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'The Future of Britain's Nuclear Weapons
org-cdr-cover-final 280306.qxd 17/05/2007 14:24 Page 1 OxfordResearchGroup building bridges for global security In collaboration with Beyond Trident OxfordResearchGroup Oxford Research Group (ORG) is an independent non-governmental organisation (NGO) which works to develop effective methods for people to bring about positive change on issues of national and international security by non-violent means. Established in 1982, it is a registered charity and a “This report covers public company limited by guarantee. In 2003 its founder director Scilla Elworthy was awarded the Niwano Peace Prize for her work with ORG, and in April 2005 The Independent newspaper named the nuclear debate ORG one of the top 20 think tanks in the UK undertaking “blue skies” thinking. comprhensively from all sides of the We carry out and commission research into realistic non-military alternatives to current security THE FUTURE argument. orthodoxy. We publish and disseminate our findings through reports, seminars, consultations and Regardless of their private dialogues. Our practice is to make accurate information available so that open public debate OF BRITAIN’S convictions, the can take place. We also seek to foster dialogue between policy-makers and their critics, to help build bridges of understanding as a means of developing new ideas and making possible significant policy authors make a shifts. ORG seeks to promote more transparent, accountable and informed decision-making compelling case for processes in UK and overseas governments. NUCLEAR a wider debate in Britain about the WEAPONS: future of our About this report nuclear weapon This report is published in the context of a series of inquiries taking place within the Defence capability. -
High Energy Materials Related Titles
Jai Prakash Agrawal High Energy Materials Related Titles M. Lackner, F. Winter, A.K. Agrawal M. Hattwig, H. Steen (Eds.) (Eds.) Handbook of Explosion Prevention Handbook of Combustion and Protection 5 Volumes 2004 2010 ISBN: 978-3-527-30718-0 ISBN: 978-3-527-32449-1 R. Meyer, J. Köhler, A. Homburg R. Meyer, J. Köhler, A. Homburg Explosivstoffe Explosives 2008 2007 ISBN: 978-3-527-32009-7 ISBN: 978-3-527-31656-4 J.P. Agrawal, R.D. Hodgson N. Kubota Organic Chemistry of Explosives Propellants and Explosives Thermochemical Aspects of 2007 ISBN: 978-0-470-02967-1 Combustion 2007 ISBN: 978-3-527-31424-9 U. Teipel (Ed.) Energetic Materials Particle Processing and Characterization 2005 ISBN: 978-3-527-30240-6 Jai Prakash Agrawal High Energy Materials Propellants, Explosives and Pyrotechnics The Author All books published by Wiley-VCH are carefully produced. Nevertheless, authors, editors, and Dr. Jai Prakash Agrawal publisher do not warrant the information C Chem FRSC (UK) contained in these books, including this book, to Former Director of Materials be free of errors. Readers are advised to keep in Defence R&D Organization mind that statements, data, illustrations, DRDO Bhawan, New Delhi, India procedural details or other items may [email protected] inadvertently be inaccurate. Library of Congress Card No.: applied for Sponsored by the Department of Science and Technology under its Utilization of Scientifi c British Library Cataloguing-in-Publication Data Expertise of Retired Scientists Scheme A catalogue record for this book is available from the British Library. Bibliographic information published by the Deutsche Nationalbibliothek The Deutsche Nationalbibliothek lists this publication in the Deutsche Nationalbibliografi e; detailed bibliographic data are available on the Internet at http://dnb.d-nb.de. -
China's Strategic Modernization: Implications for the United States
