Chief of Staff, US Air Force Gen T. Michael Moseley Commander, Air Education and Training Command Gen William R. Looney III Commander, Air University Lt Gen Stephen R. Lorenz http://www.af.mil
Chief, Professional Journals Lt Col Paul D. Berg Deputy Chief, Professional Journals Maj James C. Ulman Editor Maj Roger Burdette Professional Staff Marvin W. Bassett, Contributing Editor http://www.aetc.randolph.af.mil James S. Howard, Contributing Editor Debbie Banker, Editorial Assistant Steven C. Garst, Director of Art and Production Daniel M. Armstrong, Illustrator L. Susan Fair, Illustrator Ann Bailey, Prepress Production Manager Air and Space Power Journal Web Site Catherine Parker, Managing Editor
The Air and Space Power Journal (ISSN 1554-2505), Air http://www.au.af.mil Force Recurring Publication 10-1, published quarterly, is the professional journal of the United States Air Force. It is designed to serve as an open forum for the presentation and stimulation of innovative thinking on military doctrine, strategy, force structure, readiness, and other matters of national defense. The views and opinions expressed or implied in the Journal are those Air and Space Power Journal 401 Chennault Circle of the authors and should not be construed as carrying Maxwell AFB AL 36112-6004 the official sanction of the Department of Defense, Air Force, Air Education and Training Command, Air e-mail: [email protected] University, or other agencies or departments of the US Visit Air and Space Power Journal online government. at http://www.airpower.maxwell.af.mil. Articles in this edition may be reproduced in whole or in part without permission. If they are reproduced, the Air and Space Power Journal requests a courtesy line.
IInsidenside ccover.inddover.indd 2 55/16/2007/16/2007 33:15:58:15:58 PPMM Summer 2007 Volume XXI, No. 2 AFRP 10-1
Senior Leader Perspectives Transforming Air Force Education for the Long War and Beyond ...... 5 Lt Gen Stephen R. Lorenz, USAF Airpower’s Crucial Role in Irregular Warfare ...... 10 Maj Gen Allen G. Peck, USAF Leadership: An Old Dog’s View ...... 16 C. R. Anderegg
Focus Area Developing Airmen: Educating and Training Leaders ...... 26 Lt Col Paul D. Berg, USAF, Chief, Professional Journals
Features Inventory Management of Officers with Advanced Academic Degrees: The Case for a New Approach ...... 42 Lt Col Raymond W. Staats, PhD, USAF Lt Col Marty Reynolds, USAF Maj Aaron D. Troxell, USAF Defining Information Operations Forces: What Do We Need? ...... 53 Maj Timothy P. Franz, USAF Maj Matthew F. Durkin, USAF Maj Paul D. Williams, PhD, USAF Maj Richard A. Raines, PhD, USAF, Retired Lt Col Robert F. Mills, PhD, USAF, Retired Intellectual Modernization of the C-5: Making the Galaxy Expeditionary ...... 67 Col Mark C. “Marshal” Dillon, USAF Leadership by the Socratic Method ...... 80 Maj Aaron A. Tucker, USAF The Mandate to Revolutionize Military Logistics ...... 90 COL Bradley E. Smith, USA A Model for Managing Decision-Making Information in the GIG-Enabled Battlespace ...... 100 Maj Samuel D. Bass, USAF Maj Rusty O. Baldwin, PhD, USAF, Retired
Departments Prelaunch Notes Introducing the Chinese ASPJ and Presenting the Latest Chronicles Online Journal Articles ...... 19 Ricochets and Replies ...... 20
2007-2 contents.indd 1 4/27/07 11:05:45 AM The Merge Tactical Satellites: The Rest of the Story ...... 27 LTC Bob Guerriero, USA Tactical Satellites: It’s Not “Can We?” but “Should We?” ...... 30 Lt Col Edward B. “Mel” Tomme, USAF, Retired The Inadvisability of Posthumously Promoting Billy Mitchell ...... 34 Col Phillip S. Meilinger, USAF, Retired
PIREP Leading from the Front, Rear, and Center: A Squadron Commander’s Approach ...... 37 Lt Col Christopher T. Daniels, USAF
Quick Looks Preferential Treatment for Military Members Based on Personality Type ...... 64 1st Lt Ryan Kaiser, USAF Fit (and Ready) to Fight: Strengthening Combat Readiness through Controlled-Aggression Training ...... 78 2d Lt Nickolas Stewart, USAF
Doctrine Note Revised USAF Doctrine Publication: Air Force Doctrine Document 2-7, Special Operations ...... 88 Lt Col Alexander M. Wathen, USAF, Retired
Vignette What Difference Can You Make? ...... 109 CMSgt John P. Hearn, USAF, Retired
Book Reviews Leading Change ...... 112 John P. Kotter Reviewer: Dr. Richard I. Lester Air Power in the New Counterinsurgency Era: The Strategic Importance of USAF Advisory and Assistance Missions ...... 113 Alan J. Vick et al. Reviewer: Maj Paul A. Hibbard, USAF Fortress France: The Maginot Line and French Defenses in World War II ...... 114 J. E. Kaufmann and H. W. Kaufmann Reviewer: CSM James H. Clifford, USA, Retired Las Metáforas de una Guerra Perpetua: Estudios sobre Pragmática del Discurso en el Conflicto Armado Colombiano ...... 115 Fernando Estrada Gallego Reviewer: Lt Col Paul D. Berg, USAF Inside the Iron Works: How Grumman’s Glory Days Faded ...... 116 George M. Skurla and William H. Gregory Reviewer: Col Joseph J. McCue, USAF, Retired
2007-2 contents.indd 2 4/27/07 11:05:45 AM B-17 at War ...... 117 Bill Yenne Reviewer: Lt Col Robert F. Tate, USAFR Responsibility of Command: How UN and NATO Commanders Influenced Airpower over Bosnia ...... 117 Col Mark A. Bucknam Reviewer: Capt Tim Spaulding, USAF Prisoners: A Novel of World War II ...... 118 Burt Zollo Reviewer: Col Phillip S. Meilinger, USAF, Retired Realizing the Dream of Flight: Biographical Essays in Honor of the Centennial of Flight, 1903–2003 ...... 118 Virginia P. Dawson and Mark D. Bowles, eds. Reviewer: Dr. David R. Mets Pacific Skies: American Flyers in orldW War II ...... 119 Jerome Klinkowitz Reviewer: Dr. John H. Barnhill Soldiers and Ghosts: A History of Battle in Classical Antiquity ...... 120 J. E. Lendon Reviewer: Maj Paul Niesen, USAF The Intelligence Archipelago: The Community’s Struggle to Reform in the Globalized Era ...... 121 Melanie M. H. Gutjahr Reviewer: Capt Gilles Van Nederveen, USAF, Retired Why Air Forces Fail: The Anatomy of Defeat ...... 122 Robin Higham and Stephen J. Harris, eds. Reviewer: Dr. Robert B. Kane, Lieutenant Colonel, USAF, Retired Weapons of Choice: The Development of Precision Guided Munitions ...... 123 Paul G. Gillespie Reviewer: Maj Evan Dertien, USAF
Mission Debrief ...... 124
2007-2 contents.indd 3 4/27/07 11:05:45 AM Air and Space Power Journal Board of Reviewers
Prof. Tami Davis Biddle Col Merrick E. Krause, USAF, Retired US Army War College Department of Homeland Security Dr. Kendall K. Brown Col Chris J. Krisinger, USAF NASA Marshall Space Flight Center The Pentagon Col Steven D. Carey Dr. Benjamin S. Lambeth Air University RAND Dr. Clayton K. S. Chun Lt Col David MacIsaac, USAF, Retired US Army War College Montgomery, Alabama Dr. Mark Clodfelter Dr. Karl P. Magyar National War College Montgomery, Alabama Dr. Conrad Crane Col Edward Mann, USAF, Retired Director, US Army Military Studies Institute Colorado Springs, Colorado Dr. Dik A. Daso National Air and Space Museum Mr. Brent Marley Smithsonian Institution Redstone Arsenal Col Michael D. Davis Col Phillip Meilinger, USAF, Retired Air University West Chicago, Illinois Dr. William L. Dowdy Dr. Daniel Mortensen Alabama State University Air University Col Dennis M. Drew, USAF, Retired Dr. Richard R. Muller USAF School of Advanced Air and Space Studies USAF School of Advanced Air and Space Studies Dr. Stephen Fought Dr. Bruce T. Murphy USAF Air War College Air University Col Richard L. Fullerton Col Robert Owen, USAF, Retired USAF Academy Embry-Riddle Aeronautical University Col Thomas E. Griffith Jr., USAF Col Bob Potter, USAF, Retired National War College USAF Public Affairs Center of Excellence Col W. Michael Guillot, USAF Lt Col Stephen M. Rothstein, PhD, USAF US Embassy, Paris, France USAF School of Advanced Air and Space Studies Dr. John F. Guilmartin Jr. Maj Reagan E. Schaupp, USAF Ohio State University Air University Dr. Grant T. Hammond Col Michael A. Stanley Center for Strategy and Technology USAF Air War College Air University Col Richard Szafranski, USAF, Retired Dr. Thomas Hughes Toffler Associates USAF School of Advanced Air and Space Studies Lt Col J. P. Hunerwadel, USAF, Retired Lt Col Edward B. Tomme, PhD, USAF, Retired Air University Sci-Ops Consulting Col Mark P. Jelonek, USAF Dr. Christopher H. Toner The Pentagon USAF Air Command and Staff College Col John Jogerst, USAF Lt Col David A. Umphress, PhD, USAFR, Retired Commandant, Air Force Special Operations School Auburn University Mr. Charles Tustin Kamps Dr. Kenneth P. Werrell USAF Air Command and Staff College Christiansburg, Virginia Dr. Tom Keaney Dr. Harold R. Winton Johns Hopkins University USAF School of Advanced Air and Space Studies
Board of Reviewers.indd 4 4/27/07 11:06:13 AM APJ
Transforming Air Force Education for the Long War and Beyond
Lt Gen Stephen R. LoRenz, USAF
ir University is currently in the process of transforming for the “long war” and beyond. the idea of a university reorganizing for war Amay seem odd, but in the Western way of war, warriors and academics have always enjoyed a close relationship. the West’s first great gen eral, Alexander, was tutored by Aristotle, and when he went to war, he did so with academics in his train. According to noted military histo rian victor Davis Hanson, the close relation ship between warriors and scholars in the Western way of war is one of the main reasons for its success across the millennia.1 in the Us military, the connection between thinkers and fighters has become closer than ever, and ex ploiting this relationship to the fullest will prove key to winning the current war. Doing so, however, will require (1) understanding how military education differs from the tradi tional civilian model and (2) reorganizing our present system of military education to meet the emerging challenge.
The Unique Nature of Military Education At its core, the Us system of military educa tion does not differ significantlyfrom the civil ian system. Both are based on the university
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model of research and teaching that has domi students in the classroom. though important, nated Western education for centuries. in this purely academic work does not have the pride model, professors conduct research to push of place it enjoys at civilian schools. their fields forward. they produce books and A third difference involves urgency. the articles that they subsequently teach to their ideas that we in a military university explore students and, in the process, become better through research and the lessons we teach of educators themselves. this procedure, which ten pay off—for good or ill—much faster than systematically turns out better students, fac in other fieldsof study. For instance, a school’s ulty, and ideas, has played a significantrole in decision about whether to drop classes on the explosion of knowledge in the West and is conventional war and add lessons on insur largely responsible for the lightning pace of gency this semester or to wait for another year innovation in science and technology today. can mean the difference between life and Military education, however, differs from death; its results will show up on the battle most academic fields in a number of ways. First, field with the next graduating class. this fact although hundreds or thousands of schools can place more pressure on our schools to offer instruction in most fieldsof study, in the change curricula and on military professors to United states only a handful of joint/service develop new areas of knowledge and expertise schools teach military art and science. Further than is the norm at civilian schools. restricting the breadth of the field, for the A fourth difference concerns the need to most part only those schools associated with educate a larger portion of our workforce. certain service sponsors have faculties knowl Both civilian and military sectors desire more edgeable about particular domains of war. educated workers, but we have a stronger im thus, for instance, we have only one air war petus. in modern warfare, particularly during college, one land war college, and one naval times of rapid change, education acts as a mas war college, a situation that places an enor sive power multiplier. today the Us military mous burden on service-school faculties to re needs flexible and innovative thinkers almost search and publish work related to the type of as much as it needs bombs and bullets. yet war for which their service is responsible. in realistically, until fairly recently, we have had most fields of study, if professors do not pub enough resources to educate only a small frac lish, they can fall back on books and articles tion of the force. the issue of increasing the published elsewhere to stay current and edu size of the educated force carries high stakes. cate their students. At service schools, how ever, they are often the only game in town. A second difference between military The Need for Change schools and the majority of civilian schools in volves pure versus applied research. in most Currently the United states finds itself in fields of study, professors write for academic the midst of geopolitical changes that tax the audiences. Promotion, tenure, and other bene flexibility of our system of military education. fits come from moving academic debates for After 9/11, the nation’s military schools worked ward. in the civilian world, outside of business, to integrate lessons on terrorism into their law, and engineering schools, writing for policy curricula. As the war in iraq heated up, they makers and practitioners may even have nega added seminars on insurgency. yet today our tive connotations since it might appear to sully schools face an underlying problem vastly an instructor’s credentials as an unbiased ob greater than updating curricula and changing server. in military education, however, this lessons. essentially, we confront adaptable relationship is reversed, with practitioners con enemies who sometimes innovate faster than stituting our most important audiences. Mili our own capacity to do so. stateless organiza tary schools conduct, or should conduct, their tional structures, ongoing cyber wars, and most highly regarded research for policy mak remote-controlled improvised explosive de ers in Washington, generals in the field, and vices are only the most recent outputs of our
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enemies’ idea-generating systems. Using inno institute—the Army War College’s in-house vations produced by these systems, they have think tank—produced 3 monographs, but found ways to circumvent our ponderous Cold during the same period, Air University’s tiny War military apparatus and have pinned down think tank produced only two. When it comes our forces across the globe. their flexibilityat to injecting ideas into national debates, we find times trumps our material advantages. All too ourselves similarly behind. For example, of often our enemies appear to be winning this the military experts regularly featured on Fox war of innovation. news and Cable news network, soldiers out to answer our opponents, we must improve number airmen five to one, and the vast ma our system’s ability to produce and dissemi jority of newspaper articles on airpower derive nate new ideas. this new system must have from interviews with ground-power experts. two parts: it must systematically generate rele this lack of research production also has sec vant new ideas, injecting them into national ondary consequences. today the percentage debates, and it must develop adaptive, innova of Air University professors with a strong grasp tive students who can continue the process of air, space, and cyberspace theory and his after they leave our military schools. tory is small compared to the percentage of Air University has begun to play a role in land-power experts at Army or Marine schools. this war of ideas, but doing so requires signifi At times this dearth of experience shows up in cant changes. the core of our strategy here at the classroom. i firmly believe that each mili Maxwell AFB, Alabama, calls for reenergizing tary school has a duty to develop and dissemi the university model of research and teaching nate new ideas about the ways its service can that so effectively propels innovation in the assist the nation and contribute to the joint civilian sector. this approach is not new to the fight in the long war. Air University has not Air Force. throughout the 1930s, the Air Corps done as well as it could in this area. tactical school employed it in an effort to confront the specter of a rising Germany and Japan and to develop new uses for emerging Transforming Air airpower technology. Using a combination of University for War theory, history, and field research, instructors at the school wrote the plan employed by the to bring us back into the war of ideas, Air United states in World War ii and educated University has begun changing the way it does Airmen who developed strategies used by the business. We are treating this endeavor as part Air Force for the next half century. Unfortu of the war effort. success will require an inte nately at some point during the Cold War, Air grated campaign involving numerous ap University reduced its emphasis on this spirit proaches. of innovation and outreach to national policy First, we are reorganizing our command makers. For the most part, the Air Force out- structure. Although the Air Force originally sourced service-related research on military colocated its schools at Maxwell AFB specifi strategy to independent think tanks, and the cally to develop synergies, at present little university became mainly a teaching school. overlap exists among the schools. Primarily, a this neglect of innovation has proved costly command structure with too large a span of to the nation as well as to our faculty and stu control drives this lack of lateral communica dents. Although the Air Force remains the tion. By centralizing staffs and decreasing such world leader in developing military technology, spans, we hope to increase synergy among the it lags behind the Army in its ability to pro schools and enhance their accountability to duce and disseminate thoughts about how to our Air Force, the joint community, and the use its new technology and ideas. By one nation. count, for every book published on airpower the second set of changes involves provid today, five appear on ground-centered mili ing our instructors with greater resources and tary solutions. in 200 the strategic studies incentives to publish on topics related to air,
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space, and cyberspace. to do this, we are this process. every year our students and fac building a new university research institute— ulty write hundreds of papers—most of which an initiative taken by the other services de either appear in forums read solely by aca cades ago with good results. We believe that demics or disappear onto library shelves. to this institute will go a long way toward gener correct this problem, we have begun to guide ating and disseminating ideas about ways the student research in directions that answer cur Air Force can contribute to national security. rent questions related to the Department of in line with the university model of research Defense (DOD), Air Force, and joint commu and teaching, the institute will have a second nity and to catalogue as well as track papers purpose: giving Air University professors with produced at Air University so that relevant au innovative air-, space-, and cyberspace-oriented diences can locate them online. We have also research agendas time away from the classroom created a requirement that students and fac to conduct their work. Doing so not only will ulty summarize their work in “blue darts”— increase our pool of researchers but also will short op-eds or influence articles—that we improve our faculty—and hence the educa can forward to the DOD, joint service, or me tion we offer our students. dia audiences, as appropriate. Beyond this, we On a similar note, we are taking significant have begun to stand up special research teams steps to give our professors incentives to con that can rapidly respond to high-level research duct research on Air Force–related topics. taskings, ensuring that DOD, joint, and Air ironically, in the system that has evolved (par Force policy makers can reach back to Air tially because of the small audience for air- University for information and expert opinions. related publications), instructors often have On a more academic front, we have re greater incentives to research topics unrelated cently launched a new journal, Strategic Studies to the Air Force than to examine questions Quarterly, to help promote debate on high- pertaining to air, space, and cyberspace. simi level policy issues and have created a new on larly, publications aimed solely at academic line e-mail publication, The Wright Stuff, to readers often receive more credit than work quickly disseminate research and ideas to the intended for policy audiences. Beyond this, Air Force audience and beyond. We are also the knowledge and expertise that active duty experimenting with a number of other initia students and instructors bring back fresh from tives. We have begun to commission studies the field often go unheeded because these on important topics from well-known authors. warriors do not possess academic-level writing in addition, we are once again sponsoring skills. to correct these problems, we are ask symposia that bring policy makers and aca ing the schools to reconsider how they reward demics together to discuss important issues research and promote professors. research and are partnering with civilian and military specifically pertaining to ways that air, space, universities as well as think tanks to help stimu and cyberspace can contribute to the joint late research and debate on Air Force–related fight will receive the highest honors. Applied issues. taken together, these steps and others research—white papers, group endeavors, and like them should increase the flow of ideas similar projects—will receive as much credit dealing with air, space, and cyberspace to au as purely academic work. skilled writers who diences that can use them. Over time these coauthor with instructors and students pos changes will substantially increase the number sessing practical experience will receive as and quality of relevant new ideas flowing out much credit as do those who prefer to work of Air University. they will also help develop alone. these changes should help vector re our faculty and improve the education we of search toward the war effort. fer students. Producing ideas, however, is not enough. the third approach aims directly at our stu to be effective, they must disseminate to dent body. As the United states begins to under the nation’s intellectual centers, so we have stand the nature of the long war, the need for launched a number of initiatives to facilitate training in language and regional cultures has
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become even more apparent. Accordingly, yond this, we are making major changes in over the last year we have substantially in our education of junior officers and in our creased our offerings in these areas. to sup noncommissioned officeracademies as well as port the Air Force’s new cyber mission, the Air taking advantage of new cyber technology to Force institute of technology will soon supple develop communities of practice for squadron ment its current graduate curriculum in cyber commanders. Our goal in all of this is to in operations with a 12-month program in cyber crease vastly the number of flexible and inno warfare. Much like the Air Corps tactical vative thinkers in the Air Force. school’s efforts to pioneer air war in the 1930s, this hands-on initiative engages faculty and students in a combined effort to develop tech Conclusion nology and doctrine for fighting in cyberspace. We have also added to the number of courses in sum, the United states has only now be in other relevant fields such as counterterrorism, gun to come to grips with the nature of the counterinsurgency, space, and cyber warfare. long war and what lies beyond. Winning this Finally, we are currently in the process of re war will require us to leverage our existing vamping our Air and space Basic Course to do strengths. it will require new equipment, new a better job of building the confidence and a tactics, and, from time to time, even new warrior ethos that will serve our junior officers strategy. But it also requires something more. for the rest of their careers. Our best hope for succeeding in this struggle Lastly, we are taking steps to add dramati lies in developing a system that institutional cally to the number of students we educate. izes innovation. More than anything else, we through partnerships with civilian schools, need new ideas as well as men and women we have been able to exponentially increase who, understanding the problems we face, can the educational opportunities for enlisted Air innovate and adapt to overcome them. the men. By 200 we will begin to offer them the system of military education we continue to opportunity to pursue a bachelor’s degree. pioneer at Air University will take a significant Our new distance-learning program will soon step toward developing this system and, over allow us to give all officers a chance to pursue the long run, defeating our opponents. • an Air University master’s degree by the 12th year of their careers. We are also attempting to create a new Air University PhD in strategic studies—the first of its kind in the Us mili Note tary—that will greatly increase the pool of 1. victor Davis Hanson, Carnage and Culture: Land doctorate-holding officers from which the Air mark Battles in the Rise of Western Power (new york: Double- Force will draw its future senior leaders. Be day, 2001), chap. .
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Maj Gen allen G. Peck, USaF
ecause the dominance of within the purview of ground or special op america’s airpower in traditional wars erations forces. understanding the iW envi has not been lost on those who ronment and, in particular, airpower’s im threaten our national interests, we mense contributions is critical for america’s Bcan logically expect them to turn increasingly future air Force leaders, who will prove instru to irregular warfare (iW). the ongoing con mental in ensuring that the service continues flicts in iraq and afghanistan reflect the ways adapting to an ever-changing enemy and that us military power has had to adapt and bringing relevant capabilities to bear in an transform to meet new challenges presented ever-changing fight. by enemies who have respect for our conven tional dominance and the determination to find exploitable seams in our capabilities. The Irregular Warfare although the capabilities and effects that Environment america’s airpower brings to the fight are not as visible to the casual observer as the maneu doctrine defines iW as “a violent struggle vers of ground forces, airpower (including op among state and non-state actors for legiti erations in the air, space, and cyberspace do macy and influence over the relevant popula mains) remains an invaluable enabler for those tions.”1 iW includes counterinsurgency opera forces. airpower can also serve as a powerful tions and foreign internal defense (Fid) iW capability in its own right, as it did early in (providing support to/for a regime, typically operation enduring Freedom in afghanistan. against internal foes) as well as support for in no one should dismiss iW as falling strictly surgency operations. For example, al-Qaeda
10
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and associated movements, in their quest for ally lacks a defined command structure that power and territory, will likely resort to iW airpower can attack with predictable effects. methods, attacking perceived vulnerabilities still, airpower holds a number of asymmetric in order to influencerelevant audiences while trump cards (capabilities the enemy can nei avoiding direct confrontation with us, allied, ther meet with parity nor counter in kind). or partner-nation forces. this type of warfare For instance, airpower’s ability to conduct pre often takes a markedly different form from cision strikes across the globe can play an im traditional, conventional warfare, requiring portant role in counterinsurgency operations. the addition of iW capabilities to the “tool kit” numerous other advantages (including infor from which us forces can pull. at the same mation and cyber operations; intelligence, time, however, the air Force cannot afford to surveillance, and reconnaissance [isR]; and lose its acknowledged edge in traditional global mobility) have already proven just as warfare, which has enabled past military suc important. these capabilities provide our cesses and will prove necessary in the future to fighting forces with highly asymmetric advan maintain america’s position as the world’s tages in the iW environment. superpower. innovation and adaptation are hallmarks the long-war aspect of iW poses challenges of airpower. cold War–era bombers, designed to america’s center of gravity—its willingness to carry nuclear weapons, can loiter for hours to bring considerable resources to bear and over the battlefieldand deliver individual con remain engaged in an extended fight.h istori ventional weapons to within a few feet of speci cally, democracies tend to grow weary of fight fied coordinates. Fighter aircraft, designed to ing relatively quickly, as reflectedin this coun deliver precision weapons against hardened try’s experiences in the civil War, Vietnam, targets, can disseminate targeting-pod video and the present conflictsin iraq and afghani directly to an air Force joint terminal attack stan. indeed, the network of radical islamic controller who can then direct a strike guided extremists has produced a plan for a 100-year by either laser or the global positioning sys struggle, and democratic nations under their tem (GPs). unmanned systems such as the attack are showing signs of fatigue just a few Predator, once solely a surveillance platform, years into the battle.2 this long-war aspect has now have effective laser designation and the implications for today’s air Force; for instance, capacity for precision, kinetic strike. airborne junior officers, operating today at the tactical platforms offer electronic protection to ground level, may well be responsible for the strategic forces, including attacking insurgent commu aspects of tomorrow’s war. not only must our nications and the electronics associated with airmen have knowledge of airpower capabilities triggering improvised explosive devices (ied). in iW, but also they must articulate airpower concepts as well as educate the joint and coali exploiting altitude, speed, and range, air tion communities on the weapons and skills borne platforms can create these effects, un that airpower brings to the fight. constrained by terrain or artificial boundaries between units. Forward-thinking airmen de veloped these innovations by using adaptive Airpower’s Asymmetric tactics, techniques, procedures, and equip ment to counter a thinking, adaptive enemy. Advantages to be sure, our iW adversaries have their in an iW environment, the traditionally own asymmetric capabilities such as suicide recognized ability of airpower to strike at the bombers, ieds, and the appropriation of civil adversary’s “strategic center of gravity” will ian residences, mosques, and hospitals as stag likely have less relevance due to the decentral ing areas for their combat operations. how ized and diffuse nature of the enemy.3 the ever, they lack and cannot effectively offset amorphous mass of ideological movements unfettered access to the high ground that su opposing Western influenceand values gener periority in air, space, and cyberspace provides.
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Airpower’s Contributions— by the joint force commander. decisions re garding particular employment methods and Today and Tomorrow tactics will reside at a lower level, closer to the us airpower, in its myriad forms, is cur fightand to the knowledge of what is needed. rently operating simultaneously in multiple today, air-component forces provide the theaters, producing invaluable combat and following: kinetic effects from fighters, bomb enabling effects across the board. For instance, ers, and unmanned systems; isR that uses a the air Force has engaged in a wide spectrum variety of air-breathing, space, and nontradi of combat operations in southwest asia for tional sensors; electronic-warfare platforms; and more than 15 years, and over 25,000 airmen airlift/airdrop capabilities, which can range are currently deployed to us central com practically anywhere across iraq and afghani mand’s area of responsibility. airpower’s capa stan, provided they have not been “penny packeted” to individual units. most of airpow bilities have been—and will continue to be— er’s contributions in iraq focus on support for integral to the success of us military power in ground forces, but unique abilities allow it to this theater and in the global war on terror conduct both interdependent and indepen writ large, a fact often overlooked in accounts dent operations. that focus on the more readily visible aspects in this regard, airpower offers a wide of war. nevertheless, when properly integrated spectrum of asymmetric capabilities that we with other military and civil efforts under the can focus and direct as necessary, creating rubric of iW, airpower consistently delivers ef effects such as kinetic destruction, persis fects critical to winning the overall joint fight tent isR collection/dissemination (includ and meeting the campaign’s overarching mili ing air-breathing and space-based as well as tary and political objectives. manned and unmanned), infiltrating/ex a number of the fundamental tenets of air- filtrating forces and supplies, and attacks power have proven particularly valuable in en on computer networks and support infra abling the air Force to bring its most potent structures. all of this is available on an as- asymmetric strengths to bear in ongoing op needed basis, almost without regard for ge erations. Perhaps first and foremost amongst ography or artificial surface boundaries. these is the application of airpower via central since the beginning of operations iraqi ized control and decentralized execution. this Freedom and enduring Freedom, central imperative for centralizing planning and direc command’s air component has flown over a tion while decentralizing tactical-employment half million combat and combat-support sorties. decisions has as much applicability to iW as to though impressive, that number does not tell traditional warfare operations. the rationale the whole story. First, many of these sorties are for this fundamental belief should roll off a of long duration, supplying unprecedented professional airman’s tongue as easily as, say, persistence and presence overhead, ultimately a marine officer would justify the inviolability enabled through a combination of air refuel of the marine air-ground task force. By incor ing and forward basing. one cannot under porating all assets under a single commander, estimate the criticality of being able to choose air Force forces and joint force air compo from among a variety of weapons and tools nent commander ( JFacc), the air component and respond rapidly, particularly in an iW en can both effectively and efficiently allocate vironment in which the enemy very often dic limited airpower resources to cover compet tates the time, place, and nature of attacks. ing requirements from multiple war-fighting second, and more importantly, sortie counts commanders across the theater while main or similar metrics cannot readily depict many taining a vigilant focus on broader goals. the of the effects that the air Force brings to the firehose of effects available from airpower op fight.a lthough impressive, statistics represent erations can be focused where and when only one part of the air Force’s contribution needed, according to the priorities established in today’s war. We must not overlook either
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the robust intelligence analysis and dissemina analysis, which involves backtracking from on tioncapabilitiesthatleveragetheunprecedented going events to determine the sources from collection afforded by today’s air Force systems which they emanated (e.g., tracing back from or the communications-enabling functions that explosions of ieds to locate the bomb-making make global warfare as seamless as if it were in organizations and facilities that support them). our own backyard. in both iraq and afghanistan, airborne assets have developed the capacity to respond quickly to determine the launch points of mortar or Employing Airpower’s rocket attacks, identify suspicious individuals/ Capabilities vehicles and mark them with laser designators for apprehension by ground forces, or, in many space-based assets rank among the least cases, destroy them outright. as with other air- understood and recognized of the air Force’s power applications, centralized control of in war-fighting contributions. Vital intelligence, telligence platforms (which minimizes dupli communications, weather, and navigation ca cation of effort and ensures support for the pabilities all rely heavily on assured access to joint force commander’s highest-priority re space. space-based force multipliers are prov quirements) enables effective and efficient ing immensely valuable at the lower end of use of limited isR assets—key elements of the the conflict spectrum. take for example the coalition’s asymmetric advantage in iW. For GPs—it is not only critical to providing guid example, effective isR enables the air compo ance for precision munitions but also vital to nent to bring airpower to bear in support of reporting the geolocation of friendly troops, small coalition or indigenous ground-force insurgents, and civilians. Precision location al units, magnifying their organic capabilities. lows more rapid responses for close air support, Precision strike, another highly effective combat search and rescue, casualty evacua tool of counterinsurgency, permits us to elimi tion, and prosecution of time-sensitive targets. nate insurgents in close proximity to civilians Yet, a determined, capable adversary could or friendly ground forces, thus giving coali challenge access to space, as the chinese re tion forces a significant firepower advantage. minded the rest of the world with their recent highly accurate guidance systems, cockpit- antisatellite demonstration. selectable fuzes, and munitions of various ex intelligence made available by air and space plosive yields allow airmen to deliver intended forces serves as a critical enabler in iW. in tra effects precisely while limiting unintended ef ditional warfare, larger yields and/or quanti fects. of course, in certain situations we may ties of weapons can compensate for targeting need to attack large areas with less discrimi uncertainties, but this is generally not the case nate use of firepower—a task for which air- in counterinsurgency operations, in which un power is also well suited. intended collateral damage can undermine air mobility offers another edge in counter- support for the government and become a re insurgent operations. our forces exercise this cruiting tool for the insurgency. currently, advantage over surface-bound iW adversaries over both afghanistan and iraq, space-based by transporting personnel and cargo while by and air-breathing assets alike continuously passing contested lines of communications, monitor the situation on the ground, helping air-dropping supplies, and quickly evacuating identify insurgents as well as their organiza the wounded. in iraqi Freedom and enduring tional networks, supporters, and lines of com Freedom last year, the air component flew munication and supply. these platforms col over 50,000 airlift sorties, transporting over lect and disseminate a variety of intelligence 1,000,000 personnel and 90,000 pallets of (signals, communications, imagery, moving- cargo that otherwise would have moved via target, full-motion-video, etc.), all integral to slower, more vulnerable ground-based means the fight. overhead assets also contribute sig of transportation. the mobility advantage also nificantly to the emerging field of forensic enables the infiltration,resupply , and exfiltra
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tion of relatively small ground units. By pro to provide air surveillance and air traffic con viding humanitarian assistance, medical sup trol over sovereign airspace—an essential part port, and transportation for government of any coalition exit strategy since partner na officials to remote areas, airpower can pro tions will need support from coalition air mote the government’s credibility and im forces until they can independently conduct prove the quality of life for its population. their own operations and defend their air these types of operations, which directly af space. in this age of increasing emphasis on fect and are immediately visible to the popula iW, the air Force’s Fid capabilities will likely tion in question, can have significanteffects in receive greater emphasis and resources. the overall campaign against the insurgents. Planning, tasking, executing, and assessing coupled with relatively small numbers of combat operations are the JFacc’s forte. coalition and indigenous forces, airpower can clearly, planning and executing phase four bring a full spectrum of effects to bear, from (stabilize) and phase five (enable civil authority) humanitarian to electronic to kinetic. in some operations pose unique challenges for the air cases, the mere visible or audible presence of component.4 an understanding of how to help airpower can demonstrate commitment to a rebuild a partner nation’s airpower (includ population and support to a government as ing complexities of legislation and funding well as shape the behavior of insurgents by re for foreign military assistance, aspirations of ducing their freedom of movement and deny partner nations, and opportunities for coali ing them sanctuaries. tion contributions) constitutes one potential iW emphasis area for educating and training airmen. the air Force’s Fid force structure Assisting Partner may also need a relook with an eye towards Nations’ Air Forces improving the capacity to rebuild partner na tions’ air forces; for example, it is no coinci the air Force’s Fid, which includes mili dence that the most successful asset of the tary programs that support partner nations’ iraqi air force, the c-130, is the only aircraft strategy for internal defense and develop type it has in common with the us air Force. ment, primarily seeks to develop and sustain the airpower capabilities of those nations. By building partnerships in this way, the united Developing Airmen for states helps shape the strategic environment Irregular Warfare and impede potential terrorists from gaining a foothold in these countries. ultimately, in Force development is a function of educa creasing partner nations’ ability to counter ir tion, training, and experience, with an objec regular threats allows them to fight more ef tive of producing adaptive, creative, and fectively, enhance their legitimacy, and reduce knowledge-enabled airmen. our airmen not their dependence on us forces. only must know and articulate what their ser currently the air Force provides education vice brings to the iW fighttoday , but also must and training essential to resurrecting the air think “outside the box”—an ability that will forces of iraq and afghanistan. despite get enable them to lead and direct the air Force ting off to a slow start, the nascent iraqi air of the future. our service must continue to force is conducting rudimentary isR and mo adapt and leverage its asymmetric capabilities bility missions. operating al muthana air against those adversaries engaged in iW against Base (a section of Baghdad international air the united states and its allies. Fortunately, port), it plans to take over activities at several adaptability and an inherent capacity for think other bases. us forces continue to train iraqis ing above the fray are ingrained in the genetic in support functions needed to maintain and code of airmen. Likewise, flexibility is built protect their aircraft and bases. Furthermore, into the platforms with which they wage war. they are helping develop an indigenous ability developing bright, innovative, highly capable
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leaders who will continue this tradition of flexi veloping a new doctrinal keystone publication: bility is essential to ensure that airpower main aFdd 2-3, Irregular Warfare, which will codify tains a place at the fore of iW conflicts. how the air Force approaches iW, including our airmen must receive training and edu its capabilities and contributions to counter cation in the capabilities and limitations of insurgency operations. this document will also airpower; moreover, they must unapologeti form the basis of our service’s position as the cally articulate airpower concepts and doc joint community tackles the important busi trine to the joint community, members of other ness of writing doctrine on counterinsurgency. services, and personnel assigned to other gov all of the aforementioned initiatives are de ernment agencies. numerous ongoing initia signed to create a core of iW leaders and ex tives focus on educating our airmen on as perts upon which the air Force can rely. pects of iW in which us airpower plays a direct role and makes a direct contribution, such as the effort initiated by the air Force chief of Conclusion staff to identify and/or train airmen who have america and its military are at war; the cur a solid understanding of foreign cultures and rent threat posed by global terrorists, poten languages. in addition, expanded training pro tially armed with weapons of mass destruction, grams for new recruits, increased emphasis on is as great as previous threats to our way of life predeployment training for combat-support posed by nazism, fascism, and communism. personnel, and enhanced flying training for coalition and partner-nation forces join the aviators and Battlefield airmen based on war- united states in this effort. the us air Force fighting lessons learned all reflect the new provides air, space, and cyber power as part of realities of iW. Just as airmen can survive and the joint and coalition war-fighting team, dedi kill the enemy at great distances from the air, cated to winning the conflicts in iraq and af so must they have the training and motivation ghanistan while simultaneously protecting the to survive and kill at close range on the vital interests of our nation and the coalition ground. in which it operates. airpower, in all its forms, air Force doctrine will also play a signifi brings a vast array of direct-effect weapons and cant role in educating airmen. consisting of joint-force enablers to the fray, a fact not al the fundamental principles by which military ways clearly recognized or portrayed in the forces guide their actions in support of na press. although it is not so important that au tional objectives, doctrine shapes the manner diences properly attribute progress in the in which the air Force organizes, trains, equips, global war on terror to particular components and sustains its forces, preparing war fighters or services, it is important that air Force air for future uncertainties and giving them a men know and articulate our resident asym common set of understandings on which to metric capabilities and that they use their base their decisions. currently the air Force is knowledge and expertise to ensure that our revising the existing version of aFdd 2-3.1, service remains as relevant to tomorrow’s fight Foreign Internal Defense, 10 may 2004, and de- as it is to today’s. •
Notes 1. “irregular Warfare Joint operating concept,” draft 3. the strategic center of gravity is a source of power version 1.0, January 2007, 4. that provides moral or physical strength, freedom of ac 2. Rear adm William d. sullivan, vice-director, strate tion, or will to act. gic Plans and Policy, Joint chiefs of staff, Fighting the Long 4. Joint Publication 3.0, Joint Operations, 17 september War—Military Strategy for the War on Terrorism, briefingslide 2006, iV-25 through iV-29, http://www.dtic.mil/doctrine/ 9, February 2006, http://www.au.af.mil/au/awc/awcgate/ jel/new_pubs/jp3_0.pdf. jcs/jcslongwar_12jan06_j5.pdf (accessed 15 January 2007).
SLP-Peck.indd 15 4/27/07 11:16:31 AM Leadership An Old Dog’s View
C. R. AndeRegg
ray in the muzzle and gimpy in lunged and pulled together, and together we the hips, i slowly walk to the rag rug have felt the reward of nothing more compli next to the hearth where i turn in cated than brotherhood—the simplest of words two tight circles, ease myself down, and the hardest to achieve. i look up at you, Ghaunches first, and then stretch my front legs fresh from your initial training and eager to out, putting my chin on them. i’ve pulled all make your first pull across the high passes, the sleds there are to pull. to all the places and i think, “i could tell you everything, but there are to pull them to, stretching from the then where would be the fun in discovering wildest frontiers to the fanciest boomtowns. for yourself?” But some of it i must tell you two dogs, four dogs—even eight- and 12-dog because i want you to be better than i. teams. Straining at the harness until it cuts, Our world is harsh. a mistake can cost a paws filled with razors of ice, and breath huff life. Or even a whole team, tumbling as one ing in huge clouds of steam. With my brothers’ into the maw of a crevasse, gone forever in the shoulders brushing against mine, we have blink of an eye. and we neither get nor seek
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mercy from the cruel opponent against whom forgotten. Do you think i am a leader? Look at we struggle—the blinding white cold that is the scars on my face—the missing tip of my always hoping that we will slip. yet we pull to ear, gone to the single swipe of a vicious gether, my brothers and sisters and i, and we mother whose cub i bothered. this is not the take care of each other. it is the reward of our face of success; this is the face of life, of les kind to feel unseen bonds of buddy love while sons learned, and, alas, relearned. you will suf we pull the load to the end of the track. and fer these failures too. and each of them will sometimes there is a pat on the head, but it is make you stronger and able to pull longer and not the worldly rewards we seek. We pull be harder than ever. Until time catches up with cause we are bred to it, and trained to it, and you—and there’s no cure for that. because an old man near the sea might have along the way, though, continue to study. said, “it is a lovely thing to do.” Make time to study. See how the inuit’s dogs although we struggle through blizzards and run, but the trapper’s are different—perhaps soaring mountain passes as a team, we depend not as fast but with more stamina. While you on the leader. Our leader may not be the pull as a follower, learn from them; learn from strongest or the swiftest or the smartest, but them all. you must study how the sled skids in he or she has proved one thing over and the turn and how those in front, behind, and over—we will follow. beside you react. Does your brother shy from as i lie here, feeling the fire’s warmth the knife of the cold wind? Does your sister pull soothe the aches and ravages of a lifetime on you off balance? there is precious little time to the trail, i can reflect on the virtues—and the learn before you will be thrust into the front. pitfalls—of being the leader. things that you you will learn that there are different kinds must learn, finally, on your own. But i can of lead dogs. Some look at their team as a help you learn them more quickly if you will blessing, a team that can get the job done and listen and understand the words of the old done safely. Others look at the team as a bur dog that has pulled from every position on the den, a group of ne’er-do-wells that need to be team and—yes, even a few times, a few glori constantly nipped. But i don’t have time to ous times—has lived the joy of pulling from think about the snarlers and nippers because the lead and getting the job done. their teams, sadly, fail when the stakes are Before you can earn the respect to lead us, high. i want you to know what i know before i you must first be an excellent follower, and curl up and sleep while you go out into the the excellent follower is always first: the first cutting wind. out of a warm bed, the first away from the as the lead dog, you must work the hardest. breakfast bowl, the first ready to harness up, the house dogs think that the lead position is and the firstto encourage the dog beside him the easiest—that the traces in the rear must be or her. Most importantly, though, you must be the tautest while the lead dog needs only to the first to study. What is the meaning of the “guide” the team, his harness loose and com weather? the high clouds? the south wind fortable. this might work on a clear day over and the north? how does the team pull on the an easy trail, but not when the job is tough. soft snow? the wet? the ice? One must know recall your days in the back, when every ounce our enemy, the cold, better than we know our of strength from the whole team was needed. own pack. a slacker is a liability; a leader who is a slacker it is not enough, though, to be the firstas a could be a calamity. follower; you must also be the last. the last to as the lead dog, you must be the discipli complain. the last to sit down. the last to sleep. narian, even sometimes during the run—but and always, always, the last to ask, “Why me?” the best time is later, away from the team. re as you study, it is natural that you seek out member that your goal is to improve behavior; the best teacher, and his name is Failure. We a chastened dog will pull hard to regain his learn nothing from our successes. a short spot on the team, but a humiliated dog is ru romp on a soft trail with a light load is quickly ined forever. Before you growl at the errant
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one, look first to yourself. Did you train the i have saved for last the most important offender properly? Did you provide the right thing you must learn, and that is integrity. the equipment? almost all of us will pull ’til our leader is the first into the traces and the last hearts burst; if one does not, then it is more out. the leader eats last and eats least. the often the fault of training or equipment rather leader treats every member of the team with than attitude. But discipline when you must; meticulous fairness. the leader encourages no one else will do it because it is your job. affection for the team but never for himself or the character you build as a follower is the herself. the leader is honest, and this bears one that comes through as a leader when the repeating—the leader is honest. More than trail is icy, the wind is brutal, and the sled is any power the leader has, the leader is most top-heavy. it is no time to be a loner, or sloppy, judicious with the authority to lead the team or shortsighted. take heart from my experi into harm’s way. now you must go and lead the team while i ence: a leader can build character in the team. rest. you have studied hard and learned much he or she need only show its members the during your life as a follower. During the long benefits of hard work, courage, selflessness, winter nights, you have curled up close to the devotion, and excellence, and to these things team and heard the telling and retelling of they will respond with their whole hearts. the stories of how our proud breed evolved you must know what you stand for before into the best that anyone has ever seen. your the trail becomes difficult. Do you believe in dreams have felt the agony of crossing the your man? in your team? Will you die in the high passes and the joys of pups in the spring. traces for them? ask these questions now be your history will make you wise, and your heri cause when the white bear circles your camp tage will make you proud. Do not be afraid to at night and then rushes in, a howling, slash fail. as the scars accumulate on your head, let ing specter of evil, it is too late. you must be them remind you of the difficult life you have ready to fightin an instant or risk whimpering chosen and the glorious battles it brought. away with your tail between your legs. i trust you. •
As your secretary, I am committed to boosting your regional, cultural, and language skills to make you a more capable ambassador so that you can help build lasting, long-term relationships with our allies and coalition partners. —hon. Michael W. Wynne, Secretary of the air Force
SLP-Anderegg.indd 18 4/27/07 11:15:39 AM APJ
Lt CoL PauL D. Berg, uSaF, ChieF, ProFeSSionaL JournaLS
Introducing the Chinese ASPJ and Presenting the Latest Chronicles Online Journal Articles
he US Air Force began publishing immediate acclaim in business and language- the english version of Air and Space teaching circles.2 Mr. Jiang later emigrated to Power Journal (ASPJ ) in 1947. To ex the United States, where he attended Johns pand its language and cultural out hopkins University and completed a second Treach, the service launched Spanish and Por master’s degree in 1996. he then worked for tuguese editions in 1949 as well as Arabic and about 10 years in the US publication and soft French ones in 2005. We are now pleased to ware industries. his extensive experience in announce the imminent debut of the Chinese China and the United States will help him ASPJ, designed to encourage professional dia promote the constructive exchange of ideas logue between Chinese-speaking military and between the Chinese and American militaries. government members worldwide. For the inaugural edition of the Chinese each ASPJ editor is a regional expert and ASPJ, Mr. Jiang has selected and translated native speaker who tailors his journal’s con previously published articles about military tent to audience interests. The new Chinese transformation, strategy, and education. he is ASPJ editor, Mr. Guocheng Jiang, has impres soliciting articles from Chinese-speaking airmen sive credentials. he grew up in China, living worldwide and will publish them in upcoming through both the Great Famine of the early quarterly issues as they become available. 1960s and the Cultural revolution of the late The established ASPJ editions serve the 1960s. in the 1970s, he was “reeducated” in needs of military services in over 90 countries the countryside for three years before becom worldwide, where air forces, armies, and na ing a “worker-peasant-soldier” student at the vies use the Journal’s articles for instructional Shanghai institute of Foreign Languages.1 in purposes in academies and staff colleges. Of the subsequent era of economic reform, Mr. ficials of foreign governments also find them Jiang became deeply involved in several high- useful. We hope that the new Chinese ASPJ profile industrial projects in partnership with will prove equally valuable. foreign companies. As a journalist and chief All ASPJ editions promote professional dia interpreter, he covered foreign technological logue among airmen throughout the world so developments and authored several pioneer that we can harness the best ideas about air, ing papers about contract negotiation and space, and cyberspace power. Chronicles Online writing. After earning his firstmaster’ s degree Journal (COJ ) complements the printed edi from Nanjing Normal University, Mr. Jiang tions of ASPJ but appears only in electronic taught english to graduate students. he then form. Not subject to any fixed publication joined Yilin Publishing house, where he wore schedule, COJ can publish timely articles any two hats—one as a technical editor and an time about a broad range of military topics other as the author of two books about eco and can accommodate articles too lengthy for nomic topics. his book Gate to GATT received inclusion in the printed journals.
