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Jack Frederick Davies 1 the IMPACT of HYPERSONIC WEAPONS ON Jack Frederick Davies 1 THE IMPACT OF HYPERSONIC WEAPONS ON WORLD NUCLEAR POSTURE A Thesis Presented to The Faculty of the Department of Philosophy, Politics and Economics CEVRO Institut, Prague ------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------ In Partial Fulfillment of the Requirements for the Degree of Master of Arts by Jack Frederick Davies February 2020 Jack Frederick Davies 2 Table of Contents Page Introduction----------------------------------------------------------------------------3-6 Chapter 1 War and Diplomacy a Spectrum---------------------------------------6-15 1.1 International Actors as Hobbesian Persons--------------------7-9 1.2 The Politicization of War-------------------------------------------9-13 1.3 Coercive Diplomacy--------------------------------------------------13-15 Chapter 2 Nuclear Uniqueness------------------------------------------------------15-29 2.1 Introduction to the Nuclear Weapon------------------------------15-17 2.2 Nuclear Weapons and Coercive Diplomacy----------------------17-20 2.3 The Prospect of Limited War----------------------------------------20-22 2.4 Nuclear Weapons and Strategic Bombardment Theories------22-24 2.5 Strategic Bombing and Hiroshima and Nagasaki----------------24-27 2.6 Nuclear Weapons as an Engine of Diplomacy--------------------27-29 Chapter 3 Strategic Considerations of the Nuclear Option--------------------29-64 3.1 Compellence, Deterrence and Defense----------------------------30-32 3.2 The Balance of Terror and Massive Retaliation------------------32-36 3.3 Mutually Assured Destruction---------------------------------------36-40 3.4 Game Theory------------------------------------------------------------40-45 3.5 Limited War-------------------------------------------------------------45-54 3.6 Command and Control-------------------------------------------------54-64 Chapter 4 Hypersonic Missiles------------------------------------------------------64-71 Chapter 5 The Geopolitical and Strategic Impact of Hypersonic Weapons-71-82 Jack Frederick Davies 3 Conclusion--------------------------------------------------------------------------------82-84 Bibliography------------------------------------------------------------------------------84-87 Introduction The invention of the atomic bomb changed the nature of the world order forever. The line between warfare and diplomacy, already blurred by the rise of 19th century statistical warfare and the politics of mobilization, was in some ways completely evaporated. The uniqueness of nuclear weapons, their massive potential to cause casualties, mostly indiscriminate nature and risk of long-term damage to the environment; caused planners to think carefully about how to use them appropriately. Currently, in the world today nuclear weapons are possessed by nine different countries Russia, the United States, China, France, United Kingdom, India, Pakistan, North Korea and Israel.1 At the present time Iran and Syria are cause for concern while South Africa, Iraq, Libya, Brazil, Argentina, South Korea and Taiwan at one point had nuclear programs.2 Initially under conditions of a US monopoly, nuclear weapons were used to deter conventional aggression using a doctrine of massive retaliation. This doctrine challenged even the smallest use of conventional arms with the threat of a full-scale nuclear bombardment of cities, industry, infrastructure and military targets. Other nations however quickly realized the 1 Davenport, Kelsey, and Kingston Reif . “Nuclear Weapons: Who Has What at a Glance | Arms Control Association.” Arms Control Association, July 2019, https://www.armscontrol.org/factsheets/Nuclearweaponswhohaswhat. 2 Ibid Jack Frederick Davies 4 utility of nuclear weapons and concurrently the danger of leaving them as the exclusive purview of one nation. In 1949, the USSR became the next nuclear weapons power quickly followed by the UK, France and China; starting an era of proliferation that continues to some extent to this day. With the spread of the nuclear capability came the death of the doctrine of massive retaliation; despite efforts in certain circles to prolong it. Alternatives quickly emerged in the form of the counter-force doctrine and Mutually Assured Destruction. It was the latter that eventually became the strategic consensus, by necessity rather than assent, despite the efforts of weapons designers and strategists to break the hold of such a pessimistic doctrine on the minds of planners, the public and the military. Nevertheless, during the era of the Cold War there were several points where unequal levels of technology again rendered the possibility of military victory in nuclear war. During these times it has always been necessary