CHINA’S STRATEGIC MODERNIZATION: IMPLICATIONS FOR THE UNITED STATES Mark A. Stokes September 1999 ***** The views expressed in this report are those of the author and do not necessarily reflect the official policy or position of the Department of the Army, the Department of the Air Force, the Department of Defense, or the U.S. Government. This report is cleared for public release; distribution is unlimited. ***** Comments pertaining to this report are invited and should be forwarded to: Director, Strategic Studies Institute, U.S. Army War College, 122 Forbes Ave., Carlisle, PA 17013-5244. Copies of this report may be obtained from the Publications and Production Office by calling commercial (717) 245-4133, FAX (717) 245-3820, or via the Internet at [email protected] ***** Selected 1993, 1994, and all later Strategic Studies Institute (SSI) monographs are available on the SSI Homepage for electronic dissemination. SSI’s Homepage address is: http://carlisle-www.army. mil/usassi/welcome.htm ***** The Strategic Studies Institute publishes a monthly e-mail newsletter to update the national security community on the research of our analysts, recent and forthcoming publications, and upcoming conferences sponsored by the Institute. Each newsletter also provides a strategic commentary by one of our research analysts. If you are interested in receiving this newsletter, please let us know by e-mail at [email protected] or by calling (717) 245-3133. ISBN 1-58487-004-4 ii CONTENTS Foreword .......................................v 1. Introduction ...................................1 2. Foundations of Strategic Modernization ............5 3. China’s Quest for Information Dominance ......... 25 4. -
KA-6D Intruder - 1971
KA-6D Intruder - 1971 United States Type: Tanker (Air Refueling) Min Speed: 300 kt Max Speed: 570 kt Commissioned: 1971 Length: 16.7 m Wingspan: 16.2 m Height: 4.8 m Crew: 2 Empty Weight: 12070 kg Max Weight: 27500 kg Max Payload: 15870 kg Propulsion: 2x J52-P-409 Weapons / Loadouts: - 300 USG Drop Tank - Drop Tank. OVERVIEW: The Grumman A-6 Intruder was an American, twin jet-engine, mid-wing all-weather attack aircraft built by Grumman Aerospace. In service with the U.S. Navy and U.S. Marine Corps between 1963 and 1997, the Intruder was designed as an all-weather medium attack aircraft to replace the piston-engined Douglas A-1 Skyraider. As the A-6E was slated for retirement, its precision strike mission was taken over by the Grumman F-14 Tomcat equipped with a LANTIRN pod. From the A-6, a specialized electronic warfare derivative, the EA-6 was developed. DETAILS: The A-6's design team was led by Lawrence Mead, Jr. He later played a lead role in the design of the Grumman F-14 Tomcat and the Lunar Excursion Module. The jet nozzles were originally designed to swivel downwards for shorter takeoffs and landings. This feature was initially included on prototype aircraft, but was removed from the design during flight testing. The cockpit used an unusual double pane windscreen and side-by-side seating arrangement in which the pilot sat in the left seat, while the bombardier/navigator sat to the right and slightly below. The incorporation of an additional crew member with separate responsibilities, along with a unique cathode ray tube (CRT) display that provided a synthetic display of terrain ahead, enabled low-level attack in all weather conditions. -
Nuclear Weapons Versus International Law: a Contextual Reassessment
Nuclear Weapons Versus International Law: A Contextual Reassessment Burns H. Weston* While it is true that the world community has Quoiqu'il soit vrai que ]a communaut6 mon- yet to enact a treaty explicitly outlawing nu- diale n'ait pas r6ussi A conclure un traitd clear weapons in general, the author argues interdisant formellement l'usage d'armes that restraints on the conduct of war never nucl6aires, l'auteur soutient que les moyens have been limited to treaty law alone. Reject- de r6glementer les conflits arm6s ne sont pas ing a purely hegemonic and statist concep- limit6s au seul domaine du droit des trait6s. tion of international law, it is suggested in- Rejetant une conception purement h6g6mo- stead that an argument against the legality of nique et dtatiste du droit international, l'au- most - and clearly all dominant - uses of teur propose plut6t qu'il est possible d'arti- nuclear weapons can be fashioned from im- culer une position contre ]a 16galit6 de l'u- plicit treaty provisions, international cus- sage d'armes nucl6aires dans la tr~s grande toms, general principles, judicial decisions, majorit6 des cas, A partir des dispositions United Nations declarations, and even from implicites de trait6s existants, du droit coutu- initiatives by groups having little formal in- mier international, des principes g6n6raux, ternational status. The author employs the des d6cisionsjudiciaires, des d6clarations de "coordinate communication flow" theory of I'ONU, et m~me des initiatives de groupes norm prescription to demonstrate that the sans statut international reconnu. L'auteur laws of war, including their humanitarian fait appel A la th6orie de la prescription de components, do apply to nuclear weapons normes par flot d'information coordonn6 and warfare. -
