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Operation “Cast Lead”: News Control As Military Objective

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Israel / Gaza Operation “Cast Lead”: News control as military objective February 2009 Middle East and Northern Africa Desk Reporters Without Borders 47, rueVivienne - 75002 Paris Tel : (33) 1 44 83 84 78 - Fax : (33) 1 45 23 11 51 E-mail : [email protected] Web : www.rsf.org ned from entering the Gaza Strip throughout the conflict and they were forced to“cover” BACKGROUND at a distance a war which attracted world- wide attention.The blockade prompted pro- After six months of relative calm in Gaza, a tests and indignation from the entire ceasefire agreed between Israel and the profession. Hamas movement ended on 19 December. The Ezzedin al-Qassam, armed wing of Israeli journalists have been banned,because Hamas, then announced that the ceasefire of their nationality,from entering the territo- would not be renewed,putting the blame for ries for more than two years and the Gaza the break on the“Zionist enemy” which“did Strip is regularly closed to foreign journalists not observe the conditions" of the ceasefire, by the Israeli authorities. But this ban, from by maintaining its blockade of the Gaza Strip. 27 December onwards,while the military of- The political-military movement that fensive had just started, had serious conse- controls the Gaza Strip resumed firing quences for the work of Palestinian rockets at targets in neighbouring Israel. Is- journalists who were the only ones able to raeli aviation hit back against Gaza on 20 De- cover the conflict. ”I wouldn’t wish on cember 2008, firing three missiles close to anyone to live through what we lived the Jabaliya refugee camp. After this the through. Every evening, I asked myself how rocket fire was stepped up,with around 200 come I was still alive”,Shohdi el-Kashef,head being fired between 19 and 27 December,ac- of the broadcast news agency Ramattan, in cording to Agence France-Presse. Gaza, told Reporters Without Borders. Following the death of an Israeli civilian, kil- led by a rocket fired at Netivot, Israel laun- Reporters Without Borders went to Israel, ched an air offensive it codenamed “Cast the Gaza Strip and theWest Bank at the end Lead” on 27 December 2008,before opening of January to assess the extent of press free- a ground operation from 3 January 2009. dom violations committed during the After 22 days of conflict, the Israeli security conflict. cabinet, on 17 January adopted a resolution in favour of a unilateral ceasefire in Gaza.The last Israeli soldiers withdrew from the Gaza THE GAZA STRIP CLOSED TO FO- Strip on 21 January 2009, the day after the REIGN JOURNALISTS inauguration of the new US president,Barack Obama. As Israeli aviation launched its offensive on 27 December 2008, the military authorities According to the United Nations, the Israeli closed the Gaza Strip to foreign journalists. offensive left 1,330 dead (including 431 chil- dren and 112 women) and 5,380 wounded During the second war in Lebanon, in July- on the Palestinian side and 14 dead on the August 2006, journalists had been “embed- Israeli side (10 soldiers, of whom four were ded” with Israeli troops so as to follow killed by “friendly fire” and four civilians). military operations, as reported by Nahum More than 4,000 homes were entirely des- Barnea, of the daily Yedioth Aharonoth. And troyed in Israeli attacks and more than soldiers used their mobile phones to des- 17,000 others were damaged, according an cribe the war live to their families,but also to estimate from the Palestinian Authority’s journalists, sometimes with film as well. central statistics bureau,which estimated the losses at more than two billion dollars. In Gaza, in December 2008, the Israeli mili- tary command,drawing lessons from the free News was also a casualty of the conflict.Six media coverage that exposed its shortco- journalists were killed between 27 Decem- mings to the whole world, adopted a com- ber 2008 and 17 January 2009, two while pletely different approach.They closed the working, and at least three buildings housing Gaza Strip making it impossible for any fo- Israel / Gaza Operation “Cast Lead”: News control asPalestinian military journalists caught objective between Israelimedia firing and Hamas threats were hit.Foreign journalists were ban- reign journalist to reach the field of battle. Once they entered the sector,Israeli soldiers Territories, ordered the Israeli government were not allowed to take mobile phones with to allow access to the Gaza Strip before 1st them. January 2009 at 10am, by pools of a maxi- mum of 12 journalists.