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Articles appearing in COJ are frequently re opportunities in english, Spanish, Portuguese, published elsewhere. The various ASPJ edi Arabic, French, and Chinese. To submit an tions routinely translate and print them. Book article in any of our languages, please refer editors select them as book chapters, and col to the submission guidelines at http://www lege professors use them in the classroom. We .airpower.maxwell.af.mil/airchronicles/ are pleased to present the following recent howto1.html. To write a book review, please COJ articles (available at http://www.airpower see the guidelines at http://www.airpower .maxwell.af.mil/airchronicles/cc.html): .maxwell.af.mil/airchronicles/bookrev/ bkrevguide.html. • • Lt Col richard S. Tracey, USA, retired, “Trapped by a Mindset: The iraq WMD intelligence Failure” (http://www.airpower .maxwell.af.mil/airchronicles/cc/tracey Notes .html) 1. The term reeducated refers to a national movement • Maj Joseph T. Benson, USAF, “Weather and from 1968 to 1975 that called for sending millions of the Wreckage at Desert-One” (http://www urban students to the countryside for reeducation by peasants. These students faced tremendous challenges. .airpower.maxwell.af.mil/airchronicles/ Worker-peasant-soldier students reflected Mao Tse-tung’s cc/benson.html) policy, in effect from 1972 to 1976, of sending youths with practical job experience to college without requiring col The ASPJ staff seeks insightful articles and lege examinations. book reviews from anywhere in the world. We 2. The General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade offer both hard-copy and electronic-publication (GATT) later became the World Trade Organization.
APJ
We encourage you to send your comments to us, preferably via e-mail at [email protected]. You may also send letters to the Editor, Air and Space Power Journal, 401 Chennault Circle, Maxwell AFB AL 36112 6004. We reserve the right to edit the material for overall length.
SERVICE BEFORE SELF OR philosophy are full of complex topics further SELF-SERVICE? complicated by convoluted language designed to make the author seem smart rather than i liked Dr. David Mets’s excellent, to-the-point, and insightful article “Service before Self or Self get his point across. Such is not the case here, Service? Some Fodder for Your reading on the and i appreciate it. even a knuckle-dragging Professional ethics of Air Warriors” (Spring fighter pilot walked away more informed. 2007). i especially liked the quick-reference Lt Col Peter S. “Shadow” Ford, USAF rundown on which authors are moral absolut Tyndall AFB, Florida ists and which are relativists, as well as the reasons why; the pros and cons of each book, author, AN UNTAPPED RESOURCE FOR STABI and premise; and, most importantly, why that LIZATION AND RECONSTRUCTION book (or another by the same author) is rele vant for warriors. Additionally, Dr. Mets’s writ in his article “An Untapped resource for Sta ing style is easy to read. Most often, articles on bilization and reconstruction: The United
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States Air Force” (Spring 2007), Maj William the service academies while using the reserve Fischer does an admirable job of summarizing Officer Training Corps program to bring in the challenges of postconflict operations and officers—to both the active and reserve com discussing roles and responsibilities of the ponents—who are academically trained in the military as they relate to those operations. his skills needed in S&r operations. i realize that call for a reassessment of military roles in sta my proposal would necessitate a years-long, bility and reconstruction (S&r) operations multibillion-dollar program of retraining and after the shooting stops is most timely. Per culture change, but throwing the rudder hard- haps most noteworthy, his identification of over while at flank speed only violently re the need for greatly expanding the combined arranges the occupants and equipment on civil-military training experiences highlights a deck. Course changes take time. i applaud glaring deficiency in current Department of Major Fischer for making a plausible initial Defense (DOD) training practices. Disappoint proposal. A vigorous debate is now needed to ingly, the article falls flat at the end. The On- develop his ideas. Scene Commanders’ Course is specifically de Lt Col Allen R. Naugle, USAF signed for crisis-management requirements San Antonio, Texas during and immediately after an isolated inci dent. Over time, the course has evolved to meet the doctrinal training requirements for an on- JOINT CLOSE AIR SUPPORT scene commander (OSC) to operate as delin TRANSFORMED eated within the National incident Management Lt Col richard Bohn’s article “Joint Close Air System (NiMS). Particularly relevant to the au Support Transformed” (Spring 2007) has a thor’s recommendation to expand the course is few shortcomings. As Colonel Bohn begins his the fact that the OSC’s function fades away as argument, he briefly mentions the joint close an incident stabilizes and as criminal investi air support ( JCAS) memorandum of agree gative services and infrastructure-reconstitution ment (MOA) signed by all the services and US teams begin their restorative efforts. S&r ac Special Operations Command (USSOCOM) tivities fall into what the NiMS calls “conse in September 2004. We agree with the author quence management.” These actions require that the existence of that MOA clearly indi a diverse set of actors and may last a few weeks, cates joint military interest in JCAS. however, in the case of a Class A F-16 mishap, or several the MOA’s actual text offers very little guid years, as demonstrated in both post-Saddam ance for tactics, techniques, and procedures. iraq and the post-Katrina Gulf Coast. Put sim rather, it deals almost exclusively with stan ply, the On-Scene Commanders’ Course does dardization of joint terminal attack controller not prepare leaders to function in consequence ( JTAC) training, certification, and currency. management. The cat-herding skills required Colonel Bohn mischaracterizes the intent of of a consequence-management leader are cur the MOA. rently more available in the diplomatic corps and he also misses some key elements in his dis commercial construction-program management cussion regarding Air Force JTAC support to firms than in the DOD’s officer corps. There conventional Army units and the joint com are more effective ways to train field-grade munity’s special operations forces (SOF). in and future general-officer leaders to function his math, only Air Force tactical air control in consequence management. Serving multi party (TACP) units supply non-SOF qualified year assignments with the US Agency for inter JTACs to SOF. in reality, Air Force Special national Development or while “loaned” to Operations Command (AFSOC) is tasked via the State Department at embassies/consulates USSOCOM to organize, train, and equip in developing countries would help prepare special-tactics combat controllers to perform current junior-level and midlevel officers to the JTAC mission. JTAC-certified combat con function in S&r. And we should immediately trollers habitually integrate with Army, Navy, incorporate S&r training in the curricula of and coalition SOF and have conducted JCAS
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operations with distinctive success since the ultimate vision at Altus was to produce Air very beginning of Operations enduring Free men who are even better than those currently dom and iraqi Freedom. To meet increased on active duty. We sought to develop Airmen demand on the current and future battlefield, whose very core is infused with the Air Force AFSOC’s special-tactics forces are methodically core values because that will prepare them to growing in number while maintaining excep face the challenges of tomorrow’s volatile, un tional capability. even prior to the global war certain, complex, and ambiguous combat en on terrorism, AFSOC’s special operators earned vironment. We accepted the challenge and fierce reputations as quiet professionals through pressed on towards the goal. Our consolidated exercises and contingency deployments with efforts produced a developmental infrastruc their joint SOF counterparts, but Colonel ture we call Airmen’s Time. For more infor Bohn overlooks AFSOC’s contributions to the mation about our efforts at Altus, see https:// JTAC mission. wwwd.my.af.mil/afknprod/ASPs/CoP/Open The author also states that “these Airmen CoP.asp?Filter=OO-eD-Ae-32. To learn how we do not have the training to operate like special continued our work at Ali Al Salem Air Base, forces personnel” (p. 59). We deem it a dis Kuwait, seehttps://wwwd.my.af.mil/afknprod/ service to those courageous, highly qualified ASPs/CoP/OpenCoP.asp?Filter=OO-eD-AC-24. enlisted and commissioned-officer JTACs cur CMSgt Thomas S. Narofsky, USAF rently engaged in the fight alongside their SOF Ali Al Salem Air Base, Kuwait counterparts to describe them as less than ca pable or somehow lacking in ability. We urge the author to reconsider his assessment of the MOLECULAR NANOTECHNOLOGY quality of Air Force JTACs. AND NATIONAL SECURITY Maj Jerry Kung, USAF i read with great interest LCDr Thomas D. Hurlburt Field, Florida Vandermolen’s article “Molecular Nanotech Maj Michael Martin, USAF Maxwell AFB, Alabama nology and National Security” (Fall 2006), which addressed mankind’s admirable degree of technical development. i hope that this LEADING THE TWENTY-FIRST technical knowledge will be accompanied by CENTURY AIR FORCE high moral values so that its use may promote human development. Since i’m devoted to i just finished reading Lt Col Paul D. Berg’s medicine, i’m always interested in reading ar “Focus Area” piece titled “Leading the Twenty- first-Century Air Force” (Winter 2006) and ticles about technological advances, many of could not agree more. The very foundation of which are occurring at an astonishing rate. our leadership must be the Air Force’s core Congratulations to Commander Vandermo values. in June 2004, we senior noncommis len for his excellent work. sioned officers (SNCO) at Altus AFB, Okla Dr. Manoel A. Moraes homa, began a focused investment in our Johnson City, Tennessee people as we leveraged our skills, talents, and experiences to transform our wing Airmen Editor’s Note: Dr. Moraes read the Portuguese ver into future strategic enlisted leaders. We SNCOs sion of Commander Vandermolen’s article, available lead from the front, take care of the troops, at http://www.airpower.maxwell.af.mil/apjinter and serve as role models for our Airmen. Air national/apj-p/2006/3tri06/vandermolen.html. Force instruction 36-2618, The Enlisted Force Structure, 1 December 2004, says that SNCOs in his article “Molecular Nanotechnology and should “be . . . active, visible leader[s]. De National Security,” Commander Vandermolen velop their NCOs into better leaders and su recommends intense regulation. At the same pervisors. Deliberately grow and prepare their time, he indicates fairly clearly that the United NCOs to be effective future SNCOs” (11). Our States would be seen as a pariah if it alone
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gained molecular nanotechnology (MNT) ca potentially dozens or hundreds of nonstate ac pability. i’m not sure that i understand the tors who could upset the strategic balance. either/or position. it would seem to me that, But assume that we “win.” Unless we are given the strategic importance of MNT as an willing to preemptively destroy the capabilities extraordinarily disruptive technology advance, of our competitors, they will also reach the fin which appears inevitable in some fashion, the ish line. Since developing defenses against United States should actually try to drive its MNT-based weapons appears more difficult own “MNT Manhattan Project.” The develop than creating the weapons themselves, we still ment of nuclear capacity, coupled with our won’t be “safe” from less-advanced competitors, military, economic, and international regula including nonstate actors. Thus, even a suc tory capacities, has governed our security cessful noncooperative approach lands us in since World War ii. Wouldn’t you rather have the same situation as an international effort, the United States in the driver’s seat for the only without the buy-in from other nations, next technological revolution? Thanks for the making monitoring and controlling MNT that thoughtful article. much harder. if we are to launch an MMP, de Eric Bauswell veloping a workable, enforceable MNT regu San Jose, California latory structure would be its worthiest goal. i am also indebted to Mr. Tihamer Toth- Fejel for kindly pointing out that Dr. eric MOLECULAR NANOTECHNOLOGY Drexler was not, as i state in my article, the AND NATIONAL SECURITY: first person to coin the term nanotechnology. THE AUTHOR RESPONDS Prof. Norio Taniguchi of Tokyo Science Uni An “MNT Manhattan Project” (MMP) may be a versity used it in his 1974 paper “On the Ba great idea, depending on its purpose. is its pur sic Concept of ‘Nano-Technology.’ ” (See pose to secure US influence in an international Wikipedia: The Free Encyclopedia, s.v. “Norio control regime or to produce the world’s sole Taniguchi,” http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/ MNT superpower? The first goal is highly de Norio_Taniguchi.) sirable, but the second is unlikely to succeed LCDR Thomas D. Vandermolen, USN and could make the United States less, rather Yokosuka Naval Base, Japan than more, secure. An MMP would be a tremendously difficult WHY RED FLAG IS OBSOLETE undertaking, even compared to the original Manhattan Project. Although the United States i commend Lt Col rob Spalding on his cogent is arguably the current leader in overall nano and germane remarks in “Why red Flag is Ob technology (NT) research, some government solete” (Fall 2006), but his analysis stops just and private programs outside the United short of a third and vital scenario: preengage States are leaders in their respective NT fields. ment of main battle forces. Shaping the battle- Now consider that the research paths to pro space is a catchphrase that many use but few duce practical MNT are unknown and almost truly understand. Joint doctrine addresses certainly numerous. To assure MNT dominance, shaping the battlespace, yet previous tabletop our MMP would thus have to dominate every and fieldexercises tended to neglect both the likely research path, including currently un battlespace shaping and poststabilization phases. anticipated ones—a very expensive, unfocused, To win a war, we must shape the battlespace and therefore almost certainly doomed ven upon entry and exit, but battlespace shaping ture. Furthermore, attempts to hire or coerce for departure is always subject to unintended expertise from non-US programs will likely consequences. alienate other nations and spur competition. The two scenarios suggested by Colonel The MNT Cold War would be on, and unlike Spalding are useful for fully engaged air and the Cold War that defeated the Soviet Union, space campaigns. But we don’t start that way an MNT Cold War would have to contend with in the global war on terrorism’s battlespace.
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in fact, as Spalding mentions, the military is CLAUSEWITZ AND THE FALKLAND economically constrained. Therefore, being ISLANDS AIR WAR good stewards of taxpayer dollars, we should Thanks to Maj rodolfo Pereyra for his illumi seek to make best use of what is already in nating article “Clausewitz and the Falkland is place. And aviation counterinsurgency is a lands Air War” (Fall 2006). Although i found combat-advisory mission that leverages best most of his contentions valid and logical, i use of available host-nation air forces in the failed to discern the Clausewitzian belief in conduct of an internal or regional engage the linkage between politics and war. The au ment. This is a mission legislated to special thor’s contention that the Clausewitzian defi operations forces (SOF) under the Goldwater- nition can be applied for both countries in Nichols Department of Defense reorganiza the Falklands War could be viewed from an tion Act. other perspective—particularly in the case of it has been my personal experience that Argentina. The fact that the Argentinean mili main forces have a limited or even misinformed tary leadership resorted to war to “cover up understanding of SOF personnel and their ca economic difficulties” (112) strengthens the pabilities. Although SOF operates throughout point that the instrument of war was abused in all phases of combat operations, these forces this case. are the initial battlespace shapers. For this rea indeed, the relationship between war and son, i propose to add a third scenario to en politics is not as axiomatic as the fact that two rich the combat reality sought by Colonel and two make four. Clausewitz’s deductions Spalding. This scenario would work to about war being subservient to politics were the product of rational thinking and intense 1. develop understanding of needs, capa human experience as opposed to the surreal bilities, and limitations between the istic mode demonstrated by Argentinean gen phase-one SOF advisory forces and the eral Galtieri in the Falklands War. Arguably, phase-two main battle forces for cam the instrument of war was abused (by Argen paign and tactical-level planners and tina), in this case as an end for which it was leaders; probably unsuited. Moreover, politics was tai 2. develop understanding of capabilities lored to rationalize the war. in other words, and limitations of the Air Force’s new war preceded the politics. Such irrational or foreign area officers for main battle- subrational reasoning for waging war runs contrary to the Clausewitzian understanding force campaign-level planners; and of war in a true sense because it was used to 3. develop an understanding of how the rationalize the irrational. Clausewitz also SOF combat-aviation advisors enhance warned about such possibilities of abusing the the best use of available aircraft-to use of the military. indeed, he asserted that mission matching using existing host- “policy is the guiding intelligence and war nation airpower, and learn how to lever only the instrument, not vice versa. No other age this force into the air tasking order. possibility exists, then, than to subordinate the military point of view to the political” (On Kudos to Colonel Spalding for proposing War, rev. ed., ed. and trans. Michael howard to update red Flag with twenty-first-century and Peter Paret [Princeton, NJ: Princeton reality! Whether riding Northern Alliance University Press, 1984], 607). horses, squaring off in M1A1 main battle Nevertheless, the increasing attraction to tanks, or flying F-15e Strike eagles, military wards war as an end rather than a means power will always face the challenge of remain (which i think is more appropriate in this ing appropriate, adaptive, and relevant. case) is best explained by Martin van Creveld, Maj David C. Hook, USAF, Retired who stated in his book The Transformation of San Antonio, Texas War (New York: Free Press, 1991) that “war, far
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from being merely a means, has very often port rapid launch. even inexpensive boosters been considered an end—a highly attractive cause launchpad damage that must be re activity for which no other can provide an ade paired, and they require trained crews that quate substitute” (218). The Argentinean ac must be there and ready for unplanned tion is probably closer to van Creveld’s con launches. All the boosters and satellites must ception of war than to Clausewitz’s. Once be prepurchased and maintained in storage again, thanks to Major Pereyra for an intrigu in a flight condition. it can’t be done with ing article. military crews as there is neither career growth nor continuous activity to maintain training. Wing Cdr Z. I. Khan, Bangladesh Air Force Dhaka, Bangladesh Thus, we pay contractors. This capability will cost hundreds of millions of dollars to pre position, and it might take weeks to launch a MYTH OF THE TACTICAL SATELLITE constellation of six to 10 satellites. And what would happen if one of the boosters or satel i wholeheartedly congratulate Lt Col edward lites failed during the constellation deployment? B. Tomme, USAF, retired, for his article “The Until we develop a true tactical capability, our Myth of the Tactical Satellite” (Summer 2006). tactical-satellite demonstrations test strategic- i have spent a career in the military-launch augmentation systems that can be deployed as business, which has been and is now spending secondary payloads on other strategic missions significant dollars to develop the “responsive or use current small boosters like Pegasus, launch” capability for these mythical “tactical” Athena, and so forth. satellites. One thing that seems lost on many Col Michael T. Baker, USAF, Retired people is the cost of the infrastructure to sup Redondo Beach, California
Airmen provide America with air, space, and cyberspace dominance— the first and essential enduring requirement of a successful military operation. —hon. Michael W. Wynne, Secretary of the Air Force
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Lt CoL PauL D. Berg, uSaF, ChieF, ProFeSSionaL JournaLS
Developing Airmen Educating and Training Leaders
ccording to Air Force doc require different blends of education and train trine document (AFdd) 1, Air Force ing. Furthermore, the effectiveness of training Basic Doctrine, 17 november 2003, lends itself to measurement more easily than “the Air Force’s fundamental ser does the efficacy of education. For example, Avice to the nation is to develop, train, sustain, one can readily determine if maintenance tech and integrate the elements of air and space nicians are properly trained in aircraft repair, power to execute its functions across the spec but how should one assess their educational de trum of operations” (73). the document enu velopment? We must continually develop our merates three “core competencies” that lie “at people during their careers, even though the the forefront of the Air Force’s strategic per precious time spent on education and training spective and therefore at the heart of the Ser remains unavailable for fighting wars. vice’s contribution to our nation’s total mili Ultimately, developing Airmen means grow tary capabilities and strategic vision,” the first ing leaders. Successful Air Force leadership of which is “developing Airmen” (73). AFdd requires a harmonious blend of theoretical 1 explains that because Air Force people rep and practical knowledge about diverse topics. resent the “ultimate source of combat capability,” the service’s emphasis on studying foreign the service has “dedicated [itself] to ensuring languages and cultures adds another facet to they receive the education, training, and pro Airman development. Even more develop fessional development necessary to provide a mental demands flowfrom the Air Force’s ex quality edge second to none” by means of a panding involvement in the cyberspace domain. “career-long focus on the development of pro fessional airmen” (74). We must maintain our traditional technical A top Air Force priority, developing Air expertise in air and space as well as our in men is a complex and time-consuming task. sights into leading Airmen while we prepare Professional Airmen require a flexible bal people for these new fields. We do need tech ance between broad education, which teaches nical specialists, but properly educated leaders them how to think in creative, theoretical who can synthesize and guide others in imple terms, and specific training, which teaches menting creative solutions to complex, multi them how to perform practical tasks. An im disciplinary problems are far more valuable. proper balance between education and train the successful development of tomorrow’s ing might degrade combat performance, but Air Force leaders demands a long-term com the proper balance varies during the course of mitment and the expenditure of vast resources. a career and between different career fields. Because the free exchange of ideas helps edu Early in a career, technical training could well cate Airmen, Air and Space Power Journal, the predominate, but Airmen might later need professional journal of our service, dedicates more education to prepare for the strategic- this issue to advancing the professional dia level responsibilities of higher ranks. Engi logue about how best to develop Airmen who neers, pilots, and public-affairs officersclearly are ready to lead tomorrow’s Air Force. •
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Focus Area.indd 26 4/27/07 11:06:39 AM In air combat, “the merge” occurs when opposing aircraft meet and pass each other. Then they usually “mix it up.” In a similar spirit, Air and Space Power Journal’s “Merge” articles present contending ideas. Readers can draw their own conclusions or join the intellectual battlespace. Please send comments to [email protected].
Editor’s Note: For a reply to this article, see “Tactical Satellites: It’s Not ‘Can We?’ but ‘Should We?’” by Lt Col Edward B. “Mel” Tomme, USAF, retired, in this issue. Tactical Satellites The Rest of the Story
LTC BoB Guerriero, uSA*
etiRed AiR FoRce lieutenant tary objectives assigned to tactical units or task colonel edward tomme’s interest forces” (emphasis in original).2 FM 3-0, Opera ing article “the Myth of the tactical tions, defines a battle as “a set of related en Satellite” (Summer 2006) outlines gagements that last longer and involve larger Rsome of the challenges associated with employ forces than an engagement” and an engage ing a satellite in a tactical role. the author ment as “a small tactical conflict between op does an excellent job of describing the physical posing maneuver forces, usually conducted at constraints of satellite operations due to orbital brigade level and below.”3 colonel tomme’s mechanics and payload size, weight, and power article implies that all tactical operations are issues. However, the article includes some in engagements, lasting minutes or hours. in re accurate assumptions about the nature of tac ality, they can last for days, weeks, months, or tical operations and the potential value of a longer. the planning in advance of such op tactical satellite for the war fighter on the erations can take equally as long. ground, thus leading to a wrong conclusion. Any discussion of tactical satellites must colonel tomme begins his article by dis also consider the operational level of war, de cussing what the term tactical means to a war fined by FM 3-0 as “the level at which cam fighter:“ the warrior has a very specificunder paigns and major operations are conducted standing of what that technical term [tactical] and sustained to accomplish strategic objec means—applying to small-scale, short-lived tives within theaters.”4 A tactical satellite might events, usually involving troops in contact.”1 prove most useful at this level. Because opera From an Army perspective, tactical does have a tions can last anywhere from days to years, a specificmeaning, but it is not limited to colo theater commander could find the data and nel tomme’s. Army Field Manual (FM) 3-90, support provided by a tactical satellite extremely Tactics, states that “the tactical level of war is the valuable. At the operational level of war, the level of war at which battles and engagements commander faces the challenge of linking the are planned and executed to accomplish mili tactical employment of units to the fulfillment
*the author is assigned to the directorate of combat development, Future Warfare center, US Army Space and Missile defense command, colorado Springs, colorado.
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of strategic objectives. to succeed, he or she this function now with its overhead nonimag must leverage both strategic and tactical capa ing infrared sensors, but missile warning natu bilities, including satellite assets. rally takes precedence over battlespace char colonel tomme’s article also leaves the acterization, thereby limiting the dSP’s utility reader with the impression of tactical satellites in that role. as a replacement for existing constellations of Finally, colonel tomme questions the value satellites: “A tactical war fighter needs persis of any tactical satellite to a tactical war fighter, tent imagery. Getting a snapshot every hour or maintaining that iSR missions are not practical so is not very useful at the tactical level. . . . it because “the gap times are much longer than is almost inconceivable to contemplate send the timescale of a tactical engagement.”7 He ing commanders into combat after telling also argues that “sparse constellations of satel them that they would only be able to commu lites in Leo have no chance of providing a nicate five minutes out of every half hour.”5 useful communications capability.”8 in fact, Finally, when referring to the mission of the tactical satellites in Leo or high-earth orbits defense Support Program (dSP), colonel could perform many extremely valuable mis tomme remarks that “it would still take be sions for theater commanders. tween 12 and 20 of them to provide continual An imagery intelligence or signals intelli global coverage.”6 Because these statements gence (SiGiNt) payload on a tactical satellite, tend to narrow the focus to tactical satellites directly downlinked to the theater and available alone, as if they are the only assets available to for dynamic retasking by the theater collec the war fighter, they inaccurately convey the tion manager, could make great contributions idea that these satellites fail to meet war-fighter by supplementing other resources available to needs. in reality, commanders have a myriad the commander. the advantage of the tactical of capabilities available, each suited to a par satellite lies in its responsiveness to the theater ticular application, and tactical satellites could commander, who could receive direct support complement these other capabilities. from a space-based asset. one of the most tactical war fighters do need persistent im valuable capabilities of space-based iSR plat agery, but they neither expect nor require that forms remains the ability to collect informa it come from a tactical low earth orbit (Leo) tion over denied territory without an adversary’s satellite alone. A commander relies on the knowledge. the best use of such a tactical sys collective ability of ground-based, fixed-wing, tem would entail collecting intelligence over and space-based collectors to provide persis an area selected as the location of an immi tence across the spectrum. A tactical satellite nent operation, when that area is either de that complements other intelligence, surveil nied territory or one that the commander lance, and reconnaissance (iSR) platforms by does not want to draw attention to. even one providing some specificpieces of information, pass per day could provide useful and action even just once per day, could be extremely able information, especially during the moni valuable to a commander. Similarly, no com toring of an area for changes during the days mander expects a Leo satellite to serve as a leading up to an operation. ideally, we would primary means of tactical communications. tailor the payload to support operations in a Many other systems serve this function, but a particular theater so that it would provide in tactical satellite could augment these systems formation not already collected by other sen by providing some specialized, intermittent sors. Some examples include a nonimaging communications and data access. Finally, no spectrometer that could detect the manufac one considers tactical satellites a replacement ture of weapons of mass destruction, a micro for the entire dSP constellation, with its wave SiGiNt collector, or an infrared sensor global missile-warning mission. instead, a tac that might have a limited lifespan due to cryo tical satellite could complement this constella gen cooling requirements. tion by offering an enhanced battlespace We can also envision valuable communica characterization capability. the dSP performs tions payloads for tactical satellites—even for
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intermittent communications. take for ex of tactical satellite for long-term tracking of ample a communications package that receives friendly or enemy personnel, vehicles, or low-probability-of-detection transmissions from equipment. Again, thanks to the low-power re covert operators and then relays them through quirements for transmitting to a Leo satellite, other systems to a theater headquarters. By se small transmitters in enemy territory could go lecting a Leo asset to do this, we could use a undetected for long periods of time and would relatively low-power ground transmitter and consume very little power. Granted, this sys thus lower the probability of detection. A pay tem allows only intermittent monitoring capa load of this type would stay overhead only in bility, but for long-term tracking of personnel termittently, and an operator could send up or equipment movement, we do not always re dates just at specific times and for limited quire or desire continuous updates. durations. For a covert operation lasting days We should not dismiss the value of tactical or weeks, requiring only periodic updates to satellites. they can fill an important role as the commander, this arrangement might complements to other existing constellations prove completely sufficient. including a laser- and assets while providing a level of respon communications payload on this satellite siveness to theater commanders not available would substantially increase the amount of from strategic systems. Realizing the potential data transmitted in a short time. We would of these satellites will require the same level of never use such a system to provide continuous creativity, determination, and perseverance communications; rather, when needed, it that has made our strategic constellations so • would complement other means of communi successful for over 40 years. cation available. We could also utilize this type Colorado Springs, Colorado
Notes
1. Lt col edward B. tomme, “the Myth of the tac 3. FM 3-0, Operations, June 2001, par. 2-12, http:// tical Satellite,” Air and Space Power Journal 20, no. 2 www.dtic.mil/doctrine/jel/service_pubs/fm3_0a.pdf. (Summer 2006): 90, http://www.airpower.maxwell.af.mil/ 4. ibid., par. 2-5. airchronicles/apj/apj06/sum06/sum06.pdf. 5. tomme, “Myth of the tactical Satellite,” 92. 2. Field Manual (FM) 3-90, Tactics, July 2001, par. 1-4, 6. ibid., 95. http://www.dtic.mil/doctrine/jel/service_pubs/fm3 7. ibid., 96. _90a.pdf. 8. ibid.
We will begin the crucial part of preparing Airmen for combat opera tions by increasing the emphasis on combat skills training during our basic military training courses, and we will reorient our continuing education training programs to emphasize language and culture. —Air Force Strategic Plan, 2006–2008
Merge-Guerriero.indd 29 4/27/07 11:03:55 AM Tactical Satellites It’s Not “Can We?” but “Should We?”
Lt CoL Edward B. “MEL” toMME, USaF, rEtirEd*
he argumenT by LTC bob guer pability to compensate for the weaknesses of riero in favor of tactical satellites, which other assets would also be a plus. however, be appears in this issue, is one of the few fore commanders sign up to own that capability, attempts I have seen at a rational they should know the opportunity cost of get Trather than an emotional rebuttal to the argu ting that image and weigh it against their tacti ments presented in my article “The myth of cally sized budgets. In a vast majority of tactical the Tactical Satellite” and the in-depth study situations, some other means of obtaining that from which that article was derived.1 I appreci photo exist—means that are responsive to the ate the thought that went into his rebuttal; tactical commander instead of being slaves to however, he appears to have missed the point orbital mechanics. Those means are almost of those works. In neither piece did I claim invariably much more affordable, much less that conducting such missions as communica predictable to opposing forces, and thus much tions, imagery collection, signals intelligence more effective. When such means are avail (SIgInT), or blue-force tracking was impossible able, the rationale for going to space to get using so-called tactical satellites. In fact, I de that photo seems counterproductive. It’s not voted a large portion of those works to show that those missions can’t be done from space; ing exactly how effectively we could perform it’s that in most cases, they shouldn’t be done those missions from space. What I claimed was from space. The opportunity costs are huge. that using tactical satellites to perform those The money that commanders would need to missions was highly impractical when con spend to buy a single satellite to produce that strained by a limited budget. The point of that one picture per day could buy quite a bit of detailed research was to give senior decision alternative equipment, including nonorbital makers a tool with which to measure the ac systems that would likely prove more effective tual opportunity cost of such an endeavor. since they don’t spend most of their time half according to Colonel guerriero, “a tactical way around the globe. satellite that complements other intelligence, Space-based assets have two things in their surveillance, and reconnaissance (ISr) plat favor that in many cases mitigate their expense: forms by providing some specific pieces of in freedom of overflight and relative immunity formation, even just once per day, could be to threats of physical destruction.† The big op extremely valuable to a commander.”2 The un erational drawbacks to satellites are excessive stated corollary to his assertion suggests that predictability and extremely limited persis such a capability will also cost money—money tence. Those combinations of factors tend to that we could use elsewhere. undoubtedly, make satellites very useful in the strategic role. commanders on the ground would rarely turn In contrast, tactical areas of interest are almost down an additional satellite photo of their always significantly less than global, in most area of responsibility. having a gap-filling ca cases well within the footprints of nonorbital
*Colonel Tomme’s final air Force assignment in 2006 was as deputy director, air Force Tactical exploitation of national Capabilities (TenCaP), where he directed programs designed to extract tactical effects from strategic overhead assets. †The recent Chinese antisatellite launch considerably dilutes this advantage.
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assets. Colonel guerriero states that “tactical attention from potential funding sources, ap operations . . . can last for days, weeks, months, pear unachievable within a constrained budget. or longer,”3 implying that individual engage The marketing campaign related to tactical ments and battles between small maneuver satellites is uniform in its message of direct forces can be linked in time and space to form tactical support. For example, the air Force a single tactical operation.* It is a near truism Space battlelab and the army Space and mis that all military activity involving troops in sile Defense battle Lab demonstrated the in contact does occur at the tactical level. It is novative Virtual mission Operations Center also fairly clear that when a series of battles or (VmOC), a program designed to allow con engagements starts to last “days, weeks, months, trol of tactical satellites from the field, to air or longer,” the level of control should shift up Force Space Command commanders. That to the operational or strategic levels of war. It demonstration touted the use of untrained seems obvious that the longer an operation enlisted personnel in a simulated field envi lasts, even though, in truth, it consists of a se ronment outside of the Fourteenth air Force ries of related tactical events, the further up the headquarters building to show the system’s ca spectrum of war it must progress. Without pability to give a tactical soldier the ability to such a progression of command attention, the direct satellite collections and access the prod rationale for having higher levels of command ucts in real time. The obvious implication of would not exist. regardless of personal inter this demonstration was to show that the capa pretations of army doctrine, operations lasting bility would be pushed out into the foxholes for significant periods and/or extending across where even the lowest-level soldier could task orbital assets and immediately use the space substantial spatial extents would appear to data he or she had requested. article after ar warrant the attention of higher-level command, ticle in the press stressed directly taskable sup and hence should be classified collectively as port to warriors in the field with statements something other than tactical operations. such as “We believe we will give the soldier on Why is the definition of the level of war so the ground the ability to control a spacecraft germane to the problem of the so-called tactical payload,” “Today’s technology is close to giv satellite? It all boils down to truth in advertising. ing a foot soldier and the tactical warfighter advertising is how any product goes after cus the kind of space capabilities needed,” and tomers and, ultimately, funding. Selection of “[This capability will] directly benefit the troop the name tactical satellite appears to have its ba on the ground.”5 briefings by senior officials sis in sex appeal; the term sells the concept to in the air Force research Laboratory (aFrL) an acquisitions staff desperately looking for heightened anticipation among senior air ways to enhance delivery of command, con Force leadership of direct tactical tasking and trol, communications, computers, intelligence, support from space.6 an article on TacSat-3 in surveillance, and reconnaissance effects to the the Air Force Times even bore the headline “Sat lowest level of war fighter whose inability to ellite in Works to beam battlefield Pictures to receive those effects adequately during Opera Troops.” That article went on to say, “When the tion Iraqi Freedom has been well docu air Force began beaming pictures of the battle mented.4 Who could refuse to buy a program space from airplanes to small units of ground that promises to deliver tactically controlled troops, it was a breakthrough. now, the air space effects directly to the front lines at an Force research Laboratory is looking at doing ostensibly affordable price? unfortunately, the the same with pictures from satellites. . . . The deliverable effects publicly touted as the rai key to the experiments is to show a satellite son d’être for funding a tactical-satellite pro can fly over the theater and that a soldier on gram, apparently designed to gain maximum the ground can directly task the satellite and
*extending this assertion to its logical but absurd conclusion, one could consider all of World War II a single tactical engagement.
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get information.”7 Without question, the mar oped photos from Wal-mart. It is highly doubt keting thrust is geared toward the idea that ful that the fabled sergeant in the foxhole di tactical satellites will provide direct support to recting a satellite to give him an image of the tactical war fighters. enemy over the next hill will ever exist, given The problem with this coordinated market the current physical and fiscal constraints on ing campaign relates to the need for truth in tactical satellites. even if he does not person advertising, discussed above. In all likelihood, ally direct the sensor, the odds that his need to the effects tantalizingly advertised by tactical- obtain one of the very few images captured satellite advocates will not findtheir way to the during a pass will rise to the top of the queue front lines at all. as shown in “The myth of the seem very low, considering the numerous, si Tactical Satellite,” the least expensive tactical multaneous tactical engagements likely to be satellite used for imagery will cost a com in progress at the time. The resources are just mander about $500,000 per hour overhead in too precious. acquisition costs alone and will provide only a One could certainly move a family’s house stroboscopic glimpse of the battlefield, less hold goods across the country with a fleet of than two minutes out of every fivehours or so. Ferraris that one had to buy specifically for Furthermore, per-hour cost isn’t the only is that job and then garage them for an indefi sue. many years prior to actual need, senior nite period before the family even had orders leaders will have to make decisions concern to move. Obviously, however, a number of more ing which missions may require augmenta operationally and fiscally responsible paths to tion; planners must program resources to de the desired end state exist. Our goal should velop and acquire the necessary single-purpose not be to go to space just because we can. satellites and launch vehicles; and all this in In conclusion, we must definitely look to vestment must then go into suspended anima space when it offers the most effective way to tion for an undetermined period of time to accomplish the mission. Without a doubt, a await an unspecified tactical need in an un mission requiring global coverage or even known geographical area. overflight of denied territory beyond the range Those acquisitions and logistical costs add of airborne or near-space sensors plays to the up quickly, but prioritization of access to the strength of space. We could even envision mis asset during the limited time it is overhead sions in which receiving information exfil will be an even more pressing problem. It is trated from Colonel guerriero’s small covert- naïve to believe that such prioritization will operations team is important enough to occur at less than the operational level of com warrant launching an asset costing several tens mand, if not higher. Colonel guerriero as of millions of dollars. however in the vast ma much as admits this point himself when he de jority of realistic situations, given the existence scribes the operational level as the one at which of so many more effective ways to support our “a tactical satellite might prove most useful.”8 tactical warriors during the relatively short additionally, anyone who has worked with im timescales and across the relatively small areas agery or SIgInT knows that substantial analysis in which they operate, it appears that promot goes on before publication of any product be ing the theory of “space because we can” is an cause the raw data is difficult for amateurs to unaffordable, unresponsive, ineffective, and • interpret. getting these products to the field ill-advised course of action. would not be as simple as picking up devel Colorado Springs, Colorado
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Notes 1. Lt Col edward b. Tomme, “The myth of the Tactical =1547 (quotation attributed to Peter Wegner, the aFrL Satellite,” Air and Space Power Journal 20, no. 2 (Summer 2006): responsive-space lead) (accessed 12 December 2006); 89–100, http://www.airpower.maxwell.af.mil/airchronicles/ maryann Lawlor, “TacSat Delay Ignites Frustration,” Signal apj/apj06/sum06/sum06.pdf; and idem, The Strategic Na Connections 3, no. 9 (15 June 2006), http://www.afcea.org/ ture of the Tactical Satellite, research Paper 2006-1 (maxwell signal/articles/templates/SIgnaL_article_Template.asp aFb, aL: airpower research Institute, College of aero ?articleid=1154&zoneid=188 (quotation attributed to Peter space Doctrine, research and education, n.d.), https:// Wegner) (accessed 2 February 2007); and michael Kleiman, research.maxwell.af.mil/papers/ay2006/CaDre/tomme “responsive Space Demonstrator ready to roll,” air .pdf (accessed 31 January 2007). Force Print news, 5 november 2006, http://www.af.mil/ 2. LTC bob guerriero, “Tactical Satellites: The rest of news/story.asp?storyID=123030853 (quotation attributed the Story,” Air and Space Power Journal 21, no. 2 (Summer to neal Peck, TacSat-2 program manager) (accessed 12 2007): 28. December 2006). 3. Ibid., 27. 4. Lt Col edward b. Tomme, The Paradigm Shift to Effects- 6. aFrL briefing,Dr . David hardy, “TacSat Demo Sta Based Space: Near-Space as a Combat Space Effects Enabler, re tus: Senior Leader Vector Check,” Washington, DC, 22 search Paper 2005-01 (maxwell aFb, aL: airpower re September 2004; and aFrL briefing, Col rex Kiziah, search Institute, College of aerospace Doctrine, research “Joint WarfightingSpace,” Schriever III War game, nellis and education, n.d.), https://research.maxwell.af.mil/ aFb, nV, 8 February 2005. papers/ay2005/ari/CaDre_arI_2005-01.pdf (accessed 7. bruce rolfsen, “Satellite in Works to beam battle 17 January 2007). field Pictures to Troops,” Air Force Times, 13 november 5. Patrick Chisolm, “micro-eyes in Space,” Military 2006, http://www.airforcetimes.com/legacy/new/0-aIr Geospatial Technology 4, no. 3 (14 July 2006), http://www PaPer-2320736.php. .military-geospatial-technology.com/article.cfm?DocID 8. guerriero, “Tactical Satellites,” 27.
More than ever, we depend on our allied Airmen to succeed, and they depend on us. We must flyand fightas one. We teach, we partner, we learn—and in building friendships, we build trust. America’s secu rity today and in the future depends on building successful interna tional partnerships, one Airman at a time. —hon. michael W. Wynne, Secretary of the air Force
Merge-Tomme.indd 33 4/27/07 11:05:18 AM The Inadvisability of Posthumously Promoting Billy Mitchell
Col PhilliP S. Meilinger, USAF, retired*
tend to agree with Lt Col William J. this sort of rationale has previously played ott’s argument in a previous issue of this a part in promoting men long after they left journal regarding the inadvisability of the service. For example, in 1985 Jimmy doo posthumously promoting Billy Mitchell little and Ira eaker became full generals 40 (“MajI gen William ‘Billy’ Mitchell: a Pyrrhic years after their retirement. not only had they Promotion,” Winter 2006). Here’s my own performed magnificently in World War II, for read on the matter. which they were justly rewarded with three- Yes, Billy Mitchell was a great airman—a star rank, but they had also continued to visionary who saw a future for airpower that serve their country afterwards by becoming far transcended its use as a mere adjunct to spokesmen for airpower—by serving on vari surface forces. In the current era of “military ous commissions and panels, working in the air transformation,” those in uniform, of all ranks, and space industry to advance the technical are encouraged to “think outside the box”— boundaries of those mediums, and displaying not simply to devise improved methods of do a seemingly never-ending willingness to talk to ing old things better and more effectively, but men and women of all ranks regarding the to imagine totally new methods, doctrines, wonders of the air. as a junior air Force offi and concepts of fighting and winning wars. cer, I heard both men speak and found them Mitchell’s belief in airpower’s ability to trans inspirational. form war was perhaps his greatest achieve on the other hand, we must balance such ment. He passionately believed that airpower criteria against the possible negative effects offered a new way to fight. Having seen the felt by others in uniform. In the case of the two trench carnage of World War I, he looked for men noted above, I heard two other senior a better way. Strategic airpower offered a totally airmen—both full generals long retired—ex different path to victory. though Mitchell’s vision press dismay at the promotions of their old was imprecise—often the case with prophets— colleagues. they were not being petty but sim his fundamental understanding of airpower’s ply stating what seemed to them a simple fact: transformational possibilities, as well as his doolittle and eaker had retired at an early age ability to inspire a host of other airmen to to enter business and earn substantially more share that vision, marks him as a seminal and money than they ever could have made in uni heroic thinker. form. that was their reward. to promote them Billy Mitchell was indeed a great airman. retroactively would slight the toil of all the But should we promote him now, so many people who stuck with their service during years after his death? In my view, only two rea lean times in the aftermath of war. sons justify contemplating such a move: (1) It is useful to remember here that the mili because of continuing service to his country tary has always taken the position that it does and significant achievements not previously not consider promotion a reward for past ac recognized, or (2) because of a need to re tions—that’s what medals and decorations are dress gross and obvious injustice. for—but as a sign of the promise and poten
*the author is retired from northrop grumman and living in West Chicago, Illinois.
