabnews.com/ node/1463326/world; 117 Shi Jiangtao, “‘Better left untouched’: Philippines and Vietnam wary of Trump offer to mediate South China Sea disputes,” South 128 Graeme Dobell, “Australia as an ASEAN Community partner,” China Morning Post, November 12, 2019, https://www.scmp. ASPI, February 20, 2018, https://www.aspi.org.au/report/austra- com/news/china/diplomacy-defence/article/2119551/better-left- lia-asean-community-partner; Richard Heydarian, “Australia right untouched-philippines-and-vietnam-wary to huddle closer to Southeast Asia,” Nikkei Asian Review, March 20, 2018, https://asia.nikkei.com/Politics/International-relations/ 118 Anuel Mogato, “Philippines says China wanted non-legally binding Australia-right-to-huddle-closer-to-Southeast-Asia South China Sea code,” Reuters, August 8, 2017, https://www. reuters.com/article/us-asean-philippines-southchinasea-idUSKB- 129 Lindsey Ford, “Does ASEAN Matter?” ASIA Society Policy Insti- N1AO1LW tutei, November 12, 2018, https://asiasociety.org/policy-institute/ does-asean-matter. 119 Graham Allison, “The Thucydides Trap,” FP, June 9, 2017, https://foreignpolicy.com/2017/06/09/the-thucydides-trap/ 130 “Jaw to Jaw” versus “Jaw, Jaw,” RMI, December 14, 2010, https://richardlangworth.com/jaw-jaw. 120 Ralf Emmers, “CO17199 | ASEAN minus X: Should This Formula Be Extended?” RSiS, October 24, 2017, https://www.rsis.edu.sg/ 131 “Prime Minister’s Keynote Address at Shangri La Dialogue (June rsis-publication/cms/co17199-asean-minus-x-should-this-formu- 01, 2018),” Indian Ministry of External Affairs, https://www.mea. la-be-extended/#.XZemrLvsYRY gov.in/Speeches-Statements.htm?dtl/29943/.
121 Economist Corporate Network Asia, “Riding the ASEAN elephant: 132 “India as a “Global Swing State”: A New Framework For U.S. How business is responding to an unusual animal,” The Econo- Engagement with India,” The National Bureau of Asian Research, mist, 2013, http://ftp01.economist.com.hk/ECN_papers/ridingA- July 22, 2013, https://www.nbr.org/publication/india-as-a-global- SEAN.pdf. swing-state-a-new-framework-for-u-s-engagement-with-india/
122 “Qualified majority,” European Council of the European Union, 133 “Prime Time with Ravish Kumar, May 10, 2018| Inaccurate Facts https://www.consilium.europa.eu/en/council-eu/voting-system/ in PM Modi’s Karnataka Speech?” NDTV, May 10, 2018, https:// qualified-majority/. www.youtube.com/watch?v=hFhjuWJIQ0o
123 Richard Javad Heydarian, “Asean-China Code of Conduct: 134 Ger, Yeong-Kuang, “From Congagement to Engagement: The Never-ending negotiations,” Strait Times, March 9, 2017, https:// Changing American China Policy and Its Impact on Regional Se- www.straitstimes.com/opinion/asean-china-code-of-con- curity,” American Journal of Chinese Studies 11, no. 2 (October duct-never-ending-negotiations; Carl Thayer, “A Closer Look 1, 2004): 159–180.
92 | HUDSON INSTITUTE 135 Richard Heydarian, “Perils for Southeast Asia in Beijing’s Belt and November 16, 2017, https://warontherocks.com/2017/11/rise- Road scheme,” Nikkei Asian Review, May 16, 2017, https://asia. fall-rebirth-quad/. nikkei.com/Politics/Perils-for-Southeast-Asia-in-Beijing-s-Belt- and-Road-scheme. 149 Hoang Thin Ha, “ASEAN Outlook on the Indo-Pacific: Old Wine in New Bottle?” ISEAS, June 25, 2019, https://www.iseas.edu.sg/ 136 Francis P. Sempa, “Nicholas Spykman and the Struggle for the images/pdf/ISEAS_Perspective_2019_51.pdf Asiatic Mediterranean,” the Diplomat, January 9, 2015, https:// thediplomat.com/2015/01/nicholas-spykman-and-the-strug- 150 Jansen Tham, ” What’s in Indonesia’s Indo-Pacific Cooperation gle-for-the-asiatic-mediterranean/. Concept?” The Diplomat, May 16, 2018, https://thediplomat. com/2018/05/whats-in-indonesias-indo-pacific-cooperation-con- 137 “VP Pence will flesh out the Indo-Pacific Economic Vision,” AM cept/ . CHAM, October 11, 2018, https://www.amchamvietnam.com/ vp-pence-will-flesh-out-the-indo-pacific-economic-vision/. 151 Richard Heydarian, “As Pence kicks off his Asia tour, other countries have their own ideas for the ‘Indo-Pacific’,” CNBC, No- 138 The White House, National Security Strategy of the United States vember 11, 2018, https://www.cnbc.com/2018/11/12/us-japan- of America, December 2017, https://www.whitehouse.gov/ and-indonesia-set-their-sights-on-the-indo-pacific-region.html wp-content/uploads/2017/12/NSS-Final-12-18-2017-0905.pdf 152 Richard Javad Heydarian, “ASEAN Chooses to Focus on Chinese 139 U.S. Department of Defense, National Defense Strategy, 2018, Money Over Missiles,” China U.S. Focus, May 9, 2018, https:// http://nssarchive.us/wp-content/uploads/2018/01/2018-Nation- www.chinausfocus.com/foreign-policy/asean-chooses-to-focus- al-Defense-Strategy-Summary.pdf. on-chinese-money-over-missiles
