Can a New Universality Be Created out of the Chinese Concept of Tianxia?

Home , Gan Yang, Gu Yanwu, Tianxia, Xu Jilin

December 2014. No.3 / pp.25-52

In-jae SONG*1

Abstract Since China has begun to emerge as great global power, many Chinese intellectuals have been trying to establish a theoretical framework for a new universality which accords with the ‘Chinese Way,’ and they have often drawn inspiration from China’s long history. The concept of tianxia (天下, All-under- Heaven) has been an especially productive source for intellectuals hoping to design an alternative world system based on universal values. Xu Jilin criticizes the discourse of Chinese particularity, and suggests a fresh understanding of tianxia in which a new universality is constructed from great civilizational power. Zhao Tingyang idealizes the tianxia system of the Zhou (周) Dynasty as a model of communal reciprocity acting to promote the general welfare, and suggests that this kind of tianxia system offers an alternative system for today’s world which can better deal with problems caused by conflicting interests. Gan Chunsong also addresses problems with the current world order, especially conflicts caused by the Hobbesian pursuit of narrow and selfish interests by nation-states. His alternative approach is also based on traditional values, specifically wangdao (王道) and tianxia, which imply morality and universal humanity. All these discourses of a new universality revive the ancient notion of tianxia, reinterpreting it in terms of tolerance, reciprocity and universal humanity, and hence they propose tianxia as the foundation of their new universality. Historical tradition, however, is not sufficient to construct any such alternative universality, and is also most unlikely to achieve a global consensus. Furthermore, there is a leap of logic in the argument that a long historical tradition necessarily implies that the associated values are superior. These discourses are also susceptible to the charge of excessive idealism, and, despite their theme of tolerance, they remain limited by the premise that all the members of an imperial system must acknowledge the current order. An alternative universality cannot be created through the rediscovery of historical legacies or memories. This will

* 송인재, Hallym University 26 _ CONCEPTS AND CONTEXTS IN EAST ASIA (No.3 December 2014)

only be possible when China squarely faces up to the reality of current circumstances, and reaches out to form a consensus with other countries struggling with similar problems.

Keywords tianxia, universality, civilization, world order, Chinese Dream

The Chinese Dream

The growth of China as seen today readily evokes the image of ‘empire,’ and indeed for China, empire is both its past and present reality. China not only maintained an empire in its premodern past but is the only present-day state that retains within its current boundaries most of the territory of its premodern empire. Thus, for the Chinese, empire is a symbol of their glorious past. There are also some Western scholars who firmly believe that China is destined to lead the world in the future, and within China, the opinion that the Chinese experience should be promoted as a new developmental model has gained more weight since the Beijing Olympics. There is a vision to extend the influence of this Chinese path or model to the entire world, replacing the universality established by the modern Western world with a ‘new universality’ inspired by China. Previously, the understanding of China as a ‘civilization’ rather than a ‘state’ went hand in hand with the negative perception of China as being unable to form a ‘modern nation-state’ and thus incapable of adapting to the ‘Western universality.’ Nowadays, however, to say that China is not a state but a civilization has positive connotations, since this implies that the civilization created by China need not be limited to its territory but can have a truly universal resonance throughout the wider world. In such sentiments it is possible to discern the dream of a rejuvenated empire, and to identify Chinese aspirations on a global scale. At this moment in time, when the world is watching the revival of China with great interest, the leaders of the Communist Party of China have promulgated a new and meaningful slogan: ‘The Chinese Dream.’1

1 For Xi Jinping’s speech on the Chinese Dream, and the slogans put forth by other Chinese leaders, see Cho (2013), pp.19-27. Can a New Universality Be Created out of the Chinese Concept of Tianxia? _ 27

This neologism was coined by General Secretary Xi Jinping, who became the leader of the People’s Republic in November 2012, following the 18th National Congress of the Communist Party of China, as part of the fifth generation of Chinese leaders. Although it may appear at first to be a run-of-the-mill slogan, in fact, it contains a great depth of meaning. It is highly significant that Xi Jinping talked about the Chinese Dream during his first public speech, made in the presence of the seven members of the 18th Politburo of the Communist Party of China and broadcast live on television throughout China. He declared the Chinese Dream to be “achieving the great rejuvenation of the Chinese nation,” and spoke of it as the long-cherished ambition of many generations of the Chinese people. He urged individuals to work boldly, assiduously and collectively to fulfill this dream, and expressed his firm belief that it would be realized by the 100th anniversary of the founding of the People’s Republic (2049). By comparing the Chinese Dream with the slogans promulgated by other Chinese paramount leaders, and examining them in conjunction with developments in Chinese modern history, it is possible to gain insights into the current situation in China, as well as the thinking of its leaders. Around the time that the ‘reform and opening’ policies were introduced, Deng Xiaoping identified hunger and poverty as the greatest problems facing China, and expressed his desire to help the many Chinese people who had been impoverished by the Great Leap Forward and the Cultural Revolution. Jiang Zemin, heading the third generation of leaders of the People’s Republic, promoted the notion of China as a responsible world power and also the ‘Three Represents’ theory. Hu Jintao, leading the fourth generation, set forth the ideas of peaceful development and a harmonious socialist society. The recent leaders of China have used the concept of a ‘moderately prosperous society’ (小康社會), which originally comes from the ‘Liyun’ chapter of the Book of Rites (禮記) to refer to a society in which economic prosperity is sufficient to meet the essential needs of the people. However, since Xi Jinping has also expressed the hope that this kind of moderately prosperous society can be comprehensively achieved by 2021, the 100th anniversary of the founding of the Chinese Communist Party, it is clear that this vision of society, as first espoused by Deng Xiaoping for the modernization of Chinese socialism, has yet to be realized. Actually, all of Deng’s successors, during their tenure as General Secretary, have coined slogans which address the country’s most pressing needs to bring together the efforts of the Chinese people. ‘A 28 _ CONCEPTS AND CONTEXTS IN EAST ASIA (No.3 December 2014) responsible world power’ and ‘peaceful development’ are slogans that represent China’s suddenly elevated position in the world. The ‘Three Represents’ theory went in hand with the transition of the Communist Party of China from a revolutionary party to a ruling party, while the idea of a ‘harmonious socialist society’ was intended to overcome the negative side-effects of reform, and to strengthen social cohesion. But now China’s circumstances have markedly improved―after weathering the recent global financial crisis and successfully hosting the 2008 Olympics, and being now recognized as an economic power whose global influence is only rivaled by the US―the head of the People’s Republic’s fifth generation of leaders, Xi Jinping, is now in a position to speak about the dream of China’s rejuvenation. Following the policies of reform and opening, China’s intellectuals were quick to take advantage of the freedoms which the new direction of the Chinese state made available. Official policies brought an end to traditional taboos concerning permitted sources of knowledge, allowing intellectuals to break away from Marxist thought and look towards new resources, upon which their opinions regarding China’s future path were based. A great variety of views were put forward, with some receiving widespread support and others subject to vigorous dispute. There were even some who expressed opinions in stark opposition to the government’s official stance, either temporarily or irrevocably. There has also been a gradually developing trend amongst Chinese intellectuals in which they rediscover Chinese traditional thought and use it to make pertinent commentaries on the current state of the nation and its development. In fact, as far back as the 1980s, when Chinese traditions that had previously been suppressed by the Cultural Revolution were reinstated, ‘the great revival of the Chinese people’ was promoted as a slogan by some scholars who sought to distil the best from Chinese traditional thought and combine it with Marxism, seeking a ‘creative synthesis’ of the two.2 It can only imagined how happy Zhang Dainian (1902-2004), one of the main proponents of this approach, would have been with Xi Jinping’s speech. The creative synthesis of the 1980s was an attempt to reclaim a part of China’s traditional thoughts, which at the time were undergoing a revival; it also represented an intent to actively engage in the process of

