Masculinities and Demographic Change in Contemporary Italy By

Gendering Men:

Masculinities and Demographic Change in Contemporary Italy

By Maya D. Judd

B.A., University of California at Berkeley, 1999

B.A., University of Padua, Italy, 2003

M.A., Brown University, 2006

A Dissertation Submitted in Partial Fulfillment of the

Requirements for the Degree of Doctor of Philosophy

in the Department of Anthropology at Brown University

Providence, Rhode Island

May 2010

This dissertation by Maya D. Judd is accepted in its present form

by the Department of Anthropology as satisfying the

dissertation requirement for the degree of Doctor of Philosophy.

Date______David I. Kertzer, Advisor

Recommended to the Graduate Council

Date______Marida Hollos, Reader

Date______Jennifer Johnson-Hanks, Reader

Date______Daniel J. Smith, Reader

Date______Nicholas Townsend, Reader

Approved by the Graduate Council

Date______Sheila Bonde, Dean of the Graduate School

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Vita

Maya D. Judd was born in Pocatello, Idaho, on May 16, 1977. She received a bachelor‘s degree in Anthropology from the University of California at Berkeley in 1999. At Berkeley she conducted research in the areas of gender, folklore, and the anthropology of tourism with faculty mentors Dr. Alan Dundes and Dr. Nelson Graburn. She also had the opportunity to study abroad, in Padua Italy, where she ended up moving upon graduation. During her time in this northeastern Italian city (1997-2004), she completed a second bachelor‘s degree in Educational Sciences at the University of Padua, where she worked closely with Dr. Paolo Palmieri on several issues of anthropological interest, including a collaborative project on the history, uses, and customs surrounding bread in the Mediterranean. In 2004 she decided to return to the United States to pursue a doctoral degree in anthropology with a particular focus on Italy at Brown University under the mentorship of Dr. David I. Kertzer. In 2006, she received a master‘s degree in course from the department of anthropology. At both the University of Padua and Brown, Maya served as a Teaching Assistant for a variety of courses, covering topics such as Culture and Human Behavior and Medicine and Society. She also worked for two years as a Research Assistant on a large, international project entitled ―Explaining Low Fertility in Italy‖ led by Dr. David. I. Kertzer, Dr. Michael White, Dr. Laura Bernardi, and Dr. Marzio Barbagli. In addition to her graduate education in the Department of Anthropology, Maya was a trainee of the Population Studies and Training Center (PSTC) at Brown. This training culminated in dissertation research in Italy funded by the National Science Foundation and by a Wenner-Gren Doctoral Dissertation Grant.