R:\TEMP\Bobbi\RDD-8 3-16-04 Reprint.Wpd
OFFICIAL USE ONLY RESTRICTED DATA DECLASSIFICATION DECISIONS 1946 TO THE PRESENT (RDD-8) January 1, 2002 U.S. Department of Energy Office of Health, Safety and Security Office of Classification Contains information which may be exempt from public release under the Freedom of Information Act (5 U.S.C. 552), exemption number(s) 2. Approval by the Department of Energy prior to public release is required. Reviewed by: Richard J. Lyons Date: 3/20/2002 NOTICE This document provides historical perspective on the sequence of declassification actions performed by the Department of Energy and its predecessor agencies. It is meant to convey the amount and types of information declassified over the years. Although the language of the original declassification authorities is cited verbatim as much as possible to preserve the historical intent of the declassification, THIS DOCUMENT IS NOT TO BE USED AS THE BASIS FOR DECLASSIFYING DOCUMENTS AND MATERIALS without specific authorization from the Director, Information Classification and Control Policy. Classification guides designed for that specific purpose must be used. OFFICIAL USE ONLY OFFICIAL USE ONLY This page intentionally left blank OFFICIAL USE ONLY OFFICIAL USE ONLY FOREWORD This document supersedes Restricted Data Declassification Decisions - 1946 To The Present (RDD-7), January 1, 2001. This is the eighth edition of a document first published in June 1994. This latest edition includes editorial corrections to RDD-7, all declassification actions that have been made since the January 1, 2001, publication date of RDD-7 and any additional declassification actions which were subsequently discovered or confirmed. Note that the terms “declassification” or “declassification action,” as used in this document, refer to changes in classification policy which result in a specific fact or concept that was classified in the past being now unclassified. -
Dissertation Ist an Der Hauptbibliothek Der Technischen Universität Wien Aufgestellt (
Die approbierte Originalversion dieser Dissertation ist an der Hauptbibliothek der Technischen Universität Wien aufgestellt (http://www.ub.tuwien.ac.at). The approved original version of this thesis is available at the main library of the Vienna University of Technology (http://www.ub.tuwien.ac.at/englweb/). DISSERTATION Development and quantification of new methods for the determination and preparation of short-lived xenon isotopes for the verification of the Comprehensive Nuclear Test Ban Treaty (CTBT) in a laboratoy ausgefuhrt zum Zwecke der Erlangung des akademischen Grades eines Doktors der technischen Wissenschaften unter der Leitung von Ao. Univ. Prof. Dr. phil. Manfred Tschurlovits E141 Atominstitut der Osterreichischen Universitaten durchgefuhrt im Forschungszentrum Seibersdorf ARC Seibersdorf research GmbH, Health Physics, Risk & Safety Betreuer:. Mug. Dr. Erich Hrnecek eingereicht an der Technischen Universitat Wien Fakultat fur Physik von Mag. Raith Maria Matrikelnummer: 9401122 St. Wendelin-Gasse 6/7 1220 Wien Wien, im Marz 2006 DANKSAGUNG An erster Stelle mochte ich mich bei meinem Doktorvater Prof. Manfred Tschurlovits fur seine grogartige Unterstiitzung und Betreuung sowie die vielen anregenden Diskussionen bedanken. Den Austrian research centers Seibersdorf GmbH danke ich herzlichst, dass sie die vorliegende Arbeit finanziert haben sowie mir die Gelegenheit gegeben haben, diese durchzufuhren. Personlich gilt mein grogter Dank Dr. Erich Hrnecek fiir seine wirklich tolle Betreuung und die grogartige Zusammenarbeit, an welche ich mich bestimmt irnmer gerne zuruck erinnern werde. Allgemein mochte ich der Gruppe ,,Sicherheit und Risiko" fur die gute Zusammenarbeit in den drei Jahren danken. Ein groger Dank auch fur die Reaktorgruppe am Atominstitut der Osterreichischen Universitaten, die mich immer unterstutzt haben, wenn Proben bestrahlt wurden. -