2 For a further examination of this ‘creative synthesis,’ see Song (2010), pp.193-228. Can a New Universality Be Created out of the Chinese Concept of Tianxia? _ 29 modernization, which had yet to be realized. In contrast, the recent discourse concerning China’s future direction has dealt with the issue of how to keep going forward: how to move beyond the developments that have occurred since 2000. A key theme in this discourse has been the attempt to find a new universality to replace the Western universality which was forced upon the Chinese after their defeat in the Opium Wars. Although the main contributors to this discourse come from a variety of different areas of study and hold differing political positions, their arguments are all based upon China’s historical memories and its traditional values. Moreover, this discourse is not only concerned with China but encompasses the entire world, since its purpose is to come up with a new and alternative form of universality to replace the prevailing Western universality. At this juncture, when it is possible to witness America’s decline side by side with China’s revival, the attempt by China to develop a new universal vision based on its own experiences and values has also been understood as a discourse emerging from Chinese imperialism. It is more appropriate, however, to replace the concept of imperialism with that of tianxia, which has a traditional cultural and historical provenance.3 This tianxia is thoroughly imbued with historical memories and traditional values, and naturally comprehends a universal vision. Chinese intellectuals have come to reinterpret tianxia from various perspectives but they generally use the concept to promote a universality that is not limited to the Chinese nation-state. There are some for whom the concept of tianxia evokes notions of the past glory of the Chinese empire, and these have been quick to express caution about this discourse of empire based on China’s historical and cultural traditions. They point out that the dream expressed by the tianxia concept remains a Chinese Dream alone, which has not taken root in the wider world. Is it indeed possible, as Chinese intellectuals claim, for this ‘new idea’ of tianxia to become established as a truly universal vision? Can this ideal ever be realized? Or will it remain the purely Chinese Dream of the ‘great revival of the Chinese people’ as just an issue for Chinese politicians? In order to address these questions, the traditional concept of tianxia and its interpretation by Chinese intellectuals will be examined in the rest of this paper. There will also be a discussion of

3 See Lee (2014), pp.483-484. The Chinese discourse on empire discussed in this book refers to Wang Hui’s discussion on the Tibet issue and Gan Yang’s ‘civilization-state’ theory. 30 _ CONCEPTS AND CONTEXTS IN EAST ASIA (No.3 December 2014) whether the Chinese Dream, which has been conjured up by reinterpreting traditional concepts, is really a new idea, and the ambiguities and contradictions which arise from these reinterpretations will be analyzed.

The Tianxia Concept in Traditional Times

This section considers the traditional understanding of the tianxia concept. The term has been used since ancient times in China, and although it contains a specific meaning in the context of historical or conceptual studies, it is also widely used in a general sense to mean ‘the world.’ For the ancient Chinese, the term tianxia was generally used to refer to the known world, with its meaning being later extended to refer to the entire world. Several categories of meaning have thus been derived from the tianxia concept. Firstly, due to the special meaning that tian (天, heaven) has within Chinese thought, the tianxia concept embodies both a geographical meaning and another meaning related to the system of governance. The tianxia concept must be understood in relation to tian, since whenever the world is referred to as tianxia, the concept of tian must be considered fundamental. In the past, tian was seen to be the root of all order; accordingly, the space that was universally ruled by the principles of this order was referred to as tianxia. The ruler was called the tianxi (天子, son of the heaven) and he was seen to be provided with the tianming (天命, mandate of the heaven), according to which he ruled. The geographical dimension of the ancient tianxia concept was also influenced by the principles of the system of governance. Specifically, tianxia referred to the area under the control of the Western Zhou Dynasty, which, according to their philosophical innovations, had received the tianming. What is important here is the fact that the tianxia ruled by the Western Zhou was not just inhabited by a single ethnic group but included the territories of various distinct ethnic groups who maintained relationships with the Zhou central government. In the past, those who administered the tianxia dealt with this hybrid character of the tianxia by dreaming of ‘unification into one’ (一統), which was expressed in ancient times, by the unified dynasties of Qin and Han China, through the establishment of a common system of numbers and a single calendar (曆數). In addition, the establishment of a system of prefectures and counties made it possible to Can a New Universality Be Created out of the Chinese Concept of Tianxia? _ 31 engage the countries situated beyond the direct control of the central dynasty within relations of investiture and tribute, thereby bringing them within the boundaries of the tianxia. As a result, the tianxia concept also came to represent the traditional understanding of Sino-foreign (華夷) relations, which continued until the 19th century when this type of perception was destroyed by the incursions of the West. The tianxia order can be understood as combining hybridity with a core-periphery structure. Be it the feudalism of Western Zhou or the great unification of Qin and Han or indeed the system of tribute, all were possible because there existed a central dynasty which had received tianming and thus held the sovereignty of the tianxia, and which maintained an interactive relationship with other members of the system. The traditional meaning of tianxia can also be approached from a moral perspective. The tianming philosophy, which regarded the concept of tian as the source of all values, effectively imbued the notion of tianxia ― originally a geographical concept representing a ruled territory―with a moral meaning. This was also true for Confucianism, which inherited the tianming philosophy along with a belief that tian provided the principles of governance and was the source of the law. According to this worldview, tianxia refers to the boundaries within which the ruler carries out tiandao (天道, the way of the heaven), in other words, moral governance.4 During the period of the Zhou Dynasty the central actor was the Zhou court, but with the establishment of the unified empires it was the state that carried out this moral governance.5 According to Liu Chingfeng and Chin Kuantao, the traditional

