The Pieces to Peace: Analyzing the Role of Civil Society in the Design and Implementation of the Good Friday Agreement

The pieces to peace:

Analyzing the role of civil society in the

design and implementation of Northern Ireland’s Good Friday Agreement

Brett M. Mallon

A thesis submitted to the Faculty of Graduate Studies of the University of Manitoba in partial

fulfillment of the requirements of the degree of:

DOCTOR OF PHILOSOPHY

Department of Peace and Conflict Studies

University of Manitoba

Winnipeg, Canada

Abstract Designing and implementing effective, durable peace agreements within conflict zones is a challenging task for peacemakers and peacebuilders. Particularly when working in the context of intractable conflicts and divided societies, transitioning from conflict to positive peace, without becoming stuck in a state of liminal peace, is complicated. Thus, critically assessing the successes and failures of one of the most durable peace agreements in the last half-century, Northern Ireland’s Good Friday Agreement, provides opportunities to discover key lessons in pursuit of deeper understanding of the complexities of peace and conflict. This research project employs a qualitative, grounded theory structure which explores the successes and failures of the Good Friday Agreement from the perspective of the civil society leaders tasked with delivering everyday peace at the grassroots level. Data was collected in Northern Ireland in 2018. In-depth interviews were conducted in Derry/Londonderry and Belfast with 29 civil society leaders working in the peacebuilding field. Data evaluation revealed five key themes which represented concerns and lessons learned for civil society leaders, while reflecting on their time working in the shadow of the Good Friday Agreement. First, study collaborators highlight the strained, one-way relationship between civil society and the political apparatus in Northern Ireland. Second, they noted troubling trends with youth disillusionment and disengagement with the peace process, and the dangers that reality creates for the future of the region. Third, the complex and challenging nature of peace funding in Northern Ireland is discussed as a strain on the ability to embrace organic, locally owned peacebuilding. Fourth, civil society leaders discuss the atmosphere of negative peace that dominates Northern Ireland, which fuels their frustration with a peace process that lags behind expectations. Finally, participants provide critiques on the design of the Good Friday Agreement and offer their ideas for improvement.

This research study argues for the importance of integrating civil society throughout the peacemaking and the peacebuilding process within conflict zones. Embracing the local turn in peacebuilding offers an effective path towards developing durable peace agreements that are representative of grassroot needs, and capable of securing positive peace.

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Acknowledgements I offer my sincere gratitude to the participants of this study who allowed me into their world to explore the grassroots peacebuilding process in Northern Ireland from their perspectives. By offering their time and expertise to this study, they have contributed to the continual building of our collective knowledge of peace, conflict, and the journey of progress. I also thank the wonderful academic mentors I’ve been fortunate enough to learn from throughout my life: Professor Max Carroll, Dr. Jesse Johnson, Dr. Emizet Kisangani, Dr. Laurie Johnson, and Dr. Briana Goff, just to name a few. I would also like to thank one of my dearest friends and my most influential mentor Terrie McCants, for showing me the world of Peace and Conflict Studies and forever changing my life. I would also like to thank Dr. David Thompson for his constant support and guidance over the last few years. Additionally, my bottomless thanks to my doctoral committee: Dr. Karine Levansseur, Dr. Jessica Senehi, and of course my advisor Dr. Sean Byrne. Their patience and support will never be forgotten. I’m not sure I will ever be able to adequately put into words how appreciative I am of Dr. Sean Byrne’s steadfast encouragement and compassion he provided me with throughout this journey. I give you my eternal thanks. Another thank you goes out to those at The Cornerstone and Kite’s as well. Many words of this project were written within the walls of those places. My thanks as well to my friends and colleagues in Belfast, Derry, and Dublin. You always made my trips to Éire feel like trips home. And of course, a massive thank you to my friends and especially my family. Meg and Liss, thank you for your support and pep talks throughout. Dad, thank you for always believing in me and pushing me along. And above all else, a thank you to my Mum. This never would have happened without you and your unflinching support that made this wild journey a reality.

Dedication This thesis is dedicated to my family and friends, who have always believed in me, even in times when I have failed to believe in myself. This thesis is also dedicated to those voices promoting peace and justice, illuminating the light, even in the darkest of times.

Table of Contents Abstract ...... ii Acknowledgements ...... iii Dedication ...... iv Table of Contents ...... v List of Tables ...... ix List of Acronyms ...... x 1. Introduction: Green, orange, and a seaside joke 1.1. Introduction ...... 1 1.2. Statement of purpose ...... 2 1.3. Guiding questions and objectives ...... 3 1.4. Significance of the study ...... 4 1.5. Limitations of the study ...... 5 1.6. Chapter overviews ...... 7 1.7. Conclusion ...... 9 2. The story so far: Contextual background of Northern Ireland 2.1. Introduction ...... 11 2.2. Origins of a conflict: The plantations of Ulster (1609-1690) ...... 12 2.3. Revolution and partition: The cleavage of the island of Ireland (1921) ...... 14 2.4. The Troubles: The bloody conflict (1960s-1990s) ...... 16 2.5. The agreement(s) era: The Good Friday Agreement (1998) ...... 17 2.6. The agreement aftermath: Post-accord Northern Ireland (1998-Present Day) ...... 21 2.7. Conclusion ...... 22 3. Exploring the pieces: Theory background and literature review 3.1. Introduction ...... 24 3.2. Civil society and peace processes ...... 24 3.2.1. What is civil society? ...... 25 3.2.2. Civil society peace contributions ...... 28 3.2.3. Civil society and peacebuilding ...... 35 3.2.4. Additional components of peace processes ...... 41 3.3. Peacebuilding and youth engagement ...... 42 vi

3.3.1. Western/liberal peace model ...... 42 3.3.2. Local/hybrid/emancipatory peacebuilding ...... 44 3.3.3. Youth peacebuilding ...... 48 3.3.4. Additional components of peacebuilding ...... 50 3.4. Economic aid and peace funding ...... 51 3.4.1. Technocratic structures and external funding complexities ...... 51 3.4.2. Northern Ireland peace funding ...... 52 3.4.3. Local ownership and autonomy ...... 54 3.5. Positive and negative peace ...... 55 3.5.1. John Galtung and complexifying peace ...... 55 3.5.2. Divided societies and ethnic conflict ...... 57 3.5.3. Lessons on the road to positive peace ...... 60 3.6. Peace agreement design ...... 62 3.6.1. Peace agreement approaches and challenges ...... 62 3.6.2. Consociationalism and Northern Ireland ...... 63 3.7. Conclusion ...... 68 4. Methodology 4.1. Introduction ...... 70 4.2. Study scope and significance ...... 70 4.3. Qualitative approach and research style significance ...... 73 4.4. Recruitment strategy ...... 75 4.5. Participant profiles and research sites ...... 76 4.6. Data analysis techniques ...... 79 4.7. Ethical considerations ...... 80 4.8. Researcher positionality ...... 81 4.9. Conclusion ...... 82 5. Convenient inclusion: The use and abuse of civil society in Northern Ireland’s peace process 5.1. Introduction ...... 83 5.2. We will call you when we need you – inclusion for local legitimacy ...... 84 5.3. What could have been – assessing the Civic Forum ...... 87 vii

5.4. Where do we Fit? – civil society’s role in peace processes ...... 91 5.5. Forging their own path – Northern Ireland’s civil society ...... 96 5.6. Key findings of the research ...... 100 5.7. Conclusion ...... 107 6. Youthful apathy is useful apathy?: Considering the next generation of Northern Ireland peacebuilders 6.1. Introduction ...... 109 6.2. Debilitating disillusionment – youth and politics in Northern Ireland ...... 110 6.3. The brain drain – issues of youth disengagement ...... 117 6.4. School house blues – education issues and challenges in Northern Ireland ...... 120 6.5. A dangerous age – youth vulnerability in post-accord Northern Ireland ...... 125 6.6. A brighter future? – exploring youth potential ...... 132 6.7. Key findings of the research ...... 136 6.8. Conclusion ...... 143 7. Money matters: Structural and funding challenges for Northern Ireland’s civil society actors 7.1. Introduction ...... 145 7.2. Feeling the pinch in the purse – funding reductions ...... 146 7.3. Handcuffs and the plight of working with unpopular populations – funding constraints ...... 150 7.4. It is a changing world – funding transitions ...... 159 7.5. The fish on the hook – funding dependency ...... 166 7.6. Key findings of the research ...... 170 7.7. Conclusion ...... 178 8. Where is the positive peace?: Negative peace, no peace, and the missing piece of civil society’s role in Northern Ireland’s peacebuilding process 8.1. Introduction ...... 180 8.2. A world apart – living in a divided society ...... 181 8.3. Negative peace reigns – the peace shortfall ...... 186 8.4. The lingering troubles – the toxicity of an unresolved conflict ...... 190 8.5. Is positive peace coming? – looking ahead for Northern Ireland ...... 194 viii

8.6. Key findings of the research ...... 199 8.7. Conclusion ...... 206 9. What is not there: Northern Ireland civil society leaders’ perceptions of the successes and failures of the Good Friday Agreement 9.1. Introduction ...... 208 9.2. Before it was done – peacemaking and the pre-agreement period ...... 208 9.3. Taking a mirror to the GFA – general reflections on the agreement ...... 212 9.4. Agreement alterations – civil society leaders’ design ideas ...... 221 9.5. Post-accord ponderings – the GFA and Northern Ireland today ...... 232 9.6. Key findings of the research ...... 239 9.7. Conclusion ...... 248 10. Conclusion: Embracing a complex peace in Northern Ireland 10.1. Introduction ...... 250 10.2. Overall summary of key research findings ...... 251 10.2.1. Civil society’s role in Northern Ireland’s peace process ...... 251 10.2.2. Youth disillusionment and disengagement in Northern Ireland ...... 253 10.2.3. Civil society leaders’ reflections on peace funding in Northern Ireland .... 254 10.2.4. Unresolved issues, divisions, and negative peace in Northern Ireland ...... 255 10.2.5 Improving the Good Friday Agreement and moving Northern Ireland forward ...... 257 10.3. Recommendations for further research ...... 259 10.4. Conclusion ...... 261 References ...... 265 Appendices Appendix 1 – Study Invitation Script ...... 296 Appendix 2 – Informed Consent ...... 297 Appendix 3 – Interview Questions ...... 300

List of Tables Table 1 – Study Participants……………………………………………………………………78

List of Acronyms

CBO – Community Based Organization CIRA – Continuity Irish Republican Army CSOs – Civil society organizations DUP – Democratic Unionist Party EU – European Union GFA – Good Friday Agreement IFI – International Fund for Ireland INLA – Irish National Liberation Army IRA – Irish Republican Army IRSP – Irish Republican Socialist Party LVF – Loyalist Volunteer Force NIRA – New Irish Republican Army NICRA – Northern Ireland Civil Rights Association NIO – Northern Ireland Office NGO – Non-governmental organization OIRA – Official Irish Republican Army PACS – Peace and Conflict Studies PIRA – Provisional Irish Republican Army PSNI – Police Service of Northern Ireland PUP – Progressive Unionist Party RIRA – Real Irish Republican Army RUC – Royal Ulster Constabulary RHC – Red Hand Commando SAS – Special Air Service (British) SDLP – Social Democratic Labour Party UDA – Ulter Defense Association UDR – Ulster Defense Regiment UFF – Ulster Freedom Fighters UUP – Ulster Unionist Party UVF – Ulster Volunteer Force

Chapter 1 Introduction: Green, orange, and a seaside joke

1.1 Introduction It had been a gloomy, cold, rainy day on the North coast of Ireland. Though the dark clouds along the horizon had begun to recede, a blustery evening remained as droplets of rain still swirled persistently in the air. I glanced up from my window-side seat, pulling my attention away from work to enjoy the views around me as the train from Derry/Londonderry made its way northward towards Castlerock, before turning southeast on its eventual track for Belfast. I had ridden that train route a dozen times before, but the views around Mussenden Temple never failed to captivate me. It was at that moment, a sturdy, older man in a sweater and a wool cap caught my attention from across the aisle. “Not from here?” he inquired, having apparently heard the phone call I had made earlier regarding an appointment the next day in Belfast, my American accent betraying me as an outsider to the beautiful land around me. We introduced ourselves and I rattled off the stock script about my research that I always used whenever meeting someone new. He listened intently, asked a few questions, and wished me well with my work. Just as I was about to turn my attention back to my notes spread out before me, he spoke up again with a question, “So, are you a Protestant or a Catholic?” It was said with a smile and the hint of a laugh trailing at the end, tipping me off that a joke was being set up. With my first trip to Northern Ireland coming almost a decade earlier, and numerous additional trips over the years, I had heard this joke before, so, I decided to play into it. “Well, neither really, I suppose I’m more of an atheist if I had to label myself” I replied, and immediately his face lit up with excitement. Nodding, he drew out the silence a moment before delivering the punchline we both knew was coming… “Aye, but are you a Protestant atheist or a Catholic atheist?” He burst into laughter, beaming at the successful delivery of a truly classic Northern Irish joke. In many ways, it is a joke that is highly complex, given the deeper realities it highlights about cultural and societal divisions in the country and the acutely ingrained notions of “us and them” within the Northern Ireland psyche. But on the surface, it is a funny joke and one that shows that the wounds of division are capable of evolving, particularly through a medium such 2 as humor (Tidy, 2020). We spoke a bit more and once again wished each other well as we egressed at Great Victoria Street Train Station in Belfast a few hours later. Later on, as I reflected on that train ride, I realized how striking and complex my surroundings were. As I rode, the world outside the train reflected the complexity that has long been a part of Northern Ireland’s past and present. Flanking my left, was the rolling swells of the North Atlantic Ocean, still angry from a day of rain and wind, reflecting the tumultuous and devastating realities of conflict that have plagued the North of Ireland for centuries. On my right, the serene, rolling hills of the countryside, reflecting the quiet beauty of hope, progress, and peace. Out one window, the color orange, illuminating the sky along the horizon; out another window, the color green, emanating from the fields and farms. Inside the train, a table full of notes and transcripts that detail pain, anger, and conflict. But also, the sounds of conversation between two strangers and joyful laughter at a perfectly delivered joke. Complexity: outside, inside, and all around. It is that complexity that first drew me to Northern Ireland, and it is that complexity which continues to draw me back. In complexity there is challenge and strife, but also opportunity and hope. Embracing complexity can allow for new voices to rise and be heard which is invaluable in the pursuit of peace. This study is one about complexity. As the path of peace is traced and the Good Friday Agreement (GFA) is critically analyzed, complexities prevail time and time again. But as the voices of those at the grassroots are listened to and appreciated, clarity shines on some of these complexities. This study is one about failures, successes, and the blurry line between both. This is a study about untangling complexities of the past and embracing the complexities of the future. This is a study about nuance and perspective. This is a study about peace, conflict, and Northern Ireland.

1.2 Statement of purpose The primary purpose of this study is to critically analyze the design and implementation of the GFA in Northern Ireland. Specifically, this analysis is undertaken from the perspective of civil society, as the voices, expertise, and experience of those working at the grassroots level provides the lens through which to ask key questions about the successes and failures of the GFA and the peace process over the last two decades. By providing an opportunity for civil society leaders to offer their reflections on the agreement and the peacemaking and peacebuilding 3 process, space is created for the sharing of knowledge directly from those at the frontlines of waging peace in Northern Ireland.

1.3 Guiding questions and objectives The core guiding question of this study is straightforward: how can we better design and implement peace agreements within divided societies? Though as this study will highlight repeatedly, while the question may be straightforward, finding answers is a complex dance of nuance and critical analysis. Following closely is another key question, regarding a critical group in the peace discourse, civil society. In what ways can civil society contribute to peacemaking and peacebuilding processes, and additionally, in what ways should civil society contribute to these processes? By seeking out a deeper understanding of these guiding questions, a more holistic understanding of peace agreement design and implementation, specifically through the lens of civil society engagement, can be attained. Building this knowledge can provide ideas and insights into how more robust peacemaking and peacebuilding processes can develop within conflict zones. This has implications not only for the reduction of violence, but also the pursuit of positive peace, as envisioned by Johan Galtung (1969). An additional core objective of this study is to provide a platform for a wide range of voices from Northern Irish civil society to be heard. The “everyday peacebuilders” (Boulding, 2000) are the ones leading the charge for a more peaceful society in Northern Ireland, and the experiences and expertise from grassroots civil society leaders is exceedingly valuable in our collective understanding of peace processes. This study privileges those voices in civil society and provides a space for their stories and lived experience to inform and inspire. While participants of this study were all asked a similar set of questions around their perceptions of the peace process in Northern Ireland and the design and impacts of the GFA (see Appendix 3), they were also allowed and encouraged to speak to the issues and experiences that were the most meaningful to them personally. This approach follows the objective of privileging the natural voice of civil society leaders, giving the contributors the opportunity to not simply be a research tool, but genuine collaborators in a conversation and exploration of peace in the North of Ireland.

1.4 Significance of the study With over forty percent of peace agreements failing in civil wars (Diehl, 2016a), ushering in a return to violence, seeking to better understand the nature of agreements is a life and death matter of the utmost importance within the discipline of Peace and Conflicts Studies (PACS). Tremendously important studies have occurred over the years in great numbers, focusing upon key aspects and variables surrounding peace agreements, including policy components (Mac Ginty, et al., 2019) and agreement durability (Lounsbery & DeRouen, 2016). Valuable tools have been developed, such as the Peace Accord Matrix, originally conceived of by the late, and exceedingly great, John Darby at the Kroc Institute for Peace, Notre Dame University. Similarly, other critical datasets have been developed recently, which also provide a more nuanced understanding of the complexities of peace and conflict. The PA-X peace agreement dataset from the University of Edinburgh provides a tremendous wealth of information on thirty plus years of peace agreements from the 1990s through 2020. One unique component of the PA- X dataset is the highly detailed subcategories it provides, including the PA-X Local Database, which highlights a number of lower-level peace agreements throughout Africa and the Middle East that tend to be lost in many higher-level, globally focused datasets. Another critical dataset comes out of the University of Birmingham with the Political Agreements in Internal Conflict Dataset. Similar to the Peace Accord Matrix, the Political Agreements in Internal Conflict Dataset offers a highly detailed consideration of specific components of peace agreements not only from a policy perspective, but also a more general framing perspective. The ability to compare frameworks and policy inclusions along with a wide range of institutional factors, provides a range of opportunities for new understandings of the agreement transition prospects within conflict zones (Fontana et al., 2020). The breadth of studies and tools all move us further along in our quest for a better understanding of peace agreements. Yet, clearly, we are far from an apex of understanding as peace agreements still struggle to secure enduring, positive peace in conflict zones around the world. This study takes direct focus on one of the most interesting and influential peace agreements in the last half century, the GFA. While many effective analyses of the GFA have been produced over the last two decades, focusing on lessons learned (White, 2013), cultural implications (Armstrong, et al., 2019), and 5 broader reflections on successes and failures (Fenton, 2018), key opportunities still exist to explore the GFA from a bottom-up approach. This study fills a key gap in those bottom-up understandings of the impacts of the GFA Agreement and the peace process within Northern Ireland. By inviting civil society leaders to offer their reflections and share their experiences of working in the shadow of the GFA within Northern Ireland, a deeper understanding of the nuances of the peace process and the agreement itself can be explored. In this sense, the participant-focused approach of this study contributes to the ongoing journey for positive peace in Northern Ireland. While focused on Northern Ireland and the GFA in a case study format, this study also provides the opportunity for contributions to the PACS discipline more broadly, which is critical for a continually advancing research agenda on the critical issues of peace and conflict. This thesis offers the opportunity to critically reflect on the viability of prominent peacebuilding approaches, specifically the Western/liberal peacebuilding model and the local/hybrid peacebuilding approach. This study also takes on the challenge of exploring the complexities surrounding consociationalism as a structural remedy to peacemaking in divided societies. The conclusions offered on this complex issue is one of nuance, which has useful implications on structural solutions (and failures) of peace agreement design even beyond the Northern Ireland context. These contributions offer important points of reflection for the PACS discipline as a whole when it comes to the intricacies of peacemaking and peacebuilding processes.

1.5 Limitations of the study Peace agreements are nuanced, multi-faceted entities that typically involve a high level of complex policy components. Many participants in this study expressed hesitation when invited to provide critique or analysis of the details of the GFA itself. A number of participants were quick to note that they did not feel capable of analyzing the agreement through any kind of policy lens. However, this study was never intended to be built around a critical framework of policy analysis, and thus, it should not be viewed as one. The participants of this study were not invited to contribute along the lines of high-level policy analysis. Instead, it is their lived experience, working at the grassroots level of the peace process, that is of key importance for this study. 6

I suspect that I, as the primary researcher, bear some responsibility for eliciting this initial hesitation from the study participants on aspects of policy analysis. By phrasing certain interview questions (discussed in greater detail in Chapter 4), in such a way that asked participants to consider the policy components of the GFA, many felt underqualified to do so, given a lack of training or experience with policy analysis. Yet, as they spoke of their experiences, and namely their frustrations with limitations of the GFA design (section 9.4), they were in fact speaking along the lines of policy analysis. This suggests a number of key conclusions. First, from a methodological standpoint, it is important how the qualitative conversation with civil society actors occurs on the topic of policy- based analysis of peace agreements. While many civil society actors likely have the inherent capacity to engage with policy analysis of a peace agreement, given their experience working in the peacebuilding environment at the micro-level (Levasseur, 2014), they may not readily recognize this capacity. Thus, research and interview questions that focus on the experiential aspect of civil society engagement, rather than on a request for specific policy-analysis, are likely to provide more robust sources of informative qualitative data. Taking a grounded theory approach, this study reveals the key issues and themes that are of the most importance to those in Northern Irish civil society, rather than any preconceived ideas coming from the researcher. Due to the nature of specialized areas of focus and expertise within the peacebuilding enterprise in Northern Ireland (and, in fact, all conflict zones), many individual topics of importance shine through when taking a qualitative approach. For instance, those working directly with “difficult populations” such as former combatants and ex-prisoners, naturally speak mainly through that lens, while someone working in the realm of youth art projects may have next to no knowledge of ex-prisoner populations. This is to say that the beauty, and complexity, of a qualitative approach is that a constantly expanding participant pool will always yield unique new perspectives and valuable new stories of lived experience. However, with that said, great care was taken to ensure that saliency was met with regard to the five key themes explored throughout this study. While the stories and experiences continued to be unique through multiple rounds of in-depth interviews in the field, key themes repeatedly and consistently emerged and provide the framework upon which this study is built.

1.6 Chapter overviews The initial chapter of this study opens the door both to the research and the researcher. It offers a statement of purpose and the driving motivation for exploring the topic at hand. The conversation positions the study within the broader context of PACS, highlighting both its significance and its limitations. An overview of each of the ten chapters that comprise this research endeavor is included as well. Chapter two builds a foundational understanding of the context of Northern Ireland, the peace process, and the GFA. The historical roots of conflict in the North of Ireland are traced from the 17th century and the Plantation of Ulster, through the development of the Irish Free State (and the birth of Northern Ireland through partition), the bloody era of the Troubles, and the current post-agreement time period. While the historical context of conflict in Northern Ireland is complicated and deep, it is critical to take this look back not only to understand how Northern Ireland ended up in the conceptual place it is today, but also to understand the potential paths of the future. The third chapter dives into the literature surrounding the key issue areas explored in this study. First, the very nature of civil society is explored, and a definition established, along with an examination of the role civil society plays within peace processes. Second, a detailed examination of the literature on peacebuilding is provided. Specifically, the Western/Liberal peacebuilding model is considered in comparison to hybrid/local/emancipatory peacebuilding. Additionally, specific focus is applied to the area of youth engagement within peacebuilding processes. Third, economic aid and peace funding is touched upon. Technocratic structures and external funding complexities are explored. Given the specific focus of this study on Northern Ireland, several different Northern Ireland specific funding structures are highlighted including the International Fund for Ireland (IFI) and the EU PEACE programmes. Fourth, an examination of divided societies is conducted, particularly through an application and exploration of Galtung’s influential ideas on positive and negative peace. Finally, a foray into the literature surrounding peace agreement design is undertaken. Within this conversation, specific power sharing approaches are considered (specifically consociationalism) as well as general challenges for peacemaking processes. 8

Chapter four discusses the research methods used within this study. Specific conversations are included on the qualitative approach of a grounded-theory framework arising from in-depth open-ended interviews with civil society leaders throughout Northern Ireland. Sections within this chapter are also provided on ethical considerations and specifics of the field research conducted, including an explanation of participant selection and inclusion. Chapter five begins the first of the five core-empirical chapters within this study. Chapter five discusses the theme of civil society inclusion within the Northern Irish peace process. Participants express their frustration with political elites only turning to civil society as a means for establishing local legitimacy when it suits them. The failure of the Civic Forum is highlighted as a source of regret and frustration within civil society, even decades after its collapse. Study contributors also note their desire for increasing independence as a sector as a means to continue their collective push for grassroots-led peace initiatives. Chapter six focuses on a key population within Northern Ireland, young people. Civil society leaders within this study unanimously agree that more needs to be done in Northern Ireland to incentivize youth engagement in the peace process. Key concerns are noted, such as the brain drain and youth disillusionment with the political apparatus. Participants suggest sweeping education reform is long overdue, with calls to shift attention towards breaking down the historic segregation within the classroom. Concerns of youth vulnerability are also highlighted, particularly from those participants working directly with young people, as the violent dissident threat still simmers in many communities throughout Northern Ireland. In Chapter seven, money matters! This chapter includes participant reflections on the issues around funding when it comes to the peace process in Northern Ireland. The conversation occurs along four key dimensions. First, participants touch on their increasing concerns with progressive funding reductions. These reductions are leading to difficult decisions on cutting services and projects, and also general fears of organizational survivability as the money streams are choked to a trickle. Second, a key frustration is raised about working with “difficult populations.” Participants highlight the challenge of securing funding when working with certain vulnerable populations such as former combatants. Third, study contributors note the broader environment of funding structures in Northern Ireland and the shifting dynamics after several decades of the peacebuilding process. One key concern is the potential loss of European funding frameworks following in the wake of Brexit. 9

Finally, the topic of funding dependency is explored. Participants discuss their efforts to walk the tightrope between staying true to their mission and ideals and being influenced by those controlling revenue streams. Many participants express concern over donor influence in their peacebuilding work. Chapter eight emphasizes civil society concerns with ongoing social divisions and sectarianism, even over two decades after the signing of the GFA. The stark reality of segregated communities is noted as a continual roadblock towards a truly inclusive peace within Northern Ireland. Study collaborators also express dismay at unresolved legacy issues still to this day. With many traumas still lingering and unresolved memories from the Troubles era simmering below the surface, civil society leaders discuss how negative peace in Northern Ireland is ruling the day. Chapter nine turns a more focused eye towards the GFA itself, primarily with regards to its specific successes and failures over twenty plus years of existence. Several civil society leaders offer their reflections on the pre-agreement period and the role of civil society throughout the peacemaking process in Northern Ireland. Participants also put on their creative hats and offer their design ideas, had they been given the opportunity to be the last ones to touch the GFA before it was finalized. Ideas range from provisions for certain populations, to more robust inclusion mechanisms for public discourse on the direction of the peacebuilding enterprise. All of the ideas reveal a wealth of creativity and expertise. Finally, participants offer their thoughts on what the future might (and should) hold for Northern Ireland. Chapter ten provides an overall summary of the key findings of this study. The chapter also includes a discussion of specific recommendations concerning peace agreement design and implementation, specifically by way of civil society engagement. Thoughts on directions for future research possibilities are also noted.

1.7 Conclusion It has been over twenty years since the GFA made history in Northern Ireland and set the six northwest counties of Ulster on a new path, away from the bloody years of the Troubles. In those decades, mistakes have been made, successes have been celebrated, and many lessons have been learned. The GFA represented the first rays of light along the horizon after years of stormy skies. But after twenty years, those at the frontlines of the peacebuilding endeavor are the first to 10 admit that the GFA has not left Northern Ireland with the brilliant sunny skies of positive peace that many had envisioned in the years since it was signed. The successes of the GFA are numerous, and they must be celebrated. But those successes should also not blind us to its failures as well. As Northern Ireland continues to struggle with division, segregation, sectarianism, and dissident violence, the prospect of positive peace is tenuous as best. Poet Damian Gorman, in his poem titled “If I Was Us, I Wouldn’t Start From Here” comments on the shortcomings of the GFA and the resulting “half-baked” peace in Northern Ireland today. It is a stinging reminder that there is still considerable work to be done in the North of Ireland. Gorman notes in a repeated refrain throughout the poem, “Each generation has a sacred task: To tell a better story than it was told.” The participants of this study embrace this call to action through their tireless and compassionate work at the grassroots of the peacebuilding struggle. This study seeks to aid them in their pursuit by elevating their voice, listening to their expertise, and relying on their experience to provide lessons learned and ways forward. Peace is complex, but in that complexity resides unbridled hope and potential.

Chapter 2 The story so far: Contextual background of Northern Ireland

2.1 Introduction To understand the Northern Ireland of today, we must first turn our attention to the North of Ireland of years ago. Many years ago, in fact. It may at first seem strange to begin an exploration of today, from a position of centuries ago. But the history and context of today’s Northern Ireland, is complex and deep. It is a story of colonization, servitude, revolution, separation, division, hope, despair, and resiliency. It is a story of contested identities and closely guarded histories. This chapter outlines five key eras in the historical context of the North of Ireland in order to provide a framework of understanding for the complicated existence of conflict and peace in six of the nine northern counties of Ulster. First, the chapter explores what many consider to be the birth of the divided nature of conflict in the North of Ireland, the Plantation of Ulster in the early 1600s. The importance of this era still plays a highly salient role in the region today, as yearly celebrations still occur within the Protestant Unionist Loyalist (PUL) community regarding the Battle of the Boyne. Next, the birth of Northern Ireland and the Irish Free State are explored. The partition of Ireland in 1921 marked a massive shift on the island of Ireland as the 32 counties found themselves fractured across different nations. Third, the bloody conflict of the mid-20th century, known as the Troubles, is highlighted. The Troubles, lasting over three decades, claimed the lives of over 3,000 people and brought Northern Ireland to its knees. Everyone in the North of Ireland was impacted in one way or another, as violence and trauma dominated the era. Fourth, the years surrounding 1998 are explored as the agreement era. Following decades of devastating conflict and destruction, Northern Ireland accomplished the stunning task of developing a comprehensive peace agreement to bring a close to the active conflict. The GFA became a shining example of peacemaking success, marking a golden standard in PACS. Finally, the post-accord period and the current dynamics within Northern Ireland are addressed. The challenges of continued dissident threats and numerous political failures represent frustrations with a liminal peace in Northern Ireland. Additionally, the unprecedented 12 regional political shift of the United Kingdom’s exit of the European Union (EU) has caused added stress and uncertainty within Northern Ireland, now caught in the midst of an international boundary.

2.2 Origins of a conflict: The plantation of Ulster (1609-1690) The historic relationship between the island of Ireland and Great Britain is long and fraught with complexities. While the complex history is important in its own right, a key event and British practice in the 1600s provides the central historical anchor point upon which the current study builds its understanding of the complex Irish-British relationship: The Plantation of Ulster after the flight of the Hugh O’Neill and Red Hugh O’Donnell clans from Ulster in 1603 (Dunlop, 1924). Although the nuances of the practice represent a key understanding of British colonial practices being ironed out in Britain’s own backyard (Simms, 1972), so to speak, of primary importance for the contextual understanding here, is how these practices of the 1600s provide the roots of conflict still reverberating in the North of Ireland today. At the turn of the 17th century, in a concerted effort to maintain, and in fact expand long- term British influence on the island of Ireland, King James I sought to build upon his recent efforts to coalesce Scotland and England under the Great Britain banner by turning his attention closely across the Irish Sea (Bardon, 2011). His plan, carried out with increasing pace throughout the 17th century, was to infuse British nationals, many from the lowlands of Scotland (Hill, 1993), into the province of Ulster. Quickly, Ulster inhabitants identifying as British Protestants, began to outnumber those identifying as ethnically Irish and Catholic. This plantation effort was immediately successful in shifting allegiances throughout the North of Ireland away from traditional Irish, Gaelic identities (Nash, 2006), towards a population that was far more supportive of the British Crown and maintaining a close union with Great Britain as the Calvinist settlers refused to intermarry with the Gaelic Catholic inhabitants. It is in these roots, that modern day Northern Ireland unionists identify their own historical lineage (A. Buckley, 1989). As the population of Ulster Protestants continued to grow, a widening cleavage was emerging between the growing majority and the now minority Irish Catholics who saw their land ownership rapidly dwindling (Darby, 1987). After a failed rebellion attempt by Irish Catholics in the 1640s was sufficiently handled by Oliver Cromwell, several key events transpired towards the end of the 17th century, which still 13 echo into the modern era. As Irish Catholics looked across the Irish Sea in 1685 to see King James II (a Catholic himself) take the British throne, hope was renewed that happier times were ahead for Catholics throughout the North of Ireland. Yet William of Orange, a Dutchman and staunch Protestant, who also married Queen Mary II (making King James II his uncle and father- in-law, in classic British monarchy complexity), ultimately had other plans in mind. Leading what is known as the “Glorious Revolution,” William of Orange deposed James II in 1688. Gathering his Catholic supporters, deposed King James II launched a final attempt to regain the British throne, culminating in the Battle of the Boyne in 1690 in Co. Meath. The battle resulted in a decisive victory for William of Orange and Protestantism, and the introduction of the Penal Laws. The Battle of the Boyne has profound historical and cultural importance to those in the Protestant, Unionist, Loyalist (PUL) community in Northern Ireland. Celebrations are held yearly on the Twelfth of July, by those in the PUL community to commemorate this victory by “King Billy” as he is often affectionally referred to by Unionists (Mitchell, 2013). The Twelfth celebrations in Northern Ireland are a source of contention between those in Northern Ireland, as Catholic, Nationalist, Republican (CNR) communities see the holiday as one pushing a sense of PUL superiority (Bryan, 2000). Yet for those in the PUL community, the Twelfth celebrations are seen as a yearly pinnacle of cultural expression and celebration. It is not just contentious holidays that can trace their roots to the clashes between William of Orange and King James II; a highly influential social organization in Northern Ireland, the Loyal Orange Institution, or better known as the Orange Order, also takes its name and inspiration from this era as well (Kaufmann, 2007). Formed at the tail end of the 18th century as a Protestant fraternity to oppose Wolfe Tone’s United Ireland movement, the Orange Order has long served as a highly influential social organization for those championing the causes of Unionism and Loyalism within Northern Ireland. The organization’s inspiration and mythos are tied directly into a reverence for William of Orange and key historical events such as the Battle of the Boyne. Again, as the Orange Order still serves as a key unifying voice for many in the PUL community, just as historic celebrations on the Twelfth of July represent a yearly point of severe societal contentiousness, there can be no ignoring the importance that the Plantation of Ulster and closely related events of the 17th century when it comes to modern day Northern Ireland. 14

From cultural identity, to social cohesion, the roots of conflict in the counties of Ulster are situated squarely in the 1600s (Darby, 1976); although some would say it began with the 1170 invasion of Co. Waterford by Strongbow’s Normans (Byrne, 2008). The nuances of the Northern Ireland conflict certainly expand well beyond the events of the 1600s, but there is an inescapable link to the present-day cultural identity complexities and the ramifications of these events four centuries ago (Graham, 1994). With social organizations such as the Orange Order and the Apprentice Boys of Derry, serving as a crucial cultural identity linkage system within the Unionist community in Northern Ireland, the influence of the past is undoubtedly closely intertwined with the realities of today. These influences go well beyond social organizations as they also provide key symbolism within the PUL community (similar symbolism within the CNR community will be discussed in section 2.4). In many communities, symbolism takes the form of murals. Visual representations in the form of murals, provide both the PUL and CNR communities within Derry/Londonderry of constant reminders of the consequential events during the time of the Plantation of Ulster, thus, closely linking the 1600s to the cognitive frameworks of today. The key then, is recognizing that an in-depth understanding of the lengthy historical divisions in the North of Ireland are unavoidable in conversations of 21st century divisions. The Plantation of Ulster and the events of the 17th century certainly do not tell the whole story, but they represent an inescapable first prelude to the still evolving tale of division in the North of the Irish isle.

2.3 Revolution and partition: The cleavage of the island of Ireland (1921) As we fast forward several centuries, we arrive at another crucial juncture in the history of the North of Ireland. This is not to say, by any means, that the North of Ireland was without consequential events during 18th and 19th centuries such as the Land War between tenant farmers and absentee landlords and the industrialization of Ulster. In fact, many events, such the Irish rebellion of 1798 led by Wolfe Tone, the development of the Irish Revolutionary Brotherhood in 1858 (a group which would later evolve into the Irish Republican Army (IRA)), and the initial introduction of William Gladstone’s first Home Rule bill in the English Parliament in 1886 under pressure from Charles Stewart Parnell and the Irish Parliamentary Party represent just a number of historically consequential events that added to the Northern Irish story (Tonge, 2002). 15

As the 20th century arrived, though, significant change was on the horizon not only for the North of Ireland, but in fact the island as a whole. In 1916 Dublin was thrown into chaos during World War I with the Easter rising as a serious revolutionary push was sustained in the south of Ireland. This culminated in the 1921 Anglo-Irish Treaty, officially partitioning the island of Ireland, as the 26 southern counties formed the newly independent Irish Free State, six counties of Ulster (Antrim, Armagh, Down, Fermanagh, Londonderry, and Tyrone) formed Northern Ireland, remaining part of the United Kingdom (Walker, 2012). The separation of the six northern counties not only created a physical border on the island, but it resulted in psychological borders being drawn as well. Relations between the PUL and CNR communities in the North of Ireland were not exactly rosy prior to the 1920s, but as lines were drawn on the map, new lines of division were drawn in the minds of those throughout the island. Now physically separated from their compatriots in the south of Ireland, the CNR community in Northern Ireland in many ways found itself marooned as a minority in a “foreign” land. In many ways this shadowed similar feelings from those in the PUL community, who had long found themselves the minority group on the island, and yet were suddenly thrust into majority status. Yet direct ties to the English mainland were still relatively weak, as Northern Ireland struggled to find its place in a revamped political order away from London, across the Irish sea. Though the first few years in both the new Republic and the newly partitioned northern counties were marked by considerable internal violence and guerilla warfare (Darby, 1987), the status quo had been set and the 32 counties found themselves on different trajectories in a manner that had not ever been experienced on the island. The lines of division were carefully considered to maintain a Protestant majority in Northern Ireland; and though demographics are ever changing, that status quo has held with the Catholic/nationalist community remaining in the minority. Despite continued pockets of violence, largely led by IRA operators in the North, the several decades following partition were, at least compared to what would arise in the 1950s, relatively peaceful (Darby, 1987). A begrudging acceptance began to develop in the CNR community in Northern Ireland as the realization of a future separate from the Republic of Ireland in the south sank in more and more as the years progressed. But that “acceptance” was tenuous at best and as frustrations mounted in the middle of the 20th century inside the CNR 16 community, renewed calls for resistance began growing and it became clear a new conflict was brewing, and it emerged with the Sean South led IRA cross border campaign of 1956-1960.

2.4 The Troubles: The bloody conflict (1960s-1990s) It is challenging to pinpoint a “start” date of the era in Northern Ireland known as the Troubles. The middle of the 20th century in the North of Ireland was a time of complexity and devastation. Issues that had been brewing for centuries burst to the surface as the intractable divisions of the region provided the framework for a conflict that claimed over 3,000 lives with tens of thousands more suffering injuries (Hauss, 2010). Taking lessons from the U.S. Civil Rights movement of the 1950s and 1960s, members of the CNR community in Northern Ireland embarked on their own push for civil rights in the 1960s, seeking to highlight the plight of their minority community in the North of Ireland. The Northern Ireland Civil Rights Association (NICRA) organized largely around issues of voting, employment, and housing reform (Fenton, 2018), while also embracing a wide reaching subset of issues facing the CNR community, including abuse and exclusion by the Royal Ulster Constabulary (RUC), the main policing force in Northern Ireland, comprised mainly of members from the PUL community. As marches were increasingly met by physicality from the RUC, the civil rights movement quickly grew to a general call to action from the broader CNR community to push against what they viewed to be decades (and centuries) of injustices. As violence became an increasing tactic of the Ulster Volunteer Force (UVF), the Official IRA (OIRA) and other Republican paramilitary groups, such as the Provisional IRA (PIRA) began to arm themselves, the end of the 1960s saw Northern Ireland teetering on the edge of full-blown conflict. In 1972, an event that would come to be known as Bloody Sunday, finally left little doubt that Northern Ireland was embroiled in a full-scale internal conflict. In January of 1972, during a civil rights march in Derry/Londonderry, British paratroopers opened fire on peaceful marchers, killing 13 and fatally wounding two more that would eventually succumb to their injuries (Fenton, 2018). Horror and anger erupted in the CNR community throughout Northern Ireland, and direct rule was implemented by London several weeks later, as the situation in the North of Ireland hit critical mass. 17

Over the next twenty plus years, acts of violence became common place in Northern Ireland. Paramilitaries from both communities engaged in tit-for-tat shootings and attacks, often targeting innocent civilians. Prominent paramilitaries from the PUL community include: the UVF, the Ulster Defense Association (UDA), the Red Hand Commandos, the Orange Volunteers, the Loyalist Volunteer Force (LVF) and the Ulster Freedom Fighters (UFF) just to name a few. Likewise, the CNR community saw a number of splinter paramilitary groups form over the years including: the Irish National Liberation Army (INLA), the Irish People’s Liberation Organization (IPLO), the Real IRA (RIRA), the Continuity IRA (CIRA), and the Original IRA (OIRA), again, just to name a few. These paramilitary groups combined with the British army soldiers, the Ulster Defence Regiment (UDR), and the RUC created a dynamic and complicated picture of violence in Northern Ireland that disrupted everyday life considerably. Acts of violence also spread beyond the borders of Northern Ireland, as Republican paramilitary groups conducted campaigns in Dublin, mainland England, and even in the British Gibraltar (Hauss, 2010), while the UVF was also responsible for bombings in Monaghan town and Dublin in 1974. It was a war of attrition that these groups were waging, seeking to pressure the opposing side into submission via fear and conflict weariness. The physical toll was monumental, as was the psychological and emotional toll as well. The internment of political prisoners was used to intimidate and suppress. Communities were subjected to random acts of violence at the hands of a wide range of actors, creating an atmosphere of constant fear and uncertainty, which was particularly salient during the 1981 PIRA hunger strikes which weighed heavily on the CNR community. The traumatic toll of the Troubles lingers into today, as the physical and psychological scars still mark the communities and minds within Northern Ireland.

2.5 The agreement(s) era: The Good Friday Agreement (1998) In a sense, the era of agreements could potentially begin as far back as 1973 with the Sunningdale Agreement. The UK government released a white paper in 1972 detailing the principles of a powersharing arrangement between the CNR and PUL communities in Northern Ireland, a major development in potentially addressing the civil rights campaign that had been ongoing for the last several decades (Walker, 2012). The agreement not only established the 18 power-sharing Northern Ireland Executive headed by the Ulster Unionist Party (UUP) and the Social Democratic and Labour Party (SDLP), but also included an “Irish dimension” represented by a cross-border Council of Ireland (which would be refined and recycled later in the GFA). Despite its potential, the Sunningdale Agreement was met with immediate resistance by many Unionists (namely Ian Paisley’s Democratic Unionist Party (DUP)) and a strong number of Republicans as well. Yet even with this resistance, in January of 1974, the Executive came into existence giving Northern Ireland a power-sharing body attempting to mitigate the continuing violence throughout the region. It was a short-lived existence however, with the eventual collapse coming about just five months later (Fenton, 2018). Violence continued to spiral and the hopes of a political end to the Troubles in the 1970s was quickly abandoned. In the 1980s, a concerted effort was finally embraced by the British and Irish governments to address the bloody conflict in Northern Ireland. Negotiations picked up steam in the early 1990s and a major victory was achieved in the 1994 ceasefire by the Provisional IRA (PIRA), marking a key turning point in the peacemaking process (Mitchell, 1999). Over a rocky four years, with many stops and starts, an international mediation team led by U.S. Senator George Mitchell finally helped Northern Irish political parties find the finish line in the wee hours of the morning of Good Friday in 1998. The Agreement officially marked the political resolution to the bloody conflict that many feared would forever be an impossibility. The key political parties were once again the UUP and the SDLP led by David Trimble and John Hume, respectively, two men who would go on to be awarded the Noble Peace Prize in 1998 for their monumental efforts in leading the charge for peace in Northern Ireland. The other political parties that were part of the negotiations were the Progressive Unionist Party (PUP), the Ulster Democratic Party (UDP), Sinn Féin, the Alliance Party, and the Northern Ireland Women’s Coalition (Hancock, et al., 2010). The DUP was notably absent, and actively campaigned against the GFA and its implementation. It should not be understood that civil society was completely absent during the peacemaking process in Northern Ireland. Rather, civil society was not afforded a direct seat at the negotiating table along with the main political and conflict parties. Instead, civil society in Northern Ireland engaged with the process in other ways, absent of direct representation during the talks. This level of involvement had a number of benefits and drawbacks, which are discussed more closely below. 19

During the early years of the Troubles in Northern Ireland, civil society was met with suspicion from many in the CNR community (Guelke, 2003a). This was due primarily to concerns that the sector had close ties to the state, leading some to believe it was simply an extension of the British apparatus. But as civil society’s monitoring role (both with regards to the state and violent non-state actors) became more commonplace, especially in the 1990s leading up to the GFA in 1998, the positive role of civil society became more apparent in the Northern Irish context (Belloni, 2010). Without direct inclusion in the negotiations, civil society was forced to function in the background of the peacemaking process (Byrne, 2008). Yet, civil society in Northern Ireland was still able to be influential in the peacemaking process, largely through advocacy. Two key examples of this advocacy function at work are the Initiative ’92 and the nonparty “Yes” campaign (Hancock, 2011). Both are explained and explored below, with specific attention given to why these examples are important for understanding the civil society-peacemaking nexus in Northern Ireland. Initiative ’92 (also referred to as the Opsahl Commission) was an independent citizen’s group that developed as a think tank of sorts, ahead of the official peace negotiations that began in 1993. The Commission operated at the grassroots level, soliciting ideas from ‘ordinary people’ on how to best move the region out of the bloody and protracted conflict (Guelke, 2003a). The Commission sought a wide range of ideas regarding politics, economics, culture, law and justice, and religion to name only a few. The idea was relatively straightforward and based on a very rudimentary understanding of the strength of local knowledge. The Commission recognized there were valuable ideas and expertise at the local, grassroots level that could be utilized to help address the core issues of the debilitating conflict (Guelke, 2003a). With the release of its flagship publication A Citizens’ Inquiry (Pollak, 1993), the Commission infused a sense of possibility into the stagnating discourse in Northern Ireland. By encouraging such a wide variety of input from both the CNR and PUL communities, the Commission was able to elevate a very meaningful, society wide, discussion to the forefront of public and political discourse. As numerous authors (Belloni, 2010; M. Elliott, 2013; Guelke, 2003a) suggest, the GFA reflects at least some of the recommendations made by the Commission in its report, particularly with regards to equality and formal recognition of both communities in the public and political sphere. 20

Thus, despite not contributing directly to the provisions within the GFA, civil society in the form of the Opsahl Commission, brought certain public concern issues onto the radar of the political actors that were engaged in the negotiations and drafting of the peace agreement. Even though civil society was shut out of direct engagement, the indirect impact of Initiative ’92 still shaped a portion of the eventual peace agreement, revealing that civil society, though not a primary force, still impacted the peacemaking process. Northern Ireland presents an interesting case regarding the civil society-peacemaking relationship. As White (2013) notes “the exclusion of ordinary people from the peace process in Northern Ireland made it easier for political representatives to craft an agreement, but it also meant that the mass public was demobilized from the political process until it was needed for ratification of the Agreement” (p. 13). Even after the monumental accomplishment of getting the conflict parties to sign the GFA, a major hurdle still remained in the form of public ratification. It was at this point, that civil society played what is easily understood as its most prominent role in the peacemaking process, through the nonparty “Yes” campaign (Belloni, 2010). The “Yes” campaign, launched by civil society representatives including some of those that took part in the Opsahl Commission, closely follows the impact ripple of Initiative ’92 in several key ways. After the highly political nature of the negotiations, the GFA was met with a healthy degree of skepticism from the public, primarily those in the PUL community. This was partly due to their deep-rooted distrust of the CNL community, their unease with the early release of paramilitary prisoners, and the anti-agreement campaign being run by one of the major Unionist political parties, the DUP (Belloni, 2010). Thus, the prospects for public ratification were less than rosy. Civil society stepped up with the “Yes” campaign, creating a network of information sources helping to explain the nature of the agreement to the public, painting the GFA as an accomplishment of cooperation between the political parties (Guelke, 2003a). Through effective marketing initiatives, the “Yes” campaign pushed the narrative that the GFA was a way to move forward, away from the devastating conflict of the last three decades. Since this campaign was not politically affiliated and originating from civil society, citizens from both communities were able to identify with the campaign and were at least receptive to the message being offered. The “Yes” campaign, at least in part, ultimately helped the GFA to be ratified, ‘officially’ bringing an 21 end to the bloody conflict (more precisely: an end to the active nature of the conflict, not necessarily the conflict itself). In the years after the agreement, civil society has played a consistent role in the peacebuilding process (Belloni, 2010; Nagle, 2011; Thiessen, et al., 2010; White, et al., 2013). But as the discussion above has shown, civil society’s role in the peacemaking process was limited at best. The exclusion of civil society from the official negotiations left the people of Northern Ireland without a direct voice in the process. However, civil society adapted to the challenges of exclusion and contributed to the process through advocacy and social mobilization at key points in the process. Northern Ireland is an example of the crucial capabilities of civil society to positively contribute to the peacemaking process, even in a highly limited capacity.

2.6 The agreement aftermath: Post-accord Northern Ireland (1998-Present) Although the Troubles came to an end on that historic April day in 1998, the conflict most certainly did not disappear overnight. In fact, the bloodiest single event of the Troubles came later in 1998 on a fateful day in August in the town of Omagh in County Tyrone. Orchestrated by the Real IRA, a car bomb was responsible for the death of twenty-nine people and the injuring of hundreds more (Fenton, 2018). It rattled Northern Ireland to the core as fears of the hard-fought victory of the GFA crumbling, flashed to the forefront of everyone’s minds. Yet, the GFA and the fledgling peace process stood resolute in the face of this challenge and Northern Ireland soldiered on, determined to leave the sustained violence of the Troubles behind. This would most certainly not be the last threat to the peace process, as dissidents have continued over the last two decades, to employ violence as a mechanism to upset the prospects of peace in Northern Ireland (Walker, 2012). Even today, as the dissident threat continues to simmer and bubble to the surface (Maiangwa, et al., 2019), the GFA is repeatedly tested and the peace process is forced to handle bouts of violence. From a political perspective, Northern Ireland has continually struggled in this realm throughout the post-accord period. The Northern Ireland Assembly has been suspended multiple times, including long droughts from 2002 to 2007 and 2017 to 2020. Due to the design of the GFA, the functioning of the Executive is reliant upon the cooperation of the leading parties from both the CNR and PUL communities, which currently are Sinn Féin and the DUP respectively. 22

Due to the challenges faced within the Executive, additional political agreements have been needed over the years to jump start the political component of the peace process. Namely, the St. Andrew’s Agreement in 2006 pushed the Assembly back into action following the long absence since 2002 (Fenton, 2018). This agreement is also significant as it marked the Republican’s political support for the new policing framework in Northern Ireland, the Police Service of Northern Ireland (PSNI), which resolved a major lingering issue that had been passed over by the GFA (O’Kane & Dixon, 2019). Other key agreements came in the 2010 Hillsborough accord, and in 2015 by the name of the Fresh Start Agreement. The Fresh Start agreement sought to address budget issues within the Executive, along with proposing ways of curbing the growing paramilitary threat that had been seen within communities (Bowers, et al., 2015). These additional agreements show a peace process that is certainly still ongoing and a political sector that is still working to figure things out. Yet, the repeated suspensions of Stormont suggest that core institutional frameworks designed by the GFA, have struggled to live up to their ideals. In the present day, the United Kingdom’s break from the European Union (Brexit) has created additional strain on the peace process within Northern Ireland. Key questions still remain, years into Brexit era, as to how East-West and North-South relations, trade, and movement will be handled. Fears of a return to a hard border within Northern Ireland have stoked the embers of dissident activity and tensions remain high across Northern Ireland and the Border Counties, with many desperately hoping to avoid any significant backsliding of the peace process (Fenton, 2018). The peace in Northern Ireland is a tenuous one, that has been hard earned, fiercely protected, and constantly worried about. The past of conflict and division is never far from memory, as present-day reminders of physical and psychological barriers remain throughout Northern Ireland. Yet, those at the grassroots level continue to work tirelessly to sow the seeds of peace in the hopes future generations will reap the rewards.

2.7 Conclusion This chapter has outlined the significant historical context of the Northern Ireland conflict and peace process. Covering over four centuries, this chapter is far from an exhaustive dive into the complex history of the North of Ireland, as a concerted effort to avoid turning this project 23 into something of encyclopedic length. However, five key time periods have been explored, in order to provide a framework of understanding for how historical events have contributed to where Northern Ireland finds itself today. These periods are: The Plantation of Ulster in 1606, the partition of Ireland in 1921, the Troubles from the 1960s through the 1990s, the GFA era of 1998, and the post-accord period of 1998 through the present.

Chapter 3 Exploring the pieces: Theory background and literature review

3.1 Introduction As this study take a grounded theory approach, the path through the literature is dictated by the participants of this study. By this, I mean that rather than relying on an outside notion of the theoretical foundations at play from the outset, we are instead building our understanding of the key theoretical frameworks by first yielding to the invaluable data offered by the participants of the study. Their individual and collective experiences are central to the new understandings developed within this study, and thus, the current chapter is molded by those unique perspectives arising out of chapters 5, 6, 7, 8, and 9. Taking a grounded theory approach affords us a number of useful advantages when developing an exploration of the key literature surrounding the topics of research.

3.2 Civil society and peace processes One of the most important contributions of this study is that it is approaching the topic of peace agreement implementation and design from a specific perspective: civil society. The data within this study prioritizes the voices of those within civil society and provides them with a platform to explore the nuances of the GFA and the peacebuilding process in Northern Ireland. With this central focus on civil society in mind, it becomes critical that the concept of civil society be explored and understood in depth as a foundational pillar of this study’s focus. First, determining what civil society is not builds into the development of the understanding for what civil society is, both from a wider theoretical perspective and a very narrow definition used throughout this study. This definition aids in helping us understand the complex, and nuanced, role of civil society within conflict zones, including places such as Northern Ireland. Next, the contributions of civil society to peace processes is untangled as a more fundamental understanding of the peace related connections of this sector are highlighted. Finally, a broader conversation on peace processes in general is offered within this subsection, including a brief consideration of disarmament, demobilization, and reintegration (DDR) connections within the literature as well. 25

3.2.1 What is civil society? Deconstructing the very nature of civil society can be a complicated task (Anheier, 2004; Edwards, 2014). Thus, to begin our in-depth consideration of civil society, it may first be useful to outline what civil society is not, to help us better understand what comprises this key pillar of our society. This is primarily useful to frame as a comparison between the apparatus of the “state” and civil society as an independent sector (Kjellman & Harpviker, 2010). First and foremost, civil society should not be confused with the state, or any official apparatus of the state. Civil society is neither comprised of state institutions nor, ideally, operates in lieu of the state itself. In this sense, civil society does represent a replacement for the state itself. Yet, there are times of crisis, where this becomes the operational reality. As it will be highlighted further below, there are instances where the boundary between civil society and the state becomes blurred to the unknowing eye. This is because during times of conflict, or whenever the state is considerably weakened, civil society can be seen picking up the slack by providing functions traditionally reserved for the state (Spurk, 2010). The service delivery role of the voluntary sector is heightened in different circumstances, particularly in the functioning of the welfare state (Brooks, 2001), or at times of abject failure of the central state itself (Frumkin, 2002). This can, at times, give the impression of civil society subverting the state, consequently warping the perception of civil society as separate from the state and its institutions (Frumkin and Galaskiewicz, 2004). However, these crisis situations must be seen as a temporary deviation from the norm, rather than a representation of the norm itself (Paffenholz, 2013). Although the discussion of civil society within this study is concerned solely with civil society within a conflict context (Northern Ireland), it is critical to note that the relationship between civil society and the state functions differently outside of this context. In sum, while conflict contexts tend to blur the line between the state and civil society when it comes to functions, this should not be confused as a blurring of the conceptual differences between the state and civil society. An effective starting point for a brief overview of what civil society is, is provided by Michael Edwards (2014). Edwards, in his influential Civil Society, outlines three major schools of thought when it comes to civil society. First, is to consider civil society as a part of society. This perspective of civil society includes all associations which are voluntary in nature (e.g. 26 churches or non-governmental organizations (NGOs)). These are the groups and organizations citizens join on their own accord, linking members of society in wide ranging, and often overlapping, associations within society (Lang, 2012). A second consideration of civil society, is that it is a kind of society. This tends to be a more classical consideration of civil society, or a Kantian notion of an ethical society. Here, civil society is seen as a “desirable social order” or the idea that a civil society is a “good” society (Edwards, 2014, p. 44). This notion of civil society also bleeds into the international order, with the notion of a global civil society, focused on human rights, international cooperation, and conflict resolution. The liberal peacebuilding paradigm has at times co-opted this notion of civil society, which unfortunately has resulted in peace processes that pay mere lip service to ‘civil society’ while still ignoring local and indigenous communities and actors (K. Buckley, 2013; Colas, 2013; Paffenholz, 2013). Third, civil society can be seen as the public sphere. This idea considers civil society as the arena within which dialogue on policy, government, and cultural identity occurs (Ljubownikow, et al., 2013). In other words, it is a space for the debates that define the very nature of democracy. This is the primary basis for the argument championed by academics such as Robert Putnam (1995), that a strong and active civil society is key to consolidating and promoting democracy. In essence, it highlights the importance of social capital as “features of social organization such as networks, norms and social trust that facilitate the coordination and cooperation for mutual benefit” (Putnam, 1995, p. 67). Thus, civil society is a sector in its own right. It is independent from both the state and the economic sector, while still interacting with both (Salamon, et al., 2003). In sum, civil society can be seen as: A sphere of voluntary action that is distinct from the state, political, private, and economic spheres…It consists of a large and diverse set of voluntary organizations – that are not purely drive by private or economic interests, are autonomously organized, and interact in the public sphere. Thus, civil society is independent from the state and the political sphere, but it is oriented toward and interacts closely with them (Spurk, 2010, pp. 8-9).

Civil society then, consists of the range of voluntary organizations, including religious associations, women’s organizations, human rights groups, trade unions, and other similar organizations (Nilsson, 2012). 27

This operational definition of civil society begins to shed light on the perceived and actual role of civil society as well. As discussed above, the organizing capacity of civil society is often a critical role the sector plays within conflict zones. As Mac Ginty and Williams (2009) note, civil society represents the key source of citizen engagement within peace processes. For example, Milani and colleagues (2016) note that that Civil Society Organizations (CSOs) within Syria throughout the recent civil war represent the crucial fabric holding together civil engagement representing a key component of future peacebuilding efforts within the country. The authors suggest that as CSOs continue to strengthen their relationship with the state, citizens are brought squarely to the forefront of post-conflict rebuilding efforts, which is critical, they argue, for a truly holistic peacebuilding process (Milani, et al., 2016). Similarly, in places like Cyprus, where years of peacemaking and peacebuilding approaches have seen fleeting successes, the need to engage civil society is paramount as the contributions of citizen voices and ideas have been sorely lacking in the wider social discourse (Kanol, 2010). By coordinating and elevating citizen voices, a core role of civil society can be seen as a mechanism for peace expansion both in terms of peacemaking and peacebuilding (Uphoff & Krishna, 2004). The key is recognizing that civil society is a remarkably flexible sector of society, from a functional perspective. Civil society not only provides concrete services, but it also works as an organizing force and a valuable mechanism of broadening the conceptual boundaries of peace processes. One final key consideration when it comes to understanding what civil society is within conflict zones, is that the blurring of lines is not only in relation to the State itself. One of the challenges of divided societies is the differing and complex needs of the different communities within society. This naturally bleeds into a differing perception of civil society, not only from a functional standpoint, but also a legitimacy standpoint. The legitimacy aspect becomes important within the peace process, not just from a political sphere relationship aspect (Popplewell, 2018), but also when it comes to how communities expect civil society to function. For instance, in Northern Ireland throughout the Troubles, the CNR community was naturally predisposed to distrust and resent the state and the associated political apparatus. Seeing the British claim to the six Northern counties of Ireland as illegitimate, this in turn led to many within the CNR community to see the functions of the state as illegitimate. Thus, services 28 provided by civil society within CNR communities, suddenly took on a heightened importance in the absence of a recognition of state legitimacy. This stance helped to shape civil society in Northern Ireland in a long-term aspect as well. The reliance on civil society over the state led to a robust development of civil society functions within CNR communities in Northern Ireland. A good example of this is within the Bogside or Creggan areas of Derry/Londonderry, where the famous “You Are Now Entering Free Derry” sign highlights the deep schism between the CNR community and the state apparatus. Alternatively, the PUL community, naturally aligned with the British and the Westminster governance, did not necessarily need civil society as much when it came to service delivery throughout the latter half of the 20th century. The state, being seen as legitimate by the PUL community, was not circumvented and instead was relied upon, particularly so during the height of the conflict. In some ways, these impacts are still very visible in Northern Ireland today. A robust civil society infrastructure was expanded and solidified within CNR communities throughout the Troubles, resulting in a wide array of organizations and leaders prepared to engage at the grassroots level, which certainly impacts peacebuilding capacity. This is not to say that the PUL community is entirely void of community specific civil society organizations, but a disparity certainly exists when comparing across communities in Northern Ireland today. As mentioned previously, there are unique considerations arising out of this factor when it comes to peacebuilding capacity at the grassroots level, which is an issue that still needs deeper focus within the PACS literature.

3.2.2 Civil society peace contributions A number of discussions have developed within the literature around specific niches civil society can play during the peace process, from embracing sports organizations as mechanisms for peace (Mitchell, et al., 2016), to taking on a monitoring role (Ross, 2017), acting as a translator between the population and the state (Rood, 2005), or leading the charge for reconciliation efforts (Thiessen, et al., 2010). Each provides a snapshot, or a piece of the jigsaw puzzle, that is civil society’s role in developing and implementing peace agreements. 29

Developing peace agreements is an inherently complicated process. Unfortunately, when it comes to civil wars that end in negotiated settlements, these conflicts often recur (Diehl, 2016a), a testament to the challenges posed by attempting to successfully develop and implement peace agreements (DeRouen & Bercovitch, 2008). A peace agreement must be broad enough to be acceptable to at least the majority of conflict parties, while narrow enough to successfully address the primary concerns and interests of those involved. The peacemaking process is often long and littered with a number of setbacks and delays (d’Estree, et al., 2001). But as the process culminates with the creation of a peace accord, the weeks, months, and years of official and unofficial negotiation, deal making, collaboration, and concessions, the conflict parties finally see the fruits of their labors, and a success to celebrate. Peace agreements and peacemaking processes in general, are complex topics that require careful analysis. As Wanis-St. John (2008) explains: Systemic considerations of peace processes are needed which look at the inter- relationships between elites conducting negotiations, parties marginalized by those negotiations, the potentially vast and diverse civic sphere and its connections to both the population at large and political elites, as well as the dynamic engagement of the international community (p. 3).

