IECS Report 4 The Orthodox of : a of ? Tijs Gelens, December 2017, Institute of Eastern Christian Studies, Nijmegen

Introduction During more than 25 years after the fall of the Union, the Orthodox Church of Georgia, since 1977 under the guidance of Ilia II, has had a

very visible and vocal role in society. At the same time as the

Caucasus country was going through a transition period to become a modernized, liberal nation, the Orthodox Church of Georgia (OCG) blossomed. Throughout history, the Georgian people have often dealt with outside threats, and Orthodox was one of the main factors which preserved a sense of distinctiveness among during times like these. The OCG has naturally been cast in the role of a guardian of the Georgian

and independence. In the last decades the church has been able to 1 claim as such a privileged position in society and in the political sphere. Perhaps now more than ever it is believed that only a Georgian Orthodox Christian can be a genuine Georgian citizen – a train of thought that Georgia shares with many other former Soviet states. Because of this ethno-religious nationalism, being part of the Orthodox Church is more important than actively participating in it.1 As a result, despite the fact that according to its constitution Georgia is a secular society, has been able to function

as a voice of popular concern about changes perceived as threatening to the

Georgian-Orthodox identity and sense of distinctiveness.

Geographically outside of and rarely making headlines in the West, Contents Georgia is usually out of sight and thus out of mind. Yet for those with an Religious Landscape interest in Orthodox Christianity, for its intersection with the political sphere Historical Background and specific positions with regard to ecumenism, the Orthodox Church of A Christian Nation Georgia represents a fascinating case. The present text explores the role of Russian Occupation Georgian Orthodoxy in relation to society, the state, and other Christian After Independence churches in the context of Georgia’s Soviet history. First, however, it is worth Ecumenism taking a closer look at Georgia’s religious landscape. Conclusion Religious Landscape Just as in other former Soviet states, religion has acquired a new significance 1 See the report by the Pew Research since Georgia regained its independence in 1991. Currently, Georgia is home Center on Christianity in Eastern and Central Europe, including Georgia, to five religious groups which have historical roots in the country: the published in 2017.

Orthodox Church, , the , the Apostolic Armenian Church, and . Throughout its history Georgia has been influenced by many different cultural and religious traditions. Christianity has been present in the region since the early fourth century and became an important religious and political factor as

early as the sixth century. Accordingly, the Georgians see themselves as one of the oldest Christian nations with a history reaching back to the early ages after the dawn of Christianity. Today, Orthodox Christianity forms the largest religious group. Between 80% and 90% of the Georgians, out of a population of about 3.7 million, identify themselves as Orthodox. Islam has a long historical presence in Georgia, as the country has bordered on, or has been part of, the Islamic since the early conquests.

Today, about 9% of the Georgian identify themselves as Muslim. are predominantly settled in the Autonomous of , to a lesser degree in the breakaway region of , and in the regions along the border with and . Roman Catholic and Armenian make up the remaining religious groups. Armenian Christians are

mostly settled along the border with in the region, but also in the cities, where they have a longstanding presence, especially in and in the capital . The Jewish population, which is said to have arrived in Georgia during the Babylonian exile in the sixth century BCE, is now located mainly in Tbilisi. During the last decades it has been rapidly shrinking, largely

due to migration to .

Also, as liberal politicians were set to modernize the country and the borders

were opened to missionaries, Georgia has seen a modest rise of other 2 Christian (mostly Protestant) churches, such as Baptists, Pentecostals and Jehovah’s Witnesses. Simultaneously, the OCG enjoyed exclusive political support. The perceived inequality between Orthodoxy and other religious groups has sparked a debate about the rights of ‘foreign’ religions, as well as

about the position of the older religious minorities in Georgian society.

Regions of present-day Georgia

What is the nature of the privileges granted to the OCG? And why exactly has the OCG been given, or is able to claim, such an exclusive role in the construction of national identity? In order to find an explanation, one needs to turn to the past, as the Georgians themselves so often do.