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tial that an individual possesses for future that Mitchell quite simply did not know what tasks. In the case of Billy Mitchell, he contrib he was talking about regarding the status of uted relatively little after leaving the air Corps naval aviation—and recall that his charges in 1926. He lived for another decade, but in were made as a specific result of the crash of truth, he became largely a forgotten figure, the US navy dirigible Shenandoah—or even seldom called upon by his country or his ser that of his own service. Indeed, his perfor vice. His one book, Skyways: A Book on Modern mance on the stand was an embarrassment. Aeronautics, merely rehashed old ideas previ the court, composed of 10 general officers, ously published. found him guilty, and his punishment—sus as for the case of using a delayed promo pension from rank and duty for fiveyears and tion to right an obvious injustice, we must be forfeiture of all pay and allowances during careful. did the military or its justice system that time—was reasonable. the prosecutor truly abuse the individual, or is the proposed had called for dismissal from the army and promotion merely an attempt to soften a deci hinted at prison time. Instead the court sion in today’s kinder and gentler world? If handed down a lenient sentence, taking into the latter, then the concern is misplaced. the consideration Mitchell’s combat record in the military justice system, with its necessary em war. Pres. Calvin Coolidge lightened the sen phasis on duty and responsibility, must be up tence even further, granting him half pay for held. In the military, whose members’ lives those fiveyears. But Mitchell elected to resign. depend upon the decisions made by a com after the air Force became independent in mander, it is most unwise to undermine or 1947, it attempted to reopen the court-martial, soften a system in which the consequences of hoping to reverse its findings. after review, failure are so high. the buck really does stop however, service leaders concluded that Mitchell here for the military commander. was indeed guilty as charged. In the case of Billy Mitchell, we must ask if then there is the matter of Mitchell’s pri his court-martial in 1925 for insubordination vate life. Forget that he virtually deserted the was an unjust act. no credible evidence supports children of his first marriage, philandered, that conclusion. Mitchell did in fact accuse his and had drinking problems. the recent reve superiors in the army as well as senior admi lation—discovered in dusty inspector-general rals in the navy of “incompetency, criminal files long forgotten and brought to light by negligence and almost treasonable adminis douglas Waller in A Question of Loyalty, his bi tration of the national defense”—very harsh ography of Mitchell—of a domestic incident words for a group of men who had served between Mitchell and his first wife staggers their country for decades and who had seen the imagination. the file tells of military po combat themselves, on several occasions.1 at lice arriving at the Mitchell quarters after Mrs. his court-martial, Mitchell’s attorney stated Mitchell had suffered a gunshot wound in the that every american had a constitutional right chest during an altercation with her husband. to express his or her opinion. this is pure rub She claimed that he shot her in a drunken bish. Military officers must abide by different rage; he claimed that she shot herself in a rules; they must follow orders and exercise drunken stupor. no one witnessed the event. self-discipline. as for his charges of incompe Fortunately, the wound was not serious, but tence and malfeasance within the service hier they divorced soon after. even in a modern age archies regarding the state of aviation at the that tends to overlook personal immorality as time, the truth tends to remain largely in the long as it doesn’t affect job performance, this eye of the beholder. all of the branches com behavior is a bit much. Is this the role model plained of fiscal strictures, and all feared that we wish to honor? they did not have the resources to do their In sum, Billy Mitchell was a great airman jobs adequately. who served his country well in war and peace. regardless, after reading through the tran He was rewarded for that service—in 1941 script of the court-martial, one must conclude Congress even struck a special gold medal in
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his honor. But Mitchell also had deep flaws Note that affected his performance as an officer, a 1. “Statement of William Mitchell Concerning the re commander, and a man. We must not forget cent air accidents” (statement to the press, San antonio, this fact when we consider the issue of promo tX, 5 September 1925), 1, http://www.afa.org/magazine/ july2006/keep_billy.pdf. tion so long after his death. • West Chicago, Illinois
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Editor’s Note: pirEp is aviation shorthand for pilot report. It’s a means for one pilot to pass on current, potentially useful information to other pilots. In the same fashion, we use this department to let readers know about items of interest.
Leading from the Front, Rear, and Center A Squadron Commander’s Approach
Lt CoL Christopher t. DanieLs, UsaF*
ffEctivE lEadErship encompasses professional goals; and building on the unit’s various styles and approaches. Expe established set of core values, all of which would rience i have gained not only as a help us through transformational efforts. commander but also as a follower has during my teenage years, my mother and Eshown me that the best leaders use a multi father would sometimes return home from dimensional approach to evaluating the many work not in the best of moods. i always won aspects of a given situation. this becomes nec dered what kind of boss would send them essary in order to draw from the right set of back to their family that way. did their bosses assumptions and make an informed decision. not respect their roles as parents, nurturers, a leader can give no greater gift to our air and models for their son, in addition to their force than treating his or her followers fairly status as employees? did they really care for or and accountably, thereby creating a healthy appreciate them? Whenever possible, as a environment, both at work and at home. My commander, i tried to avoid sending folks leadership approach, which i refer to in this home to their families carrying unnecessary article as frontrearcenter (frc, pronounced stress and burdens. “frock”), applies the concept of “frocking”—a On my firstday of command, i set my vision military term used for an officer who receives into motion by clearly defining expectations, a field promotion to the next higher grade. realizing, however, that this vision had to be frocking seeks to meet mission demands. My realistic and attainable for the people buying objectives called for elevating my squadron, into it. Early on, this gave the squadron an based on its past achievements; supporting idea of what mattered during the developing
*lieutenant colonel daniels commanded the 20th contracting squadron at shaw afB, south carolina. he currently serves as an air force secretariat staff officer for the Office of the deputy assistant secretary (contracting), assistant secretary of the air force (acquisition), pentagon, Washington, dc. the lieutenant colonel is a recipient of the air command and staff college hesselbein leadership award for the class of 2006.
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and shaping of the organization’s constitu Leading from the Front: tion. this commitment tooled and geared the unit into motion, driving it to many victories. Be Willing to Take the for example, our unit climateassessment Hits and Pass the Glory grade of 100 percent indicated that our team a commander has ul work had reached an alltime high; further timate responsibility for more, squadron leadership received a grade the success of his or her of 99 percent. Ultimately, because of the frc unit. success means ful leadership approach and unit commitment, filling the mission in we earned a “fully compliant” rating during such a way that mem the command’s unitcompliance inspection. bers of the unit derive a commanders must have the competence sense of satisfaction from to lead their organizations. as a contracting having done so. thus, success for the squad squadron commander, i needed to understand ron depends wholly on every aspect of the mission for our unit— all members’ daily ac unique in that it supported the air force’s tions and interactions largest f16cJ fighter base and a numbered with each other, in the unit, and outside the airforce headquarters directly involved in unit with customers, other base organizations, conducting wartime operations in southwest contractors, and senior leadership. how we asia. i had to comprehend completely the nu act and interact with others directly affects our ances of the wing’s and numbered air force’s performance results, ability to accomplish the mission and vision as they pertained to items mission, and capacity to gain satisfaction from as small as a $20 commodity or as large as a our work—ultimately, it determines the suc $20 million communications system. trans cess of an organization. the following two sec tions offer examples of how i implemented forming our business doctrine didn’t require the frc leadership style, using excerpts from a great deal of thought, but tapping under my annual letter to squadron members to re utilized resources to streamline processes pre mind them that accomplishment, from top to sented a substantial challenge. the expansion bottom, requires a team effort. of our client base, realignment of flights, and innovative focus on individual goals set un precedented benchmarks. the squadron re Leading from the Rear: corded the highest dollarobligation rates ever, Push Hard and Uplift climbing from number eight to number two in the command within 12 months. i owe it to each of you to make sure we My mentors and technical training prepared do the right things so me well. people within my career field must that, collectively, we can be careful to avoid limiting their role and fo achieve excellence in cus only to executing the contract action. as a all we do. therefore, i contracting professional, i underwent many must ensure years of training to do just that. however, i • that you have every opportunity to en confronted the task of findingthe mechanism hance your professional development to implant leadership empowerment, profes through attendance at formal training sional and personal trust, and sound decision courses, a robust onthejob training pro making at all levels. fortunately, i discovered gram, job rotation, and full support of that mechanism—the frc approach—and those activities that will maximize promo used it to lead and instill confidence. tion potential;
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• that appraisals and performance reports commitment, communication, and equal op are completed on time, accurately and fully portunity and treatment. reflecting work performed and results Commitment. a commitment involves a achieved during the rating period; and promise to perform an act, often by a speci • that various teambuilding actions and fied time. We must be careful to make only accomplishments maximize our ability to those commitments we feel confident that we work together and with personnel out can keep—and then we must dutifully fulfill side the squadron. them. i understand that on occasion we may come to realize that we cannot fulfill a com success is certainly nothing new to you. i mitment we have made in good faith; if this intend to do everything i can to enhance your situation arises, we must immediately commu opportunities for even greater levels of suc nicate this fact to all involved parties and come cess so that you perform the mission well and to a mutual agreement on how best to resolve gain a real sense of satisfaction in the process. the situation. We must remain responsible and Executing our daily activities using core values accountable. Unfulfilled commitments result as guidance puts us on the right path to reach in distrust and undermine good working rela ing this goal. tionships. don’t underestimate the beneficial effect of successfully keeping even the small est of commitments. Leading from the Center: Communication. Open, honest, and clear communication is not only integral to making Become the Core and keeping commitments but also absolutely the Us air force’s core val essential to developing, maintaining, and en ues—integrity first, service be hancing our professional relationships. We rely fore self, and excellence in all on communication to establish expectations, we do—provide the proper provide status reports on our progress towards guidance on how we should meeting those expectations, and then indicate act and interact with others. when we believe we have met them. if expecta they establish the appropriate tions are unclear, we need to ask for clarification. standards for success, devia Effective communication results from clearly tion from which will surely re conveying a message and ensuring that the re sult in failure. the following cipient completely understands it. We have an discussion focuses on my vi obligation to our senior leadership, customers, sion of how these core values and contractors to keep them informed, as well relate to everyday activities— as to ourselves to keep each other informed. my expectations and, just as and i have an obligation to you to listen and importantly, your expectations respond to your concerns and suggestions. for of me—as we strive together to this reason, i maintain an opendoor policy achieve success as a squadron. and strongly encourage you to talk with me at any time. if we can solve a problem or enhance Integrity First our working processes or environment, let us this core value, the basis for trust, connotes the do it—and let us do it now! Effective commu willingness to do what is right. it embodies the nication enables us to learn from our mistakes, indispensable traits of courage, honesty, re develop both professionally and personally, sponsibility, accountability, justice, openness, and avoid problems in the future. it also allows selfrespect, and humility. We should establish us to tell our story so that others can under integrity as the foundation of all our actions stand our challenges and learn of our accom and interactions. some important ways in plishments. in short, communication is the which integrity ensures our success include lifeblood necessary for success.
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Equal Opportunity and Treatment. i am an • Maintain professional conduct and bear aggressive and obsessive advocate of providing ing in all of our daily activities. equal opportunity to all of you and treating you • sustain and enhance our customer focus, fairly and consistently—and i expect you to do always remembering that we are a service the same. i will not tolerate discrimination or organization. Without our customers, sexual harassment, and neither should you. the products and services we provide Evidence of such behavior should be brought would become irrelevant. however, we to my attention immediately; tolerating such must balance our customeroriented ap behavior will undermine good order and disci proach with our responsibility to do the pline as well as impede our path to success. job “right” by being good stewards of tax payers’ dollars and by following all appli Service before Self cable policies, regulations, and statutes. this core value tells us that professional duties • take care of our physical and mental take precedence over personal desires. it en wellbeing by adopting a wellness life compasses the concepts of rule following, re style. therefore, i encourage you to par spect for others, discipline and selfcontrol, ticipate in physicalfitness activities. and faith in the system. it also embodies the • shun drug or alcohol abuse and ensure importance of teamwork. No member of this that we provide appropriate assistance squadron is more important than any other, and support to those who need help in and no individual member can do everything this area. necessary to ensure the unit’s success. if we do not internally work together as a team and ex • When possible, maintain and upgrade ternally partner with senior leadership, cus our working environment. We should tomers, and contractors, we will not fulfill the take pride in our facility’s appearance. mission and we will not succeed. teamwork • continue the formal and informal pro requires honoring our commitments, effectively cesses of planning and evaluating to communicating, and treating every person as identify those areas in which we can im we would want to be treated. in addition, it prove, take the steps necessary to imple means looking out for each other to ensure ment such improvement, and then mea our personal safety and the security of our sure the results to guarantee that it has in work environment, caring for our families and fact occurred. involving them in squadron activities, and properly sponsoring new unit members and meeting their needs. teamwork also means Conclusion stepping up to the challenge and filling in when we have absences due to illness, leave, as outlined above, i try to validate the frc temporary duty, or the performance of addi approach to leadership by strongly emphasiz tional duty. ing our core values in order to gauge squad ron cohesion and success. in a recent letter to Excellence in All We Do airmen, secretary of the air force Michael Wynne and chief of staff Gen t. Michael Excellence directs us to develop a sustained Moseley stated, passion for continuous improvement and in novation that will propel us into a longterm, as we remember, we must also reaffirmour com mitment to our core values—integrity first, upward spiral of performance and accom service Before self, and Excellence in all We plishment. to achieve the highest levels of ex do—which are the bedrock upon which we op cellence, performance, and accomplishment, erate and build our future. We must also resolve we must do the following: to reinvigorate our air, space and cyberspace
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capabilities. so even while we’re engaged in the tionship between a leader and the people whom current long War, we’re transforming ourselves he or she leads. is the followme leadership into an information age force that will be able to model appropriate at times? Or is the give dominate across our domains and have dislocat andtake, personcentered model preferable? ing effects at all levels of war in this relatively new century. We’re building on our history and Well, it depends—on whether members of the soaring toward our horizon.1 organization are committed and willing to fol low their leader. i found that my frc leader as leaders, we must respond to this call to ac ship approach, fused with the air force’s core tion by sowing and cultivating the air force’s values, proved quite effective because it cre strategic goals. that will require fortitude and ated an environment of collaborative assistance implementation of the frc concept as we capable of solving problems and encouraging transform our organizations, thus ingraining development. it thus guaranteed success for mission fulfillment and producing amazing individuals, the organization, and leadership. results. for me, frocking held the key to leading and as commanders push the limits, we need transforming the squadron, executing its as perspective and advice from the people we signed tasks, and honoring the people and lead. i have learned that the frcleadership their families who unselfishly make sacrifices skill set must remain congruent with—as well to fulfill our air force’s mission. • as capitalize and build upon—the leader’s own strengths and talents. Many issues com monly addressed as leadership, learning, or transformational challenges are really an in Note evitable part of commanding. indeed, in to day’s air force, without experience in manag 1. secretary of the air force Michael W. Wynne and chief of staff of the air force Gen t. Michael Moseley, ing difficult situations, no one can sustain “sEcaf/csaf letter to airmen: air force heritage,” 5 effectiveness for very long. the frc style of October 2006, http://www.af.mil/library/viewpoints/jvp leadership development emphasizes the rela .asp?id=274.
I’m firmly convinced that leaders are not born; they’re educated, trained, and made, as in every other profession. To ensure a strong, ready Air Force, we must always remain dedicated to this process. —Gen curtis E. leMay, Usaf chief of staff, 1961–65
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Inventory Management of Officers with Advanced Academic Degrees The Case for a New Approach
Lt CoL Raymond W. StaatS, Phd, USaF Lt CoL maRty ReynoLdS, USaF maj aaRon d. tRoxeLL, USaF
Editorial Abstract: Every year the Air Force fillsnumer ous graduate-level education positions using a decades-old system that seeks to project graduate-education requirements against upcoming advanced academic degree (AAD) billets. The authors propose replacing this requirements- based system with a new model that considers Total Force development and capabilites-based planning. They assert that their model will ultimately demonstrate lifelong educational deve lopment for individuals and strategic improvement for the Air Force.
ach yEar hundrEds of military professional development. however, the exist officers receive advanced academic ing system that we use to select officers for degrees (aad), sponsored and funded graduate education does not meet this intent. by the air Force. Because graduate The Graduate Education Management sys Eeducation is costly in terms of both funding tem (GEMs), the current “bottom-up” billet- and man-hours, we must take care to ensure based requirements process, focuses on re the relevance of these degrees to each officer’s source management and utilization rather than
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on education, professional development of of stringent validation process, serves as the foun ficers, and health of the career field.1 suc dation of the system’s billet-based approach.3 cinctly put, the GEMs does not employ a stra however, in 1992 an audit by the air Force tegic vision to ensure that the graduate educa audit agency found that officers were serving tion of officers provides an appropriate set of in aad-coded follow-on assignments an aver war-fighting capabilities. rather, the system is age of one and one-quarter years versus the primarily designed to project and fill aad mandatory three years, and that aad-coded coded billets with officers possessing the speci position incumbency rates were only 40–50 4 fied degree and to provide an auditable track percent. The audit apparently did not con ing system for utilizing these officers. This sider the fact that officersfound themselves at article demonstrates the incompatibility of such a competitive disadvantage by having to forgo an approach with the concepts of Total Force career progression and broadening opportu development as well as capabilities-based plan nities to remain in an aad-coded billet for three years. such a career risk has acted as a ning and proposes an alternative—the ad disincentive for officersto pursue fully funded vanced academic degree Inventory Manage graduate education. Local commanders clearly ment (aadIM) model. understood this problem and compensated by reassigning officers at the expense of leaving Background and Issues the aad billet vacant until the projected ar rival of the next aad officer. To address this The GEMs generates unit-level aad require systemic problem, the report made the stun ments, validates and certifies billets, and proj ning recommendation of cutting the number ects vacancies annually, doing so at the lowest of graduate students by 58 percent for fiscal level, where it is ostensibly easiest to identify years 1995–98.5 although in line with resource the need for aad education. The validated utilization, this recommendation does not ac list then goes to the air Force’s career-field knowledge an important aspect of an aad— monitors, responsible for reviewing, certifying, professional development and career-field and prioritizing their functional area’s list of health. Today the unchanged GEMs remains aad billets. They act as points of contact for the primary process for managing profes organizational and unit functional managers sional graduate education. In fact, the Report as well as for the air Force Education require on Air Force Institute of Technology (AFIT): Study ments Board, which approves educational for Senate and House Armed Services Committees, quotas within available funding levels and submitted as required by the national defense places the remaining requirements on a pri authorization act of 2001, recommended continuing the present system to manage ad oritized alternate list. The air Force Personnel vanced education.6 center advertises the available aad opportu In november 2002, a “chief’s sight Picture” nities and matches approved officers with a called for taking officerdevelopment in a new graduate-degree program. selected personnel direction, both educationally and profession attend the air Force Institute of Technology ally.7 although initiatives for Total Force de (aFIT) or other graduate institutions to obtain velopment now address assignments, place an aad with a follow-on assignment dictated ment in professional military education, and by the educational discipline. Officers serve a selection of squadron commanders, it still does subsequent three-year payback tour in a vali not cover the critical aspects of professional dated aad-coded billet, concurrent with a man development related to obtaining specialized datory active duty service commitment.2 The air graduate education. Force intended that the GEMs fulfill the de The GEMs does not include any consider partment of defense’s (dOd) requirement of ation of long-term requirements or the aggre fully accounting for the utilization of graduate- gate educational health of various air Force education resources; this system, along with a specialty codes (aFsc). Lt col raymond staats
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and Maj derek abeyta provide a case study of staff of the air Force Gen T. Michael with respect to the space-and-missile career Moseley stated, “In a smaller, leaner and more field,finding that, over the last 10 years, GEMs expeditionary-focused air Force, it is essential processes have significantlycontributed to the that our airmen have the knowledge and near-extinction of space-related aad billets, competency to accomplish our mission,” em as well as graduate-level space education phasizing that “one of the most effective ways within the air Force officer corps.8 The space to develop this knowledge is through advanced commission made clear in its final report that education.”11 as the world becomes more it considered this an unacceptable situation.9 complex, globally interconnected, and depen The introduction and formulation of Total dent on rapidly changing technology, not only Force development have restructured how the must our officers possess advanced education air Force conducts education, training, and but also each career field must have the cor assignment processes. air Force Instruction rect mix of aads so that commanders have (aFI) 36-2640, Total Force Development (Active the right personnel for the right situation. Duty Officer), introduced the concept of devel analysis of current aad compositions shows opment teams (dT), whereby each functional that many career fields have officers with an career field manages and oversees the profes inappropriate range of aad capabilities. For sional development of officers,including edu example, although 99 percent of lieutenant cation, by “providing input into the [develop colonels in the space-and-missile career field 10 mental education] selection process.” The (aFsc 13s) have aads, only 13 percent of GEMs has neither incorporated dTs into the them are considered technical degrees.12 as aad process nor linked a coherent strategy to such, the 13s career fieldlacks critical compe aad selection, career-field health, or profes tencies, thereby necessarily limiting a combat sional development. Instead it remains fo ant commander’s range of space-and-missile cused on resource management and utiliza related capabilities. tion, bottom-up requirements, and near-term The importance of aads is not unique to the planning by exception. The inherent weak military. a recent Internet-based survey of For nesses of GEMs processes in the areas of pro tune 500 government-contractor firms found fessional development, career-field educational that 83 percent of senior managers have aads health, the role of dTs in professional educa (fig. 1).13 More importantly, the mix of de tion, and strategic planning point to the need grees within these organizations shows a delib for a new approach—as embodied by the erate selection and development process fo aadIM model. cused on both management and technical competence, designed to complement each Education as a company’s vital needs. Twenty-eight percent of these executives have technical degrees, Strategic Capability and the range of degrees reflects long-term developing officers with enduring compe planning to acquire educational expertise. tencies is the key to a strong, responsive, and not only are advanced educational profiles skilled military force. similar to offering com for many air Force career fields significantly batant commanders a range of effects-based out of balance, but also no mechanism cur capabilities, having educated officers capitalizes rently exists to correct this problem. It is im on our most flexible, adaptive, and important portant to note that the air Force cannot di capability—airmen. Education is an integral rectly hire senior leadership, as can the part of officerdevelopment and an indispens corporate arena. We must develop and edu able ingredient in initiatives concerning Total cate military leadership from within the exist Force development. In their recent letter to ing personnel pool—a career-length endeavor all united states air Force officers, secretary that demands strategic foresight and long- of the air Force Michael Wynne and chief range planning.
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No AAD quiring technical education.14 The aadIM MBA 17% model, in contrast, offers a capabilities-based 26% strategic approach that can implement initia Other tives and direction for Total Force development. Technical 5% The Advanced Academic Degree Inventory Law 11% Engineering Management Construct 23% Management aadIM seeks to give career fieldsa flexible 7% Other and responsive approach to overseeing pro Accounting Nontechnical fessional development and educational health 5% 6% through “top-down” aad management. It em phasizes selection and career-field manage Technical Nontechnical ment rather than tracking and resource utili zation. a capability (inventory)-based system, Figure 1. Fortune 500 government-contractor aadIM focuses on deliberate strategic re advanced-education profile for senior executives quirements instead of narrowly and often ar bitrarily selected billets. The GEMs makes the fatal mistake of as The force-development management struc suming the feasibility of aggregating a Total ture established by aFI 36-2640 encompasses Force strategy from disjointed field-level in all of the organizations vital to the aadIM ap puts. For example, within the current GEMs proach (fig. 2). By expanding its oversight into construct, only 2 percent of 13s career-field aads, the Force development council (Fdc) billets are marked as validated positions re- can establish an aad Total Force strategy as
Secretary of the Air Force / Chief of Staff of the Air Force Force Development Force Development Council Office Functional Authority Advisory Council Functional Manager
Career-Field Manager Major Command Force Forward Operating Agency Development Development Team Direct Reporting Unit Support Office Assignment Team Key Individual / As Required Chain of Supervision Standing
Figure 2. Force-development management structure. (Adapted from AFI 36-2640, Total Force Devel opment [Active Duty Officer], vol. 1, 23 January 2004, 22, http://www.e-publishing.af.mil/pubfiles/af/36/ afi36-2640v1/afi36-2640v1.pdf.)
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well as create overarching guidance for gradu sition program, a correctly educated officer ate education, thus integrating these concerns corps greatly enhances prospects for success. with all other force-development issues. dTs In their remarks to the defense subcommit already have responsibility for reviewing the tee hearing on the air Force budget for fiscal health and diversity of the force and for ensur year 2005, former secretary of the air Force ing the consideration of functional and opera James roche and former chief of staff of the tional perspectives. advanced education is a air Force Gen John Jumper noted that “the natural fit. Within the aadIM construct, the [six] cOnOPs [that support capabilities- Fdc develops aad aggregation requirements, based planning and the joint vision of combat communicates the value of graduate educa operations] help analyze the span of joint tion as both enabler and capability for each tasks we may be asked to perform and define task force’s concept of operations (cOnOPs), the effects we can produce. Most important, articulates aad requirements within the air they help us identify the capabilities an expe Force cOnOPs, identifies future needs for ditionary force will need to accomplish its mis advanced education, and integrates advanced sion, creating a framework that enables us to education into the capabilities review and shape our portfolio.”15 We must also consider risk assessment process. This guidance then the relevant portfolio of aad education to en flows to each dT for incorporation into plan sure that the knowledge base exists to execute ning and guidance specific to each career these tasks successfully. field. This top-down approach to aad man For example, a cursory evaluation of the agement uses the Fdc’s coherent Total Force types of aads necessary to support the global- strategy to thoughtfully manage the overall mobility cOnOPs forms the basis for deter health and professional development of ca mining an appropriate forcewide mix of officer reer fields. aads (fig.3). When expanded to all cOnOPs, aadIM gives air Force leadership an ave aads become an enabling capability that en nue to inject future needs quickly. Instead of hances our war-fighting ability as well as im waiting for unit-level requests to surface through proves the planning, programming, budgeting, the GEMs, aadIM starts with the Fdc’s vision requirements, and acquisition processes. This to establish cutting-edge requirements and se top-level strategic vision then flows to the dTs, lection guidance. For example, as new cyber which ascertain each career field’s contribution. warfare tactics, techniques, and procedures recall that, for each functional career field, emerge, combatant commanders must currently dTs manage and oversee officers’professional draw from existing personnel pools for the development, including education. dTs—cen necessary capabilities to fight the latest cyber tralized teams with representatives from a threats. however, the GEMs sets educational cross section of the air Force who help man quotas for a new aad requirement only if a age both the career field they represent and unit-level organization begins the process by submitting an updated request. In most cases, Aero Engineering this new strategic need will not materialize (Aircraft Requirements) from the unit level. using aadIM, the Fdc would set the strategic requirement for cyber Operations Research Civil Engineering (Resource Allocation) (Fuel Containers) warfare officers. Without this oversight and Global senior-level input, the new requirement would Mobility take excessive time to implement. Foreign Affairs CONOPS Political Science as the air Force’s transformation efforts (Overflight) (Forward Locations) continue, aad officer capabilities should be Economics Communications come better integrated into the cOnOPs and (Budget) (Command/Control) capabilities review and risk assessment pro cesses. Whether on a rapidly changing battle Figure 3. Notional AADs required within the fieldor during the life cycle of a critical acqui global-mobility CONOPS
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the development of individual officers—serve dTs are uniquely positioned to analyze de as the primary advocates for future assign sired aad capabilities, career-fieldneeds, and ments and career progression. Instead of rely current personnel inventories for the purpose ing strictly on unit requirements to drive aad of generating actionable goals. using an end- selection, aadIM leverages dT functionality state target, dTs can vector suitable officersto by incorporating the Fdc’s Total Force strategy, obtain aads in a manner that simultaneously officer preferences, existing health of the ca meets the career field’s goals and enhances of reer field, and unit-level requirements to pro ficers’ professional development. vide both individual aad and career-field edu Within aadIM, career-field-specific “ideal cation vectors. already involved with officer aad profiles” (fig. 4)—developed, reviewed, assignment and matching of professional mili and updated by each dT—express these end- tary education, dTs would extend their advo state goals. a time-phased, cumulative-growth cacy and guidance to aad selection. Through function, each ideal profileshows the percent the dTs, aadIM provides specificplanning to age of officers that should possess an aad. fulfillthe Fdc’s Total Force aad strategy. The One can decompose the aggregate profile to
Notiona l Cum ula tive Te chnica l AAD Inve ntory Le ve ls Notional Cumulative, Technical AAD Inventory Levels
100
90
80
70 s r e c s i r f e
f 60 c O ffi f o f O
e 50 g e o a g t a t n n e
e 40 c c r r e e P 30
20
S&&EE 10 Raatetedd
0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 Commissioned Years of Service
Figure 4. Notional ideal educational profile for science and engineering (S&E) officers and rated officers
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show the force percentages desired for each tion. Particularly for technical career fields, academic discipline. Each career field’s ideal education opportunities at aFIT (in residence), profile reflects the specific needs as recon the aFIT civilian Institution, and the naval ciled between Fdc strategy and unit-level re Postgraduate school are highly valued. career quirements. using Fdc’s Total Force strategy, field cOnOPs and career-development guides, dTs can create and review specialized ideal such as those published for scientists and en profilesthat include a great deal of unique in gineers, should emphasize career-field-related formation about their career field. advanced education, with the caveat that these This inventory approach focuses on deter resident-education options are limited, given mining what a healthy officer inventory looks fiscal and operational constraints.16 naturally, like and what capability-based manpower re officers want to qualify for and apply for such quirements we need for this career field. By programs, especially given the secretary and starting with strategic vision, dTs can identify chief of staff of the air Force’s renewed em appropriate degree mixes, suggest educational phasis on education by linking advanced de release rates, generate a long-range career- grees and the promotion process.17 This is field vision, and inculcate educational expec clearly a “win-win” philosophy for professional tations for the officer corps. officers and air Force strategy alike. note that educational profiles will not—in For officersnot selected for resident educa deed, should not—remain the same across the tion, whether by virtue of competition, avail various career fields. For example, s&E offi ability, or academic qualification, the aadIM cers typically require advanced degrees early construct provides a method for the dTs to during career progression—reflected in the provide vectors towards alternative degrees notional profilefor technical degrees (see fig. and educational modes suitable for each offi 4). This situation contrasts the profileof rated cer’s professional circumstance. These vectors officers,whose early career expectations focus would remain consistent with overall career- on operational duty. In this case, advanced field end-state goals as documented in the re education tends to defer more towards the spective ideal educational profile.The current midcareer point and consists of a broader system completely lacks such guidance and range of both technical and nontechnical de strategic forethought. The Officer development grees. such an educational profile, also no Plan (OdP) provides the essential bridge be tionally shown for the technical subset of de tween each officer’s preferences and the dT. grees in figure4, therefore assumes a different This approach is not limited to individual shape than that of s&E officers. vectors only. One strength of an inventory- The foregoing profiles are not contradictory. management methodology lies with career-field They both reflect respective career-field impera vectors, broadcast via the air Force Portal or tives and contribute to the Total Force strategy published in updates to career-development defined by the Fdc; that is, such educational guides. In cases in which fully funded aads profiles document each dT’s deliberate plan cannot remedy a specific degree shortage, ning for aad education. note that aadIM dTs can provide career-field vectors recom does not focus exclusively on fully funded mending fields of study for their officers to aads. In fact, fiscal constraints will nearly al consider, based on capabilities assessments ways prevent adequate funding for meeting and the Fdc’s Total Force strategy. desired educational end states through resi These career-field vectors serve as the basis dent education. of managing long-term educational health. Ideal profiles encompass the total number recently completed aadIM studies examine of aads received by the officer corps, irrespec the development of user-friendly Microsoft tive of the educational method. Personnel may Excel–based tools to create ideal profiles, obtain these degrees through resident pro forecast future inventories, and propose ap grams, internships, tuition assistance, distance propriate education quotas for advanced edu learning, or as part of developmental educa cation, both fully funded and otherwise.18
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drawing on current personnel data taken of the capability to calculate and propose fu from the Military Personnel data system and ture education quotas, given any desired “get aadIM-model forecasts, aadIM provides a well” time horizon (e.g., eight, nine, or 10 list of actionable recommendations to im years), to achieve a career-field education sta prove shortages and manage the mix of aads tus that mirrors the ideal profile.19 The model based on a dT’s implementation policies, also partitions the recommended quotas by such as planning-time horizon and maximum career phase point (not shown in fig. 6). educational-release rates. When fully funded education is not feasible, Take for example a sample aadIM analysis dTs can use the foregoing analyses for both of aads for an arbitrarily selected career field career-fieldand individual aad vectors to cor (figs. 5 and 6). Figure 5 compares the ideal rect shortages and achieve the desired mix of profile to officer aad data drawn from the degrees. But this powerful analysis tool does Military Personnel data system. The example not currently exist. however, the medium for depicts a relatively “healthy” current educa such feedback already exists via the OdP, once tional status, in that the aggregate number of we add fieldsapplicable to educational prefer educated officers approaches the desired levels. ences, qualifications, and vectors to this tool. however, further analysis reveals a potential future concern: education for officers in the firstthree groups lies below expectations, and Recommendations disproportionately large numbers of educated The following proposals will move us towards officers are nearing retirement eligibility. Fig integrating advanced education into Total ure 6 depicts aadIM spreadsheet modeling Force development.
25
20 ers
ffic Actual Ideal 15
tage of O 10 en c er
P 5
0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 Commissioned Years of Service
Figure 5. Sample snapshot of AADIM waterfall “educational health.” (Reprinted from Maj George M. Reynolds and Maj Aaron D. Troxell, Inventory Management of Advanced Academic Degree Officers:Ad vocacy and Spreadsheet Modeling, Graduate Research Project [Wright-Patterson AFB, OH: Department of Operational Sciences, Air Force Institute of Technology, May 2006], appendix B.)
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Total Yearly Graduate Education Requirements for 13s Career Field 60 55 50 Eight-Year ers 45 Option ffic 40 35 Nine-Year er of O 30 Option 25 umb
N 20 15 10-Year 10 Option 05 06 07 08 09 10 11 12 Fiscal Year
Figure 6. Sample AADIM annual quota recommendation. (Reprinted from Capt Andrew D. Jastrzembski and Lt Col Raymond W. Staats, “Inventory Management for Air Force Advanced Academic Degree Offi cers” [briefingchar ts presented at the 73rd Military Operations Research Society Symposium, West Point, NY, June 2005], 23.)
Remove the Graduate Education Management remove the air Force from a failing GEMs, we System from Air Force Instruction (AFI) 36-2302, should rescind the applicable portions of aFI Professional Development (Advanced 36-2302 in favor of the aadIM approach. Academic Degrees and Professional Continuing Education), 11 July 2001 Revise Department of Defense Directive (DODD) The GEMs does not satisfy the objectives of 1322.10, Policy on Graduate Education for Total Force development initiatives because it Military Officers, 26 August 2004 does not consider long-term career-field The GEMs draws much of its inspiration from health, makes no provision for including dTs several key paragraphs in dOdd 1322.10, in the selection process, and effectively con which requires periodic reviews of graduate ducts aad processes as training concerns education programs to ensure the funding of rather than as professional education. Even as a training and utilization concern, the GEMs appropriate academic disciplines and proper has proved less than successful, a fact docu utilization of officers receiving funded educa mented long ago by the air Force audit tion. The mechanism involves identifying, vali agency.20 We need an entirely new approach— dating, and listing—by billet—those duties so much so that revisions to the current in requiring advanced education for optimal in struction are insufficient. such an effort will cumbent performance and comparing this list be subject to the anchoring effect, described by biennially against a list of officers having re robert clemen and Terence reilly as the ten ceived corresponding advanced degrees.22 dency to use the status quo as the baseline for This listing requirement is the basis for the planning decisions, often reverting to this point ineffective system encompassed by aFI 36-2302. rather than pursuing opportunities perceived although the aadIM construct can comply as radical departures from established practice.21 with these requirements, they impose a bureau attempting to reform the current system is cratic layer that adds no value, given the stra not enough; it needs to be replaced. To fully tegic oversight inherent via the Fdc and the
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dTs. Indeed, these requirements hinder com dT vectoring for advanced degrees. doing so pliance found elsewhere in dOdd 1322.10, in will place the appropriate focus on education particular, paragraph 4.2, which states that for officersand will support the air Force’s re “the Military services shall have the authority newed emphasis on graduate-education op to provide graduate education to their mili portunities as a part of career development. tary officers in sufficient numbers and disci as concepts such as specialty-relevant distance plines to accomplish the missions of the Mili learning develop, reviewers and dTs will have tary services.”23 an examination of current and the means to articulate a broader range of vec historic aad billet-incumbency rates makes clear tor options for graduate education. that the GEMs cannot achieve strategic educa tional goals. aadIM implements the spirit of Align Educational Strategies across the Total Force this directive as a cOnOPs enabler, with aads We should reexamine unit requirements for recognized as an integral military capability. Fur advanced education, currently identified lo ther, as put forth in the preceding recommen cally and validated functionally, to align with dation, such a revision to dOdd 1322.10 re policies for strategic education. Furthermore, moves aadIM from any anchoring to the GEMs we should include education as part of each legacy. Finally, revision supports current dOd officer’s “menu of competencies,” which rec guidance to develop competency-based man 24 ognizes the inappropriateness of strictly iden agement tools for all military education. tifying officer education by one of more than note that although payback is essential as a 3,500 academic codes currently found within return on educational investment, it is already the GEMs.27 The knowledge and skills acquired assured by active duty service commitments as from a particular academic degree overlap required under Title 10 US Code, section 2005: substantially with those for many other de “The secretary providing advanced education grees. For example, two degrees offered at assistance to any person, that such person . . . aFIT—operations research (coded 0yEy) and shall agree . . . to serve on active duty for a operations analysis (coded 0yEa)—are very 25 period specified in the agreement.” Personnel closely related, distinguished only by the de meet this fundamental requirement irrespec gree of expertise in the general field (in this tive of whether the GEMs or aadIM serves as case, operations research demands more the the implementing construct. oretical depth). however, an 0yEy officerdoes not receive “payback credit” for serving in an Implement the AADIM Construct via 0yEa billet, which the current GEMs consid Incorporation into AFI 36-2640 ers as having a nonqualified incumbent. The The Total Force development construct pro aadIM construct, capable of recognizing re vides an ideal implementation vehicle for quired duty competencies, alleviates this issue. aadIM. The Fdc structure established by aFI 36-2640 allows treatment of advanced educa tion as a strategic capability. aadIM fits well Conclusion within the Fdc construct and enhances exist achieving Total Force development’s vision ing Total Force development initiatives through for graduate education to support cOnOPs the dTs and tools such as the OdP. aadIM with aad capabilities relies on healthy career also molds into the current air staff/a1 “con fields—not resource utilization and tracking. tinuum of Learning” initiative.26 aadIM pro The aadIM approach represents the right vides for a standardized approach to graduate step towards formulating a coherent strategy education across career fields, using dTs as for the development of graduate education. It the focal point and the Fdc as the coordinat incorporates an Fdc Total Force strategy with ing and strategy-setting body. the experiences and guidance of dTs while We should create new educational data fields placing selection of personnel for graduate for the OdP that include officers’ desires and education in step with the initiatives of Total
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Force development. The educational health cess does not replace smart policy. Viewing of career fields and the professional develop graduate education for what it is meant to be— ment of individuals become primary focuses lifelong education and a strategic capability— rather than afterthoughts. aadIM separates highlights the need for a change to the exist the idea of selection from tracking and utiliza ing inadequate system. • tion, thereby ensuring that the validation pro-
Notes 1. air Force Instruction (aFI) 36-2302, Professional De tary of the Air Force, and General John P. Jumper, Chief of Staff, velopment (Advanced Academic Degrees and Professional Continu U.S. Air Force, 108th cong., 2d sess., 24 March 2004, http:// ing Education), 11 July 2001, 3, http://www.e-publishing www.globalsecurity.org/military/library/congress/ .af.mil/pubfiles/af/36/afi36-2302/afi36-2302.pdf. 2004_hr/040324-roche-jumper.htm. 2. Ibid., 3–5. 16. see secretary of the air Force/science, Technology, 3. department of defense directive (dOdd) 1322.10, and Engineering directorate (saF/aQr), Concept of Opera Policy on Graduate Education for Military Officers, 26 august tions for Scientists and Engineers (Washington, dc: saF/aQr, 2004, 8, http://www.dtic.mil/whs/directives/corres/pdf/ september 2001); and idem, Career Development Guide for 132210_082604/132210p.pdf. Scientists and Engineers (Washington, dc: saF/aQr, May 4. J. r. crawford, auditor general, Report of Audit, Man 2003). agement of Education and Training Programs (Project 92051002) 17. “sEcaF/csaF Letter to airmen.” (Washington, dc: air Force audit agency, 1992), 1. 18. capt andrew d. Jastrzembski, “advanced academic 5. Ibid. degree Inventory Management Model” (master’s thesis, 6. united states air Force Legislative Liaison, Report on Air Force Institute of Technology (AFIT): Study for Senate and air Force Institute of Technology, Wright-Patterson aFB, House Armed Services Committees (Washington, dc: Office Oh, March 2005), iv; capt andrew d. Jastrzembski and Lt of the secretary of the air Force, 25 February 2002), 23, col raymond W. staats, “Inventory Management for air http://www.afit-aog.org/reportOverview.html (online Force advanced academic degree Officers” (briefing source unpaginated). charts presented at the 73rd Military Operations research 7. Gen John Jumper, “chief’s sight Picture: Total society symposium, West Point, ny, June 2005), 8; and Force development,” 6 november 2002, 1. Maj George M. reynolds and Maj aaron d. Troxell, Inven 8. Lt col raymond W. staats and Maj derek a. abeyta, tory Management of Advanced Academic Degree Officers: Advo “Technical Education for air Force space Professionals,” cacy and Spreadsheet Modeling, Graduate research Project Air and Space Power Journal 19, no. 4 (Winter 2005): 51–60, (Wright-Patterson aFB, Oh: department of Operational http://www.airpower.maxwell.af.mil/airchronicles/apj/ sciences, air Force Institute of Technology, May 2006), iv. apj05/win05/win05.pdf. 19. reynolds and Troxell, Inventory Management, ap 9. Report of the Commission to Assess United States Na pendix B. tional Security Space Management and Organizations: Execu 20. crawford, Report of Audit, 1. tive Summary (Washington, dc: The commission, 11 January 21. robert T. clemen and Terence reilly, Making 2001), 10, http://www.fas.org/spp/military/commission/ Hard Decisions with DecisionTools, 2d rev. ed. (PacificGrove, executive_summary.pdf. ca: duxbury, 2001), 314. 10. air Force Instruction (aFI) 36-2640, Total Force Devel 22. dOdd 1322.10, Policy on Graduate Education, par. 1. opment (Active Duty Officer), vol. 1, 23 January 2004, 9, http:// 23. Ibid., par. 4.2. www.e-publishing.af.mil/pubfiles/af/36/afi36-2640v1/ 24. Brig Gen robert r. allardice, aF/a1d, “continuum afi36-2640v1.pdf. of Learning Brief” (presented to the air university Learn 11. “sEcaF/csaF Letter to airmen: advanced Educa tion,” [12 april 2006], Air Force Link, http://www.af.mil/ ing symposium, Maxwell aFB, aL, 3–5 May 2006), 5. library/viewpoints/jvp.asp?id=230. 25. Title 10, United States Code, subtitle a, pt. 3, chap. 12. Military Personnel Data System Database Report (ran 101, sec. 2005, par. (a)(1), “advanced Education assistance: dolph aFB, TX: air Force Personnel center, 4 april 2006). active duty agreement; reimbursement requirements,” 13. Briefing to aFIT/cc, Lt col raymond W. staats, 18 March 2004. “advanced academic degree Inventory Management,” 26. allardice, “continuum of Learning Brief,” 2. draft, 25 april 2006, 4. 27. dr. Bruce Murphy, chief academic officer, air uni 14. staats and abeyta, “Technical Education,” 56. versity “air university supply side (continuum of Educa 15. senate, Defense Subcommittee Hearing on the FY05 Air tion) Model Brief” (presented to the air university Learn Force Budget: Testimony of the Honorable James G. Roche, Secre ing symposium, Maxwell aFB, aL, 3–5 May 2006), 4.
Staats Reynolds Troxell.indd 52 4/27/07 11:03:00 AM Defining Information Operations Forces What Do We Need?
Maj TiMoThy P. Franz, USaF Maj MaTThew F. DUrkin, USaF Maj PaUl D. williaMS, PhD, USaF Maj richarD a. raineS, PhD, USaF, reTireD lT col roberT F. MillS, PhD, USaF, reTireD
Editorial Abstract: For years national leadership has called for an information operations (IO) career force, but the broad range of skills required has prevented implementation. This article analyzes current doctrinal definitionsto determine the need for such a force and outlines rec ommendations for network-warfare and influence-operations-plannercar eer forces as well as operational-security Red Teams. It also advocates better integration of IO theory into the Air Force.
n 2001 the Quadrennial Defense Review fense Planning Guidance, 2004–2009 directed Report mandated that the military treat the development of an “IO Roadmap” that information operations (IO) not merely would “address the full scope of IO,” includ as an enabling function but as a “core ing a “career force.”2 the following year, that Icapabilit[y] of future forces.”1 In 2002 the De- road map recommended “establish[ing] an
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IO career force” and “develop[ing] IO plan Words Are Important ners.”3 Most recently, the Quadrennial Defense Review Report of 2006 again highlighted the In defining operational forces for IO, one need for IO forces.4 Although the military ser finds it useful to describe IO in operational vices have made some progress toward carry terms. As planners and operators, we charac ing out these directives, they have not yet terize operations using words such as domains, come close to fulfilling their intent. effects, targets, and capabilities. Unfortunately, Our struggles come as no surprise. they we find variations in the meanings of these are due in no small part to our inability to an common terms throughout the Department swer the question, what exactly constitutes an of Defense (DOD) (if they are defined at all). “IO force”? Given the broad definition of IO, For our purposes, this article uses a combina tion of definitions adopted by joint doctrine it has proven difficult to create a professional 6 whose training and education encompass the and the Battlespace 21st Century (B21) model. broad set of skills required to operate across Our universe consists of three primary do the full spectrum of IO. having to contend mains: physical (including the terrestrial, atmo with so many disparate parts, how can we de spheric, marine, space, and electromagnetic fine—much less build—such a force? In fact, [eM] environments as well as the tangible components contained within them), cogni we cannot. no single “career force” can cover tive (the single and collective consciousness all of IO. that exists in the minds of individuals),7 and Realizing this fact, each military branch has information (existing within both the physical approached the problem piecemeal, attack and cognitive domains and hosting the creation, ing those elements of IO most supportive of manipulation, storage, and sharing of data its own objectives, missions, and competencies. and information).8 the Army has defined an IO functional area An operational domain represents a por and has matured portions of the psychological tion of one or more primary domains chosen operations (PSYOP) mission. the navy has fo for a specific national or military operation.9 cused mainly on electronic warfare (eW) and essentially, it is an artificially defined (in that network warfare (nW), as has the Air Force. it is definedby humans), bounded area of the the Air Force recently began to address the universe. For example, the operational do idea of an nW force but has yet to define an main within which the Air Force traditionally Air Force specialty (AFS) or organize most ef operates is made up of parts of the physical 5 fectively for use by combatant commands. (atmospheric, space, terrestrial, and the eM throughout these efforts, no branch has pro environments), cognitive (the minds of the vided a clear vision for where we want to go or participants), and information domains (the a corporate strategy for how to proceed. data and information associated with the op this article attempts to answer the ques erations at hand). Another example, pertinent tion, what is an IO force? and determine those to the discussion that follows, is cyberspace. the elements necessary to fulfill the directives of cyberspace operational domain is “character the past six years. In this regard, it analyzes the ized by the use of electronics and the electro doctrinal definition of IO (and its mission areas), magnetic environment to store, modify, and examines capabilities that currently conduct exchange data and information via networked operations for these mission areas, and pres systems and associated physical infrastructure.”10 ents a gap analysis for existing shortfalls. It From this definition, we can see that cyber concludes with four recommendations that space consists of elements of the physical (the could help fulfill these directives. Although physical electronic components as well as the the focus of this article remains on the Air eM environment), cognitive (the “mind” of Force (largely by design), its theory, ideas, and any automated decision maker), and informa recommendations may prove useful to the tion domains (the data and information con other services. fined within its physical architecture).