4 Examples from discussions found in the Analects of Confucius and in the Mencius in which tianxia is provided with a moral meaning include the following: “When right principles prevail in the kingdom, there will be no discussions among the common people.” (天下有道, 則庶人不議) from the ‘Ji Shi’ chapter of the Analects and “When right government prevails in the kingdom, princes of little virtue are submissive to those of great, and those of little worth to those of great. When bad government prevails in the kingdom, princes of small power are submissive to those of great, and the weak to the strong. Both these cases are the rule of Heaven. They who accord with Heaven are preserved, and they who rebel against Heaven perish.” (天下有道, 小德役大德, 小賢役大賢. 天下無道, 小役大, 弱役强. 斯二者, 天也, 順天者存, 逆天者亡) from the ‘Li Lou I’ chapter of the Mencius. In these examples, tianxia refers to both the kingdom and the area in which a moral order has been established. For more on the moral elements of tianxia, see Jin and Liu (2006), p.108. 5 Jin Guantao and Liu Qingfeng regard tianxia as achieving its definition through the state. See Jin and Liu (2006). 32 _ CONCEPTS AND CONTEXTS IN EAST ASIA (No.3 December 2014) perception of tianxia, as determined by Confucianism, has the following three characteristics. Firstly, it has no fixed geographical boundaries nor is it limited to one specific ethnic group. Therefore, if Confucian morals are adopted by any group, then they can be included in the tianxia community; and likewise, non-Han ethnic groups can also become a member of the huaxia (華夏) community. Secondly, as tianxia refers to the area in which rule is undertaken according to the Confucian moral order, the stratification stipulated by the Confucian moral code must be adopted, which includes participation in the investiture and tribute system with the central dynasty. Thirdly, the tianxia is a moral community, and thus sovereignty lies with the highest leader of that moral community. Within the framework of this moral conception of tianxia, which consists of notions of great unification and of the investiture and tribute system, the state that is responsible for the actual running of the tianxia can become conceptually detached from it. This line of thought is represented by Gu Yanwu (顧炎武, 1613-1682) in his Rizhilu (日知錄):

What is the difference between the subjugation of a dynasty (亡國) and the subjugation of the tianxia (亡天下)? The subjugation of a dynasty is a change in family names and in the name of the dynasty, while the subjugation of the tianxia is the stoppage of humanity and righteousness, resulting in the herding of animals to eat humans or the eating of humans by other humans.

As can be seen here, the standards that determine the existence of the tianxia are not the same as those for the state, and it was Gu Yanwu’s opinion that the existence of the tianxia was dependent upon humanity and morals. With the establishment of the Ming Dynasty, Neo-Confucianism came to be adopted as the political philosophy of the Joseon Dynasty and of Japan. The associated tianxia concept was also naturally transmitted to these countries, modifying their prevailing understanding of tianxia. In Japan, during the five hundred years preceding the adoption of Neo- Confucianism, tianxia had been used to express the world order, but this tianxia was a concept unrelated to the feudalist system of China. It referred rather to the area governed by the sovereign (天皇), so that for the Japanese, their tianxia was the little world consisting of the Japanese Archipelago. The subsequent introduction of Confucian ethics brought Can a New Universality Be Created out of the Chinese Concept of Tianxia? _ 33 about the belief that the tiandao (天道) could be reincarnated, and con- comitantly the notion that ruling dynasties could be replaced. Moreover, the moral superiority that the Japanese believed they had over the Chinese resulted in Japan, rather than China, being perceived as the center of tianxia.6 According to Jin Guantao and Liu Qingfeng, such Japan-centric conceptions of tianxia later developed into the notion that Japan was the center of East Asia, thereby becoming the philosophical basis for the idea of the ‘Greater East Asia Co-prosperity Sphere.’ In the case of the Joseon Dynasty, following the collapse of the Ming Dynasty there arose an understanding of the tianxia concept, from a moral perspective, in which Joseon was regarded as the only legitimate successor of China (Zhonghua). In the 19th century, through the process of signing treaties with the Western nations and with Japan, Joseon aspired to become part of the system of nation-states, and it also made some attempts at modernization by involving the Japanese. However, as the power of Japan increased, Joseon responded by requesting Chinese assistance with its domestic affairs, utilizing the traditional relations of tribute. This move brought about a collision between China and Japan, and the Sino-Japanese War that resulted ultimately brought about the collapse of the traditional Chinese notion of tianxia. The shock of its successive defeats by the West and by Japan prompted China to devote new attention to the notion of the nation-state, rather than to tianxia. In 1900, Liang Qichao deplored the fact that the Chinese were confusing the state with the court and that they did not know what a state was. In his words: “The state is formed through the collective of the people. Who is the owner of the state? It is the people belonging to the state.”7 He regarded the establishment of a nation-state, to replace the idea of tianxia, as the most urgent task of the time. An awareness of the outside world was becoming established in China following the introduction of geographic knowledge from the West, notably from Matteo Ricci’s ‘Kunyu

6 The Japan-centric conception of the tianxia was proposed by Yamaga Soko (山鹿素行, 1622- 1685). Japan was perceived to be situated at the center of the tianxia because only in Japan did the sovereign always come from a single blood line. By contrast, in the case of the dynasties of China a change in family names took place approximately 30 times, and in the Korean Peninsula a change in family names occurred four times within two dynasties. See Jin and Liu (2006). 7 “Zhongguojiruosuyuanlun” (中國積弱溯源論) [On the Root of China’s Old Weakness] in Liang (1900), pp.15-16. 34 _ CONCEPTS AND CONTEXTS IN EAST ASIA (No.3 December 2014)

Wanguo Quantu’ (坤輿萬國全圖); and some forward-thinking intellectuals of the time sought to share this information. However, the traditional tianxia concept suffered a comprehensive collapse as a result of the existential crisis facing the Qing Dynasty. This change in the perception of the tianxia concept was about far more than geographic dimensions: it represented an awareness of a new world order, and this awareness was expressed through an urgent desire to construct a new collective entity so as to ensure the continued existence of China. As can be seen from the above discussion, the tianxia concept in traditional China encompassed several distinct meanings pertaining to geography, system of governance, and morality. Geographically, it was initially limited to central China (i.e. to the area controlled by Western Zhou) but after unification by the Qin and Han empires, it came to refer to the area directly ruled by these empires. At the same time, tianxia also referred to the area in which the governing system of these empires held sway. A key feature of this governing system was its hybrid character, comprising various ethnic groups and cultures; and the philosophical basis which sustained this system was Confucian morality. As soon as the tianxia concept travelled beyond China, however, it began to experience fissure. New understandings of tianxia gained ground in Japan and Joseon, and there was continuing encroachment by the Western powers, leading ultimately to the collapse of the traditional tianxia concept, which could therefore no longer support the notion of supremacy within East Asia. Accordingly, Liang Qichao came to regard the nation-state, and not tianxia, as the value system which China most urgently needed for its future.

