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Can a New Universality Be Created out of the Chinese Concept of Tianxia?

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December 2014. No.3 / pp.25-52 Can a New Universality Be Created out of the Chinese Concept of Tianxia? In-jae SONG*1 Abstract Since China has begun to emerge as great global power, many Chinese intellectuals have been trying to establish a theoretical framework for a new universality which accords with the ‘Chinese Way,’ and they have often drawn inspiration from China’s long history. The concept of tianxia (天下, All-under- Heaven) has been an especially productive source for intellectuals hoping to design an alternative world system based on universal values. Xu Jilin criticizes the discourse of Chinese particularity, and suggests a fresh under- standing of tianxia in which a new universality is constructed from great civilizational power. Zhao Tingyang idealizes the tianxia system of the Zhou (周) Dynasty as a model of communal reciprocity acting to promote the general welfare, and suggests that this kind of tianxia system offers an alternative system for today’s world which can better deal with problems caused by conflicting interests. Gan Chunsong also addresses problems with the current world order, especially conflicts caused by the Hobbesian pursuit of narrow and selfish interests by nation-states. His alternative approach is also based on traditional values, specifically wangdao (王道) and tianxia, which imply morality and universal humanity. All these discourses of a new uni- versality revive the ancient notion of tianxia, reinterpreting it in terms of tolerance, reciprocity and universal humanity, and hence they propose tianxia as the foundation of their new universality. Historical tradition, however, is not sufficient to construct any such alternative universality, and is also most unlikely to achieve a global consensus. Furthermore, there is a leap of logic in the argument that a long historical tradition necessarily implies that the associated values are superior. These discourses are also susceptible to the charge of excessive idealism, and, despite their theme of tolerance, they remain limited by the premise that all the members of an imperial system must acknowledge the current order. An alternative universality cannot be created through the rediscovery of historical legacies or memories. This will * 송인재, Hallym University 26 _ CONCEPTS AND CONTEXTS IN EAST ASIA (No.3 December 2014) only be possible when China squarely faces up to the reality of current circumstances, and reaches out to form a consensus with other countries struggling with similar problems. Keywords tianxia, universality, civilization, world order, Chinese Dream The Chinese Dream The growth of China as seen today readily evokes the image of ‘empire,’ and indeed for China, empire is both its past and present reality. China not only maintained an empire in its premodern past but is the only present-day state that retains within its current boundaries most of the territory of its premodern empire. Thus, for the Chinese, empire is a symbol of their glorious past. There are also some Western scholars who firmly believe that China is destined to lead the world in the future, and within China, the opinion that the Chinese experience should be promoted as a new developmental model has gained more weight since the Beijing Olympics. There is a vision to extend the influence of this Chinese path or model to the entire world, replacing the universality established by the modern Western world with a ‘new universality’ inspired by China. Previously, the understanding of China as a ‘civilization’ rather than a ‘state’ went hand in hand with the negative perception of China as being unable to form a ‘modern nation-state’ and thus incapable of adapting to the ‘Western universality.’ Nowadays, however, to say that China is not a state but a civilization has positive connotations, since this implies that the civilization created by China need not be limited to its territory but can have a truly universal resonance throughout the wider world. In such sentiments it is possible to discern the dream of a rejuvenated empire, and to identify Chinese aspirations on a global scale. At this moment in time, when the world is watching the revival of China with great interest, the leaders of the Communist Party of China have promulgated a new and meaningful slogan: ‘The Chinese Dream.’1 1 For Xi Jinping’s speech on the Chinese Dream, and the slogans put forth by other Chinese leaders, see Cho (2013), pp.19-27. Can a New Universality Be Created out of the Chinese Concept of Tianxia? _ 27 This neologism was coined by General Secretary Xi Jinping, who became the leader of the People’s Republic in November 2012, following the 18th National Congress of the Communist Party of China, as part of the fifth generation of Chinese leaders. Although it may appear at first to be a run-of-the-mill slogan, in fact, it contains a