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Status, Competition, and Violent Islamic Mobilization in Indonesia

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Status, Competition, and Violent Islamic Mobilization in Indonesia Radical Leaders: Status, Competition, and Violent Islamic Mobilization in Indonesia By Alexandre Paquin-Pelletier A thesis submitted in conformity with the requirements for the degree of Doctor of Philosophy Political Science University of Toronto © Copyright by Alexandre Pelletier, 2019 Radical Leaders: Status, Competition, and Violent Islamic Mobilization in Indonesia Alexandre Paquin-Pelletier Doctor of Philosphy Department of Political Science University of Toronto 2019 Abstract Why do some Muslim leaders radicalize while others do not? Drawing on a study of radical mobilization in Indonesia, this dissertation argues that Muslim leaders radicalize when they find religious authority hard to gain and maintain. It makes two specific points: 1) radical mobilization is more likely among weak and precarious religious leaders, those with few followers and little institutionalization; and, 2) weak and precarious leaders are more likely to radicalize in crowded and competitive religious markets, because they need to be creative if they want to survive. It argues that weak Muslim leaders, in competitive environment, are the ones most likely to use strategies of outbidding, scapegoating, and provocation. The dis- sertation’s empirical puzzle is the cross-regional variations in Islamist mobilization observed in post-transition Java, Indonesia. Since 1999, radical groups have proliferated and mobi- lized more in some regions than others. The study finds that in regions with radical groups and mobilization, most clerics have weak religious institutions, fragmented networks, and operate in competitive religious markets. In these markets, radical mobilization provides ii low-status clerics with a cheap and efficient way to bolster their religious authority. In re- gions where radical groups did not proliferate, most clerics have strong religious institutions with deep roots in society, extensive networks, and operate in much less competitive reli- gious environments. In these markets, clerics do not feel the same urge to mobilize, as reli- gious authority is more secure, stable, and routinized. The origins of these religious markets are traced back to sub-regional variations in the process of state building. State building strategies had long-lasting consequences on contemporary Muslim institutions by shaping subsequent political cleavages and state policies toward Islam. This dissertation is based on 13 months of fieldwork in Indonesia, 124 interviews with Muslim clerics and activists, and a new dataset of Java’s 15,000 Islamic boarding schools and their 30,000 Muslim clerics. iii Acknowledgments It has been a long journey, but a stimulating and fulfilling one! I would not have made it to the end without the dedicated support and energy of so many people. First and foremost, I owe my most sincere and heartfelt thanks to my supervisor, Jacques Bertrand, who made my experience in the program incredibly unique and rich. I thank you first for your patience and for never stopping to believe that I would complete this dissertation, even when I was not sure myself. I also thank you for giving me the confidence to study a topic and a region that fascinate me. Thanks for guiding me in the right direction, for your insightful questions, and for giving me the space to grow intellectually and develop my own ideas. Your frankness (especially about my awkward English at times!) and rigour helped me turn this dissertation into something better, but also helped me become a much better scholar. But Jacques, you were more than a supervisor to me, you gave me amazing opportunities, you were an ex- traordinary mentor, a wonderful travel companion, and you have become a friend. Merci infiniment! I thank my two other committee members, Lucan A. Way and the late Lee Ann Fujii, for their amazing work. Thanks Lucan for helping me see the broader picture and for your en- couragement and commenting on my work. As I finished and defended my dissertation, I could not but think of Lee Ann Fujii who left us too early. As a scholar of political violence and identity, I was profoundly influenced and inspired by her work, and especially the way she approached fieldwork. She will never read the final version of this dissertation, but I hope she would have been proud of it. I would like to thank Aisha Ahmad whose enthusiasm for my work gave me confidence that I was saying something important and relevant. Thanks for being such a good mentor and a role model. Finally, I want to thank John T. Sidel from the London School of Economics for his excellent reading of my dissertation, for chal- iv lenging me at the defense, and for his amazing comments that will shape future iterations of this project. I feel privileged to have joined a community of scholars that welcomed me with open arms and that sees its role as