140 Ankit Panda, “Did China Start Testing Anti-Ship Ballistic Missiles 153 “The ASEAN Outlook on the Indo-Pacific,” June 2019, https:// Into the South China Sea?” The Diplomat, July 2, 2019, https:// asean.org/storage/2019/06/ASEAN-Outlook-on-the-Indo-Pacif- thediplomat.com/2019/07/did-china-start-testing-anti-ship-ballis- ic_FINAL_22062019.pdf tic-missiles-into-the-south-china-sea/. 154 Ibid. 141 Segal, Gerald. “East Asia and the ‘Constrainment’ of China.” In- ternational Security 20, no. 4 (March 22, 1996): 107–135. 155 Kazuo Sunaga, Ambassador of Japan to ASEAN, “Japan’s assistance to ASEAN: Connectivity in line with MPAC2025,” 142 Segal, Gerald, “East Asia and the ‘Constrainment’ of China,” In- October 2016, https://www.asean.emb-japan.go.jp/docu- ternational Security 20, no. 4 (March 22, 1996): 107–135. ments/20161102.pdf; “Australia, ASEAN agree to start regional infrastructure cooperation,”Reuters, March 18, 2018, https://www. 143 “South China Sea: What Australia Might Do,” Australia-China reuters.com/article/us-asean-australia-infrastructure/australia-ase- Relations Institute, March 7, 2016, https://www.australiachinare- an-agree-to-start-regional-infrastructure-cooperation-idUSKB- lations.org/content/south-china-sea-what-australia-might-do. N1GV09; Malancha Chakrabarty, “India and CLMV countries: Investments, development cooperation and sustainable devel- 144 Tanvi Madan, “The Rise, Fall, and Rebirth of the ‘Quad’,” War opment,” ORF, July 4, 2019, https://www.reuters.com/article/ On the Rocks, November 16, 2017, https://warontherocks. us-asean-australia-infrastructure/australia-asean-agree-to-start-re- com/2017/11/rise-fall-rebirth-quad/. gional-infrastructure-cooperation-idUSKBN1GV09V; Richard Javad Heydarian, “The Economic Showdown in the South China 145 “The perils of China’s ‘debt-trap diplomacy’,” the Econo- Sea,” National Interest, August 28, 2018, https://nationalinterest. mist, September 6, 2018, https://www.economist.com/ org/feature/economic-showdown-south-china-sea-29917. asia/2018/09/06/the-perils-of-chinas-debt-trap-diplomacy 156 Malcolm Turnbull, Prime Minister of Australia, Keynote Address 146 Jeff M. Smith, “Unpacking the Free and Open Indo-Pacific,” at 16th Asia Security Summit the IISS Shangri-La Dialogue, June War on the Rocks, March 14, 2018, https://warontherocks. 2, 2017, https://www.iiss.org/events/shangri-la-dialogue/shan- com/2018/03/unpacking-the-free-and-open-indo-pacific/. gri-la-dialogue-2017.
147 Charissa Yang, “Scepticism over free and open Indo-Pacific strat- 157 Julie Bishop, Australian Minister for Foreign Affairs, “Change and egy,” Strait Times, August 12, 2018, https://www.straitstimes. uncertainty in the Indo-Pacific: strategic challenges and oppor- com/asia/scepticism-over-free-and-open-indo-pacific-strategy. tunities,”speech to the 28th IISS Fullerton Lecture, Singapore, March 13, 2017, https://foreignminister.gov.au/speeches/Pag- 148 Hoang Thin Ha, “ASEAN Outlook on the Indo-Pacific: Old Wine es/2017/jb_sp_170313a.aspx. in New Bottle?” ISEAS, June 25, 2019, https://www.iseas.edu. sg/images/pdf/ISEAS_Perspective_2019_51.pdf; “X” (George 158 Ibid. F. Kennan), “The Sources of Soviet Conduct,” Foreign Affairs, July 1947, https://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/russian-fed- 159 Australian Department of Defence, 2016 Defence White Paper, eration/1947-07-01/sources-soviet-conduct; Tanvi Madan, 2016, http://www.defence.gov.au/WhitePaper/Docs/2016-De- “The Rise, Fall, and Rebirth of the ‘Quad’,” War On the Rocks, fence-White-Paper.pdf
STRATEGIES FOR THE INDO-PACIFIC: PERCEPTIONS OF THE U.S. AND LIKE-MINDED COUNTRIES 160 You See Ji, “China’s Emerging Indo-Pacific Naval Strategy,” Asia of State of the United States, Rex Tillerson, Joint Statement for Policy, no. 22 (July 1, 2016): 11–19, http://search.proquest.com/ the Australia-Japan-United States Trilateral Strategic Dialogue, docview/1810309855/. August 7, 2017, https://foreignminister.gov.au/releases/Pag- es/2017/jb_mr_170807b.aspx. 161 See John Lee, “China’s Geostrategic Search for Oil,” Washington Quarterly 35, no. 3 (2012): 75-92. 175 Australian Foreign Minister Hon Julie Bishop, “Change and Un- certainty in the Indo-Pacific: Strategic Challenges and Opportu- 162 The State Council Information Office of the People’s Republic nities”speech, March 13, 2017, https://foreignminister.gov.au/ of China, China’s Military Strategy, May 2015, Beijing, http:// speeches/Pages/2017/jb_sp_170313a.aspx. english.www.gov.cn/archive/white_paper/2015/05/27/con- tent_281475115610833.htm 176 Australian Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade, 2017 Foreign Policy White Paper, pp. 4, https://www.globalsecurity.org/mili- 163 Academy of Military Science, The Science of Military Strategy, tary/library/report/2017/australia_2017_foreign_policy_white_pa- 2013, https://fas.org/nuke/guide/china/sms-2013.pdf. per.pdf.