to update strategy to account for the new technologies, offensive or defensive, in order to maintain the balance of power and dissuade a nuclear first-use. Times of adjustment and transition however are always the most dangerous; rules are not clearly defined and consequences not entirely known. One side for example may conclude that it lacks the time or money to develop an effective countermeasure; generating a ‘now or never’ approach to doctrine; or the technologically superior side may decide that now is the time to deal with its hated enemies. Thankfully, for humanity, such reactions have never developed into outright nuclear conflict mostly due to the same uncertainty regarding capabilities and the lack of political will to be an aggressor. Nations have often decided to Jack Frederick Davies 5 multilaterally limit each other’s capabilities to maintain rule sets and expectations while cautiously trying to give themselves a subtle edge. We can see this impulse in diplomatic limitation in missile defense and treaties such as SALT, SALT2 and NewSTART concurrent with the ‘intelligence war; that hung over the entirety of the Cold War. Hypersonic delivery systems are the latest in a long line of nuclear weapons developments. Like MIRVs and strategic missile defense before them, hypersonic missiles disrupt the current rule set formally and informally for the use of nuclear weapons in the international arena. Hypersonic weapons are much faster and fly in a very different way from conventional ICBMs allowing them to bypass conventional kinetic missile defense and hit targets before the command and control infrastructure of a nation can formulate a coherent response. These hypersonic advantages nullify the drawbacks of current aging ICBM systems essentially making a nuclear war theoretically winnable for the first time since MIRVs and the Reagan Era missile defenses. The massive advantages of hypersonic missiles will only be temporary, in time new missile defenses will be produced and proliferation of such weapons will restore international parity in armament among major nuclear powers. In order to predict the expected response both in the field of nuclear strategy theoretically and materially in policy; we must attempt to predict the potential impact of hypersonic weapons on the world system. In order to accomplish such a task we have a few tools available; the first is history, analyzing, the response of actors to technological and strategic evolution over time. Secondly, we can use and perhaps even update Jack Frederick Davies 6 existing successful models to integrate the capabilities inherent in hypersonic weapons. Literature on this subject at present is mostly confined to online sources. Hypersonic weapons are a new technology, with many details and particular doctrinal positions regarding their capabilities and use being state secrets therefore few scholarly publications have attempted to wrestle with their strategic impact This thesis will present a history and analysis of nuclear strategy from a realist perspective utilizing the theories of Thomas C. Schelling and the history of nuclear strategy written by Lawrence Freedman in an attempt to determine the likely effects, both in terms of nuclear strategic development and international behavior more broadly, of newly developed and deployed nuclear capable hypersonic weapons systems. I believe this is of paramount importance as we enter a new age of nuclear transition. Chapter 1-War and Diplomacy, a Spectrum In order to properly examine the impact of hypersonic weapons or any sort of nuclear weapon an analysis of war and diplomacy and where they overlap is essential. War, as a phenomenon, is defined by Carl von Clausewitz as “…an act of force to compel our enemy to do our will.3” Clausewitz identifies certain self- imposed limits and subsidiary factors relating to the conduct of such an exercise, including international law and custom. Moral force is also expressed in law and the institution of the state apparatus; it is fair to say that in the contemporary arena we 3 Clausewitz, Carl von, Michael Howard, and Peter Paret. On War. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1989. Pp.1 Jack Frederick Davies 7 can extend this out to the international community (however it may be defined) and international sanction. According to the Clausewitzian theory of war; the way to compel the enemy to do one’s will is through eliminating that adversary’s power to resist.4 The only way one power can comprehensively eliminate that powers ability to resist is through disarming them; thus denying that power of the ability to guarantee that resisting will be less harmful than submission to the hostile power. International Actors as Hobbesian persons The international order is a complex
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