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Within any operational domain, capabilities and effects (as we have defined these terms achieve effects against specific targets. Leveraging earlier). Consequently, they are referred to joint doctrine, we define a target as “an area, hereafter simply as mission areas. complex, installation, force, equipment, capa bility, function, or behavior identifiedfor pos sible action to support the commander’s ob A Review of the Information- jectives, guidance, and intent.”11 Using the Operations Mission Areas: same reference, we definean effect as “a change to a condition, behavior, or degree of freedom” Characteristics, Capabilities, to one or more targets.12 Finally, we draw upon and Career Paths the B21 model to define capabilities as “the combination of military equipment (weapons the following discussion reviews each mis systems, tools, software, etc.), personnel, logis sion area of IO, translates its definitions into tics support, training, and resources that pro operational terms, and performs a gap analysis vide the ability to achieve effects against tar of current capabilities and career forces re gets in one or more domains.”13 sponsible for that mission area. It introduces having defined some operational terms, each mission area by identifying the common we turn to the current doctrinal meaning of characteristics found within DOD-, joint-, and IO, definedby Joint Publication 3-13, Informa service-level doctrinal definitionsand then us tion Operations, as “the integrated employment ing these characteristics to restate the mission of the core capabilities of electronic warfare, area in operational terms. Viewed in this op computer network operations, psychological erational context, each analysis concludes by operations, military deception, and operations identifying those capabilities and effects re security, in concert with specified supporting quired to conduct operations effectively for and related capabilities, to influence, disrupt, the mission area and by evaluating these re corrupt or usurp adversarial human and auto quirements against existing capabilities. For mated decision making while protecting our organizational purposes, and in conformance own.”14 DOD- and service-level doctrines ad with AFDD 2-5, Information Operations, we com here to this definition and further define the bine the analysis of CnA/netA and CnD/ “core capabilities” identified therein.15 Unfor netD under the heading of nW and the analy tunately, the terms and definitions for these sis of PSYOP and MILDeC under the heading capabilities vary somewhat. Further, DOD-, of influence operations. however, due to its joint-, and service-level doctrines present a unique nature, OPSeC, normally associated with number of additional terms intended to help influence operations, is examined separately. further characterize IO. the table on the next page identifiesthose that make up a good por Electronic Warfare tion of the entire scope of IO. the sheer num ber of disparate terms, however, tends to An analysis of current doctrine shows that eW muddy the waters rather than bring clarity to involves the use of eM or directed energy and an already murky subject. includes offensive or defensive operations af For simplicity’s sake, we confine our analy fecting the eM spectrum.16 translating these sis to the following terms: EW, CNA/NetA, characteristics into operational terms, we see CND/NetD, PSYOP, MILDEC, and OPSEC (see that the eW mission area consists of capabilities table). In doing so, we consider all definitions which use eM energy or directed energy to of these terms as presented in national-level achieve their effects and that those effects occur directives and in joint, Army, navy, and Air within the EM environment (physical domain). Force doctrine. however, we refrain from re A review of current Air Force capabilities ferring to these terms as capabilities (as does shows that many of today’s weapons systems most doctrine), contending that they repre use eM energy to achieve their effects. Most of sent a combination of capabilities, domains, these come in the form of airborne jamming
Franz.indd 55 4/27/07 11:01:34 AM Table. Common Information Operations Terms
Joint Doctrine Air Force Doctrine Army Doctrine Navy Doctrine Term Identification Identification Identification Identification EW / EW Operations (EWO) Core Capability Capability Core Capability Core Capability (USAF-only term) Electronic Attack Action of EW Military Capability of Component of EW Subdivision of EW EWO Electronic Protect Action of EW Military Capability of Component of EW Subdivision of EW EWO EW Support Action of EW Military Capability of Component of EW Subdivision of EW EWO Computer Network Operations (CNO) / Core Capability Capability Core Capability N/A* Network Warfare Ops (NW Ops) (USAF-only term) Computer Network Attack (CNA) / Action of CNO Operational Activity of Core Capability Core Capability Network Attack (NetA) NW Ops (USAF-only term) Computer Network Defense (CND) / Action of CNO Operational Activity of Core Capability Core Capability Network Defense (NetD) NW Ops (USAF-only term) Computer Network Exploitation / Related Enabling Operational Activity of Core Capability N/A Network Support (USAF-only term) Operation of NW Ops CNO Information Assurance Supporting Integrated Control Supporting Supporting Capability Enabler (part of Net Capability Capability Ops) Influence Operations N/A Capability N/A N/A PSYOP Core Capability Military Capability of Core Capability Core Capability Influence Operations Military Deception (MILDEC) Core Capability Military Capability of Core Capability Core Capability Influence Operations Operations Security (OPSEC) Core Capability Military Capability of Core Capability Core Capability Influence Operations Physical Attack / Physical Destruction Supporting Supporting Capability Supporting Supporting Capability of Influence Operations Capability Capability Counterintelligence Supporting Military Capability of Supporting N/A Capability Influence Operations Capability Public Affairs Related Military Capability of Related Activity Supporting Capability Influence Operations Capability Counterpropaganda Action taken by Military Capability of Supporting N/A Public Affairs Influence Operations Capability Counterdeception N/A N/A Supporting N/A Capability *N/A = term not referred to in core doctrine document Sources: Joint Publication 3-13, Information Operations, 13 February 2006, II-1 through II-9; Air Force Doctrine Document (AFDD) 2-5, Information Operations, 11 January 2005, 5–25; Field Manual 3-13, Information Operations: Doctrine, Tactics, Techniques, and Proce dures, 28 November 2003, 1-14, 2-7, 2-8; and Navy Warfare Publication 3-13, Navy Information Operations, 2003, 13 and 2-6.
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and collection assets. however, we have made computer networks (network-based) to pro progress in the area of space control, which duce defensive effects that protect our friendly also produces effects in the eM environment.17 spaces of the cyberspace operational domain, and In addition to achieving offensive effects, all the latter using computer hardware or soft of these capabilities use measures within the ware to traverse the cyberspace operational do eM environment to deconflict their profiles main and achieve offensive effects within it. or protect themselves from enemy attacks. the Air Force has made significant prog Career fieldsand training strategies for the ress in the area of netD capabilities but still eW mission area are relatively mature. Air finds itself primarily confined to software- borne eW systems are typically integrated patch updates, virus protection, and network- within each platform, and the flying commu perimeter defense. While the commercial world nity has a recognized career path and qualifi continues to make advancements in areas such cation program for personnel assigned to use as spyware and rootkit detection, the corpo these systems. typically these individuals are rate Air Force has implemented few of these identified under the navigator (12XXX) AFS, tools or techniques. the DOD limits detailed associated with a particular platform, and des discussion of netA capabilities to classifiedfo ignated with an AFS prefix, which highlights rums, so further discussion here is not possible. their specialty as an eW airborne operator. Suffice it to say that the service still needs a Space-control capabilities that use eW assets well-structured, efficient capability-development are primarily manned by personnel from the strategy to keep up with current advances in space and missile operations AFS (13SXX) technology. and follow the career path specified under neither dedicated forces nor a mature that career field. training strategy exists for the nW mission Although this represents only a cursory area. Individuals from a mix of different spe analysis, we see that the Air Force maintains cialties filln etA positions at all levels of opera capabilities that fulfillthe immediate needs of tion. netD positions at the tactical level are the eW mission area. Its systems can achieve a more standardized in that they primarily in number of effects within the eM environment, clude communications personnel (33XXX/ and the associated forces have well-established 3C0XX). however, at the operational and career paths and appropriate training. there strategic levels, netD personnel are just as var fore, the Air Force does not require additional ied as their netA brethren. Most individuals capabilities or career forces for the eW mis assigned to nW positions are considered on sion area of IO.18 “career broadening” tours and are expected to return to their designated career-field path Network Warfare upon completion of the nW assignment. Lack of dedicated forces affects the potency netD and netA involve the use of hardware, and maturity of these forces. nW units require software, and network-based capabilities to unique training and experience to perform conduct defensive and offensive operations, the technical aspects of their mission. Unfor respectively.19 netD operations protect and tunately, these units must rely significantly on defend friendly information systems, com the prior experience and formal education of puter networks, and information transiting new arrivals. Some of these individuals may within them. In addition, they protect against have previous training in basic computer and the netA capabilities of others. netA opera networking concepts, but many possess little tions traverse through computers or computer technical expertise. We can conduct training at networks to offensively affect them or the in the gaining unit (what occurs today), but such formation resident therein.20 translating these instruction takes time and money, shortens characteristics into operational terms, we see the operational “shelf life” of the individual, that the nW mission area consists of both and detracts from mission accomplishment. netD and netA capabilities, the former using Lastly, the fact that we “borrow” all personnel
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from other career fieldsaffects continuity and kinetic weapons systems and military assets typically results in the loss of such expertise at can fulfillimmediate requirements to conduct the conclusion of the tour. Some may argue influence operations and have the potential that such disbursement strengthens the Air to achieve necessary effects within the cogni Force as a whole, but it provides little in the tive domain. way of providing a mature, experienced nW Although career paths and trained personnel war-fighting force. already exist for most Air Force weapons sys tems and platforms, training in the art of in Influence Operations fluence operations remains limited. School house and weapons-school focus does not ex AFDD 2-5 describes influence operations as tend far beyond the tactical-level effects of those “affecting the perceptions and behav deny, disrupt, degrade, and destroy. this is iors of leaders, groups, or entire populations,” not to say that psychological effects or MILDeC including PSYOP and MILDeC within its defi does not exist or that we do not conduct them, nition.21 PSYOP involves conveying selected but most operators receive little formal train information and indicators to foreign audi ing in these areas. the concepts taught—if at ences to influence their emotions, motives, all—are system specificand constrained to the attitudes, objective reasoning, and behavior. tactical level. Few personnel receive formal MILDeC operations (whether offensively or training in planning and executing influence defensively focused) mislead adversary decision operations at the operational and strategic makers in order to cause them to take actions levels through the application of our full (or not act) in accordance with friendly ob range of national capabilities. Some career jectives.22 Viewed in operational terms, the forces that specialize in affecting the cognitive influence-operations mission area consists of domain do exist, however. the Army has a capabilities that produce effects within the cogni handful of specialists trained in some aspects tive domain. of influence operations.23 the Air Force has Any weapons system and/or platform within public-affairs forces, but necessarily restrictive the Air Force can achieve effects within the rules of engagement limit their capabilities. cognitive domain (albeit not directly). For ex Cultural attachés or foreign area officers also ample, an F-15 may destroy a supply truck, receive training in related skill sets, but even which, in turn, disrupts an adversary’s fuel these have limited scope. In essence, the Air supply, which then denies the adversary use of Force lacks a cadre of individuals with the his aircraft. the inability to field aircraft may training and experience necessary to produce then influence the adversary to capitulate. mature, sophisticated effects within the cogni Consider also the positioning of the 5th Ma tive domain (i.e., those that leverage arts and rine expeditionary Brigade off the coast of sciences such as marketing, psychology, and Kuwait during Operation Desert Storm, an sociology). the state of operations in Iraq of action that helped deceive Iraq as to the di fers a perfect example of why we need such rection of the allied advance and influenced training now and in the future. Our inability Saddam hussein to reposition his defenses. to cultivate personnel trained in these skills Admittedly, we will need many capabilities not may have led to our failure as a department to yet in existence to achieve certain cognitive ef affect the cognitive domain and quickly estab fects. however, such capabilities will always lish conditions conducive to long-term stability depend upon a commander’s established mis and democracy.24 sion objectives. Without a thorough analysis of current and future combatant-commander re Operations Security quirements, we cannot identify all needed ca pabilities here. Such analysis lies beyond the Doctrinally, the definition of OPSEC is stan scope of this article. We move forward with dardized throughout the DOD.25 In opera the assumption that current kinetic and non- tional terms, the OPSeC mission area consists
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of capabilities that achieve the effects of identify cally, long-term, experienced OPSeC manag ing critical information about friendly forces, ers do not exist. their appointments are con analyzing friendly actions, and determining sidered a secondary duty, and they tend to be indicators that hostile intelligence systems might junior personnel. obtain which could be interpreted or pieced together to derive critical information in time to be useful to adversaries. In addition OPSeC Recommendations includes capabilities, which conduct defensive the preceding section characterized, in effects that eliminate or reduce vulnerabilities operational terms, the different mission areas of friendly actions to adversary exploitation. of IO. It identifiedeach area’s capabilities and the effects produced can take place anywhere effects and defined the domains within which within the associated operational domain and each one operates. In addition, an analysis of can involve the use of many different capabili current capabilities and career forces high ties (whether kinetic or nonkinetic, a national lighted shortfalls that contribute to our inability or military asset, or at the strategic, opera to execute certain mission areas effectively. tional, or tactical levels). We now address these gaps with four recom Air Force Policy Directive (AFPD) 10-11, mendations intended to help fill them. Spe Operations Security, directs “commanders at cifically, these include the establishment of every level [to] establish a program that en both an nW-operations career force and an sures OPSeC is fully integrated into their mis 26 influence-operations-planner career force, sion responsibilities.” Local OPSeC manag OPSeC Red teams at the base and major com ers rely on Air Force Instruction (AFI) 10-701, mand (MAJCOM) levels as well as full-time Operations Security (OPSEC), to develop and exe 27 OPSeC managers, and a more effective inte cute their local programs. the program is gration of IO theory within the corporate Air well documented and appears well structured Force. on paper. Unfortunately, most OPSeC manag ers take on these responsibilities as an addi Network-Warfare-Operations Career Force tional duty instead of as a full-time job, and many findthemselves ill equipped to perform nW forces should have both technical train the type of vulnerability assessments necessary ing in the use of computer hardware and/or to meet the requirements identified in these software and the ability to use such equipment regulations. thus, more often than not, they to produce offensive and/or defensive effects implement only the minimum requirements within the cyberspace operational domain. Ju (e.g., unit training and development of a critical- nior officers are experts in one or more information list)—enough to pass an inspec “classes” of networks (e.g., Internet protocol– tion but not enough to defend effectively based networks, process-control networks, te against enemy observations. the most effec lephony, etc.)28 with experience in both offen tive capabilities we have today come in the sive and defensive operations at the tactical form of multidisciplinary vulnerability assess level. Senior officers have the background ments (MDVA). Unfortunately, few units in necessary to leverage a variety of nW capabilities the Air Force conduct these at this time. in order to plan and execute integrated opera not part of a focused career field, OPSeC tions at the operational and strategic levels. managers are appointed locally from available nW forces have their own AFS and career- personnel at each level of command. they re force managers. their dedicated development ceive standardized training—mostly consist team (Dt) at the Air Force Personnel Center ing of a threat overview and brief summary of (AFPC) works to ensure that each individual the five-step OPSeC process—but very little obtains tactical-level expertise and experience instruction in OPSeC tactics, techniques, and in a variety of nW capabilities and skill sets procedures (ttP). Any continuity relies strictly during his or her junior years. this ensures on the ambition of their predecessors. typi that nW operators acquire the foundation
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necessary to serve MAJCOM and combatant surface fleets), where these planners hone commands as skilled planners and staff per their craft and apply techniques during exer sonnel during their midgrade years. Senior cise and real-world situations. they spend personnel lead nW units and organizations at their midgrade years at the MAJCOMs and/or the tactical, operational, and strategic levels. combatant commands leveraging the expertise these forces have their own education and gained during earlier years but now applying training path similar to those that currently it at the operational and strategic levels. Plan exist for other operations career fields (e.g., pi ners could also serve a tour in a joint strategic- lots and space operators). Air education and communications organization before taking on training Command handles the formal under more senior roles that affect national policy graduate and graduate training of new acces and strategy.30 sions who pass stringent aptitude tests. Under Influence-operations planners receive formal graduate training covers core fundamentals undergraduate training in skills such as ap such as operating systems, architecture, and plied psychology, sociology, and marketing. networking as well as basic force application, Much of their early development results from including attack, evasion, and exploitation experiences within a variety of tactical-level ca techniques. Graduate training improves upon pabilities and scenarios. Additional profes these skills but focuses on a specific network sional military education (PMe) coursework class.29 Following graduation from these two includes topics such as military operations, programs, qualified operators move on to command-and-control authorities, and law. their gaining operations unit, where they re Midgrade assignments also include cultural im ceive training in local policy and procedures. mersion in one or two particular theaters and A numbered air force or MAJCOM-level cyber possibly a media posting aimed at honing public- command oversees recurring training and communication skills.31 Continuous course- standardization/evaluation while an expan work in such subjects as organizational behav sion of the USAF Weapons School implements ior, foreign policy, world religions, cultural advanced tactics. studies, and strategic communications be comes required as planners move into their Influence-Operations-Planner Career Force mid and senior years. these forces would be practiced in arts and sci OPSEC Red Teams and Full-Time OPSEC Managers ences such as psychology, sociology, and market ing with an understanding of how to integrate OPSeC managers would still provide the lead national and military assets to conduct sophisti for command-directed requirements. how cated effects within the cognitive domain. Junior ever, their full-time status now gives them the officers are experts in the creation of tactical- time to implement effective OPSeC programs. level effects using one or more different capa Red teams provide vigilant support to the unit bilities (e.g., those of the land, sea, air, and OPSeC managers by regularly conducting cyberspace). Midgrade officerscan integrate a MDVAs for their base or MAJCOM. MAJCOM variety of capabilities to create operational- Red teams conduct assessments from a more level effects (e.g., joint operations and military regional perspective. Red teams and unit campaigns), whereas senior-level officershave OPSeC managers are closely connected with the experience necessary to plan and execute the counterintelligence community, thus en more strategic-level effects (e.g., foreign-policy suring that OPSeC tactics and effects mir development and long-term planning). ror—but are not limited to—expected adver Like nW forces, influence-operationsplan sary methods. together, these individuals ners have their own AFS, career-force managers, work to continuously mitigate OPSeC vulner and Dt at the AFPC. they spend their junior abilities and counter adversary threats. years embedded within a variety of tactical no specific career field or path is envi units (e.g., armor battalions, air squadrons, and sioned for either OPSeC managers or Red
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Team personnel.32 Positions are filled by indi areas of IO, and in many respects, we lack in- viduals from a variety of backgrounds, and depth, mature operational experience—the OPSEC assignments are treated as career- lessons learned from which we distill our doc broadening opportunities. However, OPSEC trine. However, as we continue to expand our planners at the operational and strategic levels operational knowledge and abilities in this should have previous experience as an OPSEC area, the Air Force must expose all personnel manager or Red Team member. All OPSEC to its evolving doctrinal concepts. In addition, personnel receive initial qualificationtraining we must strive to better integrate our develop at the local unit in areas such as social engi ing IO-power doctrine seamlessly with that of neering, physical security, and collection of air and space power and, as it matures, dem open-source intelligence; they acquire more onstrate its utility to real-world operations. advanced skill sets through on-the-job train The second approach to corporate integra ing. Well-documented TTP manuals maintain tion requires a shift in culture. For years, lead continuity and advances in this art, which are ership has realized the importance of integrat passed on during initial and recurring train ing IO within all other operations, yet we have ing of new personnel. As with all IO mission not completely succeeded—due in large part areas, “best practices” are maintained in the to the fact that we have definedIO too broadly, appropriate Air Force TTP series volume for as mentioned earlier. However, in our effort to use by all OPSEC personnel. move forward, we have effectively sidestepped integration and instead simply developed IO as More Effective Integration of Information Operations a separate entity. In doing so, we have created Theory within the Corporate Air Force everything from IO doctrine to IO organiza tions to IO training blocks of PME, all inde In addition to heeding the mission-area pendent of air and space operations. Unfortu focused recommendations mentioned above, nately, “add-on” IO can work for only some of we must more effectively integrate the doctrinal its mission areas. For example, we can (and concepts of IO into the corporate Air Force. should) develop and organize NW capabilities After all, just as all Airmen must understand separately, at least until they attain a certain air and space theory, we must also understand level of maturity and prove fit enough to inte IO theory if it is to truly become a “core grate with other air and space power capabili capabilit[y] of future forces.”33 This integra ties for combined operations.34 However, por tion must occur in two ways: (1) through im tions of IO—specifically, those within the proved education within PME curricula, and influence-operationsmission area—will never (2) (and more fundamentally) as an under be effective if developed or employed inde lying cultural change in how we approach all pendently. Influence operations (or the ef operations (whether kinetic or nonkinetic). fects achieved within the cognitive domain) PME exposes every member of the Air represent the impetus for all operations and Force, regardless of specialty, to air and space thus must become an integral part of every ca power doctrine during different stages of his pability (whether kinetic or nonkinetic) and or her career. Although this coursework in the basis for how all operators approach mis cludes IO to some extent, such lessons remain sion planning and execution. Every effect of largely theoretical, provide little or no instruc every objective of every strategy supports an tion on how to apply its concepts to existing end state that aims at affecting the cognitive operations, and do little more than provide domain. As Lt Gen Robert Elder recently stated, interesting points to ponder. In short, IO les “Operations ultimately seek to influence be sons at present have little or no substantial op haviors so we can achieve our objectives at the erational value to their recipients—a situation operational and strategic (and even the tactical) that one can attribute to the nascency of Air levels.”35 While this article advocates separate Force IO itself. In some aspects, we are just planners who specialize in these arts, it does learning how to effectively “do” the mission so in part because this principle has not yet
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become an accepted and integral part of our experts agree that the future of warfare is culture. If we are to truly be successful in this changing and that our ability to execute IO mission area, it must become the bedrock of effectively remains critical to our success on every step in force development, from institu the battlefields of the twenty-first century. tional dogma to operational training—some Over the past several years, leadership has thing we cannot achieve simply by adding an called for development of a career force that other block of instruction to standing curricula. will lead us into this arena. Unfortunately, we however, embracing such a philosophy requires have struggled even to define IO, much less a complete change in culture and a transfor determine what forces we need to answer this mation of our foundational beliefs. call. Seen in an operational light, our analysis has identified several gaps in both capability Conclusion and career field that we must address. these gaps not only hinder our ability to advance IO Information Warfare has become central to the and its mission areas but also, if the epigraph way nations fight wars, and will be critical to above is to be believed, threaten the very secu Air Force operations in the 21st century. . . . rity of our nation. the recommendations pro We must invest in our people, planning, vided here represent one solution. Do they equipment, and research so our ambitions can give us the entire answer? no, but they offer a become reality. starting point for discussion and a vision to —Cornerstones of Information Warfare, 1997 strive for. •
Notes 1. Quadrennial Defense Review Report (Washington, DC: 7. It is important to note that the terms individual and Department of Defense, 30 September 2001), 38, http:// mind used here represent any decision maker, whether www.defenselink.mil/pubs/qdr2001.pdf. human or automated. 2. Defense Planning Guidance, 2004–2009 (Washington, 8. the three-domain concept is based on the original DC: Office of the Secretary of Defense, May 2002), 36. work of David S. Alberts et al., Understanding Information Secret/nOFORn. Information extracted is unclassified. Warfare (Washington, DC: CCRP [Command and Control 3. Information Operations Roadmap (Washington, DC: Research Program] Publication Series, 2001). this article Department of Defense, 30 October 2003), 33, http:// uses a modificationof the definitionsin this work, as pre www.gwu.edu/~nsarchiv/nSAeBB/nSAeBB177/info_ops sented in Franz, “IO Foundations to Cyberspace Opera _roadmap.pdf. nOFORn. tions,” 9–14. 4. Quadrennial Defense Review Report (Washington, DC: 9. For the definition of the term operational domain, see Department of Defense, 6 February 2006), passim, http:// Franz, “IO Foundations to Cyberspace Operations,” 14–17. www.defenselink.mil/pubs/pdfs/QDR20060203.pdf. 10. this definitionis a modificationof the one found 5. the Air Force is attempting to better organize its in the “national Military Strategy for Cyber Operations,” cyber forces. In late 2006, the chief of staff of the Air draft (Washington, DC: Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Force designated the commander of eighth Air Force as Staff, november 2006), vii. Secret. Information extracted the commander of the new Air Force Cyber Command, is unclassified.For the background of and justificationfor directing him to lead such forces and provide “combat the modification, see Franz, “IO Foundations to Cyber ready forces trained and equipped to conduct sustained space Operations,” 15–16. offensive and defensive [cyber] operations.” AF/CC to 11. Joint Publication (JP) 1-02, Department of Defense 8AF/CC, memorandum, 1 november 2006. Dictionary of Military and Associated Terms, 12 April 2001 (as 6. For information on the B21 model, see Maj timothy amended through 5 January 2007), 529, http://www.dtic P. Franz, “IO Foundations to Cyberspace Operations: .mil/doctrine/jel/new_pubs/jp1_02.pdf. Analysis, Implementation Concept, and Way-Ahead for 12. Ibid., 174. network Warfare Forces” (master’s thesis, Air Force Insti 13. Franz, “IO Foundations to Cyberspace Opera tute of technology, March 2007), 7–29. tions,” 18.
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14. JP 3-13, Information Operations, 13 February 2006, 24. Maj tadd Sholtis, “Public Affairs and Information GL-9, http://www.dtic.mil/doctrine/jel/new_pubs/jp3 Operations: A Strategy for Success,” Air and Space Power _13.pdf. Journal 19, no. 3 (Fall 2005): 97–106, http://www.airpower 15. As defined in Department of Defense Directive .maxwell.af.mil/airchronicles/apj/apj05/fal05/fall05.pdf. (DODD) 3600.1, Information Operations (IO), 14 August 25. As defined in DODD 3600.1, Information Operations 2006, 1; JP 3-13, Information Operations, GL-9 and II-1 (IO), 1-2; JP 3-13, Information Operations, GL-11; AFDD 2-5, through II-9; AFDD 2-5, Information Operations, 11 January Information Operations, 53–54; FM 3-13, Information Opera 2005, 1–25; Field Manual (FM) 3-13, Information Opera tions, 2-2; and nWP 3-13, Navy Information Operations, 15. tions: Doctrine, Tactics, Techniques, and Procedures, 28 no 26. Air Force Policy Directive (AFPD) 10-11, Operations vember 2003, 1-13, 1-14, 2-7, 2-8; and navy Warfare Publi Security, 31 May 2001, 1, http://www.e-publishing.af.mil/ cation (nWP) 3-13, Navy Information Operations, 2003, 13, pubfiles/af/10/afpd10-11/afpd10-11.pdf. 14, and 2-6. 27. Air Force Instruction (AFI) 10-701, Operations Secu 16. As defined in DODD 3600.1, Information Opera rity (OPSEC), 30 September 2005, http://www.e-publishing tions (IO), 1-1; JP 3-13, Information Operations, GL-7 through .af.mil/pubfiles/af/10/afi10-701/afi10-701.pdf. GL-8; AFDD 2-5, Information Operations, 50; FM 3-13, Infor 28. the concept of of a “network class” is introduced mation Operations, 2-7; and nWP 3-13, Navy Information in Franz, “IO Foundations to Cyberspace Operations,” Operations, 13. 67–69. networks are organized under “classes” according 17. tSgt Austin Carter, “new Squadron trains for to similar underlying technologies (e.g., hardware, com Space-Based Aggression,” 25 October 2000, http://www mon services, architectures, protocols, etc.). .spacedaily.com/news/milspace-00q.html. 29. Ibid. 18. two items to note: (1) Classification restrictions 30. Sholtis, “Public Affairs and Information Opera prevent a more in-depth discussion of eW capabilities. tions,” 105. however, understanding that organized, trained, and 31. Ibid. equipped eW capabilities do exist is sufficientto proceed 32. Despite the fact that some experience will be benefi for the purpose of this article. A detailed analysis that de cial at the higher levels, we do not believe that our analysis termines whether existing eW capabilities fulfill all of a of the OPSeC mission area indicates the need for a dedi combatant commander’s needs is beyond the scope of cated career force at this time. In contrast, due to the this work. (2) the authors recognize that an overlap ex mostly nontechnical nature of the mission area, we be ists between the eW and nW mission areas since some lieve that it is more beneficialto cycle through personnel nW capabilities may use eM energy to achieve their ef fects within the eM environment of cyberspace. Such with different backgrounds and mission areas. Such diver capabilities are addressed under the nW section later sity provides two benefits: (1) different backgrounds bring in this article. different ways of thinking, which is advantageous when it 19. We use the terms NetD and NetA to be more in step comes to this mission area, and (2) the more individuals with Air Force terminology. however, we do not restrict exposed to OPSeC positions and then recast into their our analysis of these terms to Air Force doctrine but in assigned career field,the more “OPSeC aware” the corpo clude the equivalent terms CNA and CND, found in DOD-, rate Air Force becomes. For the technical aspects of MDVAs joint-, and other service-level doctrine. (e.g., network-penetration testing), it is recommended 20. As defined in DODD 3600.1, Information Opera that each Red team be supported by one or more netA tions (IO), 1-1; JP 3-13, Information Operations, GL-5 through aggressor units. It is envisioned that such aggressor units, GL-6; AFDD 2-5, Information Operations, 53; and FM 3-13, which do require a dedicated career force due to their Information Operations, 2-9 through 2-20. the US navy uses technical nature, would be part of the nW forces dis the joint definition. cussed earlier. 21. AFDD 2-5, Information Operations, 3. As mentioned 33. Quadrennial Defense Review Report (2001), 38. earlier, we evaluate OPSeC separately although, doctrin 34. One finds a precedent in the development of ally, it is still considered part of influence operations. early airpower. Air capabilities required time for indepen 22. As defined in DODD 3600.1, Information Opera dent growth and development before becoming mature tions (IO), I-2; JP 3-13, Information Operations, GL-10 enough to integrate with established land and sea capa through GL-11; AFDD 2-5, Information Operations, 52–54; bilities. FM 3-13, Information Operations, 2-3 and 2-6; and nWP 3-13, 35. Lt Gen Robert J. elder Jr., “effects-Based Opera Navy Information Operations, 2003, 15. tions: A Command Philosophy,” Air and Space Power Journal 23. examples include the IO specialist (FA30) and 21, no. 1 (Spring 2007): 17, http://www.airpower.maxwell the PSYOP specialist (FA39). .af.mil/airchronicles/apj/apj07/spr07/spr07.pdf.
Franz.indd 63 4/27/07 11:01:38 AM ASPJ Quick-Look
Preferential Treatment for Military Members Based on Personality Type
1st Lt Ryan KaiseR, UsaF
elevision and prinTed news acter types, the service could facilitate the pro continually remind us of the cost cess of identifying such individuals. addition of the global war on terrorism. The ally, newly recruited members would probably United states has assumed significant stay longer if the air Force allowed them to Teconomic expense—witness the more than choose their career field. Therefore, in order $379 billion allocated by Congress as of 29 to decrease personnel costs and ease the finan september 2006 ($360 billion of which has al cial burden of war, the air Force should give ready been spent as of 22 January 2007) for preferential treatment in recruitment and job units operating in iraq—and suffers the ma placement to people whose personality type jority of the coalition’s casualties.1 in addition makes them likely to remain in service for an to the costs of war, military and political leaders extended period of time. have determined that in order for the United personality testing would simply provide a states to remain the world’s only superpower, starting point for recruiting efforts by utilizing each military branch must have the most tech a narrower base to focus valuable time and nologically advanced equipment available. as resources. However, such testing would not of april 2006, the total development and pro eliminate candidates who lack the targeted duction cost of the air Force’s newest aircraft, personality traits. Because most recruiting the F-22 raptor, amounted to over $70 billion— efforts are not successful, military services have roughly $388 million per aircraft.2 Because used everything from television commercials huge portions of the annual budget finance and race-car sponsorships to magazine ads such technologies, the service must cut per and clothing campaigns to boost recruiting sonnel and other costs. Consequently, air numbers. Moreover, a good deal of recruiting Force members now find themselves trying to occurs at enlistment stations designed for people do more work with fewer people. who wish to volunteer. To avoid any hint of favoritism, the air Force should retain these methods, which carry no requirement of per New Recruiting Techniques sonality testing. Furthermore, by having trained Managers have long realized that they can professionals administer the tests or by com reduce personnel costs by lowering expendi missioning a new test tailored to predict job tures for training and recruiting, especially by satisfaction, the air Force could eliminate other retaining active air Force members. obvi concerns about the process. ously, recruiting people more likely to stay in assessment of a potential recruit’s personality the military for a long time would have the makes sense only if personality type and char effect of increasing retention. By basing its acter are enduring traits that last the entire recruiting efforts on testing for recognized, length of enlistment. a study by david Keirsey enduring traits such as personality and char and Marilyn Bates found that personality changes
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only slightly and that personality type remains erly organized instruments would meet the consistent over one’s adult life span.3 large, air Force’s goals. measurable changes do occur in the personality as for the issue of privacy, schools already of children, probably due to the maturing subject students to ability and aptitude tests process. Thus, the armed services vocational that measure them against their peers on school, aptitude battery, administered during the sec state, and national levels. every year, students ond year of high school when students are 15 take national standardized tests that evaluate or 16 years old, represents an ideal means of them on everything related to academics, a testing the personality of potential recruits since process that also measures schools’ ability to personalities have stabilized by these ages. teach their students. administering personality if targeted recruiting could cut the number tests concurrently with the armed services of air Force recruiters by half, the savings vocational aptitude battery would give students would amount to roughly $785,500 per month insight into the types of work most suitable for or $9.4 million per year in recruiter pay alone, them. no doubt the additional test would raise with much greater savings possible since an privacy issues—but no more than those con increase in personnel retention would reduce cerning any other aptitude test already con the amount of training. additionally, this situa ducted. Furthermore, one should weigh any tion would create a more experienced air such liability against the test’s usefulness to Force, requiring fewer people to do the same students interested in choosing careers. amount of work. increased efficiency and lastly, validity always becomes a major con improvement in the overall quality of work cern when one designs personality assessments— would lead to even more savings. especially those that facilitate job placement. The Keirsey-Bates test, introduced in 1978, has subsequently gone through several revisions. Potential Problems similarly, the Myers-Briggs test and the Min despite the advantages of targeted recruit nesota Multiphasic personality inventory, con ing, the public might consider mandatory per ceived during World War ii, have undergone sonality tests an invasion of privacy. even the a number of changes to enhance their accu 4 scientific community, which supports person racy, reliability, and validity. Further, the five ality testing, would object unless the air Force significant personality traits—openness to expe uses professionals to administer the tests or rience, conscientiousness, neuroticism, agree tailors them more towards job satisfaction. ableness, and extraversion—emerged from a any personality test designed to identify good meta-analysis of personality traits and their military recruits would have to be given to a correlation to job performance. The scrutiny large number of individuals shortly before to which these tests have been subjected and they become eligible for enlistment. since the refinement they have undergone to most high school students do not pursue a improve their assessment capabilities should career in the military, however, doing so would alleviate any concerns about their validity. subject them to a test from which they would derive no benefit. Finally, the service must Feasibility take into account any ethical concerns about a personality test’s validity across all subject Considerable evidence points to the bene groups. For example, many types of testing, fits of using personality testing in military including the american College Test and the recruitment and job placement. The military scholastic aptitude Test, have come under has used tests such as the Woodworth personal scrutiny since they show regional and ethnic data sheet since 1919 to predict a recruit’s sus inconsistencies. although some critics might ceptibility to shell shock and administered the oppose the use of tests to recruit new military Thematic apperception Test in the 1930s to members, strong evidence suggests that prop identify personalities susceptible to enemy
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intelligence. Currently the Keirsey tempera people with a particular personality type pref ment sorter categorizes people into 16 differ erential treatment in job placement and recruit ent personality types that strongly correlate ing efforts. Targeted recruiting can save the with the Myers-Briggs test; it also associates air Force money by lowering spending on occupations with each type. Using this test for recruiting efforts, reducing the amount of military job placement may be as easy as iden training, and increasing the service’s efficiency tifying temperaments most suitable for spe and experience. overall, this proposal seeks cific jobs and simply matching recruits with to lower personnel costs of the air Force and those jobs. To test this theory, the air Force other military services so they can continue to could conduct a latitudinal study of a large, fund research, development, and procurement representative cross-section of the entire mili of new, state-of-the-art equipment such as the tary; generalize the results to the air Force; F-22. new and improved equipment will ensure and adjust recruiting methods accordingly— that the United states remains a superpower all in less than a year. study participants would and will enable our military forces to continue take a test to determine their personality group, to fight the global war on terrorism. • and evaluators would then compare the differ ent groups to determine each one’s retention rate based on time-in-service data. as america continues to send troops to the Notes far reaches of the globe in an effort to stabilize 1. Wikipedia: The Free Encyclopedia, s.v. “iraq War,” http:// the Middle east and promote democracy in the en.wikipedia.org/wiki/iraq_war (accessed 15 december rest of the world, Us taxpayers are left paying 2006). 2. Wikipedia: The Free Encyclopedia, s.v. “F-22 raptor,” the bill. The men and women in our military http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/F22 (accessed 15 december services feel the pain of budgetary constraints. 2006). air Force decision makers have elected to deal 3. david Keirsey and Marilyn Bates, Please Understand with this situation by reducing personnel costs. Me: Character and Temperament Types, 5th ed. (del Mar, Ca: prometheus nemesis Book Company, 1984), 2–4. This article has suggested that the air Force 4. Wikipedia: The Free Encyclopedia, s.v. “Myers-Briggs can realize substantial savings by increasing Type indicator,” http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Myers-Briggs personnel retention—specifically by giving _Type_indicator (accessed 15 december 2006).
Through technological advances and Airmen’s ingenuity, we can now surveil or strike any target anywhere on the face of the earth, day or night, in any weather. —Gen T. Michael Moseley, Chief of staff, UsaF
Quick Look-Kaiser.indd 66 4/27/07 11:14:47 AM Intellectual Modernization of the C-5 Making the Galaxy Expeditionary
Col Mark C. “Marshal” Dillon, UsaF
Editorial Abstract: Recalling a 41-year-old admonition to “revolutionize global mobility air lift,” the author says that now is the time to begin such a revolution—and fulfill current efforts to “transform” the military—by routinely deploying the C-5 Galaxy in an expedition ary role. This article highlights the Galaxy’s capabilities, counters negative claims about its reliability, and proposes changes in doctrine, organization, training, leadership, personnel, and facilities that will help modernize the aircraft (although it does not attempt a technical discussion of those facilities).