The Rediscovery of Tianxia and Chinese New Contemplation of Universality At this moment in time, when a century has passed since the Xinhai Revolution and the first steps towards the establishment of a modern nation-state, and when China is reaping the rewards of reform and opening with development at an astonishing rate, its intellectuals are searching for a vision that goes beyond Liang Qichao’s dream. Now that China, as a nation-state, is experiencing prosperity and revival, they are pursuing a conception that can go beyond the nation-state and incorporate the entire Can a New Universality Be Created out of the Chinese Concept of Tianxia? _ 35 world. A common feature of these intellectuals is to be critical of the current world order and global trends, while at the same time promoting a Chinese vision that uses historical memory as a philosophical resource. This section considers three modes of thought according to which the tianxia concept has been reinterpreted by Chinese intellectuals, and the corresponding attempts to formulate a Chinese vision that can become a new universality, thus replacing the current world-system and values.

1) Neo-Tianxiaism : Seeking a New Universal Civilization First to be examined is Xu Jilin’s (許紀霖, 1957-) discourse on the tianxia concept. As a modern Chinese thinker and scholar, Xu Jilin has discussed issues such as the intellectual roots of modern Chinese liberalism, the new form of democracy to be realized in China, and enlightenment values and the revival of the intellectuals.8 Through his theoretical explorations, he has discussed the ways in which China, as an economic superpower, can take on the mantle of a great civilization. It is from this critical perspective that he considers the concepts of ‘civilization’ and tianxia, summoning relevant historical memories as appropriate. Xu Jilin argues that the Chinese should not focus on that which is specific to only to China but should seek a universality that all of humanity can relate to. Hence he criticizes the ‘Beijing Consensus’ or the ‘Chinese Model’ in which the specific Chinese experience of economic growth which followed the policies of reform and opening are developed and presented as a model.9 He identifies this approach as a kind of historicism and regards it with caution. He presents a lesson from history to warn against the dangers of historicism, a lesson from the opposite pole of enlightenment and universal rationalism: he observes how the German Romanticism of the 19th century, which emerged as a reaction against enlightenment and modernity, eventually resulted in the nationalism of Hitler. Based on this logic, Xu Jilin argues that it is important to pursue fundamental moral values and universal values, rather than the particularity

8 For further reference, see Xu (2013a). The theme of the introduction to the Korean translation of this book happens to be ‘Neo-Tianxiaism.’ 9 For Xu Jilin’s opposition to historicism and his search for universality and civilization, see Song (2012), pp.178-182. 36 _ CONCEPTS AND CONTEXTS IN EAST ASIA (No.3 December 2014) of a people. He relates the ideas of particularity and universality, re- spectively, to the concepts of culture and civilization. Thus, he maintains that in order for China, which has now obtained power and wealth, to be regarded as a truly ‘great nation,’ it is essential to establish its universality, and this requires the emergence of a new ‘civilization’ which contains a modern universality deriving from the universality of the ancient Chinese civilization. In attempting to demonstrate how the status of a ‘great nation’ is dependent upon civilization, Xu Jilin compares the cases of Spain and Portugal with the cases of England and the United States of America: whereas the influence of the former was limited to might, the latter also had social systems, ideas, and values which other nations admired and identified with. Hence he argues that hegemony can only be maintained through the medium of a civilization which embodies universality. He also cites a historical lesson as an example of how hegemony can be maintained in this way, namely the tribute system of Imperial China. Xu Jilin observes that this “was a system of civility which allowed the masses to achieve ‘contentment amidst poverty and pleasure from honest actions’ (安貧樂道) and maintain a balance between the body and mind through acts of kindness.” Xu Jilin supports this pursuit of universality by his reinterpretation of the tianxia concept: for him, the key point of tianxia is not the existence of a specific hegemonic state but the tolerance that lies at the heart of the tianxia perspective. In addition, he does not see the adoption of Western ideas and methods during the early modern period as representing a collapse of the traditional tianxia worldview. Rather, he interprets modern Chinese attempts to obtain, as a means of survival, new forms of knowledge from the ‘barbarian’ West, as representing a change in Sino-foreign relations; he also believes that these represent the manifestation of a new kind of non-exclusive ‘moderate nationalism.’10 This moderate cosmopolitanism―which was simultaneously a kind of nationalism―stood in between extreme nationalism and cosmopolitanism, and this was Xu Jilin’s ‘Neo- Tianxiaism.’11 In other words, he viewed Chinese efforts to establish a modern nation-state as being a civilizational endeavor for the benefit of all humanity (including China), and regarded this as a sophisticated form of

10 For modern ‘Tianxiaism,’ see Xu (2012a). 11 For ‘Neo-Tianxiaism,’ see Xu (2012b); (2013b). Can a New Universality Be Created out of the Chinese Concept of Tianxia? _ 37 nationalism which he called ‘Neo-Tianxiaism.’ With his emphasis on the importance of civilization and his leaning towards universality, Xu Jilin argued that ‘Neo-Tianxiaism’ made it possible to cultivate that which is good’ as a universal principle capable of transcending the divide between the East and West, and between the traditional and the modern. Thus ‘Neo-Tianxiaism’ obliges the (re)creation of a civilization, in which Xu Jilin expects tolerance and harmony to flourish, allowing a new universality to arise, and he presents this endeavor as a mission for 21st century Chinese intellectuals. Xu Jilin’s global vision is distilled into this concept of ‘universality,’ and tianxia is presented as the realization of this universality. The characteristic features of tianxia are tolerance and its method of exerting influence, through civilization rather than might. Xu Jilin’s suggestion that tolerance and universality can be realized through tianxia arises from his interpretation of the tribute system of the past and of the modern Chinese adoption of Western ideas. The experience of Western hegemony is also presented as a lesson to show the importance of cultural influence. The essence of tianxia is derived through the abstraction of the lessons learned from these historical memories: it is not a geographical concept limited to a specific place, nor is it a clear and concrete regional order, nor is it a moral value. The histories of China and the West, when interpreted through the lens of that which is perceived as good, become the resources for a highly abstracted universality. Xu Jilin’s ‘Neo-Tianxiaism’ can therefore be regarded as an abstract form of a new universality that is based on civilizational capability and influence.

