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The Hidden History of the Financial Crisis Free Ebook ALL THE DEVILS ARE HERE: THE HIDDEN HISTORY OF THE FINANCIAL CRISIS DOWNLOAD FREE BOOK Bethany McLean, Joe Nocera | 416 pages | 30 Aug 2011 | Penguin Putnam Inc | 9781591844389 | English | New York, United States All the Devils are Here: The Hidden History of the Financial Crisis I've read a significant amount of academic literature on the topic, but this one still filled in the gaps, as I didn't yet have a good grasp of what was going on in the ratings agencies. There are a couple places where I got a little bogged down but what can you expect from book about economics. And nobody in any government position, including the Oval Office, calls all the shots. Readers with a non-finance background should not be dismayed by the parade of ever more complex financial tools described in this book: Tranches, derivatives, collateralized debt obligations CDO'sCDO's squared, credit enhancements, and credit default swaps. But in some other corner of the economy, easy money is almost certainly All the Devils Are Here: The Hidden History of the Financial Crisis to feed hubris and greed. Rome wasn't built in a day, and neither were the seeds of the financial crisis sewn in a week. Roubini excels more at explaining more of the economics in systemic big-picture terms and also laying out reform proposals to prevent the next crisis, but overreaches quite a bit with the latter and reads a bit more like a textbook due to a lack of characters and narrative. Peter This answer contains spoilers… view spoiler [A part of the answer appears to appear on p. Other editions. Dec 28, Erika Johansen rated it it was amazing. I'm heading toward the finish but wanted to share my thoughts. It has a pretty good flow to it. If you don't understand what a derivative All the Devils Are Here: The Hidden History of the Financial Crisis, don't sweat it. Hardcoverpages. This article about a book on finance is a stub. Despite its minor flaws, I consider this book both a must-read and a very enjoyable read as well. Lewis has plenty of narrative, concentrating on several individuals with a good view as to what was going on, but is a bit narrowly focused. Look for a spike in fees - that's what the majority of wall st runs on. Sort order. I could vomit. Soon investment vehicles were being created that were full of junk which were getting the highest ratings from rating agencies. For example, none other than the government first securitized mortgages. Automotive industry crisis California budget crisis Housing bubble Housing market correction Subprime mortgage crisis. Hidden categories: All stub articles. Neither are the first time home buyer credits or the numerous things Congress thought of and shied away from, allowing the crisis to extend further than maybe it had to. This belief, they explain, provided camouflage for all manner of chicanery, putting people into houses they could not afford and erecting corrupt investment empires on the notion that unrealistic mortgage payments would All the Devils Are Here: The Hidden History of the Financial Crisis continue to flow. Hoenig, the president of the Kansas City Federal Reserve Bank, warn that Bernanke is repeating the mistake of his predecessor, Greenspan, who employed similar measures to combat the recession that followed the dot-com crash of For example, Alan Greenspan believed in the free market, not surprising in someone who, early on, had bought the Ayn Rand line. Tea Party protests United States; c. The fact former lobbyists are now running agencies that are supposed to police the very industries they lobbied for is not a good sign. Larry Summers was blinded by his deep-seated need to be viewed as a brilliant man, which in this case meant embracing, uncritically, the complexities of modern finance. Great Recession. Greed certainly had its place there, and it lasted not only through the years to the crash, but right through the government's infusion of help in the way of money and taking over certain areas to control the financial future in a certain way. It's not shrill. If he failed to do this he would have to answer to his depositors. But the buck stops. It wasn't enough that the regulatory agencies' teeth had dulled considerably over the All the Devils Are Here: The Hidden History of the Financial Crisis and that the powers-that-were in the Clinton Administration had refused to sharpen them. For their part, McLean and Nocera concentrate on the basics and bring them together in brisk, well- organized chapters. Most importantly, it cemented what I knew and made me aware of what I don't understand I can't quite get my head around synthetic CDO's, as yet. An incredibly well-ordered explanation of what happened to us all in the mortgage meltdown. The broader picture they paint is of techniques to manage risk. Lenders, he said, were able to judge the risk posed by individual applicants and to price that risk accordingly. If the stakes are high enough, greed can and will topple global financial institutions. This included mortgage securities which pre were mainly steady and reliable. There is more than enough blame to go around for more than one party. But back to Topic A: the financial crisis. All the Devils Are Here: The Hidden History of the Financial Crisis The New York Times. I thought I understood what happened, and I did, but I also had no idea of the personalities, unintended consequences, evil and good actors, including citizens and CEOs who brought on the economic recession. This is an amazing book, and one I imagine I'll return to. The right place was in a mortgage bank or financial firm, and the right time was the decade or so leading up to the financial crisis. I continue to read as much as I can about the Crisis of Help Learn to edit Community portal Recent changes Upload file. How you all failed us! The Fed! If this is the reward for failure, what would be the reward for success? How Freddie Mac and Fanny May played a pivotal role in selling sub-prime mortgage securities, and how the regulators who were supposed to oversee didn't have a strong hold on the risk and the safety issues of the securities being created, how the rating agencies were bribed or attended to - in order to get higher ratings for securities that consisted of pure junk, how Goldman Sachs was smart enough to survive through the crisis, but by betting against its own clients, and acting against the interest of its clients, how Lehmann Brothers, Countrywide, AIG, and other players were actually negligent of the risks that they were undertaking, how Goldman played a pivotal role in AIG's downfall, and so on and so forth - all these are covered in this book. It won't be the last. This book shows that we all deserve to know more about a twisted world that not only affects us more than we think, but more importantly, feeds off the common man's ignorance. Bethany McLean and Joseph Nocera. This books details the actions of the major organizations that contributed to the housing bubble All the Devils Are Here: The Hidden History of the Financial Crisis burst in But, guess what? The decider-in-chief may not have played a meaningful role in economic decision-making if only because it's highly doubtful he had a clue about what was going on. The focus is the building blocks of derivative contracts based on mortgages, passing off more and more risk in financial instruments as non-risky investments. The cast is large: one hundred main characters are listed, with many others getting a mention while not in the list. In the interconnected global world market, the reality is these days no one is safe. More Details Larry Summers was blinded by his deep-seated need to be viewed as All the Devils Are Here: The Hidden History of the Financial Crisis brilliant man, which in this case meant embracing, uncritically, the complexities of modern finance. The whole situation was a "boiled frog" one. This book includes regulatory agencies, the Federal Reserve, mortgage lenders, and wall st. I think the most surprising thing I learned about this aspect of the business was that a low percentage of the various sorts of risky mortgages were actually given to buy new homes; mostly these mortgages were refinancings. Other Editions Everyone is in bed with everyone else, and nobody is wearing a condom. Finally, All the Devils Are Here provided it. Several thoughts from my reading: 1. Dec 12, perfectlyGoodInk rated it it was amazing. So while this book may not have you on the edge of your seat, the authors have done an excellent job in accounting for the financial collapse ofthe aftershocks of which impoverish us still. Goodreads helps you keep track of books you want to read. Policymakers also saw no need to regulate derivatives, which they too saw as risk-free. Not so incidentally, these same three geniuses were also instrumental in fashioning "The Washington Consensus" that guided the work of the International Monetary Fund and the World Bank and caused tens of millions of people to starve in dozens of developing nations over the last decade and a half. Don't worry; it's really interesting as well as informative. It's simply adding responsible checks and All the Devils Are Here: The Hidden History of the Financial Crisis into a system that's gotten far too big and complicated for its own good where the lunatics are running the asylum -- dressed in Armani suits and spouting economical equations that us "little people" just can't possibly understand.
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