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Midway Repeats Trafalgar's Lessons

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Midway Repeats Trafalgar's Lessons MIDWAY REPEATS TRAFALGAR’S LESSONS CIMM/ws Midway Repeats Trafalgar’s Lessons: How Division of Force Defeated a Larger Navy William Sutherling, Docent Channel Islands Maritime Museum 3900 Bluefin Circle Oxnard, CA 93035 Keywords: massing force, firepower, Mega Joules, Lanchester relations, N-Square Law, Salvo relations, strategy, victory disease, Schlieffen syndrome, Murphy’s Law. (Pages 192, Words 36,500) 1 MIDWAY REPEATS TRAFALGAR’S LESSONS CIMM/ws This is educational material of the Channel Islands Maritime Museum. Please kindly obtain permission of the CIMM to reproduce this document in electronic or printed format. Thank you. Many thanks go to Jerry Leckie, Doug Adams, Tom Shideler, Doug Russell, Dave Anderson, Tom Danza, Bill Conroy, Heather Behrens and Tom Johnston. 2 MIDWAY REPEATS TRAFALGAR’S LESSONS CIMM/ws TABLE OF CONTENTS INTRODUCTION………………………………………………………… 7 Interesting findings: Realistic equation for Midway outcome Japan could have won with 2 more carriers at Midway, available Villeneuve could have equaled with 94 ships at Trafalgar, not available Less than 1% of total firepower sank five carriers at Midway High USN torpedo failure rate revealed torpedo bombers as a feint PART I: FIREPOWER……………………………………………………… 11 Energy in Mega Joules 12 A. WEAPONS 13 Anti-Aircraft Guns 14 Effectiveness 17 Torpedoes 19 The Great Torpedo Scandal 21 Trafalgar Comparison – Fuses 23 Bombs 26 Mines 27 B. ATTACK CRAFT 28 Warships 28 Submarines 30 Aircraft 32 IJN aircraft shortage 34 USN aircraft production 34 IJN aircraft range advantage 36 Aircraft Warfare 39 Trafalgar Comparison – Communications 42 C. TOTAL IJN AND USN FIREPOWER COMPARED 44 IJN and USN Mega Joules vs Lanchester Military Effectiveness 45 Decisive firepower, which sank carriers at Midway 47 The question of the ZUIKAKU 48 Trafalgar Comparison – Firepower. 50 PART II: FIREPOWER RATIOS, SALVOS AND TIMELINE 52 A. MODERN FIREPOWER 52 Fewer exchanges in modern warfare 52 The Dynamics of Naval Battles 54 Lanchester’s Equations and Fiske’s tables 54 The N-Square Law 58 The Salvo Equations 63 The Dynamics of the Salvo Equations 66 Trafalgar Comparison – Firepower equations for the two battles 71 Greater massing of force does not avoid M.A.D. 72 Philippine Sea 72 Midway 73 3 MIDWAY REPEATS TRAFALGAR’S LESSONS CIMM/ws B. THE TIMELINE AT MIDWAY 74 After Coral Sea 74 IJN Steaming to Midway with four carriers as 1st Kido Butai 75 After first attack on Midway Atoll 75 After decisions to change munitions – “Nagumo’s Dilemma” 77 Trafalgar Comparison – Calculated risk. 82 Were the USN torpedo bombers used as a diversion? 83 Trafalgar Comparison – Reversed decisions during battle 85 Trafalgar Comparison – Commonsense action under pressure 86 Experience and Commonsense 86 Action under Pressure 87 Decision at Pearl Harbor 87 The “Victory Disease” and the “Schlieffen Syndrome” 90 C. CROSSING POINTS 92 Crossing Points of carriers and aircraft in Actual Battle 93 Crossing Point at Nagumo’s Dilemma 95 Realistic Salvo Equations for the Battle give the historical results 97 Trafalgar Comparison – Crossing Points. 99 Crossing Points in other possible scenarios with more IJN carriers 99 Scenario with RYUJO and JUNYO 100 Scenario with RYUJO, JUNYO and ZUIKAKU 102 Trafalgar Comparison – Alternative Possible Scenarios 104 EPILOGUE/CONCLUSION 106 Glossary 107 Bibliography 114 APPENDIX A. Tables (36) 118 APPENDIX B. Solving the Lanchester Equations 160 Calculation of small differences Derivative 161 Derivative as a Limit 164 Integral 166 Solutions to Lanchester’s Equations 168 APPENDIX C. Solutions of Salvo Equation for different scenarios 170 Generic Salvo Equations 170 Scenario 1. Example of Massing of Force 170 Scenario 2. Battle of the Philippine Sea 171 Scenario 3. General Salvo Equations for Midway 171 SCENARIO 4. Salvo Equations for actual carrier numbers at Midway 172 SCENARIO 5. Salvo Equations with RYUJO and JUNYO 174 SCENARIO 6. Salvo Equations with RYUJO, JUNYO and ZUIKAKU 177 APPENDIX D. Text of Yahachi Tanabe, LCDR, IJN, on sinking YORKTOWN 182 APPENDIX E. Text of the Great Torpedo Scandal Investigation 191 4 MIDWAY REPEATS TRAFALGAR’S LESSONS CIMM/ws List of Tables in the text Table I. Total firepower in Pacific Operations 44 Table II. IJN and USN total Pacific firepower 45 Table III. Firepower which sank the carriers at Midway 47 Table IV. ZUIKAKU’s full complement potential firepower 48 Table V. ZUIKAKU’s actual immediately available firepower after Coral Sea 48 Table VI. Total firepower at Midway and Trafalgar 50 Table VII. Midway outcomes 52 List of Figures in the text. Figure 1. Radius of IJN and USN strikes. Reverse colors for consistency 37 Figure 2. Two fully constituted, well-coordinated IJN and USN air strikes 39 Figure 3. IJN AAW defense against USN DAUNTLESS dive-bomber 40 Figure 4. Illustration of Lanchester’s Equation for a larger force. 