164 See Nicholas Szechenyi (ed.), China’s Maritime Silk Road: 177 Australian Foreign Minister Hon Julie Bishop, “Change and Un- Strategic and Economic Implications for the Indo-Pacific Region certainty in the Indo-Pacific: Strategic Challenges and Opportu- (Washington DC: Center for Strategic and International Studies, nities,” speech, March 13, 2017, https://foreignminister.gov.au/ March 2018) Retrieved from https://csis-prod.s3.amazonaws. speeches/Pages/2017/jb_sp_170313a.aspx com/s3fs-public/publication/180404_Szechenyi_ChinaMaritime- SilkRoad.pdf?yZSpudmFyARwcHuJnNx3metxXnEksVX3 178 Australian Ministry of Foreign Affairs, speech at the Institute for Regional Security Annual Dinner, October 18, 2016, https:// 165 Australian Department of Defence, Defence 2000: Our Future foreignminister.gov.au/speeches/Pages/2016/jb_sp_161018. Defence Force, 2000, http://www.defence.gov.au/publications/ aspx?w=tb1CaGpkPX%2FlS0K%2Bg9ZKEg%3D%3D. wpaper2000.pdf 179 Sydney J. Freedberg Jr., “Japan, Australia Ramp Up Am- 166 Australian Department of Defence, Defending Australia in the Asia phib Forces: Countering China,” Breaking Defense, April 1, Pacific Century: Force 2030, 2009, http://www.defence.gov.au/ 2016, https://breakingdefense.com/2016/04/japan-austra- whitepaper/2009/docs/defence_white_paper_2009.pdf lia-ramp-up-amphib-forces-countering-china/
167 Australian Department of Defence, Defence White Paper 2013, 180 Eric Heginbotham, Michael Nixon, Forrest E. Morgan, Jacob 2013, http://www.defence.gov.au/whitepaper/2013/docs/ Heim, Jeff Hagen, Sheng Tao Li, Jeffrey Engstrom, Martin C. WP_2013_web.pdf Libicki, Paul DeLuca, David A. Shlapak, David R. Frelinger, Burgess Laird, Kyle Brady, Lyle J. Morris, The U.S.-China Military 168 Australian Department of Defence, 2016 Defence White Paper, Scorecard: Forces, Geography and the Evolving Balance of Power, 2016, http://www.defence.gov.au/WhitePaper/Docs/2016-De- 1996-2017 (Santa Monica: RAND 2015), https://www.rand.org/ fence-White-Paper.pdf content/dam/rand/pubs/research_reports/RR300/RR392/RAND_ RR392.pdf 169 Seventh Japan-Australia 2+2 Foreign and Defence Ministerial Consultations, Joint Statement, April 21, 2017, https://www. 181 Michael Clarke, “The Belt and Road Initiative: Exploring Beijing’s minister.defence.gov.au/minister/marise-payne/statements/joint- Motivations and Challenges for its New Silk Road,” Strategic statement-seventh-japan-australia-22-foreign-and-defence. Analysis 42, no. 2 (2018): 84-102.