Dangerous Thermonuclear Quest: the Potential of Explosive Fusion Research for the Development of Pure Fusion Weapons
Dangerous Thermonuclear Quest: The Potential of Explosive Fusion Research for the Development of Pure Fusion Weapons Arjun Makhijani, Ph.D. Hisham Zerriffi July 1998 Minor editing revisions made in 2003. Table of Contents Preface i Summary and Recommendations v Summary of Findings vi Recommendations vii Chapter 1: Varieties of Nuclear Weapons 1 A. Historical Background 1 B. Converting Matter into Energy 4 C. Fission energy 5 D. Fusion energy 8 E. Fission-fusion weapons 16 Chapter 2: Inertial Confinement Fusion Basics 19 A. Deposition of driver energy 24 B. Driver requirements 25 C. Fuel pellet compression 27 D. Thermonuclear ignition 29 Chapter 3: Various ECF Schemes 31 A. Laser Drivers 32 B. Ion Beam Drivers 34 1. Heavy Ion Beams 35 a. Induction Accelerators 36 b. Radio-Frequency Accelerators 36 2. Light Ion Beams 37 C. Z-pinch 39 D. Chemical Explosives 40 E. Advanced materials manufacturing 42 1. Nanotechnology 42 2. Metallic Hydrogen 45 Chapter 4: The Prospects for Pure Fusion Weapons 47 A. Requirements for pure fusion weapons 47 B. Overall assessment of non-fission-triggered nuclear weapons 48 1. Ignition 48 2. Drivers 53 C. Overall technical prognosis for non-fission triggered nuclear weapons 54 D. Fusion power and fusion weapons - comparative requirements 56 Chapter 5: Nuclear Disarmament and Non-Proliferation Issues Related to Explosive Confinement Fusion 59 A. The Science Based Stockpile Stewardship Program 62 1. Reliability 62 a. Reliability definition 63 b. Future reliability problems 64 c. Relevance of NIF to reliability of the current stockpile 65 2. The US laser fusion program as a weapons development program 65 3. -
Siloed-Thinking.Pdf
1 siloed thinking: A Closer Look at the Ground-Based Strategic Deterrent ABOUT FAS The Federation of American Scientists (FAS) is an independent, nonpartisan think tank that brings together members of the science and policy communities to collaborate on mitigating global catastrophic threats. Founded in November 1945 as the Federation of Atomic Scientists by scientists who built the first atomic bombs during the Manhattan Project, FAS is devoted to the belief that scientists, engineers, and other technically trained people have the ethical obligation to ensure that the technological fruits of their intellect and labor are applied to the benefit of humankind. In 1946, FAS rebranded as the Federation of American Scientists to broaden its focus to prevent global catastrophes. Since its founding, FAS has served as an influential source of information and rigorous, evidence- based analysis of issues related to national security. Specifically, FAS works to reduce the spread and number of nuclear weapons, prevent nuclear and radiological terrorism, promote high standards for the safety and security of nuclear energy, illuminate government secrecy practices, and prevent the use of biological and chemical weapons. The Nuclear Information Project provides the public with reliable information about the status and trends of the nuclear weapons arsenals of the world’s nuclear-armed countries. The project, which according to the Washington Post is “one of the most widely sourced agencies for nuclear warhead counts,” uses open sources such as official documents, testimonies, previously undisclosed information obtained through the Freedom of Information Act, as well as independent analysis of commercial satellite imagery as the basis for developing the best available unclassified estimates of the status and trends of nuclear weapons worldwide. -
A-6E Intruder - 1987
A-6E Intruder - 1987 United States Type: Attack Min Speed: 300 kt Max Speed: 570 kt Commissioned: 1987 Length: 16.7 m Wingspan: 16.2 m Height: 4.8 m Crew: 2 Empty Weight: 12070 kg Max Weight: 27500 kg Max Payload: 15870 kg Propulsion: 2x J52-P-409 Sensors / EW: - AN/APQ-148 - (A-6E) Radar, Radar, Surface Search, Medium-Range, Max range: 277.8 km - AN/ALQ-126A - (A-6E) ECM, DECM, Defensive ECM, Max range: 0 km - AN/ALR-50 Charger Blue - (Navy) ESM, RWR, Radar Warning Receiver, Max range: 222.2 km - AN/ALR-45 Compass Tie - (Navy) ESM, RWR, Radar Warning Receiver, Max range: 222.2 km - Generic Laser Designator - (Surface Only) Laser Designator, Laser