56 Figure 5. Illustration of Lanchester’s Equation for superior 3:1 gunnery. 60 Figure 6. Timeline of Nagumo’s Dilemma before 0753 on 4 June 1942. 77 Figure 7. Timeline of Dilemma after 0753 dive-bomber attack from Midway 79 List of Graphs in the text. Graph 1. Illustration of N-Square Law 58 Graph 2. Timeline of Fleet Carriers available for Midway 93 Graph 3. Timeline of Aircraft available for Midway 93 Graph 4. Timeline of Aircraft firepower during Nagumo’s Dilemma 95 Graph 5. Timeline of carriers in actual Midway Battle by Salvo Equations 98 Graph 6. Timeline of carriers in scenario with RYUJO and JUNYO 101 Graph 7. Timeline of carriers in scenario with RYUJO, JUNYO and ZUIKAKU 102 List of Maps in the text Map 1. Battle of Midway. Pacific Ocean 9 Map 2. Battle of Midway. Movement of Forces 10 List of Charts in the text Chart 1. Firepower of AAW guns of IJN and USN at Midway. 14 Chart 2. Anti-Aircraft gun Effectiveness. 17 Chart 3. Firepower of IJN and USN torpedoes at Midway. 19 Chart 4. IJN and USN submarines nominal and actual firepower. 30 Chart 5. Firepower of IJN and USN aircraft types in Mega Joules per minute. 32 Chart 6. IJN and USN aircraft Range (radius = ½ range) 36 Chart 7. Total combined Midway and Aleutian Forces for IJN and USN. 46 Chart 8. Illustration of Lanchester’s Equation for different starting force ratios. 57 Chart 9. Salvo Equations for decreasing IJN defense term 67 Chart 10. Salvo Equations for decreasing IJN staying power term 68 Chart 11. Change in IJN versus USN Effective Aircraft from 0430 to 0745 80 Chart 12. Change in IJN vs USN Aircraft Military Effectiveness from 0430 to 0745 81 5 MIDWAY REPEATS TRAFALGAR’S LESSONS CIMM/ws Chart 13. Trafalgar: Actual Battle and Scenario with 66 Combined Fleet Ships 104 List of Tables in APPENDIX A X-1 IJN Guns’ Firepower. X-2 USN Guns’ firepower. X-2a Firepower of each gun of IJN and USN at Midway 1942. X-2b Number of rounds to shoot down one enemy aircraft for each USN AA gun. X-3 IJN Torpedoes firepower. X-4 USN Torpedoes firepower. X-4a Firepower of IJN and USN torpedoes at Midway. X-4b TNT equivalents IJN Shimose and USN TNT, with other explosives for comparison. X-5 USN Mark 14 Torpedo performance. X-6 IJN Bombs and Depth Charges firepower. X-7 USN Bombs and Depth Charges firepower. X-7a Aerial Bombs used at Midway. X-8 IJN Mines firepower. X-9 USN Mines firepower. X-10 Firepower by IJN Warship class. X-11 Firepower by USN Warship class. X-12 Total IJN Warship firepower. X-13 Total USN Warship firepower. X-13a Firepower of Ships of IJN and USN at Midway and Aleutians. X-14 Firepower by IJN Submarine class. X-15 Total IJN Submarine firepower at Midway. X-16 Firepower by USN Submarine class. X-17 Total USN Submarine firepower at Midway. X-17a USN Submarine offensive firepower reduced at Midway by Mark 6 fuse. X-18 Firepower by IJN Aircraft class. X-19 Firepower by USN Aircraft class. X-19a Comparison IJN and USN Aircraft firepower by class. X-19b Range of IJN and USN Aircraft. X-20 Total IJN Aircraft firepower. X-21 Total USN Aircraft firepower. X-22 Comparison IJN USN Total Aircraft Firepower in numbers N and Mega Joules MJ/’. X-23 AAW gun firepower of IJN carriers. X-24 AAW gun firepower of USN carriers. X-25 Total IJN Firepower. X-26 Total USN Firepower. X-27 Comparison Total IJN and USN Firepower in Pacific Operation. X-28 Total Ship Firepower IJN 1st Kido Butai vs Main Body and Other Groups. X-29 Comparison of IJN and USN Firepower at Midway Battle. X-30 Comparison of Total Firepower at Midway and Trafalgar. X-31 Carriers in the Pacific theater in June 1942. X-32 Military Effectiveness ratios of IJN and USN units for Midway-Aleutians. X-33 Nagumo’s Dilemma: 1st Kido Butai Aircraft. X-34 Military Effectiveness of IJN aircraft united and then divided. X-35 Trafalgar re-analysis with Villeneuve having slow-match fuse but twice as many ships. 6 MIDWAY REPEATS TRAFALGAR’S LESSONS CIMM/ws X-36 Trafalgar re-analysis after Nelson cut line but Villeneuve with three times the ships. 7 MIDWAY REPEATS TRAFALGAR’S LESSONS CIMM/ws INTRODUCTION AND SUMMARY The Battles of Midway and Trafalgar were similar in several ways. Both were large naval battles, arising from the expansion of new empires. Both imperial commands were overconfident. Both saw larger forces defeated by smaller ones. And both changed the course of history. In a study of Trafalgar, Lanchester and Fiske showed that a force with more ships won disproportionately by attrition through the N-Square Law.1 2 Hughes, however, showed that large losses occurred suddenly in modern aircraft carrier battles.3 These obeyed the Salvo Equations.4 Midway had different dynamics than Trafalgar, but both dynamics obey the principle of mass, where the largest effective firepower dominates.
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