Peace agreements provide a fascinating opportunity for societies in conflict to not only address the crippling issues of the ongoing violence and destruction, but also simultaneously lay the foundation for the future (Harbom, et al., 2006). In essence, peace agreements form a proverbial “big bang” in the very fabric of societal existence. In other words, “peace agreements constitute a site of experimentation on which democratic renewal efforts can draw” (Bell & O’Rourke, 2007, p. 296). They are a source of genuine hope and possibility in the midst of the despair and pessimism of intractable conflict. Despite the challenges associated with implementing and maintaining peace agreements (Branch & Mampilly, 2005; DeRouen & Chowdhury, 2016; Stedman, 2001), they represent a key benchmark in the evolution of a peace process. One of the most enduring debates, both between academics and practitioners (Wanis-St. John, 2008), when it comes to peace agreements, revolves around the question of who should be included in the peacemaking process (Lanz, 2011). When it comes to the issue of inclusion or exclusion from the process, we see a distinct break between peacemaking and peacebuilding. Thus, when developing a research agenda aimed at exploring the role of civil society in the 30 creation and success of peace agreements, it is imperative not to simply lump together both the creation and success issues (Fast, 2002). This critical point of consideration is explored in brief below. When it comes to the peacemaking process, or process of creating a peace agreement, there has been considerable debate about issues of inclusion and exclusion (Paffenholz, 2014). On one side of the debate, the argument is that the more players included within the process, the more difficult it will be to reach an agreement. In essence, as more players are included, there are equally more chances for any one of those players to act as a spoiler (Stedman, 2003) to the peace process, or act as what Cunningham (2011) calls “veto players.” Although he speaks primarily about militarily capable parties, Cunningham (2011) raises key concerns with regards to veto players. He bases his claims in the wider arena of bargaining theory. Cunningham (2011) argues that conflicts with multiple veto players are susceptible to bargaining breakdown in four distinct ways. First, as the number of parties grows, the range of potential agreements that will appease all parties becomes smaller, thus shrinking the bargaining range. Second, he argues that information asymmetries occur with multiple parties. In essence, this means that information is not revealed as clearly following battles or negotiations, thus making it difficult for parties to accurately locate the bargaining range. Third, with more veto players, there is a greater incentive for parties to hold out, arguing that the last signers have the ability to force all others to their reservation points. Finally, veto players can lead bargaining failure in the sense that shifting alliances lead negotiating blocks to break down. Many of the same concerns, primarily those around shrinking ranges of acceptable agreements due to more parties bringing in a wider set of interests, are raised when it comes to the inclusion of civil society (Wanis-St. John & Kew, 2008). But there are also a number of crucial benefits provided by the inclusion of a wider set of participants; whether this be civil society (Paffenholz, 2014), which is addressed in depth below, women (Bell & O’Rourke, 2010), or even pseudo-governmental officials (Branch & Mampilly, 2005), those in favor of broader levels of inclusion in the peacemaking process argue that incorporating more voices and more interests leads to stronger and more durable agreements (Joshi & Quinn, 2015; Paffenholz, et al., 2006). 31

Although civil society inclusion can be a complicated issue, it is a debate with significant ramifications for the success and durability of peace agreements. It must be through careful consideration of the potential windfalls and pitfalls of civil society involvement that our conclusions are based. Paffenholz (2014), in the midst of her discussion on the inclusion/exclusion debate, outlines six key benefits of including civil society within the peacemaking process. Each benefit opens an insight into the wide-reaching impact of civil society on peace processes. The benefits are considered independently first, and then collectively as a testament to the broad capability of civil society. First, and most importantly, a core benefit of including civil society within the peacemaking process, is tied directly to the benefits provided by civil society to society at large. Civil society actors and organizations are skilled at addressing the underlying interests and issues for different segments of society. Civil society is built around a framework of advocacy, facilitation, and social cohesion. This means that more than any other sector, civil society has a finger on the pulse of society (Witt & Balfe, 2016). Working at the grassroots level, employing and working for local actors, CSOs and leaders understand the needs and interests of the citizens, giving a critical voice to the masses (Bullion, 2005). Critically, this function means that civil society can also give a voice to the “voiceless” within society as well (Khan & Byrne, 2018). As Demetriou and Hadjipavlou (2018) note, the voices of women in Cyprus have traditionally been underrepresented within the peacemaking process, and women’s groups within civil society are key in addressing this gap and boosting engagement. Similarly, in Northern Ireland, a key example of this function can be seen in the Opsahl Commission during the pre-agreement era of the early 1990s (Pollak, 1993). In many ways, the Opsahl Commission represents the quintessential example of effective civil society inclusion within the scope of a peacemaking process (M. Elliott, 2013; Farrington, 2004). Fully separate from the state apparatus, the Opsahl Commission (taking its name from Norwegian Human Rights lawyer, Professor Torkel Opsahl, who led the initiative) included participants from a wide array of backgrounds, representing a solid representation of civil society. As Marianne Elliott, a member of the 1993 Opsahl Commission, notes (2013), it was an attempt to shift “ownership” of the peace process away from a purely political handling, towards one that included the Northern Irish public as well. It was a brilliant flexing of civil society strength from both an organizing 32 and a voice-giving perspective. Michael Longley, a poet and member of the ‘92 initiative, sums up the commission in a beautiful way: Initiative Ninety-two (-three, -four, -five…) Offers space, a clearing In the jungle for me And you to stay alive By sharing thought and word. Are you within hearing? Am I being heard? (Elliott, 2013, p. 102) As the peacemaking process in Northern Ireland proceeded into the public referendum around the GFA, civil society’s role continued in earnest, through processes like the “YES” campaign (Couto, 2001). And, a natural evolution of the Opsahl Commission was even carried through the GFA and into the post-agreement era in the form of the short-lived Civic Forum (V. Bell, 2004; S. Elliott, 1997; McCall & Williamson, 2001) which showed immense potential (Palshaugen, 2004). Yet, as Guelke (2003a) notes, despite the high levels of civil society engagement in the pre-agreement era within Northern Ireland, including influential pushes along rights-based agendas (Loughlin, 2003), this engagement waned considerably in the post- agreement era, punctuated by the complete failure of the Civic Forum shortly after 1998. However, by deepening civil society engagement during peace negotiations, this can translate into a much more intricate understanding of the underlying interests and issues being pursued by the conflict parties. Also, when the state is a primary party within divided societies, it can be argued that with the close working relationship of civil society and the state, civil society is also uniquely situated to recognize and understand the underlying interests of the state. Thus, the very nature of civil society lends itself to be an indispensable ally in the pursuit of a successful peacemaking process. The ability of civil society to identify the underlying interests and more specifically address the underlying interests of the conflict parties, will greatly reduce the chance that conflict parties play the role of spoiler, due to their interests not being adequately focused upon (Reiter, 2015). Addressing the underlying interests of the conflict parties is paramount to an effective mediation or negotiation, thus civil society’s ability to provide such a critical service cannot be understated. The second key benefit to including civil society within the peacemaking process, is that as more groups are included within the discussions, a wider range of interests and issues will be included as well. This benefit is relatively straightforward, but also raises a number of potential 33 issues. Sustained conflicts impact all members of society, not simply the primary conflict parties and combatants. Thus, it is crucial that the interests of the public, often ignored in favor of focusing simply on the major conflict parties, are also given a voice within the process. Civil society can provide that voice, while also articulating the concerns of minority segments within society. As more groups become involved in the process, more interests are highlighted and, ideally, addressed in the final agreement (Joshi & Quinn, 2015). It is also important to give a voice to civilians, because as Wanis-St. John and Kew (2008) note, civilians bear the brunt of war’s brutality, thus, there is a moral argument as well for giving civilians a voice through the conduit of civil society. However, this benefit is also seen as a major pitfall to many researchers and practitioners alike. One of, if not the biggest, argument against civil society inclusion within the peacemaking process, is that the idea that the more groups and representatives you have at the negotiating table, the more difficult it becomes to find middle ground, or points of convergence between all of the competing interests, as was discussed above. In other words, as the number of participants grows, the range of acceptable agreements shrinks. Each conflict situation is unique, and must be treated as such, thus even perceived benefits must be considered against potential drawbacks, as this example shows. An additional hurdle along these lines can be the unity of civil society itself. A particularly revealing example of this issue is the experience of civil society throughout the Sri Lankan peace process. Mirroring the divided nature of the country, civil society in Sir Lanka at the tail end of the 20th century was deeply divided along ethnic lines (Orjuela, 2010). More importantly, rather than being a champion for the peace process and mobilizing for support, a significant portion of civil society activity in Sri Lanka actually pushed against the peace process, mobilizing support for the rejection of the process (Orjuela, 2003). Thus, we must be cautious to not accept the ‘inherently’ peaceful nature of civil society a priori, as the Sri Lankan example shows that civil society can also mobilize in the opposite direction. To put it another way, “civil society is both an independent agent for change and a dependent product of existing structures, we are likely to encounter a wide range of civil society actors, including both ‘civil’ and ‘uncivil’ actors carrying a wide range of actions” (Marchetti & Tocci, 2009, p. 202). 34

The third benefit of civil society inclusion outlined by Paffenholz (2014), is that by engaging civil society, the peacemaking process can have higher levels of accountability and legitimacy. If neutral civil society actors or organizations are included in the process (neutral meaning not representing one conflict party or another), the process is likely to be seen as a genuine attempt at peace, and not simply a power move by one of the stronger conflict parties. In a sense, civil society is viewed as a stabilizing force on the process, keeping the parties accountable to the process and the public. Similarly, civil society inclusion can also lend an air of legitimacy to an agreement that needs to be implemented on the ground. Rather than simply seeing the peacemaking process and peace agreement as an out of touch process dominated by elites, the public will recognize the inclusion of civil society and find it easier to take ownership of the accord. As Bell and O’Rourke (2007) contend, “an acknowledgment of civil society organizations as embedded within communities and thus having a unique capacity for selling the agreement, and, indeed, building agreement generally” (p. 301) provides a sense of legitimacy at the local level. Mattes and Savun (2009) touch on this issue as well, as they suggest that third party actors (i.e., not the primary conflict parties) can fill in the role of agreement guarantors, reducing the fear of the conflict parties that their opponents will renege on their agreement at a later date. Civil society can, given the opportunity, slide into this role, allowing the conflict parties a sense of reassurance that the terms of the agreement and the following of those terms by the parties will be monitored. Fourth, as it has been discussed before, civil society is made up of local actors and local organizations, thus civil society is home to a wealth of local knowledge and grassroots expertise. By including civil society within the peacemaking process, this local knowledge is made available and can be drawn upon to construct a more holistic and sustainable peace accord (Bullion, 2005). Restricting the peacemaking process to one that is solely conducted through Track One engagements eliminates the potential for local knowledge to be included to help aid in the process. Thus, a multi-track diplomacy model, based along the lines of Diamond and McDonald’s (1996) original model, can prove invaluable in the process of developing effective bottom-up processes (Byrne & Keashly, 2000; Marchetti & Tocci, 2009). With the inherent difficulty of peace processes and peacemaking in particular, restricting the amount of knowledge that is available to draw upon, will likely result in incomplete and, or, ineffective peace agreements. 35

A fifth benefit of including civil society within the peacemaking process, is that high- level civil society initiatives can be key opportunities to test out new ideas and breakdown intergroup boundaries. To expand on an example presented by Paffenholz (2014), programs such as problemsolving workshops specifically within Track Two (or non-governmental, often informal acitives), offer great opportunities to develop practical conflict resolution skills (such as interpersonal communication skills), while also enhancing relationships between the negotiating parties. A key function of civil society within peacebuilding is facilitation and this same function can pay considerable dividends during the peacemaking process. By including civil society in the process, a new set of skills and opportunities are opened to the conflict parties. When harnessed effectively, the opportunities offered by civil society can translate into tangible results when it comes to designing and implementing peace agreements. As the discussion above shows, there are numerous benefits that the inclusion of civil society within the peacemaking process provides. Admittedly there are challenges to the inclusion of civil society, but that is not necessarily due to the nature of civil society, but rather the challenge of including any other parties outside of the main conflict parties. The comprehensive benefits offered by civil society’s inclusion within the peacemaking process, as outlined in the discussion of the literature presented above, are difficult to ignore. Yet despite these noted benefits, civil society is not always full incorporated within the peacemaking process.

3.2.3 Civil society and peacebuilding But what exactly does a local shift in peacebuilding look like? By examining the role of civil society within a peacebuilding process, this question begins to resolve itself, providing a wealth of exciting opportunities for increased grassroots peacebuilding engagement (Collier, 2016). While civil society has largely played second fiddle to the state and economic institutions within the liberal peacebuilding paradigm, it has still managed to carve out some space to operate within the framework. Although the role of civil society has been more or less an afterthought in the post-cold war peacebuilding era, this is not to say civil society has not developed core functions in the peacebuilding pursuit. As discussed above, civil society plays a number of roles within society. When it comes to peacebuilding, we can recognize several key functions for civil society to contribute. By 36 combining the works of Merkel and Lauth (1998) as well as Edwards’ (2014) influential earlier conceptualizations of civil society, Spurk (2010) develops a model which includes seven specific functions of civil society: protection, monitoring, advocacy, socialization, social cohesion, facilitation, and service delivery. According to Spurk (2010), using the functional model to analyze civil society, allows for “an in-depth understanding of civil society’s detailed role in political, social, and development processes” (p. 24). Digging deeper into each of these functions, sheds light on exactly how crucial civil society is to the peacebuilding process. The first function, protection, is a highly important role that also carries a number of key considerations in the analysis of civil society’s role in peacebuilding. Essentially, at all periods during and after conflict, citizen protection is of paramount concern. Beyond the obvious concern and care for human life, citizen protection is also very practical for the ability of civil society to function. As discussed above, civil society relies on the fundamental ability of citizens and organizations to engage in activities that fuel the growth of social capital. If citizens are unable to engage in these activities due to the threat of physical danger or even death, civil society activity comes to a screeching halt. Thus, protection becomes almost a precondition for the existence of any of the other six functions (Paffenholz & Spurk, 2010). Yet, large-scale citizen protection is a monumental task within conflict zones. More specifically, it is a task that is usually reserved for the state. In this sense, civil society can never fully replace the state’s protection function, otherwise civil society, no matter how robust, will simply be unable to provide any other functions within the peacebuilding process. When able, civil society can provide ‘zones of peace,’ watchdog activities, and broader human security initiatives. But if the state is capable, or when it regains increased capability in the post-conflict period, civil society can, and should, turn over an increasing amount of responsibility for citizen protection to the state. The second function, monitoring, can be considered civil society’s system of checks and balances on state activity. In essence, civil society monitors the state and state institutions, to ensure accountability on issues such as state spending and human rights violations. It is an important function, in that civil society can create early warning systems to make sure the state does not slip into a habit of abuse, which would negatively impact the peacebuilding process. Belloni (2001) notes that in Bosnia, the Peace Implementation Council, tasked with achieving exactly what its name suggests, saw civil society as essential to developing a 37 democratic society and providing a balance to government structures. Furthermore, civil society in Bosnia was understood to be a space where the power of the state was limited by the collective action of the citizens. Belloni (2001) goes on to suggest that in the monitoring of the state apparatus, “civil society can reverse the international approach [of prioritizing state institutions] in favor of stressing the importance of indigenous initiatives to peacebuilding” (p. 167). This is an important example, which shows that by curbing the influence of incompetent state behaviors, civil society can infuse the peacebuilding process with locally derived and supported initiatives. This leads directly into the next function of civil society in peacebuilding, advocacy. Advocacy and public communication, the third function, is closely related to the first two functions, as all three revolve around civil societies unique role vis-à-vis the state. Advocacy is not only one of the most important functions for civil society within the peacebuilding process, it has also shown to be an area where civil society has been quite successful (Paffenholz, 2010a). This role includes lobbying efforts for civil society involvement in peace negotiations (e.g., parallel civil society forums), creating public pressure for change throughout the peacebuilding process, and agenda setting by local civil society actors when it comes to project and organizational development (Caputo, 2016). Essentially, the advocacy function “entails civil society promoting relevant social and political themes on the public agenda” (Paffenholz & Spurk, 2010, pp. 68-69). Two distinct types of advocacy can be identified within civil society. One is nonpublic advocacy, in which civil society actors communicate directly with the political apparatus in private, through largely informal processes. This type of advocacy is aimed at influencing either the direction or the scope of the peacebuilding process, through targeted messages to influential members in the state and state institutions. The second type of advocacy is public communication, which is carried out through public demonstrations, petitions, and press releases, etc. These actions are aimed at creating widespread public pressure on the state in order to influence and assist the peacebuilding process. The fourth function of civil society in peacebuilding, is the development of in-group socialization. At first glance, this function can seem paradoxical in a peacebuilding process, especially within divided societies. The aim of this function is to build in-group social capital and consolidate in-group identity. In the scope of peacebuilding, Paffenholz (2010b) suggests that the socialization is aimed at developing a culture of peace. But how does the process of in- 38 group socialization, at the risk of reinforcing existing divides and potentially even fostering radicalization, help develop a culture of peace within the peacebuilding process? Part of the answer is that this function is intended to lay the groundwork for more substantial between group peacebuilding. Consider ethnic conflicts as an example for why the civil society function of building ingroup socialization can be key to peacebuilding. Although ethnic conflicts are typically pitted as group A versus group B, what is not always readily considered is the turmoil within the groups or intragroup conflict (Fieschi, 2003). The argument can be made that without cooperation within groups, cooperation between groups becomes nearly impossible. This leads to the interesting conclusion that ethnic conflicts may be well suited to develop ingroup strengthening measures as a necessary step in the peacebuilding process. By strengthening ingroup cohesion, the group is in a much better position to “self-police” their own members. In other words, extremists on the fringe of the ethnic groups will find it much more difficult to gain support and traction for their violent actions, if they are faced with a unified front from their own ethnic group. Thus, building ingroup cohesion mitigates the potential for lone-wolf extremists to dictate the speed and veracity of a violence spiral between-groups. In essence, empowered groups can better engage at bridging the divide between groups and expanding a culture of peace. This conversation leads directly into the fifth function of civil society in peacebuilding, social cohesion. It is through this function that we see civil society aiming to integrate and build community. Even without the violent aspects of conflict, higher levels of mistrust mark divided societies. Add an active conflict into the mix and you are left with a highly suspicious and untrusting society. Thus, civil society can help to reconstruct trust and in turn contribute considerably to the peacebuilding process (Graham & Nash, 2006). There are three types of social cohesion-oriented activities laid out by Paffenholz and Spurk (2010). The first type is relationship-oriented ‘cohesion for peace’ activities. These include bringing people together in workshops and cross-community programs aimed at building relationships. Key tenants of peacebuilding are focused on improving interpersonal relationships. This is often accomplished by developing cross-community communication, strengthening the capacity of local populations and encouraging teambuilding (Nan & Jeong, 2008). With the leaders of grassroots movements living and working within the communities, a recognition of the needs and desires emanating from the community is likely. 39

These civil society activities are based on contact theory. Contact theory is centered upon the idea that intergroup interaction provides avenues for reducing conflict (Allport, 1954; Pettigrew, 1998). In other words, when the opportunity for interaction with those in the “other” group exists, an individual has the opportunity to develop an understanding and appreciation for different points of view. Or as Richard Rorty (2002) would argue, intergroup interaction invites the opportunity for pragmatism, or the recognition of a common solidarity between one another. Outcome-oriented activities are the next civil society activities discussed by Paffenholz and Spurk (2010). These activities include bringing together representatives of conflicting groups, with the aim of building between-group initiatives. In other words, civil society provides the mechanism for local and community groups to begin working together, as they seek to not only improve interpersonal relationships, but also establish effective initiatives to handle the challenges of cross-community work. Finally, the third type of social cohesion-oriented activity is outcome-oriented cohesion for business or development work. This is unique, in that these activities are considered non- peace activities, because they are aimed at delivering services (jointly between communities). Groups do not necessarily need to change their attitudes right away, but as long as they change their behavior, progress is being made. As with many of the other functions, the sixth function of civil society in peacebuilding, intermediation and facilitation, closely follows from the social cohesion function. Facilitation typically occurs at the local level, with community leaders and local NGOs facilitating between communities and conflict parties, aid agencies, etc. (Paffenholz, 2010b). It can also occur at the national level between conflict parties, which mirrors to some extent, certain social cohesion activities also performed by civil society. Specific facilitation activities include the following three examples. The first example is community mediation, which has shown to be an important tool in peacebuilding when envisioned outside of the liberal peace paradigm (Mallon & Byrne, 2016). A second example is negotiation and conflict resolution training, which is a key activity both within civil society and for civil society to offer (Donais & Knorr, 2013). The final example is, informal and formal facilitation between parties, although this facilitation task is more of a state or international community function rather than a civil society function. 40

Finally, the seventh function of civil society in peacebuilding is service delivery (Spurk, 2010). As with protection, service delivery should be considered a fringe civil society function. This is primarily because, like protection, service delivery is largely seen as a function of the state. Thus, if state structures are destroyed or weakened during conflict, civil society can step in to fill the role of service delivery in the absence of the state. Yet the concern is that taking on too much of the role in service delivery can be a source of distraction for civil society, in turn limiting its ability to function effectively in any of the previously mentioned roles. Paffenholz (2010b) suggests, “service delivery is in principle a civil society peacebuilding function, but only when it creates entry points for peacebuilding” (p. 401). Thus, primarily for the functions of monitoring and social cohesion, service delivery can potentially play an important role in civil societies’ place in the peacebuilding process. The seven functions discussed above effectively highlight a number of points. First, the scope and breadth of these functions reiterate a point that was made repeatedly in the previous section; civil society encompasses a wide variety of actors, organizations, and activities within society (Paffenholz, 2010c). This is especially true in times of conflict, when civil society is forced to pick up the slack left by a faltering state, in order to keep peacebuilding processes moving in a positive direction (Fast, 2014). But perhaps the most important take away from our in-depth discussion of the functions, is that civil society can and must play a key role in peacebuilding processes. When given the space and the capacity to operate effectively, civil society holds a unique ability to compassionately guide a locally influenced peacebuilding process (Donnelly, 2016). There is no question a number of challenges exist in civil society securing both the space and the support it needs (Paffenholz, et al., 2010), yet the potential for genuine progress towards positive peace is too important to ignore. Civil society gives local actors the opportunity to employ hidden or localized opportunities that fall outside of the liberal peace framework, or in certain instances, civil society allows the same local actors to adopt and adapt the liberal framework if it meets local needs, particularly economic needs (Richmond, 2011). Thus, civil society provides the bridge between the overtly technocratic peacebuilding of the liberal peace paradigm, and the localized indigenous practices of peacebuilding. Not only is civil society an indispensable component of a peacebuilding process aimed at achieving positive peace (Barnes, 2006), it is the 41 catalyst which allows local actors and local organizations to take ownership over peacemaking and peacebuilding within their own lives, communities, and nations.

3.2.4 Additional components of peace processes The complexity in the literature regarding peace processes is considerable. Specific nuances of peace agreement development will be discussed later in this chapter (section 3.6), but several general strands are worth exploring at the present. Specifically, ideas on initial peace intervention strategies, designing peace processes around ideas of transformation (rather than management or resolution, even), and the importance of proactive thoughts on re-integration strategies are highlighted below. The range of peace process interventions within conflict zones is considerable (Guelke, 2003b; Mitchell, 2011). As Carolyn Nordstrom outlines in her renowned work, Shadows of war (2004), the dynamics of war and conflict in the last half century have become highly complex. This in turn suggests, that processes of peace must be prepared to meet this complexity directly, in order to address the dynamics of power, culture, and violence. Though she speaks largely to these dynamics at the interstate level, she is quick to recognize the shifting realities of blurring lines between states and within states as well. Varying concepts and causes of war, lead naturally, Rengger (2016) argues, to varying philosophies and approaches to peace. In Northern Ireland, for example, the top-down political philosophy was heavily influenced by the liberal peace conceptualization (Darby, 2003; Tonge, 1997; White, 2013). The liberal peacebuilding framework is explored more heavily in section 3.3, but the recognition here, is that this framework heavily influenced initial negotiation efforts even spanning back to the Sunningdale Agreement in the 1970s (Tonge, 2002). But, as Zartman (2003) would suggest, the conflict was not yet “ripe” enough to secure the success of an agreement. Over twenty years later, as deaths continued to mount and the conflict inflicted a heavier toll, conditions of “ripeness” changed as the momentum for prolonged violence faltered on a larger scale. The GFA itself would come to be considered by some as simply the Sunningdale Agreement for slow learners. But for a number of reasons, the GFA has failed to deliver genuine conflict transformation (Ryan, 2009), instead leaving Northern Ireland with numerous challenges and unaddressed issues despite twenty plus years since the signing of the GFA (Coulter & Shirlow, 42

2019). This suggests that the complexity of peace processes is a holistic issue, not easily resolved even through considerable accomplishments such as conflict “ending” peace agreements (O’Kane & Dixon, 2019). Peace following devastating and destructive conflict is a tall order (Kriesberg, 2009), which reemphasizes the importance to looking at peace processes as a full puzzle, rather than focusing only on its individual pieces in isolation (Darby & Mac Ginty, 2003). Finally, the importance of widespread involvement within peace processes has been noted repeatedly, but this is a point of importance when it comes to specific populations in conflict zones as well. Primarily, I speak here of the re-integration component of former conflict actors into peace processes (Ozerdem, 2013). The two D components of discussions on disarmament, demobilization, and reintegration (DDR) are certainly important, but they tend to overshadow the R, which in places like Northern Ireland, can be a serious oversight in attempts to establish effective peace processes (Gamba, 2003; Ozerdem, 2013). As the empirical chapters of this study show (namely chapter 8), too little attention has been paid to effective reintegration strategies in Northern Ireland. This has hampered community-building efforts in Northern Ireland and strained civil society in attempts to service vulnerable populations.

3.3 Peacebuilding processes and youth engagement As mentioned above, peacebuilding is not simply a process that occurs after the development of a ceasefire or peace agreement. In fact, a certain amount of peacebuilding is necessary to bring parties close enough together to achieve any meaningful attempts at peacemaking (Ryan, 2013). The nature of peacebuilding approaches are again, varied and ideally, contextually based within specific conflict zones (Steinberg, 2013). Yet, that has not always been the case, particularly over the last half-century of peacebuilding approaches, as a singular model or blueprint, has seen wide use (Nan & Teong, 2008). This dominant model, the Western/liberal peacebuilding model is important to understand as it has dramatically influenced many intrastate conflicts, including Northern Ireland (Clancy, 2013).

3.3.1 Western/liberal peacebuilding model The explosion of intrastate conflicts (ethnically organized or otherwise) in the latter half of the twentieth century, was accompanied by both academics and policymakers alike adopting a 43 liberal peacebuilding paradigm. Formally labeled by Paris (1997), the liberal peacebuilding paradigm arose largely out of an attempt by the international relations literature to give credence to the actions being taken by Western states within conflict zones (Zaum, 2013). The liberal argument is based upon interventions characterized by any (or all) of three core liberal characteristics. First, is the characteristic of liberal agency; or in other words, interventions conducted by liberal (often) Western states. The second key characteristic is the idea that the motivations for interventions are based upon liberal objectives, such as securing widespread human rights. And the third characteristic is that interventions are justified and shaped by liberal casual beliefs. These beliefs hold that promoting liberal-democratic institutions (namely political institutions) and economic liberalization are key aspects in bringing about peace and prosperity to countries struggling with conflict (Zaum, 2013). Put another way, the liberal peacebuilding project has coalesced around an institution-building agenda (Beriker, 2009), a focus on free markets, the firm belief in the value of democracy and the value of law, and more broadly, a normative commitment to human rights. It is difficult to criticize the liberal peacebuilding paradigm for a lack of good intentions. The paradigm is situated on the belief that an international system based on Kantian ideals, composed of deeply interdependent liberal, democratic states, is the surest path towards a truly stable and peaceful global reality. Mac Ginty (2008a) argues there are five core elements of the liberal democratic peace process. First, the methodology used is based on a Western business, problem solving model. Second, the core components of the paradigm revolve around unwavering belief in both liberalism and democracy. Third, there are a number of principal actors and an additional consortium of peace sponsors. Principal actors include governments, political parties, and militant groups. The sponsors tend to be Western governments (such as the United States), international organizations (such as the United Nations), and international financial institutions (such as the World Bank). Fourth, the ideological perspective of the paradigm is based on a liberal optimism, or a belief in the perfectibility of society. At face value, each of the four characteristics laid out by Mac Ginty (2008a) are quite arguably, worthy pillars upon which to build a framework of peace. However, in practice, these characteristics have combined within the overarching liberal democratic peace paradigm to 44 produce the final characteristic: the achievement of negative peace, rather than positive peace. Thus, Mac Ginty argues that when considered in full, the liberal peace paradigm is a well- intentioned approach that has ultimately produced outcomes which fail to meet the optimism of the framework as a whole. But before we follow Mac Ginty and others into the conversation around moving beyond the liberal peacebuilding paradigm, it is important to note that the most popular peace framework of the last few decades has not lost all of its proponents. Chief among those carrying on the advocacy for the liberal peace paradigm is Roland Paris (2010). Paris suggests that the liberal peacebuilding paradigm has been unjustly criticized by many academics in the last two decades. He does not villainize those who criticize, in fact Paris (2010) repeatedly argues in favor of rigorous academic debate surrounding liberal peacebuilding. However, he notes that many of the critiques rest on what he considers ‘dubious’ claims. Among the ‘dubious’ claims, he suggests that post-conquest and post-settlement peacebuilding have been continually conflated, definitions of the liberal peace have become too broad, and there have been too many “oversimplifications of the moral complexity of peacebuilding” (Paris, 2010, p. 362). Thus, to Paris, the crisis of liberal peacebuilding has been overstated.

3.3.2 Local/hybrid/emancipatory peacebuilding Even with the effective arguments of Paris (2010) in mind, a cursory analysis of the liberal peacebuilding paradigm reveals a glaring number of weaknesses. One weakness is the typical endpoint of the liberal peacebuilding exercise, negative peace. This has a considerable amount to do with a fundamental deficit within the liberal peacebuilding framework. While focused on building institutions and securing open markets, resulting in a security-development nexus (Lemay-Hebert, 2013), the liberal peacebuilding paradigm has shown a systematic lack of engagement with the populations within conflict zones. Specifically, the paradigm fails to see local, everyday citizens as agents of their own recovery and societal reconstruction (Mushtaq, 2018). The shift towards an appreciation for and focus on local actors has been picked up by a number of authors critical of the liberal peace framework (Donais, 2012; Mac Ginty, 2008a; Richmond, 2009a). This focus on the significance of capturing the local resource in both peacemaking and peacebuilding, provides a key shift in peace process thinking within the 45 literature. The importance of local actors and local organizations is the foundation for the argument to grant civil society a far greater role in the peace process (Richmond, 2015). Since this local element is at the heart of the conversation around civil society engagement, the argument for the local shift is explored in detail in below. Mac Ginty and Richmond (2013) take ‘local’ to mean the range of local agents, which are aimed at identifying and creating necessary process for peace. Thus, a local peace is built around an emancipatory and everyday framework. It is seen as an expansion of the representational capacity of a more formalized peace architecture. In other words, the local shift brings into focus the local voices and processes that are typically suppressed in the overtly technocratic processes, such as the liberal peace framework. Local agency, and its important role, develops from two main perspectives according to Mac Ginty and Richmond (2013). First, local agency develops through practice (Hancock, 2017). Specifically, small-scale mobilization for peace develops within the context of the everyday (Daley, 2014). In other words, the lived experience of local actors allows for a genuine contribution to peace processes that are built from the grassroots level in practical terms. Second, one can look to the philosophical and theoretical development of local agency. Here, Mac Ginty and Richmond (2013) suggest that social and historical struggles give birth to legitimate institutions and large-scale mobilization. In essence, the experiences of local actors, legitimizes the push for broad-scope peace movements and the institutions that developed as a direct result (Leonardsson & Rudd, 2015). It is key to keep in mind however, that the local is not always visible even if it is highly active (Hughes, et al., 2015). For example, in highly authoritarian states, civil society may be forced to operate under the radar, so to speak, to avoid detection and sanctions from other local or international actors. Local agency is likely to be woefully underequipped to directly challenge or critique the structural power of the state or the international system. Thus, we must not necessarily write off local agency in situations where the local may not be readily visible in comparison to the formalized state structure. Another way to conceptualize these challenges is through a discussion of the post- colonial implications of the peacebuilding process (Belanger, 2016; Jabri, 2016). In essence, the overtly technocratic liberal peacebuilding model can be seen as an extension of the wide- reaching influence of colonialism within the international order (Cravo, 2017). Shifting the 46 peacebuilding process to the local and embracing emancipatory pathways, can thus be seen as a post-colonial endeavor, where indigenous voices have the opportunity to be heard and colonial traumas can be addressed (Byrne, 2017; White, et al., 2013). Embracing this bottom-up approach helps to ensure local needs are not only recognized, but more importantly, are genuinely understood (Kanol & Kanol, 2013). This approach helps to create an organic form of peacebuilding, rather than the highly formatted and structural approach of the Western/liberal approach (Stroschein, 2013). There is certainly complexity in shifting between the international and the local (Mitchell, 2011), but the opportunity for unique understandings and approaches from a dialogical standpoint (Oloke, et al., 2018) and a methodological perspective (Mac Ginty, 2019) drive home the flexibility of the hybrid approach (Mac Ginty & Richmond, 2013). Unfortunately, the liberal peace paradigm typically has a successful time co-opting the local into the technocratic framework from the very beginning. The concern here is that liberal peace is not simply a framework, but also an effective mechanism for pushing Western-liberal ideas and practices into local levels (Mac Ginty, 2008b). These challenges are summed up by Mac Ginty and Richmond (2013) into four key obstacles that must be kept in mind in pursuing a local turn in peacebuilding. First, as it has been shown above, there is a trend towards the standardization of peacebuilding interventions. Liberal peace is seen as a structured, one size fits all approach to conflicts throughout the international arena, or as Mac Ginty (2008b) appropriately labels it, peace from IKEA. The second challenge is that the local turn contradicts the universalism at the heart of liberalism. In other words, many see the local turn as an affront to liberalism itself, a position unpopular with the liberal Western world. The third obstacle is the difficulty of actually seeing the local. As discussed above, the local can be oppressed at times by an overbearing state, or simply obscured by the volatility that is common within conflict zones. Additionally, the liberal peace paradigm is approaching conflict zones from an international, state-centric approach in line with the international relations field. Thus, with the local operating well below the state level, the liberal peace framework has inherent difficulty including the local dimension. Finally, a key obstacle in the local turn is the tendency for the local to be co-opted by orthodox, internationally designed and funded 47 approaches to peacebuilding. The local is turned into a staging point for disseminating the liberal peace, rather than being a breeding ground for alternative peace strategies. In many ways, the local shift is about creating (or renewing) crucial lines of dialogue between the local and the state/international community as to how peace is to be conceptualized and pursued. Richmond (2009b) suggests that move to local inclusion represents a ‘post-liberal’ approach, which is aimed at developing a discourse ethic of empathetic self-emancipation within the everyday context; this in juxtaposition to the liberal peace focus on frameworks rather than sociopolitical dynamics. In other words, Richmond (2009b) posits a post-liberal peace “highlights the importance of local voices and narratives, and enables self-government, self- determination, empathy, care, and an understanding of cultural dynamics contained within the everyday” (p. 570). The liberal peace paradigm has clearly been shown to present pitfalls and biases, but the everyday can be seen as a form of guidance to help highlight and empower local agency. It is also key to note that local involvement should not simply be included at the time of peace implementation, but rather must be included throughout the entirety of the peace development process (Mac Ginty, 2008b). The local must be employed to help develop peace from the ground up, not simply recruited to implement a peace that was designed from the top- down. As Mac Ginty (2008b) argues, “peace [is] no longer only a matter for Track I and II; Track III in the shape of grass-roots political and civil society actors (and their techniques) also [have] a role to play” (p. 143). This speaks to a similar argument by Diamond and McDonald (1996) in their development of multi-track diplomacy, where ‘everyday peacemakers’ are seen as equally important players along with the diplomats and political professionals. Fully abandoning liberal ideals is far from what is being suggested either by the authors discussed above, or myself. Indeed, it is not the ideals of liberalism that are being questioned, but rather the mechanism through which those ideals are sought. The mechanism that has been employed time and time again in conflict zones over the last half-century is the liberal peacebuilding paradigm. This has unfortunately, included an over-the-top obsession with establishing democratic institutions and neoliberal economics. This obsession from external actors can have profoundly negative impacts on local peacebuilding enterprises, when left unchecked. Rather than dictating the nature of the technocratic processes at play, external actors should instead focus upon safeguarding the peace 48 environment, while allowing the local actors to retain the ability to create a contextually relevant peace process, dictated by grassroots needs (de Coning, 2016). The pragmatic shift away from the liberal peacebuilding approach can open the door to new peacebuilding approaches, such as adaptive peacebuilding (de Coning, 2018), where local communities are able to build their social institutions in an organic and responsive manner to the interests of local stakeholders. Additionally, this has not included an appreciation and inclusion of local actors and ideas. It has failed to reconcile ‘illiberal’ practices and actions at the local level, with the liberal ideals at the state level. But this does not mean that we should necessarily abandon liberal ideals all together. Rather we must seek to reconstruct our approach, in the manner of a ‘post-liberal’ framework, as Richmond (2009a) suggests, that not only includes local actors and organizations, but views the local level as an equal and vital partner in the development of a peace framework.

3.3.3 Youth peacebuilding One of the core themes arising from this research project is the focus on a specific category of people within Northern Ireland when it comes to the peace process, namely young people. Consequently, a consideration of the literature on youth engagement in peace processes, namely through education and peacebuilding components, is where attention turns now. Understanding how youth populations engage, and disengage, in peace processes is key to building a holistic understanding of effective peace agendas. There is a consistent and growing recognition in the PACS literature of the importance of the youth element within peacebuilding processes (McEvoy-Levy, 2013; Smith & Smith Ellison, 2012). Both when it comes to short-term peacebuilding successes, and certainly long-term successes, youth engagement is an area that sees great theoretical support in the literature (Berents & McEvoy-Levy, 2015), but still struggles to be translated into consistent and effective practice on the ground (Kurtenbach & Pawelz, 2015). These lapses in attention to youth create numerous struggles. within the peacebuilding environment, further complicating an already challenging process (Collins & Watson, 2016). Ignoring or excluding youth within a peacebuilding agenda (whether consciously or unconsciously) can lead to pockets of violence, making young people legitimate peace spoilers within the process (Micinski, 2016). Youth can play the role of spoiler by not only engaging in violent acts, but also by disengaging from the peace process entirely, putting long term peace 49 successes in jeopardy. This reality has been seen in places likes Sierra Leone where youth marginalization not only creates new detractors (Bangura, 2016), but also does little to reintegrate former youth combatants into more productive peace contributors (Bolten, 2012). Similar realities have played out in other conflict zones, such as Northern Nigeria (Agbiboa, 2015), Northern Uganda (Biziduras & Birger, 2013), South Sudan (Ensor, 2013), and Northern Ireland (Creary & Byrne, 2014; Harland, 2010; Senehi & Byrne, 2006). These examples speak to the universal importance of youth engagement within peace processes. While there are a number of ways to encourage and nurture this engagement, one of the more popular approaches is through directed peace education (Maulden, 2013; Sommers, 2009). A focus on peace education can help to accomplish a number of useful objectives when it comes to youth engagement. First, education is typically one of the ways that cultural reproduction occurs within society. Particularly within divided societies where cultural identities play a significant role in the perpetuation of intractable conflict, breaking down historically divisive cross-cultural understandings can be a critical first step in changing the narrative of conflict (Belanger, 2016; Pherali, 2016; Rooney, 1997). In other words, education can open the door for a deeper understanding of cultural interactions amongst young people in conflict zones. A second useful potential of peace education is building specific conflict resolution related skills within youth. Effective dialogue skills are critical in a peacebuilding process and peace education can help youth develop those dialogue skills in order to be full contributors to the process (Tupper, 2014; Ungerleider, 2012). As young people become more comfortable with dialogue skills, barriers between groups can be broken down during some of the earliest interactions in cross-community settings (Harland, 2009). And a third, natural evolution in the usefulness of peace education, is providing young people with the agency to influence the peacebuilding process around them (Cubitt, 2012). Providing the opportunity for youth to develop agency is vital to securing their desire for engagement in peace processes (McEvoy-Levy, 2001). Youth can be mobilized to greatly expand the reach of civil society activism (Kester, 2010; Murphy & Gallagher, 2009) and idea contribution. In other words, appreciating the importance of youth agency helps to provide a voice not only for young people as a whole (McKeown & Taylor, 2017), but also specific groups that are often voiceless in traditional peace processes, such as women (Pruitt, 2013). 50

As Rayle (2010) argues, peace education can help to create a systemic framework within society that not only bolsters a peace process, but also engages an otherwise vulnerable population that has the potential to play the role of peace spoiler (Ozerdem & Podder, 2011). As youth become engaged and genuine contributors within their communities (Stewart, 2011), contested spaces and previous fault lines of conflict (both physical and psychological) can be transformed into areas of opportunity for peace development (McEvoy-Levy, 2012).

3.3.4 Additional components of peacebuilding As the sections above reveal, the literature on peacebuilding is a vast network of interconnecting theories and ideas. Different frameworks guide our understanding of effective (and ineffective) approaches to building peacebuilding agendas within conflict zones. Special focus has been paid to both civil society and youth within this chapter, as these topics provide a core representation of the empirical chapters to come. But there are a number of broader peacebuilding concepts that also play into our collective understanding of how best to embrace this vital process in places of strife and conflict. Peacebuilding approaches are highly varied, which should encourage peacebuilders to recognize the importance of developing intervention strategies that are contextually relevant (Pospisil, 2019). The use of symbols (Mac Ginty, 2003), storytelling (Senehi, 2002, 2008, 2009), problemsolving (Kelman, 2015), and business strategies (Ford, 2015; Schouten & Miklian, 2018) are all viable and effective approaches, given the right scenarios on the ground. As new and unique peacebuilding processes continue to be explored in conflict zones (Hudson, 2016), it is critical that the research and academic community evaluate these methods in order to learn new lessons of successes and failures (Gurkaynak, et al., 2009). The peacebuilding scholarship certainly contains its fair share of debates, such as those on the importance of resolution, transformation, and reconciliation (Hutchison & Bleiker, 2013; Hamber, 2003; Kelman, 2010) or level of focus on transitional justice and memories (Maddison & Shepherd, 2014; Ross, 2013), but these debates simply serve our deeper quest for understanding. Additionally, many questions still remain and these holes in the literature must be actively pursued, as this study is doing, in order to refine our approaches to building peace within conflict zones throughout the world.

3.4 Economic aid and peace funding In a forthcoming empirical chapter (Chapter 7) of this study, civil society leaders in Northern Ireland discuss the evolving environment of peace funding and its implications on the overall peace process in the region. As a means to set the stage for this analysis, the current section explores the surrounding literature on the nature of economic and peace funding. The conversation first examines broad frameworks of external funding realities in conflict zones, followed by a specific examination of key funding strands within the Northern Ireland context (IFI and EU PEACE), and finally, rounds out the economic discussion through a focus on the importance of local ownership and autonomy.

3.4.1 Technocratic structures and external funding complexities The role of economics within the peace and conflict equation is extensive. For instance, when it comes to conflict mitigation and the very beginning stages of peacemaking, economic pressure can be seen, in many instances, as a useful tool for interveners (Hoeffler, 2014). This pre-agreement approach falls largely in line with traditional ideals within the international relations community (Murtagh, 2016), as economics are seen as a viable pressure point to exert influence in conflict zones, without the necessity of introducing external warring parties as well (Woodward, 2013). In many ways, it is this traditional view of economics as a pressure point, that wraps naturally into seeing economics as a key component within the peacebuilding enterprise as well (Brauer & Caruso, 2013). The suggestion is that exerting economic influence can help shift peacemaking and peacebuilding processes in a direction that is viewed as ideal, by the international community. Mac Ginty (2012) suggests the heavy economic focus on intervention and direction is closely tied to the technocratic-turn in peacebuilding that has been observed over the last several decades in the response to intrastate conflicts. As noted in the discussion on the Western/liberal peacebuilding paradigm (discussed above in section 3.3), a key focus is placed on securing open and free markets within conflict zones. The key point provided by Mac Ginty (2012), notes that this pillar of focus within the paradigm opens the door for substantial economic influence to be exerted by external financial donors. Masked as helping to secure this liberal pillar, external donors have the capacity to dictate the focus and direction of the peace process directly (Cheng & Zaum, 2012). 52

These technocratic structures present a serious concern for many in PACS that recognize the dangers of external interventions that masquerade as peacebuilding, but in reality, venture into the realm of statebuilding (Menocal, 2010). Technocratic approaches to peace funding creating challenging dynamics between international donors, many of whom are likely to have no understanding of the realities on the ground, and grassroots organizations attempting to secure peace within their communities (Duckworth, 2016). For such frameworks to prove effective, Goodhand and Sedra (2010) suggest, donors must have a complex understanding of the nuances within the conflict zone (Manning & Malbrough, 2009). The above conversation is certainly not meant to suggest that economic aid is not important within peacebuilding processes, rather, the manner in which that aid is provided and delivered must be consistently subjected to critical analysis and research on this issue must be constantly ongoing (Thiessen & Byrne, 2017). Discovering more effective ways for the business sector to become involved within the peacebuilding process is a key focus in many conflict zones (Ford, 2015). Economic aid is important and can offer remarkably crucial support for fledgling peace processes to get established while mitigating the potential for conflict recurrence (Mac Ginty & Williams, 2009). For instance, in Northern Ireland, there have been billions of dollars and euros poured into the region to support peace in the post-accord era, and this support has been vital. A deeper focus on several of those funding pathways in Northern Ireland is where our focus turns next.

3.4.2 Northern Ireland peace funding While there have been countless funding streams flowing into Northern Ireland over the years from the international and regional level, two key sources have consistently dominated: the International Fund for Ireland (IFI) and the EU PEACE Programmes, encompassing PEACE I, II, III, and IV variants (Byrne et al., 2009a, 2009b, 2009c, 2009d, 2009e). The EU PEACE Programme has led the way in terms of funds flowing into Northern Ireland over the last two plus decades. The first three EU PEACE (I, II, and III), beginning in 1995, delivered over 1.3 billion euros of peace money in support of the Northern Ireland peace process (Haase & Kolodziejski, 2019). The current iteration, PEACE IV has committed an additional 270 million euros through 2020 to continued peace efforts in Northern Ireland and the Border Counties (Haase & Kolodziejski, 2019). 53

The recent events surrounding BREXIT have created some uncertainty within Northern Ireland as to the sustainability of EU funds coming into the region. While negotiating parties in Brussels, Dublin, and London all highlighted the importance of protecting the provisions of the GFA, the realities of how to accomplish this task has complicated the political landscape (Hayward & Murphy, 2018). The future of potential EU funding played heavily in the BREXIT referendum campaigns within Northern Ireland (Gormley-Heenan & Aughey, 2017), highlighting the importance of the issue and the uncertainty. In the years following the BREXIT referendum, the EU has committed to carrying the EU PEACE IV programme through completion in 2020. While the future of the EU PEACE programme beyond 2020 is still in limbo, the EU has repeatedly expressed the importance of safeguarding the Northern Ireland peace process through financial support. Current proposals include the implementation of an EU PEACE Plus programme following the conclusion of PEACE IV in 2020 (Kolodziejski, 2020). Thus, while the specific future of the EU funding is still in doubt, there are signs that support may continue into the post-Brexit era. The peace funds represent a significant amount of financial support which has allowed for a considerable range of peacebuilding organizations and projects to develop throughout the North of Ireland (Byrne et al., 2008, 2010; Fissuh et al., 2012). While some of these programs are single-community or identity focused, the vast majority have been developed on a cross- community basis working towards community development (Mitchell, 2011; Skarlato et al., 2013). An additional focus of both the IFI and the EU PEACE Programmes has also been aimed at developing and sustaining cross-border programs as well, a key structural support of the North/South pillar within the GFA (Hayward, 2007; Potter & Egerton, 2011). The peace funds have opened space in Northern Ireland for unique forms of hybrid peacebuilding to develop (Hyde & Byrne, 2015). As Mallon and Byrne (2016) argue, the peace money has provided benefits consistent with a robust local-mediation provision within communities. In other words, the funds have consistently created opportunities at the grassroots level for addressing needs of vulnerable groups and highlighting issues that are holding back genuine peace efforts. Particularly in a short-term capacity, these peace funds have bolstered the voluntary sector in Northern Ireland and contributed to the development of a very robust peacebuilding framework in the region (McCall & O’Dowd, 2008; Skarlato, et al., 2015). However, this is not 54 to say that the IFI and EU PEACE Programmes have been flawless in their delivery and impact within Northern Ireland. There have always been gaps in the funding (such as a lack of funds for “challenging populations”) and sustainability has long been a concern at the grassroots level (Dean et al., 2018). These concerns are heightened by what many civil society leaders see as a disconnect between the donors designing these peace funding agendas and the needs at the grassroots communities (Skarlato, et al., 2015). In this sense, even in recognizing the importance of the IFI and EU PEACE Programmes, and celebrating their achievements in the peace process, they too are vulnerable to technocracy and disconnect from the grassroots level. Thus, there is room for improvement in how, even these largely successful peace funding programs, can and should be delivered within in Northern Ireland. This understanding also offers lessons for other conflict zones and peace funding approaches throughout the world. The key takeaway being, local ownership of the peace process is paramount, particularly when considering the economic dimension.

3.4.3 Local ownership and autonomy The importance of the local turn in peacebuilding is explored in depth in section 3.3, but many of the same lessons can and should be applied to our understanding of peace funding approaches as well. Peace funds can contribute greatly to the capacity of grassroots organizations to develop programs aimed at social cohesion. However, to secure the success of these programs, local organizations need the autonomy to design frameworks and approaches that are contextually relevant at the local level (Fearon, et al., 2009). Mac Ginty and Williams (2009) note the importance of pushing post-accord peace funding in the direction of local development, in order to create capacity at those grassroots levels for lasting locally led approaches. Empowering local actors to have ownership over policy directives can be a challenge and will often require a new approach to how funding is designed and delivered (Levasseur & Frankel, 2017). Yet this is a critical step in creating more emancipatory approaches to peace, centered on local ownership and autonomy (Barsky, 2009). Aid in the form of development approaches (Bamidele, 2016) is certainly not a novel idea (Hughes, 2016; Paffenholz, 2009), but a key departure from previous approaches based on international intervention (Hayward & 55

Magennis, 2014) is recognizing the importance of pursuing that development through the local vision (Millar, et al., 2013). As we seek to shift peacebuilding processes towards hybrid and local approaches, it is critical that the same attention be paid to funding strategies. As the peace funding discussion in Chapter 7 will show, serious concerns still exist in Northern Ireland when it comes to even longstanding and influential funding streams such as the EU PEACE and IFI. Building holistic peace processes must be a genuinely holistic approach, meaning that peace funding (design and delivery) must be at the forefront of any research agenda on peace processes.

3.5 Positive and negative peace The concept of ‘peace’ is complicated for a number of key reasons. As it has been discussed above, conflict itself is a highly complex concept, taking many different shapes and forms given the variables at play. Specific types of conflict, for example, ethnic conflicts, operate in unique ways, particularly when occurring in instances of intractable conflict in divided societies. And likewise, peace itself comes in many shapes and forms, a number of which have been discussed in previous sections of this chapter. However, there is a key dimension of peace conceptualization that requires additional consideration within this literature review; the distinction between positive and negative peace.

3.5.1 Johan Galtung and complexifying peace In the 1960s, Johan Galtung, a Norwegian sociologist and a foundational contributor to PACS, introduced a novel conception of peace that has reverberated throughout the decades (Galtung, 1964). Feeling dissatisfied with viewing peace simply as an absence of direct violence (or war), he sought to complexify the term leading to his introduction of negative and positive peace frameworks (Galtung, 1969). While peace can be seen as a natural turning point from a society in conflict, as direct violence subsides (negative peace), there are still victories to be won, as a society works towards an existence void of structural violence as well, where the peace becomes holistic and rooted in social justice (positive peace). This distinction creates an opportunity to see peace not as an end state, or something to accomplish, but rather, a continual process of delivering cultural, political, structural, and economic equity across a society that is engaged in a peace process (Boulding, 2000). This is a 56 considerable departure from viewing peace simply as an accomplishment that comes by way of signing a peace agreement or a ceasefire within a conflict zone (Diehl, 2016a). In many ways, the positive peace conception is rooted in a positive peace psychology (Cohrs, et al., 2013) that drives at a holistic peace, not just from a societal perspective, but indeed at the individual level as well. Positive peace is a peace that can be recognized in the everyday, not just in the form of safer streets where bullets are no longer flying, but in the realization of communities that are marked by cooperation, rather than division, where the streets are filled with former adversaries turned into new partners in designing a society that is focused on future prosperity. Recently, the need to further complexify our notions of peace has been growing within the literature. Battaglino (2012) for example, argues a third classification of peace, “hybrid peace” is necessary to understand the fuzzy boundary between positive and negative peace. Oliver Richmond (2015) embraces this idea as well, suggesting that the path from negative peace to positive peace is not always a clear one, thus, exploring those internal boundaries of peace, is critical in developing an understanding of how to avoid becoming ‘stuck’ in the quagmire that is negative peace. This becomes particularly important for places such as Northern Ireland, where the path to peace was hard won, but has since slowed to a crawl in the years following the introduction of the GFA. Northern Ireland is no stranger to negative peace, as is the case in many conflict zones that involve disputed boundaries and hard borders (Feldman, 1991; Owsiak et al., 2017). But durability of negative peace in Northern Ireland highlights just how important it is to explore those paths to positive peace. In Northern Ireland today, issues around cultural representation, such as the recent flags protests (Jarman, 2019), point to the unresolved issues of the legacy of The Troubles (Page, 2010; Rosland, 2019). Ongoing divisions, both physical (Abdelmoran & Selim, 2019) and psychological (Walker, 2012) have thus far, obscured the path to positive peace in the region (Mitchell, 2011). The examples provided above highlight the depth of negative peace that is possible within a “post-conflict” society (the term post-conflict should be recognized as a misnomer, particularly for Northern Ireland). But this is exactly why Galtung’s ideas on positive and negative peace are so crucial for the peace enterprise. Shifting from conflict to ‘peace’ is a significant accomplishment and by no means, are peace agreements easily achieved. However, understanding the complexities of peace leads us to recognize that more can and should be 57 pursued within a society beyond simply an absence of war (Diehl, 2016a). Positive peace is a holistic transformation of society away from the devastation of conflicts past, towards the construction of future possibilities.

3.5.2 Divided societies and ethnic conflict Ethnic conflicts have accounted for well over 50 percent of civil wars since the end of the Second World War (Fearon & Laitin, 2003). Staggering levels of intensity and violence also often characterize these conflicts, resulting in devastating repercussions that are likely to haunt societies for a considerable length of time. For instance, in an astonishingly short period of just over 100 days, the Rwandan genocide claimed anywhere from 800,000 to 1,000,000 lives (Prunier, 1995; Lemarchand, 2002). Several decades later, the physical and psychological scars left by this genocide are still apparent within the African nation. There are a number of different theoretical approaches to understanding the general concepts of ethnic conflict (Bara, 2014; Caselli & Coleman, 2012; DeRouen & Bercovitch, 2008). First, we turn our attention to a foundational understanding of ethnic conflict, essentialism, which is perhaps best covered by Roger Petersen (2002). In short, essentialism captures the notion that mass loyalties to communal identities reflect deep psychological needs. In other words, the individual’s psychological tie to the community’s identity plays a critical role in the formation of ethnic conflict. Violence erupts from a combination of four primary emotions felt by the individual and expressed by the community: fear, hatred, resentment, and rage. Kaufmann (2006) does note however, that essentialism relies largely upon the notion of elite inspired action, as simple individual identification with the community does not itself inspire action. Yet, identifying these “inspirational” elites can prove difficult when establishing research agendas. The second framework to consider is structuralism. For a straightforward perspective of this paradigm, we turn our attention to the work of Toft (2010). As Kaufmann (2006) notes, structuralism brings us the realist perspective, which for reference, has long played a significant role in the international relations realm. While a comprehensive review of realism or neorealism falls outside the scope of this study, key foundational background is seen in Waltz (1979) and Keohane (1984). This perspective effectively considers a failed state as a mini international system in which groups are tasked with their own survival. Rooted in its need for an anarchical 58 environment, the structuralism approach immediately renders itself only applicable to a smaller subset of ethnic conflict (i.e., those occurring in the shadow of a failed state). The final framework up for discussion is constructivism. Here we look towards Stuart Kaufman (2001) as a prominent voice from the paradigm. Evolving largely in mirror image from the perspective of the essentialists, the constructionists’ center on the argument that collective identities are continually made and remade through social discourse. However, due to push back largely from their essentialist counterparts, constructionists acknowledge that it is likely that once communal identities are formed, they are sticky, or unlikely to change. The view provided by the constructionists argues that ethnic violence is the product of the elites’ ability to utilize symbols to develop ethnic hatreds, which are often blown out of proportion (Kaufman, 2001). The problem noted by Kaufmann (2006) largely rests on the ambiguity of constructionists in defining what type of symbols can and cannot be used by elites to stir up violence. It is hardly a crippling critique, but it does play some importance when you consider policy implications, such as those provided by Byman (2002). Byman (2002) also embraces the constructionism paradigm, but unlike many of his colleagues, he is willing to consider policy implications of his theoretical stance. He too speaks from the idea that ethnic violence is borne from the ability of elites to fan the fires, so to speak, inciting the masses to engage in activism that goes beyond rhetoric. As such, the ethnic violence is attributed to the constructed hatred between the ethnic groups (thus the fitting term for the paradigm). Considering this perspective, Byman (2002) notes five approaches, which can translate into policy directions, for the management of violent ethnic conflict: suppression of the groups (widely viewed as the military option), identity manipulation, co-option, powersharing (i.e. consociationalism), and partition (as seen in the Government of Ireland act in 1920, subsequently creating Northern Ireland). It is also helpful to recognize the nature of divided societies which characterize the atmosphere of ethnic conflicts. Divided societies are societies that have been subjected to a prolonged and historical cultural or ethnic division within the population. Lederach (1997), a foundational scholar on the subject, suggests that divided societies are characterized by a high degree of complexity, presenting many unique challenges. With multiple groups vying for legitimacy and power within a society, cooperation is rare and trust is rarer still. Conflicts within divided societies also tend to be characterized by their intractability (Bar-Tal, 2000). This is due 59 to the conflicts being rooted in a long-established recognition of an adversarial relationship between different identity groups within the society (Avruch, 2009). Bar-Tal (2000) argues that the intractable nature of conflicts in divided societies is also largely due to the psychological components of group identity that develop in these situations. He describes intractable conflicts as those which are protracted, zero-sum in nature, and wholly consuming in all aspects of social life (Bar-Tal, 1998). He goes on to mention that such conflicts require an adaptation by society to foster the conflict situation, and the extreme beliefs and actions accompanied with them. Echoing this idea, Peter Black (2008) argues most deep-rooted conflicts involve a struggle between social identities, which he defines as the “social use of cultural markers to claim, achieve, or ascribe group membership” (p. 147). Thus, it is apparent that local actors and organizations play a key role within divided societies (Warrne & Troy, 2015). As cultural “competitions” are waged at the local level, the ability for the public sphere to coalesce around a central narrative is rendered nearly impossible by the fragmentation in the private sphere. In other words, divided societies require that keen attention be paid to the cultural dynamics within the state. This ‘local’ consideration is discussed in depth further below. Groups within divided societies tend to develop the “us versus them” mentality (Sambanis & Shayo, 2013). In essence a sense of superiority grows within groups which effectively eliminates any potential cross-cultural ties. The risk here is developing what Michelle LeBaron (2003) calls automatic ethnocentricity. Automatic ethnocentricity refers to the “trap of believing the way we see things is natural and normal” (LeBaron, 2003, p. 33). Groups develop ideas about others, often based only on observable practices such as cultural symbols, rather than meaningful conversation, and assume that is an accurate representation. Divided societies struggle with creating adequate space, at the local and national level, to allow multiple cultures to operate without interference. This lack of open space, whether in the physical or abstract, creates competition between groups for the ability to express their identity, straining already frayed relations within civil society (Toft, 2009). Hence, cultural expression becomes a point of serious contention, eliciting a response from “competing” cultures. In these instances, cultural symbols not only become tools with which to express identity, but also antagonistic expressions of superiority or perceived dominance. 60

Failing to recognize the unique complexities of divided societies also results in a failure to recognize the diverse capacity within which cultural symbols are employed. Flags are not simply raised to show support or express affiliation to an identity, but they are also used to carve out territory within a divided society. Thus, cultural symbols operate differently within divided societies than in other situations. Divided societies complicate the process of expressing identity through cultural symbols, because individuals are also encouraged to employ the symbols as an attack on other groups (Rubenstein, 2008). As the discussion above highlights, the complexity of divided societies presents a number of unique challenges. It is important to recognize these challenges both from a conceptual standpoint of how to handle this divisiveness during the peacebuilding process, and also the practical issue of designing and adapting political institutions that can adequately compensate for the complexity at hand. Political institutions cannot, as Adrian Little (2003) argues, be constructed without reference to history and contextual circumstances of a society. It is crucial to recognize that the “practical political processes that have to deal with the complexities of divided societies rarely equate unequivocally with the prescriptions of normative political theory” (Little, 2003, p. 33).

3.5.3 Lessons on the road to positive peace As discussed above, positive peace is not something that can be accomplished overnight. The idea that a few strokes of a pen during the signing of a peace agreement will immediately deliver a holistic peace is a misguided belief, particularly in divided societies marred by years of intractable conflict (Gledhill & Bright, 2019). As attempts to develop a holistic peace process are met with the challenges of negative peace, there are key lessons to learn as to how and why certain aspects of negative peace become such resilient roadblocks on the path to positive peace (Nan, 2009). Several specific examples are explored below. First, looking at Northern Ireland for context, several key points can be made about the people participating in the peace process and their roles in promoting negative and positive peace conditions. Previous discussion in section 3.3 explore the potential of disengaged youth playing the role of peace spoilers (Harland, 2010). This is an important example where a certain population contributes to negative peace conditions through a conscious rejection of the peace process itself. Even coming up short of returning to active, direct violence, detractors such as 61 disenfranchised youth can work to perpetuate divisions at the grassroots level. Bolten (2012) notes similar issues in Sierra Leone with youth ex-combatants failing to embrace re-integration processes due to disenfranchisement. But it is not simply those with a conscious rejection of the peace process that can contribute to a negative peace environment. Other marginalized groups within Northern Ireland, such as those in the LGBTTQ2+, disabilities, and ex-combatant communities, have also been left out of the dialogue process in the post-accord era (Byrne, et al., 2017). While these groups are not actively rejecting the peace process, and in fact, want to engage more completely, their inability to do so due to structural constraints continues to negatively impact the peace in Northern Ireland. This is an important recognition, as it reveals that forced omission of specific groups can also be a key contributor to negative peace, much to the frustration of those groups. This ties into a second critical point, which is the platforms of expression that are available within a peace process. Looking still at Northern Ireland, there are a number of unique ways that voice and cultural expression have developed throughout the course of the peace process. For instance, murals in places like Belfast, have come to represent a key expression of community identity (Kappler & McKane, 2019). These murals can promote both peace and division, which complicates the issue, but that tends to be the case with many forms of cultural expression and the usage of space within Northern Ireland (Robinson, 2018). In a similar vein, the arts more broadly can be an opportunity to teach tolerance and promote positive peace (Parks, 2010). Despite similar complexities as the murals when it comes to exploring victimhood through theater and film (Lehner, 2019), these artistic expressions open doors for deeper understanding, and more importantly, more room for voices to be heard. In this sense, storytelling itself (through any varied mechanism) is key, Hamber and Kelly (2016) argue, for addressing remembrance issues and ensuring broader narrative collection. Learning how to better engage former combatants (Mitchell, 2011) and invite them to be peaceful players is a challenge for societies stuck in negative peace. Recognizing the vulnerability of embracing nonviolence (Gay, 2010) and incorporating new virtues into the peacebuilding process (Muhlnickel, 2010) is a challenge for societies stuck in negative peace. Traversing the complicated issue of memory and “truth” (Arthur, 2009) and pushing against radicalization (Ferguson & McAuley, 2019) in the name of protecting divisive identity concepts (McChrystal, 2019) is a challenge for societies stuck in negative peace. 62

These issues are real, and as scholars and practitioners, we must be wary of falling into an idealistic haze in the pursuit of positive peace. Yet it is through a recognition of these challenges that lessons can be learned and opportunities can be identified to solider on in these pursuits. In order to begin addressing these challenges of negative peace, peace processes must embrace emancipatory approaches (Richmond, 2011) that seek to adhere to a concept of justice and engagement across the wide reaches of society (Maddison & Shepherd, 2014). Turning towards a society-wide peace education approach (Salomon, 2010) that emphasizes growth and progress, rather than settling for the stagnation of “good enough” can help to chart the path away from negative peace towards positive peace.

3.6 Peace agreement design As with many aspects of intractable conflicts, the development of peace agreements and the peacemaking process in general, is a highly complex activity. Wanis-St. John (2008) eloquently lays out this complexity: Systemic considerations of peace processes are needed which look at the inter- relationships between elites conducting negotiations, parties marginalized by those negotiations, the potentially vast and diverse civic sphere and its connections to both the population at large and political elites, as well as the dynamic engagement of the international community (p. 3).

Recognizing all of these interconnecting factors is critical to developing an effective analysis of peace agreements. Key topics within the peacemaking literature include: analyzing past agreements (Jarstad et al., 2015; Lyons, 2016), developing methods to engage in analysis (Joshi & Darby, 2013), considering the legal nature of agreements (C. Bell, 2006; Bell & O’Rourke, 2010; Park, 2015), and the policy within the agreement and its implementation (Joshi et al., 2015; Joshi & Quinn, 2015; Sisk, 2013).

3.6.1 Peace agreement approaches and challenges General components of peacemaking have been discussed previously in this chapter (section 3.2), but a deeper focus on peace agreements specifically is warranted. To call back to a common theme throughout this literature review, the nature of peace agreements themselves tend to be highly varied and complex (Mac Ginty, 2008a). Given the complicated nature of conflict, peace, and peace processes, though, this should hardly come as a surprise (de Varennes, 2003). 63

As peace agreements are developed, a number of key issues must be considered. This is a major reason why peacemaking processes have such trouble getting across the proverbial finish line in developing a full-fledged agreement. Agreement framers must consider vital decisions regarding electoral approaches (Byrne, 2019), overall constitutional design (Kossler, 2018), and how best to mitigate the potential of eleventh-hour spoilers (Zahar, 2003). This obviously represents only the tip of the iceberg, but it gives an indication of the initial hurdles that must be fleshed out inside of the ‘rules’ established by the negotiating parties (du Toit, 2003). As noted previously, peace agreements are fickle, and durability is a serious issue of concern. In Cyprus, for example, repeated attempts at designing a lasting peace agreement have plagued the nation for decades (Kovras & Loizides, 2012). The high-profile failures of the Zurich-London agreement in the 1950s (Sirin, 2012) and the Annan strategy within the last decade caught many peacemakers off guard, pointing to the longstanding challenges of peacemaking in the Mediterranean nation (Byrne, 2007). The story is repeated in conflict zones throughout the world, as agreement design has proved challenging from the Balkans (Zagar, 2009) to Sri Lanka (Bouffard & Carment, 2006). Because of the complexity of divided societies and intractable conflicts, peacemakers have consistently designed peace agreements around frameworks of powersharing (Coulter & Shirlow, 2019; McCulloch, 2017; Sisk, 2003). However, powersharing based agreements have been proven to come along with their own complexities and challenges. An inquiry into one such approach, which has been revered for its ‘success’ in Northern Ireland, consociationalism, is where attention turns now.

3.6.2 Consociationalism and Northern Ireland Given the focus of this study on Northern Ireland, it is important to explore the nature of one specific type of powersharing framework: consociationalism. Consociationalism was developed mainly by Arend Lijphart (1969; 1977) toward the latter half of the twentieth century. It is a key political theory that suggests that the complexity of divided societies is best handled through an application of consociational principles. Although consociational principles can in theory be utilized by both democratic and authoritarian means, we shall focus exclusively on the former. McGarry and O’Leary (2006a) highlight the four key principles of consociational democracies: 64

1. Executive power-sharing: Using the principles of representative government, the main communities within a divided society share executive power. 2. Autonomy or self-governance: Each community is given autonomy to determine matters of cultural importance (such as education matters). 3. Proportionality: When it comes to public resources, public expenditures, and positions within public institutions, each community receives a proportional share. 4. Veto-rights: Each community has the power to strike down any changes that “adversely affect their vital interests” (p. 44).