2) The Idealization of the Zhou Dynasty Feudal System and the Search for a Peaceful New World-system― Zhao Tingyang’s Tianxia System Theory Next to be considered is Zhao Tingyang’s (趙汀陽, 1961-) ‘tianxia system theory,’ which is a good example of reinterpreting the tianxia concept as a means to explore the possibility of an alternative world order. He has been called ‘the only true contemporary Chinese philosopher’ and was involved in the think-tank that provided the basis for the current Chinese leadership’s conceptualization of the ‘Chinese Dream.’12 Let us first begin

12 See Baik (2013). 38 _ CONCEPTS AND CONTEXTS IN EAST ASIA (No.3 December 2014) this examination by recalling the discussion in Section II, which established how tianxia has traditionally been regarded as form of social order sustained over a very long period of time, from the Zhou Dynasty to the Qing Dynasty. However, Zhao Tingyang’s regards tianxia as a form of regional order and limits its temporal and historical scope to the feudal system of the Zhou Dynasty.13 From this, he then investigates the modern relevance of this concept. Once Zhao Tingyang’s theory was first formulated, it has been discussed and refined by numerous intellectuals around the world. The key tenets of this theory, together with the questions that have been asked, and Zhao Tingyang’s responses will now be presented. Zhao Tingyang’s ‘Tianxia System Theory’ begins with an idealized interpretation of the feudal system of the Zhou Dynasty. He focuses on the fact that this feudal system was not something imposed by the superior power of a single strong country, but instead was successfully maintained by a small kingdom: the Zhou Dynasty. They made alliances with other kingdoms in an effort to resist the power of the Shang Dynasty, and were able to successfully lead a number of other tribes―which varied widely in terms of size, race, culture and territory―through the mechanism of culture rather than by force. From these historical circumstances, he borrowed, for his interpretation of the tianxia concept, the idea that an assortment of individual members could successfully form a community in the absence of any strong central power. Zhao Tingyang identifies two elements as the basic principles of the tianxia system. The first principle requires cohesion between individual autonomy and the overall world-system, for the benefit of all parties. The second principle is that each area has the potential to become the center of the tianxia system. The leader of the regional order, the tienxi, managed the resources of the entire system but it was the feudal lords that provided the tienxi with labor. In this way, a mutual balance was achieved in the absence of any absolutely dominant power. And this notion of maximizing cooperation while minimizing conflict allows the political conditions to be created in which the prioritization of the universal principles can take place. These principles can be summarized as mutual benefit, division of labor, and cooperation. In addition, he identified three basic conditions for the establishment

13 For a general summary of Zhao Tingyang’s thoughts on this issue, see Zhao (2010a); (2010b). Can a New Universality Be Created out of the Chinese Concept of Tianxia? _ 39 of a tianxia system. First, the members share some common interests, so that the tianxia belongs to all and does not exclude anyone. Second, each country is assured of sufficient power to promote its individual interests, so that it is clear that the benefits of joining the system are greater than the benefits of leaving it, which encourages individual countries to accept and become part of the tianxia system. Third, a mutually beneficial relationship is maintained between the countries in which the interests of each are interwoven, allowing countries to come to one another’s aid: where one has a surplus and another a deficiency, a harmonious relationship can be ensured. These are Zhao Tingyang’s essential conditions for world cooperation and world peace. Both the universal interests and the interests of each country are acknowledged, so that the advantages of belonging to the system are clear, and a relationship of mutual benefit can be established. These notions―the absence of absolute power, the division of labor and of rule, and the principles of mutual benefit―are in a sense idealistic. Zhao Tingyang also characterizes the collapse of the tianxia system of the Zhou Dynasty as resulting from the increasing power of the feudal lords, which itself stemmed from the laissez-faire attitude of the tienxi, and this collapse is not seen to reveal any moral shortcomings of the system. Zhao Tingyang does not regard his tianxia system as merely a creation of the imagination, but believes it to be an actual system that really existed in the historical past. The tianxia system is seen as an essential approach to overcoming the almost anarchic state of present-day global society, since it requires a high level of cooperation and morality from its constituent actors; and the idealized version of the world order which it presents is in direct contrast to the struggles for national interest and the threat of military conflict which we currently endure. Thus, although the tianxia system was in existence for only a short period of time in ancient China before it disappeared, it is taken as being relevant to the modern era and the whole world, setting aside any temporal or regional constraints. A number of questions have been raised about Zhao Tingyang’s theory,14 addressing its excessively idealistic nature, its feasibility and the methods for its realization, and also its efficacy. The questions also reflect the wariness which some feel, who perceive Chinese ambitions for control

14 For further examination of these questions and answers, see the introduction to the 2nd edition of Zhao (2010a). 40 _ CONCEPTS AND CONTEXTS IN EAST ASIA (No.3 December 2014) beneath the messages of peace and equality. Zhao Tingyang’s response to these questions has been to reiterate the original meaning of his theory. He stresses that it was intended to encourage collective and rational behavior which would contribute to the development of a world in which universal mutual benefit is given the priority it deserves; theoretically, Zhao Tingyang’s position is in opposition to Huntington’s notion of a clash of civilizations and is in agreement with, and inherits, Kant’s ‘Theory of Perpetual Peace.’ Regarding the putative Chinese desire for supremacy― an issue which has provoked considerable concern among non-Chinese intellectuals―Zhao Tingyang argues that the tianxia system theory is clearly in opposition to the notion of hegemony, and that it is fundamentally anti-imperialist. In response to comments that humans are essentially greedy, he proposes that humanity is striving for a new state of maturity, and he claims to see the beginnings of a movement towards a second Enlightenment, which will require the establishment of a new type of rationality, namely ‘relational rationality.’ By extracting the values of mutual benefit and coexistence as universal principles from China’s historical memory, he is aiming to establish a common understanding upon which an alternative to the current world order―ruled by competition, collision, conflict, and selfishnes―can be formulated. In this sense and from a theoretical point of view, it can be said that although the central concept used, tianxia, derives from the Chinese tradition, in fact it strongly agrees with, and can be recognized as descending from Kantian philosophy. Since Zhao Tingyang’s tianxia refers specifically to a regional order that arose during the Zhou Dynasty, it appears that the subject of his interpretation is clearly defined, with concrete spatial and temporal boundaries. And by presenting idealistic principles such as mutual benefit and coexistence as the characteristic features of this regional order, he is apparently pursuing idealized international relationships, rather than ones based on practical interest. In Zhao Tingyang’s discourse, therefore, idealism acts as the mechanism by which tianxia, as instantiated at a specific time and place, is given a transcendent universality of quite general applicability. In other words, as with Xu Jilin, the experience of a specific time is abstracted and adopted as an idealized form. However, Zhao Tingyang’s spatial and temporal definition of tianxia is not without its problems, for the concept is not limited to the period of the Western Zhou Dynasty; indeed it represents a regional order that has been part of the Chinese tradition for two thousand years, since the Qin Dynasty estab- Can a New Universality Be Created out of the Chinese Concept of Tianxia? _ 41 lished a unified empire.15 Nevertheless, Zhao Tingyang’s tianxia continues to receive scholarly attention as a new type of world order, and as a system which offers the prospect of establishing of a more mature form of rationality. It is therefore regarded as an alternative to the prevailing world order and the type of rationality to which the modern Western world has given rise.

