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Strategies for the Indo-Pacific: Perceptions of the U.S

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Strategies for the Indo-Pacific: Perceptions of the U.S DECEMBER 2019 Strategies for the Indo-Pacific: Perceptions of the U.S. and Like-Minded Countries EDITED BY DR. SATORU NAGAO, VISITING FELLOW © 2019 Hudson Institute, Inc. All rights reserved. For more information about obtaining additional copies of this or other Hudson Institute publications, please visit Hudson’s website, www.hudson.org ABOUT HUDSON INSTITUTE Hudson Institute is a research organization promoting American leadership and global engagement for a secure, free, and prosperous future. Founded in 1961 by strategist Herman Kahn, Hudson Institute challenges conventional thinking and helps manage strategic transitions to the future through interdisciplinary studies in defense, international relations, economics, health care, technology, culture, and law. Hudson seeks to guide public policy makers and global leaders in government and business through a vigorous program of publications, conferences, policy briefings and recommendations. Visit www.hudson.org for more information. Hudson Institute would like to thank General Atomics for their support of this research and publication, and is grateful for past contributions from Northrop Grumman Corporation and Lockheed Martin Corporation. Hudson Institute 1201 Pennsylvania Avenue, N.W. Fourth Floor Washington, D.C. 20004 +1.202.974.2400 [email protected] www.hudson.org Cover: A combined formation of aircraft from Carrier Air Wing (CVW) 5 and Carrier Air Wing (CVW) 9 pass in formation above the Nimitz-class aircraft carrier USS John C. Stennis (CVN 74). The Nimitz- class aircraft carriers USS John C. Stennis and USS Ronald Reagan (CVN 76) are conducting dual aircraft carrier strike group operations in the U.S. 7th Fleet area of operations in support of security and stability in the Indo-Asia-Pacific. (Lt. Steve Smith/U.S. Navy via Getty Images) DECEMBER 2019 Strategies for the Indo-Pacific: Perceptions of the U.S. and Like-Minded Countries EDITED BY DR. SATORU NAGAO, VISITING FELLOW TABLE OF CONTENTS Introduction 6 List of Contributors 8 U.S. 8 Regional Countries 8 Europe and Canada 9 Japan 10 I. U.S. 11 America’s Indo-Pacific Strategy by Patrick M. Cronin 11 American Sea Power in the Indo-Pacific by Bryan McGrath 19 II. Regional Countries 22 Vietnam and the U.S. Indo-Pacific Vision by Do Thanh Hai & Le Thu Ha 22 Singapore and the Indo-Pacific: The Relentless Quest for Balance by Swee Lean Collin Koh 26 A Quest for Strategic Centrality: The Sino-American Rivalry and ASEAN in the Age of the Indo-Pacific by Richard Javad Heydarian 29 Australia’s View of the Free & Open Indo-Pacific by John Lee 36 India-U.S. Relations in the Shadow of the Indo-Pacific by Aparna Pande 41 China’s Growing Influence in the Indian Ocean: Implications for Sri Lanka and its Regional Allies by Asanga Abeyagoonasekera 48 III. Europe and Canada 52 Britain and the Indo-Pacific by John Hemmings 52 France, a Power in the Indian Ocean by Jonas Parello-Plesner 56 Getting the Balance Right: Managing EU Relations with the U.S. and China by Liselotte Odgaard 57 Coming in from the Cold? Canada’s Indo-Pacific Possibilities & Conundrum by Stephen R. Nagy 60 IV. Japan 68 Implications of U.S.-China Tensions in The Indo-Pacific: Japan’s View by Yoji Koda 68 Does the Indian Ocean Matter for U.S.-Japan Relations? by Satoru Nagao 73 An Analysis of Japan’s Military Operations in the Indian Ocean by Satoru Nagao 80 Policy Recommendations 85 Endnotes 88 STRATEGIES FOR THE INDO-PACIFIC: PERCEPTIONS OF THE U.S. AND LIKE-MINDED COUNTRIES INTRODUCTION The rise of China and its attitude towards the world forces the countries. During the U.S.-Soviet Cold War, the winning side United States to address the challenges posed by China’s had 54 countries, but the defeated comprised 26 countries. ambitions. As a result, the United States has clearly identified These facts indicate that the number of supporters correlates to China as a competitor; the latest National Security Strategy, the likelihood of winning the competition. released in December 2017, states that “China and Russia challenge American power.”1 That same year, Vice President In the case of the current U.S.-China competition, the U.S. has Mike Pence spoke at the Hudson Institute and said “Beijing is many formal allies including NATO, Central and South American employing a whole-of-government approach, using political, countries, Israel, Australia, New Zealand, Thailand, the economic, and military tools, as well as propaganda, to advance Philippines, Taiwan, South Korea, and Japan (52 in total), but its influence and benefit its interests in the United States.”2 China’s only formal ally is North Korea.3 Beyond formal allies, Now, U.S.-China competition is escalating, especially so since the U.S.’s circle of like-minded relations expands to include January 2018, when the U.S.