Historical Background Religion in Georgia is perceived as the most important link between the present and the past. Orthodoxy, together with the Georgian script and language, has been a true force in a long history of conflicts, foreign

occupation, and territorial fragmentation. Historians may disagree about the exact importance of the church in certain historical episodes, and the current narrative about a centuries- entails decidedly modern elements, such as merging nationalism with religious identity. However, it is precisely this strong notion of continuity that empowers the ‘invented traditions’ shaping contemporary realities and thus explains the

position of the OCG today. That being said, it is important to point out that reading history exclusively along the lines of Orthodox Christianity creates the risk of denying the role of other religious groups in the creation of the present- day nation. Chronological overview 400 BCE Kingdom of () 66 BCE Protectorate of

±330 Conversion of King Mirian III to Christianity Christianity becomes official religion of the 4th century Conquered by Sassanid Persians 665 Conquered by 1089-1213 Reunification of the Georgian kingdom Georgian under the Builder (r. 1089-1125) and Queen Tamar (r. 1184-1213) 1236-1330 Conquered by 3 1386-1403 Invasions by Tamerlane Territorial fragmentation 16th century-early 18th Invasions by Persians and Ottomans century 1783 Protectorate of 1801-1917 Annexation by 1921-1991 Tbilisi taken by the Army Georgia becomes part of 1991 Independence of Georgia 2003 2008 Russo-Georgian War South and Abkhazia by Russia

A Christian nation According to a tradition popularized in the ninth century, the first Christian communities in Georgia were founded by the apostles and Simon the

Canaanite. It has been stated that Georgia was one of the first Christian nations, if not the first one. Historians generally agree that Christianity has been present in Georgia as early as the fourth century. Around 330 (or a decade earlier, according to some sources), King Mirian III of Kartli, which was a kingdom in the center of modern-day Georgia, got converted to Christianity by St. Nino, a healer from . Nino received the title of ‘enlightener

of Georgia’ and to this day she is revered as a national saint. After the in 451, the Kartvelian church joined the jurisdiction of the of , but was granted partial soon afterwards. During the eleventh century the chief prelate of the church adopted the title

of patriarch, a sign that the church had an increasing number of followers and was able to function as an independent institution. Towards the end of the eleventh century one of the country’s most celebrated kings, David the Builder

(1089-1125), united a fragmented political constellation and defeated the Seljuk Turks, who had invaded the region several decades earlier. This marked the start of the , which lasted until the thirteenth century. It is from this point on that we can speak of an autocephalous Orthodox Church of Georgia. The church managed to maintain its independent status and to survive despite the fact that up until the the region of contemporary Georgia was

occupied and influenced by various outside forces, each one of which introduced a variety of religious and cultural traditions. Most of these prominent occupiers reflect the complexity of the Georgian territorial history: Persia, the Arabs, the Mongols, the , and Imperial and Soviet Russia have all ruled over (parts of) the country. Only when Georgia was

annexed by Russia in the early nineteenth century, the autocephalic status of the OCG was annulled. The earlier occupation by the Islamic Ottoman Empire stimulated a stronger bond between Christianity and the Georgian identity, which became in fact inseparable during the two centuries of Russian domination.

Russian occupation During the period of Russian occupation church independence in Georgia was curtailed, and it is precisely because of this experience that Orthodox 4 Christianity takes such a prominent position in present-day Georgia. After its autocephaly was abolished in 1811, the OCG was absorbed into the Russian

Holy , the official institution ruling the church after the Great’s reforms a century earlier. In this way, Georgia became an exarchate of the Russian church. Georgian Orthodoxy was subjected to a policy of russification. Particularly painful was the suppression of the : the church services were conducted in Church Slavonic, and Russian became the language

of (theological) education. Furthermore, many monasteries were closed down

and church property was confiscated. As a result, the became financially dependent on the state and corruption within the church increased rapidly. Large amounts of the churches’ treasures were sold or stolen, and the maintenance of church buildings was neglected. The Georgian people became estranged from their own church and church attendance strongly declined.