3) China’s Mission and Cultural Awakening― Gan Chunsong’s Wangdao and Tianxiaism The final interpretation to be examined in this section is Gan Chunsong’s (干春松, 1965-) discourse on the tianxia concept, which is rather strongly influenced by Confucian ideology. In striving to establish a new world order, he argues that wangdao (王道, the kingly path), a traditional Confucian value, should play a central role, and that by returning to wangdao, Confucianism can provide the philosophical basis required.16 Gan Chunsong’s understanding of the current worldview is similar to that of Zhao Tingyang. He identifies a world order centered on the pursuit of narrow interests and individual profit, and regards this order as being maintained by a political philosophy based upon Hobbesian notions of hostility and a conflict of interests. In his view, if the protection of one’s own self-interest is considered to be the fundamental basis of human action, then none of the efforts to solve our current problems and bring about lasting international peace can ever be successful. In Gan Chunsong’s account, such problems can only be resolved by fostering goodwill, rather than hostility, and by adopting a perspective which takes into account the entire scope of humanity, rather than just one nation. Wangdao and tianxia are taken as the philosophical resources for this solution.17 Wangdao is the Confucian ideal of political governance in which political rule is facilitated and validated by the self-cultivation of the ruler. Such governance is therefore founded in a moral idealism, and this concept is in opposition to badao (覇道, the hegemonic path). Because wangdao represents rule based not on institutions or punishment but on benevolent governance (仁政), it becomes the philosophical basis for a

15 Lee (2014), p.484. 16 These views are summarized in Gan (2012). Some Chinese intellectuals participated in a discussion on this book, which can be found in Peng (2013). 17 For a discussion of wangdao and tianxia, see Gan (2009). 42 _ CONCEPTS AND CONTEXTS IN EAST ASIA (No.3 December 2014) wider political order built upon morality rather than force. Gan Chunsong equates the tianxia order with this notion of wangdao, since according to Confucian thought, the kings of the three dynasties of antiquity (i.e. Xia, Shang, and Zhou) were able to act in a truly kingly fashion because the tianxia order was realized at the time. Thus, Gan Chunsong’s discussion of the world order is based on the traditional Confucian perspective which regards these ancient dynasties as the ideal period, and which emphasizes governance based on morality rather than power or interest. He does not, however, approach this problem via a concrete historical memory of a specific regional order that was once established in the past as Zhao Tingyang does, but instead approaches it from the dimension of values. He then goes beyond ethics and morality, since he believes that tianxia can have a universal meaning, so he makes use of it to criticize current theories of the state. Gan Chunsong suggests the possibility that a worldview organized around the tianxia perception can address the problematic state of the current world order, which is characterized by a clash of interests, by inspiring the formulation of ideas that focus on common interests. Confucianism recognizes several stages: “the governance of oneself is followed by the governance of one’s family, the governance of one’s country, and finally peace throughout the tianxia” (修身齊家治國平天下). Gan Chunsong understands this as a manifestation of the consciousness of humanity in which the state has been transcended. Thus, the tienxia concept is seen to be an appropriate framework within which the various problems currently facing humanity, which transcend state borders, can be resolved. In this way, the tianxia concept from the ‘eight steps of cultivation’ (八條目), which appear in the Great Learning (大學), has been linked with our modern notion of the welfare of humanity. The intention behind Gan Chunsong’s re-examining Chinese traditional thought in this way must be briefly addressed: he is aiming to arrive at a ‘cultural self-awakening,’18 which begins with an introspective investigation of the Chinese cultural mindset following the transition to modernity. He notes that although China has developed rapidly, its people are not as happy as they might be and the country itself is not truly respected. He identifies the reason for this as ‘cultural nihilism,’ referring to a philosophical trend which emerged concurrently with the transition to