Let us not attempt to reconcile contradictions, but firmly embrace a rational alternative. —alexander hamilton The Federalist, no. 23
he Time has come for the air program (ReRP). Furthermore, by mitigating Force to deploy the C-5 Galaxy rou the C-5’s achilles’ heel—poor mission-capable tinely in an expeditionary role. Re (mC) or reliability rates—the amP and ReRP cent experience suggests that forward should give air Force leaders additional confi Tdeployed C-5 operations have become the dence to deploy the Galaxy routinely. Guidance rule rather than the exception and should be from Department of Defense and air Force codified into expeditionary doctrine.1 This leadership is clear: now is the time to change. doctrine or “intellectual modernization” com Challenging the military to transform, for plements ongoing mechanical upgrades via mer secretary of defense Donald Rumsfeld the avionics modernization program (amP) and opened his Transformation Planning Guidance of the reliability enhancement and reengining april 2003 by remarking, “as we prepare for
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the future, we must think differently and develop ages their strengths in order to exploit the ca the kinds of forces and capabilities that can pabilities of the C-5. adapt quickly to new challenges and to unex pected circumstances. We must transform not only the capabilities at our disposal, but also the way we Impressive Capabilities think, the way we train, the way we exercise and the The bottom line was that if the airplane [C-5] way we fight” (emphasis added).2 Likewise in the lived up to its expectations, “global military air Force’s posture statement for 2006, secre airlift will be completely revolutionized.” tary of the air Force michael W. Wynne and —Lt Col Charles e. miller Chief of staff of the air Force Gen T. michael Airlift Doctrine moseley challenge airmen to “look from their heritage to the horizon, taking lessons from During the same decade that america sent the past and adapting them for the future.”3 men to the moon and returned them safely, Using these strategic imperatives for change Lockheed engineers built the C-5 Galaxy, the as a guide, this article seeks to begin a discus United states’ largest and heaviest military-airlift 8 sion about intellectual modernization of the jet. For three decades, Us leaders have often C-5. First, it highlights the aircraft’s unique ca reached for the C-5 in their force-projection pabilities, citing its early combat employment quiver. in light of its reputation for mainte to trace its expeditionary doctrine back to the nance problems (some anecdotal, some legiti 1960s. Next, it shows that despite the C-5’s mate), however, they have often hesitated to reputation as mechanically temperamental, employ this tremendous national asset and its the label of unreliability (and thus of limited unique capabilities. in terms of cargo capacity—both volume use in expeditionary operations) is not neces 9 sarily justified.i n addition, expeditionary and and total weight—the C-5 has no equal. With room for 36 standard 463L pallets, it carries expeditionary-like employments (both combat twice as many as the C-17 (18), nearly three and noncombat) make a compelling case for times as many as the C-141 (13), and six times as routine deployment. Finally, to round out the many as the C-130 (6).10 Furthermore, it can discussion regarding intellectual moderniza simultaneously transport up to 95 aircrew mem tion, this article proposes changes not only to bers and passengers combined (20 in the upper doctrine but also to organization, training, 4 flightdeck and 75 in the upper-aft troop com material, leadership, personnel, and facilities. partment). Just as impressive is the total cargo To narrow the discussion, it makes three as weight. The C-5 can carry 291,000 pounds sumptions. First, we must continue to use the compared to 167,000 for the C-17; 68,725 for C-5 as a combat asset. This follows the second the C-141; and 40,000 for the C-130.11 tenet of Pres. Ronald Reagan’s directive on Designed for forward operations, the C-5 Us airlift policy in 1987: “The role of the mili boasts such features as the use of nitrogen to tary component of the airlift fleetis to do what render vapor in the wing fuel tanks inert and commercial transport aircraft or civilian air other firefighting capabilities throughout the crews cannot or will not do.”5 second, studies aircraft, which make it highly survivable. Because indicate that a modernized C-5m will increase it can load/unload through fully opening doors reliability and provide a more capable air in both the nose and aft portion of the aircraft, plane.6 Finally, this article does not pit C-5s it requires little or no ground-support equip against C-17s. The air Force will operate both ment.12 moreover, its high-flotation landing platforms for decades to come. (Current pro gear enables it to operate on unimproved sur gramming projects at least 50 C-5ms in the faces (including ice). in fact, the C-5 applies mobility Requirements study of 2005 and the less stress to runways and taxiways than any Quadrennial Defense Review of 2006.)7 Rather other Us airlifter.13 than placing modern combat-airlift aircraft in The Galaxy’s payload and range are also competition with each other, this article lever impressive. it can carry everything in the Us
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defense arsenal, including battle-ready tanks, tablished the foundation for today’s C-5 com helicopters, submarines, boats, and the massive bat missions in afghanistan and iraq. 74-ton mobile scissor bridge. a fuel capacity of On 3 may 1972, two years after taking pos 332,500 pounds contained in the wings (over session of its firstoperational C-5, military air 51,000 gallons) contributes to its long range lift Command (maC) completed the first and enables forward ground refueling. For three of 18 C-5 combat sorties into Vietnam. example, a C-5 with a cargo load of 270,000 To counter North Vietnam’s easter Offensive pounds can fly 2,150 nautical miles, off-load, and of 1972, Gen Creighton abrams Jr., com fly to a second base 500 nautical miles away from mander of military assistance Command, the original destination—all without aerial re Vietnam, requested the emergency airlift of fueling. With aerial refueling, only crew endur six mK-48 tanks from Yokota air Base, Japan, ance limits the aircraft’s range.14 as the United to Da Nang air Base, south Vietnam.19 Dem states adjusts its global defense posture, the onstrating maC’s intertheater airlift doc combination of the C-5’s range and payload re trine—rapid deployment of combat forces— mains a vital force-projection capability.15 the six tanks were off-loaded in less than seven The aircraft can also perform airdrops. On minutes and proceeded from the airfield di 7 June 1989, a single C-5 air-dropped paratroop rectly into combat. Building on this success, ers and equipment totaling 190,346 pounds— 15 additional C-5 combat missions to Da Nang still a world record.16 in the decade that fol and Cam Ranh Bay—averaging off-load times lowed, the air Force halted the C-5 airdrop of just 32 minutes each—delivered 42 m-41 program. according to the service’s “heritage tanks and eight m-548 tracked vehicles.20 to horizons” posture statement of 2006, which Gen howell estes Jr., commander in chief suggests taking lessons from the past and adapt of maC (CiNCmaC) from 1964 to 1969 and ing them to the future, an airdrop-capable C-5 the genius behind this unconventional C-5 could augment current or emerging airdrop employment, identified flexibility as the most requirements.17 an array of combat-airlift ca significantprinciple of war in the modern era, pabilities resides in the C-5. soon after the stating that throughout the Cold War, global Galaxy became operational, world events tested airlift had given the United states maximum these capabilities and shaped early employ flexibility.21 Building on this theme, General ment doctrine. estes later wrote that “the role of modern combat airlift, then, is to airlift combat forces and all their battle equipment, in the size and Teaching an Old Dog mix required—with the greatest speed—to New Tricks any point in the world, no matter how remote or primitive, where a threat arises or is likely There is nothing new. . . . The new is the his to erupt.”22 tory you didn’t read. On 14 October 1973, a C-5 carrying 186,200 —Pres. harry s. Truman pounds of cargo landed at Tel aviv’s Lod inter national airport. highlighting rapid global The idea of forward-deploying the C-5 origi mobility and the flexibilityof modern combat nated before the giant airlifter became opera airlift (as well as putting the aircraft at risk tional. secretary of the air Force harold from potential terrorists and missile attacks), Brown lay the groundwork for this doctrine in this C-5 landed just nine hours after Pres. the mid-1960s, stressing his willingness “to Richard Nixon gave the order for the United commit publicly to the idea of having both the states to send military supplies to israel. it C-141 and C-5 deliver directly to forward logis thus completed the first mission of a combined tics bases rather than main ones in the rear if C-141/C-5airliftcalledOperationNickelGrass.23 the landing zones could handle them.”18 in 32 days of Nickel Grass, this combination of These forward-deployed operations, albeit not aircraft posted some impressive statistics, but conducted on a routine basis, nonetheless es the political results proved even more impres
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sive, as reflected in israeli prime minister Golda vestment in the amP and ReRP, C-5s had meir’s statement that “for generations to come, achieved noteworthy mC rates. The next sec all will be told of the miracle of the immense tion captures the aircraft’s recent mission (as planes from the United states bringing in the well as maintenance) success in forward- materiel that meant life to our people.”24 deployed operations, casting doubt on the no These two operations validated secretary tion of poor rates as the sole barrier to future Brown’s construct of putting large jet aircraft deployments. forward, demonstrating that under certain conditions—or, as the secretary stated, “if the landingzonescouldhandlethem” (seeabove)— Recent Developments then the C-5 could and should be used. al At a White House National Security Council though much has changed since the early for meeting on 28 September 2001 as President ward deployments of this aircraft, one constant Bush considered Afghanistan military options remains—poor mC or reliability rates. following the 9/11/01 attacks, Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld stated, “There’s an Uzbek airport eight to 10 miles from the main Reliability: airport. We’re going to send in our assessment The Galaxy’s Achilles’ Heel team, we’re going to see if the airstrip can ac commodate C-5s.” People, ideas, hardware . . . in that order. —Bob Woodward —Col John R. Boyd, UsaF Bush at War Pushing technology of the 1960s to the Today, scores of successful C-5 combat mis limit presented Lockheed engineers with an sions into afghanistan and iraq trace their enormous challenge. For example, each C-5 roots to secretary Brown’s original forward- contains over 90,000 parts—the equivalent of deployment construct: “[C-5s] deliver directly four F-16s. as if to portend the future, when to forward logistics bases rather than main Gen Jack J. Catton, CiNCmaC, landed the ones” (see above). modeled after previous firstoperational C-5a on 6 June 1970, a wheel C-130 and C-17 expeditionary airlift squadron from the left landing gear separated from the (eas) deployments, the successful C-5 eas in airplane and bounced down the runway.25 July of 2002 in support of Operation endur Likewise, personnel in israel had to unload all ing Freedom marked a historic “first” for the 186,000 pounds of cargo from Nickel Grass’s aircraft (note the late entry of the C-5 into a first C-5 by hand because the crucial materiel- truly deployed expeditionary role).30 it was handling equipment and aerial porters were not the fact that C-5s flew into combat or into on board a second C-5 that had diverted for the bomb-cratered, night-only runway in Kan maintenance.26 dahar, afghanistan, that made history. Nor The mC rate for the C-5 fleet has always was it the 782nd eas’s launching of 100 per hovered around 65 percent—well below the cent of these sorties (26) on time to extract required 75 percent during wartime.27 in the the Princess Patricia’s Canadian Light infantry past, the air Force has focused on single-system Regiment six days (25 percent) ahead of modifications that have yielded marginal in schedule. Rather, this represented the first-ever creases in mC rates.28 Critics argue that the expeditionary deployment of a C-5 squadron in amP and ReRP represent more of the same. a combat theater with a complete support-and however, as noted in an article titled “saving command structure.31 Pentagon after-action the Galaxy,” the more comprehensive amP and briefings to the secretary of the air Force and ReRP programs may finallysolve a majority of air Force Council in December 2002 con the Galaxy’s mechanical woes.29 firmedthe expeditionary capability of the C-5. No doubt the C-5 is difficult to maintain; secretary James Roche summed up the opera however, prior to the multibillion-dollar in tion by saying, “You all did a magnificent job
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on your first ever combat deployment.”32 im of delivering nuclear and conventional weap mediately afterward, in august 2002, air mo ons via the global positioning system, up bility Command (amC) deployed its second graded its guidance technology, and wrote C-5 eas, which extended the string of on-time new doctrine for the aircraft. substituting pre departures by 15 more sorties to the even cision for mass, B-52s evolved from carpet- shorter, narrower, daytime-only (for construc bombing into successful close-air-support plat tion) Kandahar airfield.33 forms that caught the world’s attention during Noncombat operations can also help shape enduring Freedom. america continues to rely new expeditionary doctrine for the C-5. Op heavily on this aircraft. tions such as backup aircrews/aircraft, highly Likewise, the KC-135 underwent a moderniza qualifiedaircrews, and forward-deployed lead tion program similar to the C-5’s amP and ership contribute to the success of Phoenix ReRP. The R-model conversion program cen Banner—amC’s highest-priority airlift mission tered on new engines and avionics for the (presidential support).34 even before eas de 1950s-era tanker, and, as occurred with the ployments became commonplace, the author B-52, airmen transformed doctrine for the witnessed the utility of forward or expeditionary KC-135, whose Cold War mission involved a like employment of leadership, crews, and garrisoned nuclear-alert force, a refueling- maintenance. For example, in the year 2000, only tasking, and “hard” crews (including navi amC successfully merged hundreds of C-17, gators).35 after the Cold War, its doctrine changed C-5, and air-refueling missions to safely move to include expeditionary forward-deployed the Us president’s support staff to india (in sup forces, a new cargo (roller) mission, mixed port of the asia-Pacific economic Conference). crews, and a reduced crew complement (re Forward deployment has also proved valu placing navigators with new avionics). KC-135s able in training and readiness exercises. in flyingover Baghdad’s surface-to-air-missile en mid-2001 the author deployed C-5s (and C-141s) gagement zones fewer than two weeks into stateside in an expeditionary operational readi Operation iraqi Freedom touted part of the ness inspection. in fewer than five days, this doctrinal evolution. expeditionary wing not only deployed and The B-52 and KC-135 examples illustrate a then redeployed itself but also launched all precedent for modernizing doctrine along C-141 and C-5 missions on time—many in a with platforms. incorporating C-5 employment simulated chemical environment. These non into expeditionary doctrine constitutes one combat, expeditionary-like employments fur intellectual-modernization proposal for this ther demonstrate that it is time to rewrite our aircraft. in order to capture the rest, the re doctrine and make C-5 expeditionary opera mainder of this article utilizes the Joint staff’s tions routine. capabilities template for doctrine, organiza tion, training, materiel, leadership and educa An Argument for Change tion, and personnel (deliberately excluding changes to facilities). It must be considered that there is nothing more difficult to carry out, nor more doubt Doctrine ful of success, nor more dangerous to handle, than to initiate a new order of things. in light of transformation and expeditionary strategic imperatives, the recent success of for —Niccolò machiavelli ward deployments makes traditional C-5 “stage” The Prince operations ripe for change. (a traditional air Other aging, Cold War legacy systems have lift stage, with pre-positioning of aircrews at modified their doctrine—the B-52 stratofortress key airfields around the globe, resembles the and KC-135 stratotanker, for example. adopt Us mail service’s Pony express, in operation ing technology to war fighting, the air Force from 1860 to 1862. That is, when an aircraft transformed the B-52 into a platform capable lands, fresh aircrews stage or swap—just as
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Pony express riders swapped horses—to keep the “long war,” C-5 aircrews have spent as much the aircraft moving to a destination or back to time away from home as fellow airmen (in in the pickup point.)36 Though efficient at mov crements of 14–30 days) but do not receive ing forces during large operations, staging has credit as part of an air and space expeditionary experienced some shortfalls. force (aeF). in 2002 and 2003, C-5 pilots were aircrew anecdotes criticizing stage opera away from home longer than any other amC tions are legendary. however, the real impact pilots.38 During this same period, less than 10 lies at the strategic level, especially for a long percent ever approached the air Force’s man war. First, as mobilization authority for the Re dated 90-day flying-hour maximums.39 serve and air National Guard (which make up second, since C-5 crews are enablers, they the majority of the C-5’s crew force) runs out, do not qualify for aeF advantages of predict the air Force must find ways to prosecute the ability, training priority, and guaranteed post- global war on terrorism while efficiently man deployment downtime. although not consid aging a limited crew force. aware of this situa ered as “tactical” as the C-130 or C-17, C-5s tion across his command, Gen Duncan mcNabb, nonetheless routinely operate in the iraqi and commander of amC, is “pushing for a number afghani combat zones. Unlike C-130 or C-17 of reforms, in-house and in conjunction with crews, however, in the traditional stage para Us Transportation Command,” to adjust amC’s digm, C-5 crews are sent into combat by a high operations tempo. according to the gen stage manager—not a commander. a recent eral, “ ‘That mobilization authority is starting deployment of C-17 aircrews (and a squadron to run out’ . . . so amC must ‘get to the point commander) in southwest asia highlights the where we can do this steady state.’ ”37 During manifold benefitsof deploying aircrews versus
C-5
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staging. The C-17 eas commander stated that (see doctrine above). Three- and six-ship C-5 “‘this way of operating [deploying] gives both unit type codes exist and have been exercised. the combatant commander as well as the air Critics may argue that this will put C-5 aircrews crews the continuity needed to improve reli in the same deployment spiral that C-130 ability and efficiency. aircrews get accustomed crews experience; however, C-5s have a much to the combat environment and users get ac higher crew ratio than do C-130s. moreover, customed to the crew and squadron leader the eas conforms with General moseley’s most ship. it’s a win for everyone.’ ” moreover, this recent heritage to horizons priorities. Under deployment reduced required aircrews by up his first priority, “Prosecute the Long War on to 50 percent.40 Terrorism,” applicable tier-two initiatives that To meet the demands of a long war, revised align with C-5 intellectual modernization in C-5 expeditionary doctrine focuses on improv clude the following: “align garrison organiza ing mission success—but could produce im tional template with expeditionary template, proved aircrew efficiency as a by-product. For align [unit type codes] to minimize non-unit example, a complete eas (commander and deployments, ensure 100% of uniformed aircrews) would deploy to an existing C-5 stage members are in aeF deployment bucket.”41 location for 90–120 days and fly sorties to/ airmen comprising C-5 aircrews aren’t the from the iraqi and afghani combat zones (or only ones to benefit from this initiative (see where directed in-theater). Nondeployed C-5 stage managers, expeditors, and ramp super crews shuttle passengers and cargo from the visors in the section on “Leadership and edu United states to the eas location and back—a cation,” below). mission for demobilized Reserve, National another recommendation calls for attach Guard, and nondeployed active duty crews. as ing maintenance units to deploying C-5 flying the C-5 eas matures, C-5 Reserve and Na squadrons—especially for the mechanically tional Guard crews could assume more task temperamental Galaxy. “Combat Wing Orga ings—as have their combat air Force counter nization,” a “Chief’s sight Picture” from Gen parts. how many additional truck convoys John Jumper, former air Force chief of staff, could we remove from the hostile roads of reiterates this construct: iraq and afghanistan if we forward-deployed When i was a squadron commander there was C-5s routinely? an aircraft maintenance Unit (amU) attached We should consider one other doctrinal to my squadron. i didn’t command the amU. consideration: could the air Force use a mod The officerin charge of the amU was trained by ernized C-5m for airdrop? Taxpayers must ex the colonel who ran the maintenance organiza pect more from their $8 billion amP and tion. This colonel had been in the business of ReRP investment, and the air Force should maintaining airplanes for 24 years. When the demand even more from a modernized C-5m. squadron deployed, there was no doubt that the The C-5 would certainly not become the air amU would come under my command. But that Force’s primary airdrop platform, but the ser amU had been trained by someone who knew vice might wish to consider the Galaxy’s ability the fixing business as well as i knew the flying business.42 to air-drop heavy equipment as one option for meeting current and emerging requirements for such delivery and force projection. The chal Training lenges of a long war put an ever-increasing pre C-5 training challenges include developing a mium on the current combat airlift fleet and weapons instructor course (WiC), moving the thus demand that doctrine evolve to keep pace. formal training unit (FTU), incorporating maintenance success, and evaluating mission Organization readiness. intellectual modernization puts es We should deploy C-5 aircrews under the aeF tablishing a C-5 WiC at the forefront. This construct as an eas to existing stage locations course serves as the air Force model for insti
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tutionalizing tactics, techniques, and procedures sociated with hurricanes Katrina, Rita, and (TTP)—turning combat lessons identified Wilma. Despite the FTU transfer from altus to into lessons learned. TTP continuity previ Kelly, mentioned earlier, we still have an op ously maintained by the C-5 special-operations portunity to capture and formalize the 97th’s community (eliminated in 2003) now has no success. spreading these near-wartime mC formal home to institutionalize combat les rates will not only boost Kelly’s C-5 availability sons learned. Nonetheless, C-5 aircrews’ ability (by increasing the historic rates up to 20 per to safely execute tactical approaches/departures, cent) but also significantly lift air Force–wide integrate night vision devices, swiftly conduct availability of the Galaxy—regardless of the engine-running on- and off-loads, and survive amP and ReRP.47 Finally, as former secretary a surface-to-air-missile strike proves that today’s Rumsfeld stated, “We must transform . . . the C-5 crews are more than ready to embrace the way we exercise and the way we fight” (see intratheater or tactical combat-airlift role.43 if above); therefore, as the C-5 transforms its current TTPs and training profiles are any in doctrine, expeditionary operational readiness dication, the C-5 still lags behind current inspections must continue to serve as the C-5 needs. as of the summer of 2006, C-5 annual readiness training and evaluation tool. refresher training still did not include afghani or iraqi databases or require combat entry Materiel and exit profiles. since the amP and ReRP are evolutionary in fiscal year 2007, the air Force’s C-5 FTU materiel upgrades, intellectual modernization moves from altus aFB, Oklahoma, to an air poses revolutionary proposals for a modern Force Reserve Command unit at Lackland ized C-5m. Could evolutions used in other air- aFB’s Kelly Field, Texas. ensuring that this lifters—night vision devices or head-up dis transfer goes smoothly despite a host of chal plays—coupledwiththeReRP’squieterengines lenges will require keen oversight. Challenges and 20 percent thrust increase constitute a include having a combat-coded unit assume revolution in itself by significantly enhancing the training mission with no assigned training- the C-5m’s global access? Other examples in coded aircraft and smoothly transferring the clude reducing the C-5’s aircrew complements recently modernized combat mobility train (see the section on “Personnel,” below), adding ing.44 all of these events must occur in parallel airdrop capability that incorporates the Joint with the amP, ReRP, and ongoing operations Precision airdrop system, and improving in iraq and afghanistan. ground maneuver by using ReRP engines to Unlike earlier vignettes that showed suc back up the C-5 (currently an emergency proce cess with the short-term mC rate, the C-5 FTU dure).48 although these items certainly do not at altus has experienced success with the long- represent an extensive list, the potential for high term rate in an environment that parallels ex payoff with minimum cost makes them possible peditionary operations. The 97th mainte topics for the air mobility Battle Lab.49 nance Directorate at altus—the recent air Force mC rate champion—delivered rates of Leadership and Education 70.4 and 73.3 percent for 2004 and 2005, re spectively.45 This unit overcame challenges ap as the section on “Doctrine” recommended, plicable to expeditionary operations: a small intellectual modernization of the C-5 rou number of assigned aircraft (eight of some of tinely deploys squadron commanders to lead the oldest C-5as), a demanding training mis expeditionary units. in the traditional C-5 sion (multiple landings and/or air refuelings stage, we forward-deploy stage managers and per sortie), and a lower parts-supply priority other specialists to help solve specific prob (force/activity designator code) than the rest lems. These stovepipes of leadership include of their C-5 brethren.46 During the same pe expediters (senior flight engineers who assist riod, the 97th flewdozens of sorties in support with aircraft-equipment waivers) and ramp su of iraqi Freedom and recovery operations as pervisors. But we really need squadron com
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manders—people who not only manage, ex redesigning the C-5, the air Force cannot pedite, and supervise the mission but also eliminate the second flightengineer or “scan standardize tactics, intelligence, and operations ner” crew position. Nonetheless, we now have between downrange airfields; apply opera the technology to do without the C-5’s flight tional risk management; judiciously apply scarce engineer. in the environment of air Force resources (crews, maintenance, and aerial smart Operations 21, cost-effectiveness will port); and, because they know their unit mem dictate such changes. bers better than nondeployed commanders, actually improve unit cohesion/morale.50 in today’s expeditionary and combat environment, Conclusion forward-deployed squadron commanders pro vide much simpler decentralized execution Thinking about airlift means thinking about than stage managers, expediters, and ramp su combat. . . . Any activity that does not contrib pervisors. (The fact that the air Force has in ute to this philosophy, any attitude that does stitutionalized expeditionary operations into not reflect a preparation for the combat airlift all of its force development eliminates the mission, any doctrine that does not serve that need for any educational recommendations.) end is suspect and dangerous. —Lt Col Charles e. miller Personnel Airlift Doctrine in a letter to airmen, secretary of the air as mentioned earlier, the idea of forward- Force Wynne says that “we will look at innova deploying the C-5 is older than the aircraft it tive ways to use our materiel and personnel self. Recent events—Us military transforma 51 more efficiently.” as technology continues to tion, an expeditionary focus, and successful reduce the pilot’s preflight workload, the air deployments of the C-5—suggest that we should Force may look at reducing the C-5’s crew revisit this concept. intellectually modernizing complement by eliminating the third load- the C-5 to make expeditionary deployments master position and the flight engineer. at routine should occur even during mechanical the outset of iraqi Freedom, C-5s routinely upgrades of the amP and ReRP. although we and safely operated on augmented duty days have always had concerns about the C-5’s reli (or at maximum crew-duty period) with two ability, as several examples illustrate, maintain loadmasters instead of the usual three. Using only two loadmasters should not require ad ability and, ultimately, the aircraft’s mission ditional technology but would necessitate re success can be affected as much by employ training. Like C-17 pilots, C-5 pilots could as ment and/or training as by mechanical means. sume some of the ground duties for which although this article’s recommendations re current C-5 enlisted crew members (loadmas main incomplete and subject to debate, they ters and/or engineers) are responsible. This nonetheless offer a starting place for discussion brings us to a second personnel recommenda about the expeditionary C-5, which we need if tion—flight engineers. we wish to improve combat capability—today Using technology available today, other air and tomorrow. Done right, a modernized and craft (the civilian DC-10 to mD-11 conversion expeditionary C-5 may finally “revolutionize or the C-130J model) have replaced their global mobility airlift,” as former CiNCmaC flight-engineer position. Obviously, without General estes predicted in 1966.52 •
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Notes 1. “air and space doctrine is an accumulation of knowl 14. “C-5 Galaxy,” UsaF fact sheet, http://www.af.mil/ edge gained primarily from the study and analysis of expe factsheets/factsheet.asp?id=84. rience, which may include actual combat or contingency 15. house, Statement Prepared for Delivery to the House operations, as well as experiments or exercises.” air Force Armed Services Committee by Under Secretary of Defense for Doctrine Document 1, Air Force Basic Doctrine, 17 November Policy Douglas J. Feith, Washington, DC, 108th Cong., 2nd sess., 2003, ix, https://www.doctrine.af.mil/afdcprivateweb/ 23 June 2004, http://www.defenselink.mil/speeches/ aFDD_Page_hTmL/Doctrine_Docs/afdd1.pdf. 2004/sp20040623-0522.html. 2. Transformation Planning Guidance (Washington, DC: 16. Leland and Wilcoxson, Chronological History, 62. Department of Defense, april 2003), 1, http://library.nps 17. Army Modernization Plan, 2003 (Washington, DC: .navy.mil/uhtbin/cgisirsi/mon+Nov+13+12:37:04+PsT Department of the army, 13 march 2003), annex D, D-17, +2006/siRsi/0/520/TPGfinal.pdf. http://www.army.mil/features/mODPlan/2003/mP03 3. sra J. G. Buzanowski, “air Force Releases 2006 Pos mainweb100.pdf. ture statement,” air Force Print News, 2 march 2006, 18. Lt Col Charles e. miller, Airlift Doctrine (maxwell http://www.af.mil/news/story.asp?id=123016812. aFB, aL: air University Press, march 1988), 305, http:// 4. JCIDS [Joint Capabilities Integration and Development aupress.au.af.mil/Books/miller_airlift/miller_airlift.pdf. System] Overview (Washington, DC: Joint staff, J-8 Capa 19. Leland and Wilcoxson, Chronological History, 12. bilities and acquisition Division, n.d.), http://www.dodccrp 20. miller, Airlift Doctrine, 339. .org/iamwg/archive/02_20_04_JCiDs.ppt. 21. Gen howell m. estes Jr., “The Revolution in air 5. Lt Col Robert C. Owen, “The airlift System: a lift,” Air University Review 17, no. 3 (march–april 1966): 15. Primer,” Airpower Journal 9, no. 3 (Fall 1995): 25. 22. Gen howell m. estes Jr., “modern Combat airlift,” 6. John a. Tirpak, “saving the Galaxy,” Air Force Maga Air University Review 20, no. 6 (september–October 1969): zine 87, no. 1 (January 2004): 35, http://www.afa.org/ 18, http://www.airpower.maxwell.af.mil/airchronicles/ magazine/jan2004/0104galaxy.asp. aureview/1969/sep-oct/estes.html. 7. Briefing, air Force Requirements Council, subject: 23. Leland and Wilcoxson, Chronological History, 13. air mobility Command Outsize and Oversize analysis of al 24. Capt Chris J. Krisinger, “Operation Nickel Grass: ternatives, 2 December 1999; and Quadrennial Defense Review airlift in support of National Policy,” Airpower Journal 3, Report (Washington, DC: Department of Defense, 6 February no. 1 (spring 1989): 27, http://www.airpower.maxwell.af 2006), 54, http://www.comw.org/qdr/qdr2006.pdf. .mil/airchronicles/apj/apj89/krisinger.html; and Walter 8. Dr. John W. Leland and Kathryn a. Wilcoxson, The J. Boyne, “Nickel Grass,” Air Force Magazine 81, no. 12 (De Chronological History of the C-5 Galaxy (scott aFB, iL: his cember 1998), http://www.afa.org/magazine/Dec1998/ tory Office, air mobility Command, 2003), 1. The C-5 1298nickel_print.html. Galaxy was the world’s largest and heaviest aircraft from 25. Leland and Wilcoxson, Chronological History, 8–9. its firstflight in 1968 until 1982, when the soviet antonov 26. ibid., 14. an-124 captured this title. Like the C-141 starlifter, also 27. Briefing, air Force Requirements Council. manufactured by Lockheed aircraft Corporation, the C-5 28. Leland and Wilcoxson, Chronological History, 2. has a high T-tail, a 25-degree wing sweep, and four turbo 29. Tirpak, “saving the Galaxy,” 31–35. fan engines. 30. The Us air Force’s first air and space expedition 9. For definitions of the terms palletized, oversized, and ary force deployed in October 1995 to southwest asia. Lt outsized cargo, see air mobility Command instruction Col michael J. Nowak, The Air Expeditionary Force: A Strategy 24-101, Transportation, 13 February 2004. for an Uncertain Future?, maxwell Paper no. 19 (maxwell 10. “The 463L master Pallet system is the main device aFB, aL: air War College, august 1999), 10, http://www used for air transport by the United states air Force. all .maxwell.af.mil/au/aul/aupress/maxwell_Papers/Text/ cargo aircraft used by the [UsaF] are configured to accept mp19.pdf. these pallets. its dimensions are 88"W, 108"L, and 2 1/2"h. 31. Briefing, Lt Col James a. spaulding, commander, The usable space is 84 [inches] by 104 [inches]. it can hold 715th ams, and author, to air Force Council, Washing up to 10,000 lb of cargo at 8 G’s. The empty weight is 290 ton, DC, subject: C-5 expeditionary Operations, 12 De lb.” Wikipedia: The Free Encyclopedia, s.v. “463L master Pallet,” cember 2002. http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/463L_master_pallet. 32. inscription, personal photo from James Roche, 11. Leland and Wilcoxson, Chronological History, 1. former secretary of the air Force. 12. Kneeling (raising and lowering) the entire air 33. Rick sauder, “entering a New Galaxy,” Airlift/ craft approximately three feet to accommodate loading/ Tanker Quarterly 11, no. 1 (Winter 2003): 13, http://www unloading cargo and wheeled vehicles through its full- .atalink.org/atq/aTQ_Winter_2003.pdf. width opening front and rear doors is a feature unique to 34. air Force instruction (aFi) 11-289, Phoenix Banner, the C-5. Silver, and Copper Operations, 16 February 2006, http://www 13. Cmsgt Timothy Reuning, amC/a3 7VG, inter .e-publishing.af.mil/pubfiles/af/11/afi11-289/afi11-289.pdf. view by the author, 29 January 2004. Larger than a Boeing 35. hard crews are a set of crew members who always 747, the C-5 has 28 tires that help spread its weight. in fact fly together. at maximum gross weight, a C-5 has a lighter pavement 36. “Us Pony express,” The History Channel, 13 No classification number than a fully loaded C-141 or C-17. vember 2003.
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37. adam J. hebert, “air mobility’s Never-ending 44. Combat mobility training involves the merging of surge,” U.S. Air Force AIM Points, 7 september 2006, ancillary training, mission-qualification ground training, http://aimpoints.hq.af.mil/display.cfm?id=13670. and tactics, which produces a near-mission-ready, expedi 38. according to amC’s “line assigned” aircrew data tionary FTU graduate. Previously accomplished in-unit, as for 2002 and 2003, C-5 pilots average the highest number of 2006, 13 of these 15 events are now accomplished by of temporary duty (TDY) days of all amC pilots. C-5 copi the FTU at air education and Training Command. Other lots at Dover aFB, De, in 2003 averaged over 215 days initiatives proposed but not in combat mobility training TDY, beating all other amC aircrew positions by over a include training in night vision devices, airdrop, forma month. additionally, C-5 aircrew “weighted averages” were tion, and so forth. the highest of all amC’s airlifters for those two years. 45. see data from amC’s GO81/Broker aircraft 39. after mobilization of air Force Reserve aircrews maintenance system for the C-5, C-141, KC-135, KC-10, prior to iraqi Freedom (January–march 2003), the author, and C-17 aircraft. it also has provisions to accommodate serving as deputy operations group commander at Travis other aircraft. aFB, Ca, witnessed less than 10 percent of C-5 aircrews 46. see air Force Policy Directive 16-3, Operations Sup ever approaching the flying-hourlimit of 330 hours in 90 port, 26 January 1994, http://www.e-publishing.af.mil/ days as specified in aFi 11-202, Flying Operations, vol. 3, Gen pubfiles/af/16/afpd16-3/afpd16-3.pdf. eral Flight Rules, 5 april 2006, 69, http://www.e-publishing 47. GO81 data. .af.mil/pubfiles/af/11/afi11-202v3/afi11-202v3.pdf. 48. “Joint Precision airdrop system ( JPaDs): ad 40. Tsgt Chuck marsh, “C-17 Deployment Length, ef vanced Concept Technology Demonstration (aCTD),” ficiency increase,” U.S. Air Force AIM Points, 11 July 2006, US Army Natick Soldier Center, http://www.natick.army.mil/ http://aimpoints.hq.af.mil/display.cfm?id=12484. soldier/media/fact/airdrop/JPaDs_aCTD.htm. 41. Gen T. michael moseley, to commanders of the 49. “air mobility Warfare Center,” UsaF fact sheet, major commands and deputy chiefs of staff, letter, 17 may http://www.amc.af.mil/library/factsheets/factsheet.asp 2006. ?id=233. 42. Gen John P. Jumper, “Combat Wing Organiza 50. Former commander, C-17 eas, to the author, e-mail, tion,” “Chief’s sight Picture,” 2002. may 2003. 43. ian Thompson, “service under Fire—Travis Crew 51. hon. michael W. Wynne, “Letter to airmen: air Recalls Baghdad mission,” Daily Republic, 21 January 2004, Force smart Operations 21,” 8 march 2006, http://www.af http://dailyrepublic.com/articles/2004/01/21/news/ .mil/library/viewpoints/secaf.asp?id=219. news1.txt. 52. estes, “Revolution in airlift,” 15.
Dillon.indd 77 4/27/07 11:01:05 AM ASPJ Quick-Look
Fit (and Ready) to Fight Strengthening Combat Readiness through Controlled-Aggression Training
2d Lt NickoLas stewart, UsaF
ecause deployments to forward they need if they have to fight an enemy in operating locations put airmen in hand-to-hand combat. harm’s way, they must remain keenly Given these circumstances, either the air attentive and ready for possible at Force can continue to deploy poorly prepared Btack at all times. not long ago, warfare con airmen into harm’s way or it can better prepare sisted mostly of movements by uniformed them for the war on terrorism by providing them armies fighting with tanks and aircraft. today combat training—for example, by using “Iron in Iraq, however, suicide bombers and jihad- tiger immersion” to instruct all air Force spe motivated terrorists pose the primary threat. cialties in self-defense and personnel-defense unfortunately, airmen are not as ready as they training.2 this program’s defense courses would should be for dangerous, close-proximity en adopt the most applicable aspects of chinese counters with the enemy. and Brazilian jujitsu, kenpo, aikido, pakua, and this is not an issue of legal restraint or poor the hsing-i martial arts. specifically, all of the air equipment but of inadequate military prepa Force’s enlisted basic trainees; Reserve officer ration. the air Force trains its personnel well training corps, us air Force academy, and offi in the law of armed conflict, equips them cer training school cadets; and officer trainees properly, and assures their proficiency with should know weapons disarmament, arms recov firearms, but—unlike most members of our ery, rapid-withdrawal techniques, controlled sister services—few deployed airmen receive aggressionpractice,takedowns,andself-defense/ extensive training in hand-to-hand combat. personnel defense. these skills, in conjunction such expertise might represent the difference with good negotiation techniques, could save between life and death for unarmed airmen or the lives of american airmen. those who have exhausted their ammunition. Initial training would prove sufficient to comments by 2d lt Raymond Fernandez significantly improve the chances of survival of los angeles aFB, california, who deployed in a hostile environment. It would follow air many times to afghanistan and Qatar as an men through their careers, continuing at all enlisted man, typify the current situation: “If levels of enlisted and officerprofessional mili we had ever been overrun or even attacked tary education (pme). From the air and space individually, I don’t think anyone would have Basic course to air War college, and from the known what to do. I certainly wasn’t trained to First term airman’s course to the senior fight individually.”1 even aircrew members, some noncommissioned officer academy, all air of the service’s most highly trained personnel, men would continually enhance their self- don’t receive much instruction in personal defense readiness. Whether such training also defense following an aircraft ejection, a skill occurs at equivalent sister-service/joint, inter
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mediate, and senior developmental-education fails, the bayonet or knife may be the ideal schools would remain the decision of those weapon to dispatch the enemy. soldiers must services and the department of defense. transition immediately and instinctively into the appropriate techniques based on the situation defense training is the natural counterpart 3 to the air Force’s Fit to Fight program, designed and the weapons at hand. to assure the fitnessof airmen, both physically the army and marine programs may not and mentally, for forward combat operations. create a total Force of experts in hand-to much like pilates or yoga, mixed martial arts hand combat, but producing a fighting spirit (mma) lengthens and leans muscles, strength will yield tremendous benefits. their pro ens the heart and vital organs, and increases grams bind that spirit with character and blood flow as well as the ability to manage stress. camaraderie—the warrior mind-set. Because a dynamic program, mma prescribes drills air Force airmen often findthemselves in the ranging from three-mile, slow-conditioning same environment and face the same enemy as runs followed by calisthenics, to takedown sister-service troops, they need similar training demonstrations and sparring matches. airmen in self-defense to bolster their combat abili would see and feel the initial benefits,but the ties, confidence, and fighting spirit. Indeed, real return on this investment would occur this proposal seems to complement the air during deployment. Including Iron tiger in Force chief of staff’s recent move to provide basic training and pme would promote pro 19 hours of training in expeditionary combat fessional competency, self-discipline, and matu skills for all airmen deployed to a war zone.4 rity throughout the ranks. despite the air Force’s technological sophis In many respects, american airmen are the tication, combat remains very much a human best trained in the world. after all, “develop endeavor. the service must train airmen to ing airmen” is our first core competency. yet, fight the current threat of global terrorism, in other ways, we may be the weak link in the regardless of the cost in time and money, chain, compared to our colleagues in the because it cannot allow its deployed person other services. the marine corps developed a nel around the world to become targets of martial arts program in 2000 to train marines opportunity for terrorists. Hopefully, if the air and attached personnel in unarmed combat, Force implements the Iron tiger training pro using edged weapons and weapons of oppor posed in this article, potential enemies will tunity. In several different programs, army say, “don’t mess with usaF airmen—they are soldiers train in close-quarters fighting and ready to fight.” • hand-to-hand combat known as H2H or HtH, and the army’s field manuals for 2002–6 strongly emphasize Brazilian jujitsu. accord ing to army Field manual (Fm) 3-25.150 (Fm Notes 21-150), Combatives, 1. 2d lt Raymond Fernandez, financial analyst, mIl satcom systems Wing, los angeles aFB, ca, interview Hand-to-hand combat is an engagement between by the author, 10 october 2005. two or more persons in an empty-handed struggle 2. the author submitted Iron tiger immersion for con or with hand-held weapons such as knives, sticks, sideration under the air Force’s Innovative development or projectile weapons that cannot be fired. pro through employee awareness (Idea) program. ficiency in hand-to-hand combat is one of the 3. army Field manual (Fm) 3-25.150 (Fm 21-150), fundamental building blocks for training the Combatives, 18 January 2002, 1-1, 7-1, https://134.11.61.26/ cd5/publications/da/Fm/Fm%203-25.150%2020020118 modern soldier. . . . In most combat situations, .pdf (accessed 18 october 2006). small arms and grenades are the weapons of 4. adam J. Hebert, “preparing for a new Way of War,” choice. However, in some scenarios, soldiers Air Force Magazine 89, no. 7 (July 2006): 41, http://www must engage the enemy in confinedareas. . . . In .afa.org/magazine/July2006/0706war.pdf (accessed 18 these instances, or when your primary weapon october 2006).
Quick Look-Stewart.indd 79 4/27/07 11:15:11 AM Leadership by the Socratic Method
Maj aaron a. Tucker, uSaF*
Editorial Abstract: Opining that modern leaders should study the habits of great thinkers and leaders of the past, Major Tucker focuses specifically on Socrates, a retired soldier, stonemason, and philoso pher in Athens, Greece, during the fifth century BC. The author argues that since the “Socratic method” forces students to ward intellectual self-examination and a logical conclusion, it offers a valuable way to help leaders acquire critical think ing useful for influencing and persuad ing other people.
eaders in the twenty-firstcentur y conversation, questioning their assertions, and would do well to study the habits of dismantling their philosophies by turning their great thinkers and leaders of the past. own logic against them.1 in fact he claimed to socrates famously instructed his stu be “fulfilling the wishes of the gods when he Ldents through a series of carefully constructed goes about and argues with people.”2 socrates questions designed to force self-examination was unique among the scholars of ancient and lead them to a conclusion. this method athens by presenting himself not as a master for instilling critical-thinking skills is invalu of knowledge but as a fellow student working able to leaders in many circumstances as a way toward the discovery of truth during mostly to influence and persuade. Contemporary informal discussions. such dialogue empow leaders fill many roles: instructor, mentor, ers the student to question the logic and ideas leader, follower, and peer. each of these roles of the instructor even as the teacher gains in is well served by the socratic method. sight from the student’s arguments. as a re socrates was a retired soldier and stone sult, both the instructor and student are bet mason in athens during the fifth century BC. ter able to order their thoughts and arguments he took great pleasure in pulling people into into a stronger, more coherent theory tem
*the author would like to acknowledge the assistance of several outstanding individuals for their review of this article and valuable inputs: Col Mark dillon, Col harrison smith, Lt Col dan Fritz, Maj Mark thompson, Capt sandy thompson, Capt elwood Waddell, and Mr. Brian ai Chang.
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pered by relentless hammering in the forge of as the representative to France during the debate. socrates described himself as an “in american revolution, Franklin secured French tellectual midwife, whose questioning delivers military and financial assistance critical to the the thoughts of others into the light of day.”3 defeat of english armies and the birth of the too often, however, socrates used his ques United states as an independent country. his tioning to disparage his students, not neces influence at the Constitutional Convention sarily to help them. We must be wary of the was legendary as the singularly american form sharp edge of this teaching tool.4 of government took shape. the Socratic method, or elenchus, is defined Law and medical schools widely use the so as a prolonged series of questions and answers cratic method to educate their students. Law which refutes a moral assertion by leading an professors start with a real court case and then opponent to draw a conclusion that contra transform it “into another of [their] peculiar dicts his own viewpoint.5 during this dialogue, ‘hypotheticals,’ which [they alter] bit by bit, students are forced to critically examine other question by question, so [the students] can viewpoints and question their own assumptions see the way each fact relates to the controlling and assertions. socrates developed this elen principle.”10 Law students are “tacitly instructed chus as a “means to examine, refute, or put to in the strategies of legal argument, in putting shame” and gradually cultivated a school of what had been analyzed back together in a young athenians, including Plato, Xenophon, way that would make [a lawyer’s] contentions and aristophanes.6 Often, his students were persuasive to a court.”11 Medical students are left confused and bewildered, not knowing ex likewise instructed through case study and di actly what truth was or what they personally agnosis. harvard Medical school wants its stu believed. in time, however, the education his dents to “identify a gap in their knowledge, students received enabled the development of feel guilty about not filling it, and have the some of the world’s greatest philosophy. skills to learn what they need.”12 the result is a the socratic method has been widely used level of critical thinking and mental discipline throughout history in a variety of circum that society depends on for the effective prac stances. Plato continued his teacher’s tradi tice of law and medicine. tion of informal instruction and introspection; Use of the socratic method serves to pro his most famous student was aristotle. Benja duce a strong professional in fields that are min Franklin, in his Autobiography, recounted mainly self-governing. the largely successful coming across the socratic method during an efforts of law and medicine to maintain high early period of self-education: “i procur’d professional standards (and remarkably little Xenophon’s Memorable Things of Socrates, wherein legislative oversight) have their foundation in there are many instances of the [socratic] the emphasis on critical thinking and profes method. i was charm’d with it, adopted it, sional dialogue. Commensurate with the level dropt my abrupt contradiction and positive of trust that society places in its practitioners, argumentation, and put on the humble in the fields of law and medicine have managed quirer and doubter.”7 Like socrates, Ben to transcend simple training. Franklin also took delight in drawing people training and education bear important dis into conversation and “entangling them in tinctions. Military training, for instance, requires difficulties out of which they could not extri knowledge of and adherence to technical- cate themselves.”8 Unlike socrates, however, order procedures, regulations, and rules of Franklin gradually abandoned the sharp edge engagement. By contrast, education empha of dispute and moved toward a method of sizes critical thinking, original thought, and never expressing himself in absolutes, as a judgment. socrates states that he is not a master of knowledge might, choosing instead teacher in the sense that “teaching” is simply to present his opinion as just that. Franklin transferring knowledge from instructor to stu credits this deferential air to his ability to in dent. he does, however, engage students in a culcate his opinions and promote his causes.9 dialogue designed to enable the discovery of
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truth for themselves.13 socrates works strictly in the higher levels of cognitive learning. Evaluation Bloom’s taxonomy stratifies the intellectual outcomes of cognitive learning into six levels: Synthesis knowledge, comprehension, application, analy 14 sis, synthesis, and evaluation (see figure). Analysis training delivers to the student what to think (application), whereas education involves teach Application ing one how to think (analysis), how to produce original thought (synthesis), and how to make Comprehension judgments about value (evaluation). the socratic method also has drawbacks Knowledge and, like any leadership technique, fits some situations better than others. extended philo sophical dialogue requires a certain level of Figure. Bloom’s taxonomy of the cognitive knowledge in the examinee, requiring some domain training in the subject matter in order to ex 17 change a meaningful dialogue. Further, elen thing.” Leaders must trust their followers chus takes time to unfold and may be some enough to reveal themselves, or the socratic what unwieldy in an operational environment. method can become just a veil of questions Military leaders must be agile in their leader that hides their true thoughts—or lack thereof. ship style and balance the two goals of devel Leadership in the twenty-first century has oping and persuading their followers with the many emerging challenges, and leaders require socratic method and executing a time-critical tools to meet those tests. taking lessons from mission with a more directive style of leader an ancient technique for self-inspection pro ship. Continual questioning can also be an vides one such tool for modern leaders to use noying and, perhaps, counterproductive if the in their many roles. two thousand four hundred questioner is overly enthusiastic. a harvard years ago, socrates used elenchus—a series of Law school student found it hard to take, call leading questions—to educate his students in 15 ing it “unfair and intimidating.” critical thinking and to challenge their assump if a leader uses the socratic method too rig tions. Modern law and medical schools have idly, submitting only questions rather than extensively used this form of instruction to opinions or insights, the student or follower educate and sharpen the intellect of future may never know exactly what the leader thinks. professionals. similarly, the socratic method can One harvard Law school professor’s particular style of questioning threatened to severely dis serve twenty-first-century leaders to instruct illusion his students: “he just stood . . . and students, mentor protégés, motivate followers, kept asking questions; and as confusion grew, advise other leaders, and influence peers. so did dissatisfaction. no one was quite sure what [the professor] wanted from us. Were we stupid? Were the questions bad? What were we Leadership by the supposed to be learning? it was almost as if Socratic Method [he] had set out to intensify that plague of un certainty which afflicted us all.”16 in fact, Military leaders, both officer and enlisted, socrates’s own students complained bitterly findthemselves in fiveroles in which they can about his tendency to hide behind elenchus: implement the socratic method: “We’ve had enough of your ridiculing others, • as instructors in formal training. questioning and refuting everyone, while never willing to render an account of yourself to • as mentors while grooming protégés for anyone or state your own opinion about any- professional growth.