170 Japanese Prime Minister Abe and Australian Prime Minister 182 Fergus Hunter, “Australia does not want the Pacific’s debt burden Turnbull, “Visit to Japan by Australian Prime Minister Turnbull,” to increase: Concetta Fierravanti-Wells,” Sydney Morning Herald, joint press statement, Tokyo, January 18, 2018, https://www. April 11, 2018, https://www.smh.com.au/politics/federal/austra- mofa.go.jp/files/000326262.pdf#search=’Joint+Press+State- lia-does-not-want-the-pacific-s-debt-burden-to-increase-concet- ment+%E2%80%93+Visit+to+Japan+by+Australian+Prime+Min- ta-fierravanti-wells-20180411-p4z8z5.html; “Foreign Minister Julie ister+Malcolm+Turnbul+2018’. Bishop’s Interview with Ben Fordham,” April 10, 2018, https:// foreignminister.gov.au/transcripts/Pages/2018/jb_tr_180410b. 171 The White House. National Security Strategy of the United States aspx?w=tb1CaGpkPX%2FlS0K%2Bg9ZKEg%3D%3D. of America, December 2017, p. 2, https://www.whitehouse.gov/ wp-content/uploads/2017/12/NSS-Final-12-18-2017-0905.pdf 183 John Hurley, Scott Morris and Gailyn Portelance, “Examining the Debt Implications of the Belt and Road Initiative from a Policy Per- 172 Ibid, pp. 45-46. spective,” Center for Global Development Brief, March 4, 2018 https://www.cgdev.org/sites/default/files/examining-debt-implica- 173 Ibid, pp. 46. tions-belt-and-road-initiative-policy-perspective.pdf.
174 See the Minister for Foreign Affairs of Australia, Julie Bishop, the 184 Ashlyn Anderson and Alyssa Ayres, “Economies of Influence: Minister for Foreign Affairs of Japan, Taro Kono, and the Secretary China and India in South Asia,” Council on Foreign Relations
94 | HUDSON INSTITUTE (website), August 3, 2015, https://www.cfr.org/expert-brief/eco- 197 Press Trust of India, “Japan to invest $35 billion in Indian nomics-influence-china-and-india-south-asia. infra projects,” Business Standard, last updated September 1, 2014, https://www.business-standard.com/article/econ- 185 S.D. Muni, “India and the Post-Cold War World: Opportunities omy-policy/japan-to-invest-33-5-billion-in-india-infra-proj- and Challenges,” Asian Survey (University of California Press) ects-114090100718_1.html. 31, no. 9 (1991): pp. 862-874, https://www.jstor.org/sta- ble/2645300?seq=1#metadata_info_tab_contents 198 Dhruva Jaishankar·, “A Confluence of Two Strategies: The Japan-India Security Partnership in the Indo-Pacific,” Brook- 186 Chinese GDP, World Bank, https://data.worldbank.org/indicator/ ings (website), April 23, 2018, https://www.brookings.edu/ NY.GDP.MKTP.CD?locations=CN. research/a-confluence-of-two-strategies-the-japan-india-securi- ty-partnership-in-the-indo-pacific/. 187 Chinese Military Expenditure, World Bank, https://data.world- bank.org/indicator/MS.MIL.XPND.CD?locations=CN; Indian 199 Lily Kuo and Niko Kommenda, “What is China’s Belt and Road Military Expenditure, World Bank, https://data.worldbank.org/ Initiative?” The Guardian, July 30, 2018, https://www.theguard- indicator/MS.MIL.XPND.CD?locations=IN. ian.com/cities/ng-interactive/2018/jul/30/what-china-belt-road- initiative-silk-road-explainer. 188 India’s Development Co-operation, Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development, http://www.oecd.org/dac/ 200 Indian Economic Growth, World Bank (website), https://data. dac-global-relations/indias-development-co-operation.htm. worldbank.org/country/india.
189 Salman Siddiqui, “CPEC Investment Pushed from $55b to $62b,” 201 “Tillerson urges India to partner for a secure Indo-Pacific,” Hindu The Express Tribune, April 12, 2017, https://tribune.com.pk/ Times, October 19, 2017, https://www.pressreader.com/india/ story/1381733/cpec-investment-pushed-55b-62b/. hindustan-times-delhi/20171019/281638190443855.
190 “China docked nuclear submarine in Karachi harbor,” Deccan 202 “U.S.-India Bilateral Trade and Investment,” Office of the United Chronicle, January 6, 2017, https://www.deccanchronicle.com/ States Trade Representative (website), updated April 8, 2019, nation/current-affairs/060117/china-docked-advanced-nucle- https://ustr.gov/countries-regions/south-central-asia/india. ar-submarine-in-karachi-harbour-report.html. 203 The White House Office of the Press Secretary, “U.S.-India Joint 191 “Indo-ASEAN bonhomie: PM Modi’s op-ed published in 27 ASE- Strategic Vision for the Asia-Pacific and Indian Ocean Region,” AN newspapers in 10 languages,” The Indian Express, updated press release from the White House, President Barak Obama January 26, 2018, http://indianexpress.com/article/india/indo- Archives (website), January 25, 2015, https://obamawhitehouse. asean-bonhomie-pm-modis-op-ed-published-in-27-asean-news- archives.gov/the-press-office/2015/01/25/us-india-joint-strategic- papers-in-10-languages-5040122/. vision-asia-pacific-and-indian-ocean-region.