There have been a number of consociational agreements developed over the years (with varying degrees of success), such as in Belgium (Bodson & Loizides, 2017), Cyprus (McGarry, 2017), Lebanon (Bogaards, 2017), and Northern Ireland (Byrne, 2001; McGarry & O’Leary, 2017), to name a few. Consociationalism is certainly not suited for all multicultural societies, a point which will be emphasized when several critiques of consociationalism are discussed below, but its proponents suggest it offers genuine possibility for otherwise entrenched conflicts within divided societies such as Northern Ireland. The internal components of consociational agreements are admittedly complex. For instance, in Northern Ireland, there was a debate on: The design of a bill of rights, including the questions of whether such bills should be limited to conventional liberal (individual) rights or should also entrench group rights, including the political rights included in the Agreement (McGarry & O’Leary, 2006a, p. 59).

This was a particularly interesting debate (O’Leary, 2001) because it highlighted the perceived clash of liberal and multicultural principles. Northern Ireland’s GFA is an interesting example of liberal multiculturalism for a number of reasons. First, the GFA creates an institutional mechanism through which group rights are recognized. The Catholic and Protestant communities are guaranteed representation (specifically proportional representation) at all levels of society. Further, each community is given autonomy to conduct and advance their cultural affairs free from interference from the other group. For the minority Catholic community, this amounts to institutional recognition of their group rights. For the Protestant majority, the same measure of assurance is offered as well, which is key in securing the internal stability of communities and the culture at large. However, the GFA, as McGarry and O’Leary (2006b) point out, “not only stresses equality between nationalists and unionists, it also offers protection to individuals, including those who regard themselves neither unionist or nationalist” (p. 275). Thus, the state institutions, 65 through their consociational nature, embody the powerful principles of liberal multiculturalism. Group rights are enshrined within the agreement, along with the ever-important individual rights. For instance, the Northern Ireland education system allows children the choice to attend Catholic schools, or state schools (including markedly Protestant variants), regardless of what community they belong to within society. Giving individuals the opportunity to select their schools is clearly in line with the liberal principle of individual autonomy. Additionally, the fact that it is even a choice between Catholic or state schools is a testament to the institutionalization of multiculturalism. While in reality many still choose to self-segregate within the schooling system, the key aspect is that there is a choice. As Lijphart (1995) comments, modern consociationalists’ prefer self-determination to predetermination. This is certainly not to suggest that the GFA was a perfect peacemaking solution, a point which is squarely debated throughout the remainder of this study. Rather, the agreement is employed in this discussion to show the opportunities of using state institutions to create space at the local, civil society, level. It must be recognized however, that these same institutions have also played a debilitating role in the peace process through the rigidity of the GFA (Rosland, 2019). Essentially, the institutionalized dedication to multiculturalism has established a sense of institutionalized sectarianism (Brewer, 2019). This point is highlighted in order to recognize the complexity of the power-sharing puzzle, particularly with regard to a strict adherence to consociational principles long into the post-accord period. Focusing on institutions first, is a process that Richmond (2009b) considers an “orthodox graduation” of liberal peace. Ideally, a more emancipatory model would be employed to move beyond the liberal peace framework almost entirely, but at times where state provided security and institution building is a requisite, employing consociational designs certainly has the potential to, at the very least, open the door for a more profound discussion to occur at the civil society level (McGarry & O’Leary, 2006b). That opportunity though, has thus far failed to materialize in any meaningful way in Northern Ireland as the political institutions still cling to the proportional representation ideals above anything else (Fenton, 2018). There are certainly a number of critics of consociationalism, a number of which fall along similar lines as the critique’s classic liberals levy at multiculturalism. Berghe (2002) insists that consociationalism is a “clumsy, inflexible, conservative model that benefits mostly the ruling elites” (p. 437). Similarly, Simonsen (2005) suggests that consociationalism may simply contain 66 and manage a conflict, locking in patterns of the conflict within the institutional framework. This is an important distinction, suggesting that consociationalism may be an effective method of securing a settlement, but is woefully underequipped to achieve genuine reconciliation and transformation (Kelman, 2010). Or in other words, one can expect negative peace to arise out of consociational designs, but positive peace subsequently becomes much less likely. O’Flynn (2003), also argues that the GFA simply entrenches national identities in a way that “curtails individual freedom” (p. 130). In essence, it mirrors the argument of Barry (2001) that consociationalism accomplishes nothing more than a rigid framework from which individuals become locked in and oppressed by the very groups from which they derive their identity and meaning in life. Guelke (2003a) also questions whether or not “consociational and civil society approaches to the resolution of conflict are compatible” (p. 76). In other words, Guelke openly questions whether consociationalism and integrationism (the product of civil society social cohesion actions) are capable of being simultaneously pursued. It should be noted though, that in developing his queries, he focuses on the overtly “elitist” nature of consociationalism and fails to address any opportunities for grassroots movement over the long term. Arguments in favor of consociationalism tend to highlight the challenges of divided societies as necessitating such a rigid powersharing structure. Little (2003) suggests divided societies operate differently, and thus must be approached differently in peace agreement design aspects. Due to the historical and systematic oppression of minority rights and cultural recognition, institutional measures must be put in place to begin the process of building a multicultural society. Simply asking the majority community nicely to refrain from exerting their power, while leaving the same structural inequalities in place, is an exercise in wishful thinking at its best (Little, 2003). Kukathas (1998) suggests that the neutral state is the best for dealing with diversity. Impartial institutions are capable of advancing multiculturalism far better than non-neutral institutions based on power politics. Multiculturalism should incorporate a politics of recognition and a redistribution of power so that all communities have a voice within institutions and certainly within civil society. As Maciel (2014) succinctly states, “liberal multiculturalism forces us to include a cultural element in discussion of equality and justice in society” (p. 390). Within divided societies, the inclusion of this cultural element is unlikely to happen without a structural shift in societal 67 institutions. And yet, there must be a conversation about how long these rigid institutional structures can be allowed to exist. As Northern Ireland has shown, once these institutional structures are in place, they become remarkably difficult to dismantle, or even adapt (Herbert, 2019). Consociationalism presents an opportunity to provide institutional support and most importantly protection, for the different communities within divided societies, at least in the short-term. Thus, more than just the majority can carry on the conversation, as to how a society should develop. This ultimately helps to secure individual rights and freedoms, by establishing a just and moral society within the principles of an expanded liberalism. Multiculturalism is not simply a desirable inclusion within the liberal framework, it is a decidedly necessary inclusion if liberal principles are to be pursued in a manner which invites the local actor to be a primary contributor. To adequately move forward with liberal multiculturalism within divided societies, consociationalism provides a compelling institutional model in the short term. But a different conversation begins to develop when the model is examined in a long- term application. The same rigid mechanisms that ensure more voices are brought into the conversation, also create an environment where those voices are never required to evolve. Guaranteeing their position within the structure, consociationalism provides a convenient cover for divisions to deepen. Though these positions may now be clashing in the political arena rather than the battlefield, the social and cultural cleavages are unchanged. In other words, viewed through this lens, consociationalism provides ample structural oxygen for sustaining the flame of negative peace. The issue of consociationalism is a complicated one, as the above literature has revealed. Given this complexity, a nuanced understanding of consociationalism in Northern Ireland is advanced within this study. The consociational approaches developed within the GFA proved to be effective (and even necessary) in the short-term as a means to ensure more equal representation within society at the time of the GFA signing. However, the qualitative evidence that is presented within the analysis chapters of this study (Chapter 5-9) reveals the long-term negative impacts of consociational institutions within Northern Ireland. Namely, the reality that rigid consociational frameworks have played a role in perpetuating sectarianism and identity politics, which clearly goes against the goals of a positive peace focused peacebuilding process. 68

It is the complexity of this short-term and long-term relationship of consociationalism that this study suggests must be better understood and recognized in a peace agreement design process. Otherwise, divided societies in other parts of the world may also face similar long-term peacebuilding challenges as are clearly present within Northern Ireland. The position is not that consociational frameworks should be ignored within peace agreement design, on the contrary, this study recognizes the short-term usefulness of creating consociational institutions within divided societies in order to safeguard political and civil society representation for oppressed and excluded communities within conflict zones. The key, however, is that peace agreements, when making these short-term design decisions, must also develop transition processes to evolve these institutions over time. The GFA failed to take this long-term consideration into account in 1998, thus, the consociational principles have remained in place and have, as suggested by the civil society leaders later on in this study, led to debilitating institutional sectarianism in the political and civil society spheres. This study argues that institutional stability in the short-term following peace agreement implementation with processes of institutional change also designed within the agreement to safeguard against long-term drawbacks of consociationalism in divided societies presents a nuanced approach to consociationalism, which is needed in cases such as Northern Ireland. In this sense, the agreement itself, can and should represent the roadmap for change. Civil society can be recognized as the political “watchdogs” in this case, a role that (as noted by Paffenholz, 2010a) comes naturally to civil society within conflict zones, as the sector helps to monitor these processes of change over time. Evolutions of institutions alone cannot guarantee reductions of sectarianism within Northern Ireland, but it can represent an opportunity to move away from such deeply imbedded frameworks of single-identity approaches that have become the norm in Northern Ireland, due in large part to these rigid consociational frameworks over the last three decades. 3.7 Conclusion An exploration of the literature surrounding conflict, peace, and peace processes reveals a wonderfully complex network of frameworks and concepts. This chapter highlights the interconnectedness of several key themes that provides the basis for understanding the contributions of the civil society leaders which will be discussed in subsequent chapters. The nature of civil society itself, specifically what it is and is not, was examined in order to better 69 situate the discourse of this study and understand the perspective of the primary contributors: civil society leaders. The unique role that civil society plays within peace processes was also explored, specifically the functional model offered by Paffenholz and Spurk (2010). Likewise, when it comes to peacebuilding specifically, both a broad examination of the literature was presented, along with a more directed connection to the contributions of civil society within the peacebuilding endeavor. Connected within this discussion is a recognition of the importance of youth engagement and agency in peacebuilding processes. Challenges of youth disillusionment were explored, and the viability of peace education was noted as a key theoretical framework for addressing those challenges. Economic aid and peace funding play a crucial role in the entirety of the peace process dynamic, particularly in post-accord peacebuilding environments. The literature surrounding this economic component of peace processes was explored, with specific focus being given to the nuances between external funding complexities and local ownership possibilities. As divided societies represent a unique expression of conflict, the literature detailing these unique variables is also included above. Combined within this discussion is a focused breakdown of the concept of peace itself, undertaken specifically through the framework of Galtung’s (1969) essential ideas on positive and negative peace. Finally, the literature detailing peace agreements, from their design to the expression within peace processes was included to round out this chapter. An in-depth focus on consociationalism anchored this section, with an emphasis being placed on examining the powersharing framework within the Northern Ireland context. Together, all of these strands within the PACS literature help paint a deeper and more meaningful picture for the original research that is included in the forthcoming empirical chapters of this study.

Chapter 4 Methodology

4.1 Introduction When it comes to research endeavors within the Peace and Conflict Studies discipline, a variety of approaches are open to the researcher. Both qualitative and quantitative methods produce useful data in our quest for developing deeper understandings on the topics of conflict, peace, and all things related. While both approaches, as well as mixed methods approaches, have their benefits and drawbacks, it is key to develop a research agenda that aligns with the over-all research question being pursued. This study employs a qualitative, case-study approach where in-person interviews were conducted in a semi-structured nature. Given the nature of research in conflict zones, combined with special circumstances originating within the Northern Ireland context (the specific subject of this case study), several key considerations were required to be kept in mind during the pursuit of this study. These considerations are discussed at length within this chapter, alongside a general discussion of the study scope and overall approach. In total, this study includes the detailed contributions of twenty-nine participants from within civil society in Northern Ireland, as their perceptions of the GFA and the post-accord period of Northern Ireland’s peace process is considered in detail.

4.2 Study scope and significance As discussed throughout this analysis, peacemaking and peacebuilding are challenging processes. The successes won in the development of a cease fire or a formal peace agreement by no means guarantee a smooth transition into a successful peacebuilding process. With failures of peace agreements and ceasefires translating into not just a rebuke of cooperative policies, but more importantly the likely reignition of direct violence and death, building successful and robust agreements is of the utmost importance within conflict zones. Building peace and making peace are two distinct processes that simultaneously cannot be untangled in the complex equation within divided societies. Since its development and signing in 1998, the GFA has been regarded as a gold standard in PACS (Armstrong, et al., 2019; Fenton, 2018). Its successes are notable, its durability 71 certainly commendable when compared with the array of peace processes that have come before and after it (Badran, 2014). Yet much of several decades’ worth of academic and scholarly analysis has tended to focus on the agreement from a decidedly top-down approach, choosing to approach the GFA and Northern Ireland’s peace processes from a liberal peacebuilding perspective (Jarstad & Belloni, 2012). This is not to suggest that key research has not been conducted from mixed perspectives as well, including key overview reflections of the peace process (Hancock, 2008). Consociationalism, a cornerstone of the GFA’s design, has certainly spent an ample time in the research spotlight as scholars debate its merits, both within the GFA (Byrne, 2001, 2019), and elsewhere in the world (McGarry, 2017). The voices of the negotiators and track-1 policy players are considered in depth elsewhere in the literature surrounding the GFA (Diamond & McDonald, 1996; Mitchell, 1999). Largely, and notably absent, though, is a research focus on the voice of those left largely outside of the negotiating room in 1998; the voice of Northern Irish civil society at-large. Those same voices have been tasked over the last two decades, of delivering the hard-won peace into communities throughout Northern Ireland. This project provides a platform for these voices, drawing on their wealth of expertise and experiences, and offering them to contribute to our collective understanding of the complexities of the GFA and the Northern Ireland peace process. Therefore, critical holes are being filled when it comes to our understanding of the GFA from a grassroots perspective, rather than the technocratic approaches that have been explored before, and at length, in the literature surrounding Northern Ireland and its journey along the path of peace. Peace processes must be holistic to find success; thus, our understanding of peace processes must also take a holistic approach. By drawing on the voices of civil society within Northern Ireland, this project recognizes their irreplaceable source of local knowledge, expertise, and insight. If we seek to know more about the GFA and its genuine impact on Northern Ireland over the last twenty years, who better to guide our understanding than those at the grassroots level, working tirelessly to shepherd Northern Ireland through the tumultuous journey towards lasting, positive peace? This study provides a unique and underutilized perspective on the successes and failures of the GFA by directly examining the peace agreement through the lens of civil society. This is not to say that civil society leaders in Northern Ireland have not been consulted before, but this study provides a distinctive set of participants the opportunity to share their unique and extensive 72 experiences. It also provides opportunities to learn about growth and development potential within the Northern Ireland peacebuilding sector today. As new voices are brought to the forefront of the conversation, civil society leaders are given the opportunity to learn from their colleagues, and their own experiences as well, in a manner that has been sorely lacking in the surrounding academic literature. The purpose of this study is to improve our collective ability to design more effective and robust peace agreements in order to promote positive peace and reduce the prospect of conflict recurrence in the post-accord period of intrastate conflict. More specifically, this project develops a deeper understanding of the role civil society can, and/or should, contribute to the design of peace agreements and their implementation. Thus, this examination of the design and implementation of peace agreements is primarily focused on the perspective of civil society. This project focuses on the role civil society plays in the development of policy components within the peace agreement. Therefore, a key question to consider, is how does the degree of civil society engagement in the peacemaking phase impact the role of civil society in the peacebuilding process? In other words, considering the issue from the perspective of civil society actors: how should the role of civil society differ, or not, in the process of developing peace agreements (peacemaking) and the implementation of peace agreements (peacebuilding)? Further, it is imperative to address the links between state level policy decisions included within peace agreements, and the subsequent impacts to the grassroots peacebuilding process, where civil society is tasked with operating under the umbrella of a peace agreement. This project employs a case study approach of the Northern Ireland conflict and the GFA, thus the above research questions are approached from within this context. Additionally, key questions exist surrounding the specific nature of civil society engagement in Northern Ireland and the particulars of the GFA. It is important to establish the relationship between the Northern Ireland political apparatus (the state) and civil society, as this relationship has key implications for the trajectory of peace in the North of Ireland. This is key for understanding both the role of civil society in the peacemaking process, and also more specifically, the perceived and actual role of civil society during the peacebuilding process and the implementation of the GFA. The key to addressing the research focus developed above, is to approach these questions directly through civil society, relying on their knowledge and expertise to guide our 73 understandings. The specific questions asked of civil society actors, bears heavily on our ability to directly address the questions above. While this project takes on the framework of a case study of the GFA, and thus has acknowledged limits on its ability to speak to events and conflicts beyond the borders of Northern Ireland, certain implications and considerations for other peace processes are still possible. Therefore, the broader purpose of this project is to improve our collective ability to design more effective and robust peace agreements, in order to promote positive peace and reduce the prospect of conflict recurrence in the post-accord period of intrastate conflict. More specifically, this project develops a deeper understanding of the role civil society can, and/or should, contribute to the design and implementation of peace agreements.

4.3 Qualitative approach and research style significance Before discussing the specific data collection process that will be utilized in this project, several key methodological considerations must be addressed. One unique aspect of peace research is the variability offered to the researcher, in terms of research methodologies. As Wallensteen (2011) discusses, research within the PACS discipline is often uniquely suited to employ both qualitative and quantitative methodological approaches. This leads to variability and complexity within peace research, which is undeniably advantageous. To put it another way, “the interest in methods results from an additional ambition of peace research, namely to be able to make generalizations and, in a certain sense, predictions about social realities” (Wallensteen, 2011, p. 17). While both approaches have a number of benefits, the current study employs a qualitative approach, for the reasons discussed below. A qualitative approach offers the opportunity to gather rich, descriptive data, which is ideal for the purposes of this project. As Creswell (2007) notes, “we conduct qualitative research when we want to empower individuals to share their stories, hear their voices, and minimize the power relationships that often exist between a researcher and the participants in a study” (p. 40). The focus of this project develops a detailed analysis of the GFA, specifically from the perspective of civil society. Thus, it is important to recognize and draw upon the voices, experiences, and expertise of those within civil society. The participants in this qualitative study provide unrivaled knowledge, as their experiences are singularly unique and a genuinely rich 74 source from which a new understanding of the complex context of the Northern Ireland conflict and the GFA can be gleaned. Peace research itself, regardless of methodological approach, has a unique potential to aid in peacebuilding processes (Bush & Duggan, 2014). One unique aspect of conducting interviews, is the ability for a direct and immediate sharing of ideas between interviewee and interviewer. At times during interviews I noted similarities in experiences or concerns that were highlighted in previous interview sessions; this occurred primarily during the second round of field research. Thus, at times, the interviews became genuine conversations which provided an enhanced experience for both interviewee and researcher alike. The case study approach, which is the framework utilized by this project, revolves around studying a specific issue area in order to develop an in-depth understanding. Data collection in case studies is extensive, drawing on multiple sources of information. Some of the key information gathering techniques include observations, interviews, and analysis of documents, just to name a few (Creswell, 2007). When it comes to the primary research question developed above, one data collection technique stands out above the rest: in-depth interviews. As noted by Brouneus (2011), “in peace research, in-depth interviews are used to gain a deeper understanding of processes of war and peacebuilding both among elites and among different groups of populations” (p. 130). As an example, one of the questions asked to each of the participants: What is the relationship between civil society and the political apparatus? While this question could potentially be answered through a quantitative analysis of, say, the number of meetings held over a certain amount of time between civil society leaders and state leaders, this approach is fraught with a number of potential issues. Namely, the lack of a functioning government in Northern Ireland over the last two plus years, would seriously skew this metric from a quantitative perspective. But by taking a qualitative approach using in-depth interviews, civil society actors, state actors, and even citizens, can be specifically asked questions in a number of different ways which can reveal nuances hidden by troublesome quantitative metrics (Mihas, 2019). Thus, rather than relying on making an inference of the strength of a relationship based on what can be a misleading metric, the knowledge and experiences of the individuals with the closest access to the question can provide a wealth of data (Bechhofer & Paterson, 2012). In- depth interviews provide research with detail and a depth of perspective on specific research 75 queries (Brouneus, 2011), which is exactly what is needed for such a complex analysis as is undertaken in this study.

4.4 Recruitment strategy The primary method of participant selection for this study was completed through a process known as a snowball sampling technique (Bogdan & Biklen, 2007; Noy, 2008). With civil society being the foci of this study, snowball sampling is uniquely suited as a method for participant inclusion. As discussed above, a strength of civil society, in most cases, is the interconnectedness of organizations and leaders within and between communities. With the extensive number of organizations and individuals working within civil society throughout Northern Ireland, connections and partnerships develop naturally thanks to the nature of the peacebuilding process. Thus, participants become the best source, not only of knowledge relating to the central questions raised by this study, but also of who should be considered for inclusion as fellow participants. One of the core strengths of a vibrant civil society is the development of social capital (Putnam, 1995). When it comes to sampling for this study, that social capital becomes an indispensable instrument for participant identification and recruitment. With nearly a decade of experience working with, studying, and researching the Northern Ireland peace process, I have a number of existing connections with scholars and civil society actors within the region. I relied on these connections to provide me with the initial seed of potential participants, which then allowed the snowball sampling to begin in earnest. This was accomplished by reaching out to friends and colleagues and seeking suggestions for potential participants for this study. Potential participants were contacted via email using an established script (Appendix 1). If participants confirmed their desire to be part of the study, an invitation to suggest other potential participants was given both during the email conversation and while on site at the conclusion of the interview. Recruitment of participants that were suggested as a result of the snowball sampling occurring while on site in Northern Ireland, continued through email, again using the same script, or when necessary, by phone.

4.5 Participant profiles and research sites Initial data collection began in May of 2018 in Northern Ireland. Following the recruitment strategy discussed above, interviews took place throughout the month at sites in both Derry/Londonderry and Belfast. Interview locations were decided upon by the interviewees themselves, in order to provide them with as comfortable and as safe a meeting location as possible. Interview sites included offices, private residences, public locations such as coffee shops or parks, and locations within the premise of academic institutions. When it comes to participant demographics, neither age nor gender proves to be a particularly important consideration within this study. Participants were asked to discuss their perceptions of the GFA and subsequent peace process, as well as the role of civil society at large. Thus, this study did not require participants to be selected based upon specific representations of gender or age groups, as these distinctions do not play a variable role given the central focus of the study. The focus is on the role of civil society within the Northern Ireland peace process, thus the participants’ inclusion within civil society is the primary requisite characteristic. One unique consideration when it comes to participant demographics, specifically within Northern Ireland, is the division between the Catholic Nationalist Republican (CNR) and Protestant Unionist Loyalist (PUL) communities. While this study is not focused on developing a comparative component between CSOs or leaders between the two communities, several potential issues did arise after initial data collection that warrant deeper discussion within this section. This study is concerned with civil society as a whole, thus organizations and civil society leaders from both communities represent the foci. However, one salient factor that came out of initial conversations with participants is that CSOs working solely in one community may have perceptions or experiences that are considerably different from those CSOs working solely in the other community, specifically the PUL/CNR divide. While participants were not asked to self-identify which community they or their organization primarily identify with, either individually or collectively, given the segregated nature of communities within Northern Ireland, this information was typically easily identifiable. With nearly a decade of experience working with the Northern Irish conflict and considerable experience working in the country as well, community leanings were often apparent to me as the primary researcher. 77

Since the focus of this study is not on building a comparative analysis, special attention given to sample equality across the communities was not initially of primary importance. Yet initial data analysis following the May 2018 interviews revealed an unevenness of representation from the communities. A disproportionate number of those from the CNR community were included in the participant pool after the first round of data collection. This was due largely to the snowball sampling effect that was most predominate within Derry/Londonderry, which is home to a majority CNR population. Given this apparent disparity and the previously mentioned concern of potential differences between communities, the decision was made to conduct a second round of field research in December of 2018. These additional interviews were organized to ensure that saliency was genuinely reached when it comes to data originating out of civil society voices. By ensuring that initial inquiries were primarily focused within the PUL community, snowball sampling resulted in an uptick in research participants from this community. During the December 2018 session, interviews were conducted exclusively in Belfast. Interviews did consist of civil society leaders and organizations from both communities (CNR and PUL), but predominately originated within the scope of PUL communities. This naturally allowed for a balance of representation between the Derry/Londonderry and Belfast dichotomy and the PUL and CNR communities when the data was aggregated and examined as a holistic set. Thus, while equal community representation was not an initial goal at the outset of data collection, this reality was essentially reached nevertheless, in pursuit of data saliency. Primary data analysis following the December 2018 interviews provided heightened assurance that saliency had been met. While there is some variance between testimonials from those in the CNR and PUL communities, there is also significant similarity between communities. Thus, by including an adequate representation of both the PUL and CNR community within the participant pool, a genuinely representative perspective from Northern Ireland civil society is provided within this project. Again, since participants were not asked to self-identify into a community, officially ascribing community status by the researcher here in regard to participant demographics, would be inappropriate, and thus this demographic categorization is not noted. Total participant numbers eventually totaled, 13 individuals from Derry/Londonderry, 12 individuals from Belfast, and 4 individuals that technically operate outside of either urban zone. 78

These four individuals were interviewed within Belfast, but their primary location of operation with their work did not include the Belfast area. In total, contributions from 29 participants are included in this study. Table 1 (below) provides an overview of the participants. Participant Role in Civil Society Location of Gender Number Engagement Participant #1 Director of a Peacebuilding Belfast Male Organization Participant #2 CEO of an Umbrella Peacebuilding Belfast Female Organization Participant #3 Chairman of a Peacebuilding Derry/Londonderry Male Organization Participant #4 Director of a Community Derry/Londonderry Male Organization Participant #5 Peacebuilder Derry/Londonderry Female Participant #6 Community Leader Derry/Londonderry Male Participant #7 Program Coordinator Derry/Londonderry Male Participant #8 Community Leader Outside Belfast Male Participant #9 Coordinator of a Community Derry/Londonderry Female Organization Participant #10 Peacebuilder Derry/Londonderry Female Participant #11 Program Leader Belfast Female Participant #12 Project Director Derry/Londonderry Male Participant #13 Project Director Belfast Male Participant #14 Community Developer Derry/Londonderry Male Participant #15 Community Developer Derry/Londonderry Male Participant #16 Community Developer Derry/Londonderry Female Participant #17 Community Developer Derry/Londonderry Male Participant #18 Community Developer Derry/Londonderry Female Participant #19 Project Leader Outside Belfast Male Participant #20 Director of a Research Organization Belfast Male Participant #21 Program Director Belfast Male Participant #22 Program Director Belfast Female Participant #23 Organization Director Belfast Female Participant #24 Project Coordinator Belfast Male Participant #25 Organization Leader Outside Belfast Male Participant #26 Project Lead Belfast Female Participant #27 Project Lead Belfast Female Participant #28 Peacebuilder Belfast Female Participant #29 Peacebuilder Outside Belfast Female Table 1 – Study Participants An additional two individuals were interviewed as well, however their contributions are not included within this analysis. One expressly requested, prior to the interview, that no part of their discussion be included, whether through direct quotation or general sentiment. However, they still requested to carry on with the interview. I agreed to continue with the interview in the 79 spirit of providing opportunity for civil society voices to be heard, even if in this scenario I was the only one listening. The second individual that is not included in this study withdrew themselves following the interview and prior to the submission of this study. As outlined in the ethics document (Appendix 2) all files and documents relating to their interview were promptly destroyed. No reason was provided for withdrawal and as per their right, no reason was required.

4.6 Data analysis techniques Twenty-one of the twenty-nine interviews included in this study were audio recorded on a password protected iPhone belonging to the primary researcher. The remaining eight either expressed a desire for the interview to not be audio recorded, or the interview environment was not conducive to audio recording. These audio recordings were then transcribed, word for word, by me the primary researcher. These transcripts provide the core data for this study. Extensive field notes were taken by hand throughout all interviews and these field notes provide the key source of data for those interviews that were not audio recorded. This study privileges the voices of the participants above all else, including the primary researcher. Thus, the research data, meaning the participant voices, were allowed to speak for themselves. Through qualitative theme analysis (Leech & Onwuegbuzie, 2007; Mihas, 2019) key themes from the entirety of the interview responses were identified. These themes represent a collective response by Northern Irish civil society to the key issues, challenges, and successes regarding the GFA. The key analysis chapters that appear later in this project (Chapters 5, 6, 7, 8, and 9), provide a true representation of those issues that are most important to civil society leaders within Northern Ireland. While a number of issues were discussed by the participants, the themes explored in depth in this project represent the greatest consensus of civil society leaders interviewed after the dozens of hours of interviews conducted. Following an inductive research approach allows for the themes of this study to arise naturally out of the original data being gathered (Ormston et al., 2014; Woo et al., 2017). This represents a critical approach in the pursuit to truly value the knowledge of the participants above all else. In the midst of data analysis, the inductive research approach is not looking for 80 what should be present in the data, rather it is seeking to uncover what is recognizable as dominant themes across the varied interviews that have been conducted (Thomas, 2006). With dozens of hours of interviews, resulting in hundreds of pages of transcripts, the wealth of data collected from the experiences and stories of the participants in this study is immense. Embracing an inductive research process ensures that the significant findings arising out of this study are situated specifically in the experiences of the everyday peacebuilders within Northern Ireland. The importance of this inductive approach is reiterated throughout the analysis chapters of this study (Chapters 5-9) as the key themes discussed within this research directly mirrors the key themes highlighted throughout the participant interviews.

4.7 Ethical considerations First and foremost, it must be recognized that this study is focused on a conflict zone and a zone that has been the subject of plenty of research before (Kelly, 2020). As discussed previously, namely in Chapter 2, although the violent nature of the Northern Ireland conflict is dramatically reduced compared to the height of the Troubles, Northern Ireland remains a deeply divided society trapped in a frozen or liminal peace (Marijan, 2015; Mitchell & Kelly, 2011). Conflict zones are inherently complicated, and this translates into several important considerations (Duggan & Bush, 2014). Safety of the participants is of the utmost importance. Although the violent aspect of the conflict has largely been suppressed in the years following the GFA, rogue dissident groups, committed to destabilizing the tenuous peace in Northern Ireland, do still exist. While the focus of this study is specifically on the design and implementation of the GFA, the participants were encouraged to talk freely about any aspect of the conflict/peace process they wish. Therefore, it is critical to ensure participant confidentiality. Participant confidentiality is important, not only in building a welcoming atmosphere within which any topic can be freely discussed, but it is also key to ensuring participant safety as well (Brouneus, 2011). With confidentiality assured, participants can feel free to provide their open and honest experiences and assessments of the peacemaking/peacebuilding process in Northern Ireland. Confidentiality will protect participants from any concerns, however unlikely, of physical or professional ramifications due to the contents of their interviews. Thus, the identities of the participants included within this study are known only to the primary researcher. 81

The interview transcripts were scrubbed of all direct identifying information, such as organization or individual names, at the time of transcribing. Additionally, once the transcribing process was completed, interview recordings were permanently deleted. While a participant codebook was developed to assist in data analysis, this codebook only included generalized demographic information such as the gender of the participant, the location of participant operation (Belfast or Derry/Londonderry), and the generalized role of the participant within civil society (i.e., program leader or organization director). Thus, participant confidentiality was maintained throughout the full extent of this research project. Full research ethics approval was provided prior to the start of data collection by the University of Manitoba Joint-Faculty Research Ethics Board (Protocol J2017:099 (HS21151)) following an application and review process. Ethics renewal was approved throughout the duration of this study in compliance with the Tri-Council Policy Statement: Ethical Conduct for Research Involving Humans as directed through the University of Manitoba. Interviewees were made fully aware of their rights as study participants continuously during interactions with the primary researcher.

4.8 Researcher positionality As discussed above, I am not a stranger to the Northern Irish peace process, or Northern Ireland itself. Over the last decade I have visited Northern Ireland nearly a dozen times and engaged in a range of activities from studying at the University of Ulster Magee campus in Derry/Londonderry, to working with cross-community peacebuilding organizations in Derry/Londonderry and Magherafelt. I have developed friendships and connections with people in the region from both the PUL and CNR communities. In many ways, my connections and prior knowledge of Northern Irish history and grassroots activities, allowed me to connect at a more effective level with the participants of this study. They were able to speak of specific geographical locations or issue areas that I was already acutely aware of through my previous experiences. Additionally, my history of working within both the PUL and CNR communities, provided certain, initially wary, participants of my neutrality in conducting this research. I was forthcoming about my 82 background and experience with Northern Ireland throughout all interactions with study participants.

4.9 Conclusion Peace agreements mark the conceptual turn from the battlefield to the construction site. Soldiers and warriors are exchanged for architects and masons. It is the rubble of destruction that yields the mortar to bind together the buildings of a new era. This study addresses key gaps in our understanding of the role civil society can, and should, play throughout peace processes. As we seek to design more effective and robust peace agreements, we must heed the lessons of past agreements by embracing and understanding previous successes. Likewise, we must grow to understand the points of failure, or we risk repeating them and squandering critical opportunities. Peace agreements hold far more potential than to simply usher in hard fought negative peace. Rather, they can also be the mechanism through which the incessant pursuit of positive peace finally begins in earnest. We must not be satisfied with negative peace. We must not allow the monumental achievement of peace accords to fall victim to a legacy of enduring division where negative peace reigns. We must embrace the peacemaking process as a powerful ally in the peacebuilding process. This chapter explains the processes and approaches to data collection in the search to address these critical considerations. And now, it is high time to explore these issues by listening to the voices of civil society leaders in Northern Ireland. The following chapter begins that inquiry as we zero in on the links between civil society and peacebuilding in Northern Ireland, and the tumultuous relationship experienced between the political apparatus and those in civil society.

Chapter 5 Convenient inclusion: The use and abuse of civil society in Northern Ireland’s peace process

5.1 Introduction It is interesting, in many ways, to deeply examine the role of civil society within Northern Ireland. As with all conflict zones, civil society in Northern Ireland has shouldered a heavy burden over the last several decades. During the height of the Troubles, many services eroded within society, creating a void, which Northern Irish civil society willingly filled (Belloni, 2010). This service delivery approach in times of prolonged conflict is certainly not unique, as previous discussions have noted (Paffenholz, 2010a). The task of civil society, whether in conflict times or peace times, is complicated. Subsequent conversations throughout this chapter will reveal and explore this reality within the Northern Ireland context. But what exactly should the role of civil society be within a peace process? Does civil society deserve a voice during the peacemaking process? Should civil society be awarded a proverbial seat at the agreement design table? What about in the post-accord period? As the political apparatus reorients itself and re-establishes itself in the post-accord period, what does that mean for civil society’s role in the peacebuilding process? There is hardly a consensus within civil society itself, when it comes to these questions, which perhaps compounds the issues as they are discussed below. In an absence of cohesive understanding, Northern Ireland’s civil society has found itself in a precarious position twenty years into the extensive peacebuilding process following the GFA. Juxtaposed, often, to the Northern Irish political apparatus, civil society operates in a position of tenuous isolation from those perched on the hills outside of Belfast in the halls of Stormont. The most apt place to start this discussion, fittingly, is the same place I started my conversations with each of my participants; exploring the perception of civil society leaders when it comes to the relationship between civil society and the political apparatus in Northern Ireland. Following that, a discussion occurs around one of the most frustrating failures of the GFA implementation: The Civic Forum. Third, a key theme explored examines a key question for civil society, as study participants mull their position within the grand structure of Northern 84

Ireland and its peace process. Finally, this chapter concludes by examining how civil society leaders have sought to forge their own path in the post-accord period, independent of the political apparatus.

5.2 We will call you when we need you – inclusion for local legitimacy If I was keeping track of the scoffs and sarcastic laughs I received during my conversations, the record would show that my opening prompt of “discuss the relationship between civil society and the political apparatus in Northern Ireland” was the blue-ribbon winner time and time again. As a director of a major peacebuilding organization in Belfast puts it: Civic society here struggles to engage meaningfully in partnership-based relationship with government. Because its understanding of what that means is utterly different to that of the understanding of the government and that’s because the agenda of civic society organizations is at odds with the agenda of the government. (Participant #1, Director of a Peacebuilding Organization, Belfast)

A project lead from Belfast, who has worked in the field for over a decade, echoes this sentiment: There’s so much fighting and misinformation or lies and false information. I think there’s a real disconnect now between civil society and the Assembly and the further Westminster concept of government. (Participant #26, Project Lead, Belfast)

But it is not necessarily that there is an utter lack of relationship there, but more so that it is a one-way street; and that street, is decidedly not in favor of civil society. People who don’t have clout, are always squeezed at the end of the day. It’s about transactions, what can you bring to the table. Civic society, you know, there’s no votes there, do you know what I mean? So, they were always going to be squeezed. But the links that politicians need to have to civil society, needed to be strong in order to boost their, either credibility, or what they said they could do. (Participant #22, Program Director, Belfast)

The same sentiment is shared by a community organization director from Derry/Londonderry: I do feel that particularly in recent years, there is a disconnect between civil society and their politicians. Around the key issues, the fact that we don’t have a functioning government and none of our politicians seem able, or care enough, to do anything about that. And they just seem to think that it’s okay that things carry on, limp on, without that, because it suits their political objectives at some level or another. It might not suit all their political objectives. It’s absolutely failing civil society here, because we do rely on a functioning government to be able to provide basically the funding and the decision making to be able to do the things we do and to grow, innovate 85

and move forward. While on paper, you feel like politics and civil society should be closer in Northern Ireland than they are in other parts of the world, in reality I think that has changed. (Participant #4, Director of a Community Organization, Derry/Londonderry)

It is that local clout, that the political apparatus seeks to utilize from their “relationship” with civil society. Politicians continue to look towards those operating at the grassroots level in hopes they’ll offer a stamp of approval, whether it is for their campaign or their policy agenda: All kind of community-based services, even the youth services, there’s a political agenda behind a lot of the service providers. Which means that you’re not getting the actual real issues on the ground, the real issues that are affecting the community, are often not being met head on, because there’s another agenda that almost overrides what the actual need is in the community. (Participant #14, Community Developer, Derry/Londonderry)

Echoed here is the realization of the structural inequalities present between the two sectors, highlighted by another community developer from the Derry/Londonderry area: It was always a top down approach, there was never any feeding up the ways from the community sector. But as we’ll probably talk about as well, there are still, to a high degree, particularly in certain areas, a political connection with the community groups, to the extent that a lot of community groups would say they are run by those connected with the people in power. (Participant #15, Community Developer, Derry/Londonderry)

And further by an organization director in Belfast: There still feels like a real separation of political decisions and structures and decision making and where they are and how it impacts in their lives. (Participant #23, Organization Director, Belfast)

The frustration is palpable as civil society sees itself relegated to the de facto “third sector” role as they strain against the wildly fluctuating power and effectiveness of their political sector counterparts. Community organizers, peacebuilders, and project leaders in Derry/Londonderry and Belfast all express the same startling reality when it comes to their voice: But in terms of us having a voice and such, I don’t think we have that, and I think it’s getting worse, not better. (Participant #10, Peacebuilder, Derry/Londonderry)

If you do want to form an independent voice, the political machines, the apparatus of the big parties will marginalize you fairly quickly…lots of complicated issues there. (Participant #4, Director of a Community Organization, Derry/Londonderry)

You have your opportunity to put your voice forward to raise any concerns or put forward suggestion for change, but at the same time, how much of that is listened to? So 86

yeah, you have a voice, but does it work sometimes? I don’t know. (Participant #27, Project Lead, Belfast)

And in Belfast, another peacebuilding organization director suggests their direct grassroots engagement work continues to face disrespect from the political apparatus. When asked about their ability to translate successes to a wider audience, he notes the lack of reception: We do that [community engagement] on the ground, dialogue by dialogue, but we’re tiny and who listens to us? Certainly not the powers that be. (Participant #1, Director of a Peacebuilding Organization, Belfast)

An interesting look at this is provided by an umbrella peacebuilding organization based in Belfast, that spends part of its time coordinating funding channels between grassroots organizations and core funders. The CEO of the organization offers this unique perspective: And, one of the things that we haven’t got very far with, I have to say, which is in a way a disappointment, that’s the way in which the place we are now has arrested and paused some of the issues that were very important. But, essentially, it really was saying, “I don’t want to hear about these processes, I don’t want you to describe to me how, what you are doing. I want to talk about the difference it makes. And, if I’m having that conversation, I’m not interested in you as a funder and I’m not interested in you as a service deliverer, all of you community and voluntary, and other types of organizations. I’m interested in the difference you make. I want to hear about the citizens. I want to hear about the end users, customers, however you want to define them, and what a difference it made to their lives.” That is quite a different, very importantly, different approach to things. So, there’s another reason for organizations to be feeling slightly bereft, you know, slightly set aside, or used, if you like. (Participant #2, CEO of an Umbrella Peacebuilding Organization, Belfast)

The implications offered here deserve a bit more focus. The argument presented above, highlights the dangers of the long-term disconnect between the political apparatus CSOs. Without the sustained cooperation and dialogue occurring between the political sector and civil society, key issues are likely to get confused, or lost in a lack of translation between the sectors. In providing effective service delivery and addressing pressing local issues, coordination needs to occur between different sectors of society, especially in the complex environment of peacebuilding processes (Kjellman & Harpviken, 2010). Take for instance, a regional plan developed within the political sphere to address housing issues in communities throughout Northern Ireland. There would need to be a number of key players involved in developing and delivering a plan aimed at reducing homelessness, such as the Stormont Assembly controlling 87 funding, the Housing Executive handling organizing duties, and locally based civil society leaders coordinating conversations with local populations on the needs at the grassroots level. Without effective communication and cooperation, though, you may see funds being diverted to useless channels, needs at the local level being ignored in favor of a “politicized” vision of housing issues, and a disjointed plan of disorganization rather than any other alternatives. In tackling such complex issues, the whole of the system will always be stronger than any of its individual parts. But that is only true if and when comprehensive lines of communication and collaboration are enabled across sectors and decision-making bodies. As the conversations throughout this section reveal, civil society leaders are experiencing a relationship with the political sector that is marked by these dreadful failures of communication and collaboration. The result is a divergence of ideas and solutions to tackle immediate concerns as siloed approaches win out, over any kind of collaborative effort. It is a dangerous mix that often leads those most in need of service provisions left out and looking for answers that simply are not there. It is within this dysfunctional context that civil society is attempting to operate in Northern Ireland, as their calls for collaboration are falling on the deaf ears of an insular political apparatus.

5.3 What could have been – assessing the civic forum But this one-way conversation did not have to be the status quo within Northern Ireland. In fact, the GFA provided for a concrete mechanism to entirely avoid this one-sided reality. That mechanism appears, quite clearly, on page 10 of the GFA, as article 34 of Strand One: The Civic Forum. But, as the civil society leaders are painfully aware, that reality was, as it turns out, nothing more than a pipedream and a smokescreen of inclusion. A longtime civil society activist from Derry/Londonderry touches on this reality:

I would argue there is a complete disconnect between civil society and our political elite. That disconnect goes back to the Good Friday Agreement. When the Good Friday Agreement was first established, there was a provision within the Good Friday Agreement which brought up by civil society, women’s unions, trade unions, community groups, that there should be a civic forum. That civic forum was established to obviously assist our politicians and the fact that they understood where people are at from a grassroots perspective. First thing that our politicians did, right across all political parties, which came as a surprise, was that they done away with the civic forum. (Participant #17, Community Developer, Derry/Londonderry) 88

The Civic Forum has long been a source of perpetual “what if” questions within Northern Ireland. Envisioned as a way to incorporate and privilege the voices of those from outside of the political sphere, the Forum had genuine potential from its birth in the GFA. [We were] very acutely aware that the community needed to have an input. Needed to be a full partner. So, we argued for the Civic Forum and that the Civic Forum would be drawn from all across civic society and that they would then input into the process. The Civic Forum worked for a few years but its defunct and there have been various attempts to revive it. (Participant #12, Project Director, Derry/Londonderry)

If the Civic Forum had been up and running, you need the representation from the grassroots. Whereas the disconnect, as you say, just gets wider and wider. Even the young people we have coming in, they have issues like you’d see in any city, but they have the added dimension of the conflict. If you just go up one generation, sometimes two, there’s a lot of trauma there and things haven’t been dealt with. I think you need a new approach. (Participant #16, Community Developer, Derry/Londonderry)

In many ways, the Civic Forum was the logical evolution of previous civil society centered processes that popped up in the decades-long marathon towards peace during the height of the Troubles. One of the more famous examples of a Civic Forum-esque framework that developed in the 1990s was the Opsahl Commission, which occurred from 1992-1993. The Opsahl Commission represented a unique component of the overall peacemaking process as it infused a swath of new ideas and desires that arose directly out of input from civil society leaders throughout Northern Ireland. As Marianne Elliott, one of the seven commissioners of the Opsahl Commission, notes in her reflections on the process, it represented a genuine and concrete step towards providing local “ownership” of the ongoing peacemaking process (M. Elliott, 2013). It was a recognition that the voices of “ordinary” people not only could play a role in developing peace in the North of Ireland, but in fact their voice should play a key role in those discussions. Independent from the deep complexities of politics and the political sector of Northern Ireland during the Troubles era, the Opsahl Commission provided an opportunity to explore novel ideas of peace and could address core interests of local peoples by opening space for their voices to cut through the noise of a deeply divided society. Separated from the entrenched rhetoric playing on repeat from political entities, it provided a chance for a new infusion to the conversation of peace, from a sorely needed source: citizens themselves. As Elliott argues, in the face of current failings of the GFA, we can, and should, learn from the successes of the Opshal 89

Commission. As she persuasively argues, “as the Good Friday Agreement is stalling in some of the very areas which led to the setting up of the Opsahl Commission in the first place, it may be time again to bring in elements of civic society to address them” (M. Elliott, 2013, p. 102). But just as the GFA was starting to take hold as a holistically transformative document within Northern Ireland at the turn of the new century, the Civic Forum was one of the first components to fall victim to the lack of implementation that has since plagued the full-fledged realization of the GFA ideals. This effectively cut out a major source of input and engagement from civil society in the early days of the peacebuilding process. A seasoned peace researcher in Belfast explains how the process unfolded: I think in the period beforehand, civil society was probably in a stronger position, in terms of voice. I think one of the things that happens in a number of peace agreement processes is that the new government wants to establish its centrality and its control over decision making, with their representatives, their elected representatives, and other groups aren’t. We saw a similar process going underway in South Africa, which we were following on, some things happened in South Africa which didn’t happen here. But there was that sense in which civil society perhaps loses its central influence to the elected representatives. So, keeping the Civic Forum at arm’s length, I can see why that was one of those things that was going to happen. (Participant #20, Director of Research Organization, Belfast)

And for many in civil society, although they had high hopes for the potential offered by the Civic Forum, the ensuing reality of failure is a regression to the mean, hardly an outlier. Noting the long and well documented history of political sector disengagement, a Derry/Londonderry peacebuilder admits: It’s just not surprising to us as civil society that the civic forum never got up and going. (Participant #5, Peacebuilder, Derry/Londonderry)

A program director from Belfast shares her disappointment in the Civic Forums failure: Post-Good Friday Agreement, I think that the Civic Forum, the voice of community leaders and people that are in civic society have just been largely neglected. It’s really unfortunate. (Participant #22, Program Director, Belfast)

The failure of the Civic Forum, though, has not meant that the need for a mechanism of community engagement and civil society voice raising has magically disappeared. There continues to be a desperate desire from across civil society for their voice to find some kind of foothold in the ongoing conversations around policy development and the wider peace process. 90

The community need to be able to have their own voice. A collective voice that is heard from the bottom up. And that starts at council level, because at the minute, there’s not even really a civic forum that you can go to for counsel, you know what I mean? Start there at that level, then go up to the regional level as well. (Participant #15, Community Developer, Derry/Londonderry)

And even more importantly, another Derry/Londonderry community developer argues, is for there to be an equality with any kind of mechanism for civil society engagement: If there is a forum of civil society, then it should be treated on par by our political system. It shouldn’t be an add-on. It should be on par. (Participant #17, Community Developer, Derry/Londonderry)

This sentiment again brings us back to the importance of a balanced relationship between civil society and the political sphere. These arguments by civil society leaders in Northern Ireland build directly on the understanding of the complexities of civil society and how it develops relationships with the political sector (Uphoff & Krishna, 2004). The desire to stick civil society in the “third sector” category of existence by the political apparatus, represents a dangerously unbalanced approach to these complex relationships. It is a social organization that, civil society leaders within this study argue, is untenable for an effective and successfully functioning Northern Ireland. Parity of influence on policy decisions and peace process pathways is hardly a novel request from civil society. As it has been discussed at length within this section, this parity, or at least a movement towards such a reality, was important enough in 1998 to make its way into the GFA in the shape of the Civic Forum. As it followed directly the positive influences of civil society and citizen engagement throughout the peacemaking process, namely in cases such as the Opsahl Commission, the codifying of such a mechanism was seen as fulfilling a critical need of opening space for voices outside of the political sector to make an influence on the trajectory of peace in Northern Ireland. Yet these hopes have fallen disappointingly away over the years, leaving civil society leaders frustrated and asking “what if” these mechanisms had been allowed to take hold as central pillars of a more effective civil society and political sphere relationship in the post-accord era.

5.4 Where do we fit? – civil society’s role in peace processes Despite its central positioning at the grassroots level, civil society in Northern Ireland has struggled at times, to understand exactly where it fits into the jigsaw puzzle of peace. In reality, this is often a dilemma faced universally by civil society within conflict zones. Particularly as a society transitions away from active conflict and towards the concerted effort of a peacebuilding process, civil society may find itself with a certain degree of ambiguity in terms of any kind of unifying mission or agenda. This challenge can be compounded within divided societies as well, where civil society itself may become fractured and siloed between communities. With these considerations in mind, a key conversation developed with the participants of this study as they considered the existential nature of civil society itself and its role within not just Northern Ireland, but in conflict zones in general. It is important to explore these self- reflections from civil society leaders as it helps to understand not only the level of cohesiveness within the sector, but also, it provides key insight into the evolution and potential path of the peace process in Northern Ireland to date. A peacebuilder from Derry/Londonderry shares her views on what civil society should be and in that, how it can/should set itself apart from other sectors within society: [Civil society should be] a grassroots that actually hold and work and get the people staying together, to think differently, build relationships, take the risks because the politicians don’t. It’s the grassroots people that take the risks and the work that they do constantly, that actually mitigates against further violence. (Participant #5, Peacebuilder, Derry/Londonderry)

This is a key insight into her perception of civil society. She sees it in clear separation from a more subdued or restricted political sector, which is important, as civil society, in her experience, represents that first line of defense against direct conflict and violence. Thus, not only is civil society a service delivery vehicle working to build communities and relationships, it is the bastion of defense against the acts of violence that might destabilize a peace process. Civil society seen in this light, situates it as both an independent entity within society and an interconnected sector internally, acting as society’s premier conflict safety net. Within this ideal of civil society, though, there needs to be an effective unified voice as well, as one peacebuilding organization director from Belfast advocates: We need an alternative civic society voice that articulates our bread and butter needs, separately from our constitution concerns. That’s articulated by people who may or may 92

not be intolerant towards each other for sectarian, ethnic, gender, or other issues. It reflects people who are conservative or radical, well-educated or ill-educated, urban or rural. Right across the board, there has never been such a disjoint between the people and government at the local area within Northern Ireland. Disillusionment with the process and hunger for an alternative mechanism. On that basis, I say that in addition to my own personal view that powersharing representative democracy is failing to represent the needs of the people, I claim that our body of work over the last sixteen to seventeen months, clearly articulates that as a view uniformly held across civic society. (Participant #1, Director of a Peacebuilding Organization, Belfast)

With the political sphere disconnect, a topic which is explored in a variety of conversations throughout this study, there becomes a pressing need for dialogue within civil society to be ongoing and focused around central needs. As highlighted in the passage above, this civic society “voice” represents a critical pillar within a peace process. As recent failures of the Northern Ireland assembly have shown, civil society leaders recognize that the onus of continued societal dialogue often falls on their shoulders, thus representing a key charge of the sector within a peace process. Other leaders echo this sentiment as they reflect on this crucial role of waging the battle for peace at the grassroots level, through the power of people: …That notion of people power or people responsibility or total consciousness, you know, in peace building terms is an important factor. (Participant #2, CEO of an Umbrella Peacebuilding Organization, Belfast)

I could get 12 loyalists and 12 republicans in consensus building dialogue to resolve the issue of flags, emblems, parades, protests, and bonfires to the mutual satisfaction of both communities. I could do that. Not a bother. It’d take a few weeks, but we will deliver agreed responses to that issue to resolve that issue. Political parties and governments can’t do that. Ordinary people can, if enabled, if enabled. (Participant #1, Director of a Peacebuilding Organization, Belfast)

This is a key understanding and ownership of responsibility that is being noted by civil society leaders. There is a recognition that dialogue and grassroots progress cannot afford to be suspended every time Stormont throws a temper tantrum, lest you risk a societal stalling of the peace process. While civil society has been thrust into this position by the inefficiencies of Stormont, there is also a unified acceptance across the sector that this should be a central function of civil society. This situates civil society not as “third sector” left to pick up the scraps from an ineffective political sphere, but rather an active and independent player that holds a central leadership role, within the scope of a peace process. 93

As civil society coalesces around some of these key understandings of their role in a post- accord society, a number of key lessons have been learned along the way. With over two decades of experience operating within a post-accord environment, drawing on the expertise and experience provides us with vital insights. I was curious what Northern Irish civil society leaders would share with others throughout the world, that were going through their own post-accord peace process, and the responses were enlightening. One Belfast-based program director boils it down to a simple charge: Talk soon, rather than wait and kill one another. The more killing only exasperates the things and people’s desire for revenge. (Participant #21, Program Director, Belfast)

While this seems like an obvious conclusion from a peacebuilder, it once again reaffirms the importance of dedicated channels of dialogue within the post-accord environment. As discussed above, the role of civil society in fostering that dialogue, needs to be one that is taken seriously from the outset. While post-accord political structures tend to also encourage cross-community dialogue, as we have seen in Northern Ireland, relying solely on the political sector to provide the stability for these dialogue processes is a dangerous game to play. Thus, civil society should not see itself as a secondary channel of these dialogue opportunities, but the primary sector through which these processes occur. Similarly, another program director form Belfast argues that civil society must also work to expand its reach, marrying lessons learned internally with the research work being done externally from the sector: There’s something about the academia and the community and the private sector, all of these need to come together. We’re still not great at that in Northern Ireland. That’s a real challenge. We’re so disconnected from academia. (Participant #23, Organization Director, Belfast)

I highlight this reflection, because it speaks to the necessary connectedness of civil society within a conflict zone. While political sectors are notoriously prone to silo-ing, civil society must not fall into that trap. We tend to think of civil society connectedness in terms of internal cohesion, but there is much to be said, as noted by the leader above, for a broader series of connections throughout society. As conflict zones transition into devoted peace processes, cooperation becomes a necessity if holistic, positive peace processes are intended to take hold. In many ways, it is the same process that civil society is already fostering, in terms of cross- community projects, like a project leader from Belfast notes: 94

We’re not just working with one side or the other but bringing all the young people together and helping them to form their own opinion and their own view to make their own decisions, rather than have the influence of others around them or the community. (Participant #27, Project Lead, Belfast)

She goes on to note that this same cross-community cooperation should be reflected as cross- society cooperation between sectors. This connectedness helps to embed peace processes as tangible frameworks, accessible by everyone (politicians, civil society leaders, academics, everyday citizens, etc.). This is an incredibly important point within the scope of peace processes. Post-accord societies must create environments where peace is accessible by everyone and this requires a certain degree of coordination. The suggestion made by the civil society leaders included in this study, is that this coordination can be, and should be, a natural function of an effective civil society. A peacebuilding organization CEO notes what this can look like at the local level: Local people making small changes, with what they’ve got, and where they are, is in the end, as embedding, as important, if not more important than anything that is done at the policy level. (Participant #2, CEO of an Umbrella Peacebuilding Organization, Belfast)

It can certainly become a little complicated, though, as you attempt to distill large scale peace process ideas down to the local level (Paffenholz, et al., 2010). But there is also power in the local, as emancipatory processes are embraced to shine a light on the importance of eliciting the voices of local actors (Leonardsson & Rudd, 2015). There are some challenges to overcome, in establishing these emancipatory approaches, such as a project director from Derry/Londonderry notes: My experience would be that a lot of organizations in civil society, and talking specifically in terms of civil society, former combatants and ex-prisoners, they have shaped grassroots community projects on their own. And actually, were funded through American philanthropic organizations, because there was government embargoes on projects here. (Participant #12, Project Director, Derry/Londonderry)

Yet as he suggests, there is genuine power and leadership potential, crying out for an opportunity to shape the direction of peacebuilding projects. Civil society is uniquely situated to embrace this shift towards the local, by utilizing their direct contacts with local actors and their intimate knowledge of the issues and challenges being faced on the ground level. As the example above also shows, relying on the political sector to raise these local voices to places of prominence within the peace conversation, is unlikely to bear fruit. Whether it 95 is an unwillingness to work with “challenging populations” or genuine ignorance regarding the issue areas directly impacting local communities, the political sector has repeatedly pushed forward along technocratic lines of peacebuilding approaches within Northern Ireland. As civil society continues to come to terms with its own positionality in the peace process and Northern Ireland at large, turning a conscious focus towards emancipatory processes is a path that many leaders are increasingly advocating for across the sector. It is tempting, at times, when assessing peace processes to adopt a cynical outlook as well-intentioned ideals are traded for an economic and business-oriented outlook of a commercialized peace. It is a common cycle for peace processes, as the peacebuilding sector becomes oversaturated and capitalistic ideals begin to float to the surface (Schouten & Miklian, 2018). And while there has certainly been a degree of that creeping into the Northern Irish peace process over the years, the reluctant optimists that are the civil society leaders in Northern Ireland, still recognize the genuine core of a peace process at the heart of the post-accord era: Peace becomes a business! To a certain extent, I think peace is a business here. There’s an element of that. But that’s not to say that building peace by some organizations and individuals, isn’t a real…isn’t motivated by absolutely heart and emotion and wanting to make this place a better place for everybody, whoever they are. (Participant #22, Program Director, Belfast)

And this point, offered by the Belfast-based program director, is one that should not get lost in the assessment of the peace processes’ failures over the last two decades. There is still a strong foundation, situated at the local level, that continues to approach peace in Northern Ireland from a place of dedication and passion. It is upon this foundation, that the peace of today and tomorrow in Northern Ireland, needs to be built. Civil society, as a sector in Northern Ireland, is undergoing an interesting period of self- reflection as it positions itself in an evolving peacebuilding environment. Not unlike the experience of civil society sectors in many other conflict zones (Chalmers, 2010; Cuhadar & Kotelis, 2010; Kurtenbach, 2010), civil society leaders in Northern Ireland have repeatedly expressed the challenges of this positioning process in the midst of a complex post-accord period. But in highlighting their powerful positioning at the grassroots level, with the ability to both recognize and respond to the challenges at the local level, study participants note the importance of civil society taking on new roles as organizers and supporters of emerging emancipatory peacebuilding processes in Northern Ireland. 96

5.5 Forging their own path – Northern Ireland’s civil society It is hardly uncommon for civil society to take on a role of independence and leadership within a conflict zone, as the political structure is either incapable or unwilling to uphold that mantle in the height of conflict (Paffenholz, 2010a). Yet that independence can come under serious scrutiny once peace is retuned as the norm. In the case of Northern Ireland, an interesting reality has developed concerning the independence of civil society. With the halls of Stormont falling silent for significant stretches of time, such as from 2002 until 2007 and more recently in a stint of collapse from 2017 until 2020, civil society has been forced to forge ahead on its own often, in the post-accord period. Thus, that sense of independence and leadership that was cultivated during years of debilitating conflict, has not been allowed to dwindle, as we might expect in a post-accord society. The resulting reality in Northern Ireland, then, is a civil society that is quite proud (and possessive) of its independence. This stance certainly puts the sector at odds with the political apparatus, but it is a tenuous relationship of complex interdependency. Funding issues aside, which are explored in Chapter 7, the desire and importance of civil society to forge its own path forward in the peace process in Northern Ireland is both unique and massively consequential for the society as a whole. Asked about the interconnectedness of the political apparatus and civil society, the Chairman of a Derry/Londonderry based peacebuilding organization had this to say about the strength of the relationship: Very limited I think…it varies according to the situation we find ourselves in. When all of the political processes have failed, as they have at the moment, then there’s fair degree of pressure on civic/civil society to say “well, we’ll step into the breech and try to rescue the situation instead of you…” We have avoided that at the moment…because if you were to establish some sort of process whereby political negotiations…could start up again, there’d be no honesty in that at this moment. There has been such a disastrous breakdown, such a complete breakdown, the political parties are seemed to be too damned irrelevant. (Participant #3, Chairman of Peacebuilding Organization, Derry/Londonderry)

He goes on to suggest that this reality might play out differently within the PUL community: I think that’d be different if you were on the Unionist side, if you were a DUP supporter, but basically, I suppose people have lost all trust and faith particularly in politicians of a Unionist background. Seems to be no integrity whatsoever there and that is a pretty damned, damnable thing to say…damning thing to say…and it’s hard to think of anybody 97

within the Unionist political family that you would base any building bricks upon. (Participant #3, Chairman of Peacebuilding Organization, Derry/Londonderry)

Echoing these thoughts, but applying them across both communities, the director of a Derry/Londonderry community organization offers these sobering thoughts: We all come I think to resent our politicians for different reasons, or whatever. And civil society may be no exception to that, too, as we’ve matured, and we’ve seen that sort of gradual separation of our politicians and our civil society. It allows blame and recrimination to fall on both sides. (Participant #4, Director of a Community Organization, Derry/Londonderry)

And following along on these thoughts of the separation between the sectors, the community organization goes on to talk about the inability of the political sector to translate effective leadership down to the local levels, within which his work is occurring: The political leadership, excellent in terms of the symbolism and the messaging of the Chuckle Brothers era, but it needed to be supported by better investment on the ground around dealing with division and contention and controversy of the past. And it wasn’t. So, you know, that was an issue in that context that we worked in. (Participant #4, Director of a Community Organization, Derry/Londonderry)

This is a critical point of understanding, as it is a clear indication of how the political sphere has continually failed to deliver its “vision” of peace from the halls of Stormont, down to the communities throughout the North of Ireland. And without effective collaboration and communication flowing both ways between the political sphere and civil society, civil society itself is left looking for leadership in a political apparatus that is unable to deliver. Not only is division between communities within Northern Ireland left unaddressed in this environment, but division between sectors of Northern Ireland itself are left divided and drifting further apart. The dissonance between the sectors is clearly an issue that is easily identifiable for civil society leaders across Northern Ireland. There is a push and desire, though, for community organizations throughout civil society to genuinely forge their own path forward, with, or without, the assistance of those from the political sphere. We are so let down by the political sphere, that we have no choice but to prioritize ourselves. So, where there’s stuff missing, politically and structurally, we have to do it ourselves, which is sort of interesting, you know? (Participant #10, Peacebuilder, Derry/Londonderry)

Naturally, this frustration also bleeds into the general populace. Thus, CSOs are not only struggling in the face of political failures, but they are also working with a population who also is increasingly finding it difficult to see legitimacy in their elected representatives. There’s a lot of questioning and people being a lot more vocal about being unhappy with the system and the people that represent them. (Participant #26, Project Lead, Belfast)

So, when it comes to civil society and the myriad of challenges the sector is facing, where does this desire to forge ahead come from? Is it just a relic of old times, where civil society had no choice but to shoulder the burden of leadership within Northern Ireland? That desire certainly may be a driving force for some, as any transition of power following prolonged conflict presents some tricky realities (Paffenholz, 2010b). But there is also the recognition of a genuine need on the part of civil society, to continue and in some cases even enhance, the work they are engaged with at the grassroots level. As a peacebuilder in Derry/Londonderry suggests: We’re absolutely essential at that grassroots looking after the most vulnerable, looking after the people in society that need help at all different levels. And we’re the first point of contact for many people who need that direct help. (Participant #5, Peacebuilder, Derry/Londonderry)

And this help is also quite wide-ranging. For example, this help can come in the form of mitigating threats of direct violence: And we prevent a lot of acts of violence, I think, and I’ve seen that played out, where people can actually get around a table and vent and bring their conflict to the table rather than in a violent way. (Participant #5, Peacebuilder, Derry/Londonderry)

Additionally, the help can assist in challenges dealing with legacy issues (more of which is discussed in Chapter 8): The role then, I suppose of civic society, and the role of community-based organizations will become even more paramount. Because that support will need to be there, whether it’s through the kind of support we provide, or the more legal advocacy support that other organizations will provide, but it will probably become even more significant and more needed. (Participant #9, Coordinator of a Community Organization, Derry/Londonderry)

And also, this direct grassroots assistance can provide a rapid response in the face of dire mental health crisis (mental health issues are further explored in Chapter 6): But there’s also other mental health issues that you absolutely need community support in order to get people to survive, to get by, and we are essential at that level and that’s about keeping civil society as a community and not just a collective of people. (Participant #5, Peacebuilder, Derry/Londonderry) 99

There is an interesting mention in the contribution above, that warrants deeper consideration. As civil society has forged its own path forward within Northern Ireland, it has not always been one of unity across the sector. Which, considering the fractured nature of Northern Ireland as a whole, should hardly come as a surprise. In addition, civil society in general tends to struggle with finding a common voice behind which to organize itself, even in societies where widespread conflict is not a primary issue (Spurk, 2010). Despite this relatively common characteristic of a disjointed civil society, it has proven to be a frustration highlighted by leaders within the sector. As a Belfast-based researcher and organization director aptly notes: So, I think there are limitations within civil society. It’s also fragmented. When we talk of civil society, we tend to talk about the community and voluntary sector. Churches haven’t really stepped up to the plate as advocates of peacebuilding in civil society. The trade unions have on occasions, but there’s fragmentation between those different subsets within civil society as well. And they’re not unified for anybody to be a singular leader and say, this is what we need to do. (Participant #20, Director of Research Organization, Belfast)

Speaking to the specific issues around DDR a program leader from Belfast echoes this same general sentiment: It has been up to civil society to make their own path in terms of how they have shaped the Belfast Agreement and has been done on the ground but has been done in the absence of having any formal DDR process. It hasn’t been as coordinated, I suppose, as it should have been. (Participant #11, Program Leader, Belfast)

Although the general challenge of the DDR process has been touched upon in Chapter 3, an important point is made here by this Belfast-based program leader. She is directly linking the failures of the GFA and the political executive, over the intervening post-accord years, to delivering a full-fledged DDR process. This has left a serious gap at local levels, especially when it comes to the genuine reintegration of former combatants and ex-prisoners (Dwyer, 2012; McEvoy & Shirlow, 2009). When considering DDR processes in other peace processes, there are clear indications that NGOs and civil society itself, can play a stronger role in protecting these processes (Klem, et al., 2008). In fact, recent reflections on the evolving peace process in South Sudan suggest 100 overtly hierarchical and technical structures of DDR processes may actually be creating negative impacts on the process as a whole (Lamb & Stainer, 2018). There is opportunity, then, as evidenced by considering other peace processes and as suggested by the project leader above, for civil society to embrace a more active and independent role in the face of previously failed DDR attempts in Northern Ireland, particularly around the reintegration component. This again, highlights yet another potential windfall of a more independent and unique role for Northern Ireland’s civil society. The argument is not for a shunning of collaboration between sectors, or a siloing effect to take place, but rather a concerted push for civil society to take a more focused approach to forging its own path within Northern Ireland, and specifically, the ongoing peacebuilding process.