The country enjoyed a certain degree of freedom when the

broke out in 1917. The Georgian church managed to make use of this generally chaotic period by reclaiming autocephaly and electing a new patriarch.2 However, the situation soon worsened when Georgia was incorporated into the Soviet Union in 1921. The OCG was left intact, but the atheist regime severely restricted the activities of the church. It was deprived of legal status,

rights and possessions, and was subjected to persecution. This led to a further impoverishment of the church, a declining number of believers and a drop in the recruitment of new clergy. 2 The autocephaly was only recognized The seventy years of atheist policy had a significant impact on religious life. by the Russian church in 1943 and by the Ecumenical Patriarch on March 3, This period led to a so-called ‘domestication of religion’. The closure of church 1990. buildings, the persecution of clergy members and the general lack of trust in the church led to structural problems. As a result, religious faith and practice

became restricted to the sphere of the household. The performance of liturgy and rites, normally a prominent task of the , was often taken up by laypersons. Even today, home shrines, which in many towns were a necessity

in the twentieth century, are still very common, and they have remained important as a symbol of a household’s Orthodox identity. The consequences of the Communist persecution were felt well into the . According to some sources, even today communal Christian life is affected by the lack of knowledge and experience of the laity (many of whom had an atheist upbringing), as well as by an inadequate church infrastructure.

As a result of the repression exercised upon the Orthodox Church Georgian

Orthodoxy came to function as a marker of national identity. Just as in other countries (such as ), the Soviet era was perceived as one of occupation by a foreign power. The OCG was seen as the institution that unified the nation. After , Orthodoxy came to be a strong representative of Georgian identity. After a period in which independence of the church was

severely restricted, the Georgian language was re-established as the liturgical language and the autocephalic status of the church was restored. In short, the church was Georgian again. Matters improved even further when Stalin, being of Georgian origin and also being a former seminarist, forced the to recognize Georgian autocephaly in 1943. Religion and ethnicity were now used to set the Georgians apart from surrounding peoples,

a process that was stimulated by the development of a distinct historical narrative. Also because of the lack of other stable and commonly accepted national institutions (outside the framework of the Communist party), Georgian Orthodoxy came to represent a Georgian cultural identity, and took 5 up the role of an important carrier of the national discourse. Ideas of religious

belonging and ethnic origin subsequently merged. As a consequence, after the collapse of the Soviet Union, the OCG retained strong patriotic, often nationalist, characteristics, and the idea that one needed to be Orthodox in order to be truly Georgian (or to be more precise, that one needed to be an ethnic Georgian Orthodox Christian to be truly Georgian) was perpetuated.

After Independence Two important things happened once the Soviet Union fell apart and independence was proclaimed in 1991. Firstly, the ideological and socio-

cultural vacuum left by communism was quickly filled by the OCG. Thanks to the new law on religion, which was passed during the final phase of the Soviet Union, people were allowed to profess their religion again and this helped the church to further consolidate its role as an upholder of Georgian identity. Secondly, after gaining independence and after the establishment of a

national government, the role of the OCG as a symbol of identity was codified and employed by the leaders of the new republic. Because of its influential position the church managed to contribute to the state-building process of a country that was still divided. In return, the OCG was allowed to claim a privileged status among religious and other institutions in Georgia. In his

inauguration speech, the republic’s first president, , who

was a former anti-Soviet and pro-Georgian dissident, made no secret of his sympathies for the OCG. According to him, the Orthodox Church and the government were united in a special union. They had mutually supported each other throughout history and should, therefore, continue to do so.

Though Gamsakhurdia was forced to flee the country after the coup d’état in 1992, the OCG continued to enjoy a privileged position in the Georgian state. In 1995 a new constitution was adopted which declared the separation of

church and state, and at the same time recognized the special role of the OCG in the history of Georgia. This last recognition was mainly symbolic, but nonetheless significant. The special relation between the OCG and the state was further specified in a constitutional agreement in 2002, which granted the church special legal provisions. For example, the OCG clergy were granted the exclusive right to be active in the penitentiary system and the church was

allowed to appoint teachers of religious studies in public education. It also provided the church with material benefits by exempting it from paying taxes on wages, property, and on the sale of religious objects. Another example of the state acting in favor of the OCG is the restitution for ‘the material and moral damages’ suffered by the OCG under the Soviet regime. In the period

between 2002 and 2013, the OCG received an estimated 200 million lari ($125 million), together with luxurious gifts, real estate in Tbilisi and large plots of land from the state. After 2007, when Patriarch Ilia II assisted in de-escalating the tension built up during a political crisis and the subsequent protests, the annual state funding more than tripled. Only in 2014 the Georgian adopted a resolution that allowed the government to also compensate other

religious organizations for the damages suffered during the Soviet period.