192 Sampa Kundu, “ASEAN-India Partnership at 25,” The Diplomat, 204 David Dollar, “The AIIB and the ‘One Belt, One Road’,” Horizons, July 7, 2017, https://thediplomat.com/2017/07/asean-india-part- no. 4 (Summer 2015), republished at Brookings (website), https:// nership-at-25/. www.brookings.edu/opinions/the-aiib-and-the-one-belt-one- road/. 193 Ho Binh Minh, “India offers $500 million defense credit as Vietnam seeks arms boost,” Reuters, September 3, 2016, https://www. 205 Ptolemy’s world map, Revolvy (website), https://www.revolvy. reuters.com/article/us-vietnam-india/india-offers-500-million-de- com/page/Ptolemy%27s-world-map; Martellus’ world maps, My fense-credit-as-vietnam-seeks-arms-boost-idUSKCN11905U. Old Maps (website), http://www.myoldmaps.com/late-medie- val-maps-1300/256-henricus-martellus/256-martellus.pdf. 194 Devirupa Mitra, “Indonesia Told India Its Quest to Join Malacca Strait Patrols Isn’t Feasible,” The Wire, May 31, 2018, https:// 206 Robert D. Kaplan, Monsoon: The Indian Ocean and the Future of thewire.in/diplomacy/india-indonesia-malacca-strait-patrol. American Power (New York: Random House, 2010).
195 Bhaskar Balakrishnan, “Forum for India Pacific Islands Cooper- 207 Senate Committee on Foreign Relations, “Sri Lanka: Recharting ation Moves Ahead,” Institute for Defence Studies and Analyses U.S. Strategy After the War,” S. Prt. No. 111-36 (2009), https:// (website), August 25, 2015, https://idsa.in/idsacomments/ www.foreign.senate.gov/imo/media/doc/SRI.pdf. ForumforIndiaPacificIslandsCooperationmovesahead_bbalakrish- nan_250815. 208 Harry Harris, remarks for U.S. Pacific Command at Galle Dia- logue, U.S. Embassy in Sri Lanka (website), November 29, 2016, 196 Dipanjan Roy Chaudhury, “PM Modi’s Oman visit: Indian navy https://lk.usembassy.gov/remarks-adm-harry-harris/. can now access Duqm port,” The Economic Times, February 13, 2018, https://economictimes.indiatimes.com/news/defence/ 209 Harsh V Pant, “The New Battle for Sri Lanka,” ISN Security pm-modis-oman-visit-navy-can-now-access-duqm-port/article- Watch, June 17, 2010, accessed on ETH Zürich Center for show/62894357.cms. Security Studies (website), http://www.css.ethz.ch/en/services/ digital-library/articles/article.html/117624/pdf.
STRATEGIES FOR THE INDO-PACIFIC: PERCEPTIONS OF THE U.S. AND LIKE-MINDED COUNTRIES 210 Syed Gilani, “China’s 6 Magical Economic Corridors “One Belt, 223 D.J. Sta. Ana, “China reclaiming land on 5 reefs?” Phil- One Road” The Silk Route,” Pulse (blog), LinkedIn, no date Star, June 13, 2014, https://www.philstar.com/head- provided, https://www.linkedin.com/pulse/chinas-6-magical-eco- lines/2014/06/13/1334238/china-reclaiming-land-5-reefs. nomic-corridors-one-belt-road-silk-syed-gilani. 224 “The U.K. National Strategy for Maritime Security,” HM Gov- 211 Andreas Dorpalen, The World of General Haushofer (New York: ernment, May 2014, https://assets.publishing.service.gov. Farrar & Rinehart, 1942). uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/attachment_data/ file/322813/20140623-40221_national-maritime-strat-Cm_8829_ 212 Shivshankar Menon, Choices: Inside the Making of India’s Foreign accessible.pdf. Policy (Washington, DC: Brookings Institution Press, 2016). 225 “Shangri-La Dialogue: Singapore’s 50th Birthday,” HM Govern- 213 Wimal Nanayakkara, “Human Development: Sri Lanka’s ment, June 1, 2015, https://www.gov.uk/government/speeches/ Achievements and Challenges,” Talking Economics (blog), shangri-la-dialogue-singapores-50th-birthday. Institute of Policy Studies of Sri Lanka, July 4, 2017, http:// www.ips.lk/talkingeconomics/2017/07/04/human-develop- 226 “UK-Japan Foreign and Defence Ministerial Meeting” HM Gov- ment-sri-lankas-achievements-and-challenges/. ernment, 21 January, 2015, https://assets.publishing.service. gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/attachment_data/ 214 Klaus Schwab, ed., “The Global Competitiveness Report: 2016 file/398319/UK-Japan_2_plus_2_Joint_Statement.pdf. -2017,” World Economic Forum (2016), http://www3.weforum. org/docs/GCR2016-2017/05FullReport/TheGlobalCompetitive- 227 “Defence Secretary speaks at Shangri-la Dialogue,” HM Gov- nessReport2016-2017_FINAL.pdf. ernment, June 4, 2016, https://www.gov.uk/government/news/ defence-secretary-speaks-at-shangri-la-dialogue. 215 Gayan Chandrasekara, “Sri Lanka’s new foreign policy to focus Asian centric middle path: President,” Lanka Business Online, 228 Ben Doherty, “Britain’s new aircraft carriers to test Beijing in South September 1, 2015, http://www.lankabusinessonline.com/sri- China Sea,” The Guardian, July 27, 2017, https://www.theguard- lankas-new-foreign-policy-to-focus-asian-centric-middle-path- ian.com/uk-news/2017/jul/27/britains-new-aircraft-carriers-to- president/. test-beijing-in-south-china-sea.