5.6 Key findings of the research Civil society plays a vital, and complicated, role within peace processes across the globe. In many ways, civil society in Northern Ireland enjoyed a relatively rare amount of influence not only during the Troubles in the form of traditional conflict-time service delivery, but also as a key voice during much of the initial peacemaking process. In the post-accord era, though, a new feeling is permeating throughout the sector: a feeling of being used, abused, and ignored. Four key findings emerged from the data, which are discussed in depth below. First, the post-accord environment has led to a deterioration in the civil society and political sector relationship. This has manifested in growing frustrations and left civil society leaders feeling as though they are being used by political actors. Second, the Civic Forum is recognized as one of the most disappointing failures of implementation of the GFA, and civil society leaders are clamoring for a present-day replacement. Third, civil society leaders are coalescing around the importance of the sector as a whole standing on its own, no longer subservient to the constantly changing whims of an ineffective political apparatus. And fourth, civil society leaders recognize they have an obligation to focus internally as a sector, as CSOs are understood to be best suited to handle the grassroots vulnerabilities that still exist in many Northern Ireland communities. Each of these findings are discussed in greater detail below. The first key finding notes that the troubling reality now, and over the last several decades of the post-accord environment, is that the political sphere has increasingly forced civil 101 society to play second fiddle to their bizarre, stumbling solo. The GFA was, more than anything else, a document pertaining to the format and structure of the political sphere. Buoyed by this fact, the political sphere, led by a resurgence of self-importance emanating from Stormont, quickly coalesced its newfound power in the post-accord setting. This push for power led to a transitive siphoning of power and influence away from civil society. And thus, civil society quickly found itself on the outside looking in at the policy directives of a new, post-accord Northern Ireland. An important issue highlighted in the conversations with study participants, describes a unique “relationship” that has developed between the political apparatus in Northern Ireland and civil society at large. In essence, it is a one-way relationship, with that relationship terminology being employed quite loosely. As civil society leaders reveal, this relationship is one purely dictated by the selfish needs of an often-tone-deaf political sphere. In essence it is a political sphere that sees civil society simply as a tool, and not a partner. A common experience, repeated over and over by civil society leaders, was that the political sphere only wanted to engage with civil society, at times when there was something they needed. What we have seen in Northern Ireland, is that politicians only come calling on civil society when they need local legitimacy at the grassroots level. It is in the times that the political sector finds its reach failing, that they finally recognize civil society itself. It is a tiresome process for leaders within civil society, as they feel neglected and ignored by the political apparatus. This research finding is highlighting a seriously flawed relationship that currently exists between the two sectors. And it is a relationship that is stagnating any hope of successful peace policy development. As the political sphere finds it increasingly difficult to connect with a disengaged populous, the sector is increasingly leaning upon civil society to provide those connections and local legitimacy bridges. Yet, there is almost no reciprocity, when civil society seeks to engage on return channels of communication. The political sector talks at civil society, but not with civil society. The frustration and disgust within civil society is palpable. This research shows that the current political sphere and civil society relationship is one-way and highly dysfunctional, resulting in a constant source of conflict and rift within Northern Ireland. This reality has some profound ramifications for civil society itself, as well as the peace process as a whole. These ramifications will be detailed in depth below, but it is a crucial 102 recognition being universally highlighted throughout the conversations with civil society leaders in this study. The research shows that civil society leaders are noting their limited options due to the poor (and constantly deteriorating) relationship with the political sector. Compounding this frustration being felt within civil society, is the fact that the GFA, in one of its more impressive designs components, actually presented a remedy to this lack of two-way communication. A second key finding emphasizes that continual failures of implementation with the GFA have left civil society leaders at their frustration limit, though that does not prevent them from looking fondly on a grand “what if” of article 34 in Strand One of the GFA: the Civic Forum. Once upon a time, there existed a beautiful and elegant solution to soliciting input and guidance from civil society. This magical solution was called the “Civic Forum.” I speak in relative exaggeration here, as a way to make a salient point in a manner consistent with the sentiment of this study’s participants. The raw reality, is that the Civic Forum essentially does hold this type of mystical reverence within civil society, as evidenced by the testimonies of the leaders explored within this project. For many in Northern Ireland, the Civic Forum represents the great white whale of the GFA and the manifestation of all the “what ifs” over the last two decades. The appreciation levied on the forum is focused on its inherent potential rather than any actual production. This is due, as explained previously, to its disappointing lack of implementation over the last two decades. Its promise, though, was unmatched in 1998 at the signing of the GFA. A key understanding coming out of this study, is that civil society leaders were heavily reliant on the idea that the Civic Forum would be the clear mechanism through which their voice could contribute to the ongoing peace process dialogues. This was not even an idealistic view for civil society to take in 1998. Although their voice and influence waned in the eleventh hour of the peacemaking process, for much of the late 1990s, civil society represented a valued contributor to the ongoing peace processes taking place in Northern Ireland. Viewing the Civic Forum as a concrete mechanism enshrined within the GFA, its inclusion infused much of the sector with hope that this vocal input would continue into the post-accord period. Yet like numerous other aspects of the GFA, this once promising mechanism quickly fell by the wayside as a contributor to a bulging list of non-implemented components of the agreement. What is significant, though, is how much, even after twenty plus years, civil society 103 leaders still long for the Civic Forum. This speaks volumes to how important such a mechanism is for those within the sector. The Civic Forum may not have ended up being perfect, if it was ever implemented, yet civil society leaders clearly express they would rather an imperfect mechanism than no mechanism at all. The fact that civil society has latched on so closely to the failures of the Civic Forum, also provides us with a critical assessment of the GFA as a whole. The Civic Forum was the key mechanism for incorporating insight and ideas from outside of the political sector when it came to the channels of policy development dialogue. And yet, even with that amount of critical importance, as a crucial societal mechanism, it was rapidly left to a state of disrepair. This, combined with the findings of how the political sphere/civil society relationship has evolved in the post-accord era, tells the story of a political sector that has had no intention of embracing parity with their civil society fellows. Yet, given the current state of Northern Ireland and the status of the peace process itself, civil society leaders are arguing that they must be given parity in terms of meaningful policy dialogue. The GFA has numerous design flaws (as Chapter 9 explores in depth) and civil society leaders will readily identify those when given the chance. Yet the Civic Forum, from the perspective of the participants of this study, is decidedly not one of those flaws. In fact, as this research shows, the Civic Forum is highly regarded as one of the pinnacle achievements of the GFA design. But the brutal lesson that civil society has learned in the post-accord era, is that design achievements do not always translate into implementation achievements. So, what is the takeaway from these findings on the Civic Forum? One, is that celebrations around design components of peace agreements should be tempered until it is clear that implementation is assured to follow. Additionally, it is clear that civil society is begging for a mechanism to contribute their voice and expertise to the policy discussion. As leaders are lamenting the unfulfilled potential of the Civic Forum, it is clear that Northern Ireland desperately needs a mechanism to fill the gap left by the defunct Civic Forum. Ideas abound within civil society, but that is the frustrating paradox for many leaders. Without a mechanism to share those ideas, they fall victim to an experience of potential, without a path to reality. If the political sphere within Northern Ireland is unwilling to fully implement one of the GFA’s crowning design achievements, the Civic Forum, then it must offer an acceptable replacement mechanism in its place. The voice of civil society has been silenced for too long in 104 the North of Ireland, and the ramifications have been revealed in the form of a faltering peace process. The easy solution exists, in the form of embracing full implementation of the Civic Forum. But at this point, civil society leaders simply want any mechanism that provides the same benefit: their voice being heard. The third key finding reveals that twenty years on from the GFA, in the midst of a tumultuous and one-sided relationship with the political apparatus, civil society is taking stock and rethinking, in an impressively self-aware manner, about the nature of its place within Northern Ireland and the peace process itself. As the research within this study shows, there is a growing, and urgent, call from civil society to push for a much more independent role, as a sector, within Northern Ireland. One key theme that has been clearly identified from this research project, is the consistent perception across civil society that there exists a moral obligation for the sector to embrace a new approach. This is significant for a number of reasons. First, there is a clear admittance that the current political sector/civil society dynamic is untenable. Given the noted failures of the political sector to effectively deliver positive peace within Northern Ireland (a topic highlighted in depth in Chapter 8), civil society leaders are recognizing the importance and necessary haste of pushing the sector to a new, and independent standing. Civil society leaders are pointing to the abhorrent track-record of the political sector as grounding for this push for independence. In other words, the research in this study reveals that civil society leaders are recognizing that the sector can no longer base its identity around the notion of partnership with the political sphere, given the failures and inherent untrustworthiness associated with the sphere. It is not that civil society leaders are shutting the door to opportunities of cooperation with the political sphere, rather, they are no longer waiting longingly by that door of cooperation, and instead, are forging ahead on the path of independence. One key reason this push for independence is crucial, noted repeatedly by participants within this study, is that there is massive need at the grassroots level that is clearly not being addressed, thanks to the failings of the political sector. Thus, the onus rests increasingly upon civil society to chart a path forward within these vulnerable sections of communities. It is clear to civil society leaders, that if they continue to wait for the political sector to take the lead, they, and more importantly the communities they serve, will be left wanting. 105

What civil society leaders continually highlight, as revealed within this study, is the impressive potential of the sector to shepherd grassroots led change. While initially, this seems like an obvious takeaway, we are after all, talking about civil society, the positioning of civil society, as highlighted by study participants, is what is unique within this discussion. Repeatedly, leaders noted the ability of civil society to build capacity within the grassroots, to cultivate an organic cadre of burgeoning trail blazers. Thus, civil society is embracing its role of leadership in not necessarily a traditional top-down approach, but, as the chairman of a peacebuilding organization noted, “leadership in the sense to facilitate processes that allow people to become their own leaders.” This shows a powerful perspective being embraced within civil society, as the sector recognizes the power of its position in a post-accord society. Peace itself in the general sense and peace processes more specifically, are complicated things. One of the suggestions arising out of this research, as noted by civil society leaders, is that civil society positioning itself as a shepherd and organizer within communities, rather than an overt, controlling leader, can help to play a role in handling these complicated realities. In a sense, complexities can be outsourced to the grassroots communities themselves, as capacity building takes on a new life, embraced by the organic capabilities of citizens themselves. Now, this is not to suggest that there is no unifying vision. That, suggests the participants of this study, falls to the organizing abilities of civil society itself. Again, this is not necessarily a novel redefinition of civil society, from a conceptual standpoint, but from a practical standpoint within Northern Ireland, it is a decentralizing of roles and responsibilities away from a classic political sector/civil society dichotomy, heavily dominated by the former, to a more efficient and localized approach. This shift in the peace process approach is decidedly in favor of embracing emancipatory peacebuilding practices. The finding of this research reveals not that civil society leaders desire an embracing of emancipatory peacebuilding practices in Northern Ireland, but rather, they see this shift as a necessity for the health and, ultimately, survival of the peace process itself. As communities and vulnerable populations in Northern Ireland continue to struggle, civil society leaders are calling out in concert, saying enough is enough; it is long past time that civil society embraces a new role and a new position within Northern Ireland and the ongoing peacebuilding process. 106

This is where that sense of a moral obligation for independence comes into play. With the most direct view and understanding of the realties being faced on the ground, civil society leaders are naturally positioned at the grassroots level to lead the charge on critical social issues. The findings of this research suggest that civil society leaders are beginning, increasingly, to coalesce around this understanding that the most natural position for the sector is as an independent leader, addressing pressing issues within communities and pushing for change at a societal level. Free of the ball and chain that has been the political sector over the last twenty plus years, a more independent civil society would be able to initiate much more effective change processes. This reveals the desire for a key reorganizing of the working relationships between different sectors within Northern Ireland. And finally, the fourth key finding underlines that civil society leaders are recognizing the many pockets of vulnerability within Northern Ireland thus, civil society leaders continue to highlight their feelings of obligation in addressing these issues head-on, rather than simply being second-tier surrogates for ineffective political policies. In many of these populations, it is civil society that is already providing vital support, in the absence of effective top-down approaches. Rather than taking a repeatedly reactionary approach, this research project suggests that many civil society leaders are ready and willing to embrace more comprehensive proactive approaches to addressing vulnerabilities at the grassroots level. This recognition, of civil society’s central importance in providing for these vulnerable populations, is a core understanding arising out of this research project. Civil society leaders are increasingly vocal about their desire and intention to assert a more independent stance within Northern Ireland. While this can be seen as a boon for vulnerable populations as they can recognize a more steadfast commitment in terms of both service delivery and advocacy, the schism solidifying between civil society and the political sector can create some unique dynamics when considering the peace process itself. With the GFA failing to represent a unified and robust pathway towards positive peace, a divergence of vision between the political sector and civil society can pose some challenges for the Northern Irish peace process. The concern, is that the sectors begin to work in opposing manners, trying to a build a vision of peace that shares few similarities across the spheres. While this is certainly a danger that should be avoided, it should also not be understood as a set eventuality of civil society’s push for more independence. As the participants of this study argue, 107

Northern Ireland has experienced a top-down, technocratic approach to peacebuilding over the last two decades, with little positive peace results to show for it. Thus, a reorganizing of peace leadership in Northern Ireland, away from technocratic structures and processes and towards an emancipatory vision of locally led approaches, provides new opportunities for positive peace realization. As discussed at length throughout this chapter, civil society leaders argue the sector is best suited to lead this new transition to a grassroots focused emancipatory approach toward peacebuilding. Thus, while schism concerns exist in relation to the political sector and civil society relationship, the potential windfall from a shift in leadership is an exciting possibility for many in civil society, and Northern Ireland at large, that have grown weary of the technocratic policies and practices arising out of the post-GFA era. What is clearly revealed from the current research, is that the peace process in Northern Ireland has been fragmented, lacking genuine vision, and woefully inadequate for Northern Ireland’s most vulnerable populations, and the outworking of many GFA influenced visions of peace, have left civil society leaders wanting. And while the status quo is untenable, in the eyes of civil society leaders, the future is not without hope. It is the belief, based on years of experience and expertise refinement, of civil society leaders that a crucial component of charting a more effective path through the murky waters of the peace processes, rests in the ability of civil society to assert itself as a leader and organizer for emerging emancipatory approaches to locally led peacebuilding throughout Northern Ireland.

5.7 Conclusion This chapter has explored the perception of civil society leaders when it comes to their role in the Northern Ireland peace process and the positionality of civil society as a whole within the patchwork of Northern Ireland. As civil society leaders reflected on their individual role in the peace process and where they see the role of civil society in general, several key themes became apparent. First, civil society leaders touched on their relationship, or lack thereof, with the political sector. Specifically, study participants note their frustration in being used by the political sphere for local legitimacy, without a reciprocal relationship of the political sector listening to, and appreciating, local voices. Second, a specific mechanism that was included within the design of the GFA, the Civic Forum, was explored as a promising potential mechanism, that fell victim to the frustrating plight 108 of failed implementation. Repeatedly, study participants returned to the idea of the Civic Forum as a prime example of how inclusive mechanisms could be designed to elicit the expertise of civil society and local voices. Despite its failure of long-term implementation, the Civic Forum is still looked upon fondly by civil society leaders, revealing the depth of longing within the sector for concrete mechanisms for engagement. Third, a discussion was developed with civil society leaders from a broader perspective, as the positioning of civil society itself and its role within the wider peace process was investigated. Study participants note the unique ability of civil society to tackle pressing grassroots-based issues within communities. Due largely to the intimate knowledge civil society leaders possess about the communities within which they work, participants highlight the moral need for civil society to take a more proactive role in directing the path of the ever-evolving peace process in Northern Ireland. Finally, building from the previous theme, a key case is presented by study participants for increasing independence by civil society as a whole. Rather than a continued dysfunctional relationship as second fiddle to the political sphere, civil society leaders suggest that there is a pressing need, and moral obligation, for civil society to forge a more independent path forward. This is key, study participants suggest, not only for the survival of the sector and the effective delivery of services to vulnerable populations; but this renewed independence push is also critical in charting a new route for a wavering and underperforming peacebuilding process in the North of Ireland.

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Chapter 6 Youthful apathy is useful apathy?: Considering the next generation of Northern Ireland peacebuilders

6.1 Introduction As Siobhán McEvoy-Levy suggests (2001; 2006), the youth of today, can, if given the opportunity, represent the hopeful future of tomorrow within conflict zones. Many peace processes seek to quickly shift attention towards younger generations as the shepherds of this, hopefully, more prosperous future. In this, youth are often seen as a population of potential, which supposedly shines bright against the stark shadow of past challenges. While this is a noble goal, one that carries hope of a turning page, the old stories are not so easily thrown away. In this sense, Northern Ireland is no aberration. The “agreement babies” are finally growing up and the fingerprint of their vision of peace is becoming clearer in the North of Ireland, every single day. One key population that civil society focuses on in Northern Ireland is building relationships and working with youth. The importance of youth-based work has been discussed at length in numerous places of this study (namely Chapter 3). This importance is clearly reflected in the work and focus of civil society leaders in Northern Ireland. Over a dozen of the participants in this study work with organizations or programs that have a distinct youth component to their operations. And as a further highlight of the importance of youth, even those not working directly with youth, were still eager to discuss their perceptions and assessments of young people in Northern Ireland. In other words, civil society leaders within this study unanimously agreed on the importance of youth within Northern Irish society. How this importance plays out, is presented below as five primary themes arising from discussions around the topic. First, a parallel is drawn between a discussion of youth and a previous discussion of civil society in general. This parallel comes in the form of examining youth connections to the political apparatus in Northern Ireland; previously civil society relations with the political apparatus were discussed in Chapter 5. Of particular importance, as raised by the study participants, is an overall feeling of disillusionment within politics which is being expressed by Northern Ireland’s youth. 110

Second, overall problems with youth engagement are addressed. In many ways, youth in Northern Ireland are pulling back from civic engagement, especially when it comes to the peace process itself. This disengagement is due partially to their disillusionment with political leaders, but perhaps more importantly, civil society leaders suggest that the youth of Northern Ireland today struggle to connect with the peace process. Given the fact the GFA is now entering its twentieth year of life, an entire generation within Northern Ireland now exists in its shadow. As it will be discussed later in this chapter, the lack of direct experience with The Troubles has meant the peace process itself does not always resonate with those youth. Next, the messy issue of education within Northern Ireland is examined. Education, as it will be discussed shortly, is an extremely complex topic in the Northern Irish context. But it is a topic that must be addressed as it plays an important role in the ongoing attempts at peace in post-accord Northern Ireland. As it will be discussed shortly, many civil society leaders look at the notable absence of education reform in the GFA as a source of present-day dismay. The implications of the current state of education in Northern Ireland are considered in depth. Fourth, a common theme that arose in conversations around youth was one about the vulnerability of youth in Northern Ireland. These vulnerabilities include a variety of concerns from civil society leaders, ranging from mental health issues to a renewal of violence in the region. Participants of this study repeatedly express concerns that Northern Ireland’s youth would be the first group to be swept into the wave of any renewed hostilities and these fears should be recognized and understood, lest we look back in the future saying, “we should have seen that coming.” Finally, the outlook for youth in Northern Ireland is not necessarily all doom and gloom, and that, is the place this chapter focuses upon last. As frightening and challenging as many of the issues are that will be addressed throughout this chapter, there is still a ribbon of hope that runs through civil society when it comes to youth. A focus on the future is a critical piece of the peace puzzle and civil society leaders share their insight on what the next generation of peacebuilders in Northern Ireland have to offer in the quest for positive peace.

6.2 Debilitating disillusionment – youth and politics in Northern Ireland Growing up in a Northern Ireland that is devoid of daily instances of direct violence, but still squarely in the shadow of The Troubles, and traveling the path of peace as laid out by the 111

GFA, as bumpy as that path has turned out to be, the “agreement baby generation” is navigating the murky waters of youth in an interesting environment. In many ways, the political process and the policies that are directing the future of their society, should be a source of guidance during these times. But is that the case? Many civil society leaders argue, quite resoundingly, in the negative. As an organization director from Belfast suggests: The agreement baby generation…are pretty much uniformly disengaged from and feel disenfranchised by the political process here. They’d articulate political apathy, contempt, disgust, a sense that it doesn’t have any meaning for them. (Participant #1, Director of a Peacebuilding Organization, Belfast)

And his views are continually echoed by his colleagues throughout civil society: But I don’t see too many young people, what I would term as ordinary young people, getting too politically interested, around anywhere I go. (Participant #4, Director of a Community Organization, Derry/Londonderry)

Our young people, completely disenfranchised, completely marginalized from any political process, and they’re not really interested who their local councilor [is], because they don’t see them. (Participant #11, Program Leader, Belfast)

Many in civil society see this disconnect and disillusionment as a product of anger. In many ways, the political process is not for youth or even about youth. Instead, they are simply marginalized stakeholders, left on the outside looking in: I think particularly for the age range of the young people up to early to mid-30s, I think they’re completely pissed off with all political process and disconnected. (Participant #26, Project Lead, Belfast)

The marginalization and disengagement mirror the same problems highlighted in the relationship between civil society and the political apparatus. This suggests that a more fundamental structural issue exists within the political sphere, which many in civil society connect directly to certain failings within the GFA. This issue is explored in more depth within Chapter 8 and Chapter 9. The frustration exists for youth, according to civil society leaders, not because youth are entirely apolitical, but because the political system itself has failed them so completely. Thus, youth feel they have no path, or reliable avenue, to address their political needs. An organization director from Belfast puts it best: They are quite disconnected in general, that is not to say they are not politically motivated. They very often don’t understand that what is important to them is political, 112

it’s just that it’s not big P, party political. They have pulled away from that, but they care about stuff. Life is politics. (Participant #1, Director of a Peacebuilding Organizations, Belfast)

A Belfast-based project lead echoes these thoughts: But to be totally honest, the young people I work with in the last four or five years, they haven’t been particularly of interest in any political party or voting for that matter. (Participant #27, Project Lead, Belfast)

This observation from the project lead offered above highlights some interesting points of consideration that many civil society leaders noted; there are unique community level dynamics at play as well. The ever-present reality of division at the community level of Northern Ireland, once again raises its ugly head in relation to youth disillusion with politics. Many young people are finding it nearly impossible to navigate the bramble covered path of divided politics: It’s difficult to engage young people in politics around that, and then, the other issue is that the political parties here are very strong and very well organized. And if young people are interested in politics, they’re encouraged into a, sort of, party machine very early on. And political parties do have fairly strong youth wings, which do great work and if young people don’t want to be pulled into those sectarian trenches, they’re either in a Nationalist or a Unionist party or a middle-class alliance party, as its seen. They don’t necessarily have an outlet. (Participant #4, Director of a Community Organization, Derry/Londonderry)

A Belfast organization director sees this to be especially true in the PUL community: Kids who grew up in marginalized and disenfranchised areas, especially if those areas are Protestant…are utterly disengaged from political process. (Participant #1, Director of a Peacebuilding Organization, Belfast)

And on the other side of that, a Belfast program director suggests that it is those kids growing up in middle to upper class environments that are most likely to shrug off the veil of disillusionment: I would probably say that we see young people being more politically minded and activism minded around the peace process are from a middle-class background. That probably comes from their education and their own parental influences. So, for example, where you see a youth organization or branch in the Alliance party, or whatever, it’s generally associated when you look at the demographic, with a middle-class upbringing with some sort of political, social justice, or family connection to that. (Participant #26, Project Lead, Belfast) 113

A Derry/Londonderry community organization coordinator combines these observations in a succinct assessment of the challenges civil society leaders face in working with youth to encourage their engagement with the political and peace process: I know a lot of young people who really blow my mind away, with their level of political insights and political maturity and intelligence. Equally, I know a lot of young people who are not engaged, but what I see is the young people who are not engaged have been disenfranchised for loads of other reasons. They’re living, growing up with extreme poverty, they’re not engaging fully in the educational system because, mainly because of their home life… There’s maybe other issues there as well, learning disabilities and maybe you know things like autism in a family which brings all of that hardship into a family. So, you have a proportion of those young people who are being manipulated by the likes of dissident Republicans and the same within Loyalism, so they’re being manipulated and used as opposed to being supported and encouraged. So, we do have big challenges. (Participant #9, Coordinator of a Community Organization, Derry/Londonderry)

Thus, even though it may be true that “politics is life,” for many young people living in Northern Ireland, the post-accord environment, their own life circumstances, the political disconnect, or some combination of all of these factors, simply means that reality is not amenable to their direct engagement in this sphere of life. Thus, community identities exist, and maybe even community political party identities exist, but these do not dominate the lives of youth: No really strong opinions on politics, okay I’ll still be Unionist or Nationalist, but they’re not waking up thinking every day about it, they [young people] just get on with their lives. (Participant #21, Program Director, Belfast)

This desire to “get on with life” has bled into a broader disengagement with one of the biggest political realities to face Northern Ireland since the GFA: Brexit. A Derry/Londonderry community organization director touches on this as he relates the experience of a recent project aimed at youth engagement: So, the News Night program came on Monday. They contacted us looking for some young people to talk on Brexit. We gave them the details and I think that’s probably where they got the school student they had from St. Mary’s on there…We did a piece of work with Radio Four where Will Self, writer, had done this, kind of, bus tour around Brexit and he spoke to young people here about Brexit, nine of them. Most of them didn’t have a particular strong opinion, though. They don’t see it as something they can influence at all, and these are macro politics being played out at a level above them. And again, the issues are complicated. There’s just people talking at each other, debates that generate hate and very little light around it. They’re far more 114

interested with just getting on with life, enjoying their music, and forming their friendships. (Participant #4, Director of a Community Organization, Derry/Londonderry)

The GFA was intended to be a framework that led Northern Ireland into an era of peace. Above all else, it was a framework aimed at developing and securing a political future for Northern Ireland that was based upon cross-community engagement within the political sphere. But as civil society leaders have revealed, the youth of Northern Ireland’s today, the “agreement baby generation,” are staggeringly disconnected from that political reality. The implications of this disillusionment with the political processes that the GFA established, is a concern raised across civil society. The entrenched divisions of a sectarian society, the isolation of community politics, and the shortcomings of the GFA have left a void within the post-accord generation that is readily apparent to those working at the grassroots peacebuilding level. Several civil society leaders offer their ideas about why this disillusionment and detachment from politics exists within youth. Our young people don’t really care about politics, and hardly vote. They don’t show any response at all. I think that’s because politics has been so messy over the years. Maybe in a lot of families, it’s not discussed, because it’s such a contentious issue. (Participant #10, Peacebuilder, Derry/Londonderry)

I think a lot of families are the same, to try and keep their young people safe, to keep politics out of the house. And that’s filtered down to our young people, they aren’t that concerned and they’re a bit disillusioned and they haven’t got much opportunities. They certainly wouldn’t look to politics to fix it. (Participant #10, Peacebuilder, Derry/Londonderry)

Young people have no idea about politics. Then what they do see on the news is DUP or they’re all fighting each other. If they were taught citizenship, proper citizenship, politics and awareness of the whole structure, I think that would be good for the next generation coming up, because they learn about every other country, except here. Because it’s like, we don’t touch that, it’s ignored, unless you’re 17 or 18 and going into politics as a subject, then you’ll learn, but not any time before that. (Participant #16, Community Developer, Derry/Londonderry)

But not addressing the challenges around politics, or keeping the topic under wraps, does not prevent its impacts from being felt across Northern Irish society. A CEO of an umbrella peacebuilding organization in Belfast speaks to this: And then, there are another group of people who, young people, who out of their minds you can hear, come the same kinds of old truths, that were there decades ago in their father and mother’s generation and the one before that again. And it sounds so strange, 115

when you hear it come back out, unadulterated, unaffected by everything that happened in that intervening period. (Participant #2, CEO of an Umbrella Peacebuilding Organization, Belfast)

This too is echoed by a community organization director in Derry/Londonderry: We used to talk about trying to get young people engaged in identity politics in Northern Ireland. That’s the frustrations of, not even just one, but a couple of generations now, for whom Northern Irish politics has been represented by angry middle-aged men in suits shouting at each other on news and current affairs reportage. (Participant #4, Director of a Community Organization, Derry/Londonderry)

These sentiments led one Derry/Londonderry peacebuilder to quip: It’s one of the things that, in all of the groups that we’ve worked with, they find it very hard to engage youth. The ones that don’t work directly with youth, they always say its very hard to engage them. I think that the young people have their head screwed on, simply because who would want to be involved in the politics here? Who would want to be caught up in the way that people behave here? (Participant #5, Peacebuilder, Derry/Londonderry)

She said this largely in jest, but there is a startling undercurrent of truth to her statement as well. What is abundantly clear in the post-accord environment of Northern Ireland, is that the political sphere is decidedly not leading the charge in a good-faith, positive peace, and peacebuilding process. That function, as discussed in Chapter 5, has been shouldered disproportionally by civil society in the years trailing the GFA. Youth are not blind to this fact. Though they still may slip into the Green/Orange divisions of old, there is unity amongst youth, in their clear disillusionment with the political sphere. A Derry/Londonderry community developer who works directly with youth and youth- based programs, offers her experience as evidence of this: I think you find that as much as we work with a lot of young people that aren’t political, just with everything going on, especially with young women and the #MeToo movement and everything at the minute, you’re find that there are a lot more politicized. They’re so distant from the conflict that they can be swayed by the green and orange and there’s a lot of anger. I’ve noticed these groups that are politically aware, they’re going to hold the accountable to account. You’ll find that even if you watch some of the panel shows, before if young people spoke a lot of politicians were really patronizing. (Participant #16, Community Developer, Derry/Londonderry)

Along these same lines, other youth work occurring in civil society has been aimed at connecting youth with the things that directly impact their lives in more tangible ways: 116

We engage with [x number of] young people in the last nine months and I would say, if there’s two or three of them that are in any way political, was the height of it. The rest of them, don’t care. They just want to be able to get a job. They want to have a house to live in to be able to have good mental health. To not be addicted to substances. All of these real issues. That’s what they want. They don’t really care who’s in control or what’s going on, they just want to have a life that’s worth living. (Participant #14, Community Developer, Derry/Londonderry)

But we’ve developed initiatives with young people to measure the delivery of their rights on the ground, and we can get them active on that. Right to play, why is there glass on the street, why is there no parks, and they can force chance and shifts and all that. (Participant #24, Project Coordinator, Belfast)

But even though some have found success with these more direct approaches, others in civil society are still frustrated with the continued pullback of youth from any kind of political engagement. The youth disillusionment is deeply concerning and many in civil society are running out of ideas to help the agreement babies take charge of their own political futures. How do we turn that around? We’re certainly not giving young people hope. Not through the politicians at the moment. (Participant #5, Peacebuilder, Derry/Londonderry)

And as one community developer from Derry/Londonderry notes, that has meant a rise in youth taking politics, or at least politically charged issues, into their own hands in a unique way: They’re using social media they’re using the internet to get their message out. You’re going to find a kind of new voice coming from young people here that is a wee bit more radical. They’re not down in the mainstream parties and they are looking for an alternative, especially with equal marriage and women’s rights for choice, especially with what’s going on in the repeal movement. You’re seeing more modern issues, more progressive issues coming to the fore and they’re not going to fall for the same old tactics. (Participant #16, Community Developer, Derry/Londonderry)

This potential for youth led change that entirely circumvents the political apparatus, in a very parallel manner to civil society’s own circumvention of the political apparatus (discussed in Chapter 5), is a topic that is explored in more detail in forthcoming sections within this chapter. Within this disillusioned reality, civil society leaders have begun to see youth focus their attention away from the political sphere and towards broader goals and issues. This shift, while potentially positive for Northern Ireland’s youth, is often a negative for Northern Ireland itself. Following this line of concern raised by civil society leaders, a conversation on youth disengagement from the peace process and Northern Ireland itself, is explored next.

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6.3 The brain drain – issues of youth disengagement There is some natural cross-over between the current conversation and the one that occurred in the section above. Disillusionment with politics for youth, naturally leads to a certain degree of disengagement, as the study participants have effectively conveyed: For those young people that have the opportunity to get up and stay away from politics, good for them. I mean there’s a part of me that would like them to be engaged, but I’m sort of thinking, I would not want you to be involved in this toxic politics. You have the brain drain as well. You see young people that go away to university, like my son, I mean, he’s never going to come back. (Participant #5, Peacebuilder, Derry/Londonderry)

And thus, another reality of this disillusionment is a broader disengagement by youth from Northern Ireland itself. The primary way this has seemingly manifested itself, is through a conscious “flying of the nest” by young people in Northern Ireland. A Belfast based director of a peacebuilding organization offers some insight into the concept in his discussion on youth: Many of them are for not settling down here, as soon as they get out of uni, because here is intolerant, backward, and embarrassing. Who wants to admit to being from here? So, it’s off to Melbourne or London or Glasgow… Which in many ways is a very healthy attitude anyway, it’s good to leave the nest, even if you return later, it’s good to leave the nest. But it’s prompted here by something, that’s in addition to that, something that is sick in society. They’re not stupid, they smell it, they don’t want to engage in it. They want to leave it behind. (Participant #1, Director of a Peacebuilding Organization, Belfast)

In further support of the previous section on political disillusionment, a Derry/Londonderry community organization coordinator connects these ideas: So, I think there’s a real issue there with some of our young people, are turned off by the politics here, because it is quite poisonous at times, and quite aggressive. And then, they’re thinking: “well, I’m getting out of here anyway, that’s part of the reason I’m getting out of here, because of that toxicity around politics.” And the other reason is because there is no economic prospect of me staying here. So, they sort of disengage from politics at that stage because they don’t see, they don’t necessarily feel themselves to be a long-term stakeholder in the society here, certainly not enough to justify getting involved with all those angry, scary people in politics. (Participant #4, Director of a Community Organization, Derry/Londonderry)

This ever-growing trend of youth leaving Northern Ireland, with no intention of returning, is often referred to within civil society as “the brain drain.” In essence, the agreement babies are taking a look around at what the GFA has built for them over the last several decades, and 118 deciding it is simply not something they find desirable. Thus, they are choosing to leave Northern Ireland, in startling large numbers within some communities, in search of greener pastures elsewhere in the world. But what you can end up with is more of the brighter, better educated, they’ll just leave…People will be leaving and there won’t be great incentive to stay. (Participant #20, Director of Research Organization, Belfast)

A CEO of a peacebuilding organization in Belfast provides another reflection on the challenge: I have to start by saying that young people are the same as any other generational slice of society. There is no one view. The idea that young people will show us the way out of all of this nonsense, I think is probably misplaced. The big thing that young people have is a greater investment in the future, because they’re going to be there longer. Some of the rest of us won’t be. So, in that sense, they should have an enlightened self-interest in what comes next. When I look at young people, at least in the circles that I move in, you find all shades of opinion. You absolutely find far too many young people who are thinking “I’ve so had enough of all of this, and I’m off” particularly if they’re in tertiary education, they are off. (Participant #2, CEO of an Umbrella Peacebuilding Organization, Belfast)

And once they are gone, the temptations to return to the nest, are often not there. A Derry/Londonderry peacebuilder shares her own story as an example of how she has seen this happen firsthand: But a lot of young people who leave, wouldn’t have any desire to come back. In fact, all [of my son’s] friends that he went through the integrated college with and then they all separated and went to university. I don’t think any of them have come back. I can’t think of one. Because I know that they all plan when they do come home for holidays to meet up. Somebody might be in Italy, somebody might be in Switzerland, and I just don’t know any one of them that actually remained here. Isn’t that interesting? That in itself, tells a story. Bright young people, Catholic and Protestant, not talking about one or the other, none of them have come back and none of them would desire to come back either. (Participant #5, Peacebuilder, Derry/Londonderry)

This account is incredibly revealing. It not only speaks to the ubiquity of the problem, but the lasting impact of the decision to leave as well. And though issues highlighted by the peacebuilder above speaks of those who have attained high levels of education, this flight of young people is not simply relegated to that demographic. As a CEO of a peacebuilding organization also notes, this issue is being seen in young people with less education as well: 119

There are others who for economic reasons may not necessarily have gone to university, or whatever it might be, but have made other choices to go off to Australia or wherever it might be, because there wasn’t work here. Certainly, in the last decade it got very difficult, and you’ll find a fair number of our young people in Australia, and other places, at the moment. To the extent, where they go there, they find lots of people they know from here in their networks and community. That’s very sad, at one level, because that is Irish history repeating itself again, for sure. (Participant #2, CEO of an Umbrella Peacebuilding Organization, Belfast)

Some of the challenges there, link directly to the education structures in place. There is more on this topic in section 6.4 of this chapter. A community organization director from Derry/Londonderry highlights this in his analysis of the situation: [It is a] learned hopelessness. I think that that’s one thing that the schools actually imbed in the youth, there’s almost like a learned hopelessness because if you want young people to do well, then they have to do well on their exams and go to university. If they go to university, that takes them away from this place. It exposes them to a bigger world and why would they want to come back? It would be very hard to come back. (Participant #4, Director of a Community Organization, Derry/Londonderry)

But what does this trend mean for Northern Ireland itself? Unfortunately, it paints a sobering picture when it comes to large scale community engagement by the younger population. Clearly, it is extremely challenging to impact one’s own community if you are no longer actually in that community, as is the case with the Northern Irish youth lost to the brain drain. Even those that remain, are continuing to pull away from community level engagement. Those that are most acutely aware of this reality are the civil society leaders working tirelessly at those levels and finding the grassroots peacebuilding environment increasingly sparse of younger people: For young people, they don’t want to get engaged…their ambitions are bigger. The world is a much bigger place, so I think that young people, when they see television, whenever they see things on this five minutes of fame and these notion of how you have to be happy, that’s a generation I worry about because the technology and what it’s doing. But also feel that there’s a much bigger world. And I love the fact that so many young people do see a bigger world out there and they don’t see it within the narrow confines of our wee world that’s socially constructed here. So, there’s a part of me thinking, if they do go up and leave, that’s a good thing for them maybe, but it’s to our loss. I think that it’s one of the areas that the politicians have been so appallingly bad at. They can’t brainwash them and have this narrow notion of what it is to be Irish or British, that these young people just see a bigger picture and they just leave. I think they’re quite disgusted by what happens. I think that Brexit is going to do an awful lot of damage to how they see…I think they’re going to be seeing themselves, how badly damaged and how badly damaging we have been to this place and I think that being 120

played out will have more young people leaving. (Participant #5, Peacebuilder, Derry/Londonderry)

A community developer from Derry/Londonderry draws out the contrast between what he sees in the agreement baby generation as opposed to the civil rights activists in the period before the GFA:

That’s why there’s this certain age group of hard-core activists. It was a reaction to the times whereas the younger people, they don’t really have that reaction. They see all this global stuff, but in their communities, they’re just not as connected, I think with their communities. (Participant #15, Community Developer, Derry/Londonderry)

Driven by disillusionment of politics, the failing structures of the GFA, a lack of jobs or opportunities, or even simply to seek out a safer existence away from the lingering shadow of The Troubles, the brain drain is, as the name would suggest, draining Northern Ireland of what is arguably its most vital resource, young people. As the third decade of peace in Northern Ireland is already well underway, it is critical to reflect and analyze the state of Northern Ireland’s most influential population subset, youth. In the conversations above, civil society leaders have highlighted a startling reality; the best and brightest are abandoning their homeland in droves. Even those that remain, though, are seemingly pulling away from a peace process that holds little meaning for them. This is an issue that cannot be ignored, if Northern Ireland expects to see any positive momentum in decade #3 of their grand quest for lasting peace.

6.4 School house blues – education issues and challenges in Northern Ireland The state of education in Northern Ireland is one that has been addressed and explored in considerable detail over the many years of Northern Ireland focused research (McEvoy-Levy, 2012). It is a topic that warrants far more than a singular subsection tucked within this analysis, but time and focus only afford us such an opportunity in the scope of this study. While the broader impacts of the lack of education reform will be explored in Chapter 8, the following discussion reveals the initial importance of the topic that civil society leaders have identified. In our conversations over youth, civil society was quick to latch onto the education system itself as a core issue in the overall environment of Northern Ireland. First and foremost, on their minds, was the structure of education itself. By this I am referring to the decidedly 121 segregated nature of education across the country. The segregated nature of schooling in Northern Ireland is its defining characteristic and it is one that elicits considerable scorn from civil society leaders. A director of a peacebuilding organization from Belfast pulls no punches in his assessment: We deliberately educate our children to be different to each other. This is overseen by a government that has a peacebuilding strategy called “together building a united community.” It oversees the funding of state and catholic maintained schools that ensure our children are educated to be separate. (Participant #1, Director of a Peacebuilding Organization, Belfast)

His indignation of the issue comes through quite clearly as he expands his thoughts: Can you think of any logic behind the idea that you would get up now and take your kids to that school and I would get up and take mine to that school, and I take my kids to that school because they were baptized protestant, christened Protestant. You take yours to that school because they’re christened Catholic. Why? Why would anybody living in a population of 1.5 million people, choose to ensure, that their children are educated separately by religious affiliation? Or ethnicity? We don’t do this on the basis of the sexual identity of children. We only do it to a minority of our children on the basis of their gender. The idea that we would do it to our children because they’re not Christian, but maybe Jewish or Muslim, would generate a society-wide out pouring of outrage. The idea that we would educate the travelers, the gypsies, separately, people would be saying look, you’re trying to create, this is like nationalist socialism or something. And we deny that we do it by class, as access to grammar school is by ability, though that’s a lie. So, why do we do it for this? To propagate, into the future, our sense of security and belonging as us. To impose it and stamp it on our children and know that there will always be little us-es out there. What other reason could there be? Is that a wise reason? Is it logical? It’s illogical and it’s unwise. (Participant #1, Director of a Peacebuilding Organization, Belfast)

Illogical and unwise. These words echoed for a moment and seemed to hang in the air after he uttered them during our conversation together. It was something we both needed a moment to take in and truly understand. The failure of the GFA to address the education structures in Northern Ireland is a point of continued consternation. That discussion will happen in depth in Chapter 9. But the words offered here, resonate with how deeply damaging continued structural segregation within the education system has been on the youth. It is a recognized problem, one that garnered universal critique from the participants of this study, yet the solutions out of the rigid structures are far from certain and certainly not fast: To engender sufficient support to develop models of participative democracy that the powers that be over years and decades, mull over and consider and take tiny steps 122

towards, in the same way that integrated education is formally approved officially and openly supported and initiatives to set up integrated schools are welcomed, but in thirty years of conflict we’re up somewhere around 8, 9, 10 percent integration. So, it’s slow. (Participant #1, Director of a Peacebuilding Organization, Belfast)

And even more troublingly, these segregated structures are not simply relegated to the education realm. The realities of Northern Ireland as a divided society in the post-accord period is explored in detail within Chapter 8, but a community organization director from Derry/Londonderry highlights this widespread segregation issue in relation to schools: So, [an organization] had produced this report, which looked at levels of segregation in everyday lives and showed that actually segregation had increased since the Good Friday Agreement rather than decreased, in terms of physical barriers as well as school enrollments, segregated schools and then the sort of all patterns of life. (Participant #4, Director of a Community Organization, Derry/Londonderry)

A community developer from Derry/Londonderry shares her experiences which fall in line with the understanding offered by the community organization director: What happened in Derry, just about the schools, is there were two integrated schools on this side [Cityside] and then a Catholic secondary school on the Waterside, but over the last ten, fifteen years, the last remaining integrated school went to the Waterside. The Catholic one on the Waterside closed, so the river, that literally divides. People aren’t even crossing back and forth for school and people are less willing. You’ll find the numbers for the integrated schools changing, so your options are limited as a parent. (Participant #16, Community Developer, Derry/Londonderry)

In many ways though, as big of a problem as the structural issues are within education, there is an increasing concern within civil society that youth in Northern Ireland, and the broader peace process itself, are being jeopardized by the content of their education as well. In other words, while the structural issues of segregation are laying the foundation of problems, the house of horrors is being furnished by the inadequacies within the classroom: I think that it definitely comes down in terms of the education system here. You don’t talk about politics, hold it in, you don’t ever talk about politics or religion here. (Participant #11, Program Leader, Belfast)

A community developer from Derry/Londonderry echoes these thoughts: [Youth] don’t know their voice, they don’t know their own views, it’s just their regurgitating what they’ve been taught, and then when we do challenge them some of them don’t know what their own values and beliefs are. But aye, it just goes back to the school. (Participant #16, Community Developer, Derry/Londonderry)

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And these same concerns are constantly repeated in nearly every conversation with participants of this study: They’ve no interest. They don’t learn about it in school, so they’ve got no foundational, education foundation around it. Zero interest. They probably couldn’t tell you who their local MLA was… (Participant #11, Program Leader, Belfast)

I think education system should have politics built in. (Participant #16, Community Developer, Derry/Londonderry)

So many teaching professions and schools, colleges, they don’t cover the conflict. And how do we cover it? How do we talk about it? There’s lots of questions that we have. (Participant #23, Organization Director, Belfast)

When you combine the structural issues with the lack of progress within the classroom as well, Northern Ireland is left with a crisis in the education of its young people. What are the implications of this? According to civil society leaders, this represents one of the biggest threats to the security of the peace process moving forward. One director of a Belfast-based peacebuilding organization describes the situation this way: What a state. Educate us separately from each other we will not understand each other. We fear what we don’t understand. What we fear produces anger, hatred, and intolerance. It’s not brain surgery; it’s just the way things work. You don’t need to be a friggin’ genius to get this. Educate us differently and we will treat each other not as us, but as them. We don’t treat them right. It goes against human nature. We define ourselves as us, us is better. Them? Them are less. It’s the way the world works. That has to be broken down. There can only be us. (Participant #1, Director of a Peacebuilding Organization, Belfast)

Re-establishing social cohesion following intractable ethnic conflict is hardly an easy task (Hutchison & Bleiker, 2013). Given this fact, post-accord societies should be seeking to break down as many barriers as they can to encourage higher level of cross-community engagement. Yet as civil society leaders reveal, the approach to education in Northern Ireland is the antithesis of this cross-community approach. And without a focus on reducing those barriers to social inclusion at the ground level, top-down peacebuilding processes can only accomplish so much. A peacebuilding organization CEO from Belfast summarizes these thoughts: There are lots of other things in there like commitments to schools, and family and tradition, and “where we went and you’ll go there, too.” There are lots of human aspects of peace-building processes that are not about people deliberately choosing to be away from each other. They are just the ordinary, everyday habits of their lives that they’ve never thought about as being exclusive, or separate, or anything like that. But, those small 124

steps have as big a part to play in building peace process as anything that’s done from the top-down. (Participant #2, CEO of an Umbrella Peacebuilding Organization, Belfast)

And it is easy to maintain these habits of separation, when the foundation for youth interaction, the education system, is consciously designed in a way that precludes cross-community interaction. Thus, the cycles of segregation and willing separation continue unchecked in a society that is meant to be embracing “building the future together” as has been the goal of the Northern Ireland Executive (TBUC Annual Report, 2019). An organization director from Belfast speaks to this broader societal impact of continued school segregation and the challenges she faces in her work with youth in a cross-community manner: [We try] to take them out of their area and see different things, it’s really obvious in Belfast and maybe even in Derry or Lurgan or Portadown where there’s that segregation, but when you go out of that in the more rural areas, there is segregation, but it’s just not as obvious. Even to talk about that…why do your parents only go to that market, or that hotel or that restaurant? They’re cheaper? Oh, I don’t know, they’re from the McKinnley’s, oh they’re a different religion than us. Helping them to kind of understand and even to challenge them. That’s been another problem in a sense, or a difficulty, where you’re empowering young people and getting them to mix and they go home, and Mum and Dad don’t want that. (Participant #23, Organization Director, Belfast)

And this experience, from the organization director, is one that is common throughout civil society. Tasked with the already arduous effort of propelling along the peacebuilding process, civil society leaders are faced with tremendous challenges when working with youth. Cross- community programs not only must compete with the segregated structures of education that were left untouched by the GFA, but the imbedded cycles of separation at the community level leaves very few support systems for the youth they are working with. Progress within the confines of a cross-community project is rendered meaningless, in some cases, when youth return to the rigid ways of estrangement and segregation in their homes and schools. A new generation has grown up in a “peaceful” Northern Ireland, that still adheres to the siloed structures of old: So, here we are, twenty years later, and a whole generation of young people, generations, have gone through the whole education process with virtually no reform around all of that because it was more comfortable for their forebears, parents and grandparents, than it should be. (Participant #2, CEO of an Umbrella Peacebuilding Organization, Belfast)

This, argues a peacebuilder from Derry/Londonderry, is a reality which must be confronted: 125

Twenty years later, we still haven’t got the whole thing. I mean, the biggest common- sense thing is integrated education. If you bring up children separately, you’re always going to have that difficulty in the segregation. If you bring children up together the parents come together, sports come together, social life comes together. It creates integration. All of our money is being spent on trying to bring people together and it’s artificial. (Participant #5, Peacebuilder, Derry/Londonderry)

A community developer from Derry/Londonderry reiterates these thoughts with a call to action on the issue: One of the biggest feelings here, is that we live in segregated communities, we have segregated schooling, if we’re serious about the next generation, then we have to address integrated education. (Participant #17, Community Developer, Derry/Londonderry)

Held within the comment above, is an implicit question that needs to be explicitly asked in Northern Ireland. Is Northern Ireland serious about the next generation? The reflection offered by the civil society leaders included within this chapter shows the level of concern that permeates the sector when it comes to the youth in Northern Ireland today. These leaders are clearly serious about the generation and they have been working tirelessly to incorporate youth into the peacebuilding process. Yet significant structural and societal failures over the last twenty years at addressing the challenges facing youth have led to an environment of alarm as the agreement baby generation struggles to fulfill the hopeful narrative that was imagined with the GFA.

6.5 A dangerous age – youth vulnerability in post-accord Northern Ireland There has been an interesting point that pops up in conversations with civil society leaders, with impressive consistency, when it comes to youth that has yet to be addressed within this chapter. That point is a general unease that study participants feel when it comes to the vulnerability of youth within Northern Ireland. It was such a consistent point in our conversations, that it warrants its own dedicated discussion, which is what this section represents. The challenges and struggles of youth are certainly evident from the copious amount of testimony presented above. But civil society leaders consistently wanted to delve deeper into what these challenges might mean, from a negative standpoint, for Northern Ireland; both presently and in the future. A Belfast-based program director provides us a sneak peek into this thinking: 126

But, in the main what we see here, is that young people just really badly struggling now. Far more so than when the Troubles, when we started in 1992, different. When we started in 1992, there was 14 percent unemployment. Very, very high compared to what it is now. However, the level of emotional and psychological issues were not there. Low self- esteem, confidence all of that, definitely low motivation. But here, it’s got all those things plus all the emotional and psychological shit that’s going on at the minute and the whole drug culture. (Participant #22, Program Director, Belfast)

These factors pose a serious problem, and it is one that many civil society leaders struggle with on a daily basis. The program director from Belfast expands on this struggle: Their inability to…lack of confidence, self-esteem, drugs, emotional and psychological, and inability to accommodate difference, that entire cocktail… And then, you do have the trauma of the Troubles right behind it. Daily in the communities in which they live, which is either being reaffirmed subconsciously, informally, formally or whatever, by the action environment that you’re in. The flags, who’s saying what, who is that guy, he’s in the paramilitary, you know, all of that there, they have to deal with and try to accommodate. I would have no… I know, that if the Troubles started again, there would be young people involved. (Participant #22, Program Director, Belfast)

And thus, we arrive at a terrifying reality, that plagues the grassroots peace process and peacebuilders consistently: the fear and genuine potential, of youth vulnerability in the event of conflict recurrence. In a peace process built upon the back of grassroots civil society leaders, it is imperative that when they voice their concern, it is listened to intently. And listening to those voices, reveals a level of concern that is backed not by assumptions, but by lived experiences on the frontlines of a peacebuilding process: For some young people, I think they’re trying to hold on to it. We did a piece of work about five or six years ago maybe with a group outside of Belfast. Young Republican, dissident Republicans really involved in a lot of anti-social behavior, rioting, targeting the police and things. In an absolute shithole estate area, it was horrible, really deprived, whole flat blocks with addiction issues, it was really miserable. It just was a horrible place to grow up in and they had these stories and a lot of their families had been put out of Belfast and removed from Belfast, carrying a lot of trauma. The group was 11-18 year old’s and the 18 year old had just been accepted into Queen’s University and was turning it down. And I was like, okay, in my mind I’m thinking he can’t afford it, it’s too far to go…he says “I have to stay and protect my community.” (Participant #23, Organization Director, Belfast)

It was a stunning moment for the organization director, and it was a stunning moment, for me, to hear about. She continued her story: 127

I said, “who from?” “The Brits.” I was like, “from the Brits?” “Yeah, the British Army.” I said, “the army’s not here anymore. Have a wee look about the place, they’re not about.” He talked about having his house raided in Belfast. He was two years of age. I’m not saying he doesn’t remember that, but, the detail he spoke about that, I don’t know whether that was from his parents or he’s pieced bits together, he’s watched tv or things. But he spoke about that experience and he was so clear on the whole event, how they came in and what the British Army did and what the RUC did and all these different things. It was like, you’re getting this from other places. (Participant #23, Organization Director, Belfast)

For the youth referenced in the story above, the conflict, The Troubles, the ‘war,’ is far from over. He is willing to scuttle his opportunities at a University education, not out of any kind of principled stand or alternative opportunities, but out of a perceived need to more or less enlist in community defense. The moment and conversation stuck with the civil society leader and it is a story that has, admittedly, stuck with me as well. It would certainly be nice if this was a one-off instance, an aberration of sorts, in the overall Northern Ireland atmosphere. Several civil society leaders experience the same realities in their work: In some communities we work in, there’s a real want to be paramilitary, or an ex- prisoner, because there’s status attached to that, I think more for young men. It’s about where’s their identity in all this. Which is really sad. (Participant #23, Organization Director, Belfast)

Very young people at the violent end of that spectrum, as well, who are in the “one more push” category. (Participant #2, CEO of an Umbrella Peacebuilding Organization, Belfast)

The status component is something that deserves a deeper dive, and that will come at the end of this chapter. But it is certainly worth exploring a bit more at the moment. The path from preparation to action is a short one within conflict zones. As many civil society leaders are noting, for at least some youth in Northern Ireland, that is a path that has already been started down: If you’ve got an impressionable, marginalized, undereducated young community, they’re very impressionable about what they’re told. Particularly politicians need to be careful about their rhetoric, because at the end of the day, they’re not going to be doing deed or going to prison. There’s another saying here, that the politicians will fight to the last drop of everybody else’s blood. (Participant #21, Program Director, Belfast)

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After dozens of hours of interviews and hundreds of pages of transcripts, it was this quote, from an ex-prisoner and former paramilitary member, that resonates with me the most, “The politicians will fight to the last drop of everybody else’s blood.” Chilling, profound, and something that cannot be overlooked in Northern Ireland’s path to peace. It is important to consider then, where these potential conflict recurrence factors come in to play. A program director from Belfast who works directly with disadvantaged youth, offers her thoughts on the sources of vulnerabilities that youth face in Northern Ireland: In relation to here, young people do not give two hoots about the peace process, really. But, the difficulty is this, if there was a re-start to the conflict, they would also be the ones who are the most vulnerable to being engaged. Engagement in terms of the conflict in the troubles takes a variety of forms. There’s those that strongly believe in the principles of whatever side that they were on. And then there are those that are totally vulnerable and being manipulated. Either because of emotional or psychological or whatever issues. Or, there’s those who need money. They’re being fueled and driven by very different things. I do know, that young people coming through here, and the level of substance abuse and poverty, is increasing drastically. (Participant #22, Program Director, Belfast)

The issues she highlights here deserve a closer look. Her main concern, after all, is that youth would be particularly vulnerable to involvement in any return to direct violence in a “re-start” of The Troubles. Thus, in the continued pursuit of establishing an effective post-agreement environment, it is vital that these vulnerabilities be given heightened focus within our analysis. In subsequent chapters, namely Chapter 8, I will speak to the environment of negative peace that has taken hold in Northern Ireland, largely due to the failings of the GFA. But here, I would like to devote some further attention to the issues of poverty, which strikes a common chord of concern across civil society. I asked a Belfast-based project coordinator about this generalized fear expressed by some of his colleagues regarding a return to the turbulent times of The Troubles. He frames his thoughts around this idea of a fear about the “bad old days” and what that really means for the youth of today: [They say] the fall of Stormont will return us to the bad old days. What are the bad old days? Most people who are twenty are saying, “what are these bad old days that you’re talking about?” I mean, today is the bad old day. I’m skint, I can’t get a job, I’ll never be able to buy a house, I will have no money to socialize and no space to socialize in. So, these bad old days that people talk about that are almost culturally inherited in all of our institutions, are not relevant in the way that all of our institutions try to make them relevant to young people. (Participant #24, Project Coordinator, Belfast) 129

He continues this thought about the implications of this thinking: Young people organize on, or interface with each other on, the real life of the “good old days”, (laughing) the current fucking good old days that are subjecting them to these social security screenings, that are putting them through these steps to success programs that don’t get them employment, straight to organizations that vilify them, that shoot them, kneecap them, that criminalize almost every aspect of their behavior and then try to behavior modify everything they want to do. (Participant #24, Project Coordinator, Belfast)

The suggestion here, is that the realities of poverty today, and the ways that youth try to cope with these realities, represent a real and present threat to the stability of the peace process. The next chapter highlights funding challenges within civil societies’ peacebuilding process, but this program director is highlighting what he considers a “money issue” that is impacting a core population within Northern Ireland. His concern is echoed in an account from a project lead from Belfast. In talking about youth avoiding those vulnerabilities through access to higher education, she sees poverty realities impacting these possibilities: It’s easier to say, “it’s not in our family or it’s not in our community and we don’t do that”, than saying, “I can’t afford to send you to do that.” If the money is there then they can go and do it, all well and good, but parents maybe don’t have that level of knowledge on what’s out there and what support there is for a young person, son or daughter to go to university, and do further education. (Participant #27, Project Lead, Belfast)

And thus, these poverty realities create devastating vulnerabilities that civil society leaders are recognizing in Northern Ireland’s youth population. It hints at a wider societal failing, which will be discussed in more depth in Chapters 8 and 9. But these issues create real and present pathways for youth in an already conflict-prone environment. As one Belfast program director puts it: I know that their pathway to anti-social behavior is a pathway that they would take, because of other motivating factors. That’s not to say there wouldn’t be those that would take it because of principle or beliefs, but there are other reasons why they would also take it. So, whilst they don’t care about [the peace process], I’m not saying that’s all of them, there’s a lot of them that don’t. (Participant #22, Program Director, Belfast)

These challenges do not just lead to the eventuality of growing the next crop of sectarian soldiers. For many youths, these vulnerabilities already led to direct violence against themselves, in the form of suicide. The alarming rate of youth suicide in Northern Ireland, the highest in the UK and one of the highest in Europe (Department of Health, 2019), is an issue that captures 130 universal concern from the civil society leaders included within this study. The concern is palpable and the urgency in the accounts of civil society leaders is undeniable: With the level of suicides, the level of mental health issues, anti-social behavior in terms of all the issues that come with areas of poverty, in particularly cities, they’re no different in a lot of ways, than if you went to Birmingham or Manchester or some of those places. It’s just that, I think…underlying it is the trauma that is a generational thing that has an impact in a different way to those basic needs, employment, education, health. (Participant #27, Project Lead, Belfast)

Our suicide rates are so high, that’s not just by chance. Diabetes, obesity, addiction to lots of things…We’re not a huge place, and our DNA pool isn’t huge, so that’s all being passed, and we know trauma gets passed through DNA. (Participant #23, Organization Director, Belfast)

We’ve still got young people committing suicide, we’ve still got no jobs, dropping out of schools, no hope or sense of hope for the future… (Participant #27, Project Lead, Belfast)

The topic of suicide is one that deserves immense attention and focus. It is an issue that has reached a crisis point in Northern Ireland and everyone, from civil society to the political sector, must give it the attention that it requires. While many civil society leaders are scrambling to provide services to address this growing crisis, support must come from additional layers throughout Northern Ireland to ensure appropriate responses are enacted. Another issue that is contributing to this suicide crisis, especially when it comes to youth, is the lack of opportunities available to many individuals in Northern Ireland. This common thread that arose in many of the discussions with civil society leaders on the topic of vulnerabilities, deals with a general lack of opportunities available to youth, which is naturally connected to their susceptibility to vulnerabilities. Access to opportunities is obviously a broad topic area, but it is one that is important and significant in the scope of youth, to many of the civil society leaders included within this study. Education is one of those good examples. While education issues are addressed in the following subsection, a mention on the lack of opportunity to education access fits in the current discussion. One Belfast-based project lead expresses her concern on the issue. Speaking on the topic of raising themselves out of poverty, she notes: Then what that then requires is them to get a much higher level of education that then threatens either the family or the family culture around education and employment or threatens or is perceived as what people from our community do. It’s almost like, there’s a soft skill platform that you can work within, but if there’s aspirations to take that into another area, that would change the employment opportunity and the economic progression of that young person. (Participant #26, Project Lead, Belfast) 131

And that can be seen as a challenge to their family or local community. In a sense, the potential upward mobility of youth to raise themselves above the squalor of their desperately deprived communities, is seen as a direct attack on the status quo of that community. Thus, any perceived opportunity for youth, is quickly derided by the community in hopes of denying any threat to the integrity of the community itself. This has a massive impact on the internal belief processes of youth in these communities and civil society leaders are increasingly tasked with trying to reverse this thinking: So, if everybody around them has no trust in them, why would they believe in themselves? They’ll just start believing what other people are saying; “oh, I am going to end up back in prison in another two months, or I’ll be out on Friday and back in on Monday.” Because, that’s what people expect, so they live up to people’s expectations. It’s trying to put those expectations in place that you can do this, you can get a qualification, you can go on and have a good career, or you can go to university, or even just tech or training. You can do better. It’s instilling those expectations so that they start living up to the positive expectations rather than the negative. That goes back to one of the challenges as well, instilling that belief in a young person that they can do it. (Participant #27, Project Lead, Belfast)

The project lead from Belfast continues these thoughts: A lot of things I have noticed along the way, from being a training organization, to doing support, to coming into [redacted] and working with young people day in day out is, that a lot of people around them don’t have any belief in them. They write them off. It’ll be, they don’t have any loyalty to anybody, it’s a revolving door in the justice system, they’ll go in and out of custody, or they’ll do well for a few months in a hostel, but then they’ll mess up and go out on a drink and drugs binge, or they’ll fight, they’ll get involved in crime. (Participant #27, Project Lead, Belfast)

I was curious how those in civil society worked within these confines to circumvent these vulnerabilities. The Belfast-based project lead shared some of her challenges in not only engaging youth, but also even accessing them: I find that a challenge. Especially over the summer, when you’re trying to do intervention work and diversionary work and trying to take young people away from the tensions and take them away from the interface areas, to reduce any conflict or rioting or anything like that. That’s the biggest challenge, getting the young people engaged in those areas at that time of the year. They’re being controlled to go out and prep for bonfires and be at parades and do things like that, so that’s challenging for me. (Participant #27, Project Lead, Belfast)

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The vulnerabilities of youth are apparent and clearly a major, salient issue for those in civil society. What is also clear from the conversations above, is that civil society leaders are struggling to address these issues within the broader environment of the peace process environment. In many ways, the post-GFA environment in Northern Ireland has created a serious deficit in the capacity of civil society to effectively handle these challenges. Whether these vulnerabilities are due to potentials of conflict recurrence, the effects of poverty, the devastating reality of the suicide threat, boredom, or the dearth of opportunities, the realities painted by these problems are all quite bleak. If today’s youth are expected to be tomorrow’s peacebuilding workhorses, they had better be in the stable when called upon. Yet the vulnerabilities unearthed by the conversations with civil society leaders suggest that the ships of tomorrow’s peace are seemingly lost adrift without a new rank of captains to take up the helm. Throughout this section, civil society leaders have expressed the realities they face, due to the deficits of a nonoptimal peace process. Exactly why this reality exists will be explored in more depth below. But this section and the testimonials within it, serve to provide a glimpse into the challenging reality faced at the ground level by those tasked with securing the future of a troubled peace process.