After the peaceful Rose Revolution of 2003, the government attempted to alter its course of action regarding religion, and yet again it found the political weight of the OCG unavoidable. Following the Rose Revolution was elected president on a pro-western platform aimed 6 towards secularization and modernization of the country. This meant that the

privileged status of Orthodox Christianity needed to be addressed. One sign that Saakashvili meant business when ensuring religious freedom was the arrest of the former Georgian Orthodox Basil Mkalavishvili. Mkalavishvili was excommunicated in 1996 and after that he joined the fundamentalist Old Calendarist church. Between 1999 and 2002 Mkalavishvili led a series of violent attacks against religious minority groups, such as Jehovah’s Witnesses,

Pentecostals and Baptists, but also against Catholics. Although he publicly admitted being behind these attacks, neither the police nor the government did much to stop him. The patriarchate refrained from commenting on the attacks and only officially condemned his actions in 2002, when he set fire to

Bibles in a bookstore run by Baptists. After the Rose Revolution Mkalavishvili

lost his protection and he was arrested and sentenced to seven years in prison.3

Another step in Saakashvili’s secularization program was the Law on General

Education of 2005. The law was intended to secularize the educational system by restricting religious education and the display of religious symbols, as well as forbidding indoctrination and proselytizing in public schools. Though not specifically directed against the OCG, the law was meant to rein in the dominant position of the church in the school system, which had been allowed

under previous legislative acts. The law was not successful, however. Since it limited the role of Orthodoxy in public education, it was met with strong 3 In 2013 The reported that resistance and led to massive protests against the government. Ultimately, as Basil Mkalavishvili was involved in anti- is often the case in the post-Soviet sphere, secularization and modernization gay protests alongside other Orthodox were perceived as threatening when they appeared to prevent the display and priests. development of a sense of national identity. In some circles, secular law was

seen as just as restrictive as the laws of the Soviet regime, intended to isolate the church from society. Eventually, the government lost and the law remained largely unimplemented.

Saakashvili’s intention to modernize the country was crucial, as well as the fact

that he recognized the importance of human rights and the pluralistic nature of Georgian society. Even if his actions provoked a serious backlash, the situation of religious minorities has been gradually improving since his presidency. Still, Saakashvili also found himself veering towards religious nationalism. In part, he had to rely on the political legitimization of the OCG to appease those critical of his secularization program, but he also needed to

promote the Georgian Orthodox identity in support of his state-building plans. Another of his election promises was to bring unity to a regionally divided country. This becomes evident not only in the rise of state funding for the OCG during his two-term presidency, but also in Saakashvili’s course regarding the symbols of the state. Prominent examples are his inauguration ceremony in

2003 at the grave of the medieval king David the Builder, prior to which he was blessed by Patriarch Ilia II, and the adoption of the current five-cross flag in 2004.

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A report on international religious freedom published in Augustus 2017 by the US Department of State shows that as of 2016 the OCG still enjoys more state privileges than any other religious group. According to this report, religious minorities receive only a fraction of the tax benefits that the OCG enjoys, and the restitutions that have been granted to them are meager in comparison to

what has been given to the Orthodox Church. Moreover, minorities regularly face discrimination and intolerance in various sectors of society. The report mentions discrimination in schools and in the media, as well as cases of vandalism and physical assaults. In short, since the independence of Georgia, it has proven difficult for the Georgian government to avoid favoring Orthodox Christianity, even when it

has professed the intention to secularize.

But what were the consequences of independence and the subsequent policies from the perspective of Orthodoxy itself? Most illustrative are perhaps the effects of the restitution policy. Because the OCG has received many plots of land, the church has been able to enlarge its public visibility over the last fifteen years. Everywhere crosses have been erected and new churches are

being built, especially in highly symbolic and visible places, also in places with no local congregation. Just as for many Orthodox Georgians being part of the Orthodox Church is more important than actively participating in it, symbolism

also seems more important than practical consequences.

Since the independence of Georgia, the OCG has also been able to play a more active role on the political arena. Because the church, as an institution independent from the state, represents (conservative) national values, people are able to distance themselves from the government through Orthodox Christianity. An example for this can be found in the later protests against president Saakashvili. The protesters have often shown that anything that

goes against Georgia’s ‘Orthodox’ or ‘national’ values (the two can be used interchangeably here) can be experienced as an attack on the Georgian identity. In defense, the people gather in the name of Orthodoxy to make demands that might seem not related to religion at all. Nothing better displays the role given to the OCG in safeguarding ‘Georgianness’. In turn, the way

Orthodoxy is used by the people to voice discontent (a ‘popular politicization’ of the church), forces politicians from across the political spectrum to seek the support of the Patriarch as well. Willingly or not, far from just being a spiritual figure, Ilia has long ago also become a political actor. Moreover, clergy members generally feel free to openly participate in protests, and they, as well as the Patriarch, do not shy away from voicing their opinions on political issues.