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• as formal leaders while motivating people and comprehension while providing fodder toward an objective. for further dialogue. this type of discussion leads the student to an appropriate conclusion. • as followers who employ critical thinking elenchus transfers the burden of following a skills to advise leaders. logic flowfrom the student to the instructor as • as peers interacting with others. they navigate to the answer together. When students see that they have answered their each role allows the practice of the socratic own question with a familiar logic, the ability method to exercise critical thinking, creativity, to retrace their own thought process will pro and problem-solving skills while providing for mote confidence in future success. a more effective, efficientsolution to the prob a great advantage of using the socratic lem at hand. method is that sometimes the student’s con clusion isn’t the one that the instructor origi As Instructors nally predicted but is even better or at least If you are to come to the truth, it must be by acceptable. through the student’s answer, the yourself for yourself. instructor can assess the relative strengths of —socrates different courses of action and choose a new, creative path to continue the dialogue. Upon the socratic method can be effectively used arrival at a more effective solution, both the to promote critical-thinking skills, build stu student and instructor have benefited from a dent confidence, and expand the instructor’s synergy made possible through the shared ef own knowledge. during a lecture, the instruc fort of the socratic method. tor seeks to transfer knowledge directly to the an instructor aircraft commander (an area students. Often, students are forced to follow of the author’s personal experience) can make the instructor’s train of thought or logic, mak excellent use of the socratic method. the air ing the task of learning doubly hard. While craft commander is a pilot with the specific lecturing certainly has its place in the firststep responsibility and final authority for the safe of Bloom’s taxonomy (knowledge), allowing operation of an aircraft and successful com students to grasp the application and mean pletion of its given mission. a myriad of agen ing of the intended lesson is best accomplished cies and resources is available to the aircraft by guiding the thought process with socratic commander in order to ensure safety and a dialogue. additionally, the instructor can use successful mission. some tasks require no ac students’ responses to evaluate comprehen tion, some require monitoring, and some re sion, allowing him or her to fine-tunethe pre quire constant intervention to run in sequence sentation. and on time. the student aircraft commander instruction using leading questions will help has to continually apply critical thinking to build confidence as students solve problems each process to decide whether to act on it, with familiar thought processes. the instruc delegate it, or take no action. the instructor tor’s goal is to guide students to ask the right could ask what the student perceives, what his questions that lead them to reach reasonable or her intentions are, and the reasons for that conclusions. a common student complaint is, decision in short order. the student is there “i don’t know where to start.” Often, that an fore allowed to handle issues quickly and suc swer is gained only through experience, which cessfully, building self-confidencewhile ensur is where the socratic method becomes useful. ing mission success. the student quickly learns instead of telling the student where to begin that the instructor is there not to lecture (and and forcing him or her to memorize the an unnecessarily increase the workload) but to swer for future use, the instructor can simply serve as a sounding board for the student’s ask what things are important in the task. the ideas and actions. sometimes the student’s student can now follow his or her own rationale course of action is more effective than the in to the answer, which validates both knowledge structor’s idea. in this case, the student bene
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fits from positive feedback on the success of logue becomes more powerful as the mentor his or her plan, the instructor learns a new uses the protégé’s own knowledge base to technique to apply to future instruction, and guide a philosophical thread. When the phi the mission benefits from the synergy. losophy outstrips the protégé’s experience, the instructor should let the student know the mentor can continue to instruct and eluci that he or she doesn’t have all the answers and date the concept under examination. the also suffers from fears, doubts, and insecuri protégé learns both new concepts and thought ties.18 if teaching is simply transferring knowl processes, which are valuable since the men edge from teacher to student, then socrates tor, a successful leader, has already internal did not teach. socrates defined teaching as ized them. “engaging would-be learners in . . . argument the mentor, while interacting with candi to make them aware of their own ignorance date leaders, can also evaluate each individual’s and enable them to discover for themselves cognitive-learning level as prescribed in Bloom’s 19 the truth the teacher had held back.” taxonomy. Lines of questioning can evaluate socrates’s role in teaching is not to defend a each of the six levels, from knowledge to evalua thesis of his own but only to examine the stu tion. how much does the candidate know 20 dent’s assertion. in the end, however, the (knowledge)? how does he or she apply it to a teacher tests his or her own beliefs and asser new situation (application)? is it right (evalua tions as student points are examined, dis tion)? the mentor can determine each candi sected for logic, and then reassembled stron date’s level of training in the first two questions ger than before. and critical thinking ability in the third. this evaluation allows further discrimination within As Mentors the pool of candidates and a more efficient in You may plant a field well; but you know not vestment of professional-development energies. who shall gather the fruits: you may build a house well; but you know not who shall dwell As Leaders in it. Leadership is the art of getting someone to do —Xenophon something you want done because he wants Mentors are charged with developing quality re to do it. placement personnel and must therefore act —dwight d. eisenhower as both instructor and evaluator. the socratic method is well suited to both tasks and can a person in a formal leadership position can provide intellectual development as well as use the socratic method to persuade, secure practical training for protégés. it can then as support, encourage an active followership, sist specific protégés in further development and develop followers for better efficiency. and eventual promotion to leadership posi Well-timed dialogue with subordinates can al tions. Leaders trained in self-examination low the leader to both receive their counsel techniques and educated with critical think and secure buy-in to proposed policy. Ques ing ensure future organizational success. tions can be posed in conference with advi the mentor can seed the field of leader sors. this dialogue allows leaders to reveal candidates by addressing groups and by con their rationale and seek feedback on their ducting one-on-one conversation. Questions thought process from subordinates. subordi posed to groups mimic the style used by law nates who are consulted in such a manner are and medical schools and quickly generate more committed to a proposed action or policy lively discussion as the candidates generate than otherwise, and through such dialogue, ideas. the mentor can shepherd the discussion the leader may learn of an unpredicted result to enable the group to reach an important les that could be easily mitigated early but would son or truth while simultaneously illuminating be difficultto overcome after the act was com his or her own critical-thinking processes. dia mitted or policy published. Both the policy
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and its support are simultaneously improved tary mentioned this development as though Lin by exercising the socratic method. coln might have been more expeditious to be active followers are crucial to a leader’s gin with. this was not entirely so. the first year success. For followers to show initiative, how had been given to training seward in several re spects. and as the two had fraternized and poli ever, the leader must be open and predictable. cies in degree clarified, their mutual under Leaders who question their counselors receive standing was such that Lincoln could now the dual benefit of making better decisions usually say with perfect safety, “show me where because of their advisors’ input as well as in you want my name,” whereas during the first creasing trust within the organization. Follow year he would have been near ruin more than ers who trust that they know their leader’s once had not his habit been to say, “i never sign mind can take the initiative without acting a document i have not first read.”23 contrary to the leader’s philosophy. similarly, Winston Churchill evoked creative Leaders throughout history have used staffs solutions from his staff during World War ii by to enable the administration of expanded challenges and questions. Often he would set spheres of influence. a staff that understands forth a proposal with the purpose of eliciting the mind of its leader is more efficient in its critical feedback and creative counterproposals: duties and more effective in assisting the “the purpose of many of his proposals, espe leader. a leader who spends some time in dia cially his more imaginative and impractical ones, logue with key staff members educates them was to stimulate others to use their own imagi on his or her thinking, which guides the spirit nation and initiative in solving a problem.”24 and logic of subsequent efforts, resulting in realized efficiencies. As Followers abraham Lincoln, one of the most assertive presidents in history, guided his staff with The greatest trust between man and man is shrewdness and subtlety. Lincoln was a very ef the trust of giving counsel. fective practitioner of the socratic method. —sir Francis Bacon his leadership style encouraged innovation and risk taking as he would let his subordi the concept of using the socratic method nates proceed with the belief that it was their from a follower position capitalizes on the idea. if their plan was not to his liking, Lin idea that a solution resulting from such a dia coln would “focus, direct, or point his people logue has a synergistic potential not available to what he viewed as the proper path.”21 Just as to either the leader or the follower in isola socrates claimed not to be a teacher while tion. the follower has the opportunity to af guiding his students to self-knowledge, Lin fect policy and impress his or her own logic and rationale on the leader through open dia coln made a similar declaration: “i claim not logue. effecting a line of questioning from the to have controlled events, but confess plainly position of follower requires tact, discretion, that events have controlled me.”22 and a high level of trust. Both the leader and George e. Baker, private secretary to [secretary the follower must trust each other’s integrity of state] seward, described how Lincoln had and the method. changed his practice from year to year in the niccolò Machiavelli, a minister to princes matter of signing the many public documents in fifteenth-century italy, aspired to open dia brought to him by Baker. during the first few logue with his leaders. in The Prince, he ad months of his administration he read each pa vised leaders to “choose wise men in his state per carefully through, remarking, “i never sign a document i have not first read.” at a later pe who alone have the freedom of speaking the riod he asked the messenger, “Won’t you read truth to him, and then . . . ask them about these papers to me?” still later he requested everything, listen to their opinions and subse merely “a synopsis of the contents.” and in the quently resolve for himself to his liking, and fourth year his expression most often was, “show comport himself in such a manner that each me where you want my name.” seward’s secre councilor knows that the more freely he speaks
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the more he will be accepted.”25 Unfortu into difficultiesand contradictions, that at last nately, some of his princes did not see the he grew ridiculously cautious, and would hardly practical benefitsto findingtruth through so answer me the most common question, with cratic dialogue and imprisoned and tortured out asking first,‘ What do you intend to infer from Machiavelli.26 that?’ ” (emphasis in original).28 Often, the benefitof dialogue is the illumi nation of a point; however, initiation by the follower often adds an additional benefit.t he Conclusion follower can determine the sense of the leader although the socratic method was origi and enable more effective counsel in the fu nally used for self-examination and the search ture. Further, the follower’s insight into the for philosophical truth, twenty-first-century leader’s personal philosophy can be carried leaders can apply its power to the needs of back and discussed with his or her peers. the modern leadership. as an instructor, the leader’s base of followers is improved as a re sult of the effort of one follower using the so leader can promote critical-thinking skills cratic method. while evaluating the student’s knowledge and comprehension in order to fine-tune further As Peers instruction. the student benefits by following a familiar, repeatable thought process (his or If everybody is thinking alike, then somebody her own) and gaining self-confidence. socratic isn’t thinking. dialogue assists the mentor by providing intel —Gen George s. Patton Jr. lectual development and candidate evaluation for future leaders. in a formal leadership ca Leadership among peers is a difficult proposi pacity, dialogue helps secure support, encour tion. Without the bully pulpit of a formal lead ership position, a person has little leverage to age active followership, and develop efficient force a line of questioning. also without the staff personnel. similarly, a follower can use benefit of knowing the destination of the the socratic method to probe the leader’s ra thread of philosophical thought, dialogue is tionale and affect policy with a synergy not less efficient but still benefits from the inputs of available to the leader in isolation. Peers can multiple participants. there is a peculiar improve each other’s critical-thinking skills and benefit to this application, however. Peers are insight through open dialogue that promotes generally more open and frank with each creativity and constructive feedback. other than they are with their superiors and the socratic method does have its draw are willing to share contrarian viewpoints. de backs, and modern literature abounds with spite the lack of a formal instructor, peer other effective leadership techniques, each groups can use socratic dialogue to help dis with a particular strength. Pointed question cover answers. While the process can seem a ing requires a certain level of knowledge in little misdirected and disorganized, the ap the examinee, takes time to execute, and can proach can be both fun and rewarding. Often be annoying if the questioner is overly enthu people learn best when they find answers siastic. also the leader must endeavor not to themselves.27 hide behind a veil of questions, never giving Care must be taken that the socratic method his or her own philosophies or opinions to fol doesn’t exasperate peers and lose the intended lowers. Other leadership techniques are more objective of exercising critical-thinking skills. directive, immediate, and simpler for the leader Ben Franklin related his experience with a co to use. Unfortunately the follower receives little worker: “i used to work him so with my so energy toward his or her development, and cratic method, and had trepann’d [trapped] no feedback path exists except for the brave him so often by questions apparently so dis soul who is willing to speak up. tant from any point we had in hand, and yet twenty-first-century leaders face issues similar by degrees led to the point, and brought him to those encountered by citizens in classical
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athens. Both require a method to promote tion and contemplation. the leader serves as critical thinking and self-examination in the a “jeweler of ideas. he uses his questions like a pursuit of truth. socrates’s elenchus provided goldsmith’s hammer, working the concepts a solution in his method of simple question down to an incredible fineness and shine.”29 • ing to bring forth creative thought for inspec-
Notes
1. Garth Kemerling, “socrates,” Philosophy Pages, 7 au 14. B. s. Bloom, ed., “taxonomy of educational Objec gust 2002, http://www.philosophypages.com/ph/socr.htm tives: the Classificationof educational Goals—handbook (accessed 25 June 2006). i: Cognitive domain,” Learning and Teaching, 15 august 2. anthony Gottlieb, Socrates (new York: routledge, 2005, http://www.learningandteaching.info/learning/ 1999), 14. bloomtax.htm (accessed 20 June 2006). 3. ibid., 15. 15. turow, One L, 98. 4. david h. elkind and Freddy sweet, “the socratic 16. ibid., 46. approach to Character education,” Educational Leadership, 17. Vlastos, Socrates, 32. May 1997, http://www.goodcharacter.com/socratic_method 18. elkind and sweet, Socratic Approach. .html (accessed 18 February 2006). 19. Vlastos, Socrates, 32. 5. Princess Orig, “Problem-Based Learning and the 20. ibid., 113. socratic Elenchus in the teaching of Literature,” temasek 21. don t. Phillips, Lincoln on Leadership: Executive Polytechnic/Learning academy PBL (problem-based learn Strategies for Tough Times (new York: time Warner Books, ing) Portal, n.d., http://pbl.tp.edu.sg/PBL%20subjects/ 1992), 100. articles/PrincessOrig.pdf (accessed 15 February 2006). 22. ibid., 99. 6. ibid. 23. Carl sandburg, Abraham Lincoln: The War Years, 7. Benjamin Franklin, Autobiography (new York: inter vol. 3 (new York: harcourt, Brace and Company, 1939), national Collector’s edition, 1959), 38. 414. 8. ibid. 24. steven F. hayward, Churchill on Leadership: Execu 9. ibid., 39. tive Success in the Face of Adversity (rocklin, Ca: Prima Pub 10. scott turow, One L: The Turbulent True Story of a lishing, 1998), 95. First Year at Harvard Law School (new York: time Warner 25. niccolò Machiavelli, The Prince (atlantic high Books, 1997), 71. lands, nJ: humanities Press international, 1996), 113. 11. ibid., 73. 26. ibid., 15. 12. david r. Garvin, “Making the Case: Professional 27. Maj norman h. Patnode, “the socratic Method: education for the World of Practice,” Harvard Magazine Leveraging Questions to increase Performance,” Program 106, no. 1 (september–October 2003): 64. Manager 31, no. 6 (november–december 2002): 48. 13. Gregory Vlastos, Socrates: Ironist and Moral Philoso 28. Franklin, Autobiography, 62. pher (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1991), 32. 29. turow, One L, 93.
Tucker.indd 87 4/27/07 11:03:30 AM Revised USAF Doctrine Publication Air Force Doctrine Document 2-7, Special Operations
Lt CoL ALexAnder M. WAthen, USAF, retired
Air Force Lieutenant General Charles Wald . . . recalled that the rapid progress of the Northern Alliance in early November 2001 had been enabled by the targeting support provided by just “three or four [special operations forces] guys on the ground.” —Benjamin s. lambeth Air Power against Terror
ir Force speciAl operations forces AFDD 2-7 includes short, interesting, and (AFsoF) provide unique capabilities well-written vignettes portraying the birth of to the war-fighting combatant com AFsoF and its evolution through the present mander. Air Force Doctrine Docu day. readers unfamiliar with the terms carpet Ament (AFDD) 2-7, Special Operations, 16 De baggers or air commandos as they apply to air- cember 2005, describes AFsoF’s support to power don’t know AFsoF. particularly notable the joint force commander and reiterates the is the fact that these vignettes include not only command relationships that enable him or her success stories but also examples of failures to leverage the capabilities of those forces as and the way those failures have helped the part of a greater campaign plan. This opera force evolve. tional doctrine document guides the employ every Airman having an investment in the ment of AFsoF to meet today’s threats. application of airpower should read AFDD 2-7 AFDD 2-7 supersedes its previous version because it provides a worthy introduction to (dated 17 July 2001) and updates key AFsoF AFsoF’s unique mission, command relation doctrine concepts and terms. As America con ships, and operating motive. For example, the tinues to engage in the global war on terror document amply describes Air Force special ism, AFsoF has shifted from a platform-based operations command’s responsibility, as the to a capabilities-based model that can accom air component of UssocoM, to organize, modate such a campaign. signaling a change train, and equip AFsoF to provide the neces in paradigms, this publication offers a revised sary air capabilities to conduct UssocoM’s discussion of modern AFsoF and the applica nine core tasks: tion of certain enduring principles and guid • counterproliferation of weapons of mass ing truths; places more emphasis on AFsoF’s destruction core tasks and missions as defined by Us special operations command (UssocoM) direc • counterterrorism tives; updates and clarifiescommand, control, • special reconnaissance and organizational relationships; and refines AFsoF planning and support considerations. • direct action
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NOTAM-Wathen.indd 88 4/27/07 11:13:50 AM DOCTRINE NOTE 89
• unconventional warfare • intelligence, surveillance, and reconnais sance • foreign internal defense • information operations • personnel recovery/recovery operations • civil affairs operations • precision fires • psychological operations • dissemination of psychological operations in the process, AFDD 2-7 provides short expla • specialized air mobility nations of each of these tasks. Furthermore, it • specialized refueling goes on to list and describe AFsoF’s core mis sion areas: These examples reflect the range of infor mation about AFsoF available from AFDD • air-to-surface interface 2-7. Furthermore, the doctrine document pro • agile combat support vides a strong understanding of how AFsoF interacts with the joint force, detailing operat • combat-aviation advisory operations ing and command relationships. it is a must- • information operations read for all Airmen. •
NOTAM-Wathen.indd 89 4/27/07 11:13:51 AM The Mandate to Revolutionize Military Logistics
COL BradLey e. Smith, USa
Editorial Abstract: In 2003 senior leaders of the US military establishment called for the designation of a military-wide distribution process owner (DPO). They took this action to head off the often- observed disconnects among tactical, operational, and strategic distribution as well as other associ ated logistical processes. The author posits that this long-overdue initiative represents a revolutionary paradigm shift in the ways we should conduct logistical operations in both peace and war.
n September 2003, the secretary of de Afghanistan and Iraq.1 With few exceptions, fense designated US transportation Com Americans know that their soldiers, sailors, mand (UStrAnSCOm) as the distribution airmen, and marines are adequately provi process owner (DpO) for the Department sioned to fight the battles. While there have Iof Defense (DOD). It was a signal that systemic been some contentious, publicly debated is solutions need to be instituted at the national sues such as body-armor shortages and add-on level to better integrate military logistics, espe armor for vehicles, media coverage focused cially in the areas of transportation, supply, and on industrial production and election-year information technology. the secretary’s direc politics—not the distribution pipeline and tive was a call to action for the entire logistics supply chain management.2 Actual shortages community to make the necessary organiza are few compared to those of past wars. tional and cultural changes to establish one Still, there is room for significant improve distribution system for the entire military. ment at the higher levels of our logistics infra the call was in stark contrast to logistics at structure to project and sustain combat forces the tactical level, which has been successful in worldwide. Our leaders need to improve the
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way they integrate tactical, operational, and change in a short period of time—even for all strategic processes to form a more effective, the right reasons—seldom occurs at the higher streamlined distribution pipeline.3 Shortly levels. proponents of change for the better are after the invasion of Afghanistan, many dis not always rewarded, so impressive-sounding connects occurred due to training issues. For phrases and glossy pamphlets precede actual decades the military reduced training oppor achievement. the slow progress of military tunities involving expensive, large-scale unit evolution may be acceptable in peacetime but moves that would have increased an already not when survival of the nation is at stake. Se high operations tempo. exercises and war nior military officials must take the necessary games were conducted with reduced numbers risks and proceed to effect a “revolution in of tactical line personnel. even then, logistics military logistics” that has been talked about and distribution challenges did not receive for over a generation. sufficient emphasis. Fixing responsibility for distribution at the the onus is upon the DpO to make funda four-star level sets the stage for progress. For mental changes in the ways we conduct large the firsttime, we have what is in essence a distri scalelogisticaloperations.First,systemicchanges bution command that subsumes responsibility must be made to ensure proper linkage and for transportation and a portion of defense synchronization throughout the entire distri logistics and operations-information tech bution pipeline. Second, we must find new nology. the movement of information in near ways to provide the most effective support to real time is as important as the physical move units engaged in combat without incurring ment of personnel, cargo, and supplies. It will large additional costs. As Federal Times reported take four-stars to effect change to systems cur on the initial tip of the iceberg, “During the rently in place and bring our information first month of major combat operations in technologies into the twenty-firstcentur y. the Iraq two years ago, the Defense Department amount and type of logistical forces must ulti lost track of $1.2 billion in materials shipped mately be reorganized. new roles and mis to the Army, encountered hundreds of back sions will have to be assigned. All of this must logged shipments, and ran up millions of dol be accomplished to achieve situational aware lars in fees to lease or replace storage contain ness of all distribution considerations, includ ers because of backlogged or lost shipments.”4 ing power projection and the generation of As US international commitments continue to combat power in-theater. grow, there is no guarantee that additional re sources will be provided to the DOD. While Revolutionary Change in Transportation most senior leaders would recognize the need to find ways to work smarter with fewer resources, After becoming the DpO, UStrAnSCOm paradoxically, they would also acknowledge expanded its mode-manager mission to en that many efficientpeacetime operations have compass the systemic whole of the Defense no place on the battlefield. Combat effective transportation System. In the past, the com ness outweighs all other considerations. mand operated exclusively between ports of embarkation and ports of debarkation. today the focus is more holistic and extends from Revolution in factory or depot, through forward distribution points inside the theater, to forces engaged Military Logistics with the enemy. movement of up-armored Change is difficult for any organization, high mobility multipurpose wheeled vehicles military or civilian; therefore, the more con (HmmWV or humvee; up-armored HmmWV troversial changes are usually introduced over is designated UAH) is one example of mission time. Any significant,new procedures are em growth. UStrAnSCOm and project managers braced by a relative few and thus pose chal analyzed production schedules in the United lenges to teamwork as a whole. Significant States, tracked the flow from stateside facto
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ries to Kuwait, monitored in-theater upgrades dispersed across the battlefield. troops physi with ancillary equipment such as blue force cally cannot unload and reload containers trackers and combat-identification panels, quickly enough for onward movement to keep and tracked onward movement by surface or pace with throughput demands, so containers intratheater air into Iraq.5 they closed gaps with mixed consignees have to be pushed for between strategic and operational transport ward to a single recipient. Units that never re to eliminate delays with UAH delivery. tac ceive their goods must reorder, but there is tical commanders received progress reports still no guarantee that they will ever receive so they could anticipate the receipt of UAHs their materiel if peacetime protocols are fol for planning purposes. lowed at depots. readiness in combat suffers, and nonmonetary costs are staggering. Second Revolutionary Change in Supply order effects include a general loss of confi dence in the supply system at the tactical level. Advancements in transportation must coin troops inflate priorities on requisitions. Out cide with improvements in other areas before of frustration, commanders demand move the overall distribution chain is strengthened. ment by air even though surface transport is Holistic improvements in supply might not be responsive enough to meet required delivery as readily forthcoming. Unity of command has dates. trust in the distribution system is de not been established for UStrAnSCOm to stroyed. Ironically, measures put in place at fulfill the supply portion of its DpO mission. the strategic level to achieve cost-center effi UStrAnSCOm has no assigned quarter ciencies in fact manifest themselves into gross master organizations. they are all transporta inefficienciesthroughout the operational and tion related—Air mobility Command (AmC), tactical realms. While some improvements have Surface Deployment and Distribution Command been made, it will take a united effort by trans (SDDC), and military Sealift Command. DpO porters and quartermasters under one com initiatives are constrained to the goodwill and mander to straighten it out and institute effec informal relationships established with supply- tive organizational practices for the long term. oriented organizations such as the Defense A single commander with complete oversight Logistics Agency (DLA). Cooperative efforts of the distribution system would also be able alone will not bring about a revolution in mili to capture total systemic costs, both financial tary logistics. That will require unified efforts and nonfinancial,and make the best decisions through a clearly established chain of command. in support of the war fighter. Depot packing of containers is an example Distribution challenges involving depot-level of the close links between supply and trans packaging have deep institutional roots that portation and of the reasons it will take unity stem from an unwillingness to adopt costly of effort to resolve some long-standing prob procedures with the sole justification of directly lems. In past wars, procedures at national-level supporting troops in combat. because logisti warehouses have caused tremendous hard cians at the national level are so far removed ships at forward-distribution points in-theater from the battle, it is difficultfor them to finan and have damaged the combat readiness of cially justify modifying their efficient peace units on the line. In peacetime, warehouse time practices. Again, one commander with men have been rewarded for fillingcontainers complete oversight of the entire distribution to capacity, which oftentimes resulted in mul pipeline is needed to weigh all considerations. tiple consignees per shipment. transportation For example, mismanagement of supplies and metrics drove supply procedures, proved to be sequencing of shipments were principal les highly efficient, and significantly reduced costs. sons of the Spanish-American War. railcars— Such an approach is disastrous in wartime since the containers of their day—were packed and forward-distribution points are not resourced shipped to Florida for onward movement by with enough materials handling equipment ship with total disregard for the ground fight and personnel to deal with multiple consignees in Cuba. Confusion ensued at the port of
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tampa as logisticians unsuccessfully tried to immediate results. Second, we have a systems- sort out the mess. In Vietnam, an unmanage integration problem. Almost every computer able iron mountain of containerized materiel system that currently exists within the DOD was received at seaports and could not be has been developed to meet specificser vice or sorted for onward movement to tactical units. unified-commandneeds and does not tie into throughout Operation Desert Storm, the US a larger, integrated whole. (this is the same Army faced the same problems we do today challenge that confronts our intelligence and concerning containers with multiple consign law enforcement agencies. now the American ees. Currently in Iraq, millions of dollars in public is holding them accountable since they penalty costs are assessed each month for a were not able to work together before 11 Sep multitude of reasons, many of which can be tember 2001.) In the DOD, it will take a con traced back to a fundamental difference of certed, cooperative effort by the four-stars to opinion between strategic-level logisticians and integrate systems into a coherent whole, tactical-level combat commanders concerning thereby enabling holistic assessments about the use of containers. (At the national level, all aspects of our military, including the distri logisticians were leasing and procuring con bution pipeline. tainers as if they were transportation com Architecture supporting the Joint Opera modities to be quickly returned from Iraq. but tion planning and execution System ( JOpeS) tactical-unit commanders did as they always illustrates both these challenges. JOpeS is have in combat and held on to containers to critical to our military’s ability to respond to be used for mobile storage, bunkers, security threats worldwide. this system (under another walls, and work space.) name) originated in the 1950s and has been “brute force” logistics used throughout the upgraded with applications and name changes nineteenth and twentieth centuries is no lon over the years. the JOpeS software provides a ger a viable way to support the US armed forces way for component commands to request stra of the twenty-first century. Senior leaders can tegic and operational transportation, which now capitalize upon improved communica supports only a portion of the distribution tions, computers, and other advanced tech pipeline. the JOpeS charter is actually much nologies to achieve greater efficiencies and larger, as its name suggests, but the software fulfill unrealized potentials within the distri meets few needs of the tactical commander. It bution system. Disconnects between the stra does not integrate tactical or operational plan tegic, operational, and tactical worlds mani ning or allow staff officers to easily manage fest themselves in many different ways, and it unit movements, supply needs, and transpor will take a DpO with the right component tation requirements. nor does it track the commands, using the chain of command, to generation of combat power flowing into the sort out the complexities and unify the effort. theater. In addition, the products produced are complex and cumbersome—enough so to Revolutionary Changes in Information Technology make warriors cringe. It requires months of specialized training and a great deal of pa two obstacles block real progress in reforming tience to input data and interpret results. the military’s information technology. First, JOpeS must be enhanced to help revolutionize many computer systems are inadequate since military logistics as well as other war-fighting the basic architecture is generations old. the capabilities. military services have simply added new appli All of the JOpeS functions need to be in cations to systems over the years without re corporated into a new, single architecture to placing the basic foundation. At some point, provide tacticians a complete picture of per applying new technology to a generations-old sonnel and materiel on the ground, properly frame will no longer suffice.t he military con arrayed for battle, as well as what is en route by tinues to spend billions of dollars on new ap air or sea, in order to anticipate total combat plications to old computer architecture to get capability. Its current focus upon the move
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ment of personnel and unit equipment needs the demands of a fast-paced, fluid battlefield, to be included in a new and more comprehen they must be empowered with the ability to sive capability that incorporates all aspects of make decisions based on the current status of distribution, and then those considerations personnel, equipment, and supplies in the must be inculcated into the greater automated pipeline. realm of strategic- and operational-level war With today’s technology, there is no reason planning and execution. through execution, that information cannot be displayed in simple, future JOpeS technology must provide auto easily accessed formats that allow logisticians mation support to decision makers across the and tacticians to make decisions and commu entire spectrum of joint-operations planning, nicate them using the same Web-based system. including redeployment of forces, reconstitu the system should allow quick data entries in tion, and in-transit visibility. Combat com put by warriors with minimal training in order manders need comprehensive situational as to speed turnaround times for operational as sessments based on near-real-time information. sessments. Fulfilling these needs will further the current system is simply too outdated and empower our tactical commanders and may clumsy to continue with incremental upgrades well revolutionize the way we prosecute the war to accomplish those goals. on terror. JOPES Planning in the Future. because lo Sufficiently powerful computers may not gistics is so integral to tactical warfare, auto exist today for one system to collect and pro mated tools for tacticians to conduct course- cess the volumes of data needed to plan and of-action analysis must automatically factor in execute global distribution and combat opera distribution. transportation and supply fea tions. that should not stop our military, for it tures should be built into the software, along has accomplished the seemingly impossible with other basic essentials such as tactical before. the US Army built the first modern maps and unit symbols. As tactical courses of computer, named eniac, in 1944 to automate action are contemplated and included in com its artillery fire and bombing tables—an ex puter scenarios, associated logistic units, sup tremely ambitious task in its day. While the ply requirements, and optimum strategic-lift next generation of computers may come estimates should be automatically programmed about as the result of DpO initiatives, the ef as well for each analysis. After a course of ac fort cannot be accomplished without visionary tion is selected, the supported and supporting leadership from the Joint Staff, military ser commands should be given immediate and si vices, and unified commands—especially the multaneous access to take anticipatory actions, Joint Forces Command as the joint deploy including validation and scheduling of lift. ment process owner. this envisioned process should occur within Senior logisticians may serve as a catalyst for JOpeS and must be far more compressed and change throughout the DOD. but since distri user friendly than it is today. tacticians would bution, strategic movements, and operational- be better equipped and more quickly able to level maneuver comprise only part of the joint brief battle plans that include all the strategic, planning and execution system, logisticians operational, and tactical underpinnings, many alone cannot fix the problems with JOpeS of which involve distribution. Decisions could and achieve its full war-fightingpotential. Her be expedited and agility improved at all levels. culean efforts from outside the logistics com JOPES Execution in the Future. moving in munity will be needed before revolutionary formation in near real time has just as much changes in information technology come about. importance as moving cargo and supplies. If the challenges are significant and will not be tacticians are ever to gain visibility over large overcome until cultural changes occur at the unit moves in their entirety, then revolution highest levels of the military. ary change in our information technologies First, senior-level war fighters have to com will be absolutely necessary. If logisticians are mit to revolutionizing information technolo to achieve an agile distribution system to meet gies to better equip the country to fight its
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current battles. Aggressive leaders who em ceive attention from senior personnel who re body the warrior spirit do not naturally gravi act to urgent priorities of the moment. but tate towards computers. but these are the very they also realize that an important project, people most needed to ensure that techni worked for generations but not to fruition, is cians design JOpeS to meet war-fighterneeds. really a hot potato. the history of JOpeS and Air and ground combat officers as well as sur its predecessor systems includes reshuffled face warfare officers are more critical to the proponent responsibilities and mission trans success of a new system than are combat logis fers between commands. ticians. Done correctly, their efforts would Given the significance of these challenges, produce a national asset that would be the the military’s cultural biases, and what is at modern-day equivalent of napoléon crawling stake for the country, JOpeS can only hope around on his campaign-tent floor, totally en for a high-ranking champion to emerge, rec grossed with his maps, working out time- ognize its significance to the nation, lock horns distance calculations as well as war-gaming with the challenge, and ramrod a new product branches and sequels, positioning his forces through the system. that person may well have and resolving sustainment challenges. to be someone from outside the uniformed Second, the needs of individual military military ranks. the fate of revolutionizing mil services have been allowed to subsume the itary logistics, among other things, is closely greater joint interests. For generations, ser tied to the future of JOpeS. Under optimal vice needs, parochialisms, and competing conditions, it would take years to produce the budgetary priorities have thwarted the senior- needed changes. A nation at war needs the leader consensus necessary for fundamental very best tools to prosecute the fight, so we need and profound changes to JOpeS. Strong per to start now, regardless of the risks involved. sonalities have been at play across the board, so even stronger ones are needed to prevail. third, command climates at the highest Resourcing the DPO Mission: echelons of our military have to change. While Reorganization of Staffs extremely dedicated and highly successful of ficers work tirelessly to accomplish assigned and Support Forces missions, they also have the political savvy to the DpO mission requires changes in the protect their reputations. they normally pos organization of logistical commands and staffs. ture themselves so they are not associated with From the command perspective, line units with projects that lack momentum and do not specialized training are needed to perform progress according to schedule. Significant distribution functions and fulfill the theater glitches and unforeseen delays would no doubt commander’s materiel and information require occur during the development and initial ments. From the staff perspective, US Central fielding of a new system the size and magni Command (USCentCOm) is pursuing a new tude of JOpeS. Any concerted effort to bring approach. DpO representatives are colocated it into the twenty-firstcentur y would be fraught with theater staff to provide strategic-level with risk. because failure in the pursuit of ex analyses and advise operational commanders. cellence is not an option on many flag-officer these new capabilities could “reach back” to staffs, the future of JOpeS remains uncertain. the continental United States (COnUS) and Second-order effects from these challenges provide the unity of command needed for create ineffective staff dynamics at high levels. end-to-end distribution. many have heard the old adage about the staff officer who worked a project and then inher CENTCOM Deployment and Distribution ited it again years later upon his return, essen Operations Center tially where he had left off. that’s JOpeS. Ac tion officers understand temporary delays. UStrAnSCOm and USCentCOm organized they know that their efforts cannot always re a new strategic-level staff called the CentCOm
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Deployment Distribution Operations Center questions over command relationships be (CDDOC) and colocated it with the land- tween national-level logistics agencies and the component headquarters at Camp Arifjan, Ku secretary of defense’s intent in regards to the wait.CDDOC personnel are trained, equipped, “DpO.” Ownership implies a high degree of and resourced to conduct strategic-level analyses responsibility to streamline the entire distri using available information technologies such bution system, including supply and materiel as the Global Command and Control System, management. responsibility and authority Joint Flow Analysis System for transportation, should be commensurate, so one would think and Global Decision Support System. they co that command relationships would also evolve ordinate with operational staffs such as Army to ensure unity of effort. materiel Command and the DLA to anticipate the DLA and CFLCC partnered to resolve readiness needs, take corrective action when challenges with the closing of requisitions af shortfalls in supply or transportation occur, ter goods are received in-theater. During the and work quality-of-life issues in-theater. the first six months of Operation Iraqi Freedom, CDDOC has been so successful that similar $1.2 billion worth of requisitions had not been initiatives are being worked in US pacific closed out electronically by line organizations Command and US european Command. even though it was believed that most of the the CDDOC joined with Combined Forces supplies had actually been issued out by for Land Component Command (CFLCC) and the ward distribution points.7 (there is no certainty DLA to provide more reliable and responsive over the accounting for goods since records support to Combined Joint task Force 76 in were not kept in-theater, and the multiple- Afghanistan. At one time, 100 percent of the consignee problem discussed earlier further task force’s sustainment was flown directly from complicated supply discipline.) Until the re the United States to Kabul. this approach was ceipt process was finalized,funds could not be replaced by intratheater air channels and sur transferred from Army accounts to the DLA, face routes through pakistan using the direct- which caused the agency’s cash flow to dry up support warehouses in Kuwait.6 this signifi and threatened its continued operations. Ac cantly reduced shipping time for orders and counts were finallyreimbursed by CFLCC, but achieved more responsive support to the war no permanent fixes have been put in place to fighter. While more effective means of support ensure that tactics, techniques, and procedures also proved more efficient, significant dollar at the strategic level mesh with operations at savings were not the driving force for change. the tactical level. A gap still exists, and it is the the CDDOC spearheaded the “single ticket” DpO’s responsibility to ensure it is closed be initiative to achieve seamless unit movement fore the next campaign in the global war. from origin to final destination. previously, the DLA has assumed an increasingly im onward-movement arrangements were made portant role in executing the general support only after deploying units arrived in-theater. supply mission in USCentCOm. the DLA the CDDOC gained visibility of units prior to has already issued thousands of national-stock their departure from the COnUS, eliminated numbered items in-theater and expanded them transit delays in-theater, and closed the gap be to over 7,000 items by 2006. A robust general- tween strategic and operational transportation. support base drives down customer wait time and provides responsive backup sup Improving Materiel Management and Supply port to the direct support base and war fighter. through proper DLA management, Strategic-level changes being made in the replenishment stocks are ordered well in ad quartermaster field complement DpO efforts vance, and crisis management is avoided. right now, but there is no guarantee that sepa bulk tonnage best suited for surface trans rate commands will always row together to port does not have to be flown in on an close the seams between the strategic, opera emergency basis. these efforts have helped tional, and tactical levels. these changes raise close the gap between the operational realm
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(theater-supply requirements) and the stra chains of command are involved: UStrAnS- tegic realm (transportation-required delivery COm for the strategic, CFLCC for the opera dates). they illustrate that effective support tional, and multi-national Force-Iraq for the can result in huge efficiencies and cost savings. tactical. by combining the strategic and opera tional, no longer would handoffs be necessary Support Forces at congested aerial ports and seaports, which are not ideal locations to transfer onward- new organizations need to be established to exe movement responsibilities. cute the DpO mission. After staffs such as the Deployment and distribution operations CDDOCs provide strategic-level assessments, battalions could also assist the DLA with its military line units with the proper training and emerging general-support base missions. At resources will be needed at key logistics nodes present, the DLA uses contractors to perform to implement those staff recommendations. materiel management and warehousing func AmC is organized to execute inter- and intra- tions. In the future, commercial options may theater airlift missions, as well as operate air not be viable in some hostile regions of the fields for deploying forces, and to maintain world, so provisions need to be made to ade unity of command—even though in some cases quately resource the DLA in-theater to per the command has relinquished operational form what are arguably DpO missions. the control of resources to the theater. but AmC’s permanent assignment of active duty or re ground counterpart, SDDC, does not have serve organizations to the DLA would estab the force structure to accomplish its mode- lish command relationships and training regi operations mission and carry out an expanded mens well in advance of overseas missions. distribution role. SDDC relies heavily upon Since the military’s force structure is unlikely Army reserve units that have already fulfilled to grow in the foreseeable future, senior lead their mobilization commitments specified by ers would have to resolve any controversy the secretary of defense. SDDC’s active Army stirred up by considering reassignment of tac units are stretched thin while engaged in op tical units from force provider commands. erating seaports around the world, even be fore taking on additional end-to-end distri bution responsibilities. Resourcing the DPO Mission: “Deployment and distribution operations” battalions and groups could be organized Information Technology from the current logistics force structure and Computer programs in the US military have manned with personnel trained in transporta been developed independently from one an tion, supply, and information technology. this other and do not tie together. to accomplish new capability could be used in-theater to the DpO mission—as well as other strategic- reach back to major logistics commands in the level missions in the DOD—systems manage United States and ensure that the theater ment and holistic assessments of entire pro commander’s intent is met. Just as AmC moves cesses are needed. If end-to-end distribution is personnel, equipment, and cargo forward to ever to become a reality, it will require inte corps organizations, so can SDDC use these grated software systems. units to execute the surface onward-movement the logistics community needs to place less mission from ports of debarkation to points as emphasis on developing new software systems far forward as corps forward distribution and more on integrating the prolific number points. Such an approach combines strategic of separate programs that currently exist. Lo and operational distribution efforts into one gisticians must work toward a common opera unified whole under one DpO chain of com tional picture that provides the most current mand. this is currently the approach we are status available for all inter- and intratheater using to supply our troops in Afghanistan, and movement and tie it all together. We cannot it has worked well. but in Iraq, three separate afford to continue waiting for a single archi
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tecture to build the common operational pic Conclusion and ture. that panacea has been discussed for de cades and is not likely to materialize anytime Recommendations soon, given the competing military services’ Over the years, tactical-level logistics have priorities and budgets. evolved separately from strategic-level distri In light of these realities, the most practical bution processes. today they are partially un and effective approach—called the “knowl linked. Unity of command must be established edge wall”—is currently being implemented so the DpO can bring strategic, operational, at UStrAnSCOm. task by task and challenge and tactical logistics back into alignment. by challenge, leaders are finding ways to em Only then will they form an integrated whole ploy integration software to pull key data from to serve the needs of forward-deployed units. numerous databases and automatically display Designation of a single process owner for dis the most currently accessible information. ex tribution was a signal from senior civilian lead isting programs are linked together to gener ers that significant changes needed to be made ate charts templated with key management- in large-scale logistical operations. to carry out information fields that are automatically its DpO responsibilities, UStrAnSCOm will updated as new data enters the database. the need a forward-staff presence in-theater to con intent is to build charts as exportable pack duct strategic-level assessments and provide dis ages for use in the field by war fighters. While tribution options to the combat commanders. the DpO uses the knowledge wall to monitor the health of the distribution system, other UStrAnSCOm must partner with the services, commands will be able to use these same ex unified commands, and DLA to reorganize staffs portable products to make operational deci and create line units from existing force struc sions. UStrAnSCOm uses Single mobility ture. JOpeS must be fixed to better enable fun System software to accomplish integration damental changes to military logistics and other functions, and the command is focused on ca war-fighting systems. Information technologies pabilities rather than promoting specific soft with outdated architectures should be replaced. ware programs. the remaining logistical programs should also the goal is to eventually build briefing be cobbled together to create a common operat charts with drill-down capabilities to make ing picture and gain near-real-time assessments them usable at all levels of a staff. they display of personnel, equipment, and supplies in the a full array of information: manifests for air logistics pipeline. Command relationships need craft en route and vessels under way, equip to be examined and possibly realigned so that ment or supplies currently in the strategic or DpO responsibilities are commensurate with theater pipelines, and cumulative supplies DpO authority. moved into the theater. the DpO presents a new paradigm for the Ideally, the standard for the manual input logistics community. First, tying strategic and ting of logistics data should be “one time at operational logistics together into a coherent, the point of origin,” which later saves countless end-to-end whole is the key to effective distri hours of work and increases responsiveness of bution. to measure progress, we must adopt the distribution system. If the knowledge-wall new effects-based metrics that accommodate a approach is adopted throughout the logistics systems approach to logistics. Second, logisti community, the consequent linking of increas cians at all levels will have to remain focused ing numbers of databases will reduce manual on tactical warfare and be willing to let go of inputs. eventually, senior leaders should ban peacetime efficiencies for the sake of wartime service-centric programs that might be adver effectiveness. bold leadership is needed to tised as supporting joint systems but that actu achieve results, build trust in the distribution ally serve immediate and narrowly focused in process, and revolutionize our logistical pro terests. the greater joint-distribution interests cesses to support future campaigns in the war must take precedence. on terrorism. •
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Notes 1. Joint publication ( Jp) 1-02, Department of Defense within theaters or other operational areas. Activities at Dictionary of Military and Associated Terms, 12 April 2001 (as this level link tactics and strategy by establishing op amended through 5 January 2007), http://www.dtic.mil/ erational objectives needed to achieve the strategic doctrine/jel/new_pubs/jp1_02.pdf, defines tactical level objectives, sequencing events to achieve the operational of war as “the level of war at which battles and engage objectives, initiating actions, and applying resources ments are planned and executed to achieve military ob to bring about and sustain these events. . . . jectives assigned to tactical units or task forces. Activities at this level focus on the ordered arrangement and ma strategic level of war — the level of war at which a neuver of combat elements in relation to each other and nation, often as a member of a group of nations, deter to the enemy to achieve combat objectives.” mines national or multinational (alliance or coalition) 2. the distribution pipeline and supply chain man strategic security objectives and guidance, and develops agement are two different concepts. the distribution and uses national resources to achieve these objectives. pipeline is a portion of overall supply chain management. Activities at this level establish national and multi this article focuses primarily upon the distribution pipe national military objectives; sequence initiatives; de line, but the subject cannot be discussed in isolation from fine limits and assess risks for the use of military and supply chain management. they are interrelated and af other instruments of national power; develop global fect each other’s efficiencies. the responsibilities of the plans or theater war plans to achieve those objectives; DpO do not include many aspects of supply chain man and provide military forces and other capabilities in agement performed by the services, such as forecasting, accordance with strategic plans. levels computation, and stockage policies. Logistics, 4. tim Kauffman, “DoD told to Shape Up: Omb and supply chain management, and resource provision do not Congress Order Overdue management Fixes,” Federal equal the distribution pipeline or pipeline management. Times, 9 may 2005, 1. Jp 1-02, Department of Defense Dictionary, provides the fol 5. blue force trackers enable ground troops to com lowing definitions: municate using text messaging and track friendly/enemy distribution pipeline — Continuum or channel through forces. trackers are designed to increase combat effec which the Department of Defense conducts distribu tiveness and reduce friendly-fire incidents. Combat iden tion operations. the distribution pipeline represents tificationpanels (CIp) are affixedto tracked and wheeled the end-to-end flowof resources from supplier to con vehicles to identify them as friendly forces. they are 1/8" sumer and, in some cases, back to the supplier in retro thick by 24" high by 30" long and are composed of low- grade activities. . . . emissivity thermal tape. CIps are attached flat against ve hicle sides and top decks, so when gunners view them logistics — the science of planning and carrying out through thermal sensors, they see a contrasting cold spot the movement and maintenance of forces. . . . against the hotter surface of the vehicle. 6. these warehouses are stocked with supplies that supply chain management — A cross-functional ap are shipped overseas using strategic sealift instead of ex proach to procuring, producing, and delivering prod pensive airlift. As of June 2005, these initiatives and others ucts and services to customers. the broad manage have reduced the cumulative averages of DOD cargo ment scope includes subsuppliers, suppliers, internal moved by air to the USCentCOm area of operations information, and funds flow. from 18 percent since 9/11 to 13 percent since October 3. Jp 1-02, Department of Defense Dictionary, provides the 2003. Author’s personal papers—documentation of his ser following definitions: vice as chief, Joint Operations Division, UStrAnSCOm, Scott AFb, IL, August–December 2004. operational level of war — the level of war at which 7. Author’s personal papers—documentation of his campaigns and major operations are planned, con service as the deputy C4, CFLCC, Camp Arifjan, Kuwait, ducted, and sustained to achieve strategic objectives August 2003–August 2004.