great depth of meaning. It is highly significant that Xi Jinping talked about the Chinese Dream during his first public speech, made in the presence of the seven members of the 18th Politburo of the Communist Party of China and broadcast live on television throughout China. He declared the Chinese Dream to be “achieving the great rejuvenation of the Chinese nation,” and spoke of it as the long-cherished ambition of many generations of the Chinese people. He urged individuals to work boldly, assiduously and collectively to fulfill this dream, and expressed his firm belief that it would be realized by the 100th anniversary of the founding of the People’s Republic (2049). By comparing the Chinese Dream with the slogans promulgated by other Chinese paramount leaders, and examining them in conjunction with developments in Chinese modern history, it is possible to gain insights into the current situation in China, as well as the thinking of its leaders. Around the time that the ‘reform and opening’ policies were introduced, Deng Xiaoping identified hunger and poverty as the greatest problems facing China, and expressed his desire to help the many Chinese people who had been impoverished by the Great Leap Forward and the Cultural Revolution. Jiang Zemin, heading the third generation of leaders of the People’s Republic, promoted the notion of China as a responsible world power and also the ‘Three Represents’ theory. Hu Jintao, leading the fourth generation, set forth the ideas of peaceful development and a harmonious socialist society. The recent leaders of China have used the concept of a ‘moderately prosperous society’ (小康社會), which originally comes from the ‘Liyun’ chapter of the Book of Rites (禮記) to refer to a society in which economic prosperity is sufficient to meet the essential needs of the people. However, since Xi Jinping has also expressed the hope that this kind of moderately prosperous society can be comprehensively achieved by 2021, the 100th anniversary of the founding of the Chinese Communist Party, it is clear that this vision of society, as first espoused by Deng Xiaoping for the modernization of Chinese socialism, has yet to be realized. Actually, all of Deng’s successors, during their tenure as General Secretary, have coined slogans which address the country’s most pressing needs to bring together the efforts of the Chinese people. ‘A 28 _ CONCEPTS AND CONTEXTS IN EAST ASIA (No.3 December 2014) responsible world power’ and ‘peaceful development’ are slogans that represent China’s suddenly elevated position in the world. The ‘Three Represents’ theory went in hand with the transition of the Communist Party of China from a revolutionary party to a ruling party, while the idea of a ‘harmonious socialist society’ was intended to overcome the negative side-effects of reform, and to strengthen social cohesion. But now China’s circumstances have markedly improved―after weathering the recent global financial crisis and successfully hosting the 2008 Olympics, and being now recognized as an economic power whose global influence is only rivaled by the US―the head of the People’s Republic’s fifth generation of leaders, Xi Jinping, is now in a position to speak about the dream of China’s rejuvenation. Following the policies of reform and opening, China’s intellectuals were quick to take advantage of the freedoms which the new direction of the Chinese state made available. Official policies brought an end to traditional taboos concerning permitted sources of knowledge, allowing intellectuals to break away from Marxist thought and look towards new resources, upon which their opinions regarding China’s future path were based. A great variety of views were put forward, with some receiving widespread support and others subject to vigorous dispute. There were even some who expressed opinions in stark opposition to the government’s official stance, either temporarily or irrevocably. There has also been a gradually developing trend amongst Chinese intellectuals in which they rediscover Chinese traditional thought and use it to make pertinent commentaries on the current state of the nation and its development. In fact, as far back as the 1980s, when Chinese traditions that had previously been suppressed by the Cultural Revolution were reinstated, ‘the great revival of the Chinese people’ was promoted as a slogan by some scholars who sought to distil the best from Chinese traditional thought and combine it with Marxism, seeking a ‘creative synthesis’ of the two.2 It can only imagined how happy Zhang Dainian (1902-2004), one of the main proponents of this approach, would have been with Xi Jinping’s speech. The creative synthesis of the 1980s was an attempt to reclaim a part of China’s traditional thoughts, which at the time were undergoing a revival; it also represented an intent to actively engage in the process of 2 For a further examination of this ‘creative synthesis,’ see Song (2010), pp.193-228.
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