6.6 A brighter future? – exploring youth potential But is it all gloom and doom when it comes to youth? Interestingly, not necessarily, according to many of the civil society leaders that have contributed to this study. While there are numerous challenges facing youth and their effective inclusion within the Northern Ireland peace process, as discussed at length above, many civil society leaders continue to harbor a degree of hope. Given the conversations thus far around youth, the existence of hope seems almost startling, but the hopeful sentiment is expressed throughout civil society, suggesting it is a robust belief and not simply the case of peacebuilders wearing rose tinted glasses. Progress seems to be the key factor in this hopeful trend across civil society. Progress not necessarily from a peace process perspective, but progress in the form of generational shifts around social issues and identity issues. These shifts, to many in civil society, represent genuine opportunity for a Northern Irish peace process that has seen dubious success in the years following the GFA. A chairman of a peacebuilding organization in Derry/Londonderry notes this generational shift: 133

The first thing I’d say, the young people today are much more articulate, much better educated, much more aware than ever. And are better people than my generation and generations before them. And I think that has been a progression. You know I think that my father’s people would be less articulate, less well educated, and less willing to accept difference than my generation and I think the younger generation are much better at accepting difference and celebrating difference. And I think that’s only good. (Participant #3, Chairman of a Peacebuilding Organization, Derry/Londonderry)

You see young people who are fortunate enough to be economically and socially pretty okay. I’m not talking about rich or anything, like that, but they’re okay economically and socially. The Troubles are like history to them, like what the second World War was to people like me that forgot about it, trying to get on with their lives. (Participant #21, Program Director, Belfast)

And this shift, also noted by a project lead from Belfast, provides her with hope for the prospects of the peace process moving forward: I would be hopeful that in twenty years’ time, the young people that are now coming through, and like I said, I think that is still a predominately middle class grouping, but there is enough of a momentum I think there, that they’re starting to challenge…the us and them mentality. You’ve got young people now and young adults now who refer to themselves as both British and Irish citizens. The uptake in the passports is an indicator of that as well. There’s much more fluidity in the way that grouping, and age grouping, see their identity. That makes me hopeful. Because it’s likely it’ll be that grouping of middle-class young people who are the next elected representatives and your next heads of civil services and civil engagement or whatever. So, if they’re coming from a place where they’re more welcoming, more inclusive…and it’s not just about Catholic and Protestant, it’s about ethnic minorities here now and people coming from, asylum seekers and refugee status groups within the society. I definitely see in my twelve-year-old, a much more social awareness about issues like homelessness and open talking about that. A definite awareness around LGBTQ rights and the whole referendums that have gone on down South. That gives me hope in the sense that it’s on the radar and the young people coming through and the young adults that are already coming out of university or whatever…if they don’t leave, if they stay, there is a more inclusive, open culture and they don’t see their identities as set in stone. (Participant #27, Project Lead, Belfast)

The identity component highlighted by this project lead is highly significant. In a place marked by identity divisions and a conflict imbedded with consistent identity challenges, a shift in identity perspectives is all but a necessity for any hope of a future for the peace process. The Irish/British identity issues have dominated Northern Ireland discourse for centuries thus a potential reorientation around this issue is a weighty realization. 134

This identity issue has been tracked for a number of years by the Northern Ireland census and those results show evidence of this shift as well. Data from the previous two censuses (2001 and 2011) show a continued decline in Protestant populations while Catholic populations continue to rise (Key Statistics Census 2001; Key Statistics Census 2011). When it comes to national identity though, a question specifically posed in the 2011 census, some interesting results were revealed. When asked to identify as only British, Irish, Northern Irish, or a series of combinations of each, 40 percent of residents had a “British only” identity, 25 percent had an “Irish only” identity, and 21 percent had a “Northern Irish only” identity. When given the chance to note whether they include different national identities as part of their personal identities, 48 percent of residents included “British” as a national identity, 29 percent included “Northern Irish” as a national identity, and 28 percent included “Irish” as a national identity (NISRA, 2014). Thus, there is clearly a willingness and a desire for a substantial portion of the population to tie their identity not to either the Republic in the South or the Kingdom to the East. Instead, identifying as Northern Irish is seen as legitimate and familiar to many of the 1.8 million people living in the region. As Northern Ireland prepares for the next census in 2021, the question of national identity will be one that is closely analyzed. The celebration of progress tied this notion of a narrative of hope together for many in civil society. There is a recognition that the environment of Northern Ireland today, thanks largely to efforts at grassroots levels, presents opportunities for youth that could not have been a reality in the past. An organization director in Belfast shares her thoughts on this new reality and what it means for her own children: There’s something that we need to take…all a bit more seriously and really build, and be happy and positive about what we have achieved because Northern Ireland is a really different place than what it was for me growing up. I’m 40, so me growing up it’s a completely different place. I love that my children, when they see a police car, they get excited, because it’s “oh, there’s a police car Mummy.” Whereas it’s not an armored Landrover. They’ve been in a police station. It’s just different. (Participant #23, Organization Director, Belfast)

Difference, when it comes to a society trying to shift from conflict to peace, is a good thing. Those good things are occurring due to the quality of work being done at those grassroots levels: They’re a group who are here, very engaged. There’s been a lot of work done on the empowerment of young people, the engagement of young people, civics, and young 135

people and children’s parliaments, and all the rest of that stuff, coming from school right out, the whole way through. There are lots of young people who come through all of those processes, like in those two peacebuilding initiatives, either ground-up or top-down ones that we were describing, who feel very much committed to saying “never again, we want to do it a different way.” (Participant #2, CEO of an Umbrella Peacebuilding Organization, Belfast)

A program director from Belfast adds: Then we have young people who are involved in our peace programs who are challenging us. Under your PEACE IV funding you have like 45 million questionnaires to fill in, like this is nothing, what’d you have for breakfast type of stuff practically. It’s like religion, community you grew up in, community you live in, how you identify, nationality, all this. They’re like, why are you asking us this? We don’t see ourselves like this. I’m Jack and I’m bisexual or I’m Jack and a humanist, or whatever. And you’re asking us to put ourselves in these boxes? Now, I think that’s great that they’re challenging that, I do think that they are influenced and they might not always know. (Participant #23, Organization Director, Belfast)

This testimony represents a wonderful insight into how youth can not only change the culture of identity in Northern Ireland, but can also play a role in impacting the fundamental structural components of the peace process. Structures tend to be quite resolute and resistant to change, which has always posed a serious challenge in peace processes (Steinberg, 2013). Yet internal pressures from youth, as seen in the example provided by the organization director above, represent genuine potential in the path of Northern Ireland’s ongoing peace process. These implications, in a post-accord environment, will be explored in more detail later on in this chapter. Does the positive potential for youth in Northern Ireland make up a net-positive? Maybe not from a quantitative perspective. There is no denying the fears, disillusionment, and vulnerability of youth make up the majority of the conversation within this chapter. But from a qualitative perspective? There is certainly an argument to be made that the undercurrent of hope emanating from many in civil society is a serious player in dictating the overall path of this conversation. The challenges are real, and they should not be denied. But the potential is real as well, and that should be appreciated and built upon. But genuine understanding on the issue of youth is difficult to capture when looking only at individual elements. Thus, we must consider the issue from a holistic perspective, in order to draw out the knowledge offered through the experience and expertise of the participants within this study. That holistic consideration is where our attention now shifts. 136

6.7 Key findings of the research In any society, youth represent an important stakeholder group. This is exceedingly true within conflict zones, where youth represent a tangible link to the “future,” a future that many within a fledgling peace process hope is one markedly different from the past. Yet in Northern Ireland, rather than being a stakeholder group that society sees as a hopeful transition to the future, youth represent a source of concern and anxiety, which is understood most acutely by those at the front lines of waging peace: civil society. Five key findings emerged inductively from the data. First, young people, like civil society leaders, are also very disillusioned with the political apparatus in Northern Ireland. Second, there is a troubling trend of youth disengagement from the peace process and Northern Ireland itself. Third, segregated education is highlighted by civil society leaders as one of the leading causes of continued sectarianism and division within Northern Ireland. Fourth, civil society leaders recognize the vulnerability of youth as a distinct population group in Northern Ireland, particularly when it comes to the potential for conflict recurrence. And fifth, despite their fears and frustrations with young people, a number of civil society leaders still express hope that changing views of identity within younger generations represents potential for a brighter future. As I spoke with civil society leaders about Northern Ireland’s youth, several key themes continued to rise as pillars of eminent importance. The first is a recognition of an interesting parallel relationship that youth and civil society share when it comes to the political apparatus within Northern Ireland. Or perhaps a more accurate assessment, is the recognition of a similar lack of relationship when it comes to the political apparatus. With civil society leaders relating the widespread disconnect they see between youth and politics and politicians one cannot help but draw the similarities to the same conversations that were explored throughout Chapter 5 when it comes to the remarkably poor relationship between civil society and the political apparatus. With two key stakeholder groups, youth and civil society, experiencing the same disconnect and disenfranchisement with the political sphere, the evidence of a deeply flawed political sphere in Northern Ireland continues to be bolstered. These implications in perpetuating a state of negative peace are explored in more detail in Chapter 8. But for youth, the implications of widespread disillusionment with the political process represent a serious issue. The first and most present issue, is that if this disillusionment is left 137 unchecked, one has to wonder what the future of Northern Irish politics will look like? In a political environment that is already plagued by extreme instability, a lack of youth engagement means a dwindling scope of ideas and representation in an already narrow sector. A failure to effectively incorporate youth into the political conversation, risks creating an environment of stale ideas that have simply been recycled from the days of old. New ideas will become sparser and the divided rhetoric is unlikely to be broken. This cycle, once entrenched, rapidly becomes self-reinforcing. An echo chamber develops where the political elites are engaged only by one another, further distancing themselves from the realities of the populous at the grassroots level. And as one peacebuilding organization director suggests, the relationship between youth and the political sphere goes beyond apathy, into downright disgust. He argues that the political process, for many youth no longer, if it ever did, holds meaning. This is a serious issue for any democratic society, and even more so for a society climbing out of prolonged conflict. If the political institutions are intended to be the primary mechanisms by which the peace process is being driven forward, as was seemingly envisioned by the GFA, a disillusioned youth represents not only a threat to the success of politics in Northern Ireland, but it also represents an existential threat to the success of the peace process as well. Some of this disillusionment can be traced back to a learned distancing of engagement, as several civil society leaders note, at least when it comes to how parents and families handle, or more appropriately, avoid handling, politics. But a more pressing issue, which is highlighted repeatedly by civil society leaders, is that a large portion of youth in Northern Ireland simply do not have the capacity to devote attention to the political sphere. These youth populations find themselves faced with much more concrete concerns, such as finding employment, securing housing, avoiding the quagmire of drug abuse and addiction, and handling challenges with mental health issues, and that is all just the tip of the iceberg. Wider implications of youth vulnerabilities will be discussed shortly, but the key finding here, is that youth engagement in the political sphere is seriously hampered by ongoing challenges that dominate their focus and concern. Thus, the failure of the GFA to secure a peace dividend across society, especially in historically deprived communities, has led to a cycle where youth do not look to the political sphere as a beacon of hopeful change, but an imposing structure 138 that represents little more than a constant stream of “middle-aged men in suits shouting at each other.” The reality though, as one civil society leader highlights, is that politics is life. But the failure of the political sphere to effectively engage youth, combined with shortcomings of the GFA to tackle pressing issues of economic deprivation and mental health issues, has led to youth disassociating from the idea that change can be accomplished through political avenues. This is rightfully ringing alarm bells within civil society as leaders recognize the disillusionment with politics is leading naturally into a disengagement with the peace process as a whole. This second key finding of the chapter, the disturbing disengagement of youth from the peace process, and at times Northern Ireland itself in the form of the brain drain, is creating a significant wave of apprehension within civil society. While many civil society leaders expressed a sense of understanding when it came to the brain drain, they also recognize it as a serious challenge for the peace process and Northern Ireland as a whole. After all, if the best and brightest are leaving en masse, who will be left to carry on ownership of the peace process in the years and decades to come? The transition of knowledge and the passing of the leadership torch is not currently occurring within many CSOs, as there is a significant lack of youth incorporation at management levels. The fears and frustrations expressed by civil society leaders suggests that the already rocky road of peace in Northern Ireland is not likely to see any improvements in the short or long term. The role of youth populations in peace processes has been discussed at length earlier in this study and the insights offered by the civil society leaders show that Northern Ireland is already in the midst of a crisis when it comes to the effective incorporation of youth into these necessary roles as present and future leaders of the ongoing peace process. Successful peace processes are not just those that are able to bridge the divide between conflicting parties. Successful processes also bridge the gap between generations as youth take over the mantle of leadership from the generations of conflict and embrace the hopeful future of promise and peace. But from the experience and perspectives of the civil society leaders within this study, that generational bridge is not just languishing in a state of disrepair, the bridge, for much of Northern Ireland’s youth, does not even seem to exist. The data from this study shows that the future of Northern Ireland’s peace process is in a dangerous position as youth are not 139 only distancing themselves from the process, but they are physically distancing themselves from Northern Ireland all together. So why is this occurring? Is this simply the fate of Northern Ireland and we should all just get used to it? The answer to that second query, is certainly no. Though challenges exist for youth in Northern Ireland, points of intervention do exist. Thus, we circle back to the pressing question of why these challenges are plaguing Northern Ireland and the youth within the country. While part of the answer lies with broad shortcomings and failures of the GFA, which will be discussed in Chapters 8 and 9, a specific youth-related issue was repeatedly highlighted by civil society leaders as a leading cause of many issues discussed above: education. The third key finding, is that the overwhelming nature of segregated education in Northern Ireland was almost universally highlighted by civil society leaders as a key issue relating to the challenges that have been discussed. As one organization director mentioned, “educate us separately from each other we will not understand each other” and the issue with that, is “we fear what we don’t understand.” Segregated education in Northern Ireland is depriving youth of crucial opportunities for understanding the “other.” This means a perpetuation of “us and them” mentality, which is a far cry from the building of any kind of “shared future” as the political sphere continues to champion. The ubiquity of frustration from civil society leaders on the issue of segregated education highlights the seriousness of the problem. And for many in civil society, this is one of the major glaring mistakes of the GFA, the lack of any direct reforms to the education structure in Northern Ireland. This omission from the series of reforms included in the GFA is still left unattended and unresolved in Northern Ireland today. The research shows that the lack of education reform represents a critical and ongoing barrier to effective peacebuilding in the region. This suggests that the failures of the GFA to address the issue in 1998 need to be given a sense of urgency today, as an issue that needs to be tackled. Whole scale education reform towards an integrated system is by no means an easy or pain-free process. The peacemakers in 1998 understood this reality, which is partly why they chose to “kick the can down the road” when it came to education reform. But with the experience and expertise gained over the last two decades, civil society leaders are arguing that this kicking of the can down the road has created a sustained roadblock on the path to peace. 140

And if the ease of reform has not grown in the last twenty years, it seems unlikely to grow in the next twenty. This realization has led to many of the leaders included in this study to call for an immediate focus on education reform for the sake of understanding, knowledge, and the survival of the peace process itself. The longer that youth are educated separately, the deeper the trenches are dug within PUL and CNR communities. Thus, the “agreement babies” continue to play into the divisions of the Troubles, rather than the ideals espoused in the agreement itself. If Northern Ireland is going to be serious about the political push of “building together a shared future,” civil society leaders argue that it will have to start with bringing youth together for a shared education. The importance of education reform is clear, but the challenges surrounding it are obvious as well. Civil society leaders note both of these realities and recognize why many peacemakers and peacebuilders have simply left the issue to be solved at another time. But the growing sense is that time is not exactly in infinite supply. The challenges of full-scale reform cannot be ignored, which means this should be a time where creativity is utilized to draw a balance between making forward progress while avoiding being paralyzed by the endemic historical issues of education reform. Stopgap solutions such as shared campuses should continue to be explored as steppingstones towards genuine integration. Shared campuses, where students still attend segregated classes, yet are sharing a campus leading to natural opportunities for interactions with their fellow youth are clearly not a lasting solution, but it is that type of creativity that needs to be utilized when it comes to education reform in Northern Ireland. The data gathered in this study clearly reveals the urgency of the issue for Northern Ireland’s civil society leaders and thus creative and urgent action must embraced now. The time of kicking the “education can” down the road, as civil society leaders implore, has to end, for the sake of peace in the North of Ireland. The fourth key finding notes the vulnerability of youth as a distinct population group in Northern Ireland. As you combine all of these factors, from political disillusionment, peace process and societal disengagement, along with a segregated and structurally flawed education system, you find yourself with a significant population of youth taking up the mantle as one of societies’ most vulnerable groups. This vulnerability of youth populations represents the culmination of many fears and concerns expressed by civil society leaders. The original research 141 within this study highlights this dangerous reality as those on the frontlines of the grassroots environment are ringing alarm bells about the youth they are working with. Civil society leaders are noting firsthand recognition of rising levels of emotional and psychological concerns within youth that are being undertreated. That alone is concerning enough but given that these realties are occurring in the shadow of The Troubles and the ongoing societal divisions, a toxic mix is brewing which is having profound influences on the youth of today. Additionally, the continued influence of paramilitaries creates an added negative pull on those already vulnerable youth. In severely deprived communities, where jobs are non-existent, political leadership is unheard of, and drug abuse is running rampant, youth can see paramilitaries as a source of status and security in the midst of their vulnerability. This has led to several civil society leaders expressing considerable concern that, in the hopefully unlikely event of conflict recurrence, youth would be the first group swept up into the action. Putting aside the fears of armed conflict, civil society leaders are quick to note that another type of violence is already impacting these vulnerable youth populations in the form of the staggering rates of suicide. If the GFA was meant to deliver genuine and holistic peace to Northern Ireland, the epidemic of youth suicide rates throws into serious question the successfulness of the realization of that goal. What is alarming about this reality, is that many of the factors that civil society leaders attribute to the rise in youth suicide, such as, economic deprivation, the housing crisis, and criminal and paramilitary behaviors in communities, are all issues that were seen in the 1960s and 1970s in the prelude to the escalation of The Troubles. Thus, as youth struggle with these issues and challenges, many civil society leaders are looking back asking, how are we back here again? What did the GFA actually fix? While a more in-depth consideration of the promises and betrayals of the GFA are explored in Chapter 9, what is clear from the data presented in this chapter, is that the unwillingness or inability of the GFA to adequately incorporate and address concerns of youth has led to a generation of “agreement babies” that are still vulnerable, and in some cases more vulnerable, as they experience the same challenging life realities as their parents and grandparents. Working class youth are more vulnerable with little opportunities, while middle class university education youth leave for more fertile ground in a brain drain. 142

In this sense, several civil society leaders fear that many of the same factors that were brewing in the years leading up to The Troubles are beginning to bubble up once again in Northern Ireland today. With violence already a reality for many young people living in Northern Ireland, by way of suicide rates in vulnerable communities, the “peace” process is no more than a fairytale without bearing or influence on their daily lives. Serious attention and change needs to occur now, as time is a luxury that is simply not afforded to Northern Ireland’s youth. And finally, the fifth key finding of this chapter, reveals that not all hope is lost in the minds of civil society leaders as they consider the next generation. Despite all of the above findings when it comes to youth…the overwhelming sense of concern and fear emanating out of civil society…there exists another theme in their testimonies as well. This theme is one of potential and, just maybe, one of hope. Despite discussing at length, the challenges facing Northern Irish youth today, many civil society leaders also revealed a slight, but nonetheless consistent, thread of hope when considering the potential of the “agreement baby” generation. Civil society leaders note the shifting realities of identity within younger populations and hope that this will lead to future change within Northern Ireland. Evidence from demographic responses in census figures already indicate a shift in national identity occurring within Northern Ireland, and civil society leaders are offering qualitative evidence to support this at the grassroots level. Identity is becoming more nuanced within younger populations and this has the potential to open new opportunities for broader levels of inclusion between groups; whether that group distinction arise from a cultural or nationality perspective. Perhaps it is the nature of those that find their way to the peacebuilding field that they cannot help but to always hold onto at least a small thread of hope. Or, maybe it is due to those in civil society having a front row seat to the individual realities at the grassroots level. Realities which certainly show the challenges and issues ahead, but also realities that show the hope of progress that exists as well. Whatever the reason, the message is clear. Youth do represent the embodiment of the future and that future is one that is still to be written. Speaking about the changes they see in Northern Ireland today, compared to their own childhoods, civil society leaders offer a critical reminder for all places traveling down the road of peace. Embracing youth engagement within peace processes represents a wealth of potential and opportunity. In Northern Ireland, as this research project shows, youth represent a very real 143 opportunity for a shift in the narrative around identity that has helped to perpetuate a centuries old conflict. First-hand experience from the grassroots level, offered by civil society leaders throughout Northern Ireland, reveals that youth today are beginning to effectively think outside of the “us and them” paradigm that continues to plague the country as a whole as their identities become more complexified outside of the narrow sectarian ethnoreligious one. Capitalizing on this willingness and desire of youth to break down the borders of identity can lead to a genuine tonal shift in Northern Ireland, that can begin to erode the physical and psychological boundaries that still exist decades after the signing of the GFA. Again, the challenges are raw and very real when it comes to youth, and the burden of progress cannot and should not be left solely to rest on their shoulders. But what the civil society leaders in this study provide, is a recognition that the “agreement baby” generation, when supported and appreciated, can be a valuable ally in building a more powerful and positive peace in Northern Ireland.

6.8 Conclusion This chapter focused upon the ever-important topic of youth within Northern Ireland. Highlighting the concerns raised by civil society leaders, several key themes were discussed. First, a general disillusionment with politics and the political sphere was discussed as a key roadblock towards including the voices of youth within the conversations of peace and progress. This disillusionment has led to a significant disconnect between the political sphere and youth; a disconnect that parallels the relationship between civil society and the political sphere. Second, the pressing issue of youth disengagement from the peace process was explored. Additionally, the brain drain was discussed as an example of how some youth are taking this disengagement to absolute terms and abandoning Northern Ireland altogether. Third, based on the consistent evidence provided by civil society leaders, the specific issue of education structures was investigated. A near unanimous consensus from civil society leaders included in this study point towards the continued practice of segregated education as a significant cause of continued societal divisions and youth struggles. Fourth, with these challenges taken into consideration, a general discussion on youth vulnerabilities revealed the dangers of leaving these issues left unaddressed. Touching on issues such as economic deprivation, mental health (including suicide), paramilitary influence, and 144 more, the importance of recognizing youth as a vulnerable population was a crucial point of focus for all of the study participants. Finally, a small, but significant ribbon of hope runs through these conversations regarding youth, and that hope was explored as a means to embrace the potential of the “agreement baby generation.” Namely, the shifting conceptualization of identity within youth populations was highlighted as a source of opportunity for shifting the divided narratives and rhetoric of old. Many challenges exist, but youth in Northern Ireland today represent an opportunity to transition from the conversations of conflict towards the progressiveness of peace.

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Chapter 7 Money matters: Structural and funding challenges for Northern Ireland’s civil society actors

7.1 Introduction As it turns out, peace processes can be remarkably lucrative. In many cases, technocratic peace processes become highly formalized, highly professionalized, and a genuine financial windfall for those that understand how to take full advantage of the process (Cheng & Zaum, 2012; Duckworth, 2016; Hoeffler, 2014; Mac Ginty, 2012). In Northern Ireland alone, billions of euros, pounds, and dollars has been poured into the peacebuilding process (Potter & Egerton, 2011). And yet, these funds are far from accessible for many. Rather than an open hand of support, many peacebuilding programs in Northern Ireland are met with a closed fist of denial. But what impact have the fundamental and structural funding frameworks had on civil society in Northern Ireland? As it turns out, a lot. In every conversation with civil society leaders that occurred within the scope of this study, the topic of peace funds and financing was never far from the forefront of conversation. What was clear from the ongoing conversations with study participants was one simple fact when it comes to money; it matters, a lot. This centralized focus on funding is hardly a novel finding when it comes to the PACS discipline. As discussed at length in Chapter 3, considerable research has been undertaken to better understand the role of peace funding and external funds within peacebuilding processes. However, as similar conversations arose with the participants of this study, a number of unique understandings were revealed. As the Northern Irish peace process officially enters its third decade (from the signing of the GFA, at least, as I fully recognize the existence of a holistic peace process that extends much further back), funding considerations within the area are entering an interesting period. The honeymoon period of external funding is certainly well beyond its twilight and CSOs are increasingly forced to devote considerable thought towards the future of peace operations within Northern Ireland and the funding transitions that are already well underway. Additionally, as nearly all participants mention, the relationship between civil society and the political apparatus in Northern Ireland is strained, at best; these conversations are discussed in depth within Chapter 5. This has had dramatic impact on peace funding, as mission drift 146 becomes a genuine challenge in the breakdown of effective communication between the sectors. With the multi-year suspension of Stormont clouding the air with uncertainty, funding frustrations are beginning to evolve into funding fears. This chapter explores the importance of peace funding within Northern Ireland by drawing on the experience and expertise of civil society leaders. Four key themes were continually on the minds of the study participants and each is reviewed in turn. First, I highlight the challenges of funding reductions. Both the threat of potential reductions and the effects of current reductions are examined. Second, funding constraints faced by those within civil society are noted. As civil society has sought to fill in gaps left behind by GFA inadequacies (whether through design or implementation), civil society leaders discuss the maddening challenges of accessing core funding when working with “undesirable” populations and topic areas. Third, as mentioned before, Northern Ireland finds itself in a time of transition, and this extends to funding structures and frameworks as well. Civil society is navigating new waters and leaders are considering not only their own futures in the midst of these transitions, but also what it means for the peace process as a whole. And finally, the stark reality of funding dependency is an issue that comes up with considerable frequency, highlighting its importance on the minds of civil society leaders. This dependency comes in many shapes and forms and it fundamentally impacts how peacebuilding processes are occurring throughout the North of Ireland. When it comes to peace processes, money matters. That conclusion, in and of itself, is not revolutionary. However, the unique contributions by this study’s participants provide new insights into exactly how money matters within the Northern Ireland peace process. By privileging their voice, their experiences, and their expertise, this chapter explores these funding topics from the perspective of civil society, and within the context of the GFA design and implementation.

7.2 Feeling the pinch in the purse – funding reductions In the midst of hard-won peacemaking processes where the jubilation of a hopeful new future is no longer a fool’s dream, the doors of peace funding tend to be open wide as funders (external and internal alike) jump at the chance to join in the wave of goodwill. Yet the post- accord period is rarely smooth and those initial waves of momentum, and peace funds, begin to evaporate as the peacebuilding process fights to become the new norm within society. Civil 147 society leaders are acutely aware of this reality and they are not shy about expressing their ongoing struggles with these reductions. This ‘honeymoon’ period of peace funding is the only reality that some within civil society know. Yet there are others, who have been established long before any financial peace dividends started flowing into the region, that have a clearer understanding of the ebb and flow (emphasis now on ebb), of peace funds within Northern Ireland. Talking about this process, one hybrid funding organization CEO offers her perspective: [This process is] complicated by the fact that what will be normal as we go forward, is less, certainly in financial terms, and in delivery terms for community and voluntary organizations, than what it would’ve been in the last twenty years. So, those who’re thinking of the last twenty years as being the normal, it’s not. I’ve worked longer than that, and so, I think, it goes back to a period before that again. And, it’s easier, in the community and voluntary sector, to go from a place where a lot of the activity was being funded, on a voluntary base…people were just doing the work, not being paid for it at all. Through the process of…small amounts of money, then to European [funds] and large amounts of money, and so on. It’s easier to get sucked into that road, if you like, than it is to walk painfully back in another direction again. (Participant #2, CEO of an Umbrella Peacebuilding Organization, Belfast)

And that, unfortunately, is the reality that many CSOs are looking at today. It is a reality of trying to walk backward on the money road, away from the windfall of billions of euros, towards an existence of far more stringent financial realities. And for many, these new realities may even mean the end of operations as they know it. A Derry/Londonderry based peacebuilder lays out her stark new reality: I don’t think we’ll survive beyond this year, because our funding has been cut, totally. I will have to go part time and [redacted] will have to get another job beyond this year. We’re living on reserves, because our funding has been so badly cut. Nine organizations, out of 42 that applied, got core funding. Many of them didn’t get what they needed. If we speak out, we’re sidelined…There’s nobody to speak up for us because it’s not in the interests of the councilors or the politicians or anything to speak for us. (Participant #5, Peacebuilder, Derry/Londonderry)

Some are luckier than others, as one peacebuilding organization director notes below, but she’s not blind to the realities others in civil society are facing: Short term funding is always a challenge, but we are always lucky that we’re still here. And there’s lots of organizations that are really good, doing work that they’ve done, and they’ve been taken for granted. Where statutory providers have not recognized the hard work that the community voluntary sector does, and not see how we help them, so there’s been lots of different challenges. (Participant #23, Organization Director, Belfast) 148

As major peace funding programs begin to phase out, or undergo their own transitions, such as the EU PEACE program, CSOs are left to struggle in the wake of those reductions, unable to sustain without these core monetary infusions that they have come to rely upon: It’s already, since the ending of the PEACE III program, there’s already been lots of cuts in peace money, peace monies. Lots of organizations have closed down or trimmed heavily. (Participant #20, Director of Research Organization, Belfast)

The CEO of a hybrid funding organization echoes this: So, there’s a natural resizing going on there, and that has implications for the amount of money that is available in the community and voluntary sectors for the source of activities they want to carry out. (Participant #2, CEO of an Umbrella Peacebuilding Organization, Belfast)

There is a natural ebb and flow within post-accord peace process societies when it comes to funding but what the civil society leaders above are highlighting is the increase in the ebb, without the corresponding flow. As the purse strings tighten it is not just about cutting back on services, it becomes a concern of survival. While a surplus of services and programs is likely to exist in the midst of a flood of peace funding, when that well dries up, the pruning of programs and services is typically done wholesale and at random, not in any kind of community focused manner. This can mean that critical services that are not duplicated may fall victim to the same axe as those duplicitous programs. To compound the issue, many grassroots organizations do not typically retain an economic expert or grant writing savant on staff. Thus, as the access to funds is restricted, many organizations are left wholly unprepared to fight for their slice of the proverbial funding pie. One Belfast-based organization director mentions her struggles: There’s all of that and that’s where I’m not a business person. So, I would almost advise them to have somebody who is a business person who can help them. [Our organization] is a charitable organization but we have to run as a business as well. We had a board meeting on Monday night and they’re holding me account to the bottom line. “You have this many staff and this much money, where’s the rest of the money” they said? You’re working this amount, you’re doing all these projects, you’re now better on social media… Oh god, it’s so hard. But where’s the money and here’s the availability and where are you in five years’ time, in ten years’ time? I’m still out delivering training and mediating and looking at an interface area and trying to bring communities together and trying then to go to [the Department of Justice] (DOJ) and do that. So, you’re doing all of that as well as running a business and that’s really difficult, so having some who could 149

help with that and invest in an administration, and those kind of back office support. (Participant #23, Organization Director, Belfast)

So where can they turn for help? Unfortunately, there are not too many options. One hope would be to their local political representatives, but that potential recourse is fraught with even more complexity. It was a key concern that was explored in depth within Chapter 5, but the disconnect between civil society and the political apparatus within Northern Ireland has a significant impact on funding realities as well. A very frustrated peacebuilder from Derry/Londonderry quite succinctly summarizes her thoughts: I think that we only matter, when it suits the politicians, other than that, we don’t matter. We would be seen as the first casualties of any funding cutbacks. (Participant #5, Peacebuilder, Derry/Londonderry)

Carrying out grassroots peacebuilding work is challenging enough, without constantly looking up to see the funding guillotine perched precariously above your head. Navigating this reality is something that many smaller organizations have neither the capacity nor the capability to handle. However, there have been some hybrid organizations that have popped up in Northern Ireland, as is seen in peace processes elsewhere (Fearon et al., 2009), to help fill this void of support and transition. One such example is explored below. The Community Relations Council (CRC) is an interesting hybrid funding organization that deserves some brief discussion within the context of this chapter. It was developed in 1990 and has functioned as an arm’s length body of the Northern Ireland Executive. This puts the CRC at an interesting crossroads between both the community sector and the political sector, straddling what has historically been the nexus of a complicated relationship between the sectors. The CRC functions primarily as a funding body, though its directive is not influenced from the political sector per se, there is obvious influence through open lines of dialogue and communication. Likewise, the CRC is not directly engaged in grassroots service provisions, yet it has traditionally worked hand-in-hand with these organizations throughout civil society. The focus has always been on furthering the cross-community objectives of both the Executive and civil society, thus, its hybrid status. In having a hand in funding decisions, the CRC has provided key grassroots level understanding, while also being uniquely equipped to understand and handle the complexities of accessing the higher-level funding channels. 150

As discussed before, in the eyes of Northern Irish civil society, the CRC represents an important piece in the peace funding puzzle. Especially for many small-scale programs and organization, the CRC represents a hybrid funding source that allows them to access funds that might otherwise be entirely out of reach. Thus, when the CRC faces the pain of cutbacks, those reductions are magnified to the dependent organizations below. A Derry/Londonderry based peacebuilder spells out those concerns that are felt throughout the grassroots community: What they’ve done effectively is totally decimated the community relations council, it’s down to just a bare minimum now. It was a funding function, but the policy and decisionmaking function and advice has been removed. There has been a number of other departments within it, or voiced, that have been removed and it has become just essentially a small funding body with a very small funding pot of money. (Participant #5, Peacebuilder, Derry/Londonderry)

When those pots run dry, it is the small, grassroots organizations that are the first to die of thirst. The CRC offers an interesting lesson though, on the power and importance of hybrid funding organizations within post-accord societies. The complexities of peace funding are not uniquely relegated to Northern Ireland, thus, other post-accord societies can, and should, take note of the usefulness of such hybrid organizations. As a whole, the increasing intensity of funding reductions are not a surprise to civil society leaders in Northern Ireland, but that does not mean everyone is prepared to face this new reality. If these funding reductions were occurring at a time of unquestioned peace and prosperity within Northern Ireland, the conversations might be more upbeat. After all, is not the intention of peacebuilding processes that they eventually cease to exist once peace has been realized? But the reality is that Northern Ireland is not a peaceful society (at least in terms of positive peace, which is discussed in the following chapter). Thus, these reductions do not mark a celebratory transition phase, but one that is marked by apprehension and uncertainty. Building peace is challenging. Building peace in times of uncertainty of organizational survival is a challenge as many civil society leaders find themselves unable to handle the stress.

7.3 Handcuffs and the plight of working with unpopular populations – funding constraints Exploring issues regarding peace funding naturally led, almost always, towards a conversation around the constraints felt by CSOs. It was a natural transition in our conversations, as reductions and constrictions often impact CSOs in the same negative manner. Thus, even 151 those organizations that may find themselves immune to the current round of funding reductions, though they keep a wary eye ahead, they are likely already working within a significant set of constraints that are impacting their ability to deliver the peacebuilding services they seek to provide. Civil society leaders note a variety of ways in which they are constrained, from influence by external forces to working with ‘difficult populations’ within Northern Ireland. But what is important here, is recognizing that constraints on peacebuilding organizations means constraints on the peace process as well. For a process that is already an uphill battle, these constraints can have immediate and dire impacts, as the civil society leaders in this study discuss below. The director of a peacebuilding organization discusses a number of ways that he’s found CSOs to be financially constrained: Community sector organizations are constrained from mobilizing in this way: A) for fear they’ll piss the powers that be off, because we’re financially dependent, B) because to insure ongoing funding, you’re forced to tender and apply for funds that are offered with predefined outcomes so you’re not responding to the need on the ground…homelessness, hunger…you’re fitting into the imposed decisions from the top. Thirdly, you’re funded in a way to ensure that the best you can deliver is locally and short term, not regionally and long term. Fourthly, every time that you reapply for funding, to secure funding, you have to reinvent yourself, you have to do something different and something new. And finally, because there’s not enough money to go around, you’re set up to actively compete against the organizations that you need to work in partnership with to build a coalition to generate a critical mass of awareness in civic society. Once you get that critical mass of awareness, the beautiful thing is that if my organization achieves that, we get a critical mass, in the process of getting that, we lose control over that, it’s not ours anymore. It’s theirs. And it snowballs. And we’re just along…we’re just sailing the avalanche down, we’re merely a part of it to god knows where. (Participant #1, Director of a Peacebuilding Organization, Belfast)

There are a number of issues that he highlights here that deserve some deeper analysis. To begin with, let’s consider his first point. The interconnectedness and dependency factors have been touched on in Chapter 5 and will also garner some attention later in this chapter as well. But the fact that he immediately notes this rather fearful dependency suggest how heavily it weighs on those in civil society. This dependency component provides a frightening amount of power for “the power that be” over civil society actors. Subsequent discussions in this chapter explore these issues in depth, but the importance of this psychological and financial constraint cannot be overstated. 152

He also brings up the issue of disconnect between higher powers, whether that be independent funders or politicians, and the grassroots level. Again, this was an issue broached in a previous chapter (Chapter 5), but it was done so in general terms as a discussion of the civil society – political apparatus relationship. This issue’s direct impact on funding warrants a second consideration within the current context. The second point he makes, highlights how out of touch the current peacebuilding environment is with the realties at the grassroots level. By incorporating a complicated and overly bureaucratized funding process, a strange lag develops in the focus areas of the programs and services that are led by grassroots organizations. Instead of the “first responders” dictating the needs on the ground, the higher-level funding apparatus sets the agenda, regardless of the immediate needs seen at the local level. Thus, many times civil society leaders are left running programs that do little to assist in the actual and present needs of their communities, simply because they are handcuffed, when it comes to the type and focus of funding that is made available to them. The short-term component he notes in his third point, rings true of many peace funding operations (Cheng & Zaum, 2012). When working to address immediate crisis points, short term funding does not necessarily present any major problems. However, for those organizations and civil society leaders working on long-term goals within their communities, goals that will take planning and consistent foundational work, this short-term method of funding presents serious constraints. It is challenging to build a multi-year plan, when you are unsure if you will still have funding as the calendar turns to a new year. A community developer from Derry/Londonderry offers a useful example of this reality: The only kind of negativity I would have is what [redacted] has said, funders come in giving short term funding, maybe a year, fifteen months, to do meaningful work and that’s where I would be, not scathing, but it disappoints me. It’s like piecemeal and it’s not good enough, it’s not long enough. People aren’t remaining secure in their jobs. You work for a partial organization and we were talking about the structures, the political structures, feeding down from the top down to the communities. It’d be very difficult for people possibly coming from this organization to try and secure employment elsewhere within other organizations. That I suppose, would be my only negativity, there’s not enough partial jobs for people who really want to do meaningful work for the real reason. We’re not just ticking boxes just for the sake of it to keep funders happy. I just wish we could fix that more here on this end and it’s difficult to do, because you’re expected to go out and in six months, what’s a year’s work and 153

what you send in the application has to be completed. (Participant #18, Community Developer, Derry/Londonderry)

Additionally, as the Community Organization Director noted earlier, the short-term funding also tends to be very locally focused, although exceptions obviously exist. This creates serious challenges to building a broader, more interconnected peace process throughout the region. Civil society thrives as it builds connections and social capital, but that natural ability becomes exceedingly challenging when these types of short-term locally exclusive funding constraints are applied throughout the section. One would think, though, that this local focus might mean a boon for local communities. Unfortunately, that is not always the case. Many marginalized communities throughout Northern Ireland are still “waiting” to see their share of the peace dividend. The atmosphere of miniature, local bubbles that has developed due to the short-term localized funding decisions at many stages of the EU PEACE and IFI programs has meant that some communities simply get lost in the shuffle. A program director from North Belfast discusses her frustrated experience: It [EU PEACE funds, the IFI] was helpful and provided opportunities for greater engagement, particularly in areas where there wouldn’t have been engagement. But I would argue that it hasn’t all been spent well. I think much more important, well not much more important, but in parallel with this, we didn’t get a big economic investment in order to lift marginalized communities up out of their poverty. It actually got worse, because we sort of ten, twelve years ago had that crisis and everything got worse. So, there wasn’t the economic investment. Say for instance, use an example of a community like this, education underpayment is a huge issue here. Even with economic investment, I’m talking about industry and what not, the kids in these communities wouldn’t have been equipped with the skills to avail of the opportunities they’re owed. It’s quite overwhelming. (Participant #21, Program Director, Belfast)

The Community Organization director quoted earlier, brings up another important issue as his fourth point highlights a common critique of some external peace funding programs, like the aforementioned EU PEACE or IFI. There tends to be an interesting desire from funders to shift their focus between iterations of their funding frameworks. Take for instance, the shift from the mission focus of PEACE III and the revamped objectives of PEACE IV (Special EU Programmes Body, 2016; McGarrigle, 2016). For organizations operating directly within the objectives cone of PEACE III, the attempts to justify their operations to fit with PEACE IV funding is not exactly an easy task. My own experience working within the sector, assisting a grassroots organization based in Magherfelt, Northern Ireland in 2013, with funding applications 154 at the transition of PEACE III and PEACE IV, showed me firsthand the existential crisis that many CSOs experience in the face of these changes. And finally, this competitive atmosphere that is fostered, due to these funding constraints, suddenly pits peacebuilding organization against peacebuilding organization in a bizarre gladiatorial competition within the context of an idealistic collaborative field (neoliberalism). This competitive reality of CSOs is one area that is woefully under explored within the PACS discipline. And as that competition increases, not out of genuine growth of an expanding sector, but by way of an artificial shrinking of mutual resources, it is critical that new understandings be developed to better assist organizations in returning to partnerships of collaboration rather than competition. In many ways, we can look to the world of organizational analysis to understand this process as it closely resembles a common system archetype: tragedy of the commons (Braun, 2002). While cooperation and goodwill are often free flowing when the communal pot of resources is full, once the number of programs and organizations that are drawing upon that common resource finally stretches it beyond capacity, suddenly fewer and fewer are able to draw from that resource pot. This leaves heightened tensions and competition which is hardly conducive to peaceful goodwill amongst peacebuilding organizations. This environment creates some challenging realities, as one Belfast-based organization director mentions: Even though you work in peacebuilding, actually, we’re all vying against each other for money and funders will tell you this much. Maybe if you’re too open and too friendly, what are they after, you know? And we’ve had that. When we started with the housing executive, and we started every session with tea and coffee and scones, we were all, “what’re you after, what do you want?” (Participant #23, Organization Director, Belfast)

These considerations represent a useful perspective on the over-all constraints faced by civil society in regard to the funding structures within Northern Ireland. There is also an inherent understanding of a general lack of control, for civil society, that is built into these constraints as well. In many ways, the lack of control, constrains the potential of civil society, not only in service delivery, but perhaps even more importantly, in terms of voice input in the overall direction of peace process activities. One Derry/Londonderry peacebuilder puts it this way: Because of the way that civic society is formed here and the way that organizations are funded, and supported, that if we speak out, we are eliminated. There’s a culling of the community sector and the peacebuilding sector, because we are the only challenge to the 155

Good Friday Agreement and to the politicians that are in power, because they don’t have any other challenge. (Participant #5, Peacebuilder, Derry/Londonderry)

Similar sentiments shine through in the opinion of a program leader in Belfast, as she equates the situation to that of highway robbery: There’s still that level of, where I feel that we’re being held to ransom, to a certain extent. You can have this pot, but you must do this and this. That’s for every piece of funding that we apply for, but there are levels where it does compromise what your principles are and what the ethos of the organization is. (Participant #11, Program Leader, Belfast)

Walking that line between maintaining organization, and mission, independence while also working to not “piss off the powers that be” takes a lot of work. When resources are tight and the pots of funding are drying up around you, finding exactly how to manage that balance is a constant battle for those in civil society: A big, big challenge has always been resources. And being as creative as possible in trying to get resources…you can’t do stuff without resources, so that’s a big challenge. And the other thing then is within that, getting resources and retaining a level of integrity. Because nobody gives you resources without wanting to put their constraints on you. And so, you can be bought off by the system and by a series of systems…they’ve got plenty of resources, but if you want to do what’s worth doing…and you don’t always see that, that’s not always clear. (Participant #3, Chairman of Peacebuilding Organization, Derry/Londonderry)

It is not just a result of the funding structures though, that these constraining problems arise. The funders also shoulder a burden in creating and perpetuating this problem within Northern Ireland. A hybrid funding organization CEO offers her unique perspective on this: And, one of the things that we haven’t got very far with, I have to say, which is in a way a disappointment, that’s the way in which the place we are now has arrested and paused some of the issues that were very important. But, essentially, it really was saying, “I don’t want to hear about these processes, I don’t want you to describe to me how, what you are doing. I want to talk about the difference it makes.” And, if I’m having that conversation I’m not interested in you as a funder and I’m not interested in you as a service deliverer, all of you community and voluntary, and other types of organizations. I’m interested in the difference you make. I want to hear about the citizens. I want to hear about the end users, customers, however you want to define them, and what a difference it made to their lives. That is quite a different, very importantly, different approach to things. So, there’s another reason for organizations to be feeling slightly bereft, you know, slightly set aside, or used, if you like. (Participant #2, CEO of an Umbrella Peacebuilding Organization, Belfast)

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Thus, the situation is complex, as funders and program leaders face unique and concurrent challenges within the scope of the funding environment. Compounding these issues, is the fact that a number of CSOs face considerable pushback from funders, hybrid or traditional, due to the issue areas or the specific populations that they are working with in their peacebuilding activities. This unique, and far too often under considered, component of grassroots peacebuilding, has meant that those organizations willing to work with “difficult populations” often times find themselves squarely on the outside of the funding landscape, looking hopelessly inward towards a reality of access they cannot tap into. Overt control over funds can naturally lead to funders having overt control over the types of organizations and programs that develop within the peacebuilding field. One significant challenge civil society leaders note, as a result of this constraint, is the issue of accessing funds when working with ‘unpopular populations.’ This is an inherent issue within conflict zones that represents a significant gap in our overall understanding of effective peacebuilding processes (Mitchell, 2011). Funders, especially those tied directly to the state apparatus, tend to be a bit tense when it comes to taking chances on new funding ventures. There is considerable logic there, though, for funders to want to play it safe in the fragile post-accord period. Emotions are still highly charged following years of sustained conflict and any potentially destabilizing moves are typically avoided like the plague. As a result, when it comes to committing funds to potentially highly divisive projects, avoidance is the norm rather than the aberration. Thus, we come to the issue of working with unique populations within Northern Ireland, namely, ex-prisoners and former combatants, CSOs have often found it a nightmare to access and secure funding to carry on their critical work. As noted by a program leader in Belfast: My experience would be that a lot of organizations in civil society, and talking specifically in terms of civil society, former combatants and ex-prisoners, they have shaped grassroots community projects on their own. And actually, were funded through American philanthropic organizations, because there was government embargoes on projects here. (Participant #11, Program Leader, Belfast)

Her view and experience was supported time and time again by her fellow civil society leaders: We do get formal government funding, from the department of justice. What I’m saying to you is obviously equivalent in terms of [Community Restorative Justice Ireland] (CRJI) as well. And that has largely been done, I would say predominantly it’s been done, without a really good, strong political backing. 157

Because, in essence it was groupings like ourselves that were the only ones supporting particular groups within civil society: ex-prisoners, former combatants, families who have been affected by Troubles and the conflict, and supporting families up and down to prison services. Those groups sort of just came about in terms of…social justice projects really, but we just didn’t label them that. We were labeled as being, “sure they just work with the paramilitaries or they’re supporting terrorism.” Far from it. Far, far, far from it. That’s been a level of stigma. (Participant #11, Program Leader, Belfast)

The challenge though, is that ideas around victims/survivors/ex-prisoners/former combatants, and other ‘difficult populations’ has been a highly politicized topic from the very beginning (Vollhardt, 2015). And the politicization of these communities is continuing to wreak havoc, not only in the halls of Stormont, but throughout civil society as well. The frustration is palpable as one program leader from Belfast shares her thoughts on the issue: Yeah, I mean even, part of the reason we’ve no government at the minute is that they couldn’t get agreement on victims. That’s getting down to the fact of paying compensation. The DUP have vetoed that because they’re saying, no, no, no. Whilst all these normal civil people will receive compensation, you might have a handful of former combatants that will also benefit and what your view on that is… But you’re sort of thinking that the people that are campaigning for that are the victims. Who are you to tell them? If this is the group and they are saying we’re fine with this, or not fine, but you know, we accepted this as maybe something will help us move on. And the political parties are coming in and they’re trumping what they’re saying, in my opinion, I just think that’s wrong. I just think it’s wrong. They’re the body and they’re the voice, well then as a political representative, listen to them! Don’t trump what they’re saying. Then, you know, don’t even come back to the public and tell us why you haven’t been able to agree. They haven’t even been able to agree on why they’re not agreeing! It’s like, but we’re still paying them. Ugh! It just wouldn’t happen anywhere else. It just wouldn’t happen anywhere else. (Participant #11, Program Leader, Belfast)

As civil society leaders navigate the complicated and nuanced realities of peacebuilding works, a number of additional constraints rise painfully to the surface. Whether it is challenges faced within the communities: The problem is, when they leave those rooms, and go into their communities and may become impacted by the existing power blocs, they will be, and this is at every level, the community group might attack them…the paramilitary group…and subtler, there’s subtler forms of, we’ll stop your money, we’ll report you to the home office. There’s subtle forms and then there’s not so subtle forms, like be careful there boy. (Participant #24, Project Coordinator, Belfast)

Some CSOs are feeling pressures to increase a social media footprint: 158

So, one of our funders recently said, “your presence on social media is really bad, your website doesn’t tell you what you do.” I was like “okay, but which is more important, that or out doing the work? And how do you articulate what you do and who are you articulating it for?” Those are the challenges I think, which in a sense saddens me, because really those are the easy things for some people. (Participant #23, Organization Director, Belfast)

Or CSOs are simply running into the dreaded reality of burnout in the fast paced, high stress environment of peacebuilding: One of our big issues, we tend to put down, we work twenty hours on this and we get paid for that, but we really spent fifty hours on it, but we only get paid for twenty. That’s great once, twice, but if you have ten of that going on at the same time, the staff get burnt out, it can just spiral then. (Participant #23, Organization Director, Belfast)

Thus, the constraints and challenges are as numerous as the number of organizations trying to forge their own path in the post-accord peace process. This suggests that funders are largely failing to adequately address the genuine needs of those they are funding. In this sense, by employing a largely prescriptive approach, rather than an elicitive approach (Lederach, 1997), a blind eye is being turned to the grassroots level, which is quite the common theme arising repeatedly throughout this study. If peace funds are going to be utilized to their full potential, civil society leaders are imploring funders to start recognizing the challenges they are facing at the grassroots level and, more importantly, they are crying out for them to listen to their needs and ideas. The overall conversation around funding constraints can be challenging to dissect. Depending on your perspective, and area of focus, constraints can manifest in dramatically different ways. For instance, those working with ‘challenging populations’ find themselves consistently advocating for the importance of their work and their existence, with those calls often falling on deaf ears of the funders above. Though these populations need to be served just like any other, if not more so, if CSOs are unable to access funds to work directly with these populations, the ability to effectively run these programs becomes a monumental challenge. Thus, civil society often finds itself stuck between two worlds. One that reflects the reality of the needs at the grassroots level, and one that reflects the, often politicized, desires of funders at the highest levels of society. And those that suffer the most from this clash of vision? It is the communities and populations at the grassroots level that are the most vulnerable within society that ultimately suffer the most. 159

As civil society leaders have discussed throughout this section, constraints not only represent procedural challenges for grassroots organizations, but also real-world dangers when it comes to the peacebuilding process. And as complicated as these challenges are, they represent but one layer in the maze that civil society leaders must navigate. Another wrinkle, this one in the form of Northern Ireland being in a transition period, represents another set of hurdles for these leaders. This consideration is explored in depth in the following section.

7.4 It is a changing world – funding transitions Peace processes change. There is a natural evolution within conflict and post-accord societies, and transitions in funding structures and frameworks is certainly included within this reality. Reductions in funding and ever-fluctuating constraints, have been discussed in detail above. These factors, along with the evolving nature of the peace process in general, lead to transition periods within the scope of civil society organizational functioning and peace funding. Perhaps at no other time, outside of the initial flood of peace funding at the close of the twentieth century, has Northern Ireland seen such a heightened period of funding transitions than in the present. One key point of transition is the waning of the PEACE IV installment. With the benefit of a slight extension, PEACE IV is slated to extend through 2020. However, for the first time since 1995 and the introduction of EU PEACE I the continuation of the EU PEACE funds is in doubt. Thanks to the uncertain future provided by the Brexit fiasco, civil society leaders are anxiously considering an operating world where the largest peace money supplier is no longer present within Northern Ireland. In March of 2019, the European Parliament and the Council affirmed the continuation of EU PEACE IV, regardless of the status of the United Kingdom within the European Union. However, the future of the EU PEACE Programme beyond the conclusion of PEACE IV is still largely unresolved. One idea floated by the EU has been to implement a new EU PEACE Plus Programme, which would combine funds from both the EU and the British government (Haase & Kolodziejski, 2019). Yet, just how that would function and to what degree the level of financial support would actually be, is far from concrete. This is a serious concern for many civil society leaders: 160

Don’t forget there is going to be…we’re in Europe, right now. We’ve got PEACE IV, it’s major funding. But once we go out of Europe, I don’t know where that all is going to go and what happens then. (Participant #22, Program Director, Belfast)

Additionally, the ongoing failures and shortcomings of the Northern Ireland Assembly increasingly places the onus on civil society leaders and organizations to chart their own way forward, which means asking hard questions about funding futures. Transitioning away from secured, core funding, is a scary reality for many within civil society. Whether it is forced, or undertaken willingly, a period of transition is the new reality for Northern Ireland: There’s a lot of displacement going on, relating to a downsizing of resources that are available for work at the community and voluntary level, as well. This follows the well- worn path of most peace processes internationally. So, I talk first, about the resource that is coming off-shore, if you like. We are probably one, if not the most, heavily funded peace process that you will find across the world. We’re indebted to the European Union, to America and other sources of funds. But, they have all long since actually reached the point of thinking “okay, you’re reasonably sorted,” they thought, “so, we need to go off and pay attention to the other things that are going on in the world.” So, if you track the resources that we’ve come through, for instance, “The PEACE Program” under the European Union, you will see a very definite downward slide in relation to that. If you look at somewhere like the “International Fund for Ireland,” and they, too, are a much smaller organization now than they would’ve been at one time. (Participant #2, CEO of an Umbrella Peacebuilding Organization, Belfast)

A big problem, though, was that for many in civil society, the allure of ignoring this transition was too tempting, for too many years. While the peace funds were flowing in freely to Northern Ireland, CSOs were typically content to bask in the glow of this unprecedented influx of funds and capacity. It is similar in many ways, to picnickers enjoying the stunning show of lightning in the distance, unwilling to admit that the light show accompanying their afternoon relaxation would soon ruin their evening meal with a downpour of rain. This transition period is not exactly news to anyone; everyone knew it was coming. But it is hard to blame a fledgling peacebuilding sector for deciding to focus only on the prosperous times of peace money windfall, rather than the bleak future of a cash strapped peacebuilding industry. Thus, as the CEO of a hybrid funding organization notes: Although it was talked about in general terms, there was no great plan for how this structural transition was going to take place. (Participant #2, CEO of an Umbrella Peacebuilding Organization, Belfast)

A key researcher out of Belfast echoes this: 161

I think there is a big absence of a road map for future peace, future sustainability here. Don’t think we’ve got that. But I don’t think it’s sure that it needs to be done through supporting a peacebuilding industry any more than, or probably less than it does say, improving education, improving jobs, and quality infrastructure. Looking at the environment and whatever. The structural divisions at the political level suggest that is the point of focus but it needs to be more of a look at the totality and the whole. I think it’s an inevitability about the decline in peace monies. But it needs to be addressed in relation to looking at the wider society of where this place wants to be in twenty-five years’ time. (Participant #20, Director of Research Organization, Belfast)

What transition should look like, is an interesting point that this researcher raises. Though that is largely beyond the scope of this study, several of his points are worth considering in a bit more depth. Specifically, the idea that peace funding processes, at some point, should consider a shift away from specific peacebuilding enterprises, towards a more concerted effort on core community development. This key idea is explored by Manning and Malbrough (2009) in their examination of peace funding in Mozambique. The findings of their research suggest that the cooperation of bilateral funders with local actors, combined with an impressively flexible funding agenda, played a key role in developing an effective peace process in the region. The flexibility component notes that funding agendas evolved based not on external funders’ ideals of “peace” but rather, due to the actual needs at local levels. This allowed the peace process to naturally evolve as well, as programs were able to shift away from a specific “peacebuilding” agenda towards a framework that attended to local and community needs. Recognizing that peace agreements must ultimately go through some transition periods highlights the importance of ensuring that funding structures are either flexible, or replaceable as the needs of post-accord societies change. In Northern Ireland, for instance, there were many immediate and pressing issues around security and de-escalation in the period just after 1998. But Northern Ireland, as it has been highlighted throughout this study, is a different place today, several decades later. What the peace process looks like today, is markedly different than what it looked like over twenty years ago. Thus, the importance of flexible and changing funding structures and agendas is a highlighted necessity in order to maintain a holistic approach to peace in Northern Ireland. This transition period creates a fascinating opportunity to critically explore mentalities and perspectives of those operating within the conditions of an abrupt shift. Again, relying on the 162 expertise and experience of an influential hybrid funding organizer, a CEO offers her views of trying to bridge this transition period, as she sees her affiliated grassroots organizations struggling to cope with the change, while also simultaneously upholding her responsibilities to the broader funders: We’ve got a policy to deliver. If you’re helpful to the delivery of that policy, however broadly you determine that helpfulness, then yes, we can resource you to a greater or lesser extent, within what it is we are required to do,” because, money is set against public policy. So, that notion of who funds independence is what’s in play, it’s not really what government does about that. It’s only because in the past that’s the way it operated and people think that’s naturally where it should come from. It’s not. It’s much more likely to come either from small pots of independent resource, from foundations or independent charities or indeed without resource at all and done on a purely voluntary basis, as it often is in other parts of the world. I think that that is probably, we’re struggling at the community and involuntary level to let go of what was there before, in some way. Not because we want the conflict again, but because we’re still trying to assimilate all of the elements of the change we’re in at the minute. (Participant #2, CEO of an Umbrella Peacebuilding Organization, Belfast)

This outlook of a transitional approach is built upon by a Belfast based researcher: You’ve got to find a way of getting people to switch mindsets and support the process, if not individual elements of it. Diversity, inclusiveness, the underlying peacebuilding work on the ground, and financial support on the ground, and international actors, they’re the agreement, but they’re key elements for the whole process over the last twenty years. You don’t just do it at the agreement stage and then forget about it. (Participant #20, Director of Research Organization, Belfast)

There are those within civil society though, that are more than willing to offer their thoughts on future approaches. Without prompt, a peacebuilder from Derry/Londonderry offered her take on how the transition period should be handled by her colleagues in civil society: So, here’s what has to happen. The funding pots and the ways in which we have to operate, and I’m not talking big money, I’m not talking about big salary, I’m talking about essential running costs and survival, that has to come from independent bodies that aren’t controlled by the politicians, or the civil servants. They have to be completely independent. (Participant #5, Peacebuilder, Derry/Londonderry)

Additional input on this was offered by a community developer from Derry/Londonderry: Programs like this, if you were given more time to build a capacity and properly think through ideas, to set up personal enterprises and really make them work for people, because there’s a real desire, especially for women, they want to do something. They want to go out, and we want to really help them create easier pathways to work and employment and the women really want to do it. It’s just providing that opportunity and having the time to properly think it through and get it off the ground. But if you’ve only 163

three months left of a contract yourself, you have to think about your own welfare. It’s difficult. I find that difficult. (Participant #18, Community Developer, Derry/Londonderry)

The ideas from these civil society leaders are highlighted to show that novel concepts of how to push forward exist and deserve at least some consideration. Civil society leaders recognize and understand the nuance that exists at the grassroots level, therefore, their unique ideas to handle this new influx of funding reeducations are not just random thoughts, they are solutions that are born from years of experience and practice within this environment. Not every solution will be a success, that is not the suggestion here. Rather, the argument is that as the peace funds continue to be reduced and as that pace picks up, new ideas and solutions are needed to handle this transitionary phase. As reductions and constraints hit the sector hard, part of the transitions that need to happen, revolve around a reorganizing of the civil society peacebuilding enterprise. Divided societies, of which Northern Ireland can be considered a posterchild example, tend to develop some interesting quirks within their peacebuilding field, relative to other conflict zones (Millar, et al., 2013). Namely, divided society peacebuilding processes are marked by an ever-impressive amount of duplication. In the early years following the signing of a peace accord or ceasefire, peacebuilding processes in divided societies struggle with effective cross-community engagement. This leads naturally, to the development of what can be seen as almost parallel peace processes, that are occurring within each community. In Northern Ireland, for instance, rather than developing one elder advanced education program in Ballymena, in the years following the GFA, you were likely to find two elder advanced education programs that were running at the same time: one that services the PUL community and another that services the CNR community. These programs may share literally every similarity; from program coordinators, to project materials, and potentially even the site of operation. In some ways, this duplication may provide useful benefits. Perhaps a wider audience can be reached for project services, or an environment that is more comfortable to participants may be cultivated. Additionally, in an environment of massive funding capacity, this duplication does not necessarily pose big problems, in terms of peace money allocation. However, as the environment changes, program duplication no longer becomes sustainable, or even desirable, 164 from a cross-community peacebuilding perspective. Thus, current transitions within the field also require a reassessment of these practices: Getting us as a sector to work better together, even just talking there to [redacted], we each put in our funding applications to work in similar areas. Sometimes we do the same thing or the same sort of thing, or we target the same groups of people and you need twenty people for your group to do ten hours every week, and I need fifteen people to do thirty hours and the funders allow that to happen. They don’t say, actually, you know Brett, you need to go speak to [redacted] and we’re going to give you a wee bit of money to spend at a time to work out what you want to do. (Participant #23, Organization Director, Belfast)

The organization director from Belfast offers a bit of advice to help ease transitions: Connect with the funders, because they’re human as well. That’s the thing…we talk about humanizing the other and for me the other are the funders or the academics and that’s what I need to get better at. (Participant #23, Organization Director, Belfast)

It is an interesting world that CSOs have to traverse when it comes to funding. And that is part of the problem. This transitional period is revealing complexities that have always existed but are now becoming considerably more apparent as civil society leaders are staring down the barrel of an uncertain future. Figuring out how to manage these transitions is paramount, it is becoming obvious, to the survival of many grassroots-based organizations throughout Northern Ireland. As the transition period continues, several civil society leaders continued to look to the future and offer their thoughts on the key steps that will come up next. One Belfast based program director touches on this with a plea towards focusing on analyzing ‘good practice’ within the sector: I don’t know how many organizations, how much money has gone into peace related activity, that there is nowhere in terms of good practice, about good relations work. There was something around equity, diversity and interdependence at some point, but all this money is going in, and nobody has asked, how does this work? How does this work? There is a complexity to it. (Participant #22, Program Director, Belfast)

She goes on to note that some serious and critical questions must be asked, if the peacebuilding process has any chance of adapting beyond this transition period: And people will say, well how long does this go on for? How long do you fund…how much more money is required to transform this society? You have to ask, was the money used appropriately? Did it bring about change? Who measured that change? What was the change? How did you do it? You know, all those questions, I’m not saying they haven’t been asked, but they’re still out there. (Participant #22, Program Director, Belfast) 165

As these questions are being asked, from an increasingly large chorus of voices from civil society, answers will need to follow. From the funders to the political sphere and even many times, within civil society itself. A fractioned and disconnected civil society is far easier for the political sphere to ignore, versus a unified and consistent voluntary sector. Likewise, ideas and solutions regarding this transitionary period are being developed within many isolated pockets of civil society and it is high time that those ideas build upon one another, rather than work in competition against one another. I fear I have done too much though, within this section, to paint transition periods as frightening things. This is certainly not the reality that should be painted as things are far more nuanced than that simple black and white perception. There is progress too, that needs to be recognized within these periods. Sharing success stories is one of the joys of civil society leaders in Northern Ireland. One of my favorites, was offered by an organization director from Belfast: It’s also, we’re absolutely honored to be in rooms with people and see change and through our PEACE III program, we worked with the housing executive and we worked out in 80 housing estates, but we also worked with 2,000 other staff and there was one guy…one of the first meetings we did, and he was really horrible. He was really negative, who are you and he was wearing this big swanky, shiny suit, and we were a bit scruffy and he talked about some of the people in the communities that he manages and he gives money to as being people that are scumbags and he wouldn’t scrape them off the bottom of his shoe and he talked really, very, he painted a real picture. Three years later, he was advocating for good relations work, he was advocating for those guys in the community, and he had changed the way he worked. For me, that’s a huge honor. (Participant #23, Organization Director, Belfast)

As frightening and troublesome as the transition period may be, it can also represent a genuine manifestation of the hard work that’s been undertaken over the years, as evidenced above. The pursuit of peace along the road of change, is one marked with potholes and roadblocks at nearly every turn. But transitions offer a chance for reflection and celebration, as the trials of yesterday manifest in the successes of today. To express the beauty of this reality, I offer the eloquent words of a Belfast program director: You stay here for a reason. You do the hours that you do for a reason. You put in your heart and soul for a reason. I can see that daily when people are coming in and when I talk to staff who I remember ten years ago, fifteen years ago, who were on the program. One of them is running our finance at the minute, one of them is running the PEACE IV program at the minute. That is change. That’s transformation. It is possible. We just need to be aware of what’s round us, to try and navigate around all that. (Participant #22, Program Director, Belfast) 166

And that, is a hopeful transition that is worth fighting for. In the face of seemingly insurmountable odds, it is the strength of the civil society leaders that will carry forward the peace process. Waging peace is infinitely more challenging than waging war, and it is the courageous who travel the difficult road. As challenges of funding reductions continue to mount within the peacebuilding sector, Northern Ireland’s peace prospects will rely heavily on the courage of civil society leaders to push forward creatively in their endeavors.