Acknowledgments

This work would not have been possible without the financial support of grant agencies. I received a National Science Foundation Research Experience for Graduate Students (REG supplement) which made possible preliminary research during the summer of 2006. I also received a grant from the Wenner-Gren Foundation, which allowed me to stay a full year in the field. The many Italians who gave so much of themselves to help me in my research can't be named, but their pseudonyms fill the text. Old and new friends made navigating the waters of daily life in Padua not only easier, but simply pleasurable. To Manuela Bruschi I owe my deep thanks: a glass of wine, a listening ear, and a seat on her couch were always available, not to mention a plate of pasta here and there. Over a decade of friendship let us sit in comfortable silence, amiably debate, and mull over a horoscope or two. Silvia Pighetti was always ready to lend a helping hand, offer a spritz, and share her art and life with me, may many be as fortunate as I in learning from your calm and positive outlook on life and love. I thank Fiorenza Redi and her boundless curiosity, who has always pushed me to think harder and deeper, and who I greatly esteem and admire. Monica Bellomi is a dear friend, without whom this project would not have reached successful completion. Her refusal to take things at face value and willingness to risk in life is always refreshing. Giuseppe Piraino made every day an adventure, and his open-mindedness, tranquility, and calm steadied me more times that he can ever imagine. For their friendship, interest, and endless advice, I also heartily thank Galen Abbott, Herve Ferrat, Elena Gibertini, Nunzio Loria, Ilaria and Paolo Noventa, Fabio Pagani, Giovanni Prarolo, Carlo Sardena, Angelo Soravia, Mirko Zanatta, and Lucia Zanelli. A very big thanks to my committee: David Kertzer, Marida Hollos, Daniel Smith, Nicholas Townsend, and Jennifer Johnson-Hanks all read and commented liberally and fruitfully. I appreciate your interest in my research, all the time you have shared with me, and the abundance of ideas that have resulted. For their personal and professional support, challenging questions, priceless suggestions, and tactful critique through the years, I also thank Keith Brown, Sandra and Fulvia Busatta, Gianpiero Dalla Zuanna, Alessandra Gribaldo, Elizabeth Krause, Jessaca Leinaweaver, Phil Leis, Ester Rizzi, Bill Simmons, Kay Warren, and Michael White. Whether you realize it or not, you have had a profound impact on my thinking throughout this project. I‘ve likewise been sustained intellectually and emotionally by so many of my fellow graduate students throughout the years, especially Jennifer Ashley, Florencia Borreschiohiga, David Borton, Maggy Brandt, Angel Chiriboga, Emilio Depetris Chauvin, Federico Droller, Angelica ―Veci‖ Duran Martinez, Tatiana Farina, Judith Gallego, Julia Garner, Benedetta Gennaro, Emilio Gutierrez, Martin Goetz, Juan Carlos Gozzi, Paco Jurado, Mariko Klasing, Guillermo Miguel, Petros Milionis, Omer Ozak, Sarah Overmyer, Dimitra Politi, Luca Prazeres, Lara Reichmann, Isa Restrepo, Nathan Schiff, Antonella Sisto, Jennifer Szuszan, and Chiara Valenzano. My loving appreciation goes to my parents Martha and Robert Judd, and my sister, Aliza Nizet, their care and support sustains me always. Lastly, but certainly not leastly, my gratitude and love to my husband, Ruben Durante, who suffered the writing of this dissertation while climbing to the Ph.D. finish line himself. Words cannot express how much I love you: you are my intellectual sparring partner, my fellow adventurer and my passionate companion. Ti amo.

Table of Contents

Chapter 1. Introduction. Gendering Men: Masculinities and 1 Demographic Change in Contemporary Italy

1.1 ―Lowest-Low‖ Fertility 7 1.1.1 Ideational Change 1.1.2 Uncertain Adulthood 1.1.3 Women (and Men?) 1.2 The Study of Men as Men 17 1.2.1 Masculinities and Challenges to Hegemonic Masculinity 1.3 Padua 25 1.4 Research 32

Chapter 2. Paths to Male Adulthood: The Strong Italian 40 Family, Perceptions of Age, and Demographic Consequences

2.1 The ―Strong‖ Italian Family 43 2.2 Bamboccioni and Mammoni 46 2.2.1 An Infelicitous Remark 2.2.2 Late Departure 2.2.3 The Precarious Cohorts 2.2.4 An ―Aspiring‖ Welfare State 2.3 Permissive Parents 58 2.4 Bamboccioni Reflect 64 2.5 Transitions to Adulthood: Perceptions of Time and Age 68 2.5.1 More Time, But Never Enough… 2.5.2 Forever Young 2.6 Adulthood 78 2.6.1 When is one an Adult? Men Respond 2.6.2 The Impact of Women on Italian ―Adulthood‖ 2.7 Conclusion 83

Chapter 3. Changing Italian Masculinity, a Historical Approach 89

3.1 Fragile Masculinity: 1870-1921 93 3.1.1 The Feminist Movement: Challenging Patriarchy 3.1.2 Virility, the Nation and Low Fertility 3.1.3 Reactions to Threatened Male Supremacy Cont‘d 3.2 Fascism and WWII: 1922-1950 103 3.3 The Economic ―Boom‖ and a Multifaceted Revolution: 1950-1979 107 3.3.1 The Economic Boom 3.3.2 Revolution: The Second Demographic Transition Begins 3.3.3 The Gender Revolution and (Re-)Reactions to Threatened

Male Supremacy 3.4 Fragile Masculinity at the Turn of the Twentieth Century: 1980-2008 119 3.4.1 The Current ―Crisis of Masculinity‖ in Padua 3.4.2 The (Fragile) ―New Man‖ and the (Return of the) ―New Lad‖