216 James R. Holmes, “Monroe Doctrines in Asia?,” The Diplomat, 229 Ibid. June 15, 2011, https://thediplomat.com/2011/06/monroe-doc- trines-in-asia/. 230 “Defence Secretary strengthens ties between U.K. and Oman,” HM Government, August 28, 2017, https://www.gov.uk/government/ 217 United Nations Resolution 2832 (1971). news/defence-secretary-strengthens-ties-between-uk-and-oman.
218 John Hemmings, “What Kind of Foreign Policy and Security 231 Weida Li, “British Prime Minister to visit China on January 31,” GB Policy Should a Post-Brexit Britain Adopt?” RUSI Commen- Times, January 29, 2018, https://gbtimes.com/british-prime-min- tary, July 4, 2016, https://rusi.org/commentary/what-kind- ister-to-visit-china-on-january-31. foreign-policy-and-security-posture-should-post-brexit-britain- adopt. 232 Severin Carrell, “South China Sea: U.K. could send aircraft carrier to back Australian vessels,” The Guardian, July 20, 2018, https:// 219 Small ‘s’ is used to denote that these are not formal strategies or www.theguardian.com/world/2018/jul/21/south-china-sea-uk- government strategies, but rather groups of policies that can be could-send-aircraft-carrier-to-back-australian-vessels. grouped together and defined as having strategic intent. 233 “How much trade transits the South China Sea?” ChinaPower, 220 David Cameron, “My Visit can begin a relationship to benefit CSIS, https://chinapower.csis.org/much-trade-transits-south-chi- China, Britain and the world,” The Guardian, December 1, 2013, na-sea/. https://www.theguardian.com/commentisfree/2013/dec/02/da- vid-cameron-my-visit-to-china. 234 John Hemmings and James Rogers, “The South China Sea: Why it Matters to ‘Global Britain,’” Henry Jackson Society report, 221 “Securing our economy: the case for infrastructure,” Civil Engi- January 2019, https://henryjacksonsociety.org/publications/the- neering Contractors Association, May 2013, https://www.ceca. south-china-sea-why-it-matters-to-global-britain/. co.uk/wp-content/uploads/legacy-media/103459/ceca_cebr_re- port_-_securing_our_economy_the_case_for_infrastructure_-__ 235 “China cancels trade talks with U.K. in protest over defence sec- may_2013.pdf. retary’s speech: the Sun,” Reuters, February 13, 2019, https:// www.reuters.com/article/us-britain-china-talks-idUSKCN1Q312U. 222 John Ross, “David Cameron’s humiliation in Beijing may yet serve a useful purpose,” The Guardian, December 3, 2013, https:// 236 George Parker and Henry Mance, “Gunboat diplomacy’ dispute www.theguardian.com/commentisfree/2013/dec/03/david-cam- upsets U.K. trade mission to China,” Financial Times, February eron-humiliation-beijing-china. 14, 2019, https://www.ft.com/content/f38cc1d4-306e-11e9- 8744-e7016697f225.
96 | HUDSON INSTITUTE 237 Evan S. Medeiros, “Strategic Hedging and the Future of Asia-Pa- 248 Walter Russell Mead, “Incredible Shrinking Europe”, Wall Street cific Stability,” The Washington Quarterly, 29, no. 1, (Winter 2005- Journal, February 12, 2019, https://www.wsj.com/articles/incred- 6):145-67. ible-shrinking-europe-11549928481.
238 According to the Harvard Atlas of Economic Complexity, the US 249 Mehreen Khan, “EU’s Tusk: ‘with friends like Trump, who needs accounted for 13.4% of British imports in 2017, the largest single enemies?”, Financial Times, May 16, 2018, https://www.ft.com/ purchaser of UK goods, second-only to the EU, http://atlas.cid. content/c3002464-5907-11e8-b8b2-d6ceb45fa9d0. harvard.edu. 250 European Commission and High Representative of the Union for 239 George Allison, “HMS Queen Elizabeth Carrier Strike Group to Foreign Affairs and Security Policy, EU-China — A Strategic Out- deploy in 2021”, UK Defence Journal, October 25, 2019, https:// look, March 12, 2019, file:///C:/Users/LiselotteOdgaard/Down- ukdefencejournal.org.uk/hms-queen-elizabeth-carrier-strike- loads/communication-eu-china-a-strategic-outlook.pdf, 2-11. group-to-deploy-in-2021/ 251 “EU-China Summit Joint statement,” Brussels, April 9, 2019, 240 “France unveils its defense policy in the Asia-Pacific,” Ministry https://www.consilium.europa.eu/.../euchina-joint-state- of the Armed Forces (website), updated June 8, 2018, https:// ment-9april2019.pdf. www.defense.gouv.fr/english/dgris/international-action/region- al-issues/france-unveils-its-defence-policy-in-the-asia-pacific. 