7.5 The fish on the hook – funding dependency With a discussion around reductions, constraints, and transitions provided above, one final consideration of the Northern Ireland peace process funding nexus is needed to round out our directed analysis. Funding dependency is a component that is influenced by all of the topic areas listed above but, is one that is important enough to civil society leaders to warrant its own subsection within this analysis. Dependency issues have certainly been broached within this chapter above. But a concerted focus, around the nature and implications of dependency of funding structures in Northern Ireland, is where we focus now. It is a necessary focus, considering the assessment of a Belfast based project coordinator: The relationship between the community voluntary sector, the community apparatus, the advice organizations, the broad sort of groups and organizations that have come up in the aftermath of the peace process and the State, the political parties and the State, is generally one of occasionally critical friends, generally. Because there’s always a massive reliance upon the State for funding. (Participant #24, Project Coordinator, Belfast)

A Derry/Londonderry peacebuilder adds to this sentiment: So, it means they totally control the civic and voluntary community sector and how they think and what they can do and we’re right back to the 80s. (Participant #5, Peacebuilder, Derry/Londonderry)

And yet, as it has been highlighted time and time again, even in this state of dependency, civil society leaders find themselves on the outside of the conversation looking, rendering them, at times, both helpless and hopeless: Nobody’s listening to us. We absolutely need help. We need our politicians behind us. We need some sort of resources, just to maintain and keep ourselves going. (Participant #5, Peacebuilder, Derry/Londonderry)

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As with nearly all things in Northern Ireland, a community developer from Derry/Londonderry notes that even this dependent relationship forces civil society into the realm of division, further straining one of the last bastions of hopeful unity within the region: You have to be associated with one political grouping. If you’re not associated with that particular grouping, then if you’re a grassroots organization then you don’t get funding. But then if you sign up to their sort of political ethos, then in that situation, you’ll get funding. Then those other groups outside of that, will struggle to get in there. How government operates here is about patronage and that is something that is going to be very, very difficult to breakdown. (Participant #17, Community Developer, Derry/Londonderry)

A Belfast based researcher explains how the issue with this type of “patronage” plays out within the sector, and the challenging fracturing that comes with it: Civil society is fragmented, is often dependent upon government departments and agencies for its financing. It’s a bit challenged in terms of its critical voice at times. It’d becomes drawn into service delivery a lot of the time, rather than advocacy. If you start to take strong public viewpoints on certain things which are critical, you then get pigeonholed on that side. So, it’s a challenge to sustain that. (Participant #20, Director of Research Organization, Belfast)

Those that have pushed against this reality, often struggle to do so effectively. Yet that struggle, the struggle to stay ‘neutral’ in the midst of a dependent relationship, is core to the identity of many organizations within civil society, as a program director from Belfast discusses in her testimony on the subject: For [our organization] because we haven’t been aligned to anybody, we’ve had to hold our corner. So, it’s not just a matter of somebody handing us a plate or making it easy. We’ve had to really work hard and we had to produce results so that people would take us seriously. It wasn’t like, such and such an organization that’s linked to such and such, or somebody is backing them or whatever, or there’s a phone call, or whatever it is. We don’t have that. We’ve had to produce results. We’ve had to stand…we’ve had to give something to say, “this is what we can do, this is the impact that we can make and the change we can make.” We’ve done that pretty brilliantly over the last twenty-six years. Funding is an even place, I was going to say, but it’s not really, because there are things that happen. However, we were lucky enough to get a major grant with the PEACE IV people and I think [our organization] is probably one of the foremost organizations in terms of doing good relations peace related work, certainly around young people. We’ve done well there. But it’s been on our own efforts. It’s not like somebody has come along…I’m sure there are people and funders that think we’re good, I’m sure there are, but it’s not like they’ve said, that’s good practice, let’s learn from that. (Participant #22, Program Director, Belfast)

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This again, highlights how vital those higher-level peace funds, such as the EU PEACE funds or the IFI, truly are when it comes to reducing the potential for dependency to develop around local level political divisions. It also further solidifies that CSOs must be consistently conscious of these dependency factors. A core funder discusses this from her unique perspective: And, all the time, we let go of our power in that regard, or we designate it elsewhere, and in our case, we’ve said “that’s a political decision, here we sit powerless, while these things are done to us.” And, to go right back to the start of our conversation for the community and voluntary sector, that is something that it absolutely should not let happen to itself. As a funder, I regularly hear the funder’s agenda, what the funder wants and that kind of thing. That is such a passive parcel. Actually, nobody can make your organization do anything. And, if you let that happen, what does that say about your own sense of your mission. (Participant #2, CEO of an Umbrella Peacebuilding Organization, Belfast)

The suggestion there, is that grassroots CSOs should not, under any circumstance, sacrifice their values or mission in pursuit of funding. Yet that is a view much more easily held from the position of funder, rather than the position of funds recipient. Thus, there is not only the wide chasm between the political sector and civil society, but even those peripheral hybrid organizations attempting to straddle the funding line, sometimes fall victim to a failure of genuine understanding of the dire situation some CSOs find themselves in, in these shifting funding environments. One example of this disconnect in action is described by a Derry/Londonderry based peacebuilder whose organization was recently combined with another local peacebuilding organization at the behest of their primary funders. While the process might have made sense from the funder’s perspective, the reality of how it played out at the grassroots level, left civil society actors wanting: The irony here is that [another organization], and [our organization], we were asked to go into partnership by [our funding organization], as a good model. And we have been getting funding to do joint peace work, which is massive, because we can split up shared space and then I would focus on community education and all. Then this year they decided that because we had put in our joint application for core funding, that one coordinator and one administrator was enough to do 15 major projects and 9 major, major projects and so they put our salaries down to 45 percent, across the board. Which means…to survive, we have to do a lot of consultancy work and bring in a lot of work that’s not necessarily direct community relations…So, that’s typical, where we get penalized for being in a partnership by the very council that’s asked us to set it up as a partnership. (Participant #5, Peacebuilder, Derry/Londonderry)

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Thus, CSO dependency does not even remotely mean deeper understanding on behalf of those core funders. The above account is a striking example of just how poorly those funding decisions can play out at the grassroots level. In a failure to understand the dynamics of the grassroots peacebuilding process of civil society, funders risk devastating consequences to the capacity of those vital civil society actors and organizations. As the most recent Stormont collapse lasted well over two years, some civil society organizers are beginning to become acutely aware of just how deep those structural dependencies have become anchored within Northern Ireland. One Belfast community organization director puts it this way: I think because politics in Northern Ireland has been so heavily weighted on the green and orange issues that we haven’t necessarily made the connection that actually this affects our roads, this affects our education, this affects our health and we still have this kind of…there’s a support with London and the British government will come in and the Irish government. So, it’s a bit like when you move out of the house for the first time and you leave your Mum and Dad but they still send you the odd food parcel, and they’ll come and visit you and take you out for dinner. In a sense I think we’re a wee bit like that in Northern Ireland, somebody has always kind of helped us out along the way and now that we’ve gone for such a long time without Stormont being operational, I think people are beginning to see actually, this is impacting us. (Participant #23, Organization Director, Belfast)

But the dependency cannot last forever. And that is not just because Stormont cannot seem to last forever, or even a while. As discussed before, the peace money will eventually dry up. The fact that funds have been flowing into the North of Ireland at such a high level for well over twenty years is actually quite rare on its own. The reality though, is that for any society traveling down the road of peace, one should in fact hope that peace money eventually disappears, but not out of a source of apathy or indifference, but because the peace process is actually working and there is less need for peace funds and the peacebuilding processes they are funding. A Belfast researcher argues this point about the ending of peace money: The ending of peace money will…it’ll end some jobs, end some work, it might close some organizations, as well as our organization closing down, but in some sense, you want to see a time come when peace money comes to an end. The people who are doing the work, are never going to tell you this is the right time to stop funding me and take my job away. (Participant #20, Director of Research Organization, Belfast)

After twenty plus years of peace funding operations in Northern Ireland, the funding environment is complex, often times rigidly structured, and overall a well-oiled dependency 170 producing machine. Civil society leaders constantly find themselves struggling against this dependency, hoping to stake out their own independence in the complex environment. But those who have managed to secure a sense of independence know they are a rare breed and that knowledge frames a constant struggle in both practice and vision. As the civil society leaders’ experiences reveal in the passages above, the historic and well-practiced divisions of “Orange and Green” have permeated even into the dependency quagmire of peace funding. Thus, those grassroots organizations unable to secure independence, not only develop deep dependencies to the political apparatus, but those dependencies may also come laced with sectarianized allegiances as well. It becomes obvious then, why these issues are so salient in the minds of civil society leaders. Dependency issues are not uncommon in post-accord societies; thus, Northern Ireland is not an aberration in that sense. But the unique components of functioning within a divided society, which has recently had a nonfunctioning executive and a serious trend of declining peace funds, has helped to create a dependency environment that can only be understood through elevating the voices of civil society leaders engaging at the grassroots level. The discussion offered above provides that voice and reveals the challenges that civil society faces not just today, but also the serious issues that must be considered when it comes to the future of the peacebuilding process in Northern Ireland.

7.6 Key findings of the research A number of key findings arise from the key themes discussed here in Chapter 7. These findings include a wealth of understanding when it comes to reductions, constraints, transitions, and dependencies of peace funding within Northern Ireland. The insights offered by civil society leaders is vital in helping to fully understand the complexity of the funding environment in the post-accord period and what it means for the future of the Northern Ireland peace process. The GFA represents a turning point in the Northern Ireland peace process, and recognizing the path of peace funding following that turning point, is of critical importance to grasping the full scale of the different pillars of the peace process: what has occurred, what is ongoing, and what the future looks like. Let us first turn to the key findings of this research around the topic of funding reductions. 171

Four key findings emerged inductively from the data. First, funding reductions are starting to seriously impact the peacebuilding sector, creating new challenges for CSOs that they have largely been able to avoid over the last two decades. Second, funding constraints are forcing CSOs into a mold, stifling the ability for certain vulnerable populations to be reached with critical services. Third, transitions in funding focuses from external donors are creating challenges in developing and maintaining a unified peace approach in Northern Ireland. And fourth, funding dependency is limiting the creativity of CSOs at the grassroots level to react in contextually appropriate ways to new and sustained challenges within communities. Each of these findings is discussed in more detail below. First, study participants were quick to note the rising number of challenges presented when it comes the funding reductions that are occurring within the Northern Ireland peacebuilding sector. Despite the ongoing support of the EU PEACE Programme in the form of PEACE IV, funding reductions have been felt across the sector and this comes with some serious ramifications. While the development of funding reductions within post-accord societies is a natural process in conflict zones, Northern Ireland has enjoyed a uniquely long honeymoon period of sustained peace funding. Entering into a new era, then, where the pots of peace funds are dwindling, marks an important turning point in the peace process. What the research of this project shows, is that the peacebuilding landscape in Northern Ireland is already experiencing shifts, and those shifts are expected to pick up steam in the short- term future outlook. A number of civil society leaders reveal that peacebuilding projects and organizations are being cut, as the streams of peace funds coming into the region are slowed and eliminated. This reduction is likely to have profound impacts throughout civil society and Northern Ireland as a whole. While there is, to a certain degree, a redundant nature in the peacebuilding sector within Northern Ireland, a typical reality within divided societies, that does not necessarily mean the elimination of redundant programs will maintain a completeness of service provision. With Northern Ireland still being a deeply divided society, both psychologically and physically, an issue explored in depth in Chapter 8, the redundancy in community-based programs is still a necessity in many areas. For instance, while on paper it may appear that there are two adult literacy programs running in North Belfast, the reality is that one is serving PUL community 172 members while the other is serving CNR community members. Eliminating the perceived redundancy of these programs, in the name of funding reductions, actually results in the removal of services and benefits for an entire community. Thus, this research highlights the dangers of funders that lack a nuanced understanding of the realities at the grassroots level. The ideal would be, over two decades on from the GFA, that Northern Ireland would be in a place where redundancy of community programs and projects could be addressed through cross-community support, but that is not the reality for Northern Ireland today. Funding reductions are an inherent challenge that every post-accord society must navigate, but due to the ongoing nature of division within Northern Ireland and civil society itself, the country is particularly vulnerable during this process. Through the conversations with the civil society leaders included in this study, it is clear that we are seeing just the beginning of the impacts due to funding reductions. As these reductions pick up steam, the extent of programs and services offered in the peacebuilding sector will diminish as CSOs themselves will be forced to reduce their influence or shutter their doors all together. Northern Ireland has benefitted from an extended honeymoon period of peace funding thanks to massive, ongoing, benefits provided by programs like EU PEACE and the IFI. However, it is clear that the next twenty years in Northern Ireland will not contain a windfall of billions of euros/pounds of peace funds like the previous twenty years. That new reality is something that civil society leaders are being forced to recognize at a rapidly increasing pace. Second, tied closely to those reductions is an increasingly complicated framework of constraints levied against civil society in terms of access to those shrinking pots of available funds. One of the more interesting discussions that arose, which carries an exorbitant amount of weight for not only the Northern Ireland peace process, but in fact any post-accord peace process, is the discussion around working with “difficult” populations. The study participants represent civil society leaders working in a variety of capacities, from organization directors, to hybrid funders, to program organizers, to community developers and peacebuilders. Within this role variety, also exists a wide spectrum of variety in terms of the populations that these civil society leaders work most closely with in their unique capacities. Most notably for this particular discussion, are those working with populations such as ex- prisoners, former combatants, or any populations with paramilitary connections. 173

A consistency in my conversations with these participants was how quickly they raised their grievances with accessing funds for their work. The moment the topic of peace funding came up (or in several instances, even before such a topic was prompted), frustration and anger spilled out freely as they all related their challenges of working with “challenging” populations. This consistency of concern and experience highlights a systemic problem within Northern Ireland. Many of the most vulnerable populations within post-accord Northern Ireland are seemingly woefully under-advantaged when it comes to accessing key peace funds, and this represents a serious problem. Post-accord societies tend to organization themselves around the general DDR principles. However, as evidenced by the testimony of the participants of this study, key populations within Northern Ireland are struggling to achieve a genuine process of reintegration, due to overbearing structural funding constraints. As participants within this study suggest, organizations are facing a complex funding environment that is seeing them struggling to access funds to work with many of Northern Ireland’s most vulnerable citizens. Participants are highlighting their increasing unease with the feeling that they are being forced to fit into a mold which is envisioned and dictated by, often, out of touch funders, rather than a reflection of the actual needs at the grassroots level. This disconnect between funders’ conceptions of what is needed within the peace process and the realities of the push for peace at the grassroots community level is creating considerable constraints in the ability of civil society to effectively deliver the services and assistance that is desperately needed within vulnerable communities. This is a critical finding arising out of this original research, that deserves considerable focus. Civil society leaders are noting a trend within the funding environment, where funders are shying away from providing resources towards organizations working with certain groups and issues, such as ex-prisoners and former combatants. This, inherently, is creating serious constraints for those organizations seeking to work with these populations. Without being able to access the already reducing pots of peace funds, the prospect of getting new programs off the ground is nearly impossible, and those already working with these populations are struggling to crunch the numbers to see how they can keep the lights on. The reality is that peacebuilding processes are not just about light-hearted youth programs that bring together primary school kids to create peace artwork and photo ops. While 174 those programs are useful and serve a key purpose, and are great optics for peace funders, that type of program represents but a small piece of the peacebuilding puzzle. Peace processes within conflict zones also consist of the less than glamorous work that does not always yield feel good photo ops. These programs can be, somewhat understandably, less appealing from a funder standpoint. But when a peace process is dictated by funder optics and not by the actual needs of communities, you end up with a peace process that fails to deliver positive, transformative peace. Ensuring that vulnerable populations get the appropriate level of support within the peace process also provides another key component in the peacebuilding environment, it helps to reduce the potential of recidivism within those populations and conflict recurrence on the societal scale. Civil society projects and programs can help these stigmatized populations develop new skills and competencies which allow them to engage meaningfully with peace time process and economies, a necessary component to their overall reintegration into society. Taking these opportunities away though, by highly constrictive funder agendas, leaves many of those within these “difficult populations” left with very little opportunities for productive societal engagement. As one participant of this study notes, speaking from personal experience as an ex- combatant and former prisoner himself, the challenges these individuals face from society are already significant. If they are also pushed out of the peace process, what options are left? The concern is that, as numerous paramilitary branches continue to operate throughout Northern Ireland, whether it be the New IRA, the UVF, the UDA, or others, ex-combatants and former prisoners may see no other option but to fall back into this nefarious world creating widening pockets of peace process spoilers. Genuine opportunities exist to help these vulnerable populations effectively integrate back into society, not just as contributing members, but as leaders within communities looking to embrace the peace process. But what this research has shown, is that due to the unwillingness of funders to work with these ‘difficult populations’, those opportunities are being squandered. As funders build funding agendas around optics and not actual needs, CSOs are forced to either adapt into the mold of this disconnected peace process or forge their own path with independent funding. As civil society leaders within this study reveal, this constraint complexity is resulting in a grassroots reality where vulnerable populations are woefully under supported. 175

From a wider perspective when it comes to constraints, a key understanding arising from this research is that civil society in Northern Ireland, in many ways, is “being held ransom” by funders. Civil society leaders reveal that they are feeling forced to conform to the peacebuilding agendas of major funders. In this sense, civil society leaders are not able to dictate the nature and aims of their own projects which match with the needs being seen at the grassroots level. Instead, in an attempt to still access key funds, grassroots organizations are looking upward taking their cues from technocratic top-down processes out of a necessity of organizational survival. This means that grassroots needs are not necessarily being addressed, as many funders have varying ideas about what the nature of the Northern Ireland peace process should look like from a functional standpoint. This is a dangerous path for peace processes to follow as mission drift of funding agendas can quickly result in approaches and aims being delivered from the top- down that do not reflect the key needs within communities. Thus, this research shows that CSOs are not only being constrained in ways that are impacting their survivability within the peacebuilding landscape, yet vulnerable communities at the grassroots level are also seeing their needs and interests ignored by the peace agendas of funders that do not necessarily mesh with these grassroots realities. The third key finding, as discussed above, recognizes that transition is the name of the game when it comes to peace processes and this is well understood in the field. Yet that does not mean that transitions are exactly enjoyable, from a rudimentary survival perspective, for civil society leaders. Obviously, the desire is always to see a natural phasing out of peacebuilding processes. If the conflict environment ceases to exist, transiting into a positive peace environment, well then naturally, peacebuilding processes would cease to exist as well. That is admittedly an extreme extrapolation when it comes to conflict zones, but the general concept holds true. All, or at least those with genuine intentions, should essentially want to the see the ultimate extinction of the peacebuilding enterprise. In other words, genuine peacebuilders are, basically, working every day to put themselves out of a job. The reality though, is that peace processes rarely, if ever, live up to this ideal “phasing out” of requisite existence. Thus, the natural ebb and flow of a peace process presents the peacebuilding sector with a wealth of transition related challenges, outside of extinction, which are succinctly explored in the testament of the participants of this study. Chief among them, are concerns over the future of a peacebuilding process that civil society leaders may or may not 176 have voice in dictating. While civil society seeks to forge its own path at every available juncture (dependencies not withholding, as discussed in more depth shortly), leaders in the sector consistently express fear that their voices already are, and will continue to be, the first to fall on deaf ears. Consistently, civil society leaders shared stories of transition challenges that center on their ability to effectively utilize their voice in the conversation over policy and peace process direction. This is a point that necessitates considerable discussion. As mentioned previously, the lack of voice that civil society possesses when it comes to policy development, is an issue that is not only highly salient for the participants of this study, but also an issue that can be linked directly to shortcomings of the GFA. With the failure to comprehensively incorporate mechanisms for civil society’s engagement with policy development, outside of failed implementations like the Civic Forum, the GFA essentially created a policy development environment that has resulted in a one-sided conversation. Thus, what has been seen, is that there is a constantly shifting vision from funders of what is “needed” or what is “popular” from a peacebuilding perspective. But if civil society leaders do not have access to a viable mechanism to contribute their voice to the conversation, this means that these transitions happen beyond their control, as peacebuilding organizations are seemingly swept up in the current, left floating along without a paddle. In Northern Ireland today, transitions in funding agendas are not being done to match the shifting needs of communities, instead, transitions are occurring independently of grassroots needs and purely at the whim of funders. A unified peacebuilding vision is by no means a necessity within conflict zones, but shifting foci of peace process goals should at least align within needs of the society and communities. Yet as the research within this study shows, that is not the reality of the process within Northern Ireland today. With an admitted approach of “constructive ambiguity” being a cornerstone of the GFA design, this conscious decision has resulted in ongoing ambiguity within the peace process itself, twenty plus years down the road. This has led to a peacebuilding sector within civil society that is struggling to keep up with the kaleidoscope of transitions that bear no connectivity to actual needs being seen at the grassroots level. In many ways, this leads to an entirely reactionary peace process, rather than a proactive one. Funders will always lag slightly behind the core understandings of CSOs and leaders simply 177 due to the distance between first-hand knowledge of the context at the ground level. Thus, a reactionary peace process is too busy putting out fires as they pop up, rather than working towards a reality where proactive measures can be taken to ensure the fires do not start in the first place. Transitions are normal and often welcomed within peace processes, but what the civil society leaders within this study have made abundantly clear, is that the transitions they are facing are decidedly not normal, nor are they welcome at the grassroots level. And fourth, having discussed reductions, constraints, and transitions, we come to the final prominent finding that arose from the many conversations on peace funding: the debilitating reality of existing in a world of dependency. Dependency was never far from the minds of civil society leaders, and as their contributions to the study show, that prominence of focus on the issue is rightfully justified. The reality is that the number of independently wealthy community and voluntary organizations is…not high. Hence, the peacebuilding sector in Northern Ireland, and similarly throughout conflict zones, is unavoidably linked to donors and funders. Many civil society leaders, as highlighted throughout this chapter, struggle with this funding dependency, as they strive to keep funders interested by attempting to placate their desires, while also trying to valiantly retain at least some sense of independence to conduct their critical peacebuilding work in their own community-based vision. Yet when push comes to shove, it is often down to either keeping the lights on or opting to abandon that sense of independence. What transpires then, is the evolution of a civic society that is left largely voiceless, as their collective ability to raise critical issues is silenced by a recognition that meshing lock step with funders is the only hope for survivability. Power is being systematically stripped from the community and voluntary sector as funders always sit ominously over shoulder, prepared to swing the axe of de-funding at the first sign of deviance from their own narrowly defined vision of the peace process. Thus, creativity is far from welcomed, being seen rather as an existential threat to the status quo that the political sector and funding bodies have long controlled with an iron grip. The deeper the well of dependency becomes, the more the Northern Ireland peace process becomes a technocratic nightmare for local peacebuilding organizations to navigate. Without the ability to respond flexibly to the challenges and issues that inevitably arise at the local level throughout the span of a long-term peace process, the less effective grassroots organizations are at building positive peace. While the GFA itself, for better or for worse, was 178 not designed to handle issues around long-term peace funding (design issues addressed in more depth in Chapter 9), it did solidify power imbalances between societal spheres, that further reduces the critical potential for civil society to control the influence of its own voice. What is clear from the conversations and perspective of civil society leaders explored throughout this chapter, is that these imbalances deepen the ties of dependency, which have resulted in a profound challenge for grassroots peacebuilding organizations to effectively carry out their mission of building positive peace within Northern Ireland.

7.7 Conclusion This chapter addressed the key issues around peace funding within Northern Ireland. Through careful consideration of conversations with civil society leaders from throughout Northern Ireland’s peacebuilding sector, a number of key themes are identified within this chapter. First, civil society leaders touch on some of the unique challenges they are facing as funding reductions are being felt across the peacebuilding sector. The reductions are posing a serious threat to what has long been a vibrant and varied peacebuilding sector within civil society. Second, a number of civil society leaders have highlighted seriously debilitating constraints when it comes to accessing core funding. The participants of this study note an increasing demand to “fit the mold” as dictated by funders, and not necessarily the needs of their communities. Encompassed within this as well, is the challenge many peacebuilding organizations are recognizing as funders continue to distance themselves from working with “difficult populations” such as former combatants and ex-prisoners. This has resulted in some of the most vulnerable populations within Northern Ireland, left out in the cold when it comes to fully funded community development and peacebuilding programs. Third, and closely related to reductions and constraints, the study participants note that Northern Ireland is in the midst of a transitionary period which is leading to a forced process of adaption by grassroots organizations. A main issue with this, is that these changes are being dictated by funders and political elite and not by the actual needs reflected at the grassroots level. This has resulted, civil society leaders suggest, in the peace process itself experiencing a certain amount of mission drift, as a unified vision of the path forward, left far too ambiguous within the GFA, continues to be a source of conflict rather than collaboration. 179

And finally, civil society leaders highlight the challenges they are facing when it comes to increasing dependency within the peacebuilding sector. This dependency means organizations lack the creative and independent control to explore contextually unique processes of peace. This means the Northern Ireland peace process is one that is increasingly not owned by the grassroots. This funding dependency reinforces the technocratic nature of the Northern Ireland peace process which has key implications for the fluid nature of the peace process going forward.

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Chapter 8 Where is the positive peace?: Negative peace, no peace, and the missing piece of civil society’s role in Northern Ireland’s peacebuilding process

8.1 Introduction What does peace mean? Happiness? Social integration? No more battle related deaths? Northern Ireland checks a few of those boxes, but does that make it a peaceful society? Peace is a fickle concept. It is held on a pedestal for many conflict societies, yet it is often a reality that many do not understand. When is it all finally over? When has a conflict been bested? The nuances of conflict, and a society in conflict, litter these questions with half answers and unknowns. Northern Ireland, twenty years post peace accord, still struggles mightily with these questions and finds itself with frustratingly few answers. As civil society leaders spoke about a range of issues during our conversations, one major theme continued to arise, the nature of peace itself within Northern Ireland. And who better, in fact, to discuss the scope and reality of peace in Northern Ireland, than those leaders on the frontlines of working to deliver that very peace. The combined experience of the participants of this study measure in the scale of centuries, and their expertise and lived experience shed an illuminating spotlight on the state of peace within Northern Ireland. What is clear for Northern Ireland today, is that the hopeful ideals of peace that captivated the nation with the signing of the GFA have failed to be fully realized. Peace does exist, but as civil society leaders note, it seems to be the wrong kind of peace. The notion here, is the distinct, and devastating, difference between positive and negative peace, a concept first introduced by Johan Galtung (1969) and which was discussed from a theoretical perspective earlier in this study. Yet in this chapter, by eliciting the knowledge and stories of those civil society leaders at the grassroots level in Northern Ireland, we see the real-world ramifications of this theory in action. The general conversations on Northern Ireland’s peace can be gathered into several key themes. First, this chapter explores the reality of Northern Ireland as a divided society. Despite having a two-decades old peace agreement framing an extensive peacebuilding process, many civil society leaders note that Northern Ireland is still just as divided today, and maybe even 181 more so, as it was at the conclusion of The Troubles. The implications of this are explored in detail. Second, specific examples are provided by the study participants that give credence to the suggestion that Northern Ireland is gripped by a state of negative peace. Building from this idea is a third theme concerning the lingering impacts of unresolved trauma influences from the Troubles. Finally, civil society leaders offer their thoughts on the future of Northern Ireland’s peace. Given the oppressive existence of negative peace, does any optimism remain within civil society for a future with positive peace? While opinions from civil society leaders on this topic are mixed, their range of answers all share one common theme: hesitation. Exactly why hesitation is a unifying feeling amongst the participants is considered in detail. Yet before we look ahead, we must first focus on the state of Northern Ireland’s peace in the present. This frame of reference is where our discussion begins.

8.2 A world apart – living in a divided society Hundreds of words were dedicated in previous chapters of this study discussing the unique realities of divided societies. For decades, centuries even, Northern Ireland has held the dubious privilege of being a leading posterchild for examples of divided societies. And those divisions of old have lingered into today. For a society long focused on the mantra of “building a future together” the divisions of the present represent a clear roadblock to any hope of that shared future. The challenges of engaged peacebuilding within a divided society are repeatedly expressed by the civil society leaders within this study. And the divisions are not contained to only one section of society, such as education, which was discussed in Chapter 6. Rather, it is seen as a holistic issue that impacts all phases of Northern Irish society. As one Belfast-based peacebuilding organization director says: Absolutely we’re one people. But we do not see ourselves as one people. We are divided by our culture, our political and religious identity and our history. Powerfully divided. We have a system of democracy that has an element of apartheid in it. Which does not rest easy with democracy. (Participant #1, Director of a Peacebuilding Organization, Belfast)

The completeness of the division that he mentions is striking. The organization director suggests that some of the fault lies within the structure of the political system, which points to an issue 182 inherent in the GFA and in fact is often considered one of the most successful components of the GFA. While the revealing shortcomings of institutional aspects of the GFA will be discussed further in the following chapter, it is important to recognize, argues this civil society leader, the impacts of the political structure on the divisions within Northern Ireland. One of the struggles within divided societies is changing the narrative that has been engrained over years and decades. Thus, it is not quite as simple as saying, ‘alright then, time to start working together as a unified society.’ Building unity out of division is something that naturally takes time. As the saying goes, trust is something that is easily lost and hard to win. An organization director from Belfast touches on the challenge of trust within a divided society: We’re also asking people to trust each other, when naturally, what we’ve been brought up with is to not trust each other. (Participant #23, Organization Director, Belfast)

And she later continued her thoughts on trust, expressing the reservations she hears from those she works with in the community: You’re asking me to trust people now, when I’ve lived in fear and mistrust and that’s going to take a long time. I think that timeframe is the bit I don’t think we’ve all got our head around. (Participant #23, Organization Director, Belfast)

While restoring trust in a community that organized itself on distrust for centuries, is certainly not an overnight process, it is also something that has seen very little progress in the years following the GFA. This represents, in many ways, a failure of the peace process to live up to its own ideals. As a result, a research organization director argues progress is in fact, moving trust and relations in Northern Ireland in the wrong direction altogether during the post-accord period: If you look at what’s happened over the last twenty years, it’s the center that’s the one that’s disintegrated, and we’re polarized more and more and this has reaffirmed that sense of polarization. (Participant #20, Director of Research Organization, Belfast)

This polarization and distrust is leading, in many cases, to a cultural shift in which people are almost seeking out these situations. Rather than face any sense of cognitive dissonance around these divisions, people find ways to reaffirm their differences and perpetuate this sense of separation. But I do think we’re moving and shifting into this area where people are preempting and going out of their way to be offended. It’s not healthy. If you’re offended by the murals that are going up the Falls Road, don’t go and look at them! Don’t drive by. If you’re 183

offended looking at union flags, up the Shankill Road, well then take a different…don’t go out of your way to be offended. (Participant #11, Program Leader, Belfast)

That is not only unhealthy at an individual level but also remarkably unhealthy at a societal level. Taking into account that Northern Ireland is two decades into its rigorous and structured peace process, such a high level of “unhealthiness” at a societal level, raises serious questions about the peace process itself. As the general societal divides take hold, there are profound implications for what that means in the everyday lives of the Northern Irish. Not just from a cultural or cognitive dimension, but in terms of being physically divided as well (Mitchell & Kelly, 2011). Speaking about a project he led with youth in Derry/Londonderry, the director of a community organization shared this interesting example: We gave these young people these trackers over a week of their lives to show, to compare their results along by gender, by age, by religion, whatever and really to try to highlight the fact that our young people still live almost completely segregated lives, despite this peace in our times. (Participant #4, Director of a Community Organization, Derry/Londonderry)

He continues with other revelations of the study, noting that even when one of Northern Ireland’s central issues, segregated education, was taken out of the mix, the results remained the same: Even students that went to integrated schools lived in segregated communities so that they would mix in the daytime and then they would go home to their completely segregated lives and the only place where we saw any sort of prolonged interaction, not interaction but sharing of space at the same time by people of different religions, was shopping centers on a Saturday afternoon. (Participant #4, Director of a Community Organization, Derry/Londonderry)

This project is hardly an anomaly, as the same general sentiment was expressed repeatedly by civil society leaders as they discussed both their work and, fascinatingly, their own experience growing up in Northern Ireland: We find the young people we work with, they don’t, they still don’t know the other community. (Participant #16, Community Developer, Derry/Londonderry)

At university was the first time I engaged with Protestants. That’s a sad state of affairs when you think about it. (Participant #14, Community Developer, Derry/Londonderry)

Me personally, I left school when I was 18, went to Belfast to work, I’d never met a Protestant, till I went into a shared house with three Protestant women. Never. I wasn’t on 184

me own, there was a lot of people [like that]. (Participant #18, Community Developer, Derry/Londonderry)

These are experiences that are replicated over and over throughout Northern Ireland. The simple reality is that division and disconnect from the “other” community is not an aberrant experience, it is the nearly universal experience. There is a pretty straightforward connection between keeping people apart and the ability for them to develop trust and understanding with one another. It just does not work. [Ideally] there wouldn’t be so many barriers put up. You know, dividing communities, having walls there where there’s a clear divide between Catholic and Protestant communities. That shows…If a child is playing in the garden and there’s fence, they know they’re not allowed to go over that fence onto the main road. It’s the same in a community. There’s a wall there, we don’t go beyond that. (Participant #27, Project Lead, Belfast)

It is an obvious conclusion, but one that clearly needs to be reiterated as the full scope of the Northern Ireland environment is considered. An organization director from Belfast puts it best: [We’ve been] working with housing associations to say, if you keep building houses and putting people in single identity estates, we’re not really changing anything. Putting them into a mixed education school is great, but then they go home again and that’s where they shop and that’s where they socialize and that’s where you’re able to demonize the other, whoever the other is. (Participant #23, Organization Director, Belfast)

Individuals divided and apart, create a society divided and apart. Peace is about cooperation and unity, things that are sorely lacking in the current environment within Northern Ireland. The argument here is that holistic change is needed when it comes to breaking down the divisions that are plaguing Northern Ireland. You can remove the burs from the coat of a collie, but if you immediately release the pup back into the briar patch, what will come of your initial effort? When it comes to enacting genuine social change, it is critical that these initiatives are multi-layered in order to provide several structures of support. As societal divisions continue to dominate, small scale efforts of cross-community engagement and support, as important as they are, need to be threaded together in a holistic safety-net protecting the challenging and precarious path to unity. And as the civil society leader quoted above argues, as with so much else, that change needs to start at home (or with homes to be more specific). Psychological-based societal divisions are challenging enough to address in 185 the best of circumstances, yet those challenges are compounded significantly when physical divisions are allowed to perpetuate unabated (Megoran, et al., 2014). A quick mention of the nebulous behemoth that is Brexit is worthy of inclusion within this conversation as well. Brexit was a topic that arose repeatedly, and in a variety of forms, throughout my conversations with civil society leaders. It is a topic which in many ways, deserves its own comprehensive study/chapter/thesis/book, but given the overall focus of this study, is included only sparingly as it connects to the key topics explored. Brexit, though, represents a legitimate and consistent concern of civil society leaders in Northern Ireland as it relates to the divisions they recognize within society. It provides the backdrop for a concerning spiral into deeper divisions, as highlighted by a program director from Belfast: They also at their core, and that’s a wider thing, at their core they find it difficult to accommodate difference. It’s not so much a debate and dialogue about Protestants and Catholics, in the locality that we’re in, it’s more about difference, which is now triggered by Brexit, immigration and all of that. (Participant #22, Program Director, Belfast)

Similarly, a peacebuilding organization director from Belfast not only sees Brexit as the backdrop for these general societal slides, but as a direct attack on the progress that has been achieved throughout the peace process: But the fear, my fear is, that the impacts of Brexit, even before it’s implemented, are steadily unpicking twenty years of peacebuilding and progress as we speak. Because we can see that in our post-Brexit dialogue and engagements. It’s not just a direct attack on the structure of all three strands of the agreement, and again you don’t need to be a brain surgeon to see how it’s threatening the structures of the agreement, it’s impacting directly at the ground in terms of how people are seeing each other. General intolerance is obviously growing, according to our dialogue record. General intolerance, not just Catholic and Protestant, but us, them, and others. A greater freedom to be intolerant and articulate it since Brexit. (Participant #1, Director of a Peacebuilding Organization, Belfast)

This represents a startling assessment, especially given the fact that Brexit’s endpoint is still entirely unknown, despite years of talks and yo-yoing “progress” between London and Brussels. Thus, the future impacts of Brexit cannot even be planned for by civil society leaders, given the fact the negotiating leads seem to be as clueless as the layman. Brexit is a massive and complex topic that cannot be fully explored within the confines of this study. But its overbearing nature and ever-present reality, means that it is an inescapable 186 concern for many in civil society, and frankly, everyone throughout Northern Ireland and beyond. Thus, it is an issue and topic that adds another layer to local dynamics and plays a significant role in the swirling uncertainty and division in the North of Ireland. What does this divisive environment mean for Northern Ireland in general? A peacebuilding organization director from Belfast sums it all up the best: The voice of the marginalized, the disgruntled, the disenfranchised, are getting squeezed. Because the system suits those in power, and those in power are confident if they do certain things they will return to power, no matter what happens, what incentive is there for them to change the system? To consider to what extent it’s truly democratic or truly reflective or representative democracy. What’s the onus? There isn’t one. So, our system is self-sustaining. Everybody is complicit in maintaining it, as long as political leaders and community leaders and the media, or social media, continue to actively reinforce the underlying ignorance based fears of the other, through the promotion of stereotype, misinformation, and downright overt lies, that ensure that I remain constrained to vote one way, and one way only. (Participant #1, Director of a Peacebuilding Organization, Belfast)

Division leads to exclusion and exclusion continues to reinforce the division. The cycle remains unbroken and Northern Ireland remains stagnated in a perpetual state of unfulfilled promises of peace.

8.3 Negative peace reigns – the peace shortfall Northern Ireland’s peace is an interesting peace. It is one that has been lauded time and again as more or less a golden standard across the PACS discipline (Mac Ginty, 2008a). Yet, while the lack of high levels of direct conflict is, and should be, celebrated universally, the same cannot, and should not, necessarily be said about the “peace” itself. Johan Galtung famously differentiated between positive and negative peace, and this distinction is exemplified perhaps in one of its purest forms, in Northern Ireland. Within conflict zones, progress can be a challenging thing to measure. Quantitative statistics can be skewed, and narratives can arise out of entrenched positions of old. Thus, to secure a deeper understanding of the nature of the peace itself in Northern Ireland, this study calls upon and prioritizes the experiences of those situated at the grassroots level of the peacebuilding enterprise: civil society. To orient ourselves around the idea of analyzing Northern Ireland’s peace, we turn first to the testimonial of a peacebuilding organization CEO from Belfast, as she provides her assessment of the situation: 187

If you look at the kind of peace that we have established, there’s a pathology associated with it, you know. So, we tumbled on for a period of time, generally, in political terms, arguing ourselves into stalemate. Then we have crisis talks. We get to a win-win or a everybody loses, whichever you want to say, and then we move on a little bit, and then we hit it again. Some people would typify that as being, you know, we really can’t take the hard choices unless our backs are absolutely against the wall. So, we haven’t learned how to respectfully negotiate a settlement, on an ongoing everyday basis. (Participant #2, CEO of an Umbrella Peacebuilding Organization, Belfast)

Stalemate, as it will become apparent throughout this discussion, is the name of the game for post-accord Northern Ireland. And stalemate, is the quintessential characteristic of a society plagued by negative peace. As that stalemate becomes normalized, it normalizes a failure of peace that is accepted as an existence of “good enough”. This reality is challenging for those that have lived through The Troubles, though, and examine the current peace both in comparison to the conflict of old, and even conflicts elsewhere. As a Belfast-based program director notes: But to say are we in a good place? I don’t think we are. Probably, if you’re looking at it from an international perspective, there’s a lot of places that would be very thankful to be where we are now. Thinking of Syria and places like that. What we’re living with, much better than killing one another. But certainly, it’s not panacea. It’s a very frustrating place to live, Northern Ireland, in terms of the politics [and peace]. (Participant #21, Program Director, Belfast)

And this frustration is being increasingly felt across civil society as leaders take stock of a decelerating peace process: I think I’ve got to the stage where I don’t have very great expectations whereas I did fifteen years ago. I thought, to come through that conflict and move into this and there was a lot of energy and a lot of pride and a lot of engagement going on, which kind of ground to a halt right around 2010 and 11, before the flag protests, but it was stable. Then the flag protests [were] a negative and since then it’s just been a ship with no rudder or anything. It’s been drifting. The sectarian divisions are so deeply rooted in here, that stopping violence between the two communities is actually not something to be sneezed at, it’s something positive if you can stabilize that. But what you can end up with is more of the brighter, better educated, they’ll just leave. (Participant #20, Director of Research Organization, Belfast)

That flight risk, of the brighter and better educated, was an issue explored in depth in Chapter 6. The frustration of stagnation noted above by the civil society leader highlights a new and developing trend within the peacebuilding process. And along with the stagnation, comes concerns of appearing to “challenge” the peace process as well, should civil society leaders not 188 fall in lockstep with the process as is. A project coordinator form Belfast notes the struggle of his organization throughout the years fighting against the “fear” of challenging the peace process: This is a fragile peace…it was [redacted] who started our organization and said it very well…if you mentioned religious inequality during the war, they said you were supporting the war, if you mentioned religious inequality during the peace, they say you’re attacking the peace. I think the thing generally…I was going to say it’s a benign thing…I think it’s a fear thing. More than that it’s a power thing. It’s a, this place has to be controlled and it is being controlled by very powerful people who benefit from its control and that comes through finance politics, amongst other things. But if there was a benign explanation for why we haven’t progressed a lot of the inequalities and tackled a lot of the problems, I’d think it’s that people have a conflict fear, that is constantly rolled out. (Participant #24, Project Coordinator, Belfast)

He goes on to note how this impacts not only those within civil society, but the wider populous of the everyday peacebuilders as well: I would say that broadly, people are absolutely detached from a peace process. Peace process is an elite playing ground for politicians, NGOs, etc., who intervene in it, with please make this part of the agenda, or can this become a priority in this particular phase of conflict and negotiation that you’re going through. People, broadly, intervene in that in a number of ways. They don’t intervene at all, it’s irrelevant to them, they watch it on the TV screens, and they moan about it maybe. They vote, occasionally, and they vote more or less straight down the middle. (Participant #24, Project Coordinator, Belfast)

This detachment over the years has been growing for a number of reasons. One reason is linked closely to the fear component mentioned by the project coordinator above. It is the sense that, some peace must be better than no peace, so who am I to challenge the path of this process? Yet those cognitions are not normal within the scope of a healthy peace process. Instead, that is the mark of a “fragile peace” that is almost best ignored, for fear of upsetting that perilous balance. Healthy, positive peace processes should instead include robust analysis and critiques of the processes at play. Another reason this detachment is picking up steam is closely related to the continued failures of the political sector. As disillusionment builds with the capability of Stormont to deliver on a unified vision of peace, a task it has been largely failing at throughout the last two decades, their failures in regard to key issues continues to frustrate and stagnate key dialogue opportunities throughout Northern Ireland as a whole: If you look at the patterns that have been going on over the period of the four reports that have been produced so far, and the fifth one’s in production now, there were failures in 189

terms of government response to social welfare, broader policy issues, long before the executive fail. So, there was a discontent with the sort of peace we had developed, long before we actually hit the buffers at the political level. And, I don’t know whether that is part of what has caused a strange calm around where we find ourselves now. So, it has something to do with the disillusionment that had set in before we got to this point. (Participant #2, CEO of an Umbrella Peacebuilding Organization, Belfast)

Similar to the specific discussion on youth disengagement in politics within Chapter 6, the suggestion here by civil society leaders is that the population as a whole is suffering this detachment as the stagnation and failures of Stormont continue to pile up. A project director from Derry/Londonderry puts it this way: What nobody’s mentioning and what nobody wants to say it or mention it, but in the absence of a political process and with continued injustice and inequality and a sense of grievance, the potential for conflict is always there. There are people who aren’t that far removed from it that they don’t remember how it happened or why it happened, so I think we’re in a dangerous stalemate. (Participant #12, Project Director, Derry/Londonderry)

Stalemate, stagnation, fragility…These are the classic hallmarks of negative peace or liminal peace (Diehl, 2016). And a state of negative peace creates a very precarious state of potential conflict recurrence. And therein lies the true horrors of a negative peace; it is an awfully short trip back down into the depths of conflict. The reality is that the key conversations and issues have not been solved over the intervening years of peace and, as the new car smell of the 1998 agreement has worn off, the rusty frame has revealed itself and thrown serious questions as to whether or not it is a vehicle that can truly deliver Northern Ireland to a state of lasting positive peace. A project director from Derry/Londonderry offers his take on the divided and negative peace that has taken hold in the post-accord period: So, I think instead of trying to negotiate their future, out with us, with their fellow inhabitants on the island, instead of trying to exist on their religious and cultural and civic rights, they’re just heading for the cliff edge and confrontation. If you’re asking did the peace process work? I think it got us a breathing space where the violence ended and we could try and sort something out but we’ve ended up twenty years later nearly at the endgame point where it’s time to either live peaceably with us and treat us as equals, on the island and try to care about a society where everybody’s equal, or, they still want to be the dominant force until they’re deposed almost and smell the coffee. So, that’s where I see it at. (Participant #12, Project Director, Derry/Londonderry)

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Negative peace as an abstract theory is frightening and demoralizing enough. But what do the physical manifestations of negative peace actually look like in reality? In Northern Ireland, it is a reality marked with death, division, and despair. A project coordinator from Belfast offers his insight into this chilling reality: You do have more people that have taken their own lives since the conflict ended than died during it. So, people are dying. And people are dying through things that could possibly be prevented if their society functioned a bit better or was more equal or the underlying inequalities that fueled conflict were addressed. But it’s good that people aren’t shooting each other in the streets…as much as they were. We do still have armed paramilitary organizations in very prominent positions of power. We do still have very sectarianized political decisionmaking. Totally sectarianized political machine at the top, and all of the permutations of that at the policy level down at the ground level. We do have, effectively, a totally divided society in every way you can imagine, education, housing, environment, walls that literally divide people, social spaces. (Participant #24, Project Coordinator, Belfast)

The GFA represents many things, both good and bad, but as this study is repeatedly showing, as the agreement itself is examined through the lens of civil society leaders working in the post- accord setting, the realities of Northern Ireland today are not indicative of a society experiencing the windfalls of positive peace. Negative peace is a scourge that locks post-accord societies in a perpetual cycle of dashed hopes and broken dreams. By no means is this to suggest that achieving positive peace is an easy task. The challenges that plague a society in active conflict do not magically evaporate on agreement signing day. It takes time and effort to undue and rebuild from decades, or in the case of Northern Ireland, centuries, of division and death. Yet the temptation is to see any peace as ‘good enough’ within post-accord societies. As the testimonials of the civil society leaders included in this section suggest, though, ‘good enough’ is, in reality, neither good nor enough when it comes to life at the grassroots level. Negative peace reigns in Northern Ireland, that much has been made clear by civil society leaders. Thus, the question must be asked, after twenty years…how much longer will that reign be allowed to last?

8.4 The lingering troubles – the toxicity of an unresolved conflict While there are a number of factors influencing the existence of liminal peace within Northern Ireland (a deeper discussion on this occurring at the end of this chapter), one major contributor is the lingering impacts of the Troubles still to this day. These unresolved issues are 191 not ones that are always readily identifiable from an external perspective. But thanks to the knowledge and experience of civil society leaders, a deeper understanding of the dynamics at the grassroots level of communities, and the peace process in general, reveals valuable insights into these enduring issues. As civil society leaders speak to the realities of living in a state of negative peace, a commonality nearly all study participants touched on is the challenges of a society that is either unwilling or unable to truly step out of the shadow of the past. But we’re distracted over here with this stuff from the past, where the big focus should be right here and the investment should be right here and tackling the real issues, that are on the ground. That’s my personal point of view, because we see it coming through our door every day. (Participant #14, Community Developer, Derry/Londonderry)

And what has resulted from this, according to a community organization director in Derry/Londonderry, is a general avoidance of the “hard” issues that continue to impact the country: This constant desire that we have to kick the can down the road and not address the most toxic and divisive issues because, not now… We’ll work on the easiest stuff around the edge and we’ll leave that hard stuff until relationships are developed in such a level that we can deal with that. Clearly, that hasn’t happened. (Participant #4, Director of a Community Organization, Derry/Londonderry)

And he is right; the ideal emanating from the GFA that the more challenging issues could be addressed at a later date has, at least thus far, proven to be utterly untrue. Rather than focusing on new issues and tackling new challenges, the issues and challenges of old continue to dominate the psyche of Northern Ireland’s culture: Not a day goes past in the paper that you don’t see something being resurrected from 30, 40, 50 years ago and that all has the impact of dragging us down. (Participant #21, Program Director, Belfast)

The problem is, it is the same issues that initially led to the explosion of The Troubles, that many civil society leaders are seeing today. Thus, it is a cycle of trauma and unaddressed grievances that seems to be playing out the same story once again: So, everything that was gerrymandering in ‘67 and all of that type of stuff, can’t be called the same now, but the same political dynamics are in play all of the time. They have permeated every single facet of decision-making in the state. From the public authority to the NGOs…and that common sense that makes no sense, exists to greater and lesser degrees, in all those tiers of either activity, political deal making and resource allocation. (Participant #24, Project Coordinator, Belfast) 192

The concern for this project coordinator, is that it is the same prelude he has seen building today, that he witnessed at the tail end of the 1960s. That prelude, obviously, set the stage for the devastation of The Troubles. Therefore, the same foundation issues, which have been left unaddressed, are rising to the forefront again, only this time, they are compounded by the, also unaddressed, traumas of the previous conflict. This is a dangerously potent mix. Lingering trauma from such a violent and entrenched conflict is not, in itself, surprising. Trauma arising from societal conflict, such as in Northern Ireland’s case, tends to be elastic in meaning and resilient in endurance. In other words, the realities of trauma and its impacts look different amongst individuals, but also tends to imbed itself as a general impression across society as a whole. It is not necessarily the existence of the trauma that is an issue for Northern Ireland, rather it is the inability and unwillingness to deal with that trauma, at a societal level, in any kind of meaningful way. Thus, by “kicking the can down the road” and allowing the traumas and issues of the past to go largely unaddressed, they continue to feed into the negative peace of Northern Ireland today (Hamber and Kelly, 2016). Toss in a toxic mixture of Brexit uncertainty and an anemic Stormont and it is a recipe for serious concern among civil society leaders. And we are in a very bad place, I think, in terms of a vacuum. You have all the trauma of The Troubles, which still goes on and you can still touch it and feel it. And then you have the world, European type of context in terms of Brexit and that upheaval and level of change without a local government. (Participant #22, Program Director, Belfast)

An organization director from Belfast, echoes these same thoughts as presented above: I think what we have now is just at that kind of tipping point and that stalemate that maybe we’ve taken things a bit for granted. But there’s still a lot of hurt and trauma across every section that we need to really deal with now. (Participant #23, Organization Director, Belfast)

The horse wearing the blinders is not just an ailment of society at large, though; there are those in civil society that are also contributing to this overall “can kicking” by separating their peace work from the traumas of the past. Admittedly, not all peacebuilding projects or programs should be aimed at dealing with past traumas. Trauma is, after all, one of a range of key issues that must be tended to during the course of a peace process. Yet in saying that, the trauma component should not be willfully ignored either. It is vital that these continued impacts are recognized and understood, lest civil society contribute to the treading of water around trauma 193 issues. One peacebuilder from Derry/Londonderry was remarkably candid in her self-reflection on this issue: But I can quite happily take the scenic route around the dead. I think that that’s a powerful line, because there’s so many people here, as civic society and this is probably back to your big question, that don’t have to take responsibility because they’re not actually directly impacted by the conflict. (Participant #5, Peacebuilder, Derry/Londonderry)

It can be tempting, as a peacebuilder, to become myopic, focusing only on your little piece of the peace puzzle. Yet the cultural and political ignoring of the lingering trauma from The Troubles is creating conditions in Northern Ireland that are ensuring the continued existence of negative peace. Thus, it is imperative that these issues and this trauma be seriously addressed sooner rather than later. Otherwise, civil society leaders fear there will be a continual rise in the shift of marginalized groups towards the dangerous extremes. As one researcher from Belfast said: But, the problem is, in areas similar to here, that was most acutely affected by conflict, where people are pretty marginalized, lot of social deprivation, they don’t have much material wealth or a good quality of life, then their identity becomes much more important to them and they’re more inclined to take that more extreme view. It’s not untypical of any democratic society where you get social deprivation that gives rise to extremes. (Participant #20, Director of Research Organization, Belfast)

As the traumas of the past continue to fester and contribute to the increasing instability of the concoction of chaos in Northern Ireland, the slide to extremes is not just a possibility, it is a reality, and one that Northern Ireland is already seeing in alarmingly increasing regularity. Paramilitary groups thrive upon this instability, and trauma represents a crucial key in unlocking the negative potential of marginalized and vulnerable members of society. This is readily apparent in the rising activity of dissident republicanism in traditional strongholds like Derry/Londonderry (Maiangwa, et al., 2019). This has been highlighted recently with the death of journalist Lyra McKee at the hands of the ‘New IRA’ (NIRA) (BBC, 2019). Lyra was shot dead in Derry/Londonderry as she was covering sustained rioting against the PSNI around the Creggan area of the city. Her death sent shockwaves throughout the region as the threat from paramilitary organizations in Northern Ireland suddenly took on a new and grim reality. Residents and politicians from all communities were quick to unify in their condemnation of the NIRA, but the event once again highlighted the fragile state of communities that are still struggling with active paramilitary influence. 194

If Northern Ireland is genuine about a desire to embrace a more positive and peaceful future, the realities of the past must be handled with compassion and urgency (McChrystal, 2019). As core issues remain unresolved due in large part to design decisions within the GFA to “kick the can down the road,” it is becoming increasingly apparent to those in civil society that contributed to this study, that this can appears to be destined for an eternity of kicking along. The problem, though, is that negative peace wears on a society and on a people. The road upon which that can is being kicked is getting rockier by the day, and many civil society leaders fear that road may soon end in another stumble-over-the-edge-of the conflict cliff.

8.5 Is positive peace coming? – looking ahead for Northern Ireland The challenges within Northern Ireland, during the Troubles, throughout the peacemaking process, and in the post-accord years, have been numerous and resilient. For decades, civil society has been at the epicenter of these challenges, as it struggles to navigate the choppy waters of a consistently disjointed peace process. Given the challenges and the setbacks, one could understand if a sense of pessimism permeates throughout the sector. Yet is that the reality for those engaged in this work, day in and day out? With so much focus in Northern Ireland being placed on the past, I was curious about what civil society leaders thought about the future. Talking about the future within conflict zones can be an interesting process. Active conflicts tend to necessitate a constant “here and now” perspective and post-accord periods tend to be littered by a near obsession with the past. Thus, little room is often dedicated towards the future, at least, little room that is not purely lip service to the notion. The political sector in Northern Ireland tried for many years, to shift attention towards the future with their “Shared Future” campaign, asking society as a whole to operate from this perspective. That push, however, never really panned out. Citizens and community leaders found it challenging, to put it lightly, to even begin to explore a future, given many of the injustices of the past have still been left unaddressed. But the future is an important piece of the peacebuilding puzzle, and testing the temperature of civil society leaders as to their views of the future, provides a critical insight into direction of the process as a whole. With Northern Ireland decidedly suspended in an atmosphere 195 of negative peace, the question begs, is a transition to positive peace in the cards? As one project coordinator from Belfast puts it: The problem in conflicts is that you have two opposed things going on. How do you reconcile them without one being obliterated or eliminated? (Participant #24, Project Coordinator, Belfast)

For decades now, the North of Ireland has been caught on this negative peace treadmill. And the questions of negative peace continue to reverberate, from a wider chorus of voices all asking, are we stuck in this liminal peace? Can the divisions of old be reconciled? Is positive peace every coming? Because [the peace process] has lost its way, if ever it had a sort of series of unifying principles, if it ever had those from the start, they’re certainly on their way out now. And I think that has questions…for everywhere, big conglomerate of different peoples living together. So, the question is, how can we have governments that reflect, and I suppose, the decision-making process which reflect the overall needs and at the same time allow individual difference and at the same time not just allow but celebrate individual difference. (Participant #3, Chairman of Peacebuilding Organization, Derry/Londonderry)

The concern expressed above, about a “mission drift” of the peace process, is one that is echoed by many civil society leaders throughout Northern Ireland. The fear is that “peace” twenty years beyond the GFA has been corrupted by the intervening decades, and has contributed, in part, to the existence of the negative peace experienced today. As one researcher notes: There needs to be a radical rethink or radical thought given to where this place goes in the next twenty years. One of the concerns I’ve had, is there isn’t a clear direction where it’s going. Where it wants to go. There isn’t the political leadership to give it that. (Participant #20, Director of Research Organization, Belfast)

The failures of the political apparatus that he notes are significant and are a topic that has been explored in previous chapters. But his overall point, of the future direction of Northern Ireland, is an important consideration. All peace processes need to include at least a cursory glance to the future at the outset, but much of the focus in the early years of a concerted peacebuilding process tend to be dominated by the immediate concerns of the here and now (Ryan, 2013). After several decades, though, civil society leaders have already shifted, or are in the late stages of shifting, their gaze to the future. What comes next? Is this the right path to peace? In looking ahead, several civil society leaders reflected upon the needs that exist for the building of a more positive peace future within Northern Ireland. One need, notes a 196 peacebuilding organization director from Belfast, is for civil society to continue to embrace the growing discontent with the political sphere and use that as a drive to expand the voice and impact of civil society within the peace process: Practically, twenty years from now, will it be better will it be worse? I have no friggin’ idea. If it hadn’t been for Brexit, I would have been inclined towards cautious optimism, because there was a gradual building of discontent with the ways things are, that we see in our dialogues that cuts across all the divisions. There’s a growing awareness amongst civic society organizations of the need for that alternative mechanism, that would enable the growth of a non-party political civic society voice as a challenge to and support for, formal democratic process. (Participant #1, Director of a Peacebuilding Organization, Belfast)

In many ways, this can help to keep civil society focused on the genuine goals of peace, and not slip into a general discontent with the negative peace that is the established norm. This also requires a certain degree of self-reflection, from the sector as whole, which is a key component on understanding the path forward: Positive, pluralist democracies should always assume that the business of sustaining peaceful and good relationships across the community is their work…is something that they should be seriously thinking about. Whether or not you’re moving away from a conflict and past an accord, out into the future, coming up to an accord or fearing that you’re descending down into violence again, you’re always somewhere on that spectrum, even whether you realize it or you don’t. (Participant #2, CEO of an Umbrella Peacebuilding Organization, Belfast)

And thus, when asked a simple question about the optimism or pessimism for the next twenty years in Northern Ireland, consensus between civil society leaders was largely one of “cautious optimism,” as noted by the organization director above. But that does not mean optimism comes easily for everyone. One program director from Belfast notes his struggle between optimism and pessimism and his thoughts on what a “successful” future might bring: I would like to be optimistic, but I find it difficult at the present time to be optimistic. But by saying that, I’m not anticipating a massive return to violence or anything like that, but there [are] malign elements out there who will take advantage of any instability around politics that exists here. It’s a long time for us to be without an administration here, it’s almost two years now like. The longer that drifts, I think personally the British government should have introduced direct rule before now and let us get on with it. Personally, I prefer direct rule actually, to local administration. Because I find that the British government ministers can rise above our division and make decisions based more on rationality than (laughing) make it from their head rather than their heart. (Participant #21, Program Director, Belfast) 197

The call for a swift return to direct rule is admittedly not a stance that would find much cross- community support, but the sentiment behind the call is universally recognized. The program director and his natural desire to be optimistic is at odds with the reality of a dysfunctional political system and a divided society that he sees around him. And that is what is so dangerous, amongst a multitude of things, about negative peace. It works relentlessly against even the most dedicated optimists within society. And so, with the bevy of challenges facing Northern Ireland today, where does any optimism come from? Civil society leaders had a number of interesting responses to the “next twenty years” question, which helps to shed some light on this key topic. Part of the optimistic stance of civil society leaders comes from a recognition of the path that has already been traveled and, more importantly, the successes of civil society in helping Northern Ireland travel down that path. As one community developer from Derry/Londonderry suggests: I think if, politics here moves forward, you will see a more proactive civil society that’s saying, we’re not going to go back there. It takes time to bring about fundamental change. Somebody like me who lived through the civil rights movement and the conflict, I thought we would have been further on at this stage, but I’m still not disillusioned, I still think we’re moving in that direction. (Participant #17, Community Developer, Derry/Londonderry)

His frustration in noted and is an inescapable component of the reality he recognizes on the ground. Yet to him, the most important word of the phrase “slow progress” is not the slow it is the progress. Likewise, a peacebuilder from Derry/Londonderry shares the same feeling: So, the next twenty years, I’m hoping that I’m going to see the glass half full. That I do see that common sense rule out. Hopefully that there’s a civilization and a civil society that won’t allow us to go back into violence. While things aren’t perfect, they’re far from the worst. (Participant #5, Peacebuilder, Derry/Londonderry)

Other civil society leaders reverberate these ideas such as a project coordinator from Belfast: My optimism though, comes from…we’re 100 percent certain that communities can be organized to create change, meaningful change. We actually have navigated over the last 10 years, all of the cumbersome obstacles and difficulties that manifest in post-conflict societies to get to that change, with those communities, without them getting killed along the way. It’s about scale. It’s about replication and scale. This place will be in constitutional flux now for the next twenty years, but it’s been in constitutional flux since the state was formed. And probably have been in constitutional flux for about 800 years! Constitutional flux is actually the norm. (Participant #24, Project Coordinator, Belfast)

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And a project lead from Belfast: I think there’s an optimism for me that if those small steps can be taken, whatever happens at the higher political levels, at least we can start creating a different story within our own work. Within our own organizations, within our own family units, within our own communities, just by adopting a kinder approach to the way we do life and relate to people and socialize. (Participant #27, Project Lead, Belfast)

A key trend is flowing throughout all of these thoughts that is not just about embracing a certain brand of realistic optimism. Even more interesting than that commonality, is the nexus of where this optimism is coming from: civil society and the grassroots. All of the responses above highlight the successes and the potential of engaging the peace process at its most foundational levels led by civil society and the everyday peacemakers (Boulding, 2000) within communities. As another community developer from Derry/Londonderry puts it: I think if you look in twenty years, I obviously didn’t live through the conflict, I think there is that change that’s happening. We’re working with [redacted] group and stuff, older people talking about what peace rally means, people who lived through the conflict don’t want to go back there obviously. So, they would keep quiet about a lot of things, because at least there’s no trouble. So, that negative peace you hear people talking about. But now that it’s twenty years on, people are kind of going, right, I don’t think it’s going to go back to that, maybe we can start to point out the faults. What do we think hasn’t worked, what do we want? Twenty years is a long time to be putting up with not getting your full rights, so their perception here hasn’t really changed things, people thought what would’ve improved haven’t; housing, you hear a lot of the same issues. Definitely yeah, you’re right, people are being more vocal and that’s from the rights perspective rather than anything else. (Participant #16, Community Developer, Derry/Londonderry)

She recognizes the change potential that has existed and continues to endure within communities. This is the unifying thread that connects her with civil society leaders throughout Northern Ireland. Even in the face of a prolonged and cold winter of negative peace, the optimism for sunnier days has not yet died out. That optimism is being kept alive by those in civil society that are on the front lines of the peace process, the ones that have seen the best and the worst that a post-accord society has to offer. Their diligent optimism shows us, once again, the vital importance of civil society. Optimistic. Have to be optimistic. I’m from here and my family is from here. I have to be optimistic. I think that we…you know as a country, wherever your border starts and ends, we are fantastic. Yes, optimistic. Hopefully we will never ever revert back to anything like it was during the troubles. (Participant #11, Program Leader, Belfast)

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It is clear that optimism is not overflowing within the peacebuilding sector in Northern Ireland. Yet, it would also be disingenuous to suggest that there exists no positive thinking. Instead, many civil society leaders express a more reserved sense of stubborn commitment. They recognize that even though they might not feel optimistic in a personal capacity, they have an obligation as a sector to push forward, even if it is with a forced sense of collective optimism, as they remain the first line of defense in securing a positive peace future.