On the other hand, Ilia has acted as a mediator between the government and the protesters on more than one occasion. His political weight has also had an impact in international relations. During and after the Russo-Georgian War in of 2008 the Patriarch used his influence and contacts with the Russian 8 patriarchate to de-escalate the situation and to facilitate the diplomatic

relations between the two countries.

Ecumenism

A final illustration of the direction the OCG has been heading since 1991 is its relation with other Christian churches. Isolated from the outside world and subjected to renewed restrictions after World War II, the OCG applied for membership in the World Council of Churches (WCC) in 1962. The OCG, whose autocephaly was not yet recognized by the Ecumenical Patriarch at this time, was able through the WCC to re-establish contacts with other Christian

communities, particularly with the other Orthodox churches. For a while, participation in the ecumenical movement remained a challenge. All contacts and official encounters took place under the surveillance of the Soviet secret service; travels were restricted and it was sometimes difficult to invite partners from abroad. Despite the prevailing context of control, propaganda

and mistrust, actual contacts with other Christian communities could be made. In 1977 Ilia II, who had announced to be a staunch supporter of the ecumenical movement, was elected patriarch. The OCG attended conferences held by the WCC more frequently and strengthened its ties with other churches. Within Georgia, too, Ilia fostered inter-confessional relations, for example by

participating in the church services of other denominations.

Attitudes towards other confessions changed with the fall of the Soviet Union.

This shift, however, had already been initiated during the Soviet era. Soviet historians had made efforts to rewrite the history of Georgia and to influence the way Georgians related to ‘outsiders’. In Adjara, for example, the period of Ottoman domination was described as one of repression and decline in which

Orthodox Georgians were forced to convert to Islam. Muslims were vilified and the Ottoman period was juxtaposed to the Golden Age, in which Georgia prospered under an Orthodox king and an Orthodox church. Such an

interpretation of history stimulated some Georgians to feel antagonism towards anyone who was not ethnically Georgian. The antagonistic attitude was pursued further in the religious-nationalist discourse after Georgia became independent and was incorporated as an integral part of Georgian identity (as discussed above). This development coincided with the introduction of new freedoms, including the freedom of religion. While

Orthodox Christians were able to practice their faith openly and in public again, the new environment made it possible also for ‘new’, mainly Protestant churches, to settle in Georgia. Religious pluralism clashed with the dominant religious nationalism, which caused anti-ecumenical sentiments among the church hierarchy to come to the fore. Matters came to a head in 1997 when a

group of monks called the ecumenical movement ‘heresy’ and threatened with if the OCG would not leave the WCC immediately. Despite his previous activities in the WCC, Ilia soon afterwards decided that it was more important to preserve unity within his church. He saw no other alternative but to give in to the demands. In 2016, during the final preparations for the first Pan-Orthodox Council to be held on Crete, Ilia acted as a more conservative hierarch. Days before the

opening of the council in June, Ilia announced that he would not attend. In an official statement, he explained that unity within the Orthodox Church needed to be reached before an event like this could be organized. He stated that this required more time. Several observers have noted that the absence of the 9 Georgian Patriarch (along with that of his Russian and Bulgarian colleagues)

can also be interpreted as an act of implicit criticism towards the Ecumenical Patriarch, Bartholomew I, who had already for some time been engaged in a friendly dialogue with the Catholic Church and with several Protestant churches. In an earlier statement the same year Ilia had indeed made clear that his interpretation of the relation between the Orthodox Church and the rest of the Christian world was decidedly more conservative.

