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(CUWS) Outreach Journal USAF Center for Unconventional Weapons Studies (CUWS) Outreach Journal CUWS Outreach Journal 30 July 2015 Feature Item: “Nuclear Weapons Sustainment: Improvements Made to Budget Estimates, but Opportunities Exist to Further Enhance Transparency.” Authored by the U.S. Government Accountability Office (GAO); GAO-15-536: Published: July 30, 2015; publicly released: July 30, 2015, 47 pages. http://www.gao.gov/assets/680/671788.pdf The annual joint report submitted by the Department of Defense (DOD) and the Department of Energy (DOE) in May 2014 includes 10-year budget estimates for sustaining and modernizing U.S. nuclear weapons (see figure), and these estimates are generally consistent with internal funding and modernization plans, with a few exceptions. For example, GAO could not fully verify that DOD's command, control, and communications estimates were consistent with its internal funding plans, because DOD did not document methodological assumptions and limitations associated with these estimates as GAO had previously recommended. Similarly, DOE's estimates are generally consistent with its internal plans, with two exceptions; for example, the budget estimate for the first five years of the cruise missile warhead life extension program is lower than the cost range in DOE's internal plans. U.S. Nuclear Weapons Air Force puts 4-Star General in Charge of Nukes for First Time since Cold War At Loose End: Pentagon Racking Its Brains Over US ICBM Basing Mode Cost of US Nuclear Delivery Systems Soared 40% in a Single Year U.S. Counter-WMD Russia Launches Cutting-Edge Spy Ship to Track U.S. Missile Defense Putin Blames US for 'Spiral of Arms Race' Russia Makes Proportionate Response to Missile Defense in Europe — Defense Ministry U.S. Arms Control Putin: Russia's Strategic Defense Actions Comply with Int'l Commitments US, Russia Should Have Diplomatic Dialogue on INF Treaty - CRS Homeland Security/The Americas USAF Chief Engineer: Directed Energy for Missile Defense 'At Tipping Point' Strategic Command Focused on Hypersonic Missile Threat Asia/Pacific N.K. Building High Explosives Assembly Facility for Nuclear Weapons at Yongbyon: 38 North North Korea Marks Korean War Anniversary with Threat to 'Leave No Americans Alive' North Korea Will Not Give Up Nuclear Weapons Unilaterally — Ambassador North Korea May Conduct Nuclear Tests in October — Deputy UN Envoy N. Korea Completes Upgrade of Rocket Site, shows No Signs of Launch Preparations yet Scud Missiles Fired into Saudi Arabia from Yemen Traced to N.Korea: Official N. Korean Leader Inspects 'War Drills' against U.S., S. Korea Europe/Russia Russia to Build 5th-Gen. Nuclear Subs by 2020 in Push to Modernize Military Russia Not Planning to Deploy Tu-22M3 Bomber in Crimea Live-Firing of Iskander-M Tactical Missiles Completed near Russia's Orenburg Tu-160M2 to Have New Avionics That Will Increase Its Effectiveness Twofold Russia to Deliver Modernized Version of S-300 Air Defense System to Iran Middle East Zarif Reacts to Kerry’s Senate Hearing Remarks IRGC Deputy Top Commander: US Unable to Take Slightest Hostile Move against Iran Iran Nuclear: Media Ordered to Be Positive about Deal Araqchi Clarifies “Reversibility” of JCPOA Commitments for Iran UN Agency May Allow Iran to Gather Soil Samples at Alleged Nuclear Site Kerry Warns of Consequences if Congress Rejects Iran Nuclear Deal Leader's Aide: UNSC Resolution on Iran's Defensive Capabilities Unacceptable Verification of Iran N-Program Depends on Secret Agreement with IAEA Saudi Arabia to Buy 600 Patriot Missiles for $5.4 bn DoD to Congress: Iran Deal or No, Military Options Open Iran Rejects Report of Confidential Annexes to JCPOA India/Pakistan Pakistan to Buy 8 Submarines, the Biggest Arms Export Deal for China Africa Commentary Commentary: Vienna Deal is Best Way to Keep Iran from Getting Nuclear Weapons ‘Peace for Our Time’ The Most Dangerous Nuclear Weapon in America's Arsenal Are America's Long-Range Ballistic Missiles Doomed? Return to Top Alaska Dispatch News – Anchorage, AK Air Force puts 4-Star General in Charge of Nukes for First Time since Cold War Robert Burns, Associated Press (AP) July 27, 2015 WASHINGTON — Working to reinvigorate its nuclear force after years of missteps and scandal, the Air Force is putting a four-star general in charge for the first time in the post-Cold War era. His mission: Restore institutional muscle and assert more influence on the force's behalf. "Having a four-star in charge of this command will be crucial," Air Force Secretary Deborah Lee James said in an interview, "because rank matters." Gen. Robin Rand, a career fighter pilot, will take over Tuesday as commander of Air Force Global Strike Command, replacing Lt. Gen. Stephen Wilson. Rand has never served in the nuclear force, but he has broad experience in the Air