8.6 Key findings of the research Northern Ireland continues to be a deeply divided place. That may be an obvious statement, given the preceding discussions throughout this study, but it is a statement that deserves continual repeating as we attempt to grasp the realities of the Northern Ireland peace enterprise. The GFA was meant to mark a turning point in Northern Ireland, and in many ways, it accomplished that task. The shift from “conflict” to “peace” is a messy boundary, an irony not lost on those in Northern Ireland and the border counties, but it is a significant transition, nonetheless. Yet not all peace is created equal. And as the civil society leaders within Northern Ireland have revealed in this study, the “peace” within Northern Ireland, twenty years on from the dramatic transition of 1998, is one that can hardly be universally celebrated. Four key findings emerged inductively from the data presented in Chapter 8. First, Northern Ireland remains a deeply divided society, with divisions existing both in the physical and psychological form. Second, negative peace perpetuates in Northern Ireland as a ‘fear of conflict’ continues to force people to accept a “half-baked peace,” to once again borrow a term from poet Damian Gorman. Third, issues around trauma and the legacy of the past continue to go unaddressed in Northern Ireland and plague the peace process from a foundational level. And fourth, despite personal reservations, civil society leaders note there is a collective ‘forced’ optimism that can still be found within the peacebuilding sector, and it is upon this framework that strength must be drawn in the push towards positive peace. These findings are discussed in greater detail below. First, as highlighted by the first-hand experience which includes decades long experience of civil society leaders, the divisions within Northern Ireland are not only still present, but in some cases, are deepening to startling new levels. One of the primary reasons for these societal divisions, is the continued practice of physical divisions within Northern Ireland. Civil society 200 leaders continually highlighted the segregated education and housing practices as stunning realities that fly directly in the face of any pursuit of positive peace. The GFA was notably silent on any kind of direct push for society-wide integration and cross-community contact when it comes to the basics of civil life. The agreement forced engagement in other areas of life, such as political institutions (though the successes here are not exactly brilliant, as the next chapter explores), yet a failure of direct contact initiatives in other areas have certainly played into the negative peace realties being experienced today in the form of widespread social divisions. How can you work together, if you do not even know one another? The findings of this research study show a direct outworking of the brutally negative ramifications of contact theory in action. As Northern Ireland’s people are robbed of contact on a cross-community basis, they have also been deprived the prospect of securing a society marked by positive peace. It is no wonder then, why the physical barriers present in Northern Ireland, whether it be housing, schooling, or otherwise, are consistently on the minds of civil society leaders. As they work in the heart of communities at the grassroots level, the participants of this study have been privy to the deepest understanding of the challenges that continue to face Northern Ireland, over twenty years past the signing of the GFA. They are not raising an issue that is simply a momentary blimp on the peace radar, rather, they are ringing the alarm bells of a sustained threat. Second, the research presented here is clear; the barriers that exist in Northern Ireland today, need to be tackled now, as part of a comprehensive patchwork of support for social, cultural, and political integration of new interactions. This is an area where the political apparatus cannot look to the GFA for guidance, as it is an issue which was left wholly absent from the guiding document of peace. Yet that is not to say that policymakers have nowhere to turn. As the participants of this study continually show, there is a wealth of ideas and knowledge housed within civil society, that can and must be drawn upon today, to help push Northern Ireland out of the stagnant divisions of the current negative peace. The positive/negative peace binary is certainly an oversimplification of the complex realities associated with any conflict zones and connected peace process. Yet, there is no ambiguity or overly complex assessments coming out of the voice of civil society leaders within this study in regard to positive/negative peace within Northern Ireland. The unified clarity is 201 unmistakable in their testimonies; Northern Ireland is not a success story of positive peace. Rather, the evidence from the highest levels of the political apparatus to the most intimate levels of grassroots communities shows a clear understanding; negative peace has an unrelenting grip on the six northern counties of Ulster. The Northern Irish peace is not the shining success story many hoped it would be. The post-accord period has consistently shown signs of a negative peace that has, thus far, been unbreakable. The lack of progress, twenty years beyond the GFA, and the same stumbles occurring again and again, have left civil society exasperated and frustrated. The participants of this study all express this frustration, a notable finding, as the primary emotion of a positive peace process is one of accomplishment and satisfaction, not frustration and dejection, which is what we see in Northern Ireland today. One of the more interesting points to arise from the testimonies of civil society leaders, is the suggestion that fear is also a significant emotion that is being felt throughout Northern Ireland. It is a “fear of conflict” that participants have identified, suggesting that the peace in the North of Ireland can be described as fragile, at best. As participants note, in a startling revelation, this fear has been historically, and currently, employed to intimidate people into accepting the current version of peace in Northern Ireland. The status quo is protected, in essence, by this fear. But when the status quo is a deeply divided society gripped by negative peace, that protection is a deeply damaging reality. All of this has led, civil society leaders suggest, to a society-wide disengagement and disillusionment of the peace process itself. Youth specific disillusionment was explored in depth in Chapter 6, but the findings here, suggest that the detachment from peace is not relegated to a single generation. Rather, throughout Northern Ireland, in both PUL and CNR communities, and from the country’s oldest to its youngest, detachment from the peace project is a problem of societal concern. In other words, what we can recognize in Northern Ireland today, is a dramatic lack of momentum for peace. Though peace is clearly never an end state, there is always an ideal waning of critical attention for a peace process, as the realities of positive peace permeate throughout society and ultimately dominate the narrative. Yet that is not the fading path that we are seeing in Northern Ireland. The waning clearly exists, as evidenced by the findings of this study, yet the 202 accompanying positive peace does not. In its place, exists a negative peace stalemate that dominates the social narrative. While the troubling levels of suicide in Northern Ireland is an issue that has been discussed in other places of this study (namely Chapter 6, looking at the youth dimension), it is worth noting once again, as it was repeatedly highlighted as a direct manifestation of the negative peace being seen by civil society leaders. As the findings of this study show, the suicide plight in Northern Ireland is not confined to a single generation or a singular community; suicide is a society wide concern in Northern Ireland. This suggests that focused action on mental health initiatives is an area of unity that needs to be pursued with the utmost haste. While it is important that Northern Ireland work to move out of the overall environment of negative peace, it must also be recognized that a focus on big picture change cannot come at the expense of significant focus on current and dire manifestations of negative peace, such as suicide. As it is shown by the discussions throughout this study, we can identify a number of contributing factors to the existence and perpetuation of negative peace within Northern Ireland today. However, the negative peace reality seems to have a contributing factor that is recognized by every participant within this study: unresolved issues involving legacy. What is painstakingly clear, is that the Troubles continue to cast a trauma filled shadow over Northern Ireland. The GFA avoided the issue of legacy, almost entirely, as it was seen as an issue that would seriously hurt the chances of the document getting across the proverbial finish line of the peacemaking process. The assumption, or perhaps the hope, was that relationships would gradually improve in the post-accord years to a point where those sticky, divisive issues could be addressed head on. Yet civil society leaders are emphatic that, even after two plus decades, that hopeful reality seems as implausible as ever. Thus, the “hard stuff” has become even harder as the momentum of 1998 has slowly waned over the years, leaving in its wake, a frustrated and distressed society. This is a key lesson, the research shows, when it comes to tackling the challenging issues within peace processes. “Kicking the can down the road” in hopes of improved relations between conflict parties, is far from a guarantee. As it has been shown within the Northern Irish context, not only have relationships not improved, yet the path towards addressing these challenging issues, is in fact, more muddled now than it ever was at the time of drafting the peace agreement. This suggests that peacemakers and peacebuilders would be wise to capitalize on times where 203 momentum exists in order to wrestle with “sticky” issues, rather than wait for fairer days, which may never come. As it has played out for Northern Ireland, the choice to kick the can down the road can be more closely seen as pushing a snowball down a hill, that has now become a snow boulder that is even more unmanageable than before. The reason the legacy issue is continually highlighted by civil society leaders, is that they are directly witnessing the choking toxicity of the current environment of the Northern Irish peace process. Unresolved aspects of the conflict continue to be an unrelenting anchor, dragging downwards and backwards. Thus, what is abundantly clear from the findings of this study, is that the issue of legacy must finally be addressed, even as challenging and uncomfortable as it might be, and it must be done today, not tomorrow. Without that commitment, the negative peace will not dissipate. Third, another key contributing factor to the toxic environment can be attributed to the lingering trauma perpetuating on from the Troubles. The general desire to avoid dealing with legacy issues has meant that effectively handling the long-term trauma of protracted conflict is something that has also been caught in the failures of the GFA and the peace process as a whole. The trauma of the past has not abated over time, as shown by the testimony of the program director suggesting it is still so present, you can “touch it and feel it.” The use of such strong, tactile language reveals that the traumas of the Troubles is not an abstract concept residing in the background. Instead, it is a painful, present, and real issue at the forefront of everyday life in Northern Ireland. While grassroots programs and organizations are engaged in dealing with the traumas of the past within communities, it is clear that their tireless efforts are not equipped to address this pressing issue at a larger societal scale. The impact these organizations make within their communities is incredible and powerful and makes one wonder how powerful a broad society- wide approach could be if given the chance. As the traumas of the past continue to contribute to the toxic, negative peace within Northern Ireland, the effort to handle these issues can no longer be shouldered only by grassroots CSOs. The political sphere must contribute, through the executive, thorough and sweeping policy attention to the issue. This is another area where the GFA, unfortunately, is ill-equipped to be used as a failsafe of support and structure. Perhaps the most telling account, when it comes to the lingering trauma, is given by the Derry/Londonderry based peacebuilder as she talked about taking the “scenic route around the 204 dead.” This insight provides a powerful understanding of how trauma and legacy has been handled in Northern Ireland in the post-accord era. It was a practice taken by the framers of the GFA, it has been a practice employed by the executive and political sphere for decades, and it is a practice that many are still clinging to today. Yet that scenic route has not taken Northern Ireland into the promise land of positive peace. Instead, it has kept the wheels of progress stagnant and stale in the muddy roads of negative peace. And fourth, with all of this discussion about the realities of negative peace in Northern Ireland, it is apparent that optimism is not exactly overflowing within civil society. This should provide a serious wakeup call to all associated with the Northern Ireland peace process, when those tasked with the delivery of the peace are those that are also the most openly pessimistic about its prospects. This is not to suggest that it is all entirely hopeless within civil society. There are ribbons of hope, which will be discussed shortly. Yet the findings of this research clearly reveal frightening levels of frustration, trepidation, disappointment, and even, despair within the frontline grassroots peacebuilders of Northern Ireland. It is also quite clear, that civil society recognizes the critical need for the sector to fill the gaps left by the ineffectiveness of the political apparatus in delivering a new direction and approach to peace within the six northern counties of Ulster. The on again, off again, existence of Stormont and the ever-growing societal apathy with the political sphere, has had an interesting coalescing effective within civil society. The universal recognition of these realities within civil society has resulted in a unique unity from leaders in seeking to take the fate of the peace process within their own hands. And it is this growing unity that represents one of the ribbons of hope. This is what is so critical to understand about Northern Ireland; against, seemingly, all odds, hope still exists. In a chapter about the crippling realties of negative peace, hope may seem like a topic of inclusion. Yet a crucial finding of this research project, is that hope genuinely does exist, if you look in the right places. It is in those pockets of hope within civil society, that attention needs to be paid, and support must be provided, in order to chart an effective path forward. Afterall, if we cannot find any optimism at all within a peace process, then what is the point? The findings within this chapter challenge us, all of us, to ask a question that is clearly playing heavily on the minds of civil society leaders. Is this it for Northern Ireland? Is this what peace truly looks like? And that is, perhaps, a key existential question that all peace processes 205 must face at some point. Is this the best that we can do? It is clear that after two decades of a peace process, that much of the time feels like one step forward and two steps back, many civil society leaders in Northern Ireland are mulling this very question. Is this it? Is the negative peace within a divided society the best that Northern Ireland can do? It is an interesting question, not just for Northern Ireland, but for post-accord conflict zones throughout the world. The notion that peace, of any kind, is preferable to conflict is a central pillar of the PACS discipline. And yet, Northern Ireland is a prime example of an unhealthy society that has seemingly found itself in the quicksand that is an unhealthy peace process. External perspectives, and even those from within Northern Ireland, emanating primarily from Stormont, tend to gloss over the negative qualifier before the peace label, if they admit it exists in the first place, that is. Yet from deep within Northern Ireland, at the nexus of the peace process itself, civil society leaders are crying out for a recognition that things might not be as rosy as they seem. The question, “is this good enough,” is gaining steam in how often it is being asked by civil society leaders within Northern Ireland, and that represents an important finding from this research, and a key lesson for peace processes elsewhere. As difficult and betraying as it might seem to ask the question, it absolutely must be asked by those engaged, at all levels within peace processes. Many civil society leaders in Northern Ireland, as evidenced by the wealth of discussion above, are starting to answer that key question. And their answer has been in the negative. No, they are saying, this “peace” is not enough. The promises and the hopes of the GFA have been replaced by the bitter understandings that Northern Ireland’s peace process is one that is still marked by division and stalemate. Stalemate itself is not a symptom of a failed peace process. Considering the realities of conflict, peacetime stalemate can be seen as a glorious reprieve to the deadly realities of an active conflict. Yet a stalemate cannot and more importantly should not represent an end point. Existence within a stalemate might be better than existence within active conflict, but why accept a reality short of a genuine state of conflict transformation? Following the hard-fought victory of designing and signing a peace agreement, it is entirely understandable why societies would shy away from questioning or challenging the nature of the liminal peace that has taken hold. Direct violence is, mostly, not being seen on a daily basis anymore, so why question it? Things are better, right? Yes…in the short term. Yet 206 looking at Northern Ireland, a society that is over twenty years into its peace process, the long- term view reveals the cracks which have developed in the once glistening façade of a “gold standard” peace agreement. And for many, these cracks have revealed the same divided and conflict prone society that had seemingly been left behind.

8.7 Conclusion This chapter tackles a key reality within Northern Ireland today: the existence of negative peace. As civil society leaders share their experiences and expertise within this study, a clear picture is drawn of the devastating realities of living within a society marred by negative peace. The knowledge provided by the participants of this study illuminate several key themes of negative peace in Northern Ireland, from its origins to its impacts. First, the reality of Northern Ireland as a divided society was addressed. Civil society leaders note that the divisions that exist within society today in many ways mirror those that existed prior to the GFA. Some leaders even suggest they are seeing these divisions deepen as communities across the North of Ireland remain physically and psychologically apart. A deeply divided society is not the mark of a society experiencing positive peace. Northern Ireland, two decades into a peace process, does not resemble the hopeful future many envisioned back in 1998. Rather than cultural and social unity emboldening progress, Northern Ireland finds itself stagnant in the midst of a grueling and entrenched stalemate. As this stalemate continues, civil society leaders are highlighting troubling levels of societal detachment with the peace process itself. Intensifying these realities, is the fact that civil society leaders suggest that Northern Ireland has still not been able to effectively tackle the ongoing challenge of the Troubles legacy. Pointing directly to a conscious decision for the GFA to “kick the can down the road” on issues like legacy, study participants suggest the toxicity of the Troubles has not dissipated over time. Instead, propelled by failures to effectively and compassionately handle lingering traumas, these long-practiced avoidance techniques have had crippling effects on the peace process. Finally, even when all hope seems to be lost, civil society leaders repeatedly cling to ribbons of hope and this finding provides a significant bookend to this chapter. As leaders ask the question, “is this peace good enough?” many are responding with a resounding, no. It is in 207 this resilience and perseverance that many civil society leaders are embracing their own autonomy in pushing for a new direction for peace within Northern Ireland.

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Chapter 9 What is not there: Northern Ireland civil society leaders’ perceptions of the successes and failures of the Good Friday Agreement

9.1 Introduction Was the Good Friday Agreement successful? Undoubtedly yes. With the stroke of a few pens, hard won as those pen strokes were, the peace agreement of 1998 delivered a reprieve of the direct violence that had plagued Northern Ireland for decades and gave the first glimpse of hope in a centuries old divide. Yet the subsequent decades, the decades of “peace,” have failed to live up to the promise that was brimming in those early spring months following the 1998 GFA. In 2019, Northern Ireland is a still a deeply divided society. From schools, to communities, to neighborhoods, to politics, the Northern six counties of Ulster are as segregated today, as they were during the heights of The Troubles. And thus, Northern Ireland finds itself today, in perpetual struggle to understand the “peace” that was supposedly delivered by the GFA. What has become increasingly clear, is that the concept of the GFA being a “gold standard” when it comes to peace agreements, is a notion that does not exactly hold up when the perspectives of civil society leaders are taken into account. With a wide variety of specific issue areas explored in previous chapters, this chapter explores the overall perceptions of civil society leaders when it comes to the agreement that has defined their work in the peacebuilding field for the last two plus decades. Specifically, a closer examination of the pre-agreement stage is discussed, overall reflections on the GFA, unique re- design ideas, and final considerations on the impact of the GFA in Northern Ireland today. By embracing and recognizing the unrivaled value of civil society leaders’ perspectives on the agreement, this chapters offers a remarkable and wholly unique assessment of the agreement that has defined a nation, a generation, and, in many ways, the academic study of “successful” peace agreements.

9.2 Before it was done – peacemaking and the pre-agreement period While this study focuses primarily upon the design and implementation of the GFA, a quick discussion is warranted on the reflections of civil society leaders concerning the lead up to its signing in 1998. The peacemaking and negotiation stage of a peace process is obviously 209 critical to any hope of successes achieved down the road in the peacebuilding environment (Guelke, 2003b). Yet on the other side of that coin, ineffective peacemaking can create a plethora of challenges for even the most diligent of peacebuilding processes. They are, in this sense, intricately linked processes that at times, are even indistinguishable from one another. Though civil society leaders were not asked to speak directly to the negotiating process leading up to the GFA, as that falls just outside the scope of this study, a couple of key thoughts naturally arose during the course of the interviews and these insights help to set up subsequent points of critical analysis later in this chapter. Although none of the study participants were directly involved in the negotiation process in an official capacity, working within civil society during the years leading up to the signing of the agreement, provided them with a unique perspective on the process. Processes such as the Opshal Commission (Pollak, 1993) have been mentioned before in this study, as a prime example of how the lead up to the GFA represented a fairly inclusive process of dialogue across societal sectors. The impact of the Women’s Coalition on the peacemaking process is another example of extra-political groups that were capable of making at least a surface level impact on the development of the initial peacemaking process. Another example is The Northern Ireland Forum, which a researcher from Belfast discusses: I think some of the benefits of the peace agreement here, with Northern Ireland, is the way they structured it to be as inclusive, broadly inclusive. One of the things that tends to get forgotten about, things like the forum. The Northern Ireland Forum, 1996 Northern Ireland Forum, which was a good way somebody came up with to give people a political legitimacy to take part in the negotiations. Although that was what needed to get the UDA and the UDF on board, it also was effective in getting the women’s coalition and the labor grouping involved in the discussions. It’s always about being as broadly inclusive as possible. Finding ways to get everybody around the table. (Participant #20, Director of Research Organization, Belfast)

That inclusivity is relatively rare, when it comes to peacemaking processes (du Toit, 2003). And unfortunately, that inclusivity hardly became the norm in the post-accord period, an issue that has continued to exasperate civil society for decades. Yet that initial reaching out, across sections of society, is an important point in understanding the nature of both the GFA, and the Northern Ireland peace process as a whole. While the GFA largely ended up being a political document, centered around political structures, the influence of this inclusive approach can be seen in the inclusion of a provision like 210 the Civic Forum (section 34 of Strand 1). Yet, many of these inclusions fell by the wayside, along with the “inclusive” atmosphere of cross-sector dialogue. And try as civil society did in those years leading up to the signing of the agreement, there were a bevy of issues that the political powers that be, were simply unwilling to take on and incorporate fully into the debates and discussions. Specific deficits of the agreement will be highlighted and discussed in the following section, but the idea of why some of these deficits exist, is key: There’s obviously, if you look back at the agreement and the negotiations there, no meaningful resolution of the issues of policing reform could be agreed within the negotiating process leading to the agreement and the conclusions at that time were, this is a potato that is too hot for us to handle. We’ll pass this one over to an independent commission. We forget about it, we get along with the work of seeing if we can work together and we’ll wait for their findings, hopefully a million years from now, and we’ll worry about it then. (Participant #1, Director of a Peacebuilding Organization, Belfast)

The issue of policing reform did ultimately result in what has been considered one of the more important accomplishments of the peace process (Doyle, 2013). Yet it is key to note that this accomplishment was ultimately left to the independent commission, which highlights the overall unwillingness, or inability, of the peacemakers to tackle key issues in the peacemaking process. Similar critical legacy issues were also left in a bizarre limbo throughout the process, as one peacebuilder from Derry/Londonderry notes: In terms of the peace agreement, the Belfast Agreement, I know that Bloody Sunday wasn’t actually part of the agreement. But there was a tacit understanding that if there was no resolution of Bloody Sunday, there was no way forward…and that was across the board at every level. So, it was never on the table, but it was never off the table. (Participant #10, Peacebuilder, Derry/Londonderry)

As it will be discussed throughout the remainder of this chapter, the failure to address these hot button issues (such as legacy, language, remembrance, housing, re-integration, etc.) in any meaningful way during the peacemaking process, not only weakened the GFA as a whole, but has subsequently led to significant challenges throughout the peacebuilding process over the last two decades. Peacemaking is challenging. It represents a significant tonal shift within a conflict zone and thus, a multitude of challenges arise which peacemakers must juggle. The initial inclusivity within the Northern Irish peacemaking process is commendable and provides many useful lessons for other societies taking those first tenuous steps down the road of peace. Yet the 211 lessons from Northern Ireland also reveal that the “passing off” of the hot potato is not a foolproof solution to addressing divisive issues. Likewise, if the atmosphere of inclusivity evaporates following the signing of a peace agreement, the goodwill fostered during the peacemaking process does little to assist the peacebuilding process that follows. Peacebuilding processes rely on effective peacemaking processes, but they cannot function based solely on the successes of the past. Just as a garden needs to be continually watered to produce fruits and vegetables, peacebuilding processes required continued inclusivity if a society ever hopes to bear the fruits of the labor. In considering the pre-agreement environment, a brief focus on the Northern Ireland Forum is important. Despite on-going challenges and complexities in decision-making amongst Northern Irish political parties and the British and Irish governments, in the early months of 1996 following on the successes of previous paramilitary ceasefires and substantive inclusive party talks (S. Elliott, 1997), an electoral political process was pursued. This process ultimately resulted in the Northern Ireland Forum for Political Dialogue, which drew 110 members to the body from the wide range of political parties across the muddled Northern Irish political landscape. The Forum was noteworthy though, as it was more or less a successful election process despite the consistent detractions from political leaders from both communities throughout the negotiation and campaigning process. Success here, is in recognizing that the Forum represented the first elected Assembly in over a decade within Northern Ireland, a sign that political dialogue was indeed taking hold as a viable path, an alternative to an ongoing path of direct violence, towards a potential long-term solution. As Sydney Elliott (1997) notes, “the electoral route to talks had proved to be a robust mechanism” (p. 121), which as history reveals, was an accurate foreshadowing of the historical success that would arrive just two years later in the form of the GFA. While the Forum was largely dominated by political parties, it still represented a sign that those in civil society that had long been championing dialogue processes, were starting to see their efforts reflected in the wider political discourse (Tonge, 2002). There’s little question that the Northern Ireland Forum provided some much-needed momentum to the substantive peace talks that finally culminated in the GFA. And that is not to say that the Forum was purely made up of traditional political party representatives. While the likes of the UUP, DUP, SDLP, Sinn 212

Fein, and Alliance parties swept the majority of seats, other civic-minded groups, namely the Women’s Coalition, also earned a number of seats within the Forum, showing once again that civil society leaders were contributing to these crucial processes, even if their seat at the proverbial table was not exactly the biggest of the bunch. With at least a cursory consideration of the pre-agreement period completed, it is important to now turn to an examination of the GFA itself. Although the agreement may have stood for an ideal of inclusivity and completeness during the peacemaking process, did the agreement itself live up to these ideals? To better understand this question, I turn now to the experience and expertise of those that have been working constantly for decades under the shadow of the GFA.

9.3 Taking a mirror to the GFA – general reflections on the agreement The GFA. The Belfast Agreement (BA). Often, just simply, The Agreement. It is a document that shaped the course of history in the North of Ireland. It has been hailed as visionary, revolutionary, and trend setting. Its durability has been subject of countless research project and papers, as its “secrets to peace” are continually explored by scholars and practitioners the world over. But what is the reality of the document for those most closely associated with it and its ramifications? To best understand the GFA it is important to draw upon the experience and expertise of those within civil society. With their wealth of experience and unique perspective, civil society leaders represent a critical insight into the successes and failures of the GFA when it comes to the direct impact of the agreement on the peace process. Reflections on the agreement reveal a mix of appreciation, frustration, and regret as expressed by the study participants. While the civil society leaders within this study tended to focus on a more critical perspective of the GFA, that is not to say that these reflections were void of praise. When considering the “successes” of the agreement, one peacebuilding organization CEO suggests these ingredients of success go beyond policy accomplishments: So, what is the other ingredient then? Don’t assume that iteratively, everything else will work itself through, because if you look at agreements across the world, we actually have survived longer than most do. And most actually fail on these issues. They get right back to zero sum, really fast. (Participant #2, CEO of an Umbrella Peacebuilding Organization, Belfast) 213

She is speaking here, about the impressive durability of the GFA. The durability aspect of the GFA is perhaps its most defining factor, all these years later. As it has been discussed throughout this study, peace agreements are notoriously fragile and the survivability of the GFA is highly commendable and rightfully impressive. And though much of the discussion within this study centers on the failures and shortcomings of the GFA, the fact that it is still an active document, over two decades after its initial signing, is a reality that should not be lost in the midst of critical analysis and I am thankful several participants made it a priority to highlight this accomplishment during our discussions. As first mentioned in the section above, one community developer from Derry/Londonderry made sure to note the innovativeness of how inclusion was handled in the pre-agreement phase and how that translated into some design aspects, despite their eventual abandonment during implementation: That goes back to this issue of accountability and that’s one of the good things about the Good Friday Agreement, wasn’t it? I give credit about that idea of the civic forum actually came from the women’s movement and it was built upon by George Mitchell. He’d seen the potential of that. The other person who’d seen the potential of that, who’s been run out of history, was a woman, and that was Mo Mowlam. But no thought, where would this work itself out further down the road. One of the weaknesses maybe, another thing that maybe could be built into that civic forum model, that I envision, is that you also have alongside that, a youth forum. (Participant #17, Community Developer, Derry/Londonderry)

And while this point of implementation and thoughts of how best to extend the framework of the agreement will be addressed below, the component of inclusivity is one that is important to consider here. Although the negotiating table itself was confined to the political elites, there was still a considerable grassroots level of inclusion that ultimately helped get the GFA across the line in 1998, such as the “Yes” campaign (Couto, 2001). The GFA worked very hard to establish inclusivity in Northern Ireland, especially at the grassroots level. While this forced inclusivity has led to some less than ideal political manifestations, in the form of sectarianized frameworks and processes, like the corrupted petition of concern, it represents a backdrop from which many civil society leaders engage in their cross-community work: Everybody knows it, they can quote it verbatim, everybody is acutely aware of it and the work that they’re doing and the kind of outreach and provision that they’re trying to make. So, I think that has been one of the real triumphs of the Agreement on the ground, working level, in terms of impacting on the ordinary person across Northern Ireland, and their psyche. That explicit legal provision for inclusivity of all of those diversities is 214

something that, whether people agree with it or not, their awareness and understanding of it was never greater than was achieved through the Belfast Agreement. (Participant #4, Director of a Community Organization, Derry/Londonderry)

And in many ways, the GFA was a document that took the first step towards changing the narrative to one that sees the conflict as a universality within Northern Ireland, or as one peacebuilder from Derry/Londonderry notes, helping people see they were all suffering together: The Good Friday Agreement, it was about giving everybody that constructive ambiguity, as they say, in order to get them out of a hole and buy in to other parties, but also convince everybody that they were doing this for the greater good, when it wasn’t in the greater good at all, it was just that they were losing. We were all losing, there were no winners. (Participant #5, Peacebuilder, Derry/Londonderry)

And while it turns out that ambiguity within the GFA has been an ongoing critique of the document levied by those in civil society, in 1998, that same ambiguity allowed individuals from both communities, to see it as a document that spoke directly to them. This is no easy task in a society as deeply and historically divided as Northern Ireland. Yet the overwhelming support during the referendum, over 71 percent in favor, (Tonge, 2002) shows just how impressive of an accomplishment that truly was at the height of a bitter conflict. But as useful as constructive ambiguity may have been in allowing the GFA to pass from the drawing board to the construction site, from the perspective of civil society leaders twenty years later, the GFA has been found wanting: It’s the machinery of agreement, if you will. I think that’s something that we missed in our process. And, that other accords around the world should absolutely pay attention to that. I think it’s no accident that our, the GFA, was as creatively ambiguous as it was. It needed to leave room for things…you know, it got what it could, as all agreements do. (Participant #2, CEO of an Umbrella Peacebuilding Organization, Belfast)

Thus, the GFA was a product of its time, but not a product for all time. That distinction has become increasingly clear throughout the peacebuilding process, as negative peace has dominated the environment. This is a point that is reverberated throughout civil society. In many ways, two conversations need to occur when assessing the GFA. One, should center around what the GFA accomplished and meant in 1998, and another, should center around what the GFA accomplished subsequently and what it means over twenty years later. As the participants of this study have suggested, the conclusions from those conversations diverge considerably. Hence, later in this chapter, the topic of the GFA legacy will be explored, but first, we need to turn to 215 another legacy conversation, and that is the legacy issue of The Troubles themselves, which unfortunately, was an issue that was seriously lacking in the GFA. When it comes to legacy issues and the handling of specific groups within Northern Ireland, such as victims and survivors, the GFA has proved to be woefully inadequate and this has led to debilitating issues for the peace process as a whole: I think that’s one of the major failures of the Good Friday Agreement, that they didn’t address that grouping [victims and survivors] sooner. Because in the interim, the attitudes have hardened or negative impacts have been at play and imbedded far more than needed to have been, if it had been addressed. (Participant #22, Program Director, Belfast)

Another peacebuilder from Derry/Londonderry who works directly with victims and survivors, offers her reflections on the lasting impacts of the decision to leave legacy issues unaddressed: I think that should have been a part of, I know it was in small parts of the Good Friday Agreement, but it never really happened, that disclosure part. The transparency and all of that, it never happened. It’s people like the researchers at the Pat Finucane Centre that are going into the [Ministry of Defence] (MOD) and finding out this stuff or the public records and they’re uncovering research now that has been hidden from us. Judging by what has come out in recent years, there is a wealth of information that could heal people here. Why wait for people to die? I think that’s a failure of the agreement, is that people are still waiting and they’re dying off. If that family don’t get answers, that anger and that bitterness is going to be passed down to the next generation. (Participant #10, Peacebuilder, Derry/Londonderry)

If the legacy issue was simply a can being kicked down the road, it would be one thing. Yet the reality has shown the legacy issue to be more akin to pushing a snowball down a snowy hill. While it was a genuine and significant issue in 1998, the inability, or refusal, to pick up and address that legacy snowball at the time of the GFA, has resulted in a snow-boulder cascading down the hills of peace, as civil society leaders struggle to corral contentious issues that were left “constructively ambiguous”: Like any agreement, it’s okay to agree, but the implementation of all the things in the agreement, that’s where the difficulty arises. There was a lot of things at the time of the agreement that couldn’t be negotiated into the agreement because they were so contentious that to put them into the agreement they would have never found an agreement. One of the big things that I’ve found that is consistently dragging us back, is the legacy problem. (Participant #21, Program Director, Belfast)

An interesting point raised by the program director above, touches on one of the central critiques of the GFA, implementation, or, more accurately, the lack of implementation. This has created unique new challenges for intergroup relations as legacy issue continues to divide 216 communities (Vollhardt, 2012). Consequently, it is not just about the GFA failing to address certain issues, which is clearly a large problem in and of itself, but additionally even some issues that were at least partially addressed, have failed the test of implementation over the intervening years of the peacebuilding process. When asked what the biggest downfall of the GFA has been, one peacebuilder from Derry/Londonderry nearly cut me off with her lack of hesitation in answering: [The issue is] the implementation of the Good Friday Agreement. Don’t think for one minute that it was a success story, at the start. Or even that it was implemented. It was simply a tool to get the warring parties, politicians and the paramilitaries, out of a deep hole. (Participant #5, Peacebuilder, Derry/Londonderry)

This reflection offers us an interesting perspective on the peace agreement itself. Rather than seeing the agreement as a long-term conflict resolution mechanism, she suggests that its primary function was simply one of short-term conflict management. This distinction is an important one to make, when considering the outlook and scope of peace processes (Gamba, 2003). This reflection on the GFA offers some interesting considerations for the broader question of what the purpose of peace agreements should actually be within conflict zones. That question will be explored at length later in this chapter. As for the central complaint of implementation which is highlighted above by the peacebuilder from Derry/Londonderry, she’s touching on a critique that retains near universal agreement amongst the many civil society leaders that are included in this study. As conversations with my study participants naturally turned towards general reflections of the GFA, no discussion was void of implementation talks: Its [GFA] potential was amazing. The problem, it’s back down to implementation. That’s been the failure of it. (Participant #17, Community Developer, Derry/Londonderry)

I think it [GFA] worked, we just maybe could’ve been better at how we talked about it, how we progressed it. (Participant #23, Organization Director, Belfast)

If you look at the agreement, there’s so much built in, it just hasn’t been implemented. (Participant #16, Community Developer, Derry/Londonderry)

Failures of implementation have plagued the GFA from the beginning. Previously, in Chapter 5, the missed potential of the civic forum was explored at length. This is a particularly frustrating example of a process and mechanism that had immense potential, which fell victim to the non- implementation curse. This is what civil society leaders continually mentioned, that the GFA 217 itself was far from perfect. Yet, as it turns out, even the contents of the agreement have proven to be, in many cases like the Civic Forum, nothing more than potential and certainly not part of a lasting reality. What good is the world’s best designed agreement, if the text on the page never turns into real-world practices? In this sense, for many civil society leaders, the GFA, rather than being a beacon of hope, has proven to be a resolute reminder of the frustrating lack of hope that has translated out into practice. Lack of implementation on its own is a serious impediment to the Northern Ireland peace process, but if it was merely a lack of implementation of the perfect peace agreement, civil society leaders might be a little more understanding. Yet as the participants of this study note, the GFA is far from a perfect document. Implementation issues aside, the agreement itself has a significant number of shortcomings that seriously compound the issues already noted above. As one Belfast-based researcher reflects on the agreement:

Although it’s been selected, or highlighted as being very positive, it has an awful lot of weaknesses within it and gaps within it, and those become more evident as you go along. (Participant #20, Director of Research Organization, Belfast)

It was easy in the years surrounding 1998 to overlook the gaps within the GFA, as it was celebrated for its short-term effectiveness in dwindling the active, violent components of the conflict and seemingly setting Northern Ireland on a new, hopeful path of peace. Yet as the distance from that celebratory day in April of 1998 widens, the cracks and gaps are not so easily covered by the glossy pomp and circumstance of a hopeful tomorrow. For many civil society leaders on the front lines of waging peace in Northern Ireland, that hopeful tomorrow has come and gone, and they find themselves still struggling with the realities of a today which is marked by division, sectarianism, and economic deprivation. The Good Friday Agreement was convenient for our time, but it should never have been made permanent. (Participant #5, Peacebuilder, Derry/Londonderry)

One peacebuilding organization director from Belfast offers his reflection on the agreement: Our peace process, our agreement has been lauded as great, as visionary, remarkable, etc., etc., etc., to me, that’s absolute crap. All that happened was, we got sick and tired and exhausted of the reality of living this way and killing this way. From whatever community we came from, it was self-evident, it doesn’t matter how many of them we kill, they’re not going to go away. We ran out of steam. (Participant #1, Director of a Peacebuilding Organization, Belfast) 218

Thus, Northern Ireland, as suggested by the civil society leader above, has languished in this state of negative peace. Although the steam propelling the active violence of The Troubles evaporated, the GFA was not able to invigorate a positive peace process to take over in the absence of violence. And so, negative peace holds, in a tired society. A society tired of fighting, yes, but also without the energy to forge a new path as well. The GFA was supposed to shepherd Northern Ireland into the new era of peace and prosperity, but its shortcomings in design and implementation, have left Northern Ireland adrift in the sea of division, without an oar to propel them forward along the river of peace. One of the key reasons that a failure of implementation has left Northern Ireland so remarkably disadvantaged in the post-accord period, is that the collaboration and inclusivity that was achieved in the pre-agreement phase has been almost entirely abandoned as the last remnants of civil society engagement died out with the failures of mechanisms like the Civic Forum. Particularly in PUL communities that there’s a sense of being left behind from the Good Friday Agreement and the political process, because the results on the ground for them…has not resulted in employment. It hasn’t resulted in more equitable access to education. It hasn’t resulted in health and well-being and prosperity and all the things that were promised. (Participant #26, Project Lead, Belfast)

As impressive as initial consultation and collaboration may have been, the lack of implementation around specifically designed inclusion mechanisms has left the GFA as a product not of the people, but of the political elites, effectively sequestering the document in the political sphere: The problem with the Good Friday Agreement, became that its ownership and the ownership of its delivery, became the power of the political parties and institutions that created that. As opposed to, the populace. What’s been absent from every decision, and every decision-making forum, that was established to give life to the policy, the out workings of the Good Friday Agreement, are people. People affected by the problems. (Participant #24, Project Coordinator, Belfast)

This is a significant betrayal not only of the spirit of the GFA, but of the peace process as well. Peacebuilding processes are most effective when in the hands of those at the grassroots level (Oloke, et al., 2018). For such a defining and “successful” document as GFA to abandon the voices of the people whom it effects the most, everyday Northern Irish citizens, is a serious indictment on its legacy as a stalwart of effective positive peace. In its haste to achieve short- 219 term successes, as important as they genuinely were, many civil society leaders feel the agreement sacrificed a more robust attempt at healing divisions over the long-term: But my belief and I think most people’s belief, was this [The GFA] is just the stop gap. You give it two or three years at that time and we’d be like a real democracy with oppositional politics. We’d have left and right. But we don’t. Twenty years later. (Participant #1, Director of a Peacebuilding Organization, Belfast)

That sense of short-term realities handcuffing genuine work on long-term societal needs has continued to play into the further polarizing realities of today: So, we don’t have gay marriage simply because one party says no. We don’t have abortion because one party says no. There’s so many things that could be done differently but everything here is the exception to the rule, we’re a special case. That should never have been allowed. (Participant #5, Peacebuilder, Derry/Londonderry)

This peacebuilder goes on to sum up her reflections on the agreement in a powerful way: That’s what’s happened here with the Good Friday Agreement. People lost sight, very quickly, of the big picture. Then it became a fight for the dominance. Unfortunately, the bigger picture that the Good Friday was supposed to embody was lost very quickly. (Participant #5, Peacebuilder, Derry/Londonderry)

That big picture idea worked wonderfully as just that in 1998: an idea. The celebrations could commence around the successes of the day, and those sticky problems could be ignored. There was a grander “ideal future” that all could envision in their own unique way. Yet without any concrete road to reach that ideal and with the realities of today, as civil society leaders see those initial paths to inclusion having been left by the wayside of history, that grand ideal shares no commonality with what the GFA provides them today. As one project lead from Belfast puts it: So, unless it’s actually working for all and equitable for all…there’s still going to be that feeling of disconnect, the Good Friday Agreement hasn’t helped us at all, we’ve still got young people committing suicide, we’ve still got no jobs, dropping out of schools, no hope or sense of hope for the future…( Participant #27, Project Lead, Belfast)

As she notes, to many, the GFA represents not a pillar of hope and potential but is instead seen as a relic of decisions left unmade and promises left unfulfilled. Reflecting upon and critiquing the GFA can be a tricky issue for those within civil society. Many of the leaders included in this study have been tirelessly working to build peace in Northern Ireland, long before the GFA came into existence. Thus, they know the horrors of The Troubles and often were thrust to the front line of crisis de-escalation in the communities within which they operate. This means they’ve 220 seen the benefit of living in a society that is now largely devoid of active, direct violence. The GFA is a major reason that reality exists today. Yet, their position at the grassroots peacebuilding level, gives them a raw, unfiltered perspective on the reality of the state of negative peace in Northern Ireland today. And as they continue to fight for their voice to be heard, they are forced to deal with the harsh realities of what it means to build peace in Northern Ireland, twenty years on from the GFA. A program director from Belfast captures this sentiment best, in her reflection of the agreement: But bricks can only be cemented and you need the cement in between. I don’t think that they had all the cement that they needed. They largely ignored the community sector both in terms of the lessons that they brought to that and the role that they had in paying tribute to that, but also the ongoing role that they should have. Instead, it becomes fractionalized in terms of whoever political party you might be linked to. And any type of civic society…if you’re trying to build civic society, anything that separates or divides, is always going to have massive impact down the line. It’s never going to be solid, there’s going to be cracks in that wall, right across. So, you might build the wall and you might build the house or structure, whatever it is, but it’ll have those cracks because it’s built on separate…being separate. (Participant #22, Program Director, Belfast)

The mortar that binds the bricks of peace is just as important as the bricks themselves. In 1998 the GFA represented a number of the key bricks that were needed to start the cohesive building of peace. Were there bricks that were missing? Certainly, but that is the nature of peacemaking within deeply divided societies (Kossler, 2018). By no means is that an excuse for willful ignorance of key issues, from a short-term perspective, kicking the can down the road a bit is far better than that road being continually littered with the bombs and bullets of continued direct violence. And for this accomplishment, many civil society leaders suggest, the ushering in of something in Northern Ireland other than direct, active violence, the GFA deserves its accolades. Yet this study is not about Northern Ireland in 1998. This research is looking at Northern Ireland since 1998 and how the GFA has impacted the intervening years of “peace.” From that perspective, the frustration and critiques from civil society leaders begin to flood in. As the dialogue and inclusivity evaporated and the voices of those in civil society repeatedly were ignored, the cracks in the GFA have been impossible to ignore. And as the years have passed, the ramifications of those cracks have crystalized and haunted the civil society leaders tasked with delivering, as Northern Irish poet, Neil Gorman puts it, “a half-baked peace” (Gorman, 2018). 221

Thus, critique of the GFA is not only warranted, it is necessary in order to understand where Northern Ireland goes from here. With the benefit of time and critical reflection, I was curious to know what civil society leaders would have changed about the GFA, had they been given that direct opportunity. As it turns out, they have a plethora of ideas on the topic which provide not only insights on the agreement within Northern Ireland, but also a wealth information to consider for peace processes throughout the world. This is where our attention turns to next.

9.4 Agreement alterations – civil society leaders’ design ideas While as a researcher, I should probably love all of my interview questions equally, the reality is, one question gave me the most excitement throughout my conversations with civil society leaders. Given the incredible wealth of experience and expertise of the civil society leaders included within this study, I found it useful to seek out their creative design ideas. Thus, one of the key prompts I offered each participant, was to have them envision that they were back in 1998 and they had the opportunity to touch the GFA last. They could adjust any component of the agreement or add in anything they wanted, with the guarantee that it would be included in the final product. Given all they have learned over the last twenty years and the experience they have gained, if a trip back in time to the drafting room was in store, what would they do? A number of participants focused first on the structures presented within the agreement. As one peacebuilding organization CEO from Belfast suggests, this is where all conversations around GFA changes should begin, considering that is ultimately what the agreement was about, the structural components: So, what was the Agreement then? Its most important feature was the way in which it provided an architecture. (Participant #2, CEO of an Umbrella Peacebuilding Organization, Belfast)

In a society that was largely devoid of any genuine structures of dialogue or governing (outside of Westminster direct rule), the GFA took the crucial steps towards establishing key structures from within which changes could be designed and applied. The problem though, was that this architecture, the structures put in place, ultimately failed to push any kind of unity narrative. Instead, the structural components of the GFA simply created the space for a furthering of the divisions and the sectarianism. The civil society leader noted above, goes on to explain this issue: 222

Instead what happened was essentially we very quickly began to fall back down into zero sum identities as well. So, those who favored a United Kingdom played to the east-west access of all of those structures and those who favored a United Ireland identity played to the north-south elements of those identities. So, nobody is involved in anybody else’s structures, other than at best, by voting their no’s. To some extent, that’s not what the Good Friday Agreement suggested should happen. But it did allow for the fact that you could prosecute your identity as British, Irish or both or none, within that overall context. So, it left enough room for maneuver, in the hope that things would move forward in a positive way. But that same latitude left the possibility of regressing in the other direction again. (Participant #2, CEO of an Umbrella Peacebuilding Organization, Belfast)

And the regression, is ultimately what we have seen over the last twenty years. The continued and in some ways deepening polarization between CNR and PUL communities was discussed previously in Chapter 8 and the suggestion offered by the civil society leader here, is that the GFA actually has a significant role to play in that regression. The structures have not only been poorly implemented, but many of them have done little to help bridge political, cultural, or ideological divides; a serious knock against the spirit of a highly lauded peace agreement. The moderates within Northern Ireland signed up to the GFA under the recognition that any peace was better than The Troubles dragging on, but the writing seemed to be on the wall from the very beginning when it came to the flaws of the GFA: Now the moderate parties, for all authentic reasons, and civic society bought into it at the time, because they absolutely knew that there was nothing else there, but it was a sectarianized document that sectarianized the future of politics on this island. (Participant #5, Peacebuilder, Derry/Londonderry)

The debate over the nuances of no peace versus negative peace is certainly one of vital importance within PACS, yet the issue at hand here, is whether or not the signing up to a recognizably flawed document laid the groundwork for short term negative peace to ultimately impede any future path to positive peace. Political and social structures are notoriously difficult to unravel, and that is exactly what has been playing out in Northern Ireland as the sectarianized structures of the GFA continue to dominate political and social organizing in Northern Ireland (Herbert, 2019). Thus, these structural flaws are a clear opportunity to consider changes to the nature of the GFA. One community developer from Derry/Londonderry cannot help but tie in recent “supply and demand” deals between the DUP and the Tory government (Tonge, 2019) to some of the inherent structural changes that he would have liked to see part of the GFA: 223

I think in hindsight you could add something to the effect that, should a British government need a majority, that one of the parties from the North couldn’t join on to that. Because that’s what’s caused a lot of this problem at the moment, is that fact. So, in hindsight, if that was specified in there, that would be useful. (Participant #15, Community Developer, Derry/Londonderry)

While this suggestion is clearly born out of a reaction to recent events in the UK, it touches on a key component of Strand 1 concerns within the GFA and speaks to how quickly the sense of “unity” is abandoned in Northern Ireland when one community sees an opportunity in front of them. As the peacebuilding organization CEO from Belfast noted previous in this chapter, the general ambiguity of many Strand 2 and Strand 3 aspects which allows for those divisions along both an East-West and a North-South basis, reinforces the lack of forward thinking in many design aspects of a structural nature. The ability for these structures to be so easily abused at the whims of the British Government, the Irish Government, or specific political parties within Northern Ireland, is a flaw that may civil society leaders would have addressed, if given their chance to influence the final GFA product. The unique consociational nature of the political structure that was developed within the GFA has been touched on from a broad perspective already in this study, yet several civil society leaders pointed directly to this framework as a key challenge for Northern Ireland today: There’s the problems of the consociational nature of the government. I’m not sure at the time, whether you could have got a better deal with that, but I think what we know now, is that getting yourself into a consociational system is difficult to get out of. And it basically pushes a set of hurdles further down the road. (Participant #20, Director of Research Organization, Belfast)

This again is highlighting the rigid nature of the political structures. As we have seen, and evidenced by the consistency of critique by civil society leaders, any success of the consociational system in Northern Ireland has been tainted by a deeply sectarian environment that continues to dominate political structures. In many ways, an argument can be made that the consociational system has not been a success at all. The viability of such systems has been called into question before (McGarry & O’Leary, 2006a) and that conversation is remarkably salient in the current context of Northern Ireland’s political stalemate. Considering the fact that Northern Ireland recently spent well over 1,000 days without a functioning government (at the time of writing), the consociational successes must be seriously scrutinized. 224

With the breakdown of the political structures, where conversations were not exactly free flowing to begin with, it is difficult to see where the GFA is succeeding in its democratic ways. Take into account as well, the glaring absence of voice from civil society and the grassroots level, the critiques of the GFA rapidly mount. One project coordinator from Belfast would have liked to see a more specific structural inclusion of the grassroots voice: If there was some type of way of including in the Good Friday Agreement that all those people whose rights are absent by the lack of its implementation must be central to the decision making to how the policies work on the ground, I think it would have been a greater democratic pull on the agendas. (Participant #24, Project Coordinator, Belfast)

Many recognized that implementation on some issues would be tricky, though the scope of implementation lapses to date were certainly not envisioned in 1998, and thus the civil society leader quoted above, provides a suggestion that would have retuned a sense of agency to those left without a voice or representation from the outworkings of a poorly implemented agreement. Full implementation of peace agreements is an ideal that is unlikely to be achieved within any conflict zone. Those with a conscious recognition of that potential, could go a long way in making sure that those directly impacted by these failures, are not left without any recourse for getting their needs met. The Civic Forum is an example of a structural inclusion that was intended to ensure that voice was heard at the policy development table. Yet as it has been noted numerous times in this study, that structural mechanism was one of the first dominos to fall. The suggestion by the participant above, of ensuring a safety net, built directly into the GFA, is an idea that should be seriously considered for other peacemaking processes around the world. Relying on full implementation of structural mechanisms without a failsafe process in place to ensure continued dialogue and contribution from outside of the political sphere, is an oversight of the GFA that has had significant impacts on the effectiveness of delivering positive peace over the last several decades. The GFA tried to walk a very delicate line in appealing to both the CNR and the PUL communities. It was a necessary tightrope act, if there was ever any hope in seeing the agreement across the finish line in a referendum. Yet the continued walking of that tightrope, over the last two decades, has proven to be a foolhardy attempt: But in terms of the powers that are contained and codified within the Good Friday Agreement and the institutions that emerged from it, they are very, very limited. And 225

they are ultimately wrapped up in the binary…the binary necessity of Nationalist and Unionist representation. So, that in short, has created a failed institution. Twenty years later, the institution has, probably by most people’s reasonable measurements, failed. (Participant #24, Project Coordinator, Belfast)

The institutionalized binary of a consociational system, in hindsight, all but guaranteed that Northern Ireland was destined to languish in a structural system based upon sectarianism. Thus, as the project coordinator quoted above highlights, the structural failures of today, are due directly to a failure of the GFA to design effective institutions at the structural level. While looking at the structural components of the GFA, a number of important considerations were made by the civil society leaders within this study. Particularly, when it comes to a membership-based structure like the Civic Forum, despite its obvious failures, one program director from Belfast would have liked to see a continuous refreshing of voices coming out of such mechanisms: I’d have wanted to see some sort of measures in there that would have required a churn of membership or whatever. I think I’d also have wanted to see a youth end to this. Whatever that structure or forum or engagement would have been, to have built that through. (Participant #22, Program Director, Belfast)

This is an important suggestion, as it highlights a secondary, inherent problem to structural mechanisms like the Civic Forum. Even fully implemented, the Civic Forum could also have fallen victim to the rot of polarization and sectarianism, without the proper care and focus. The GFA charged the First Minister and Deputy First Minister with responsibilities for selection and appointment of representatives to the body which may lead one to worry about a politicization of the body. Even with those concerns set aside (as the challenging logistics of representative selection is another matter entirely), there was no concrete consideration for what the Civic Forum would look like as a long-term body. This “constructive ambiguity,” once again, allowed for an unfortunately smooth transition from existence to obscurity after only a few short years of operation. Long-term, the Civic Forum’s success would likely have depended upon a continual infusion of new voices and new ideas. Again, if the Civic Forum was the only mechanism for civil society engagement at any kind of significant policy development level, which it was in the initial years following 1998, then the mechanism needed to be able to produce input from throughout the broad spectrum of civil society. A static representation within the Civic Forum 226 would not have been able to achieve that feat, thus the above suggestion of a continual “churn of membership” would have continually brought up new voices and perspectives. Adding in a youth element as well, either within the Civic Forum or even an independent Youth Forum, would have also provided an opportunity to build bridges to incorporate the critical voices of tomorrow’s peacebuilders within Northern Ireland. When it comes to the wealth of problems that exist around wide-spread disengagement with the peace process at the grassroots level and sustained challenges associated with economic deprivation, one community developer from Derry/Londonderry offers his unique idea about ways the GFA could have addressed some of these issues: What’s happening at the moment with these peace things, they’ll offer you a one-year program and the fact is what we really need here, in terms of dealing with the major problems of disengagement, are the high level of unemployment…is a Marshall plan. The Good Friday Agreement didn’t ever deal with the Marshall plan. It was a wee sort of add on. Therefore, I think we need to look at doing that and then within that, how do you build social capital? At the moment, social capital has not been built here. Social capital has been built around a small political elite. It’s also been built around those people who have the wealth to get to university and so forth. The fact is, what’s happening at the moment, people from working class communities… cannot afford to go to university. And then there’s a brain drain. It’s a bad mix. (Participant #17, Community Developer, Derry/Londonderry)

Many of the points he raises here, from disengagement, poverty, brain drain, and so on, are issues that have been discussed in depth throughout this study. He is arguing that the GFA could have, and in fact should have, played a direct role in working towards a comprehensive solution to tackle these challenges. It is this type of creativity that is sorely missing from much of the GFA. Clearly, social capital is a critical component of effective functioning of civil society and also something that plays a crucial role within peace processes (Pierobon, 2019). Building in provisions to the GFA that bolster social capital development in the post-accord period, is a brilliant suggestion that other peace processes would do well to consider. A key process to ensure that a change such as the one suggested above, or really any structural component of the GFA, is truly paying off when it comes to establishing a peace dividend, is to have a steadfast series of review mechanisms in place. One of the key critiques of the GFA arising from civil society, is that these review mechanisms were essentially non-existent in the final GFA product. This has meant that, for over twenty years, the agreement has been 227 allowed to run its own natural course, a course which has obviously not benefitted the concept of peace within Northern Ireland. A researcher from Belfast highlights this seriously structural flaw as a major point of his critique of the GFA: I think the challenge of actually having some form of review mechanism of progress and where we are with everything. Some things have just been allowed to lax, locally, as it is, it’s a treaty between the British government and the Irish government. And the two governments have some responsibility to implement and therefore it shouldn’t be down to the local government, the local political parties to safely decide on the Civic Forum. In some sense, when they did the review process they did have this independent oversight commission that overviewed the policing reforms…and I think if there’d been something built in you might have been able to have an ongoing independent review of it by the two governments to overrule the local parties at certain stages. That could have driven some of the issues further forward, even with the review of the workings of the Assembly. (Participant #20, Director of Research Organization, Belfast)

This is a similar critique that was offered by a fellow Belfast civil society leader: I would say, something in that agreement should have had the capacity for an upgrade. Amendments or some sort of process for ongoing, is it working? Is it still user friendly? Is it still beneficial? It’s done the initial what we want it to do, and that’s great. Provide a platform of peace to move forward from. (Participant #26, Project Lead, Belfast)

This is an incredibly important point that is raised by civil society leaders and one that takes a bit of courage to bring up. The societal and cultural reverence paid to the GFA has meant that it is not always an easy document to publicly critique. At times, a critique of the GFA has been seen as a critique of peace within Northern Ireland and few, if any, civil society leaders would willingly choose to be labeled as a peace criticizer. This is one of the reasons that the GFA has remained as the primary, stalwart framework for the peace process over the last twenty years. This is not to say though that additional negotiations and agreements have not occurred over the post-accord period. Several prominent examples exist such as the St. Andrews Agreement and the Fresh Start Agreement (and most recently, just as this study was going through final edits, the New Decade New Approach Agreement), just to name a few. Yet at the end of the day, it is still the GFA that dominates the narrative when it comes to peace in Northern Ireland. Thus, from a structural perspective, the GFA is open to a number of key critiques, as the civil society leaders within this study have shown. This consideration is both unique and useful, considering the structural components of the GFA have produced the most visible impact on Northern Ireland over the last twenty years, at least from a policy development standpoint. In exploring flaws and shortcomings of peace agreements, examining the structural aspects is an 228 undeniable necessity in developing a holistic understanding of how peace agreements function. The discussions provided above, begin to peel back the veil of the GFA as new light is shed on the agreement’s framework. While structural critiques were one primary way that civil society leaders offered their suggestions on GFA changes, another popular choice was to focus on specific issue areas that they would have liked to see included in the final document. Some of this arises from the struggles and challenges that civil society leaders have faced over the years in working with specific population groups that were seemingly lost in the “constructive ambiguity” of the GFA. But their experience and expertise offer a critical window into how peace agreements, specifically the GFA in this case, influence the path of peace in the post-accord period. One of the biggest issue areas that civil society leaders emphasized is an issue that has been explored in previous areas of this study, and that is legacy concerns. The saliency of the issue on the minds of civil society leaders clearly indicates its importance in their work and an obvious area they might turn towards in offering ideas about improvements they would have liked to see within the GFA: [The GFA] should’ve made more explicit provision for dealing with the past, it shouldn’t have allowed that to be kicked down the road. (Participant #4, Director of a Community Organization, Derry/Londonderry)

So, if there had been things put in place from the Good Friday Agreement to support everybody who was affected by The Troubles, there might not be as much…it wouldn’t be something that continues on down through generations because you would be getting it and nipping it in the bud at the start and supporting those who have been affected by death or intimidation or fear of being in cross-communities. (Participant #27, Project Lead, Belfast)

There was stuff that wasn’t achieved in the Good Friday Agreement which I think has come back to haunt us. There was a Bill of Rights that we would have liked to have seen and there was a whole…we’re dealing with stuff today…the legacy stuff, we should have dealt with legacy. And that hasn’t happened. (Participant #12, Project Director, Derry/Londonderry)

And even young people, as a peacebuilder from Derry/Londonderry argues, is an important component of this legacy issue: Provision for young people! They didn’t think about what’s next. They dealt with the problems as they were then. Releasing political prisoners, and what all was happening then. They didn’t plan ten years ahead, twenty years ahead, and now we’re twenty years ahead. I don’t think they had that foresight. They should have had some provision in 229

there for what’s next. What about young people? (Participant #10, Peacebuilder, Derry/Londonderry)

This failure to adequately address legacy issues is something that has had profound repercussions in Northern Ireland, as issues of victimhood have created significant challenges for intergroup engagements (Noor, et al., 2017). As one Belfast researcher argues, a failure on legacy issues is one of the key failures that have led to Northern Ireland’s “imperfect peace”: [The agreement design] has meant that we’ve got an imperfect peace. That’s an outworking nature of a consociational agreement, is the outworking the original agreement plus subsequent crises within it. I do think things like the DDR, the gap in DDR, failure to implement legacy, failure to do anything about the Bill of Rights, effectively were some of the big issues. (Participant #20, Director of Research Organization, Belfast)

He again touches on a number of issues that have been highlighted throughout this study, which again goes to show how impressively unified civil society in Northern Ireland, when it comes to recognizing the inherent issues within the GFA. He also touches on another issue area, the DDR process, which a number of his other colleagues in civil society also floated as their primary focus when it comes to GFA adjustments. It has been discussed previously, but there are certain populations within Northern Ireland that have seemingly been labeled as “difficult populations” and none more so, than former combatants and ex-prisoners. Those civil society leaders that I spoke with who worked directly with these populations, were some of the most frustrated peacebuilders. A program leader from Belfast, working with former combatants and ex-prisoners, argues that the failure of the GFA in terms of re-integration, has ballooned into a major, societal wide concern: I think the gap certainly for moving forward from Belfast to Agreement to Fresh Start is around the re-integration. It’s everything in terms of, for me it’s flags and human rights issues, it’s around jobs, it’s around access in homes and employment, insurance, travel insurance, car insurance, house insurance, everything. Stigmatization, grandchildren of former prisoners can’t apply for certain jobs. So, I think it is a massive…we’ve just generated a massive generation of people who are coming up through society that are still being prohibited from certain things and certain aspects based on forefathers. (Participant #11, Program Leader, Belfast)

She goes on to suggest an interesting reversal of the DDR process: I think if we had included some form of a mechanism around re-integration, because we had the demilitarization…demobilization, we haven’t really had…but I think if we would 230

have had DDR, we should have had RDD, I think it would have worked better. (Participant #11, Program Leader, Belfast)

It is a key sentiment, that highlights the importance of reflecting on agreement shortcomings: Re-integration. And you’ll see, based on my work, which is what I had focused on in that, I do think that is a real missing gap in terms of the Belfast Agreement. (Participant #11, Program Leader, Belfast)

DDR processes are certainly complicated and always represent a unique challenge for each conflict zone (Özerdem, 2013). Yet what the Northern Ireland example has shown, is that a failure in completely delivering the re-integration component, represents a roadblock to positive peacebuilding efforts. In many ways the disarmament and demobilization efforts in Northern Ireland represent a brilliant example of success that should be reviewed and considered in conflict zones throughout the world. Yet that final component, the R (the reintegration) of the DDR, well that, as civil society leaders have highlighted, that leaves a lot to be desired. One program director shared his personal story, which highlights the realities of these populations: I will never be granted full citizenship in my own country again, because I was a political prisoner. (Participant #21, Program Director, Belfast)

And asked if it would have helped to have more explicit provisions for reintegration enshrined in the agreement, he went on to say: [The politicians] did say that, but they never implemented it. They did say it at the time of the agreement and from my perspective the biggest opponents of that are [current] politicians. They fight every concession that’s made to us, tooth and nail. (Participant #21, Program Director, Belfast)

DDR processes are certainly complex, and that complexity cannot ever be overlooked in the transition phase within conflict zones. Yet complexity should never be used as an excuse to shift to tomorrow, what needs to be accomplished today. Failures of effective reintegration continue to be felt in many of Northern Ireland’s most vulnerable communities (Maiangwa, et al., 2019). As the civil society leaders above note, the shortcomings of the DDR process, specifically the R component, is an unmistakable flaw in the GFA that deserves interrogation. A final core focus for a number of civil society leaders, comes back to the importance of human rights provisions. It is interesting, considering that the lead up to The Troubles was marked by a crystalizing of efforts to establish civil rights for the CNR community, that the GFA has largely failed to deliver on any serious civil rights agenda. 231

[The GFA] should’ve made more explicit provision around human rights legislations. (Participant #4, Director of a Community Organization, Derry/Londonderry)

Given this reality, it is not surprising that a number of civil society leaders highlight this failure as one they wish would have been dealt with more effectively in 1998: But for me, to embed a greater understanding of rights based activism and agenda, to enhance and increase the populaces understanding of rights and what they are, who has them and who doesn’t, how it would benefit me and so on….And to develop community led initiatives to achieve whatever those communities or those constituencies want, they are the things that are essential in post-conflict situations, if you’re really going to achieve an imbedded peace. (Participant #24, Project Coordinator, Belfast)

He recognizes though, that this was not exactly an easy task that the peacemakers faced, but for him, it was still one of undeniable importance: Because otherwise, it has been absolutely dictated by the agenda, whatever that political agenda may be, whatever that high agenda might be, detached from poverty agenda might be. In hindsight, that was probably an absolute inevitability. But how do you codify it? How do you put something like that into a treaty that says, this is what participation looks like? This is how you measure it, and this is how on the other end of it, it leads to effective policy on the ground and resource allocation. And this is how you put that into a treaty in an 800-year colonial, post-colonial situation that gives effect to a peace process that stops people from killing each other, but also tackles inequalities and deprivation. (Participant #24, Project Coordinator, Belfast)

The reality is that hindsight is 20/20, and the civil society leaders included above would be the first to admit to that reality. While certain failures of design in the GFA were apparent even at the time of drafting, other failures have only become obvious with the assistance of time and reflection. The offering of design ideas for the GFA by the civil society leaders in this study recognizes both of those aspects. If a genuine reflection of the GFA is to be built, we have to be able to simultaneously recognize that many design decisions were made as a necessity of the time, but that this does not make these decisions immune from critical analysis. In offering their own design ideas, the civil society leaders in this study are curating their own peace agreement design “Wishlist” based on the decades of experience working within the confines of design decisions made in 1998. If hindsight is 20/20, why not use that clarity of vision as we turn forward into the future? Both in Northern Ireland and for other peace agreements elsewhere, yet to be designed, the unrivaled knowledge and expertise from the civil society leaders in this study provides a critical infusion of creativity into the key question: how 232 do we do “peace” better? It is crucial we continue to raise these voices and provide an opportunity for their ideas to break through to the forefront of peace agreement design discussions.

9.5 Post-accord ponderings – the GFA and Northern Ireland today As we considered the agreement itself, the changes that could have been made, and the ramifications of it playing out today, the participants of this study also wanted to look forward. There is a natural tendency in the peacebuilding field, to always have one eye fixed on the future. Thus, many of the conversations with the participants of this study, ended with a focus that was forward and outward, as they mused on the meaning of the GFA and living in a post-accord society. In these conversations, we covered many perspectives. Study participants touched on social consequences of the GFA, reiterated failures of the agreement and the meaning of this within society, highlighted political consequences of the GFA, and ultimately offered their stance on what the GFA’s legacy truly represents for Northern Ireland. The GFA represents many things, from a historical perspective, to a current day understanding, and a future interpretation. By listening to the experiences and unrivaled knowledge of civil society leaders, we can begin to unpack these complicated nuances, in order to build a holistic understanding of that groundbreaking document that was finalized and signed in the wee hours of a Northern Irish spring in 1998. It is a challenging thing, shifting from conflict to peace. A psychological shift has to occur, to start seeing “the enemy” as a collaborator. And as the GFA agreement introduced a bevy of new structures and frameworks within society, this added logistical challenges and changes that were heaved upon these already complicated psychological challenges as well. As one peacebuilding organization CEO puts it: My view, right from when the Agreement was signed was, particularly if you’re coming out of a period of conflict, the business of bringing those who have been in conflict with each other in to run a country, or a region in this case, when the job of running a region is as complicated as it is, even without that background context, is a big ask. It’s a big ask at the relationship level, it’s a big ask to learn the new skills that are required to be able to do that and to navigate your way through the choppy waters that are all around us anyway for all sorts of reasons. (Participant #2, CEO of an Umbrella Peacebuilding Organization, Belfast)

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Thus, the GFA for all of its successes and failures, must also be recognized for its role of adding complexity to the social order. By no means is the GFA alone in this or in fact unique in any way when it comes to this reality. This is true of all peace agreements, as they seek to mark the turning point from conflict to peace, and introduce new frameworks and structures into a conflict weary society. But it is an understanding of peace agreements that must be recognized. Peace does not happen overnight and peace agreements, no matter how well designed, take time and experience to deliver any outworking of success.