-China “trade war” began. The countries like the UAE, Saudi Arabia, India, Vietnam, Singapore, United States needs to win the competition to protect the U.S.- Indonesia, and others. led rules-based order. In June 2019, the U.S. Defense Department published its Indo- Given the United States’ need to win the competition, Pacific Strategy Report.4 In this document, the U.S. expresses cooperation with allies and like-minded countries is key because its perception of which countries are allies and like-minded historically, the number of political partners has been a decisive partners in the Indo-Pacific region and explicitly names those factor in geopolitical struggles. For example, in World War I, the countries. Though Pakistan and Myanmar are cooperating with winning side comprised of 32 countries, but the losing side was China, the three are not formal allies. And currently, Myanmar composed of just 4 countries. In World War II, the winning side is rethinking its relationship with China. Presently, China has had 54 countries, but the losing alliance consisted of only 8 started many infrastructure projects under the Belt and Road Initiative, which have saddled countries accepting Chinese aid and investment with enormous debt. China then leverages this Figure 1: Military Success in Relation debt and makes those countries support pro-China policies. As to Alliance Size a result, when Sri Lanka turned away from its pro-China policy, China demanded payment of the debt and has taken control of The Number of Countries Sri Lanka’s Hambantota Port for 99 years. 60 50 Therefore, maintaining and improving collaboration with its 40 allies and like-minded countries in the Indo-Pacific will be key 30 for the U.S. However, when many countries try to cooperate, 20 challenges arise due to varying perceptions about capabilities, 10 strategies, and interests. It is of increasing importance to identify 0 and understand the perceptions of those cooperating in this WWI WWII The Cold region because the current security arrangement may not be War sufficient to address the challenges ahead. This report includes Source: Author the views of scholars studying the United States, Vietnam, 6 | HUDSON INSTITUTE Singapore, ASEAN, Australia, India, Sri Lanka, U.K., France, Vice President, Lewis Libby; Director of Studies, Joel Scanlon; EU, Canada and Japan. Even if what I can do is very limited, Director of Operations, Nick Mackey; Publications Director, I am hopeful that this report will promote understanding and Carolyn Stewart; Manager of Grants and Projects, Victoria contribute to the victory of the United States, its allies, and other Miller; and Hudson Institute intern, Riho Aizawa. Without like-minded countries. their efforts, it would have been impossible for me to publish this report. Finally, I would also like express my thanks for all the advice and support I received from the experts and staff at the Hudson Dr. Satoru Nagao Institute and the Japan Foundation, especially all contributors; Visiting Fellow President of the Hudson Institute, Dr. Ken Weinstein; Senior Hudson Institute STRATEGIES FOR THE INDO-PACIFIC: PERCEPTIONS OF THE U.S. AND LIKE-MINDED COUNTRIES LIST OF CONTRIBUTORS U.S. Richard Heydarian is currently a visiting fellow at National Patrick M. Cronin is the Asia-Pacific security chair at the Chengchi University, and formerly served as assistant professor Hudson Institute. Dr. Cronin has served as the senior director in political science at De La Salle University. He has written for of the Institute of National Strategic Studies, director of studies The New York Times, Washington Post, The Guardian, Foreign at the International Institute for Strategic Studies, senior vice Affairs, and is a regular contributor to Aljazeera English, Nikkei president and director of research at the Center for Strategic Asian Review, South China Morning Post, and The Straits Times. and International Studies, and senior director for Asia-Pacific He is the author of, among other books, The Rise of Duterte: A Affairs at the Center for a New American Security. He also served Populist Revolt against Elite Democracy (Palgrave Macmillan, as the third-ranking official at the U.S. Agency for International 2017) and The Indo-Pacific: Trump, China, and the New Development in the George W. Bush administration. Struggle for Global Mastery (Palgrave Macmillan, 2019). He has advised Philippine presidential candidates, presidential cabinet Bryan McGrath is the managing director of The FerryBridge members, senators, and the Armed Forces of the Philippines, Group LLC, a national security consultancy. He is a retired U.S. and is also a television host on GMA Network in the Philippines. Navy destroyer captain and the former deputy director of the Hudson Institute Center for American Seapower. He earned John Lee is a Senior Fellow at the Hudson Institute. He is also a B.A. from the University of Virginia and an M.A. from The a non-resident senior fellow at the United States Studies Centre Catholic University of America.
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