Smith.indd 99 4/27/07 11:02:07 AM A Model for Managing Decision- Making Information in the GIG-Enabled Battlespace
Maj SaMuel D. BaSS, uSaF Maj RuSty O. BalDwin, PhD, uSaF, RetiReD
Editorial Abstract: The Defense Department is transforming information-technology systems into a Global Information Grid (GIG) that will connect sensors to weap ons systems and provide unprecedented situational awareness. The authors sug gest that if not properly implemented, the GIG may overwhelm war fighters with information presented at the wrong time, at the wrong level of detail, and without proper analysis. This article proposes a model to direct the flowof information in the GIG.
heDeparTmenTofDefense(DOD) analysis and interpretation. This article pro is in the midst of transforming its vast poses a model to prevent this situation by di collection of information-technology recting the flow of information based on its systemsintoaninterconnectedGlobal classification level, integrity, and relevance to TInformation Grid (GIG), which will ultimately the end user. connect sensors to weapons systems, enable personnel to share information at will, and provide unprecedented levels of situational The Global Information Grid awareness to commanders at all levels. how In response to increasing difficultiesassoci ever, if we do not implement the GIG with a ated with sharing information between vari proper level of restriction on the flowof infor ous platforms and information systems operat mation, war fighters risk being overwhelmed ing in the joint environment, the DOD created not only by too much information but also by the concept of the GIG.1 DOD policy defines information presented at the wrong time, at this grid as “a globally interconnected, end-to the wrong level of detail, and without proper end set of information capabilities, associated
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processes, and personnel for collecting, pro cause of the display’s ability to divert viewers’ cessing, storing, disseminating and managing full attention away from their primary duties.5 information on demand to warfighters,policy The frequently asked question concerning makers, and support personnel.”2 established what shows on the displays and who has re GIG policies also implement key components sponsibility for the content raises an even of the Clinger-Cohen Information Technology broader and more important question about management reform act of 1996, including the future GIG-enabled command center: how information security, revised acquisition strate will we manage all of the data available on all gies, and best practices for handling data at all of the interconnected platforms? levels of the DOD.3 although many of the ef although the GIG’s influenceon the devel forts in developing the GIG might simply en opment and acquisition of weapons systems is tail the application of the DOD’s best practices evident in requirements for common data in acquisitions to the still-maturing fieldof in standards and supported communications pro formation technology, the goal of achieving tocols, the military services are actively devel information superiority remains paramount— oping ways to inject network technology every the primary objective of the overall GIG effort. where. army projects such as Future Force Connecting personnel and equipment with Warrior will provide each soldier with a com advanced information-sharing tools will likely plex array of networked information sensors revolutionize our capabilities, but we must and displays, reminiscent of the gear worn by carefully manage the quality and volume of the futuristic space marines in the science- 6 information presented to the war fighters of fiction movie Aliens. One scene in that movie tomorrow. depicts a frighteningly realistic scenario in which the team commander watches health monitors go silent as each member falls and The Sand Table the confusion of battle grinds his decision- making ability to a halt. Several years later, For centuries, military commanders have real commanders orbiting in Black hawk heli used various models to understand the battle- copters over Somalia tried to command a res space. In the seventeenth century, campaign cue convoy through a decaying urban environ planners used intricate, craftsmen-built scale ment. The communications delay between the models of fortifications to analyze points of airborne command post and the trucks intro 4 vulnerability and routes of attack. In the field, duced chaos significant enough to confuse the leaders have long used sticks and stones in the convoy, effectively driving it into a dead end.7 sand to rehearse maneuvers and depict unit Future systems must be able to create a timely locations and terrain. aircraft and antiaircraft flowof critical information in both directions, technology increased the complexity of the and we need to establish processes to help us “sand table” by adding important air compo manage and respond to that flow effectively. nents to the planning process. new technology Because of the rapidly increasing volume of used in Operation Desert Storm provided available information, numerous research proj commanders and bomb-damage analysts a live ects now under way seek to design virtual envi view from the cockpit and, in many cases, from ronments that integrate, analyze, and display the weapons themselves as they flew into tar every piece of information in an immersive, gets. Today, command centers of all levels are four-dimensional battlespace, where mission equipped with large data walls, on which in planners and commanders can manipulate teresting computer or video feeds provide a time and perspective to suit their needs.8 One constant flow of data. Live video from re can easily imagine the demands placed on motely piloted predator aircraft feeds into air commanders trying to conduct a war from in and space operations centers, giving com side a virtual, real-time sand table with data manders and intelligence analysts what some from thousands of sources pouring in at in people call “predator Crack” or “Kill TV” be credible rates. additionally, the GIG notion
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ally gives personnel anywhere in the battle- data diverts focus from the broader picture. space the ability to have similar representations Similar scenarios could illustrate how a tactical streamed to their locations by various means. unit on the ground might see data intended an obvious hazard of this capability—beyond only for a strategic view; any changes to the information overload—is the danger of com actions of that tactical unit might eliminate a manders making tactical decisions based on key component of a strategic plan. We assert data intended for a strategic perspective and that such an inverted perspective constitutes a war fighterson the ground adjusting their tac very real hazard of information that might ex tics based on information intended only for ist in a GIG-enhanced battlefield. strategic planners. In an ideal environment, we would deploy thousands if not millions of sensors across the battlespace to collect climate, audio, video, The Problem of Inverted and electromagnetic signal data. additionally, Perspectives airborne command and control (C2) assets would compose an integrated picture of the as prescribed in joint doctrine, planners battlespace. Current processes and tools such design operations to follow the principles of as air tasking orders help deconflict the air war, which include surprise, simplicity, security, space, but some operations conducted on the and unity of command.9 numerous historical ground or at sea might not be coordinated examples illustrate how friendly or hostile knowl with all components. a robust sensor net would edge of certain components of plans drasti provide a bridge between these dissimilar cally altered the results of those plans. Still components of the battlespace to help pre others demonstrate that reaction or failure to vent incidents of friendly fire,but the compos respond to evolving circumstances has a dras ite picture would likely not have relevance to tic impact on the operation and effectiveness some war fighters. In total, the amount of in of the leadership involved. rather than ex formation collected will be immense, and the plore the success and failure of operations details of the battlespace available for display with respect to the principles of war, we should will prove tempting to war fightersand leaders consider the implications of operating a GIG- at all levels. GIG-enhanced aircraft will have enhanced command center of the future. access to a vast store of information. however, For example, a suite of sensors programmed with this comes the possibility that unprocessed to detect personnel and vehicle movement sensor data might make its way into the cock could collect and report status for display on a pit, forcing pilots with increased sensitivity to command center’s data wall, indicating ma collateral damage and escalation to change neuver by an unknown unit. If we can attribute tactics, select alternate targets, or abort the this maneuver to a friendly special-operations engagement. mission planned and executed in secrecy, we Ground units would need time to analyze should restrict access to this sensor data at the the data from sensors detecting a nearby fire- same classification level of the mission and fightbefore determining the location of units not automatically display it on a data wall for in the area and perhaps requesting additional viewing by personnel without an appropriate airborne or spaceborne surveillance. Those clearance. Conversely, if a similar sensor suite units not aware of friendly forces in covert op detected the footsteps of an individual in a re erations could alter their tactics or maneuver stricted area, we should present the data col in response to indications of a nearby fire- lected by this sensor (probably not displayed fight—particularly if sensors indicated activity on the same data wall) only to appropriate se in a unit’s area of responsibility. hopefully, all curity personnel. Commanders directing their parties in that area would have already re attention to an unprocessed data point like ceived briefingson operations to an appropri this could experience an inverted perspective, ate level of detail, but any GIG-enhanced ca whereby a single piece of potentially irrelevant pabilities for examining additional sensor data
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could affect the commander on the ground in sources to prevent users from seeing informa a number of ways—hence the need for clear tion not cleared for their consumption. Thus rules for using this data in order to avoid in far, however, we have addressed only the verted perspectives. proper treatment of data with respect to con One could present any number of examples fidentiality. The integrity or trustworthiness of demonstrating avoidance of inverted perspec the data is also of prime importance, particu tives by limiting exposure of data in the GIG, larly in urban areas, where we have a great and still more examples could illustrate that need for very accurate and timely data and, any restrictions on information flow could re therefore, a need to evaluate raw data rapidly duce flexibility. Considering both sides of this and prepare it for presentation to leadership. argument, we assert that we should place lim normal data-classification techniques do not its on the places that automatically receive data classify information based on its integrity, so we as well as on the people authorized to access need to explore a method to help categorize it. We must also consider that some plat data that could cause an inverted-perspective forms—as William T. hobbins, a lieutenant hazard in a GIG-enhanced picture of the general at the time, indicated during an inter battlefield, whether it is unprocessed remote- view with Airman Magazine—will produce data sensor data or imagery not yet evaluated by at different rates while operators in varying intelligence personnel. roles will consume data feeds at different rates, thus adding more considerations for a poten tial solution.10 Clearly, this paints an amazingly Biba’s Integrity Model complex picture with fuzzy and continuously evolving operational requirements. While working on an air Force computer- security research project in 1977, K. J. Biba wrote what has since become the seminal pa Current Management of per on information integrity.11 In it, he exam Information Flow ined a method for maintaining the validity of data on information-processing systems, choos We are all familiar with the classification ing to use the concept of integrity as a measure levels definedby the national Security agency. of information’s validity. That is, information Only users holding a secret or higher clear from a known, trustworthy source would have ance and having a need to know can read data high integrity, while information based on ru protected by a secret classification level. Simi mor or from unknown sources would have low larly, readers with a high classification level integrity. Similarly, password-protected infor can normally read any material at or below mation stored in electronic form would have that level, assuming they have a need to know. In a conceptual, GIG-enabled virtual com higher integrity than data available for read mand center, we could classify information ing or editing without any access controls at specificto a sensitive operation at a sufficiently all. If we extrapolated this concept for applica high level to prevent those who hold lower- tion to our GIG-enhanced command center, level classifications from reading the data. the integrity of the reader—that is, the read Furthermore, we could reserve display of data er’s response to data—is influenced by the in relevant to those classifiedoperations for indi formation consumed. new and startling infor viduals with the required need to know. addi mation will affect the reader’s behavior to tionally, we must assure that data on a com varying degrees, based on the integrity of the mand center’s displays remains at the lowest source of that data. For example, a commander clearance level of personnel with access to might decide to take some risks after reading those displays. information from a reliable source but not do Using a well-disciplined approach, we could so in reaction to the same information from properly secure or sanitize data from all an unreliable source. Similarly, one should not
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interpret a report that included a data point In plain terms, rule one means that a sub from a low-integrity source as factual. ject can read an object only if the data will not In the strict formulation of Biba’s integrity have a deceptive or misleading effect on the model, three rules apply to reading, writing, reader. In our command center, we would not or acting upon information from sources of normally present data (an object) to the com various integrity levels. This model refers to mander (a subject) unless the data had under things that can create and consume data as gone proper vetting using prudent processes. subjects and to products produced as objects. rule two means that some data source of a The rules rely on the notion of dominance, lower integrity level can’t inject information which implies some sort of permission granted that one might interpret as accurate or valid. to the dominant over the subordinate, whether again using our command center example, that permission involves reading, accessing, or we would not display raw data on the data wall in some way modifying something. Using se until we have validated it, much like we would curity clearances to demonstrate dominance, not present the actions of a unit to the com Biba shows that one object dominates another mander as confirmed results until we have when its security clearance level is the same as conducted proper battle damage assessment or higher than that of the other object. For or a mission debriefing.r ule three would pre example, a secret clearance dominates secret vent unnecessary reaction to deceptive acts or or unclassified clearances, while top secret preprocessed data from sensors, which could dominates top secret, secret, and unclassified prove useful in avoiding inverted perspectives. clearance levels. When a subject dominates an Together, these rules address some of the object, the subject can read the object. If the concerns we have explored so far with respect subject does not dominate the object, the sub to unprocessed sensor data. Therefore, it seems ject cannot read the object, just as someone reasonable that application of the Biba integ with a secret clearance cannot read a top-secret rity model to a notional command center can document but can read secret or unclassified form the basis of a system implemented to help documents. Biba uses the concept of integrity prevent inverted perspectives. This model and the rule of dominance to determine ac could assist in defining specific requirements cess controls in his computer-security re for automatically filtering information and search. The three integrity-preserving rules controlling access, but commander flexibility from Biba’s integrity model are as follows: and the ability to share information would ex perience necessary limitations to some de 1. a subject can read an object if and only if gree. Joint doctrine emphasizes information the object’s integrity level dominates (is dissemination as a key component of intelli greater than or equal to) the subject’s in gence support: “Intelligence will play a critical tegrity level. That is, a subject can only and continuous role in supporting warfight read objects with equal or higher integrity. ing. advances in computer processing, precise 2. a subject can write data into an object if global positioning, and telecommunications and only if the subject’s integrity level will provide joint force commanders . . . with dominates the object’s integrity level. the capability to determine accurate locations Since the subject must have integrity at of friendly and enemy forces, as well as to col lect, process, and disseminate relevant data to least as high as the object, the object’s 13 integrity is preserved. thousands of locations.” a key point entails the use of the word rele 3. a subject can execute (or direct the ac vant to describe the dissemination of data. tion of) another subject if and only if Further discussion in doctrine defines this term the first subject’s integrity level domi as a key attribute of intelligence that describes nates the second subject’s integrity level. the scope of intelligence gathering and sharing Someone of lower integrity cannot oper efforts; moreover, it delineates who needs spe ate on someone else’s behalf.12 cific pieces of information and, more impor
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tantly, who shouldn’t be distracted by irrele are referred to as subjects, while the docu vant data.14 Therefore, a model that combines ments or virtual products produced are re the DOD’s traditional classificationlevels with ferred to as objects. Our information-sharing data integrity and relevance holds the key to mechanism assigns three ratings to every sub formulating policy for data-sharing mechanisms ject and object: classification, relevance, and developed for future command centers. integrity. Suppose the classificationlevels for subjects Classification, Integrity, and objects are unclassified, for official use only, secret, or top secret. For simplicity’s sake, our and Relevance model will not address clearance caveats or The war fighter’s need for relevant and ac clearances for personnel from other countries, curate information is thoroughly understood but we could readily incorporate them. The and well defined in doctrine and operational relevance and integrity levels of subjects and art, but defining the scope, sources, and for objects will be low, medium, or high. personnel mat of the data would require continuously classification levels normally do not change over updating vast amounts of information. efforts time, but personnel can induce and experi to build systems that provide data in predefined ence changes in integrity levels and will pro formats or follow predefined message-sharing duce objects of varying relevance levels. Simi rules normally result in products difficult to larly, documents and processing systems often integrate or expensive to update. To avoid the have the same ratings as their content or inputs. problems of updating systems to keep pace For our command center, we propose the fol with continually evolving technologies, we pro lowing rules, which govern all information- pose to control information flow using a data- sharing transactions and which we enumerate sharing mechanism based on classification, below prior to discussing their implications in integrity, and relevance. The following sum the next section: marizes our definitions so far: 1. a subject can read or process an object • classification: a rating assigned to infor mation in order to provide appropriate if and only if the subject’s classification protection and restrict access level dominates the object’s classifica tion level. • integrity: a measure of a subject’s or ob ject’s trustworthiness 2. Initially, all trusted subjects have a high integrity rating, and all subjects and ob • relevance: a measure of applicability to a jects are assigned appropriate classifica purpose or a customer tion ratings. all untrusted subjects have • dominance: the condition in effect when a low integrity rating. one entity has the same or higher rating 3. The integrity level of a subject or object can as another be raised only through a well-controlled Our information-sharing mechanism must process. enable meaningful and adaptive information- sharing capabilities within a command center. 4. When a subject creates an object, the Consider such a center staffed with personnel created object will have an integrity level of varying clearances and areas of functional equal to the subject that created it, or if expertise, similar to other command centers the newly created object contains infor such as wing command posts, expeditionary mation from other subjects or objects, operations centers, or air and space operations in full or in part, the new object will have centers. as in Biba’s model, both personnel the lowest integrity level of the compo and systems can create and consume data and nent information.
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5. The relevance level of a subject or object poor information source could compromise is determined through another well- the entire scheme. controlled process. rule four requires that personnel or sys tems creating information attribute the source 6. If a subject reads an object of a lower in accordingly and properly mark data at the ap tegrity level, the subject’s integrity level propriate integrity level. Doing so will ensure will take on the object’s lower integrity that a receiver places the suitable level of trust level. The subject can return to its previ or skepticism on the information. new infor ous integrity level only in accordance mation compiled from multiple sources will with the process defined in rule three. not automatically assume the integrity level of 7. a subject can process and then manually the subject compiling the information; in or automatically forward an object to an stead, the integrity level of the new object will other subject only if the forwarded ob reflect the lowest such level of the compiled ject dominates the receiving subject’s information until application of the process integrity and relevance levels and if the defined in rule three. receiving subject’s classification level The process suggested by rule five can be dominates the object’s classification.15 more flexiblethan that in rule three, depend ing on the role of the receiving subject. For example, a tactical ground unit would have a Rule Analysis and Clarification much smaller “sphere of relevance” than would a C2 aircraft orbiting over an area of rule one ensures observation of the funda responsibility. The ground unit would typi mental requirements of need to know, secu cally be interested in information about an rity, and proper access-control mechanisms. opponent’s nearby ground forces, in-range ar rule two ensures that personnel and tillery units, or status of aircraft flyingclose air information-processing systems can share in support, but not in mission tracks of long- formation following our basic rules. Trusted range friendly aircraft, threats from enemy air subjects include sources trusted in a wide con defenses, or air-refueling tracks. however, the text, whether that involves coalition partners; C2 aircraft might want to display locations of our own personnel- and information-processing friendly ground forces in the area of a specific systems and equipment; and intelligence, sur operation. Some process must define an ap veillance, and reconnaissance resources. Un propriate sphere of relevance for each subject, trusted subjects include those systems and based on mission needs. at the operational personnel not under the command center’s level, each subject should also be able to cus control, possibly including subjects such as tomize its sphere of relevance to assure the ad the domestic and international media, infor dition of data of interest or the removal of in mants, or any source of questionable origin. formation deemed no longer pertinent. rule three dictates establishment of a for rule six prohibits the forwarding of any mal process to change the integrity level of a low-integrity information as higher-integrity subject or object. The intelligence community information without proper analysis and con uses similar procedures to mark the level of sideration. Similarly, personnel who read low- trust in an intelligence resource; multiple integrity information must be careful not to sources of lower integrity levels could provide make decisions or pass on the information enough corroboration to support raising the without putting it into proper context. This integrity level of a subject or object, but the particular rule is more difficult to implement process of doing so should be well understood for personnel than for data-processing equip and performed by a designated entity. This ment. For example, one could interpret a sys process will obviously represent one of the tem’s report of erratic and illogical readings most important components of this model from a sensor as a malfunction; additionally, since improperly raising integrity levels of a one could include the appropriate caveats
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with low-integrity data added to a report. how to interpret data and make changes to integrity ever, when the subject is a person rather than and relevance levels, based on that interpreta an automated system, preventing him or her tion. Intelligence and operations personnel from acting on or up-channeling information will normally be in the best position to change without regard for its lower integrity will pres these levels, depending on the specificsof the ent a problem. situation. In order to enforce both rules, per rule seven ensures the proper filtering of sonnel must have a good understanding of the information in accordance with integrity and processes and must properly restrict mechanisms relevance rules. a tactical display is useless if it that effect changes to integrity and relevance. exhibits irrelevant or misleading information at the wrong time, and unprocessed or incom plete data could cause premature or incorrect Conclusion decisions. The final caveat guarantees that Clearly, we operate in a politically complex sensitive operations are not compromised— environment, and many operations occur in data must undergo sanitizing or proper de the focal point of a 24-hour news cycle. missed classification before transmission to subjects opportunities to engage high-value targets not involved in the operation. In effect, this and incidents of collateral damage have equal rule provides the “push and pull”—prevent probability of becoming headlines; both can ing information overload from unneeded au raise questions about our military effective tomated pushes while preserving flexibility ness. as a result, a commander’s appetite for for pulling useful data. information will continue to grow, as will de mands that future systems be interconnected Back in the Command Center via the GIG. Our efficiency and ability to rap idly fuse, analyze, and convert raw data into In order to implement these rules in a com actionable intelligence will depend on the ca mand center, we need to completely automate pabilities of future systems and the processes some processes, let personnel in various ca that govern their implementation. We believe reer fields or leadership positions handle the that the classification, integrity, and relevance others exclusively, and see that both systems rules described above will help guide the and personnel implement several rules. after development of systems for maximizing the transfer of objects to paper form, tradi data fusion and avoid the pitfalls of condi tional processes such as classification controls tions such as inverted perspectives. Because and need-to-know restrictions become person of the benefits associated with these rules, nel responsibilities, while various mechanisms we need to utilize a simulated command can restrict the flow of digital information. center and information-processing systems rules three and five,however , require humans to develop them significantly. •
Notes 1. Deputy Secretary of Defense memorandum, DOD 3. Clinger-Cohen Information Technology Management Reform Chief Information Officer (CIO) Guidance and Policy Memoran Act of 1996, 40 US Code 1424, 104th Cong., 2d sess., 3 January dum (G&PM) No. 11-8450: Department of Defense (DoD) Global 1996, http://www.cio.gov/Documents/it_management Information Grid (GIG) Computing, 6 april 2001, http://www _reform_act_Feb_1996.html. 4. See, for example, musée des plans-reliefs national .dtic.mil/whs/directives/corres/memos/gigmemo.pdf. monument, http://www.monum.fr/visitez/decouvrir/fiche 2. Department of Defense Directive (DODD) 8100.1, .dml?id=102&lang=en. Global Information Grid (GIG) Overarching Policy, 19 Septem 5. personal experience of major Bass. ber 2002, 8, http://www.dtic.mil/whs/directives/corres/ 6. US army Future Combat Systems, http://www.army pdf/810001_091902/810001p.pdf. .mil/fcs.
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7. mark Bowden, Black Hawk Down: A Story of Modern 11. matthew Bishop, Computer Security: Art and Science War (new York: atlantic monthly press, 1999), 136–37, (Boston: addison-Wesley, 2003), 153. 148–51, 193. 12. K. J. Biba, Integrity Considerations for Secure Computer 8. house, Statement of Mr. James B. Engle, Deputy Assis Systems, Technical report eSD-Tr-76-372 (Bedford, ma: tant Secretary of the Air Force (Science, Technology and Engineer USaF electronic Systems Division, april 1977), 33. ing), to the House Science Committee on Air Force Information 13. Jp 2-0, Doctrine for Intelligence Support to Joint Opera Technology Program, 107th Cong., 2d sess., June 2002, tions, 9 march 2000, I-1, http://www.dtic.mil/doctrine/ http://gop.science.house.gov/hearings/full02/jun24/ jel/new_pubs/jp2_0.pdf. engle.htm. 14. Ibid., II-15. 9. Joint publication ( Jp) 3-0, Joint Operations, 17 Sep 15. Steven B. Lipner, “non-Discretionary Controls for tember 2006, II-2, http://www.dtic.mil/doctrine/jel/new Commercial applications,” in Proceedings of the 1982 IEEE _pubs/jp3_0.pdf. Symposium on Privacy and Security (Oakland, Ca: Institute of 10. John a. Tirpak, “The network Way of War,” Air electrical and electronics engineers, april 1982), 2–10. man Magazine, march 2005, 26–31, http://www.afa.org/ magazine/march2005/0305network.pdf.
We stand ready to conduct a large-scale, long-duration ir regular warfare campaign as an integral part of the Joint Team, to include counterinsurgency, security, stability, tran sition and reconstruction operations. —2007 U.S. Air Force Posture Statement
Bass Baldwin.indd 108 4/27/07 11:00:29 AM What Difference Can You Make?
CMSgt John P. hearn, USaF, retired*
ir ForCE SuPErviSorS commonly reward their subordinates for out standing performance. The decora tions they bestow represent tangible expressionsA of gratitude. oftentimes, however, supervisors never realize the effect they have had on their subordinates. The finestcompliment i ever received came from one of my former subordinates. When i supervised him, he was an Airman first class; now he’s a senior master sergeant. He once told me that, had it not been for me, he would have left the Air Force to become a civilian. i did not save his life in a moment of glory; on the contrary, i had several interesting talks first class who had processed with him concerning his demeanor and his thousands of candidates— s l o w l y methods for communicating with other Air slid the black, notched block across the men of varying ranks. As a law-enforcement measuring arm, stopping the block when desk sergeant, he frequently had opportunities the point of the arm had centered itself: to excel when conversing with other people “one hundred and fifteen pounds, Sir,” he on base. Since we were stationed together dur said. The doctor, a major, annotated a check ing a “short tour” in Korea, i had only a few list on the candidate’s medical record and months to interact with him before he was re commented, “You’re not going to make it, assigned. Years later, he told me how i had in kid. The minimum required weight for ad fluenced his life—that i had inspired him by mission to the academy is 120 pounds. You my example. What a feeling! in essence, i suc have to meet that standard when you weigh ceeded at one of the jobs the Air Force paid out at the end of the week.” Devastated at me to do because part of a leader’s job involves this news, the young man thought of his fa developing subordinates to be future leaders. ther, who had enlisted in the Army and At times a person’s actions influence the served throughout World War ii, winning a Air Force’s mission far beyond the demands commission and finally retiring as a colonel. of his or her job description. For example, His father had high expectations for him late in the spring of 1957 on the first day of and had expended a great deal of effort to candidate-prescreening orientation, a young win his appointment to the academy. How man stood on a scale at the Air Force Academy could he tell him of his failure to meet ad clinic. The medical technician—an Airman mission standards?
* Prior to his retirement on 1 April 2007, the author served as superintendent of the 96th Security Forces Squadron (Air Force Materiel Command), Eglin AFB, Florida.
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Seeing the despair in the young man’s eyes, “Sir, would you do me a favor and weigh the technician told him to wait outside the of that last candidate one more time?” fice;he came to see him when the doctor took “i already marked him as a failure. He a break: “Listen to me. Go over to the chow didn’t make the weight.” hall and see the mess sergeant. Tell him i sent But the technician persisted, so the doctor you, and tell him about the problem you have; agreed to his request. As the candidate once he’ll take care of you.” more stood on the scale, the technician slid At the academy’s dining facility, the mess the weighted block across the measuring arm sergeant—overweight, unshaven, and inarticu until the pointer centered itself. late—patiently listened to the candidate’s “one hundred and twenty pounds, Sir.” plight and said, “okay kid, you just eat what “You’re very lucky, young man. You just ever i put on your plate.” over the next week, barely made it.” the sergeant made a point of fillingthe young Having said that, the doctor made a new man’s plate with pasta, fats, bananas, and car mark on the record and placed the candidate’s bohydrates—food that, in today’s Air Force, file in the basket marked “ACCEPTED.” would give a dietary technician a coronary. Al The candidate graduated 12th in his class though the candidate stuffed himself at every in 1961, and throughout his illustrious 33-year meal, the intense physical activities packed into career, he flew F-4 Phantom ii aircraft over the orientation program prevented him from the triple-canopied jungles of Southeast Asia gaining weight. By week’s end, the young man in support of infantry soldiers far below. re lay in bed contemplating his future and worry turning to the States, he served in a variety of ing about the next day’s outprocessing physical. posts during the following years, including Just before lunch, the candidate entered choice assignments at the Pentagon. in addi the doctor’s office for his weigh-out. Earlier tion to fighters, he also flew training aircraft, he had weighed himself, happily seeing that C-141 transports, and, later, B-52 bombers. He he was up to 120 pounds. Now, however, at the became a wing commander and was promoted clinic he heard the technician announce, to general. on one memorable inspection at a “one hundred and eighteen pounds, Sir.” northern-tier base, as commanding general The doctor made his final mark on the candi for Strategic Air Command’s (SAC) inspector- date’s medical record and turned his gaze upon general teams, he got out of his aircraft and him: “See, kid, i told you that you wouldn’t asked for a vehicle, as was his custom. The wing make it.” He then tossed the record into the commander handed him an agenda for his visit, wastebasket. in his anguish, the young man but the general had his own agenda. Without explained, “i had to do my final physical fit the usual entourage, he drove along the flight ness exercises and the run this morning. i lost line and stopped by an aircraft that an Airman weight doing that.” The technician followed was servicing. Stepping out of the car into the him into the hall and handed him a quarter: freezing wind, the general asked the Airman “Go down the hall, and buy a carton of choco how he could service the aircraft wearing late milk.” Puzzled, the candidate asked him, heavy arctic mittens. “it’s not very easy, Sir, but “Why do you want a carton of milk now?” it’s so cold out here that if i touch the metal “it’s not for me; it’s for you.” with my bare hands, my skin will freeze to it.” “Don’t be ridiculous. i’m not thirsty right The general then radioed his inspection team now.” to rendezvous back at his aircraft; they would The technician stared at the candidate as a inspect some other base farther south instead. parent would when disciplining a wayward The wing commander told him he could not child: “Listen, Mister, a carton of chocolate do that. Smiling, the general said, “Colonel, milk is one quart and weighs just over two it’s not safe out here to work on aircraft. i’ll pounds.” After the young man returned with come back at another time when weather con the milk, the technician watched him drink it ditions are better. Meanwhile, if you disagree all down and then approached the doctor: with my decision, call General Davis at Head
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another as well as the benefits that accrue from that person’s influence. The general would be the first to say that, had it not been for the concern and considera tion shown him by two enlisted members back in 1957, he never would have had either the opportunity or authority to help the enlisted force. His successes not only benefited Air Force members but also favorably affected the Gen George L. forces of our sister services and NATo allies. Butler began his The young medical technician and the mess Air Force career sergeant may never know just how important a in 1961, retiring in 1994. contribution they made to the defense of our nation. They will never receive a medal or quarters SAC and tell him.” With that, the in plaque to commemorate what they did for the spection team departed. Air Force. if the candidate whom they helped During the general’s tenure at the Penta later saved a life in vietnam, those two enlisted gon, some members of the East German mili members also had a hand in saving that life. if tary who were inspecting a site in the Warsaw the policies and procedures the candidate Pact area killed an Army major. The general eventually developed to deal with a nuclear- received a tasking to write a policy directive armed opponent prevented misunderstand detailing procedures for notifying Warsaw Pact ings and, possibly, a nuclear incident, then forces of all future inspection requirements. those men also helped make the world a safer These procedures also applied to Soviet-bloc place. if the general-to-be opened base hous forces when they conducted inspections of in ing for junior enlisted members to soften the stallations in the North Atlantic Treaty orga economic burden of raising a family, then nization (NATo). in a formal ceremony, the those two men deserve some of the gratitude chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff and his of those personnel. Soviet counterpart approved and signed the We all know that combining hydrogen and general’s policy directive. oxygen produces water, but not everyone one of the greatest moments in the general’s knows that it takes a catalyst to join those two career occurred when he became SAC’s com elements. in this story, many people may know batant commander—its last commander, as a about General Butler and his accomplish matter of fact. He also orchestrated the stand- ments, the results of his actions, and the way up of uS Strategic Command after the col some people have benefited from those ac lapse of the Soviet union and the inactivation tions. However, very few of them know that of SAC, Military Airlift Command, and Tactical none of the general’s accomplishments could Air Command. During his stay at offutt AFB, have occurred without the efforts of two en Nebraska, he worked tirelessly to improve liv listed members, acting as catalysts, who went ing conditions of personnel who lived on and out of their way to help someone else. The off base and to upgrade offutt’s fitnesscenter . general tried unsuccessfully throughout his in short, he was a leader who took care of the career to find those two caring men so he people who took care of the mission. i’ve men could thank them. i hope that the readers of tioned only a few of his accomplishments in a this journal can now appreciate them as well very productive career that spanned more as the countless others who silently make dif than three decades. But this account not only ferences in our lives. Can you make a differ mentions some of the successes of Gen George ence? Probably more than you will ever L. Butler, the candidate-made-general, it also know. • stresses the effect that one person can have on Eglin AFB, Florida
Vignette-Hearn.indd 111 4/27/07 11:17:09 AM 3 discusses the implications of change for the twenty-first century. Part 1 includes Dr. Kotter’s analysis of why trans forming organizations fail. He identifiesleadership as the engine that drives redirection, maintaining that a purely managerial mind-set will inevitably fail to produce constructive revisions, regardless of the quality of people involved. Some key consequences of failure in transformational-change efforts, pri marily based on a lack of leadership, include the following: reengineering takes too long and costs too much, promised programs do not deliver hoped-for results, and new strategies are not imple mented well. However, these failures are not inevi table. With a heightened sense of awareness of the need for change and the application of relevant leadership competencies, one can avoid these fail ures or at least greatly reduce them. The key to pre venting failure resides in acquiring a deeper and first-rate understanding of why organizations resist Leading Change by John P. Kotter. Harvard Business change, having a compellingly dedicated champion School Press (http://www.hbsp.harvard.edu/ who sponsors change, and making sure that the b02/en/books/books_home.jhtml), 300 North practices to complement and reinforce change are Beacon Street, Watertown, Massachusetts 02472, comprehensive and based on a process model such 1996, 208 pages, $26.95 (hardcover). as that contained in part 2 of Dr. Kotter’s book. In part 2, the author outlines an exceptionally Nothing endures except change—the only con workable and relevant eight-stage process for creat stant. Clearly, only in effective transformation does ing redirection. He argues that successful transfor one find tangible security and the realization that mations will not happen easily and that one must those who fail to improvise face an unenviable fu create a detailed road map which guides the way. ture. In Leading Change, Prof. John Kotter, whom His powerful process for creating major reform makes this reviewer interviewed at the Harvard Business a unique contribution to better understanding reno School, has written a most thorough, insightful, vation leadership. It includes the following steps: and provocative process assessment for effecting organizational renewal. This superb, timely, and 1. Establishing a Sense of Urgency. Examining practical book is a must-read for anyone in a leader current realities and identifying crises, po ship position who is engaged in transformation and tential crises, or major opportunities for im development of reengineered organizations for the provement. twenty-first century. Quite simply, Leading Change is the best book on this subject published to date. 2. Creating the Guiding Coalition. Putting to This intensive, well-written volume provides an ex gether a group with enough influenceto lead cellent synthesis for leading and managing an accel the change and getting the group to work to eration process to bring about change. Dr. Kotter gether as a team. presents a model designed to drive change from 3. Developing a Vision. Creating a vision to help small increments to dramatic shifts and thus adjust direct the change effort and formulating organizational systems and structures to better strategies for achieving that vision. meet mission requirements. Part 1 of Leading Change’s three parts addresses 4. Communicating the Change Vision. Con the change problem and its solution. Part 2, the stantly communicating the new vision, strate heart of the book, considers the author’s eight- gies, and behavior expected within the orga stage process for dynamic and positive change. Part nization.
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5. Empowering Broad-Based Action. Getting rid The short title of this RAND monograph gives of obstacles that prevent change, reshaping the impression that its authors will enlighten read systems or structures that undermine the ers as to characteristics of the newest generation of change vision, and encouraging risk taking and counterinsurgency (COIN) warfare and details of nontraditional ideas, activities, and actions. airpower’s role in this novel environment—certainly a topic of great interest to military-aviation scholars, 6. Generating Short-Term Wins. Planning for given recent operations. Despite providing a con visible improvements in performance as well cise recap of COIN’s political and military charac as recognizing and rewarding people who teristics, the work describes timeless principles— made the wins possible. not novel ones. Although the study does (lightly) 7. Consolidating Gains and Producing More treat various applications of COIN airpower, it ex Change. Using increased credibility to change pends much effort somewhat narrowly promoting all systems, structures, and policies that do the expansion of the Air Force’s elite foreign air- advisory unit as the most cost-effective means of not fittogether and do not meet the transfor combating budding insurgencies of the future. mation vision. Recognizing people who can The pseudobeguiling title aside, the work has implement the change vision and reinvigo only a few faults and much to offer the reader con rate the entire process. cerning COIN. The authors spend a majority of their 8. Anchoring New Approaches in the Culture. time clearly defining and categorizing insurgencies, Encouraging more and better leadership as detailing COIN principles, and discussing grand well as more effective management. Articulat strategic options for COIN. They advocate a “new” ing the connection between new behaviors and strategy of “precautionary” COIN—very limited mili organizational success and ensuring the suc tary intervention at the earliest stages—as the most cession of continued leadership development. cost-effective means of combating insurgency (p. 70). Even though the study does not eliminate the po After considering the organization of the future, tential necessity for “remedial” COIN, whereby the leadership, and lifelong learning, the author con host government requires direct outside assistance tends in part 3 that the twenty-first-century organi to put down an insurgency, it focuses primarily on zation will become less bureaucratic, contain more changes needed to enhance the Air Force’s capabilities effective customer data systems, and be more risk to execute a robust, precautionary COIN strategy. tolerant as well as more open and candid. He em The authors introduce an Iraq-style situation, a phasizes the importance of lifelong learning and so-called constabulary COIN, as a third option but enhanced leadership skills to success in the future. take it no further than a concept in which an oc In summary, given the inevitability of change, we cupying power has removed the existing govern must embrace it if we wish to successfully meet the ment and now must fight an insurgency while gen challenges of the present and the future. In Leading erating a legitimate replacement. This particular Change, Dr. Kotter provides us with a detailed road topic raised a hopeful eyebrow. Sadly, however, the map that highlights potential dangers and offers authors avoid an opportunity to explore needed solid advice to all leaders and managers trying to changes in airpower applicable to today’s major orchestrate effective change throughout their or challenges by tersely noting that “the occupying ganizations—the principal theme of this book. state should take what steps it can to limit the scale of the insurgency beforehand” (p. 72). Dr. Richard I. Lester A case study on El Salvador’s insurgency and an Maxwell AFB, Alabama examination of considerations in the development of COIN capabilities highlight important issues for US military planners: that smaller footprints and closer contact are often preferable, that the host Air Power in the New Counterinsurgency Era: The nation must win the political as well as military battle, Strategic Importance of USAF Advisory and As that military restraint is a virtue, and that airpower sistance Missions by Alan J. Vick et al. RAND offers important capabilities. The remainder of the (http://www.rand.org/publications/index.html), work theoretically and methodologically details 1700 Main Street, P.O. Box 2138, Santa Monica, how the Air Force can affect an early insurgency California 90407-2138, 2006, 204 pages, $25.00 best through institutional and bureaucratic initia (softcover). Available free from http://www.rand tives and the growth of air advisers, using the 6th .org/pubs/monographs/2006/RAND_MG509.pdf. Special Operations Squadron as a model.
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In sum, I was impressed by the discussion of He preferred physical structures because, as he military power’s application to insurgency but de said, “concrete is better . . . and is less expensive flatedto discover that the prescription for airpower than a wall of chests” (p. 15). The wall that France amounted to speeches, new Air Staff offices,courses built would carry his name. If only it had worked. in developmental education, and an order-of After World War II, one encountered much talk magnitude increase for the 6th Special Operations describing the Maginot Line as a white elephant Squadron. Granted, increased operational air- that created a false sense of security—a “Maginot advisory capability constitutes a valid recommenda mentality” that doomed France to defeat. Authors tion for precautionary COIN, but the study omits J. E. Kaufmann and H. W. Kaufmann take the op discussion of relevant airpower options in all types posite stance, suggesting that the Maginot Line ful of counterinsurgencies. If “the optimal force mixes filled its purpose and gave French authorities an for warfare against regular [i.e., conventional] and opportunity to mass their combat power in the face irregular [i.e., COIN] adversaries differ even more of the Nazi onslaught. The authors posit that re today” (p. 60), then shouldn’t the Air Force also strictive French doctrine limited subordinates’ consider developing a small but talented “model” freedom of initiative, hemming in the French mili COIN air force to strafe enemy insurgent positions tary’s free thinkers. That argument, which the instead of relying on fourth-generation (soon fifth- Kaufmanns state as a given, is certainly worthy of generation) fighters costing $75 million (according consideration, but this reviewer takes no position to the Defense Department’s Program Acquisition on it because the points are difficult to glean from Costs by Weapon System, February 2006)? Where are this dense work. the examinations of tough force-structure choices? Rather than a work of history or doctrinal analy Must US forces capable of flying, employing, and sis, Fortress France is predominantly an engineering instructing from third-generation attack platforms study, packed full of detailed drawings and expla be limited to select special operators? Unfortu nations of every aspect of the Maginot Line down nately, Air Power in the New Counterinsurgency Era to the smallest detail. For example, readers inter stops short of addressing these options. I would ested in the protective properties of reinforced read this monograph again for the excellent expo concrete walls against artillery shells of various sizes sition of not-so-new COIN principles but look else will appreciate table 2-9 (p. 49), typical of the where for novel, innovative, and broadly applicable book’s many tables. Whereas most military histories airpower solutions. lack sufficient graphics and visuals, this one comes close to overdoing it, offering 33 tables and 54 fig Maj Paul A. Hibbard, USAF ures—almost half the book. Naval Postgraduate School In an effort to put the Maginot Line in context, Monterey, California the authors do offer a short opening chapter that discusses its origins as well as snapshots of the prepa rations and performance of France’s air and naval arms. Additionally, they mention similar French de Fortress France: The Maginot Line and French fensive works in Africa known as the Mareth Line. Defenses in World War II by J. E. Kaufmann However, one finds the book’s one-page conclud and H. W. Kaufmann. Praeger (http://www ing chapter unsatisfying, serving merely as an end .greenwood.com/praeger.aspx), Greenwood note that will leave the reader wondering about the Publishing Group, 88 Post Road West, West authors’ true points. port, Connecticut 06881, 2005, 220 pages, Furthermore, Fortress France devotes itself com $49.95 (hardcover). pletely to the physical properties of the wall. As the premise of the book implies, if the wall itself com The Treaty of Versailles ended World War I, but prises only part of the story, then the authors should it did nothing to prevent World War II. Shortly af have placed more emphasis on the people involved. ter it was signed, European countries began consid They do include all the major players but in such a ering plans for the next inevitable war. France ini way that fails to bring out their humanity—their tially created offensive plans but found them sterile presentation simply doesn’t excite the mind. unrealistic due to manpower shortages created by This is a shame because the story of the Maginot World War I. In 1929 André Maginot, the French Line presents such fertile ground for military think minister of war and a veteran of Verdun, began ers—ground that Fortress France leaves untilled. pushing for the creation of massive defenses that Oftentimes military history allows the student to would cut off German invasion routes into France. establish parallels and extract lessons that apply to
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modern military thought. Why read military his biblical verse “follow me, and I will make you fish tory—or any history for that matter—if we cannot ers of men” (pp. 87–90). Members of the FARC use it to understand our current condition? This thereby cast themselves not as kidnappers but as book may do that—but without assistance from the revolutionaries conducting religiously inspired authors. For example, might the lessons of the acts. Colombian paramilitary groups use similar Maginot Line and France’s reliance on it for de rhetorical devices. Dr. Estrada contends that these fense serve as a warning to those who favor robots, metaphors treacherously mask crimes by intellectu unmanned vehicles, and smart weapons over hu ally eroding the public’s ability to use normal lan man efforts? One will never know because the guage to understand events. As he puts it, “The Kaufmanns fail to open the door to such thinking. war’s rhetoric has generated an unconscious reversal Finally, the book is just too expensive. For of the values we Colombians attribute to our shared $49.95, one could buy several decent books on the daily reality, and this reversal corresponds primarily subject. Overall, the extremely limited scope and to changes in words and their meanings” (p. 123). excessive detail of Fortress France, together with His focus on the power of words reminds one of other concerns mentioned above, limit its utility George Orwell’s classic book 1984, in which gov for the average reader. ernment deprives people of the vocabulary they need to articulate ideas that might challenge its ab CSM James H. Clifford, USA, Retired solute authority. McDonough, Georgia Readers unfamiliar with philosophy and rheto ric may find Las Metáforas de una Guerra Perpetua hard to grasp. They might also wonder whether the author’s analytical method implicitly assumes that Las Metáforas de una Guerra Perpetua: Estudios political discourses and metaphors really are sub sobre Pragmática del Discurso en el Conflicto ject to rational examination. Passions certainly run Armado Colombiano by Fernando Estrada Gal high during guerrilla wars, but if one accepts the lego. Fondo Editorial Universidad EAFIT Clausewitzian notion that war is the continuation (http://www.eafit.edu.co/fondoEditorial), Car of politics by other means, then political discourses rera 49, no. 7, Sur-50, Medellín, Colombia, 2004, should reflectdeliberate strategies calculated to in 173 pages, $10.00. fluence public opinion. Employing metaphors during counterinsurgency Las Metáforas de una Guerra Perpetua argues that is challenging yet important. This book offers use opposing sides in Colombia’s chronic guerrilla war ful insights, but some of its underlying assumptions articulate their political views through metaphor- seem excessively gloomy. Dr. Estrada paints a bleak based discourses that can be interpreted through picture of Colombian social and political condi systematic study. The author, Dr. Fernando Estrada tions, lamenting how that country has “a deprived Gallego, director of the Regional Studies Center at social culture with the world’s highest unemploy the Industrial University of Santander, Colombia, ment rates, highest corruption rates, and most dis has published other works about the theoretical re couraging indices of social cooperation” (p. 31). lationships among philosophy, language, and ratio One can hardly believe that Colombia is in such nality. In this book, he applies complex philosophi dire straits. The author also bewails the country’s cal concepts from Aristotle, Thomas Hobbes, Carl heterogeneous political and social systems in terms von Clausewitz, Michael Walzer, and many others that might almost apply to the United States. Co to examine how discourses influence listeners and lombia certainly faces serious problems yet has distort the public’s perception of events. His analy managed to sustain democratic governance despite sis is convoluted and narrowly confined to Colom decades of guerrilla war—a remarkable achieve bia, but serious students of information operations ment. Writing during Pres. Álvaro Uribe’s first term, may find broader applications for his thoughts. Dr. Estrada sounds a skeptical note about how the The author carefully dissects public statements president would address Colombia’s problems. made by guerrillas of the Fuerzas Armadas Revolu President Uribe’s impressive reelection in 2006 cionarias de Colombia (FARC) and right-wing shows that he is a potent agent of national progress. paramilitary groups to show how those organiza Indeed, the author acknowledges that despite Co tions use metaphors to obscure and justify their vio lombia’s problems, “we have a country filled with lent actions. For example, the FARC euphemisti hope, challenges to barbarism, and enterprising cally refers to indiscriminate mass kidnappings as spirit, with people capable of conceiving projects “miraculous catches,” a metaphor derived from the for a new order of communal living” (p. 37).