helping the new generation do well. The AAS Conferences and SEAREG meetings have become like old friends reunions for me. I have enormously bene- fited from the generous suggestions, criticisms, and encouragement, at various stages of my dissertation, of Michael Buehler, Greg Fealy, Kikue Hamayotsu, Robert W. Hefner, Allen Hicken, Sana Jaffrey, Eunsook Jung, Erik Martinez Kuhonta, Diana Kim, Rita Smith Kipp, Edmund Malesky, Jeremy Menchik, Tom Pepinsky, Dan Slater, and Yuhki Tajima. I have also benefited over the years from the support of many members of the broader academic community such as Dominique Caouette, Isabelle Côté, Alain G. Gagnon, Tania Murray Li, Matthew I. Mitchell, and Ardeth Maung Thawnghmung. I owe a very special thanks to Jer- emy Menchik and Isabelle Côté for their friendship, and for being just amazing and generous mentors. I will pay it forward, I promise. At the University of Toronto, besides my dissertation committee, I have learned a lot from the late Richard Simeon, who rapidly believed in me and who I miss dearly. I have also ap- preciated the encouragement of Neil Nevitte and all my conversations with Donald Forbes. The staff of the Department of Political Science is simply extraordinary. I would like to thank them all for making Sidney Smith’s cinder block walls so much warmer and welcom- ing. I especially want to thank Carolynn Branton and Sari Sherman for everything they did for me. I will keep sending pictures of Louise, I promise. I owe a deep gratitude to many people in Indonesia, who gave both time and energy to help me conduct this research. I have learned so much more than this dissertation could ever con- vey. I had the privilege to meet genuinely friendly, welcoming, and generous people and I would like to apologize to all of you for any mistake I may have committed, especially for not being “halus” enough sometimes or for other unintentional cultural missteps. I owe spe- cial thanks to my friend Wawan Gunawan who made a lot of this research possible and who made my trips to the Priangan so much more fun. Many thanks to Abdil Mughis Mudhoffir, Abdul Karim Addakhil, Ahmad Bastomi, Ahmad Suaedy, Sukron Hadi, Ali Munhanif, Andi Rahman Alamsyah, Dadi Darmadi, Hunaifi Mas’oed, Andi Rahman, Ahmad Zainul Hamdi, v Jalaluddin, Shohei Nakamura, Sri Nuryanti, Sukirman Marshan, and Wahyuni Widyaning- sih. To all of you, and those I cannot name here, terima kasih atas segalanya! My colleagues and friends have greatly enriched my time in graduate school on both an in- tellectual and personal level. It always felt good to share meals, drinks, laughs, and also to picket with you all. I want to thank for their friendship over the years Noaman Ali, Gabriel Arsenault, Ozlem Aslan, Karlo Basta, Ève Bourgeois, Dragana Bodruzic, Yi-Chun Chien, Yannick Dufresne, Min Do, Ahmad Fuad Fanani, Marie Gagné, Carmen Jacqueline Ho, Da- vid Houle, Kate Korycki, Melissa Levin, Jaby Mathew, Michael Morden, Jerald Sabin, Jes- sica Soedirgo, Paul Thomas, Mark Winward, Irene Poetranto, Jean Lachapelle, Hamish van der Ven, Andrew McDougall, and Luke Melchiorre. I would also like to thank my friends outside of Toronto for their support, especially Stéphanie Chouinard, Catherine Ellyson, Guillaume Filion, Arnaud Marion, Julien McEvoy, Sébastien O’Neill, and Jean-Charles Saint-Louis. Special thanks to my friend Gabriel who persuaded, when I was the most con- fused, that I was at the right place and that I should continue. Your friendship is one of the best things that the University of Toronto brought me. Marie, you have been an amazing friend throughout the years. You offered constant support and encouragement, always read my work and provided brilliant feedback and, most importantly, made sure to tell me when I was silly. I also want to thank Jessica for her friendship and support both in Canada and In- donesia, and especially during our fieldwork (i.e. when I was always sick!). I look forward to our next dim sum brunch! My work would not have been possible without the financial support of the Social Science and Humanities Research Council of Canada (SSHRC) and the Ontario Government Schol- arships Program (OGS). I would also like to thank the University of Toronto’s Department of Political Science and School of Graduate Studies for supporting my fieldwork. Without this crucial financial support, it would have been impossible to spend as much time in the field. Fieldwork has easily been the most challenging, yet life-changing part of the experi- ence. I am glad I was part of a department, a university, and an academic community that recognize and value fieldwork. Finally, support from the Trudeau Center for Peace, Conflict, and Justice (Munk School of Global Affairs) and the Centre d’études et de recherches inter- nationales (Université de Montréal) helped me complete this program. vi My greatest debt is to my family. I would like to thank my parents for always valuing educa- tion and for prizing curiosity and experience over comfort and stability.
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