Target Designator & Ranger (LTD/R), Max range: 18.5 km - AN/AAS-33 TRAM - (Surface Only) Infrared, Infrared, Navigation / Attack FLIR, Max range: 55.6 km Weapons / Loadouts: - Mk83 1000lb LDGP - (1954) Bomb. Surface Max: 1.9 km. Land Max: 1.9 km. - 300 USG Drop Tank - Drop Tank. - Mk82 500lb LDGP - (1954) Bomb. Surface Max: 1.9 km. Land Max: 1.9 km. - Mk20 Rockeye II CB [247 x Mk118 Dual Purpose Bomblets] - (1969, Mk7 Dispenser) Bomb. Surface Max: 1.9 km. Land Max: 1.9 km. - AGM-84D Harpoon IC - (1986) Guided Weapon. Surface Max: 138.9 km. - GBU-10E/B Paveway II LGB [Mk84] - (USAF) Guided Weapon. Surface Max: 7.4 km. Land Max: 7.4 km. - GBU-12D/B Paveway II LGB [Mk82] - Guided Weapon. Surface Max: 7.4 km. Land Max: 7.4 km. - GBU-16B/B Paveway II LGB [Mk83] - (USN) Guided Weapon. -
Jack Frederick Davies 1 the IMPACT of HYPERSONIC WEAPONS ON
Jack Frederick Davies 1 THE IMPACT OF HYPERSONIC WEAPONS ON WORLD NUCLEAR POSTURE A Thesis Presented to The Faculty of the Department of Philosophy, Politics and Economics CEVRO Institut, Prague ------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------ In Partial Fulfillment of the Requirements for the Degree of Master of Arts by Jack Frederick Davies February 2020 Jack Frederick Davies 2 Table of Contents Page Introduction----------------------------------------------------------------------------3-6 Chapter 1 War and Diplomacy a Spectrum---------------------------------------6-15 1.1 International Actors as Hobbesian Persons--------------------7-9 1.2 The Politicization of War-------------------------------------------9-13 1.3 Coercive Diplomacy--------------------------------------------------13-15 Chapter 2 Nuclear Uniqueness------------------------------------------------------15-29 2.1 Introduction to the Nuclear Weapon------------------------------15-17 2.2 Nuclear Weapons and Coercive Diplomacy----------------------17-20 2.3 The Prospect of Limited War----------------------------------------20-22 2.4 Nuclear Weapons and Strategic Bombardment Theories------22-24 2.5 Strategic Bombing and Hiroshima and Nagasaki----------------24-27 2.6 Nuclear Weapons as an Engine of Diplomacy--------------------27-29 Chapter 3 Strategic Considerations of the Nuclear Option--------------------29-64 3.1 Compellence, Deterrence and Defense----------------------------30-32 3.2 The Balance of Terror -
UCRL-LR-107454: Assessment of the Safety of US Nuclear Weapons And
Fvl+- UCRL-LR-I07454I Report to Congress: Assessment of the Safety of u.S. Nuclear Weapons and Related .c\ Nuclear Test Requirements ,.., R. E. Kidder July 26, 199'::1 '1 Contents Abstract 1 Introduction 1 Principal Meansof Providing NuclearWarhead Safety 2 One-PointSafety : 3 NuclearPlutonium SafetyDispersal Safety 3 SafetyStandards for NuclearWeapons 3 ComparativeSafety of U.S. NuclearWeapons 3 The Minuteman Missiles 5 The Trident Missiles 5 Fire-ResistantPits 5 SeparableComponents 6 Responseto Congressmens'Questions 6 Summaryand Conclusions 10 Recommendations 12 References 12 AbbreviationsUsed 13 Appendix A. Letter from Edward M. Kennedyto JohnNuckolls A-l Appendix B. Letter from Les Aspin to the HonorableJames D. Watkins B-l Appendix C. Nuclear SafetyCriteria C-l Appendix D. SafetyStandards for NuclearWeapons D-l Appendix E. A Summaryof AccidentsInvolving U.S. NuclearWeapons and Nuclear WeaponsSystems E-l AppendixF. Biography F-l iii Report to Congress: Assessment of the Safety of U.S. ~ Nuclear Weapons and Related Nuclear Test Requirements Abstract.The principal safety features included in the design of modern nuclear weapons are described briefly, and each nuclear weapon currently in the stockpile or under development is given a comparative safetyI rating from "A" through "D," indicating the extent to which these safety features are included in its design. The list is then narrowed by deleting weapons currently scheduled for retirement and short-range, surface-to-surface tactical nuclear weapons that will likely be returned to the U.S. and placed in storage. With the exception of the Minuteman and Trident ballistic missile warheads, all warheads in this projected future stockpile will have both of the most important design features that contribute to nuclear weapon safety: enhanced electrical isolation (EEl) and insensitive high explosive (IHE).