Chapter 4. Paduan Male Identity 134

4.1 A Theoretical Paradox 138 4.1.1 Conquering Masculinity 4.1.2 Visible Confusion 4.2 Meanings of Masculinity 152 4.3 A ―Crisis‖ of Gender Relationships 156 4.3.1 Women‘s Views of Men 4.3.2 Responsibility, Masculinity, and Demographic Change 4.4 Men‘s Views of Women 163 4.4.1 Persistent Inequality 4.4.2 Female Labor Force and Male Psychology 4.5 The Power of the Mother Figure 173 4.6 Rethinking Masculinities 181

Chapter 5. Italians Do It Better? The Male Body and Heterosexuality 184

5.1 Gazing on the Male Body 187 5.1.1 Commodification and Paduan Men‘s Bodies and Sexuality 5.1.2 Objects of Desire 5.2 ―Evolving‖ Sex Characteristics 204 5.2.1 Latin Lovers on their Last Legs 5.2.2 Never Enough 5.3 A Shift in Consumption, a Shift in Sex 220 5.3.1 Old Men, Young Men: Moving Towards ―Pure‖ Relationships? 5.4 Inequalities, Power, and Change 227

Chapter 6. Union Formation: Conjunctures and Construals 233

6.1 Conjunctures and Culturally-Configured Construals 237 6.2 A Brief History of Union Formation in Italy 243 6.3 Case Studies 250 6.3.1 Claudio 6.3.2 Danilo 6.4 Conclusion 268 6.4.1 Demographic Conjuncture Theory: a Reflection

Chapter 7. Mammos and Patriarchs 274

7.1 Europe‘s Oldest Fathers: Why the Delay? 278

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7.2 Moving Towards Building a Family 281 7.3 Progetti di Vita: The ―Life Projects‖ of Two Different Generations 286 7.4 Identifying with Fatherhood 288 7.5 I Am Not My Father 291 7.6 Mammos and Patriarchs: Different but the Same? 297 7.7 Delay and an Age-Gap in Unions: a Fruitful Combination? 301

Chapter 8. The Real and the Ideal. Egalitarian Attitudes, 309 the Gendered Division of Labor and Men‟s Fertility Intentions

8.1 Gender and Fertility Studies 312 8.2 Gender Equity in Family-Oriented and Individual-Oriented Institutions: 316 A Critical Review 8.3 Paduan Men: Gender Ideologies, Work, Family, and Fertility Intentions 320 8.3.1 Surface Gender Equity 8.3.2 Reconciling the Real and the Ideal 8.3.3 The Realizable Ideal? 8.4 Conclusion: Closing the Gap between the Real and the Ideal 345

Chapter 9. Conclusions 350

9.1 Implications for Demographic Research 358 9.1.1 Gender: A Social Institution 9.1.2 A Renewed Look at Institutional and ―Whole‖ Demographies 9.1.3 Sexuality, the Body, and Population Processes 9.2 Implications for Research on Gender 366 9.2.1 Gender and Demographic Trends 9.2.2 Demography, Biological Constraints, and Gender 9.3 ―Gendered‖ Demography and a ―Demographic‖ look at Gender 372

Bibliography 375

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List of Figures

Figure 1. Italy, the Veneto region, and the 5 provinces of Veneto, including 25 Padua (Padova)

Figure 2. Average number of children per woman. Veneto and Italy, 27 1999-2005

Figure 3. Specific fertility rates by age group of women resident in Veneto, 28 1999-2005

Figure 4. Percent women (age 33-44) employed by number of children. 29 Northeast Italy and Italy, 2005

Figure 5. Average number of children per woman. EU countries and Veneto, 31 2004

Figure 6. Percentage distribution of university graduates 1 year after 168 graduation working in Veneto in 2006, by position held and gender

Figure 7. Respondents who do not contribute to family organization according 181 to some characteristics, 1998 (%)

Figure 8. Number of marriages celebrated in Italy from 1950 to 2005 247

Figure 9. Average age of bride and groom at first marriage, 1952-2004 248

Figure 10. Average age at first birth by sex. Cohorts born in the 1960s – 279 Several European countries