“Even though we do The army not only designated Gaza as a“clo- not in principle agree with‘pools’,the Court sed military zone” but they also added corri- gave us no choice, judging that it was ‘pools’ dor of land 2 kilometres wide around the or nothing, the FPA’s lawyer said in a press territory,into which only authorised persons statement.The defence ministry reduced this could enter.A photographer from the Reuters number to eight and said two of them should news agency was arrested on 13 January for be chosen by the army. having“taken photos inside the closed zone”, according to a military spokesman.His accre- However,the Court’s decision was never im- ditation was suspended for two weeks and plemented. The army justified keeping Gaza his cameras were confiscated. closed for“security reasons” linked to the air attacks.After it launched the ground offen- According to the Government Press Office sive, on 3 January,the army justified its deci- (GPO), between 800 and 1,000 foreign jour- sion by the fact that the presence of foreign nalists have permanent accreditation to work journalists could obstruct the progress of mi- in Israel, GPO head, Daniel Seaman, told Re- litary operations. The foreign journalists porters Without Borders that 500 extra could reveal strategic positions and the journalists had been accredited to cover the ground operations could put the safety of conflict as “visitors”. journalists in the field at risk. Who took the decision to close the From the start of short “humanitarian Gaza Strip to foreign journalists? truces” guaranteed by Israel on 7 January, fo- reign journalists asked to be allowed to enter The various Israeli authorities put the res- the zone when crossing points were opened ponsibility on each other. Foreign ministry up to humanitarian aid, for two or three hours spokesman,Yigal Palmor, told Reporters Wi- a day. thout Borders that his administration had no- thing to do with the decision.But he stressed The Coordinator of Government Activities in that restrictions put on journalists wanting the Territories (COGAT), the Israeli defence to go to the Gaza Strip pre-dated the ministry body in charge of coordinating issues conflict. relating to civilians, controls the crossing points, particularly that of Erez. Palmor told The “National Information Directorate”, set Reporters Without Borders that well before up in 2008 to deal with everything to do with the military operations in Gaza, the opening government communications, was certainly hours of the crossing points had been reduced consulted, butYigal Palmor said the decision to guarantee the safety of personnel working was taken at a yet higher level, between the there.The COGAT had therefore responded Israeli Prime Minister Ehud Olmert,and De- negatively to foreign press demands, using the fence Minister, Ehud Barak. Nahum Barnea, argument of restrictions linked to the safety of editorialist on Yedioth Aharonoth,said that the personnel at the crossing points, refusing the- two men did not agree:“If Barak leaned to- refore to allow journalists to cross over during wards allowing the entry of foreign journa- the hours set aside for aid organisations. lists, Olmert definitely vetoed it”. When on 9 January, it appeared there was sta- How did the press itself react? lemate, Reporters Without Borders launched an appeal urging the Israeli authorities to res- The Supreme Court on 31 December 2008, tore access to the Gaza Strip to foreign repor- after proceedings were launched by the Fo- ters, judging such a closure to be untenable reign PressAssociation (FPA) grouping all fo- and dangerous.The appeal was signed, within a reign journalists in Israel and the Palestinian few days, by 160 international media, including Israel / Gaza Operation “Cast Lead”: News control asPalestinian military journalists objective caught between Israeli firing and Hamas threats CNN, the NewYorkTimes and Sky News.The 160 Strip by the Rafah crossing,which is control- signatures were on 22 January handed to the led by the Egyptian authorities.The Israeli Israeli ambassador in France, Daniel Shek, by army announced on 22 January that it had de- the secretary general of Reporters Without cided to allow foreign journalists to enter Borders, Jean-François Julliard. Gaza via Erez from the following day. Howe- ver, it only applied to the journalists regularly Foreign and Israeli reporters were despite this accredited by the Government Press Office. forced to stay on the outside.“Journalists are asked to watch the war from far away,through Following a second appeal by the FPA,the a huge glass screen.We can guess at the des- Israeli Supreme Court on 25 January told truction, but we do not know about the the Israeli government that it should human stories behind it,” said one BBC journa- allow foreign correspondents access to list. The town of Sderot, north of Gaza, was the Gaza Strip, closure only being invoked turned into a “giant journalistland”, to quote in “circumstances of physical danger”.The the correspondent for Le Monde, Benjamin FPA welcomed this decision that “streng- Barthe.The army set up a press centre for fo- thens protection of press freedom and reign journalists where the military could re- freedom of movement, as fundamental ceive press representatives in any language, or rights that cannot be restricted except almost, military spokesman, Major Avital Leibo- in extreme circumstances”, as the organi- vich told ReportersWithout Borders:“You just sation’s lawyer, Gilead Sher, put it.
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