18 For a discussion on cultural self-awakening, see Gan (2013). Can a New Universality Be Created out of the Chinese Concept of Tianxia? _ 43 modernity, that is based upon a denial of one’s own tradition. Gan Chunsong maintains that because China lacks confidence in its own traditional philosophies and systems of thought, it also lacks the language to articulate its experience of success. In order to overcome this problem he proposes ‘a cultural self-awakening’; this is intended to revive the traditions that were discarded and rejected in order to achieve modernity, and to allow the expression of an authentic Chinese voice instead of using the voice of the Other (the West). He also argues that such a cultural self-awakening should not be constrained to the (re)construction of culture within the boundaries of one’s own country, but should strive towards the greater goal of establishing a tianxia conception which transcends the interests of individual nations. When discussing the idea of “cultivating oneself, bringing order to the family, governing the country, and bringing peace to all,” Gan Chunsong adds that the modern notion of the nation-state did not traditionally exist in China, and that this is precisely the point where cultural self-awakening and the reinstatement of tradition meets the tianxia conception with its awareness towards humanity. This notion, that China should recover its confidence so that it can rise to become a model for all humanity is at the core of his thinking. Gan Chunsong regards the tianxia concept as transcending the notion of the nation-state, so that it has relevance for all humanity, and hence he argues the need for the Chinese to regain their cultural confidence, which will open up the prospect of a new humanity. To reiterate: this understanding of tianxia comes from the Confucian framework of stages present in the ‘eight steps of cultivation’ of the Great Learning, and the operational principles of the tianxia order are discussed in terms of moral values, with wangdao as the central principle, which assumes the ‘benevolent governance’ of a morally salient ruler. Thus, Gan Chunsong’s discourse on the tianxia concept may be understood as being based on a moral idealism, a people’s cultural self-awakening, and a consciousness of the broader needs of humanity. In addition, it can be seen as comprising the following three elements: tradition, a Chinese identity, and universality. Let us step back now to compare these three visions, of Xu Jilin, Zhao Tingyang, and Gan Chunsong. Just as China is beginning to dream of a great rejuvenation of its people, Chinese intellectuals are also beginning to explore new ways of looking at the tianxia concept, in order to provide some direction for this rejuvenation. Xu Jilin has focused on the ‘civilizational’ aspect of tianxia, as a preparation for the cultural nihilism and 44 _ CONCEPTS AND CONTEXTS IN EAST ASIA (No.3 December 2014) anxiety about values that may accompany China’s transition to a rich and strong nation. He envisages a civilization which contains both the historical memories of China and an aspiration towards universality. He hopes that these civilizational values will improve upon that which the West has produced until now, creating something which is not limited only to China but which can be shared and acknowledged universally. His ‘Neo-Tianxiaism’ reinterprets the tianxia concept, seeking to prevent the narrow ethnocentrism that often leads to nationalism, and to encourage universality and rationalism. The arguments of Zhao Tingyang and Gan Chunsong, who both read the possibility of a new world order into the tianxia concept, approach this concept from slightly different dimensions; but they agree upon using tianxia as the basis for an ideal state which will allow the current world order to be transformed. The tianxia that collapsed in the 19th century, after clashing with the West, was undoubtedly limited to the narrow confines of China, in contrast to the wider meanings which the term is capable of encompassing. To summon up this concept of tianxia from China’s history inevitably leads, therefore, to memories of the tribute system, and since this tianxia was relevant only to the Chinese and has already been destroyed during the transition to modernity, it is very difficult to make use of this concept to imagine the possibility of a China which dreams of standing at the center of the world. Hence, the tianxia concept now being adopted in China, with its yearning for a ‘great revival,’ is being envisaged in a distinctly more idealistic and abstract form. In fact, these discourses reveal much about the current generation of Chinese intellectuals: their conceptions of tianxia express their critical perceptions of world history in the modern period and of the current world order, and also contain their hopes for a sustainable future in which China transcends the borders of the nation-state.

The Resilience and Predicament of the Tianxia Discourse

1) The Resilience of the Tianxia Discourse In evoking the tianxia concept, Xu Jilin, Zhao Tingyang, and Gan Chunsong have all adopted a global perspective in their attempts to find a new universality. If we link this with the global standing that China has Can a New Universality Be Created out of the Chinese Concept of Tianxia? _ 45 recently achieved, it is possible to discern, projected into their discourses on tianxia, the manifestation of a ‘great nation’ which looks beyond its boundaries towards the wider world. In terms of its geographical scope, the current discourse on tianxia shares similarities with others on empire or localization, but its distinguishing characteristic is the fact that the subject of this discourse has been derived from the Chinese intellectual tradition. Since the policies of reform and opening were introduced, there has been a growing movement to reinstate China’s traditional heritage; and now that China’s economic resurgence is indisputable, the cultural pride of the Chinese has increased exponentially. There are dangers, however: if it is purely inward-looking, such cultural pride can easily lead to exclusivity and arrogance, which may then be exacerbated by the memory of past hardships such as the Opium Wars, leading to a backlash against the West. It must be acknowledged, of course, that the discourses on tianxia examined in Section 3 maintain a distance from such extremes. Regardless of their ‘good intentions,’ however, these discourses have not enjoyed much international support. For example, those who read into the tianxia concept ideas of Sinocentrism, or even the erstwhile tributary relationships, have been critical of such attempts to interpret the historical international relations of Asia only through the lens of tolerance, as if all relationships were voluntary and on friendly terms.19 Moreover, as China’s capabilities have increased, so have suspicions about its intentions. Such wariness is based on a misunderstanding of the fundamental meanings underlying the use of the tianxia concept, and this preconception not only hinders the development of a true understanding but is also rather difficult to correct. In fact, such criticisms have little bearing on their intended targets since, as can be seen most clearly in Zhao Tingyang’s case, the Chinese intellectuals discussed in this paper are very aware of the suspicions that their use of the tianxia concept may give rise to, and they each have their owns means of addressing such misconceptions.

19 Wang Hui’s idea of a ‘trans-systemic society,’ which argues for a complex system based on horizontality and diversity, has been presented in the Korean media with the emphasis on his depiction of the tribute system as a historical norm. Popular opinion has therefore tended to attack his ideas, for example by suggesting that the Chinese new left dreams of the resurrection of the tribute system. See “Where Has the Thinking of Chinese Intellectuals Come to,” Weekly Chosun, Issue 2285, December 2013. This article ran as the cover story, and examined the ideas of Wang Hui and others in the Chinese new left, together with sources critical of this intellectual tradition. 46 _ CONCEPTS AND CONTEXTS IN EAST ASIA (No.3 December 2014)

Actually, these authors have devoted a lot of attention to formulating theoretical mechanisms which enable them to obtain a universalist perspective. The general distrust about the use of the tianxia concept and the response towards this distrust have also already been reflected in real life policies, so that those responsible for the tianxia discourse, as well as others attempting to draw a blueprint for China’s future based on its history, are clearly aware of the potential controversy and have sought for ways to sidestep it. Given the resilience of the Chinese discourse on tianxia, therefore, which expresses a manifestly universalist vision, that in some cases reaches for post-nationalism, any response which criticizes this discourse by taking an adversarial stance between nations is inevitably unsatisfactory. This is a situation that must be dealt with by all who find it problematic that China has grown into a great nation and will surely become greater still. An alternative approach is therefore needed to address this issue, one which goes beyond piecemeal responses based on nationalistic concerns or the fear of the Chinese threat.