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Even if his assumptions are too pessimistic for pany because of mismanagement (i.e., bad deci Colombia, Dr. Estrada’s ideas have wider applicability sions made) by these leaders. than he claims. For example, like Colombian armed A major aircraft (and later space vehicle) builder groups, al-Qaeda terrorists often try to legitimize for the US Navy, Grumman was founded on the barbarous acts by resorting to religious metaphors. concept of building as safe a vehicle as possible to The author’s policy recommendations may also protect the pilot—even at the expense of aero- have international validity because if the Colombi design qualities that may have increased range ans can make democracy work, they can serve as a and/or maneuverability. Indeed, “naval aviators model for others. To counteract social and political christened Grumman Aircraft Engineering as the fragmentation and lessen the attraction of armed Iron Works because of the habit its battle-damaged groups, he calls for more integration of minorities airplanes had of getting their pilots back to the car into Colombian politics. He also advocates govern rier deck” (p. vii). The company remained depen mental decentralization to empower local authori dent upon the Department of Defense (DOD) as ties to address local grievances. These prescriptions its predominant (if not sole) customer throughout could apply as well in Iraq and other countries seek the vast majority of its corporate life. When Grum ing to unify disparate groups; however, one should man did venture into the realm of product diversi use prudence in doing so because weak central- fication in the civilian market (e.g., windmills, governmental authority characterizes failed states buses, and solar panels [p. 163]), these excursions like Somalia and Afghanistan. Even in democratic proved unprofitable. Do these business decisions countries faced with severe political disruptions, illustrate bad management practices? Readers must the ship of state needs a firm hand on the tiller. decide for themselves. Las Metáforas de una Guerra Perpetua, a theoretical One of the authors, George M. Skurla, relates treatise about what the US military calls informa Grumman’s story through a series of anecdotal vi tion operations or strategic communications, holds gnettes based on events that occurred during his particular interest because our experience in the tenure at the Iron Works. Though the tale of one global war on terror shows the importance of public specific company, it has a more far-reaching effect attitudes. The book offers a conceptual lens for in insofar as the book offers readers an appreciation of terpreting information campaigns in Colombia, the inner workings of the defense industry’s aircraft- but its basic ideas apply to information operations building element over a 30-year period. It identifies in general. Too abstract for the hands-on practi successes in innovation by several firms as they tioner, it may nevertheless suit advanced theorists evolve into major defense contractors, a phenome and strategists. Dr. Estrada provides just the sort of non that becomes readily apparent to Skurla as he insights the Air Force needs as it embraces cyber visits Lockheed, where he sees firsthand the F-117, space operations. and then Northrop, where he views a model of the B-2. Because these first ventures into the realm of Lt Col Paul D. Berg, USAF stealth technology represent something unknown Maxwell AFB, Alabama to Grumman, he criticizes its management style for a lack of awareness. Perhaps it was mismanagement at Grumman, or perhaps it was a conscious deci sion by the government to limit the cognizance of Inside the Iron Works: How Grumman’s Glory stealth technology during its infancy—that is a Days Faded by George M. Skurla and William H. question of public policy and something for the Gregory. Naval Institute Press (http://www.usni reader to determine. .org/press/press.html), 291 Wood Road, An However, the firsthandaccounts of how business napolis, Maryland 21402, 2004, 256 pages, $32.95 works and how Congress, the DOD, and defense (hardcover). contractors depend upon each other to fulfilltheir own missions and assure our collective security un Inside the Iron Works, an interesting and useful deniably justify the price of the book. A fast read, book for Air Force readers, focuses on the person Inside the Iron Works offers detailed insight into the alities of and decisions made by senior manage defense industry as seen through the eyes of one of ment officials at the Grumman Corporation from the company presidents and chief operating officers. the 1940s through the 1980s. Its premise, sup ported by the authors’ anecdotes, maintains that Col Joseph J. McCue, USAF, Retired Grumman failed as a defense manufacturing com Springfield, Virginia
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B-17 at War by Bill Yenne. Zenith Press (http:// but offers very little new information, no detailed www.zenithpress.com), 729 Prospect Avenue, analysis of bomber operations, and too few stories P.O. Box 1, Osceola, Wisconsin 54020, 2006, 128 of the men who flew this great airplane in combat. pages, $19.95 (softcover). Despite its simple, clean presentation, I find it difficult to recommend this book since it presents When people think about American airpower in little or nothing in terms of historical significance; World War II, several images stand out. There are in reality, it is a rehash of the dozens of other B-17 perhaps no other icons more compelling than the books already on the market. If readers want an elegant silhouette of the magnificent Boeing B-17 other B-17 book with several new photographs and Flying Fortress. Whether painted in camouflaged many of the same ones from other books, then they olive drab or glistening in its unpainted natural sil may want to add it to their collection. If, however, ver finish,this aircraft, bristling with .50-caliber ma they prefer a fresh look at the B-17, along with new chine guns, struck fear and demanded respect stories of bravery and courage under fire,then B-17 from its German adversaries in the Luftwaffe. at War is not for them. Against this backdrop, Bill Yenne adds to the al ready overcrowded history of this amazing airplane. Lt Col Robert F. Tate, USAFR A San Francisco–based author, Yenne has writ Maxwell AFB, Alabama ten more than two dozen books on the military, aviation, and other historical topics, including the excellent Story of the Boeing Company (Zenith Press, 2005). Because of his knowledge of the history of Responsibility of Command: How UN and NATO one of America’s most significant companies, it Commanders Influenced Airpower over Bosnia comes as no surprise that the author decided to by Col Mark A. Bucknam. Air University Press narrow his focus to one of Boeing’s most important (http://www.maxwell.af.mil/au/aul/aupress), aircraft. What is surprising, however, is the lack of 131 West Shumacher Avenue, Maxwell AFB, Ala detail in this rather expensive paperback. bama 36112-6615, 2003, 428 pages, $40.00 (soft Like other authors of the publisher’s At War se cover). Available free from http://www.maxwell ries, Yenne probably had to encapsulate as much .af.mil/au/aul/aupress/Books/Bucknam/ history of the B-17 as possible within a limited num Bucknam.pdf. ber of pages. Considering the plethora of B-17 books available, many of them hundreds of pages in length, In 1991 American airpower was reborn over the trying to put the entire history of such a magnifi desert sands between Kuwait City and Baghdad. In cent machine into fewer than 130 pages is no small the decade that followed, policy makers aggressively feat. Unsurprisingly, the author falls a little short in made use of airpower and its promise of seemingly this attempt. unlimited precision and effectiveness. The forests Although B-17 at War contains more than 100 and hills of the disintegrating former Yugoslavia rep excellent photographs, 32 of them in color, it in resented airpower’s next challenges—Bosnia during cludes no cutaway drawings, color plates, profile 1992–95 and Kosovo in 1999. Whether one calls comparisons between B-17 variants, or maps of the these efforts successes or failures, they highlight the operating areas in Europe, the Pacific,or the Medi political challenges of employing and controlling terranean. Although the development of combat- violence from the air in situations less amenable to box formations, which helped thwart attacks by airpower than the first Gulf War. Colonel Bucknam Luftwaffe fighters, contributed to the B-17’s suc addresses the first of these interventions—the air cess, one finds no detailed mention or illustrations war over Bosnia, which began as Operation Deny of them. The book does, however, discuss the little- Flight and ended as Operation Deliberate Force. known but nevertheless interesting operational his Through interviews and a study of North Atlan tory of the B-17 in the Pacific.Although B-17 at War tic Treaty Organization (NATO) and United Na details an inventory of the aircraft for selected tions documents, Bucknam shows how upper-level months as well as the number of variants and their commanders—of all nationalities—sought to con specifications,it never fully gets off the ground as a trol airpower to meet their particular goals. He de significant work of history. For example, Yenne tails these interventions as they flowedboth through talks about the YB-40 (B-17 gunship) but omits any and around the chain of command as circum pictures of this aircraft. Simply put, B-17 at War pro stances dictated. Unsurprisingly, he concludes that vides a look at B-17 operations on an almost day-by commanders used their military expertise to gain day basis, illustrated throughout with photographs, influence over airpower from policy makers. What
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is surprising is that he shows how commanders not sitioning food and supplies directly. Nelson’s re only influenced the details of military intervention quests for food, clothing, and medicine have gone but also began to function as policy makers them ignored by higher-ups who, apparently, are content selves. Colonel Bucknam demonstrates how this to let the prisoners die of neglect. Indeed, Zollo practice especially held true of NATO commanders, has one high-ranking officerexclaim, “I don’t have whose airpower plans (complemented by those at to feed and clothe [expletive deleted] Nazis” (p. US Air Forces in Europe) often drove the selection 160). Nelson agrees to Delman’s scheme, but one of possible policy options. This conclusion is one of of the POW drivers—an SS officermasquerading as many worthy insights offered by Responsibility of an enlisted man—engineers an escape and takes a Command, which should be read by anyone who hostage (coincidentally, Delman’s best friend). Del- wants to know more about how airpower functions man tracks down the escapee alone, settles the in both peacekeeping and coalition warfare. score with the SS officer, rescues his buddy, and gets a convoy load of supplies back to the camp. Of Capt Tim Spaulding, USAF course he receives no credit for his actions. It seems Royal Air Force Lakenheath, United Kingdom the Army is like that. Prisoners is barely worth a review and certainly not worth reading, but I thought it necessary to call attention to the underlying fallacious premise re Prisoners: A Novel of World War II by Burt Zollo. garding the American “policy” of murdering pris Academy Chicago Publishers (http://www oners. That was simply not the case. .academychicago.com), 11030 South Langley Avenue, Chicago, Illinois 60628, 2003, 275 Col Phillip S. Meilinger, USAF, Retired pages, $22.50 (hardcover). West Chicago, Illinois
In the months following the Normandy invasion in June 1944, the German army began its long re treat east. As it did so, an increasing number of Realizing the Dream of Flight: Biographical Essays German prisoners of war (POW) fell into Allied in Honor of the Centennial of Flight, 1903–2003 hands. Because resources were earmarked for Al edited by Virginia P. Dawson and Mark D. Bowles. lied forces prosecuting the war—to end it as quickly NASA History Division (http://www.hq.nasa.gov/ as possible and thus save lives—the care of tens of office/pao/History/history.html), 300 E Street thousands of German POWs became a low priority. SW, Washington, DC 20546, 2005, 326 pages, Undoubtedly, the fact that many of them suffered $20.00 (hardcover). To order, write the NASA and died in captivity gave rise to James Bacque’s Center for Aerospace Information, 7121 Stan stunning accusation, appearing in his inflamma dard Drive, Hanover, Maryland 21076. Available tory book Other Losses in 1989, that Supreme Allied free from http://history.nasa.gov/sp4112.pdf. Commander Dwight Eisenhower deliberately tried to starve to death and otherwise murder German Realizing the Dream of Flight, an anthology edited POWs. Reputable military historians quickly exam by Virginia Dawson and Mark Bowles, consists of ined Bacque’s assertions and concluded, convinc academic papers presented at a conference cele ingly, that no such policy and no such massacre brating 100 years of flight; it also includes a DVD ever existed. Now comes Burt Zollo, a former US recording of the conference proceedings. Expertly Army soldier who served at one of those POW edited, finely produced, and containing a useful camps near the end of the war, to write a fictional index, this book, like most anthologies, does not ized account of such a camp. By doing so, he gives rely upon a common theme beyond aviation and credence to the ridiculous charges of an Allied space, and the papers vary in quality. The contribu policy of deliberate starvation. tors, many of whom deal with their own particular Zollo’s story line is lackluster: “Sandy” Delman, research interests, are highly qualified historians a young American soldier and Jew working at one and good writers, but only Alan Gropman has any of the POW camps, is so outraged by the treatment practical experience with combat aviation. of the Germans that he decides to take action, go His essay deals with Gen Benjamin O. Davis Jr., a ing straight to Lieutenant Colonel Nelson, camp principal player in the painful integration of blacks commander, to propose a plan. Delman suggests into the armed forces of the United States and one taking a convoy of trucks—driven by German of the foundations of Gropman’s seminal book, The POWs—to supply depots near the front and requi Air Force Integrates, 1945–1964 (1978). The other es
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say under the category “Military Strategists” (see the book on integration and Biddle’s on strategic book’s introduction, p. xi) is Tami Davis Biddle’s bombing for the detail necessary to the military piece about Gen Curtis E. LeMay, a central player profession. The essays on commercial aviation and in her important book Rhetoric and Reality in Air NASA space development are summaries often Warfare: The Evolution of British and American Ideas drawn from other books but sufficientfor the mod about Strategic Bombing, 1914–1945 (2002). Neither ern air warrior. Even though Realizing the Dream of Davis nor LeMay was present at the creation of avia Flight does not form a coherent whole, it might de tion, which had matured a fair amount by the time serve a middling place on officers’ reading lists if they got their wings. If the conference needed to they already have a pretty firm grasp of the history include military operators in the story, then one of air and space power. wonders about the total absence of naval aviators. In the firsttwo essays, feminist scholars Amy Sue Dr. David R. Mets Bix and Susan Ware write about Bessie Coleman and Maxwell AFB, Alabama Amelia Earhart, respectively. Closer to the creation of aviation, Coleman did not attain the fame that accompanied Earhart, and both women died in air craft accidents at a young age, cutting short any fur Pacific Skies: American Flyers in World War II by ther contributions they might have made. Ware Jerome Klinkowitz. University Press of Mississippi does make the valid point that women seemed to (http://www.upress.state.ms.us), 3825 Ridgewood play a greater role in the barnstorming age than Road, Jackson, Mississippi 39211-6492, 2004, 256 they did after aviation became more profitable,lay pages, $32.00 (hardcover). ing that fact at the feet of gender discrimination. But Betty Friedan’s great book The Feminine Mys English professor Jerome Klinkowitz has written tique (1963) makes the point that the first wave of extensively about World War II in such books as feminism died out after passage of the 19th Amend Their Finest Hours: Narratives of the R.A.F. and Luft ment and did not revive until the second wave got waffe in World War II (1989), Yanks over Europe: Ameri rolling in the 1960s. I think she explained that, as a can Flyers in World War II (1996), and With the Tigers cultural phenomenon, it included the ideas of over China, 1941–1942 (1999). In Pacific Skies, he many women as well as male prejudices. In any takes the familiar in a new direction, leaving the event, both aviatrixes had an important moral and archives to historians and using as his material the financial supporter—a male in both cases. narratives written by participants, both during the The anthology also includes three fine essays by war and in the half century since. With room for William M. Leary, W. David Lewis, and Roger Bil only 100 of the thousands of memoirs and biogra stein on the emergence of aviation as a profitable phies available, Klinkowitz is necessarily selective in enterprise during the 1930s. Leary addresses the making his choices. His selection seems representa collaboration of Charles Lindbergh and Juan Trippe tive, including the classics as well as relatively ob in the building of Pan American Airways; Lewis scure works. And he uses writings by both Ameri writes about the part played by Eddie Rickenbacker, can and Japanese veterans. Johnny Miller, and Eastern Airlines in airmail ser vice; and Bilstein offers an account of Donald Doug The book has two parts. First, the author tracks las’s rise and fall. Later on, Tom D. Crouch, Michael the war chronologically, dividing it into four parts: Gorn, Andrew J. Dunar, and Roger Launius—all peacetime and the sudden outbreak of war, the fine historians of air and space technology—con Japanese advantage, the turning of the tide, and tribute chapters about the genesis and maturing of the late-war shift in approach, including the kami the space age. Most of them deal with figures not kazes and low-altitude firebombing. This is not a well known to Air Force officers: Willy Ley, a space battles-and-leaders narrative; the book presents not writer; Hugh Dryden, a scientist and manager; and only the old, familiar accounts of Curtis LeMay, Robert Gilruth, a mover and shaker in the manned Jimmy Doolittle, and “Pappy” Boyington, but also spaceflightprogram who lived in the shadow of the (and more often) those of various aces, heroes, and astronauts. The other essay—about Wernher von ordinary Airmen. It relates a personal war rather Braun, who was present at the creation of the space than an officialone. The firstsection consists of the age—is a stimulating piece. introduction and all but one of the topical chapters The other chapters are probably sufficient for (“Going to War in Peacetime,” “An Air War at Sea any Air Force officer’s professional reading pro and on Land,” “Tales of the South Pacific,” and gram, but he or she will want to go to Gropman’s “Endgame”).
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“Endgame” discusses the final phase of the war, Lendon starts with a review of the Greeks’ mili characterized by kamikazes and the firebombingof tary culture and mind-set—an important introduc Japan. The increasing brutality of war during this tion because it sets the historical stage for the en period provides a natural lead into the other part tire book. Noting that the ancient Greeks based of the book, the thematic one. In this section, many of their warrior principles upon The Iliad, Klinkowitz examines the attitudes of the adversaries, written around 700 BC, he stresses that a number the philosophical underpinnings and motivations, of historians refer to the Homeric poems as the and the perception of the foe. He also draws dis bible of the Greeks (p. 36). Lendon further ob tinctions between the nature of war in the Pacific serves that the Greeks based their warrior principles and in Europe. Moreover, he deals with an odd not so much on the military discipline and order phenomenon—the unusually large percentage of familiar to modern warriors but on the characteris Pacific veterans who turned to religion of one sort tics of a sports team. That is, war became a competi or another in the aftermath of the war. tion, with the contestants battling more for recogni A polished and experienced writer, Klinkowitz tion as the bravest or most glorious (as in The Iliad) has 40 books to his credit and knows how to tell a than because their general ordered them to fight. story. The work holds together nicely throughout. This mind-set plays throughout Greek military We encounter a bit of slippage late, when Klinkowitz history—from the Spartan philosophy and culture discusses debates over the dropping of the atomic of conduct in warfare—and culminates with a dis bombs in a one-sided manner. His attempt to make cussion of Alexander the Great’s campaign to the the kamikazes explicable is adequate but not satisfy Middle East (itself Homeric in proportion and ing. Also, he seems to have written the philosophical deed). It also plays into the use and evolution of section without consideration of Paul Fussell’s War Greek military formations from 500 BC into early time: Understanding and Behavior in the Second World 200–300 AD. Technology seldom drove changes in War, written in 1989 but arguably still the best study the Greek method; in fact, the Greeks had forsaken of attitudes and motivation in the Pacific war. Re advances in military technology in favor of imple gardless of these shortcomings, however, Pacific menting interpretations of historical writings and Skies is worth the few hours it takes to read it. discussions over “the right way” to conduct war and behave in it. Dr. John H. Barnhill Through this review of history and analysis of Houston, Texas Greek writings, Lendon shows the reader how the Greek military philosophy operated, why it oper ated the way it did, and the natural conclusions of Soldiers and Ghosts: A History of Battle in Clas this track. Choosing not to concern itself solely with sical Antiquity by J. E. Lendon. Yale University the military side of affairs, Soldiers and Ghosts also Press (http://www.yale.edu/yup), P.O. Box explores the civilian and political connections of 209040, New Haven, Connecticut 06520-9040, Greek society since the Greeks initially believed in 2005, 480 pages, $35.00 (hardcover), $20.00 a citizen-soldier as much as Americans do (but in a (softcover). somewhat different context). Throughout this study, one finds the underpinning that Greek writ Once upon a time, there was an ad campaign ings, rooted in ideals from and interpretations of promoting public libraries, the theme of which de The Iliad, constituted the foundation for the Greeks’ clared “You Are What You Read.” This promotion military psyche and doctrine. emphasized the idea that increasing the amount of Lendon uses the second half of Soldiers and material read would mold anyone into a better edu Ghosts to discuss Rome and its rise as a republic as cated and more productive person. Nothing could well as its fall as an empire. The Romans also be illustrate this concept more effectively than using lieved in a citizen-soldier concept but with a Roman ancient Greece and Rome as role models. J. E. Len- twist. Like the Greeks, they based their military don’s book Soldiers and Ghosts, a far cry from a fairy psyche and doctrine on their historical readings tale or an ad campaign, gives the reader a very thor (some of which were probably fabrications loosely ough appreciation for why these two cultures’ mili based on a historical event). As Romans’ cultural tary forces became what they read. Across the pages awareness grew during the first two centuries AD, of both Greek and Roman history, he decisively so did their interest in “ancient” Greece. Without shows us that neither culture suffered from a short belaboring the point, suffice it to say that the au age of reading and that both had ample opportu thor does an equally admirable job in discussing nity to employ what they read. the Roman war and civil psyche as well as their ap
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plication to military campaigns as Rome’s high- ligence professional with more than 25 years’ expe water mark rose and then fell. rience) during a one-year stay at the Joint Military Why is a book as obscure as Soldiers and Ghosts Intelligence College’s Center for Strategic Intelli important to advocates of airpower and space gence Research, the book demonstrates that intel power today? We all recall Sun Tzu’s mantra “know ligence reform is difficult and sometimes impossible, your enemy as yourself.” To better anticipate the thanks to turf battles, congressional wrangling, lack enemy, it’s important not only to find out what he of resources, and personality conflicts.Most impor would do but why he would do “that something” tantly, the study documents the struggle to change that way. Such is the rationale that Lendon pres the course of the intelligence community after the ents—to great effect! The Greeks and Romans be collapse of the Soviet Union and the emergence of haved as they did for the most part because of the a new, globalized world. readings they incorporated into their military and Gutjahr refers to the National Security Agency civilian cultures. Our military employs its doctrine and its struggle to intercept and monitor new com as it does, based upon lessons learned and contin munications media, such as the Internet, that the ued professional readings; likewise, people in our agency had not dealt with during the Cold War. As society view military ideals as they do, based upon components within the intelligence community what they read and see. It’s not far fetched to say struggled with new tasks, a series of intelligence fail that other militaries and societies, past and pres ures seemed to accompany the rise of new radical- ent, function similarly. Islamic terrorist groups. India’s nuclear tests, North My only complaint about Soldiers and Ghosts in Korea’s missile launch, and the proliferation of nu volves the constant sidebar diversions within chapters clear materials added to the community’s woes. Con that the author uses to build further points. Imag gress’s attempts to change the community after the ine sitting in a math lecture only to have a social- collapse of the Soviet Union and the emergence of sciences topic emerge on the professor’s board for a new global order in the nineties illustrate the dif a 10-minute discussion. Eventually, all of these points ficulty of some of these executive- and legislative- that Lendon brings up come back to roost at the branch struggles. From a historian’s point of view, end of the chapter. Some help to clarify main points the author provides a useful service to anyone at or even bring up new points upon which other tempting to gather information about what trans chapters elaborate. Still, the sudden jumps from pired in the House and Senate Intelligence Com one topic to a completely different topic on the mittees during those turbulent years. same page were distracting—I frequently wondered According to Gutjahr, the definition of “intelli where the tangents were leading. gence reform” and what it should encompass in Nevertheless, Lendon’s study makes for very en volves most reform movements, regardless of joyable reading about ancient Greece and Rome. whether the executive or legislative branch pushes More importantly, it gives the reader tools to pon the changes. Others have argued that in the post– der other militaries and their societies—a skill that Cold War global age, intelligence is adaptive and that the community must continuously reform it could no doubt prove beneficial to future analysts self. Reform should occur as a community-wide, and planners in the ongoing global war on terror. perpetual series of process-improvement tasks. Pro Soldiers and Ghosts gets my vote as a must-read. cesses and procedures that guarantee success Maj Paul Niesen, USAF against today’s opponents will not work on tomor Scott AFB, Illinois row’s enemy, who has shown his adaptability and maneuverability inside our decision cycles—hence the need for intelligence reform. Believing that the intelligence community remains caught up in a The Intelligence Archipelago: The Community’s 1947 structure, the author argues for far-reaching Struggle to Reform in the Globalized Era by changes, which Congress in 2004 could not muster Melanie M. H. Gutjahr. Joint Military Intelli the votes to pass. gence College (http://www.dia.mil/college/ The Intelligence Archipelago covers every issue index.htm), 200 MacDill Boulevard, Washing within the intelligence community for the last 15 ton, DC 20340-5100, 2005, 283 pages. years—including transnational issues that emerged with the proliferation of technologies, the creation The Intelligence Archipelago examines efforts to re of the National Imagery and Mapping Agency (now form the intelligence community dating back to the National Geospatial-Intelligence Agency), and World War II. Written by Melanie Gutjahr (an intel the emergence of terrorists with state support. In
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telligence officers will recognize all problems and rians of aerial warfare take on this noteworthy task situations described in the book, lending it the with short but detailed and engaging essays. The credibility that so many other reform texts lack. contributors consider the defeats of the air forces Gutjahr also addresses the terrorist attacks of 11 of Poland (1939), France (1940), Arab countries September 2001 and subsequent attempts at re (1967), Germany and Austria-Hungary (1914–18), form, using data from the National Commission on Italy (1939–43), Imperial Japan (1942–45), Ger Terrorist Attacks upon the United States (the 9/11 many (1940–45), Argentina (Falklands War, 1982), Commission) to illustrate the systematic nature of Russia (1941), United States (1941–42), and Brit intelligence failures. She then examines the com ain (1941–42). Through these essays, the book ex mission’s report in detail and turns her attention to plains the complex, often deep-seated foundations the struggles that accompanied the creation of the for these catastrophes. position of director of national intelligence. Her The book’s editors are well versed in military his detailed exposé helps the reader understand the tory. Robin Higham, professor emeritus of military complex posturing within the intelligence commu history at Kansas State University and editor of the nity as Congress inevitably mandated reform. Such journal Aerospace Historian from 1970 to 1988, has reform is hampered by a lack of a shared vision be written and edited many books on varied aspects of tween the intelligence community on one side and military history. Currently chief historian at the Di Congress and the president on the other. Some of rectorate of History and Heritage, National Defence Gutjahr’s anecdotes suggest that improvement has Headquarters, Canada, Stephen Harris coauthored occurred, but others demonstrate that the bureau the official history of the Canadian air force. The cratic processes deeply embedded within the com two editors asked prospective contributors to exam munity have not changed. ine “archetypical examples from which worthwhile Granted, the text suffers from problems that conclusions could be drawn” (p. 1) and provided typically arise when authors attempt to turn an aca them with numerous questions to stimulate their demic thesis into a book—that is, too many quota thinking. They especially wanted the contributors to tions, poor layout, and wordiness that makes it dif go beyond technical, tactical, and political reasons ficult for the reader to follow the author’s key for the defeats of the subject air forces. points. Nevertheless, these flaws should in no way Thus, the essays are both overviews and analytical stop the intelligence professional, historian, or po narratives that examine more than the specific air litical scientist from studying the data therein. The campaign. In addition to the typical reasons for Intelligence Archipelago is a gold mine of information, these catastrophic defeats, the contributors provide and the annexes—a collection of executive orders doctrinal, logistical, and cultural reasons to show and legislative bills—show the path of reform to why these air forces failed in their respective his the current intelligence community. I highly rec torical air campaigns. Each also discusses the indus ommend it to officers, intelligence professionals, trial and economic capability of each country to and anyone interested in government reform. produce/obtain the quantity and quality of aircraft (airframes and aircraft engines) needed to counter Capt Gilles Van Nederveen, USAF, Retired prospective enemies effectively. Most also discuss Fairfax, Virginia an important but often overlooked aspect—the quality of aircrews and maintenance personnel. Guided by the editors’ initial request, each con tributor came up with the same basic reasons for Why Air Forces Fail: The Anatomy of Defeat edited the defeat for these air forces despite differences in by Robin Higham and Stephen J. Harris. Uni time, place, economic status, and culture. They versity Press of Kentucky (http://www.kentucky concluded that the leaders of each country and its press.com), 663 South Limestone Street, Lex air force did not properly connect doctrine, tech ington, Kentucky 40508-4008, 2006, 416 pages, nology, and industrial output to produce aircraft $39.95 (hardcover). and trained crews and maintenance personnel to preclude defeat in the historical campaign. Their Historians have well documented the defeats of failure did not generally stem from ignorance or armies and navies but have paid far less attention to stupidity but from the politics and culture of their the defeat of air forces. What does exist is usually in times. For example, the defeated air forces of histories of the greater conflict of which the air 1939–42 were the products of post–World War I campaigns were a part. In Why Air Forces Fail, per mentality and economics as much as technology haps the firststudy of its kind, 11 well-known histo developments. The initial air victors of that con
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flict—Germany and Japan—had simply done bet to sending a single aircraft to hit multiple targets ter than their defeated enemies. However, in the precisely. Key to this revolutionary capability are long run, neither air force could maintain its posi precision-guided munitions (PGM), ranging from tion because of the same basic causes that ham early radio-controlled bombs to the current genera pered the air forces they had initially defeated. tion of laser- and satellite-guided weapons, whose The editors could have organized the book bet development we can attribute to both human in ter. The essays are arranged haphazardly—not topi novation as well as evolutions in technology. These cally or even chronologically. Higham and Harris weapons, which permit more flexibility in aircraft themselves write that the defeated air forces fall delivery and enhance bombing accuracy, have be into three categories: (1) the “dead ducks,” which come a key asset of our military. Moreover, their never had a chance (German air force of World ability to destroy targets yet cause little to no col War I, Russian in 1941, Polish in 1939, French, and lateral damage has changed national-security policy. Italian); (2) the “hares,” which had initial success Weapons of Choice provides a detailed account of but eventually failed (Luftwaffe and Japanese air the US military’s development of PGMs, an effort force in World War II); and (3) the “phoenixes,” that began during World War I and continues today which suffered initial defeats but were reborn from in the form of numerous programs. Gillespie traces the ashes of their defeats (the Argentine air force, these weapons throughout aviation history, ad Arab air forces, Royal Air Force in 1941–42, and US dressing their testing and employment as well as Army Air Forces in the Pacific,1941–42). If the edi military and political players’ reaction to them. He tors had arranged the essays by these categories, not only discusses the effect of PGMs on military readers could have better discerned similarities strategy and tactics for all major US conflicts from and differences among the different air forces. World War I to recent battles in the Gulf, but also As one would expect, the essays differ in quality analyzes how they have affected current airpower and depth. The better ones cover a relatively short capabilities. The author limits his coverage to conven campaign, such as those of the Polish and French air tional guided bombs (not cruise missiles or surface- forces at the beginning of World War II. On the to-surface missiles), examining the innovation, other end of the spectrum, one finds the essay on technology, budgets, national-security policy, and the Arab air forces, which tries to do too much by politics that have shaped their development; he discussing all of the major Middle Eastern air forces, also uses the results of multiple Quadrennial De including the Israeli air force, from the 1950s to the fense Reviews to assess the effect of PGMs on cur 1970s. A better approach would have focused more rent national policy and force structure. His book on the Egyptian and Israeli air forces alone. Each exposes readers to the wide variety of guided weap essay also includes short bibliographies and areas ons and explores reliability and logistical issues that for future research—definite pluses. Overall, Why raised concerns about employing them in battle. Air Forces Fail represents a much-needed and long- Unfortunately, Gillespie does not delve into the overdue addition to airpower history and a must- recent emergence of the small-diameter bomb or read for any airpower enthusiast, historian, and mention capabilities that the military might like to serving operational Air Force officer. see in future PGMs. Such omissions, however, do not detract from the book’s ability to educate readers Dr. Robert B. Kane, Lieutenant Colonel, USAF, Retired on the current capabilities/limitations of these weap Air Armament Center ons and their effect on airpower. Lastly, Gillespie Eglin AFB, Florida seems somewhat biased toward the Air Force de spite the other services’ major contributions to the development of precision weapons. Overall, Weapons of Choice offers an excellent his Weapons of Choice: The Development of Precision tory of PGMs. Airpower enthusiasts and novices Guided Munitions by Paul G. Gillespie. Univer alike will gain a better understanding not only of sity of Alabama Press (http://uapress.ua.edu), the important capabilities that the current genera Box 870380, 20 Research Drive, Tuscaloosa, Ala tion of PGMs gives the military, but also of the ad bama 35487-0380, 2006, 232 pages, $35.00 verse effect their absence had on earlier conflictsin (hardcover). our nation’s history. During the brief history of aviation, our nation’s Maj Evan Dertien, USAF bombing efforts have progressed from using hun Air Force Fellow dreds of bombers to destroy a single enemy target Yorktown, Virginia
2007-2 Book Reviews.indd 123 4/27/07 10:58:20 AM APJ
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Mission Debrief.indd 124 4/27/07 11:07:06 AM OUR CONTRIBUTORS
Lt Gen Stephen R. Lorenz (USAFA; MPA, Uni Maj Gen Allen G. Peck (USAFA; MS, Air Force C. R. Anderegg (BA, Hobart College; MS, Troy versity of Northern Colorado) is the com Institute of Technology; MA, Salve Regina Col University), a member of the Senior Executive mander of Air University, Maxwell AFB, Ala lege) is commander, Headquarters Air Force Service, is the director, Air Force History and bama. The general attended undergraduate Doctrine Center, and vice-commander, Air Museums Policies and Programs, Headquarters pilot training at Craig AFB, Alabama. A com University, Maxwell AFB, Alabama. He has US Air Force, Washington, DC. Prior to assum mand pilot with 3,300 hours in eight aircraft, served as an F-15 aircraft commander, instruc ing his current position, Mr. Anderegg was an air he has commanded an air-refueling squadron, tor pilot, and standardization and evaluation and space power strategist in Project Checkmate a geographically separated operations group, flight examiner. General Peck has completed during the planning and execution of Opera an air-refueling wing that won the 1994 River two tours on the Air Staff at the Pentagon and tions Enduring Freedom and Iraqi Freedom. He side Trophy for Best Wing in Fifteenth Air a joint assignment as chief, Current Opera served as an active duty Air Force officer for 30 Force, and an air-mobility wing that won the tions, US Central Command (USCENTCOM), years, commanding an F-15 squadron and twice 1995 Armstrong Trophy for Best Wing in MacDill AFB, Florida. The general has com serving as a fighter group commander and twice Twenty-first Air Force. He also served as the manded an air operations group in Germany, as a fighter wing vice-commander. A former F-4 commandant of cadets at the US Air Force an air expeditionary wing in Saudi Arabia, and Fighter Weapons School instructor pilot, he flew Academy and as deputy assistant secretary for the Air and Space Expeditionary Force Center, more than 3,700 hours in the F-4C/D/E/G and budget, Officeof the Assistant Secretary of the Langley AFB, Virginia. A key planner for the the F-15A/C/E, including 170 combat missions Air Force for Financial Management and air war over Serbia, General Peck served as chief, during the Vietnam War. Following his retire Comptroller, Headquarters US Air Force, Combat Plans, combined air operations cen ment from the Air Force at the rank of colonel, Washington, DC. General Lorenz is a graduate ter (CAOC), Vincenza, Italy, during the subse he wrote The Ash Warriors and Sierra Hotel: Flying of Squadron Officer School, Air Command quent campaign. He also served with the com Air Force Fighters in the Decade after Vietnam. Mr. and Staff College, Air War College, and the mander, Air Force forces at USCENTCOM’s Anderegg is a graduate of Squadron Officer National War College. CAOC during Operation Iraqi Freedom’s ma School, Air Command and Staff College, and Air jor combat operations. As deputy combined War College. force air component commander, he oversaw planning, tasking, execution, and assessment of coalition air operations for Operations Iraqi Freedom and Enduring Freedom. A command pilot with more than 2,700 hours in the F-15, including more than 300 combat hours, Gen eral Peck is a distinguished graduate of the US Air Force Academy, Squadron Officer School, the Air Force Institute of Technology, and the College of Naval Command and Staff; he also attended Harvard University as a National Se curity Fellow.
COL Bradley E. Smith, USA (BS, Washington and Lee University; MS, University of Southern California; MS, National Defense University), served as chief of the Joint Operations Division for the United States Transportation Com mand. A veteran of both Gulf wars, he has served in a variety of command and staff posi tions in the continental United States, Korea, Saudi Arabia, Kuwait, Haiti, and Germany, in cluding chief, Deployment Division, Joint Chiefs of Staff at the Pentagon and commander, 7th Transportation Group (Composite) at Fort Eustis, Virginia. A graduate of the Army Com mand and General Staff College and School of Advanced Military Studies, Colonel Smith has published several articles in the Military Review.
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Bios.indd 125 4/27/07 10:59:12 AM 126 AIR & SPACE POWER JOURNAL SUMMER 2007
Lt Col Raymond W. Staats (BA, Syracuse Uni Lt Col Marty Reynolds (USAFA; BS, Pennsylvania Maj Aaron D. Troxell (USAFA; MS, Wright State versity; MS, Air Force Institute of Technology; State University; MBA, Gonzaga University; MA, University; MOA [Master of Operations Analy PhD, Virginia Polytechnic Institute and State George Washington University; MOA [Master of sis], Air Force Institute of Technology) is chief, University) is vice-commandant of the Commu Operations Analysis], Air Force Institute of Tech Unit Compliance Inspections Branch for the in nity College of the Air Force, Maxwell AFB, Ala nology) is the director, Commander’s Action spector general, Headquarters Air Force Materiel bama. He previously served as an assistant pro Group and Analysis, Assessment, and Lessons Command, Wright-Patterson AFB, Ohio. He has fessor of operations research and chief of the Learned (A9), Twelfth Air Force (Air Forces program-management experience in the B-1B Operations Research Division within the De Southern), Davis-Monthan AFB, Arizona. He pre and KC-135 program offices. The major also has partment of Operational Sciences, Air Force viously served as chief of staff, 355th Wing, and held various group and squadron flying assign Institute of Technology, Wright-Patterson AFB, assistant director of operations, 41st Electronic ments, including commander, Current Opera Ohio. He has served as a Defense Satellite Com Combat Squadron, Davis-Monthan AFB, and as tions Flight, 22d Operations Squadron, McCon munications System III crew commander and staff weather officer, tanker airlift control center, nell AFB, Kansas. He has deployed in support of instructor with the 3d Space Operations Squad Scott AFB, Illinois. An EC-130 instructor pilot, he Operations Southern Watch, Allied Force, and ron, as well as executive officer for the 50th flew combat missions in Operations Enduring Enduring Freedom. Additionally, he served as Operations Group, Schriever AFB, Colorado; Freedom and Iraqi Freedom. Colonel Reynolds is an operations officer for Operation Iraqi Free Delta II launch-crew commander with the 1st a graduate of Squadron Officer School and the dom, directing 20 KC-135s and 32 crews as well Space Launch Squadron and chief of the Delta Air Force Institute of Technology (intermediate as the execution of 1,300 wartime sorties. A II Standardization and Evaluation Section, 45th developmental education). graduate of Squadron Officer School and Air Operations Group, Cape Canaveral Air Force Command and Staff College, Major Troxell is a Station, Florida; and ICBM test operations offi senior pilot who has logged over 2,500 hours in cer with the 576th Flight Test Squadron and tanker aircraft with experience in combat and chief of plans and programs at the 381st Train special-operations support. ing Group, Vandenberg AFB, California. A graduate of Squadron Officer School, Air Com mand and Staff College, and Air War College, Colonel Staats has previously published in Air and Space Power Journal.
Maj Timothy P. Franz (BS, University of Central Florida; MS, Central Michigan University; MS, Air Force Institute of Technology) is assigned to Barksdale AFB, Louisiana, to work on the stand- up of the new Cyber Command. In this role, he provides direct support to all Air Force network- attack squadrons. He previously served as an Lt Col Robert F. Mills, USAF, retired (BS, information-operations planner at Headquarters Montana State University; MS, Air Force Insti United States Strategic Command, Offutt AFB, tute of Technology; PhD, University of Kansas), Maj Matthew F. Durkin (USAFA; MS, Air Force Nebraska. Major Franz also helped stand up the is an assistant professor of electrical engineer Institute of Technology) is a resource analyst 23d Information Operations Squadron, where ing at the Air Force Institute of Technology at Headquarters USAF/A9 (Air Force Studies, he co-led the creation of Black Demon, the Air (AFIT), Wright-Patterson AFB, Ohio. He joined Analysis, Assessment, and Lessons Learned). Force’s first global network-defense exercise, and the AFIT faculty after serving 21 years as a com He previously served as test director for the A-10 spearheaded the publication of Air Force Tactics, munications officer in a variety of information- Aircraft Sustainment Squadron and as an A-10 Techniques, and Procedures (AFTTP) 3-1, vol. systems-management and engineering roles. aircraft-battle-damage-repair engineer at Hill 36, Information Warfare, 2001, the Air Force’s first His research interests include information op AFB, Utah. He led planning of a multimillion- information-operations tactics manual. Major erations and security, electronic warfare, net dollar test program to ensure successful inte Franz is a distinguished graduate of the Air work management, and systems engineering. gration of state-of-the-art targeting-pod and Force Institute of Technology, Squadron Offi Lieutenant Colonel Mills is a graduate of the precision-weapon capabilities on the A-10. Major cer School, and Undergraduate Space and US Army Command and General Staff College Durkin is a graduate of Squadron Officer School. Missile Training. and Joint Forces Staff College.
Bios.indd 126 4/30/07 8:16:08 AM CONTRIBUTORS 127
Maj Paul D. Williams (BS, University of Wash Maj Richard A. Raines, USAF, retired (BS, Col Mark C. “Marshal” Dillon (BS, Arizona State ington; MS, Air Force Institute of Technology; Florida State University; MS, Air Force Insti University; MA, Embry-Riddle Aeronautical Uni PhD, Purdue University) is an assistant profes tute of Technology; PhD, Virginia Polytechnic versity; MSS [Master of Strategic Studies], Air sor of computer science and cyber operations Institute and State University), is director, War College) serves as the US Transportation in the Department of Electrical and Computer Center for Information Security Education Command liaison to US Southern Command, Engineering at the Air Force Institute of Tech and Research, Department of Defense Trans Miami, Florida. His other staff assignment was at nology, Wright-Patterson AFB, Ohio. He has formation Chair, and associate professor of Headquarters US Air Force, Pentagon. Colonel served in many information-operations roles, electrical engineering, Graduate School of En Dillon began his career as a space shuttle systems both operational and supporting, for 17 years. gineering and Management, Air Force Insti engineer. A distinguished graduate of under His research interests center on cyber opera tute of Technology, Wright-Patterson AFB, Ohio. graduate pilot training, he has commanded the tions, including algorithms, artificial intelligence, A senior member of the Institute of Electron 22d Airlift Squadron at Travis AFB, California, and computer architecture. Major Williams is ics and Electrical Engineers, he has authored the 782d Expeditionary Airlift Squadron (the a distinguished graduate of the USAF School or coauthored more than 90 technical publi first C-5 combat deployment into Afghanistan of Applied Aerospace Sciences (in electronic cations in the areas of computer and satellite during Operation Enduring Freedom), and the communications and cryptographic systems), communications, communications theory, vul 97th Operations Group at Altus AFB, Oklahoma. Officer Training School, Basic Communications nerabilities of communications systems, and Prior to his current assignment, he served as Officer Training School, and the Air Force In information security. Major Raines is a gradu vice-commander, 97th Air Mobility Wing, Altus stitute of Technology. ate of Squadron Officer School and Air Com AFB. A distinguished graduate of Air Command mand and Staff College. and Staff College and a command pilot with more than 3,500 flying hours in the C-5, KC-10, T-38, C-17, and KC-135, Colonel Dillon has com bat experience in both the C-5 and KC-10.
Maj Rusty O. Baldwin, USAF, retired (BSEE, New Mexico State University; MS, Air Force In stitute of Technology; PhD, Virginia Polytech nic Institute and State University), is an associ ate professor of computer engineering at the Maj Samuel D. Bass (BS, University of Central Air Force Institute of Technology (AFIT), Florida; MS, Embry-Riddle Aeronautical Uni Maj Aaron A. Tucker (BS and MS, University of Wright-Patterson AFB, Ohio. Major Baldwin versity; MS, Air Force Institute of Technology) Southern California; MS University of Missouri– retired in 2004 after 23 years of active duty in is senior communications watch officer, Opera Rolla) is the C-17 flight commander and a C-5 the Air Force, which included assignments at tions Team 3, National Military Command Cen and C-17 experimental test pilot in the 418th Lowry AFB, Colorado, to attend technical ter, Pentagon, Washington, DC. He has been a Flight Test Squadron, Edwards AFB, California. school for the instrumentation-mechanic ca student at the Air Force Institute of Technology He has commanded combat missions into Af reer field; Holloman AFB, New Mexico, as an (AFIT), Wright-Patterson AFB, Ohio, and has ghanistan and Iraq as a C-5 flight-examiner instrumentation mechanic with the 6585th Test served as combat-communications flight com aircraft commander at Travis AFB, California. Group; and Los Angeles AFB, California, as a mander and contingency planner at Ramstein As an Air Force intern at the Pentagon, Major project officer for the Defense Meteorological Air Base, Germany; Air Mobility Command Tucker worked in the Military Personnel Policy Satellite Program. After earning his master’s network-operations and security-center flight Directorate of the Office of the Secretary of De degree at AFIT, he went to the Avionics Direc commander and group executive officer at fense, Rated Force Policy Branch in the Air torate of the Air Force Research Laboratory. Scott AFB, Illinois; commandant of cadets and Staff, and Congressional Action Division in the Following PhD studies at Virginia Polytechnic assistant professor of air and space studies at Air Force Secretariat. He graduated from the Institute and State University, he returned to AFROTC Detachment 20, Tucson, Arizona; and US Air Force Test Pilot School at Edwards AFB Wright-Patterson AFB to join the faculty of the missile combat-crew member, crew evaluator, and was honored by his classmates with the Electrical and Computer Engineering Depart and crew instructor at Malmstrom AFB, Mon Aaron C. (C-dot) George Award for best war ment at AFIT. Major Baldwin attended Squad tana. Major Bass is a graduate of intermediate rior focus to field the best weapon system pos ron Officer School and completed Air Com developmental education (AFIT) and Squad sible. Major Tucker is a distinguished graduate mand and Staff College by correspondence. ron Officer School. of Squadron Officer School.
Bios.indd 127 4/27/07 10:59:15 AM Subscription to the Air and Space Power Journal for People Not Affiliated with the Military or Government
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subscription.indd 128 4/27/07 11:13:17 AM EDITORIAL ADVISORY BOARD
Gen John A. Shaud, USAF, Retired Lt Gen Bradley C. Hosmer, USAF, Retired Maj Gen I. B. Holley Jr., USAFR, Retired, Duke University (professor emeritus) Col Steven D. Carey, USAF, College of Aerospace Doctrine, Research and Education Dr. J. Douglas Beason, Colonel, USAF, Retired, Los Alamos National Laboratory Dr. Alexander S. Cochran, National Defense University Prof. Thomas B. Grassey, Naval War College Lt Col Dave Mets, USAF, Retired, School of Advanced Air and Space Studies (professor emeritus)
Left to right : Lt Gen Stephen R. Lorenz, commander, Air University; Gen Stéphane Abrial, chief of staff , Armée de l ’air (French air force); Mr. Rémy Mauduit, editor, Air and Space Power Journal-Français ; and Gen T. Michael Moseley, chief of staff, US Air Force, during General Abrial ’s visit to Air University, Max- well AFB, Alabama (5 April 2007).
IInsidenside ccover.inddover.indd 3 55/16/2007/16/2007 33:17:13:17:13 PPMM