We’re still in a peace process here in my opinion, I don’t think we’ve come out of a peace process, but we maintain it. (Participant #11, Program Leader, Belfast)

Yet, despite not happening overnight, the expectation with any peace agreement is that the long-term positive peace impacts of its design will be felt within society, and sooner, rather than later. Part of that hope rests in seeing a transition away from leaders of the past (who will always be tied to the conflict in the minds of many) to the peaceful shepherds of the future: That’s why I supposed I would have liked the young side to this. I’m not quite sure how that would have worked, but something that would have taken it through another generation. Because, the people that have been around the conflict and the peace process in the early days, needed to leave the stage at some point. I’m not sure whether…I don’t know whether they left soon enough? (Participant #22, Program Director, Belfast)

But with the very real challenges of engaging youth in the political and peace processes of today, compounded by the lack of attention paid to the group within the GFA, Northern Ireland is looking around somewhat haplessly, wondering where and when that next generation of leaders will emerge. As discussed in Chapter 6, civil society leaders see some hope in looking at the younger generation in terms of openness and perspective sharing. These are key elements to move away from the poison of old, as one peacebuilding organization chairman discusses with vigor: With the Good Friday Agreement, it has to be in your best self-interest to see, you know to put yourself in the other shoes. This is the potential benefit from it, if we put ourselves in the other shoes, then we can create a society together. And we’re not betraying anything, when we step in the other shoes. So, when you hear [some stuff]…and I don’t know if you listened at all, but Sammy Wilson and others. Holy shit...What sort of people are these. And the answer to that is of course, perfectly ordinary people, the same as us. But there’s been some poison dropped into them. Which continues to poison the whole system. (Participant #3, Chairman of Peacebuilding Organization, Derry/Londonderry) 234

His view is obviously a partisan one, originating from the CNR community, yet it is one that is no doubt shared by many, in the reverse, from the PUL community as well. When the poison of the old guard continues to infect and taint the discourse coming down from the halls of Stormont, the togetherness encapsulated within the GFA is quickly scuttled. And that is a major societal ramification of the GFA. In the haste of accomplishing a deal in 1998, needed as it was, provisions for the future were left ambiguous and vulnerable to slipping back into the poisons of the past, or worse yet, never fully clawing your way out of that vat of poison. Based along this line of critique and concern, a number of civil society leaders are regretful today, that review mechanisms were allowed to be so lax when it came to the GFA. One organization director from Belfast shares her wish, when considering the state of the peace process today: It is a really slow process, but we probably should have…if I could go back and say twenty years ago, that’s what I’d be saying, every five years do a review and talk about what hasn’t [happened]…what you’re going to focus on in the next five years and be really clear about that and articulate that to everybody. This is what we focused on in the first five years, this where we’re going, this is where we’re going, and I think that would help people understand and see. (Participant #23, Organization Director, Belfast)

And who could have been a crucial voice within those reviews? As one project lead from Belfast argues, those chiefly responsible for delivering on the hopes of the GFA: There should have been people’s forums to start to say, well these are the needs we now see. We’re moving beyond peace; we are wanting to move into a society of health and well-being and prosperity. What does that look like or not look like in our actual communities that we live in? (Participant #26, Project Lead, Belfast)

She goes on to expand this thought to include a structural consideration as well: At that higher level of politics and kind of the Stormont level, I’m not sure it’s progressed terribly far down the track by having an agreement that basically perpetuates two parties. I think in hindsight that somewhere within the framework…what we’re twenty years down the track…maybe the seven year mark, the ten year mark, that two party agreement system to have been evaluated and maybe dissolved or phased out of the political requirements for how democracy and citizenship happens here. That a process of being able to do that with real, actual consultation and voices at the table from residents of communities who could have contributed their voice and experience of ten years ago. (Participant #26, Project Lead, Belfast)

Her suggestion here is a brilliant one and will be explored in more depth in the following section. However, a few notes on her ideas are important to make here. In a certain sense, her first 235 suggestion would have been the ideal evolution of the Civic Forum had the mechanism been fully, and flexibly, implemented. As for her comments on structural concerns, she is highlighting a very common theme expressed by civil society leaders, which is that continued revision of the structures in use is clearly not just a desired process, it is a necessary process. The static, and in many ways entirely worn-out, mechanisms of the last twenty years, the Northern Ireland Assembly, seem to have finally pushed many civil society leaders past their point of appeasement. As it has been noted many times before, the structural design of the GFA has resulted in Northern Ireland being “stuck” in a two party, sectarianized political system. Being able to move away from that structure through continual review mechanism, built directly into the agreement itself, as suggested by the project lead above, would have been a big step in helping Northern Ireland move away from those ‘stuck’ positions. And including local voices in that process, through an ever-evolving Civic Forum-like body, would add to the local legitimacy of those constant reviews. All of that being said, it is not as if the GFA was entirely void of any such mechanism, at least from the participatory standpoint. The Civic Forum, a hot topic of conversation throughout this study, represents a key mechanism that could have gone a long way in staving off some of the problems highlighted by the civil society leader above. This, again, gets back to the serious shortcomings of the GFA around implementation: I think if they would have implemented the Good Friday Agreement in all of the areas, I think that, that would have made a difference. (Participant #5, Peacebuilder, Derry/Londonderry)

By no means though, are any of the civil society leaders, nor am I, suggesting that the Civic Forum was or even had the potential to be a panacea for Northern Ireland’s challenges today. Rather, it is low hanging fruit, considering it was explicitly laid out within the GFA and still ultimately fell apart in such a quick and frustrating manner following 1998. Even a fully implemented Civic Forum, that was still going strong today, would not have itself delivered Northern Ireland into an era of positive peace. However, the consistent crying out from the voices of civil society leaders on the need for a genuine community led forum in order to give power to the voices of those at the grassroots levels, shows how important a mechanism such as the Civic Forum is, both in the design and implementation of peace agreements. 236

There have been some external challenges as well, that civil society leaders have been quick to note, when it comes to the present-day support of the GFA. While it was written as a holistic document, with the intention that all three structural strands be appreciated equally, that has not necessarily been the reality that has existed over the last two decades: Actually, what’s happened is we have gone straight from putting far too much pressure on strand one, and not paying enough to two and three. (Participant #2, CEO of an Umbrella Peacebuilding Organization, Belfast)

This has meant, that those crucial pillars of any north/south focus and the British-Irish Council have fallen by the wayside, leaving Northern Ireland, in many cases, to fend for itself in the face of an arms-length approach by London and Dublin. As one community developer from Derry/Londonderry suggests: Once the agreement was signed, everybody walked away. Both the Irish government and the British government failed to live up to their obligations on that agreement. (Participant #17, Community Developer, Derry/Londonderry)

Another researcher from Belfast agrees with this assessment, and he argues that it highlights the clear need for there to have been more stringent review mechanisms within the GFA: There has been a problem I think where the two governments have taken their eyes off the ball and gotten a bit relaxed about the whole thing, which has lost a lot of the momentum in it. That sense I think of what do you need in it… You need some kind of oversight support for the process over a period of time. It may be something that could have helped with it. Participant #20, (Director of Research Organization, Belfast)

This sense has been heightened throughout the ongoing Brexit situation as well. As Northern Ireland has taken center stage in many of the Brexit negotiations and debates, though it has largely been negotiations about Northern Ireland, which glaringly, are not negotiations that tend to include Northern Irish voices, the positioning of delegations from both Dublin and London has been complicated by attempts to maintain the integrity of the GFA. Yet as the still uncertain fate of Brexit, and any withdrawal agreement arising from it, hangs in the air, many in Northern Ireland are questioning whether or not they can trust that the British and Irish government will keep the best interest of Northern Ireland in mind, after years of failed obligations. As my conversations with civil society leaders concluded, many took an opportunity to reflect on the GFA and the legacy it maintains in Northern Ireland. It is an interesting thing, to talk about the legacy of something that is still ongoing and impacting the lives of people every 237 day. Nevertheless, after twenty years, the reality is that the GFA does possess a legacy already, even if its story is still being written. Just like legacy issues regarding the traumas of The Troubles are complicated within Northern Ireland, assessing the legacy of the GFA from the perspective of civil society leaders holds its own complications as well. For one community developer in Derry/Londonderry, the legacy of the GFA is still marked by the failures of political leaders to deliver on promises: Go back to the Good Friday Agreement, when it was signed, that this was going to take a generation. We’re now over twenty years since then, and we’re back to square one. Simply because, politicians are in control, and who really controls the politicians? You go to the civil servants and it’s the same civil servants that actually managed the Unionists that were there and they’re still there obviously, involved. That needs to be changed. (Participant #17, Community Developer, Derry/Londonderry)

For him, the legacy of the agreement will always be tied to its successes and the progress it provides. Except, with the same leadership in place in many places, as was present before and during the signing of the GFA, that progress has failed to be delivered, rendering Northern Ireland, to him, back at square one. That is a frustrating place to be, after twenty years of hard- fought peace work. A peacebuilder in Derry/Londonderry suggests that the GFA has introduced a new fight within Northern Ireland. Not one waged by the use of bullets and bombs, but one waged through the formation of narrative: There’s been a big fight over the dominant narrative, since the Good Friday Agreement. There’s been a pushing I think, that the Good Friday Agreement hasn’t helped either. Now, I would be the one for the Good Friday Agreement, because at that time there is no alternative. So, I’m not saying I wasn’t about it. But since that time, there’s been a fight for the dominate narrative. Who’s taking the moral high ground? Who are the victims here? Who wants the narrative to be written into history? That has been our fight. (Participant #5, Peacebuilder, Derry/Londonderry)

The fight over the dominant narrative is one that is no stranger to divided societies, especially in Northern Ireland (Robinson, 2018). Yet the fact that the GFA has become a source for this narrative battle to continue, shows again how complicated the legacy of the agreement truly is within Northern Ireland. The civil society leader above is quick to note her support for the GFA at the time of its introduction, but she also cannot ignore how it has played out in the social discourse over the last twenty years. 238

Thus, an effective assessment of the GFA is an incredibly nuanced task. Take, for instance, the reflections on the legacy of the agreement, as offered by a community organization director from Derry/Londonderry: So, I think, for twenty years on, we haven’t done too badly. People need to remember how things were pre-Good Friday Agreement. And that’s part of it. You’ve got a generation, which thankfully, have grown up with no knowledge of what that was like before. So, when they don’t see ordinary functioning government, on some level of normality, they think this has failed us. But, actually, even what we have now is still beyond better than what we’ve had before. (Participant #4, Director of a Community Organization, Derry/Londonderry)

He is largely positive in his assessment of the GFA’s legacy, because he is basing his reflection on a comparison of Northern Ireland today, compared to the times before 1998. And certainly, in terms of direct violence, things are far and away better and that should not ever be forgotten. Although this again brings us back to the question of, is this version of peace in Northern Ireland good enough? It is a peace, as discussed throughout this study, which is frozen and liminal, hardly living up to the ideals of a genuinely progressive and inclusive society that many hoped to be part of twenty years post-accord. Successes have certainly been seen, such as in policing, as one civil society leader points out in her assessment: Policing was reformed top to bottom. We could talk about the extent to which that has worked, but there was a very deliberate process took place there and there was also an implementation plan associated with that. So, that one got done. (Participant #2, CEO of an Umbrella Peacebuilding Organization, Belfast)

Nonetheless the whole of the agreement itself, in all of its “constructive ambiguity” manages to give a range of ambiguous considerations on its legacy. And from many in Northern Ireland, there is still real fear of assessing the GFA as anything other than a wonderful success. After all, it, largely, stopped the bombs exploding and the bullets flying, so how could you ever look at it as anything other than a genuine success? But, what’s at the nub of it? Well, basically, we don’t like each other, and we never got to groups for those fundamental reasons that we don’t like each other and there’s a lack of trust there. And so, time might improve that. We’ll see. But I don’t know if there’s any appetite to revisit the Good Friday Agreement, at this stage, certainly, amongst the leaders. They want to revisit the Good Friday Agreement to take out the clauses that might make Brexit illegal, or might make a hard border illegal. But I think on a wider level, in terms of the toll it’s created, I think there was always a notion that it would outlive its 239

usefulness. Possibly people were thinking it had reached that point. (Participant #4, Director of a Community Organization, Derry/Londonderry)

Thus, we call again on the wisdom of Johan Galtung as we push the notion of peace beyond the simple absence of direct violence, to one that encompasses the totality of positive peace (Galtung, 1969). And on that charge, argues a project leader from Belfast, the GFA is left wanting, and thus, it should be assessed and critiqued: But, twenty years on talk to people at the interface and talk to people living in certain communities, it’s actually either made no difference, or in some ways, they’re worse off. I think there’s an opportunity for more learning here, and maybe because we’ve been held up for so long as being the gold standard, or being the place to come and learn, that then creates a culture where you stop learning yourself and going to places to learn how other countries are doing it. Or, are there other ways to do it? Are there more new, innovative things going on out there? (Participant #26, Project Lead, Belfast)

Just as we should not forget the importance of the 1998 GFA, neither can we base our entire assessment of the agreement on its accomplishments over twenty years ago. Time has allowed us the space to consider the long-term implications of the document as well. As the reflections of the civil society leaders within this study have shown, that long-term assessment of the GFA reveals a number of critical cracks in the document, that have led to profound implications on the state of peace in Northern Ireland today. It is complicated to assess an agreement that has meant so much to Northern Ireland and has endured with stunning resiliency over many years of trials and tribulations. However what is clear, when assessment and reflection are not duty-bound to a perspective looking through rose tinted glasses, is that the GFA, as a whole, is not necessarily worthy of the gold standard title PACS has long levied upon it. In fact, that conceptualization of the agreement may have, at least in part, played a role in the inability for many leaders to critically examine the agreement in hopes of learning new lessons to put into play. As civil society leaders still struggle with issues today, that have grown no better, sometimes even worse, in the intervening years of “peace” following the signing of the accord, the notion that the GFA was an agreement “for the time” but not for “all time” is one that becomes clearer by the day.

9.6 Key findings of the research Peace does not happen in a vacuum. Processes of peace, whether that be peacemaking, peacebuilding, or something in-between, all happen within a complex network of interrelated 240 parts where context reigns supreme. The context of Northern Ireland in the latter half of the 1990s was one of despair, division, and frustration. The lead-up to that momentous moment in 1998 and the introduction of the GFA was an exercise in perseverance that at many times, resembled a fool-hardy naiveite framed as hope. Yet against the odds, peace, a concept unknown for decades in the North of Ireland, ultimately won the day. Four key findings emerged inductively from the data presented within this chapter. First, the GFA was certainly initially successful, however, a large part of this success came through ignoring some of the more challenging issues in 1998, many of which still plague Northern Ireland today. Second, it has proved to be a serious challenging to implement the “constructive ambiguity” that defined the GFA design. Third, civil society leaders possess a wealth of novel and innovative ideas on how the GFA could have been improved in 1998 and can be improved even today. And fourth, Northern Ireland is in need of a new narrative, consisting of new actors within the peacebuilding environment, and civil society holds a stable of readily available contributors. These findings are discussed in greater detail below. First, the GFA represented a beacon of hope and movement in what had been seen as a sea of intractability. For those civil society leaders that have been active in the peacebuilding field since the time of The Troubles, the achievement of the GFA itself, without consideration of its content, is a success that some feared would never occur, but all agree should never be diminished. Thus, any assessment of the GFA must strike a balance of embracing the successes of 1998 with the critical reflections on the realities of the post-accord period. One key recognition that is highlighted by civil society leaders within this study, is that the peacemaking process in the years preceding 1998, seemingly against all odds, actually represented an atmosphere of relative inclusivity. Input was sought from civil society by political negotiators in the early days of dialogue processes. Participants within this study continually highlighted this as one of the major accomplishments of the Northern Ireland peace process in the 1990s. The importance of this early inclusion was key, many civil society leaders argue, in breaking through the inertia of initial peacemaking attempts. And yet, any sense of inclusivity that might have existed when it came to dialogue groups, was notably absent as the issues being addressed in the agreement finally started to solidify. This is an important recognition that is highlighted by a number of civil society leaders 241 within this study. As the pre-agreement era marched forward towards the GFA, decisions were made to actively avoid certain issue areas; both in the dialogue occurring between the parties and certainly in the language that was appearing on the initial drafts of the agreement. One example highlighted in the testimonies above, for example, is that of Bloody Sunday. The contentious event, and the issues surrounding it, represents an example of the challenging topics that were left in a nebulous state not only throughout the talks, but also within the GFA itself as well. Other issues, like policing reform, were consciously avoided when it came to the GFA and instead were handed off to independent commissions. While this proved effective, at least in the short term, for issues like policing, the approach traded in-the-moment victories for down-the-road stumbling blocks. This once again, brings us to a key understanding about the GFA. There were immediate realities of a complex peacemaking process that simply cannot be ignored. Yet the long shadow of peace was, it must be recognized, consciously ignored. Northern Ireland is not unique in taking this approach, but nonetheless, with the benefit of the last two decades as context, it is an approach that needs to be critically assessed in determining the most effective pieces to peace. What the research within this study shows, is that there are aspects of the peacemaking process that not only can, but do, adversely impact the subsequent peacebuilding process. If we are seeking to build more effective and holistic peace processes, we cannot separate the pre- and post-agreement periods from analysis. As this study shows, despite several successes in the pre- agreement period in Northern Ireland, mainly the, at least, appearance of attempted dialogue inclusivity, the challenging issue avoidance technique, has proved to be a considerable hinderance to peacebuilding efforts. Thinking through these issues, leads us directly into a focus on the content of the GFA itself, successes and failures alike. As it has been discussed at length in previous sections and chapters of this study, peace agreements are notoriously challenging. It is a momentous process to reach the negotiating table and find a way to produce a document that is able to curtail the ongoing conflict. However, creating a document that is capable of surviving the honeymoon period and is able to stand up to the most challenging test of all, the test of time, well, that is another daunting challenge in and of itself. It is this second test, the test of an agreement’s durability, that has been the downfall of many promising peace processes within divided societies. 242

Yet these challenges, as significant as they are, were bested in Northern Ireland, with the production of the GFA. As study participants reflected on the GFA itself, many were quick to highlight these successes first and foremost. This is an important finding within the qualitative research conducted for the study, and something that should not be glossed over. Although every single participant ultimately levied serious critiques at the GFA, to varying degrees, one of the most common places to start when outlining their personal and professional reflections, was from a place initially rooted in appreciation. This approach by many of the participants reveals several key understandings about how the GFA is seen at the grassroots level of civil society within Northern Ireland. First, this initial response from a place of appreciation for what the GFA was able to initial accomplish, came primarily from those civil society leaders that have been engaged in the peacebuilding process since before 1998. While all participants recognize the importance of the GFA and its impact on Northern Ireland in bringing an end to The Troubles and largely, but not entirely, the sustained direct violence, those working at the grassroots level before/during/after the signing of the GFA were able to witness that change directly within their peacebuilding work. Additionally, this initial instinct to begin reflections of the GFA with an appreciative approach, is also rooted in the nature of the peacebuilding sector in Northern Ireland and how it has evolved over the intervening years following the signing of the GFA in 1998. As one participant mentioned, there is often a sense by those in the peacebuilding sector, and civil society in general, that the GFA is more or less a sacred cow within Northern Ireland. Similarly, to how a fear developed of being in any way critical of the peace talks in the 1990s, lest being labeled an “anti-peace” advocate, the same general atmosphere has developed in the post-accord period as well. As the international focus on Northern Ireland and the GFA has ballooned in the last two decades, that sense of reverence for the GFA as a monolith and embodiment of peace in the counties of Ulster, has created an environment that instills hesitation when it comes to voicing critiques of the GFA. Fearing they will be labeled “anti-peace” by speaking openly about the GFA, peacebuilders and civil society leaders tend to shy away from the critical analysis that all peace agreements should endure. Thus, the default response of uncritical appreciation for the GFA has been hardwired into the psyche of civil society leaders. In many cases, it is as if they 243 feel like they have to recite a script citing their appreciation, before they feel comfortable voicing any of their critiques or concerns, of which, it turns out, they have many. The consistency of this initial hesitation towards in-depth critical analysis is a key theme coming out of this study. It reveals that there are serious psychological and political impediments in Northern Ireland when it comes to effective discourse around the shortcomings of the GFA. This understanding helps to highlight why we have increasingly seen a disconnect between the “collective wisdom” on the successes of the GFA and the realities of its failures being felt at the grassroots by peacebuilders and civil society leaders. This is not to say that the GFA is not worthy of praise and appreciation. Many leaders noted its impressive attempts at inclusivity and cross-community support, which was clearly vitally important to its initial successes in 1998 and setting Northern Ireland on a new path. However, these successes cannot and should not, be held to such a revered standard that critical reflections and analyses on the agreement are pushed entirely out of the picture. The GFA made a difference in Northern Ireland as it, in many ways, “forced” cooperation between communities and party leaders that had long skated by on the divided realities of the status quo. Except, the GFA has not been a universally positive force in Northern Ireland, when considering its impact on the peacebuilding process and key issues that are still plaguing the country. After the cursory nod of appreciation for the GFA, every single study participant offered numerous, and sometimes scathing, critiques of the agreement itself. This finding shows there is widespread dissatisfaction with key aspects of the GFA arising from the frontline grassroots civil society leaders pursuing peace in Northern Ireland. Second, it has been mentioned several times before, yet one of the biggest issues that study participants highlight with the GFA is its “constructive ambiguity” when it comes to design characteristics. While its noted that this constructive ambiguity was certainly useful in 1998, civil society leaders repeatedly draw attention to this aspect as a key challenge for Northern Ireland’s peace process over the last two decades. In essence, this ambiguity has led to a number of key issues, such as victims/survivor groups, social justice causes, civil rights issues, remembrance, etc., being woefully under addressed when it comes to effective policy development. This ambiguity has led to a vital understanding of the GFA as an agreement that was good for the time (1998) but not good for all time. As one researcher from Belfast noted, the 244 gaps and shortcomings within the GFA are not being covered up over time, but they are increasingly revealing themselves as serious flaws of the agreement itself. One of the most important findings within this study, arising from the critiques of civil society leaders, is that the permanence of the GFA (periodic supporting agreements such as the St. Andrews Agreement notwithstanding), has been revealed to be a serious impediment to peace in Northern Ireland. This is largely because the ambiguous nature of the agreement around key, and challenging, issues in 1998 is still ambiguous today. Thus, progress on these issues is fleeting at best as no clear pathway exists for a unified approach to tackling these pressing society-wide concerns. But to compound the issue, it is not just about what the GFA does not say, although the findings of this study add further evidence to the fact that even the issues and solutions the GFA does distinctly outline, serious problems of implementation remain. In tandem with critiques on the ambiguity, civil society leaders also levied highly critical assessments regarding the implementation aspects of the GFA. Thus, issues such as legacy, not only remain ambiguous due to gaps in the GFA, as solutions and institutions aimed at potentially tackling this issue, such as the Civic Forum, have perished at the hands of time without ever having been fully implemented. The ambiguous framework may have been wonderful in accomplishing the historic signing and passing of the agreement, but implementing ambiguity is a fool’s errand. Thus, for civil society leaders, assessing the GFA is essentially a two-part story. One aspect is assessing its potential, where the GFA gets middling marks from civil society leaders, and the other aspect is assessing how it has been implemented, where the GFA gets consistently failing marks. The key understanding here, is that when considering the legacy and impact of the GFA within Northern Ireland, it is short-sighted to only note the successes of 1998 without the recognition of the implementation failures of the 2000s. Potential is wonderful to marvel at and celebrate within the academic realm, however if that potential is not ever realized through effective implementation, there will be no celebrating at the grassroots level where positive peace remains a fantasy. Tied closely to the issue of implementation is another unique insight that was revealed through conversations with the participants of this study: ownership of the GFA and the peace process in general. Numerous participants noted there has been a general disconnect, which has been growing over the years, between the citizens of Northern Ireland and the peace process. In essence, thanks in large part to the shortcomings and failures highlighted above, the Northern 245

Ireland populace is struggling to see their place, and voice, in the evolving peace process. In other words, the ownership of the GFA and the peace process itself has become increasingly concentrated in the hands of the political elites. Combine this with the well-noted failures of the political institutions over the years in Northern Ireland and the sentiment expressed by the peacebuilders highlighted in this study, paint a grim picture of the intended peaceful outworking of the GFA. A program director from Belfast put it best when she equated the GFA and the peace process to bricks and cement respectively. As beautiful as the bricks of potential from the GFA may be, without the cement to bind these bricks together, in this case, effective civic engagement, the foundation of peace is likely to come crashing down around you. It was an effective agreement for the time, which is an important understanding. Yet the research presented within this study reveals a far more critical understanding of the GFA; it has not been an effective agreement for all time. It is neither the intention of myself, nor the study participants, to only levy critique at the GFA, however, as this would only be a half solution. Equally important, is the process of considering ways in which the GFA could have been improved, given we now have the advantage or reflecting on a wealth of experience and time as the GFA has played out in Northern Ireland for over two decades. As participants consider changes, they would have liked to see reflected in the GFA, they are not (nor am I) rejecting the agreement itself, rather it is about embracing this unique knowledge and expertise they have gained by working in the shadow of the GFA for numerous years. Third, and perhaps the most important finding from this section of the study, is that there is no shortage of ideas coming out of civil society regarding potential changes to the GFA. This indicates a wealth of opportunity for pursuing both short-term and long-term improvements to the Northern Ireland peace process. While the specifics of the suggestions are detailed and unique from each participant, they all coalesce around three key categories: the binary nature of the consociational system, the need for review and upgrade mechanisms within the GFA, and the addressing of specific issues left “constructively ambiguous” such as legacy, re-integration, and rights-based policies. It is telling that so many participants within this study pointed towards the binary consociational nature of the institutions launched by the GFA as a point of change on the GFA. 246

While this study consciously avoided the inclusion of those within the political sphere in the participant list, the amount of focus given to the political institution component of the GFA by civil society leaders suggests how influential the issue is for those at the grassroots level. An unmistakably key finding of this research endeavor is that civil society leaders in Northern Ireland are highly critical of the consociational nature of the political institutions arising out of the GFA. While this is not necessarily an indictment on consociationalism itself by civil society leaders since only a handful of the participants admitted having any deep knowledge of political systems theory, it is a recognition that their experience working with the political institutions in Northern Ireland since the GFA, has not exactly proven to be fruitful. The binary and steadfast nature of the political institutions arising from the GFA have done little to rectify the deep sectarian nature of Northern Ireland from neither a political nor cultural perspective. In fact, one key argument made by several participants is that they attribute the binary nature of the GFA influenced political institutions as a source of deepening the sectarian chasm within the country. Along similar lines are the suggestions from civil society leaders that the GFA could have/would benefit from more concrete review mechanisms and paths for upgrades to its core framework. While it must again be noted that political discourse has not been entirely lacking in Northern Ireland over the last twenty years given the moderate successes of negotiations around the St. Andrews Agreement, the Hillsborough Agreement, and the Fresh Start Agreement (and most recently, during final edits of this study, the New Decade New Approach agreement), the civil society leaders within this study still find the GFA itself wanting, when it comes to robust opportunities for upgrades. This touches again on a key desire of civil society leaders for the GFA to be an evolving document that is amenable to changes in reflection of the ongoing needs to the peace process and grassroots communities. The finding also suggests that civil society leaders continue to recognize and call out for the voice of civil society to be not just a token, used by political elites as they see fit, but rather a robust review on the political institutions themselves. The lack of review mechanisms and paths for upgrades within the GFA has led to an overtly politicized realization of the GFA that has consistently closed the door on cooperative enterprises with civil society leaders. The ramifications, argue the participants of this study, have been realized in a 247 floundering peacebuilding process that is shackled to an inflexible and poorly implemented peace agreement. And fourth, when it comes to the suggestions for changes offered by civil society leaders, a bevy of unaddressed issue areas have been raised repeatedly and with fervor. Many of these specific issue areas have been discussed at length elsewhere in this study, yet several key points deserve to be made within the current discussion. While it is unsurprising that civil society leaders working with specific populations (youth, former combatants, victims/survivors, etc.) would naturally want to see more support and provisions provided to their work, the near unanimous recognition of legacy issues, re-integration failures, and absent human rights provisions is notable throughout the data collected in this study. It is clear, that these three broad issues, represent the crux of the challenges facing the Northern Ireland peace process today. Civil society leaders, working at the grassroots level, repeatedly circle back to these issue areas as the major failings of the GFA playing out in Northern Ireland over the last twenty years. Particularly the issue of legacy, is consistently highlighted as the primary challenger to stepping into an era of positive peace. The GFA framers consciously avoided the issue of legacy in 1998, relying on the heavily mentioned tactic of employing “constructive ambiguity” so as to defer that challenge to a more amenable time in the future. Yet, it is blatantly clear after twenty years of collective knowledge and experience following that decision, that current times are seemingly no more amenable than they were at the close of the 20th century. Thus, legacy continues to be an “anchor” that unfailingly drags the peace process, and Northern Ireland itself, backwards at every turn. The knowledge and expertise of civil society leaders, when provided with the chance to speak freely, gives us an idea of the primary failings of the GFA over the last twenty years. Yet what does that mean for today in Northern Ireland? Are we destined to simply lament the failures of the past while treading the rough waters of today? For the civil society leaders in Northern Ireland today, the shortcomings of the GFA and the failures of the last twenty years do not necessarily represent a death sentence for hope and progress for today and the tomorrows to come. For civil society leaders in Northern Ireland today, however, progress and hope for the future require a shifting of priorities and actions in the present. As the findings of this research show, Northern Ireland is far from a shining example of a “successful” peace process as division 248 and sectarianism still mar the cultural, political, and social landscape. It is clear now, after several decades, that the GFA, designed as it is today, is not the driving force to positive peace that many hoped it would be. The findings of this research reveal that civil society leaders are crying out for the opportunity to be heard as they attempt to drive the peace process forward in the overbearing shadow of the GFA shortcomings. However, it is not their burden alone in charting a path towards a more peaceful and unified Northern Ireland. Numerous civil society leaders highlight the British and Irish governments as key pieces to the puzzle as these parties are largely fallen away from their commitments outlined at the signing of the GFA. Thus, with the infusion of new voices arising from civil society and a return to commitments previously established for the British and Irish governments, the gaps within the GFA can begin to be mended. A key contribution of this research to our understanding of the Northern Ireland peace process today, is that there is a wealth of ideas and knowledge that is remaining untapped. Civil society leaders recognize and understand the challenges that continue to exist, and in some cases, worsen, at the grassroots level. They also show a keen understanding of how the frameworks of the GFA could be reviewed and improved, if only given the chance. Northern Ireland is stuck in a quagmire of imperfect peace, reinforced by an imperfect peace agreement. A new narrative must arise in the political and public spheres of Northern Ireland that mirrors the narrative originating from civil society; the GFA was an agreement for the time, yet holding fast to the idea that it should be an agreement for all time, risks keeping Northern Ireland shackled to a “half-baked” peace that is destined to repeat the rhetoric of old, long into the divided future.

9.7 Conclusion This chapter takes a closer look at the GFA itself as the reflections of civil society leaders in Northern Ireland are relied upon to provide expertise, knowledge, and context. Based on decades of experience, civil society leaders are uniquely suited to provide critical analysis on the agreement itself, as we seek to untangle the complexities of its impact in Northern Ireland over the last twenty plus years. This abundance of experience led to a number of key insights on the agreement from the often-overlooked perspective of civil society. First, the pre-agreement period of peacemaking was explored. Civil society leaders highlighted the importance of initial inclusivity of civil society-based voices when it came to the 249 early days dialogue processes. However, they noted that as the contents of the GFA solidified, much of it in the wee hours of those consequential April 1998 days, a number of core issues were left untouched and consciously ignored, in favor of securing short-term successes. This “constructive ambiguity” approach to agreement contents on core issues, provides the crux of the critiques and complaints within the next section of the chapter as participants share their general reflections on the nature of the agreement. There were successes of the GFA to celebrate, most obvious being the general end to the direct violence of the Troubles, yet these successes, civil society leaders argue, often obscure more grim realities of the peace process in Northern Ireland as they have come to know it. With both failures of design and implementation, for civil society leaders, the GFA represents a document of missed opportunity and unrealized potential. With these critiques in mind, civil society leaders also offered their own ideas about ways that the GFA could have been, and still could be, improved. Rather than accepting the GFA as a “sacred cow”, the creative juices flow as the participants of this study explored constructive adjustments to the framework of the agreement itself. Namely, these ideas include addressing the apparent long-term failings of a consociational design of political institutions that devolve into a sectarianized mess, embracing heightened review mechanisms and upgrade paths for the GFA, and highlighting key issues that were abandoned in the ambiguity of the agreement such as legacy, re-integration, and human rights. Finally, civil society leaders utilize their wisdom and experience to focus their attention on Northern Ireland today. With the shadow of the GFA still very much present throughout Northern Ireland and the peace process, civil society leaders reinforce a critically important and desperately needed shift in the status quo. The GFA was a successful agreement for the time, in 1998, but the intervening years of the post-accord period reveal that the GFA is not a successful agreement for all time. For peace to truly succeed in Northern Ireland, the GFA must be subjected to reviews, updates, and an infusion of influence from new voices within civil society and those shouldering the burden of waging peace at the grassroots level.

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Chapter 10 Conclusion: Embracing a complex peace in Northern Ireland

10.1 Introduction Throughout this study, the complex nature of the Northern Ireland peace process has been explored through a concentrated focus on civil society leaders’ reflections and perceptions on the successes and failures of the GFA. As peace agreements developed throughout the world in conflict areas continue to struggle to establish robust, positive peace, the importance of developing a deeper understanding of peacemaking and peacebuilding processes is of paramount importance. The GFA, with over twenty years of being the guiding framework for peace in Northern Ireland, provides a wealth of opportunity for critical analysis into what has been successful and what has fallen short, both in terms of design and implementation. As holistic peace processes are developed to meet the complexity of conflict, greater attention needs to be paid to the experience and expertise originating from the grassroots level. In both the pre-agreement peacemaking process as well as the post-agreement peacebuilding endeavor, civil society represents a key stakeholder group and organizing sector through which positive peace can be realized. Yet, the voices of those in civil society are still too often ignored in the midst of overtly technocratic peace processes frameworks. This study aimed to provide the opportunity for a sharing of knowledge and understanding emanating from civil society leaders within Northern Ireland. Having worked for decades within the shadow of the GFA, seeking to deliver on the promises of peace at the grassroots level, these leaders provide an unrivaled source of organic, local knowledge on the successes and failures of the Northern Ireland peace endeavor. By adopting a qualitative, grounded theory approach, this study recognizes the civil society leaders within Northern Ireland as a valuable source of understanding, specifically on the successes and failures of the GFA as it relates to the peacebuilding enterprise over the last two plus decades. The research was conducted through in-depth, face-to-face interviews with 31 civil society leaders in Northern Ireland, with responses from 29 of those participants contributing to the findings of this research. The remainder of this chapter summarizes the overall key findings of the research along five overriding themes arising from the conversations with the study 251 participants. Additionally, this chapter also considers areas that are in need of future research, both in relation to Northern Ireland specifically and the PACS discipline more generally.

10.2 Overall summary of key research findings Chapters 5 through 9 comprise the empirical findings and discussion of this study. Participant responses are included verbatim in order to reflect an honest representation of their expertise and experience on the issues and topics. Each chapter also includes a discussion on the significance of the original, key research findings of this project. These empirical chapters are summarized below.

10.2.1 Civil society’s role in Northern Ireland’s peace process The positionality of civil society in Northern Ireland has been relatively complicated over the last half century. Throughout the Troubles, as is common in many conflict zones (Paffenholz, 2013), civil society in Northern Ireland not only stood largely independent from the state, yet it also provided key services in communities that were abandoned by the state. As peacemaking efforts grew in the late 1980s and early 1990s, civil society was quick to seek engagement. A key example of this is seen in the Opsahl Comission (Pollak, 1993) as civil society leaders provided a direct voice on the key issues facing Northern Ireland during those initial peacemaking efforts. However, the post-agreement era has marked a troubling trend as civil society leaders see their voices increasingly falling on deaf ears from the political apparatus, creating a very rocky relationship between the two sectors in Northern Ireland today. As the conversation with the study participants explored this complicated positionality of civil society in Northern Ireland, four key findings were revealed to be weighing heavily on civil society leaders. First, civil society leaders expressed the feeling that they were being used by their counterparts within the political sphere. The political sphere has consistently pushed aside civil society choosing to see the voluntary sector not as a true partner in the post-accord period, but instead more as a tertiary “third sector” that plays second fiddle. Yet as the political sector struggles for influence in certain pockets and communities within Northern Ireland, the pursuit of legitimacy tends to run through civil society actors. Thus, the relationship between civil society and the political apparatus tends to be a one-way avenue, with civil society increasingly 252 frustrated with a lack of respect and collaboration. This spells serious trouble for the prospect of a holistic peacebuilding enterprise across sectors of Northern Ireland. Second, a common frustration noted by civil society leaders was the lack of any type of legitimate mechanism for contributions from the civic sector. This frustration highlighted the failure of the Civic Forum as a serious missed opportunity in the post-accord period. The Civic Forum was repeatedly noted as one of the biggest “what-ifs” when it comes to the failures of GFA implementation. The failure of the Civic Forum is not only disappointing for those in civil society, as it was seen as a genuine opportunity for dialogue, yet more importantly, it is also a representation of the growing gulf between the political apparatus and those at the grassroots level. Its failure, and the failure to replace it with any similar mechanism, is seen by civil society leaders as a conscious miscarriage of trust between the sector and the political apparatus in Northern Ireland. A third point of emphasis is the ever-present question in the minds of civil society leaders as to where exactly the sector fits in the wider peace process in Northern Ireland. This study reveals an impressive amount of consistency across civil society, as leaders included in this project argue for an increasing focus on strengthening civil society. The suggestion is that civil society in Northern Ireland not only has a practical need to improve their internal bonds, but also a moral obligation to do so given the recent track-record of the political sphere. As the Northern Ireland Executive has seen serious struggles in the last two decades (Fenton, 2018), spending considerable time on hiatus even, key aspects of the peacebuilding process have been left wanting (e.g., legacy issues, as I discussed in Chapter 8). Civil society leaders recognize their unique positioning at the grassroots level and are eager to leverage this into continued (and increased) leadership opportunities at the frontlines of the community peacebuilding agenda. Finally, with these considerations in mind, a number of study participants highlighted their desire to see civil society fully embracing a position of peace leadership within Northern Ireland. Feeling as though the political apparatus cannot be reliably counted upon, civil society leaders advocate for an increased focus on civil society leading the charge on the continued path towards peace. With numerous pockets of vulnerability still existing within communities throughout the North of Ireland, civil society leaders recognize their key charge in providing vital support at the grassroots level.

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10.2.2 Youth disillusionment and disengagement in Northern Ireland In Chapter 6, the second key theme of this study is explored: issues surrounding youth engagement in the Northern Ireland peace process. Within the PACS field, youth have long been recognized as a key population group when it comes to peace processes (McEvoy-Levy, 2001; Smith & Smith Ellison, 2012). Participants of this study were quick to touch on this as well throughout their contributions, as they repeatedly underscored certain concerns when it comes to youth in Northern Ireland today. First, the findings of this study reveal a serious issue of youth disillusionment with the political apparatus in Northern Ireland. In many ways, this reflects the same frustration that civil society leaders themselves feel regarding the political sector, which is one reason why civil society leaders were so quick to recognize the same disconnect occurring within youth populations. As youth regard the political apparatus with distrust, concerns are raised as to where new ideas and new visions of the future will originate, if the politics of Northern Ireland continue to be dominated by the sectarian schisms and rhetoric of old. A second, closely linked concern of civil society leaders, is what they refer to as the “brain drain” within Northern Ireland. In a startling high number of cases, youth disillusionment is not just contained to apathy, however it has evolved into an active disengagement and distancing by way of exiting Northern Ireland. In essence, the Northern Ireland “brain drain” is Albert Hirschman’s (1970) famous exit-voice-loyalty model playing out with devastating effects. Feeling they have no voice (and certainly no loyalty) to change the system that is recognized as failing, youth are simply choosing to leave Northern Ireland, with many uncertain to ever return. The third key issue when it comes to youth, is highlighted by civil society leaders’ frustration with the structural component of education in Northern Ireland. Civil society leaders within this study argue that a leading factor to many of the youth-focused problems can be traced to the inefficiencies of education in Northern Ireland. Primarily, the frustration is with the continued segregated nature of education across the North of Ireland. Civil society leaders recognize this as a core cause of many divisions they see throughout communities (more on this in Chapter 8). Addressing segregated education is seen as a necessary structural approach to improving cross-community relations and aiding the peace process as a whole. Fourth, civil society leaders express considerable concern at the vulnerability of certain youth populations and the ongoing threat of dissident activity in Northern Ireland. As dissident 254 and paramilitary activity continues to plague disadvantaged communities throughout Northern Ireland (Maiangwa, et al., 2019), civil society leaders note that youth populations are a particularly vulnerable group when it comes to engaging in anti-social behavior as the youth suicide rate is one of the highest in Europe. More attention, participants argue, needs to be paid to these vulnerable youth in order to mitigate conflict recurrence. Finally, study participants suggest there is impressive potential in the younger generations, if only it can be recognized and utilized. There are shifting aspects of identity within younger people (for instance, around aspects of LGBTTQ2+ inclusion) that provides a glimmer of hope for many in civil society. It is this hopeful potential that further highlights their concerns as explored above. Thus, a focus on youth inclusion in the peace process should not simply be seen as a secondary focus, instead, it must be a primary focus in a reconceptualized holistic peace process aimed at moving Northern Ireland forward.

10.2.3 Civil society leaders’ reflections on peace funding in Northern Ireland Chapter 7 highlights a critical issue when it comes to post-accord peacebuilding processes: peace funding. This theme is unique in that it revealed a highly complex reality of historic and current peace funding of the Northern Ireland peace process, yet the same fears and concerns were felt across civil society, speaking to the importance of this issue in the minds of all civil society leaders. Four key funding related factors were shown to be of critical importance to civil society leaders within this study. First, reductions in peace funds are starting to pick up steam within Northern Ireland. Peace funding reductions are a natural part of any peace process (Murtagh, 2016), yet this has been a reality that Northern Ireland has largely avoided until recently. As these reductions start to become more noticeable, civil society leaders reveal their concerns when it comes to a parallel reduction in the vital services provided by civil society. This is particularly troublesome as civil society finds itself still filling in large gaps of service that have been sustained by failures of the political sector and shortcomings of non-implementation of cornerstone aspects of the GFA. Civil society leaders are already stretched thin on the front lines of the grassroots peacebuilding effort and peace funding reductions threaten to eliminate some of those crucial positions and organizations. 255

A second issue is attempting to work within funding constraints placed on many civil society leaders and organizations. Civil society leaders are increasingly feeling as though their work must fit a certain mold, as envisioned by the technocratic structures outside of their control. This study reveals the immense struggle civil society leaders face when working with “difficult populations” (as labeled by donors and politicians) such as former prisoners or ex-combatants. This has meant that some of the groups within Northern Ireland that are the most vulnerable are unable to access services due to these overbearing funding constraints. The fear among many civil society leaders, is that this is potentially creating groups of peace spoilers and squandering the opportunity to embrace a truly inclusive peacebuilding process. Third, there have been funding transitions that are revealing more cracks in the idea of a unified vision of peace within Northern Ireland. Civil society leaders suggest that the GFA never truly provided a unified vision of long-term peace and this has led to challenges at the grassroots level. Recognizing the dramatic transition of a post-Brexit Northern Ireland as yet another variable, study participants express apprehension at trying to navigate these transitions without any overall unifying vision of peace over twenty years since the GFA was signed. Finally, a number of civil society leaders admit that funding dependency is a serious issue throughout the sector. This study has shown that dependency in the form of funding ties means that organizations lack the creative and independent control to explore contextually unique paths of peace. In essence, the peace process is not one that is centered at the grassroots level, thus, there is a lack of local ownership of the direction of peace in Northern Ireland. This means that funding dependency is reinforcing the technocratic nature of the Northern Ireland peace process, casting doubt on the viability of an organic and responsive peace process moving forward.

10.2.4 Unresolved issues, division, and negative peace in Northern Ireland Touching on broader aspects of the peace environment in Northern Ireland, Chapter 8 highlights civil society leaders’ concern of continued ramifications of living in a divided society. Four key points of emphasis were noted by study participants including the realities of negative peace and unaddressed traumas of The Troubles. Civil society leaders also turned their attention to the future and offered insight into their perception of Northern Ireland’s path moving forward. First, the complexities of living and working in a divided society were at the forefront of all participants’ minds throughout our discussions. Despite over two decades since the inception 256 of the GFA, divisions in Northern Ireland are still deeply ingrained. Not only in the form of highly segregated education (see Chapter 7 for further discussion), but also within communities across Northern Ireland. The research findings also indicate that the divisions are not improving, and, in many communities, the divisions seem to be, in fact, becoming more entrenched. Participants were quick to note that the physical barriers that still exist (Abdelmoran & Selim, 2019), for example the peace walls, are working to maintain the psychological barriers (Robinson, 2018) within society. These barriers need to be tackled now, and aggressively so, as part of a comprehensive patchwork of support for social, cultural, and political integration between the PUL and CNR communities (Nan, 2009). Second, using the framework of Galtung’s (1969) influential positive and negative peace conception, the study participants suggest that the Northern Ireland peace of the last twenty years has not truly lived up to what many had hoped it would be. Rather than genuine positive peace being achieved, civil society leaders argue that Northern Ireland has found itself with at best a liminal peace, and more commonly, a peace that fits squarely in Galtung’s ideas of a negative peace. It is a frustrating realization that is driven, civil society leaders suggest, by a “fear of conflict” that has prevented serious, critical reflection on the peacebuilding framework, and the GFA itself, as people feel intimidated into accepting this negative peace. Thus, just as Northern Ireland’s conflict was once marked by stalemate, civil society leaders suggest that Northern Ireland’s peace is also one marked by stalemate. Third, a major concern for civil society leaders in Northern Ireland today, is what they consider a serious lack of attention being paid to lingering issues and traumas from the Troubles. One of the more glaring issues with the GFA is its lack of genuine attention on the issue of legacy of the past, and this was repeatedly pointed out by participants of this study. The ongoing traumas of yesterday have been left untouched for too long, and they have festered into an open wound that is poisoning the peace process of today (NIO, 2019). As one civil society leader compared the willful ignoring of legacy issues to taking the “scenic route around the dead,” the clear understanding from those throughout the sector is that taking the scenic route is no longer a viable option. If the peace process is to have any chance of moving meaningfully forward towards positive peace, the legacy issues must be met head-on and addressed now, rather than later on down the road. Otherwise, civil society leaders argue that Northern Ireland will continue to languish in a state of negative peace. 257

Finally, as participants were invited to take a more focused look into the future, it is clear that optimism is not the predominant feeling in the minds of civil society leaders. This finding represents a serious alarm bell for all of those invested in the Northern Ireland peace process, as those individuals at the frontlines of being tasked with delivering on grassroots peacebuilding, are the ones that struggle the most to find optimism in the current climate. Where small pockets of hope do exist, continued support must be given to nurture these embers and stoke them into a society-wide flame of peace opportunities. Doubting the ability of the political apparatus to deliver an effective framework of peacebuilding moving forward, civil society leaders recognize the necessity of civil society to continue to fill in the gaps created by an ineffective political executive and embrace locally led and emancipatory peace processes moving forward (Leonardsson & Rudd, 2015).

10.2.5 Improving the Good Friday Agreement and moving Northern Ireland forward The final empirical chapter, Chapter 9, focuses more squarely upon the framework of the GFA itself. Study participants were encouraged to think specifically about the peacemaking process and reflect on the product of that process (the GFA) and what the peace agreement has truly meant in the post-accord period. GFA shortcomings, potential changes to the GFA, and the meaningfulness of the GFA over two decades into its existence were all key areas of analysis for civil society leaders within this study. An initial point of reflection on the peacemaking process offered by civil society leaders, was the fact that there was a general desire to avoid many of the challenging issues on the table in the lead up to the birth of the GFA. Specifically, peacemakers shied away from highly charged topics like Bloody Sunday, how to handle remembrance, legacy (as discussed in Chapter 8), and even policing, which was shifted off to an independent inquiry. Part of this avoidance was certainly necessary to get the GFA across the finish line, as is the case in any peacemaking process within divided societies (Kossler, 2018). However, civil society leaders are quick to question whether or not too much was ignored in the Northern Ireland peacemaking process. Key successes were certainly made, and the GFA does deserve celebration for its accomplishments, yet as certain oversights are still lingering today, civil society leaders highlight these frustrations when reflecting back on the pre-agreement period. 258

Second, in offering their reflections and critiques on the GFA itself, civil society leaders provide indispensable insight which is included within this study. The GFA did make a difference, there is no question on that matter. In many ways, it forced cooperation at a time when many truly believed that was an impossible feat within Northern Ireland. However, as the GFA is celebrating anniversaries of its signing of twenty plus years, many of its imperfections are breaking through its once shiny veneer. Civil society leaders argue that the GFA was built too heavily upon the idea of “constructive ambiguity.” The ambiguous framework was highly useful in the “selling” of the GFA to both the PUL and the CNR communities along a variety of issues and interest areas. However, that ambiguous framework has proven to be a nightmare when it comes to implementation. As useful as the constructive ambiguity was in 1998, it is equally (if not more so) as destructive twenty plus years into implementation efforts. By engaging in an imaginative exercise where participants were asked to envision themselves being the last ones to touch the GFA, allowing them to make any changes they wished, civil society leaders revealed many unique ideas based on their wealth of experience working at the grassroots peacebuilding level. Offering these changes does not mean the participants are rejecting the GFA outright, though several participants did hold that stance, rather it is about recognizing areas of improvement after working for decades in its shadow. Ideas offered ranged from structural reforms of focusing on non-binary institutions (a rejection of consociational ideals that define the GFA), ensuring higher levels of implementation, more UK and Ireland oversight, and heightened review mechanisms to ensure more consistent upgrades and changes to the GFA over the years. Additionally, nearly all participants suggested they would have liked to see more direct provisions for key issues that were left unaddressed or under-addressed within the GFA. These include a focus on legacy issues, more direct paths of reintegration within a DDR framework, and increased protections for human rights. Finally, this study reveals a point of emphasis that is shared collectively throughout civil society in regard to the GFA; it was an agreement for the time, yet certainly not for all time. Despite efforts to develop new peace agendas over the years, such as the Fresh Start Agreement in 2015 (Bowers, et al., 2015), the GFA still stands as the guiding monolith in Northern Ireland’s peace process. Therefore, the GFA should be the focus of continued reviewing and updating. Civil society leaders argue that Northern Ireland is in need of a new peace narrative, which 259 requires new actors and a new language that throws off the sectarian rhetoric of old. Civil society leaders recognize that their voice as a sector is critical in developing this new narrative and they must be willing to levy smart and pointed critiques at the failures and shortcomings of the peace process (and agreements) that have come before them.

10.3 Recommendations for future research Northern Ireland, its history, its conflict, its peace agreement, and its peace, have all been the subject of countless research projects, papers, and books over the years. However, this study reveals that there is still much to be learned by offering a platform to the voices of those at the grassroots level of waging peace. The experience and expertise of civil society leader in Northern Ireland, and in fact all conflict zones, is consistently under appreciated. Based upon the findings of this study, there are several potential paths of continued focus when it comes to Northern Ireland and peace agreement research. What has been made exceedingly clear, is the vital importance of civil society coordination and organization both before and after the development of a peace agreement. A cornerstone of strength for civil society anywhere, is its internal connections. Organization is needed prior to an agreement so that a collective voice for the grassroots can help to influence the nature of the agreement itself. Research must continue in order to better understand how civil society can be engaged throughout the peacemaking process. How exactly do we balance the concern of an overcrowded negotiating table, where peace spoilers are a genuine concern, with the need to incorporate a wide range of voices from across society? That balance is likely to be contextually unique within different conflict zones, which provides further justification for pursuing this research inquiry. The challenge becomes, not only who should be involved in the development of peace agreements, but also how those involved should play a role. While the hurdle of understanding who should be involved is challenging, fully understanding how those parties operate in their unique roles within the peace process becomes an equally tall task. It is not enough that we focus simply on who is at the table, but also how the table will function as a cohesive negotiating unit. Recognizing how the parties interact with one another, and from where they are negotiating, becomes vital to the health of the process. 260

The post conflict period in Northern Ireland revealed just how quickly inclusion of civil society can be pushed aside, as well. The Civic Forum never lived up to its potential and is destined to be one of the biggest (and most impactful) failures of the GFA. Thus, other divided societies need to heed this lesson, and future research must focus on ways to improve civil society engagement in the post-agreement peace process as well. Civil society coordination and cooperation is an ongoing necessity within a peace process, both to influence the peacemaking process and to sustain and safeguard a grassroots voice during the peacebuilding process. Therefore, focus should also be paid to ways of strengthening the internal cohesion of civil society, particularly in the challenging realities of divided societies. This study also reinforces the importance of youth engagement within post-accord societies. Northern Ireland has struggled mightily in this regard, as civil society leaders revealed a number of ongoing issues including youth disengagement in extreme forms (the brain drain). Further research should be devoted to developing new ways to encourage youth engagement in peace processes. The landscape of communication and multimedia use has changed dramatically, even in the last decade. Lessons from the field of communication studies must be incorporated into a modern understanding of youth civic engagement. Understandings of successes elsewhere on social issues, the March For Our Lives organization in the United States for example, can lend considerable insight into ways of increasing youth engagement in post-accord peace processes. There are numerous opportunities for further research on peace funding in post-accord societies as well. Northern Ireland is an interesting case when it comes to the longevity of large- scale funding sources such as the IFI and, specifically, the EU PEACE Programmes. Yet, much uncertainty exists in the continued realities of the EU PEACE Programme in the midst of Brexit. Thus, the nuances of shifting regional dynamics on regional peace funding sources presents an opportunity to gain a clearer understanding of the durability of these types of large-scale peace funding sources. An additional point of research inquiry should center on the proactive role of civil society in mitigating the development of conflict. While considerable research continues as to the peacebuilding capacity of civil society, a challenge still exists in developing our collective ability to quantify the prevention of violence. A civil society that better understands its own violence prevention capabilities will allow for continued proactive peacebuilding efforts, rather than reactive peacebuilding efforts within conflict zones. 261

Finally, the common refrain from civil society leaders in this study was to suggest that the GFA was an agreement for the time, but not all time, and it brings up an important question; not just for Northern Ireland, but in fact conflict zones throughout the world. How does a society move beyond an agreement as popular and influential as the GFA? Research is often focused on the durability of peace agreements, and rightfully so, given their general struggle to survive long- term. Yet far less attention, again, understandably given the small sample size, has been provided to the implications of holding onto an agreement perhaps too long. This study suggests that many of the present-day peace challenges in Northern Ireland can be traced back to shortcomings of the GFA. Understanding how to handle these long-term transitions away from popular peace agreements, in order to ensure a constantly evolving and contextually relevant peace process is ongoing, is vitally important.

10.4 Conclusion What, then, does all of this tell us of the conflict and peace in the North of Ireland? This study illuminates the realities of a peace that is in fact, far from won. The peace process in Northern Ireland has not failed, as much as it has been unable, after decades of vigorous grassroot support, to genuinely succeed. The cities that bookend the train route from Derry/Londonderry to Belfast offer ample evidence of a society that remains in a state of negative peace. And this reality is true in towns and communities throughout Northern Ireland. Yet, Northern Ireland in 2020 is a very, very different place from Northern Ireland in 1998. Thanks to the GFA, peace arrived in Northern Ireland at the end of the 20th century. It marked a turning point in a bloody conflict that claimed thousands of lives. And yet, over twenty years later, as the peace has spread from Belfast to Armagh; from Magherafelt to Derry/Londonderry, and everywhere in between, a question has bubbled up with increasing vigor, “is this the best peace we can manage”? For many, it is not feelings of celebration that they feel each year on the anniversary of the GFA, but rather frustration. It is a short road to conflict and a long road to peace; that is the unfortunate reality that those in conflict zones throughout the world come to realize in their peacebuilding endeavors. Is there optimism amongst civil society leaders in Northern Ireland? Yes…but it is not what it may initially appear. The optimists, at least those that can muster such a self-title, do not 262 see their optimism born out of hope, but rather a strained sense of obligation. They are, after all, the front-line soldiers on the battlefield of peace. If they cannot be optimistic, who will be? That at least, is part of the realities they face in an environment that sees their mettle tested relentlessly. Many of their colleagues have lost that obligatory battle already. Their optimism after twenty years of “peace” has faded like the rolling green hills of the Irish countryside, along the shores of the Causeway coast. They trudge on, not out of optimistic hope, but an engrained sense of duty, realizing they just may represent the thin veil between the negative peace and no peace at all. And yet still, opportunities exist in Northern Ireland and elsewhere, to invigorate peace processes with the voices of those at the grassroots of peacebuilding efforts. As a discipline, PACS researchers, scholars, peacebuilders, and practitioners somehow seem to continue to be guilty of the same follies over and over again in our pursuit of understanding, when it comes to Northern Ireland. The political realities, even as stagnant as they are, continue to dominate our focus. And once again, just like in the heart of the conflict in the 1960s and 1970s, just like in the push for peace during the 1980s and the 1990s, and just like the post-accord period of tending the peace after the turn of the millennium, a crucial voice has been underappreciated and criminally marginalized. This is the voice of civil society. And this study seeks to aid in rectifying this repeated silencing. Undoubtedly, Northern Ireland and the GFA offer lessons to be learned for other divided societies engaged (presently, or in the future) in a peacemaking process. Yet, this is not to say that Northern Ireland, with its peacemaking process behind it, is left without a course for change. When it comes to specific, prescriptive change solutions for Northern Ireland today, aimed at assisting in efforts to better embrace positive peace outcomes of the peacebuilding process, two particularly salient ideas are advanced. The first source of change exists within civil society itself. As discussed in Chapter 5 (section 5.5), the sector itself needs to embrace a new conceptualization of its role within the peace process in Northern Ireland. Rather than recognizing the role of civil society to be purely (or even primarily) about service delivery of peacebuilding efforts, the sector must embrace a more active leadership role in guiding the direction of the peacebuilding process. With the most 263 direct knowledge of issues impacting citizens at the grassroots level, civil society has critical knowledge regarding the needs of communities. Part of embracing this “co-leadership” approach is certainly connected to capacity building in the sector, particularly from a policy perspective. Civil society must foster a cohort of leaders that not only have the capacity to engage in policy analysis and development (Evans and Wellstead, 2013; Howlett, et al., 2014), but also feels comfortable in doing so within Northern Ireland. It is likely that many such leaders already exist, but they must now be supported by the sector. This will mean turning away from the notion that critiques and challenges levied at the GFA are done so in an “anti-peace” nature, which has long been the status quo perception. A sector that embraces critical analysis of the peace process and the peace agreement that is in place, will play a key role in supporting the further development of these policy contributors arising from the sector. Second, there must also be specific changes within the state apparatus as well. This prescriptive solution is largely based out of the creative ideas offered by participants in section 9.4 and is also based in the conclusions arising from Chapter 5 (sections 5.2 and 5.3). It is quite clear that the current and future success of the peacebuilding endeavor in Northern Ireland requires an active and engaged civil society. The state apparatus must open more space for collaboration and contributions from civil society in order to build a truly holistic peace process. An immediate solution would be to re-implement the Civic Forum today. In this sense, the GFA actually does offer a prescriptive solution that has simply failed to materialize due to poor implementation. However, there should be considerable adjustments made to the Civic Forum as envisioned in the GFA in order to make it more robust to the instability that has long plagued the Northern Ireland political sector. A robust mechanism for civil society engagement and contribution within the political sector is critical. If the political sector in Northern Ireland is serious about safeguarding the peace progress made over the last three decades and pushing that peace process forward, the state apparatus must make room for civil society through a mechanism in the same vein as the Civic Forum. In this sense, the peace process must become something that it has largely failed to be over the last three decades; a collaborative process. The state apparatus must open space to engage with civil society as partners, genuine co-collaborators, for positive peace to be an achievable goal in Northern Ireland. 264

By creating space for new voices to tell their stories and share their ideas, peace processes can embrace an organic evolution into an effort that is locally led and contextually responsive. The longer we close off the peacemaking and peacebuilding processes to those at the top, the greater risk we run of peace agreements living at the upper echelons of the political system and dying at the grassroots of the peacebuilding process. The everyday peacebuilders provide the lifeblood for peace agreements and peacebuilding agendas. When the discourse is deprived of this blood, any subsequent agreement is bound to wither and die leaving a conflict ravaged society reeling in the wake of a failed peace process. This terrible fate can be avoided, but it means changing the way we view peace. Peace and conflict are not simply opposites on either side of a coin. Genuine peace is a departure from division, exclusion, and rigidity. Embracing peace means learning a new language of acceptance, understanding, and flexibility. Peace is not an either-or equation. Truly holistic peace is capable of holding the complexities of the past, the challenges of the present, and the opportunities of the future.

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Appendix 1 – Study Invitation Script

Introductory Phone/Email Communication Script to New Participants

Hello, my name is Brett Mallon. I am a PhD candidate in Peace and Conflict Studies at the University of Manitoba based in Winnipeg, Canada. Your name was mentioned by your colleagues in civil society as someone that would be beneficial to speak with regarding research I am conducting. I am currently undertaking an in-depth case study on the design and implementation of the Belfast Agreement in Northern Ireland. More specifically, my project aims to develop a deeper understanding of the role civil society can, and/or should, contribute to the design of peace agreements. You have been identified by your peers as an important member of civil society within Northern Ireland and I am wondering if you would be interested in meeting with me to discuss my study? If you would be interested in taking part in this research, I would sit down with you for an interview that would last between 60 to 90 minutes. Your privacy and confidentiality are of my utmost concern and will be protected throughout. If you have any questions at all, about myself or the study, I’m happy to answer them for you. Thank you for taking the time to speak with me.

Introductory Phone/Email Communication Script to Existing Contacts

Hello, I am currently undertaking an in-depth case study on the design and implementation of the Belfast Agreement in Northern Ireland. More specifically, my project aims to develop a deeper understanding of the role civil society can, and/or should, contribute to the design of peace agreements. As an important member of civil society within Northern Ireland, I am wondering if you would be interested in meeting with me to discuss my study? If you would be interested in taking part in this research, I would sit down with you for an interview that would last between 60 to 90 minutes. Your privacy and confidentiality are of my utmost concern and will be protected throughout. If you have any questions at all, about myself or the study, I’m happy to answer them for you. Additionally, I am interested in recruiting more participants in Northern Ireland to be included within my study. If you believe there are other members of civil society who would be beneficial for me to include in this study, I would welcome your suggestions. Thank you for taking the time to speak with me.

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Appendix 2 – Informed Consent

Informed Consent 1

Informed Consent

Research Project Title: The Pieces to Peace: Analyzing the role of civil society in the design and implementation of the Good Friday Agreement

Principle Research: Brett M. Mallon Contact: (204) 391 -6849 ,

Research Supervisor: Dr. Sean Byrne

This consent form, a copy of which will be left with you for your records and reference, is only part of the process of informed consent. It should give you the basic id ea of what the research is about and what your participation will involve. If you would like more detail about something mentioned here, or information not included here, you should feel free to ask. Please take the time to read this carefully and to under stand any accompanying information.

1 . Description of the study This research is part of the requirements for a PhD in Peace and Conflict Studies at the University of Manitoba. The purpose of this project is to improve our collective ability to design m ore effective and robust peace agreements in order to promote positive peace and reduce the prospect of conflict recurrence in the post -accord period of intrastate conflict. More specifically, this project develops a deeper understanding of the role civil society can, and/or should, contribute to t he design of peace agreements.

2 . Study procedures Your participation in this study consists of a face - to -face interview lasting between 60 and 90 minutes. The interview will operate more generally as an infor mal conversation around your experiences and knowledge within civil society in Northern Ireland. The conversation will be an opportunity to consider the successes and challenges of the peace process over the last two decades.

3 . Recording d evices With y our permission, the researcher will employ the use of an audio recorder and also handwritten notes during the interview.

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4. Potential benefits of participation Participation in this study provides an opportunity to discuss your work within civil society and explore the success and challenges you’ve experienced. The knowledge and expertise you lend to this study will help to address key gaps in our understanding of the role civil society can, and should, play throughout peace processes.

5. Potential risks of participation It is not anticipated that your participation in this study will pose any risk, either personally or professionally. Your identity will be safely guarded, so that you may feel free to speak openly during the interview. If at any time, before, during, or after the interview that you wish to withdraw from the study for any reason, you will be supported in this decision by the researcher fully.

6. Confidentiality Your privacy and security are of paramount importance. Your name and any identifying information will be kept in a secure manner within a password-protected codebook and used only as a reference for the primary researcher throughout the study. Your name will not be used in any field notes, written drafts, or published materials. All sensitive information, including email correspondence, field notes, audio recordings, and codebooks will be kept in a locked or password protected container, which will only be accessible to the primary researcher. All data will be destroyed within three years of the completion of the study (no later than December of 2021).

7. Voluntary participation and withdrawal Your participation in this study is entirely voluntary. If you wish to withdraw from this study at any time, you may do so without any consequence. You may simply email the primary researcher at the email address provided at the top of this form with your desire to withdraw. You are not required to answer any specific question, or discuss a topic that you are uncomfortable with during the interview. Feel free to ask any questions before, during, or after the interview if you would like clarification about the interview itself or the study in general. You may withdraw at any time, up until the submission of the primary researcher’s thesis (expected submission is August of 2018).

8. Debriefing and feedback At the conclusion of the interview, we will have a short conversation about your thoughts on the interview itself. After the data from the study has been analyzed, the researcher will provide you with a summary of the results by mail or email and you will have an opportunity to provide feedback at that time as well. This summary can be expected within six months following the time of the interview.

9. Dissemination of results The results of the data will be included in the researcher’s PhD thesis. Publication of the thesis either in part or in whole as a book or within academic journals may also occur. Your confidentially will be maintained at all times throughout these publications.

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10. Confidential data destruction All confidential data, such as audio recordings, field notes, and personal information will be destroyed within three years after the completion of the study. At no time during this period will your confidential data be exposed to anyone other than the primary researcher.

Your signature on this form indicates that you have understood to your satisfaction the information regarding participation in the research project and agree to participate as a subject. In no way does this waive your legal rights nor release the researchers, sponsors, or involved institutions from their legal and professional responsibilities. You are free to withdraw from the study at any time, and /or refrain from answering any questions you prefer to omit, without prejudice or consequence. Your continued participation should be as informed as your initial consent, so you should feel free to ask for clarification or new information throughout your participation.

The University of Manitoba may look at your research records to see that the research is being done in a safe and proper way.

This research has been approved by the Joint Faculty Research Ethics Board. If you have any concerns or complaints about this project you may contact any of the above-named persons or the Human Ethics Coordinator at email address: [email protected] or phone number: 204-474-7122. A copy of this consent form has been given to you to keep for your records and reference.

I give permission for the interview to be audio recorded (check one): YES _____ NO _____

Participant’s Signature ______Date ______

Researcher and/or Delegate’s Signature ______Date ______

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Appendix 3 – Interview Questions

1. How would you describe your (professional) relationship with the political apparatus in Northern Ireland? Do you feel you, as a member and leader of civil society, have a voice and an impact when it comes to policy development in Northern Ireland?

2. In what ways has the Belfast Agreement been conducive to the grassroots peace process? Additionally, how has the Belfast Agreement been an impediment to the grassroots peace process?

3. Aside from the discussion around the Civic Forum, the Belfast Agreement is essentially void of discussion on civil society involvement in the peace process. How do you feel this lack of inclusion has impacted the role of civil society in the peace building process? For instance, has it been positive by providing freedom? Or has it been negative in providing a lack of direction and/or oversight for civil society?

4. Imagine you are the final person to touch the Belfast Agreement, with complete assurance your adjustments would be approved; what would you add to the agreement to have made your involvement in the peacebuilding process easier over the course of the last few decades?

5. What do you believe the role of civil society should be in a post-accord peacebuilding process, like Northern Ireland?