Force, most recently as commander of the organization in charge of all recruiting, technical training and professional military education. He steps in amid optimism in the Air Force that it has put its nuclear force back on track. A series of Associated Press reports revealed that the force had atrophied and morale had suffered, in part because of a lack of resources as other arms of the service prevailed in competition for dollars and power. Elevating the Air Force nuclear bomber and missile command to four-star rank was among the recommendations last fall by an independent panel that studied the root cause of slip-ups, particularly within the organization that operates and manages the Air Force's 450 Minuteman 3 intercontinental ballistic missiles, or ICBMs, at bases in Montana, Wyoming and North Dakota. The study was undertaken on orders from Defense Secretary Chuck Hagel in response to the AP reports starting in May 2013 that documented evidence of low morale, weak discipline and training gaps. Hagel ordered top-to-bottom changes and pledged $8 billion in new investment over five years. He endorsed the independent study's conclusion that having a three-star run the nuclear force was a mistake. "There is no substitute for" four-star influence, the study said, adding that relegating the nuclear command to lower rank sent a "less-than-desirable message to the airmen performing the mission." The days of having a four-star nuclear command ended at the close of the Cold War when the U.S. dismantled Strategic Air Command, the Air Force's strategic bombers were reassigned to Air Combat Command and the ICBM fleet was given to Air Force Space Command. A shocking mishandling of nuclear weapons at a bomber base in 2007 brought reforms that led to creation of Air Force Global Strike Command, the organization that Rand will now lead. The command manages the Air Force's nuclear force, but the military's nuclear war-fighting group is U.S. Strategic Command, headed by a four-star admiral. It also has other responsibilities including cyber and missile defense. Virtually the entire nuclear Air Force chain of command has been overturned since the AP disclosed in May 2013 an internal Air Force email lamenting "rot" inside the ICBM force. The note's author was Lt. Col. Jay Folds. He was reacting in part to training and disciplinary breakdowns at the Minuteman 3 wing at Minot Air Force Base that prompted the Air Force to suspend 17 launch officers, an unprecedented action that came to light only through the leaking of Folds' email. Folds is now a full colonel and recently became the No. 2 commander at the 341st Missile Wing at Malmstrom Air Force Base in Montana. Rand, a 1979 graduate of the Air Force Academy, has run the Education and Training Command since October 2013. Before that he headed the Air Force component of U.S. Southern Command, and he commanded the Air Force's main fighter wing in Iraq in 2006-07. He declined to be interviewed for this article. His lack of nuclear experience is not a worry, said Air Force Secretary James. "I think he's just the ticket," she said. "The No. 1 thing this community needs is it needs a fantastic leader, an inspirational leader." "It would have been great if he also had the nuclear experience, but in this case we didn't have somebody immediately in the wings who was ready to take that on at that level, who had that experience." Tony Carr, a retired Air Force officer who is studying law at Harvard, says putting a non-nuclear officer in charge can serve as a check against complacency. "Elevation of the position to a four-star billet is even more remarkable," he said. "This reflects the Air Force's acknowledgement that institutional neglect is a special risk in this community. A four- star's access and presence at the highest level of resource allocation and policy collaboration is an insurance policy against that neglect." James and other senior Air Force officials say they are confident that the ICBM force has been jolted out of its doldrums and its era of decline. "The actions we've taken over the last 18 months are moving us in the right direction," Maj. Gen. Jack Weinstein, commander of all three ICBM wings, said in late June. https://www.adn.com/article/20150727/air-force-puts-4-star-general-charge-nukes-first-time- cold-war Return to Top Sputnik International – Russian Information Agency At Loose End: Pentagon Racking Its Brains Over US ICBM Basing Mode While the question of upgrading the US nuclear triad arises, the Pentagon is still racking its brains over the most cost-effective option for ICBM basing, American writer Steve Weintz emphasizes. 29 July 2015 If the US Armed Forces plans to keep its ICBM (Intercontinental Ballistic Missile) force it should find an appropriate basing mode for it, American writer and filmmaker Steve Weintz explained.
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