2) The Predicament of the Tianxia Discourse The proponents of the discourse on tianxia regard the concept as providing a means by which the unintended negative side-effects and irrationalities of the modern world-system can be overcome. However, the historical memory of empire which accompanies this discourse acts as an obstacle which prevents the tianxia concept from gaining wider acceptance. This is the predicament that the discourse on tianxia currently faces, and it requires a discussion which considers the problem on a theoretical level and also with regard to the issue of historical memory. First let us consider this predicament on a theoretical level: the essential problem is that historical memory is used to establish the notion of universality, and from this the idea of a ‘good’ civilization is proposed. Xu Jilin, who has identified the quality of civilization as a touchstone in China’s future journey, has suggested that Chinese civilization has a special significance because China was supposedly the birthplace of humanity’s first ‘Axial Civilization.’20 However, can the fact that a certain civilization maintained a long tradition really be taken as an indication that any

20 Interestingly, Gan Yang, who proposed the ‘civilization-state’ theory and who belongs to a different intellectual tradition, also agrees with Xu Jilin in regarding ‘Axial Civilization’ as the basis for China’s claim to be considered a great civilized nation. See Song (2012). Can a New Universality Be Created out of the Chinese Concept of Tianxia? _ 47 civilization which develops out of it will necessarily be a good one? Surely, in order to pursue the creation of a new civilization, one must take systemic and cultural innovations into consideration. In addition, it can hardly be asserted that the Chinese civilization, with its great depth of tradition, has only ever followed the ‘good’ path. Therefore, to simply idealize the historical experience of Chinese civilization and then to draw arbitrary connections between this ideal and some putative future civilization is logically untenable. Indeed, if Xu Jilin’s discourse on a universal civilization, based on the so-called ‘Axial Civilization,’ is not supported or explained further then it is highly possible that it will remain merely a window dressing: an expedient ornament providing some class to accompany the economic development of China as a great nation. Turning now to the predicament facing the tianxia discourse in terms of historical memory, we need to examine the actual international policies that were implemented by Imperial China, as can be observed from world history. The proponents of the discourse on tianxia all expound notions of diversity, tolerance, and universalism. However, the empires of the past did not consolidate their status merely through cultural justification and friendly persuasion, but always relied also upon military or economic power. Tolerance and diversity may at first glance appear to be values which can readily encompass diverse cultures and socio-political systems, but historically such tolerance and diversity depended upon the approval of those administering the empire’s central government, and were implemented only to the extent which the imperial system allowed, which in turn was determined by the culture and customs of its members. The historical reality is that those who did not acknowledge the central government were not dealt with according to the principles of tolerance. In addition, within the framework of imperialism, the structure of tolerance is not reciprocal; it consists of those who ‘are tolerant’ and those who ‘receive tolerance.’21 Some useful lessons can be found in the universalism of Europe which first became a potent idea in the 18th century. It has been pointed out that European universalism was also a form of window dressing for anything which emanated from Europe, and this helped to facilitate the Eurocentric and hegemonic attitudes that followed.22 Since

21 For a discussion on empire and tolerance, see Gong (2012). 22 For a discussion on the negative aspects of European universalism, see Wallerstein (2008). 48 _ CONCEPTS AND CONTEXTS IN EAST ASIA (No.3 December 2014) this notion of tianxia, now so central to the Chinese vision of universality, was itself conceived in China, it is understandable that the suspicions regarding Chinese intentions will not easily be set to rest. Then what can be done to give credibility to the Chinese discourse on universality? Very little will be possible until China manages to formulate a culture or system that is genuinely compelling to the Other, with a truly universal appeal. Previous instances of this kind of transnational appeal can be found (setting aside judgments of right or wrong): for example the Chinese and Soviet systems during the Cold War period, which were admired by anti-establishment activists in many countries, in differing degrees; or the North European system of social democracy, with its strong welfare system, which may be regarded as an ideal case. In comparison, it is difficult to see how such universal appeal can be achieved if it is based only on the tradition of Chinese civilization with its long history, as those who have initiated the discourse on tianxia have tried to do. We have been discussing attempts to establish a Chinese model which can be adopted universally―a model which is seemingly inseparable from state-led development and an authoritarian political system―by asserting some unique characteristics which entirely distinguish it from the models of other nations; but all such attempts are problematic, for their fundamental nature is easily exposed. It must be acknowledged, of course, that this search for a distinctively Chinese roadmap is based upon a critique of capitalism and its global influence, but the theoretical framework needed to provide some viable alternative remains very rudimentary. This is the problem that the discourses coming out of China on a ‘new universality,’ including that of tianxia, must address. And this is not a task that can be easily taken care of by simplistically proffering, as its key principles, universality, peace, and reciprocity. If China is to truly become a great nation, worthy of general admiration, then the internal problems which have led to the widespread negative perceptions of China must first be analyzed and addressed, and this should be the starting point for any serious discourse upon China’s future. Who can say whether the Chinese system will become acknowledged by outsiders as valuable and useful, and perhaps will even be regarded as something to be aspired to? If this does ever come to pass, however, it will not be based on declarations made by Chinese intellectuals, but on the manifestly superior qualities of Chinese civilization. Before the issues of political and economic systems, or the world order, can be discussed and acted upon it is essential for China to Can a New Universality Be Created out of the Chinese Concept of Tianxia? _ 49 deal with the negative consequences of its rapid growth and its author- itarianism. Unfortunately, the discourses on universality emanating from China are generally lacking in this respect, and scarcely even recognize the importance of such an endeavor. Unless this problem is taken care of, the Chinese Dream and the hopes for a new universality, as represented by the tianxia concept, are unlikely to be realized.

Conclusion

If the Chinese discourse on a new universality deals only with the issues of historical memory, world order, and universality, without fully addressing the problems currently facing China, then it will be deeply suspect, regardless of its true intentions: it is apt to be seen as disreputably providing academic plausibility for the Chinese government in its mission to fulfill a ‘Chinese Dream.’ Moreover, such an idealistic discourse, with little basis in reality, may never amount to much more than a naive dream. There is also the dangerous possibility that this discourse will ultimately be used as a kind of excuse: if it happens that the Chinese government begins to follow badao, moving further away from that which the tianxia discourse characterizes as ‘good’ and ‘civilization,’ this will allow the intellectuals involved to wash their hands of the consequences. Those who wish to guide China along a path which takes full account of world history, and who wish to establish universal values so that China can truly participate in the flow of world philosophy―these Chinese intellectuals can never hope to realize their aims until they are willing and able to make an honest appraisal of the current situation in their country. Only thus can the dream of tianxia avoid the traps of nationalism, or naivety, or mere self- justification. Finally, it should be remembered that the dream of a new and ideal world order need not be the prerogative of any specific state, such as China. If the world order evinces problems and contradictions, then since these are universal in origin and impact, they should be addressed through actions taken at a universal level which transcends states. Within any nation, be it China, the United States of America or the United Kingdom, it is clear there exists a wide variation in value systems and goals, and nobody has a monopoly on potential solutions. Surely, instead of relying on the history and traditions of a single nation, a better way to formulate an 50 _ CONCEPTS AND CONTEXTS IN EAST ASIA (No.3 December 2014) alternative universality capable of replacing the current world order is to make use of the experiences of all those who have struggled to resolve the existing problems and contradictions, in whichever part of the world they may be found.

(Translated by Ilhong KO) Can a New Universality Be Created out of the Chinese Concept of Tianxia? _ 51

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