252 European Commission, “Joint Proposal for a Council Decision,” Brussels, April 27, 2018, https://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/ 241 For the author’s personal observations on French defense of GA/TXT/?uri=CELEX:52018JC0010. freedom of navigation in the South China Sea, see “The French Navy Stands Up to China,” The Wall Street Journal, June 7, 253 Zakir Hussain, “Singapore, European Union sign landmark free 2018, https://www.wsj.com/articles/the-french-navy-stands-up- trade, partnership agreements,” The Straits Times, October 20, to-china-1528411691; and “Will the South China Sea Become 2018, https://www.straitstimes.com/world/europe/singapore-eu- a Chinese Lake?” American Interest, July 3, 2018, https://www. sign-landmark-free-trade-partnership-agreements. the-american-interest.com/2018/07/03/will-the-south-china-sea- become-a-chinese-lake/ 254 Delegation of the European Union to India and Bhutan, “EU-India factsheet: A new strategy on India,” November 20, 2018, https:// 242 Florence Parly, speech delivered at the Shangri-La Dialogue eeas.europa.eu/delegations/india/4010/eu-india-factsheet-new- meeting in Singapore, June 3, 2018, https://www.defense.gouv. eu-strategy-india_en. fr/english/minister/prises-de-parole-de-la-ministre/florence-par- ly-shangri-la-dialogue. 255 Delegation of the European Union to India and Bhutan, “Euro- pean Union Naval Forces — Port Visit to Mumbai,” January 25, 243 Par Julien Bouissou and Bastien Bonnefous, “Emmanuel Macron 2019, https://eeas.europa.eu/delegations/india/57118/europe- veut accroître la place de la France en Inde,” Le Monde, March an-union-naval-forces-port-visit-mumbai_en. 9, 2018, https://www.lemonde.fr/emmanuel-macron/arti- cle/2018/03/09/emmanuel-macron-veut-consolider-la-place-de- 256 Australian Government Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade, la-france-en-inde_5268395_5008430.html#. “Australia-European Union Free Trade Agreement, June 18, 2019, https://dfat.gov.au/trade/agreements/negotiations/aeufta/Pages/ 244 Ministry of Europe and Foreign Affairs, “Joint Strategic Vision of default.aspx. India-France Cooperation in the Indian Ocean Region,” Ministry of Europe and Foreign Affairs, France in India (website), March 10, 257 This essay is based on a forthcoming book chapter called 2018, https://in.ambafrance.org/Joint-Strategic-Vision-of-India- “Canada Asia-Pacific Relations: Transforming into a Middle Power France-Coop-in-the-IOR. Indo-Pacific Stakeholder,” in The Palgrave Handbook in Canada in International Affairs, Paul Gecelovsky and Robert W. Murray 245 Edmund Goldrick, “France and India: a réunion in the Indian (eds.), Palgrave, U.K. (2020). Ocean?,” International Institute for Strategic Studies (blog), March 2, 2018, https://www.iiss.org/blogs/analysis/2018/03/france-and- 258 Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Japan (MOFA), Free and Open india-reunion. Indo-Pacific (FOIP), July 12, 2019, https://www.mofa.go.jp/ files/000430632.pdf. 246 Main results of the Asia-Europe Meeting (ASEM), European Council (website), October 18-19, 2019, https://www.consilium. 259 United States Department of Defense (DoD), Indo-Pacific Strategy europa.eu/en/meetings/international-summit/2018/10/18-19/. Report, Department of Defense, 2019, https://media.defense. gov/2019/Jul/01/2002152311/-1/-1/1/DEPARTMENT-OF-DE- 247 Laurence Defranoux, “Inde: le grand je stratégique de Ma- FENSE-INDO-PACIFIC-STRATEGY-REPORT-2019.PDF. cron,” Libération, March 11, 2018, https://www.liberation. fr/planete/2018/03/11/inde-le-grand-je-strategique-de-ma- 260 Australian Government Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade cron_1635409. (DFAT), “A stable and prosperous Indo–Pacific,” Foreign Policy White Paper, 2017, https://www.fpwhitepaper.gov.au/foreign-poli- cy-white-paper/chapter-three-stable-and-prosperous-indo-pacific.
STRATEGIES FOR THE INDO-PACIFIC: PERCEPTIONS OF THE U.S. AND LIKE-MINDED COUNTRIES 261 ASEAN, ASEAN Outlook on the Indo-Pacific, June 23, 2019, China, “Cyber Security Law of the People’s Republic of Chi- https://asean.org/storage/2019/06/ASEAN-Outlook-on-the-In- na,” November 7, 2016, http://www.npc.gov.cn/npc/xinw- do-Pacific_FINAL_22062019.pdf. en/2016-11/07/content_2001605.htm.