Ilia’s statements in 2016 were strikingly similar to the sentiments of the anti-

ecumenical group of 1997. Not only did the protesters within the OCG protest on both occasions against a policy of rapprochement which would place Orthodox Christianity on equal footing with other churches. They also expressed conservative opinions on issues such as mixed-marriages and homosexuality. Even though the anti-ecumenical clergy of 1997 were

denounced because they had threatened to cause a schism, the fact that their demands were honored validated their agenda in the end. Therefore, it is probably not surprising that the modernizing and westernizing trends in Georgia over the past few decades have been met with enduring and growing conservative and anti-ecumenical sentiments.

Conclusion

Since 1991 Georgian Orthodoxy has gone through a period of resurgence. It

developed parallel and in response to a state that has been looking for ways

to approach the West while maintaining its own identity. The Orthodox Church played both a positive and a problematic role in this process. It has provided stability and a sense of unity (perhaps even a sense of purpose) in a country that has gone through rapid changes and has seen many conflicts as a result.

Simultaneously, Orthodoxy has been of discontent that prevented the government from making radical changes to the way Georgian Orthodoxy relates to society. Furthermore, the merging of nation and Orthodox

Christianity in a common narrative and patterns of identity has negatively impacted attempts to further integrate the non-Georgian and non-Orthodox population. This is just one of the many challenges that the future holds . It will be interesting to see how the relations with Europe and with the USA, on the one hand, and with Russia, on the other, will develop, and what the role of the OCG (if any) will be in fostering these relations. Likewise,

it will be interesting to see if the position of religious minorities will improve in the future. But most importantly, it will be interesting to see what will happen to the OCG, to its relation with the rest of Christianity and to its central position in Georgia under Ilia II’s successor.

Sources and further reading Tamara Grdzelidze, ‘The Orthodox Church of Georgia: Challenges under and Freedom (1990-2009)’, International Journal for the Study of

the Christian Church, 10.2-3 (2010), pp. 160-175.

Tamara Grdzelidze, Martin George, Lukas Vischer eds., Witness Through The Institute of Eastern Christian Studies (Instituut voor Oosters Troubled Times: A History of the Orthodox Church of Georgia, 1811 to the – IVOC) is a research Present (, 2006). institute connected to the Radboud University Nijmegen (), Tornike Metreveli, ‘An Undisclosed Story of Roses: Church, State, and Nation focusing on the history and current in Contemporary Georgia’, Nationalities Papers, 44.5 (2016), pp. 694-712. situation of the Eastern Christian communities, in Southeast and Eastern Mathijs Pelkmans, Defending the Border: Identity, Religion, and Modernity in 10 Europe, the Russian Federation, the the Republic of Georgia (Ithaca and London, 2006). and as well as in transnational diasporas. This new series H. Rapp, ‘Georgian Christianity’, in The Blackwell Companion to of Reports aims to contribute to the , Ken Parry ed. (Oxford, 2007), pp. 137-155. public debate by highlighting how these Christian communities influence and , Edge of Empires: A History of Georgia (London, 2012). are influenced by current religious, cultural and political developments. Silvia Serrano, ‘De-Secularizing National Space in Georgia’, Identity Studies, 2 (2010), pp. 37-58. IECS is an independent nonprofit organization, working in close Silvia Serrano, ‘The Georgian Church. Embodiment of National Unity or association with the Radboud University Opposition Force?’, Russian and Law, 52.4 (2014), pp. 74-92. in Nijmegen. In addition to funding from the Radboud University, the institute relies on private funding for its regular Internet sources work. This report series is partly funded for by PIN (Solidariteitsbijdrage van de U.S. Department of State, Bureau of Democracy, Human Rights, and Labor, gezamenlijke religieuzen in Nederland). Georgia 2016 International Religious Freedom Report

For more information on the topic of https://www.state.gov/j/drl/rls/irf/religiousfreedom/index.htm#wrapper this report, contact the office ([email protected]). See further Pew Research Center, Religion & Public Life, Religious Belief and National ru.nl/ivoc and @IvOCNijmegen. Belonging in Central and : National and Religious Identities Converge in a Region once Dominated by Atheist Regimes, (2017) Info http://www.pewforum.org/2017/05/10/religious-belief-and-national- [email protected] tel.: +31 24 361 56 03 belonging-in-central-and-eastern-europe/ http://www.ru.nl/ivoc

Address Images Radboud University Nijmegen Map: Wiki Commons Erasmusplein 1 https://commons.wikimedia.org/wiki/File:Gg-map.png 6525 HT Nijmegen Flag: Wiki Commons

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