262 Center for Strategic and International Studies, “How much trade 276 Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Japan, “Monitoring and surveillance transits the South China Sea?” China Power, https://chinapower. activities by Canada against illicit maritime activities including csis.org/much-trade-transits-south-china-sea/. ship-to-ship transfers,” press release, May 24, 2019, https:// www.mofa.go.jp/press/release/press4e_002454.html. 263 Rahul Roy-Chaudhury and Kate Sullivan de Estrada, “India, the Indo-Pacific and the Quad,” Survival 60, no. 3 (2018): 181-194. 277 Government of Canada, Vancouver Foreign Ministers’ Meeting on Security and Stability on Korean Peninsula, July 9, 2019, 264 Ha, Hoang Thi. “ASEAN Outlook on the Indo-Pacific: Old Wine in https://www.international.gc.ca/world-monde/issues_develop- New Bottle?” (2019). ment-enjeux_developpement/response_conflict-reponse_conflits/ crisis-crises/korea-coree.aspx?lang=eng. 265 Ibid. 278 Caitlin Kontgis, Annemarie Schneider, Mutlu Ozdogan, Christo- 266 Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Japan (MOFA), 2018. Free and Open pher Kucharik, Nguyen Hong Duc, and Jason Schatz, “Climate Indo-Pacific (FOIP). July 12th, 2019, https://www.mofa.go.jp/ change impacts on rice productivity in the Mekong River Delta,” files/000430632.pdf (accessed July 20, 2019). Applied Geography 102 (2019): 71-83.
267 James Patrick, “Grand, Bland or Somewhat Planned? Toward 279 Chris Harrod, Alejandro Ramírez, John Valbo-Jørgensen, and a Canadian Strategy for the Indo-Pacific Region”, University of Simon Funge-Smith, “Current anthropogenic stress and projected Calgary, School of Public Policy, SPP Research Paper 7, no. 21 effect of climate change on global inland fisheries,” Impacts of (2014): 1-20. Climate Change on Fisheries and Aquaculture (2019): 393.
268 Justin Trudeau, Prime Minister of Canada, “Prime Minister of 280 M. Caballero-Anthony, “Hidden Scourge.” International Monetary Canada announces closer collaboration with Japan,” news Fund (IMF), Finance & Development 55, no. 3 (September 2018). release, April 28, 2019, https://pm.gc.ca/en/news/news-releas- es/2019/04/28/prime-minister-canada-announces-closer-collab- 281 Ministry of Foreign Affairs, “2018 Annual Report of Statistics on oration-japan. Japanese Nationals Overseas (based on October 2017),” Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Government of Japan, https://www.mofa.go.jp/ 269 Ibid. mofaj/files/000368753.pdf.
270 Hugh Stephens and Don Campbell, “Getting Across the Finish 282 Satoru Nagao, “Japan can be the best partner for Sri Lanka and Line: Canada and the Trans-Pacific Partnership,” Canada-Asia India,” Institute of National Security Studies of Sri Lanka (website), Agenda 35 (2013): 3. 18 April 2017 , http://www.insssl.lk/preview.php?id=50#light- box/0/. 271 Kantei (Prime Minister’s Office), “Presidency Press Conference by Prime Minister Shinzo Abe Following the G20 Osaka Sum- 283 (Japanese) mit,” June 29, 2019, https://japan.kantei.go.jp/98_abe/state- 平間洋一『第一次世界大戦と日本海軍―外交と軍事と ment/201906/_00002.html. の連節―』（慶応義塾大学出版会、1998年）。 284 (Japanese) 272 Stephen R. Nagy, “AI Hegemony with Chinese Characteristics: 木俣滋郎「セイロン島沖海戦」『連合艦隊 下巻 激闘 Geotechnology & the U.S.-China Trade War,” China-U.S. Focus, 編』（世界文化社、1997年）44～47㌻。三木原彗一「インド洋作戦」『 January 25, 2019, https://www.chinausfocus.com/finance-econ- 歴史群像 2000年冬・春号』（学研、2000年）33～49㌻。 omy/ai-hegemony-with-chinese-characteristics-geotechnolo- 285 (Japanese) gy--the-us-china-trade-war . 中村秀樹『本当の潜水艦の戦い方―優れた用兵者が操 る特異な艦種―』（光人社、2006年）。木俣滋郎「特殊潜航艇の奇襲」 273 Stephen R. Nagy, “Global Security in the Geo-technological Cen- 『連合艦隊 下巻 激闘編』（世界文化社、1997年）48～51㌻。 tury: Sino-U.S. relations and the reconceptualizing conflict and 286 (Japanese) conflict management in the era of AI,” working paper, presented 道下徳成「自衛隊のシー・パワーの発展と意義」、立川 at 2019 International Studies Association, Singapore, July 4, 京一、石津朋之、道下徳成、塚本勝也編著『シー・パワー』（芙蓉書房 2019. 出版、2008年）219～278㌻。 287 (Japanese) ; (English) Homepage of the Japan Maritime Self 274 Ministry of National Defense of the People’s Republic of China, Defense Force,同上 http://www.mod.go.jp/msdf/formal/english/activi- “National Security Law of the People’s Republic of China (2015),” ties/index.html. March 3, 2017, http://eng.mod.gov.cn/publications/2017-03/03/ content_4774229.htm. 288 Homepage of the Japan Maritime Self Defense Force, http:// www.mod.go.jp/msdf/formal/english/relief/index.html. 275 The National People’s Congress of the People’s Republic of
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STRATEGIES FOR THE INDO-PACIFIC: PERCEPTIONS OF THE U.S. AND LIKE-MINDED COUNTRIES Hudson Institute 1201 Pennsylvania Avenue, Fourth Floor, Washington, D.C. 20004 +1.202.974.2400 www.hudson.org