Figure 11. Changes in gender equity over time 318

Figure 12. Gender equity and fertility intentions between the real and the ideal 321

List of Tables

Table 1. Interveiwed men of ―childbearing age‖ by select characteristics 35

Table 2. Total number of men and women interviewed, by age 36

INTRODUCTION. GENDERING MEN: MASCULINITIES AND DEMOGRAPHIC CHANGE IN CONTEMPORARY ITALY

One late Sunday morning, Jacopo stood with his shoulders slightly hunched to ward off the brisk November chill, his hands stuffed deep into his pockets and his chin buried in a thick black scarf and the upturned collar of his coat. We walked aimlessly around one of the central piazzas in Padua, Italy, following his two-year old daughter chase after pigeons. We were not alone in the piazza, but many other small gatherings of parents strolled and chatted, keeping an alert eye as their child (or more rarely, children) ran screaming over the well-worn ground. Women could be seen walking arm-in-arm while men pushed strollers, and snippets of conversations about the latest soccer game could be heard interspersed with the flutter of wings and the call of vendors selling flowers, fruits and vegetables. In some ways, this picture of Padua, a mid-size city in the region of Veneto in northern Italy, has a certain timelessness to it, as children and adults have long walked the ancient city streets. Padua was not built for cars, and its residents often zip through the historic center on bicycles or on foot, easing the narrow roads of traffic. In other ways, however, Padua – like many other places in Italy – has changed dramatically. Families are just one indication of this, both in terms of their composition, and the roles and expectations of men and women within them. Certainly none of the

Italians present that Sunday morning in the piazza were in the least bit surprised to see a father holding a child, pushing an infant in a stroller, or balancing a toddler on his hip.

Yet this behavior represents a remarkable change which has occurred in little more than a

2 generation, for Jacopo‘s father rarely held him, and would certainly never have been seen in public pushing him around in a stroller, a duty which fell more appropriately to his wife, whom he still refers to publically and in conversation as ―mother.‖ Perhaps equally notable are the abundance of only-children, who tug on their parents‘ sleeves, begging them for more seeds to feed the pigeons, and are unhindered in gaining their attentions by a rival sibling. No one in the piazza is seemingly aware of the relatively disproportionate ratio between parents and children, but rather the focus seems to be on keeping Paola‘s gloves tightly fasted, and Luca‘s hat from falling off, or occasionally casually bending over to plant a kiss on a small rosy cheek.

Indeed, the patriarchal Italian father surrounded by his many bambini hardly exists anymore in today‘s Italy. Although stereotyped as proud of their traditions and ingrained in their ways, Italians have adjusted with seeming ease to both contemporary low birthrates and diminishing patriarchy. In fact, Italy had one of the lowest birthrates in the world in the 1990s, plunging to hitherto unforeseen low levels. Over a decade of research into demographic behavior in Italy, and the rest of Europe, has led to a number of theories seeking to account for very low fertility. Surprisingly few investigations, however, have looked at the ways that assumptions about gender affect European demographic patterns. Even fewer have explored the changing nature of male identity and heterosexual masculinity. This study aims to understand, on the one hand, the underlying factors shaping Italian male identity, masculinity, and gendered modes of interaction in Padua, Italy and how these, in turn, influence demographic outcomes such as fertility rates. On the other hand, a critical examination of broader Italian demographic patterns (e.g. the timing of departure from the parental home, forming a union, and

3 having children) provides an enlightening window onto the particular facets of contemporary Italian masculinity.

One reason for the lack of critical gender studies of population processes is that men, masculinity, and men‘s powers and practices have typically been taken-for-granted in demography. Gender has largely been seen as a matter of and for women; men have remained ―ungendered,‖ ―natural,‖ or a universal and immutable entity.1 This dissertation

―genders‖ Italian men in order to gain a better understanding of persistent low fertility rates in Padua. More broadly, I endeavor to understand the consequences of men‘s emergence as a gender on Italian demographic patterns. What happens to the ―unmarked‖ category once it is ―marked‖? What does this mean for fertility outcomes?

Building on feminist and men‘s studies, I use a historical approach to show how the gendering of men in Italy is largely the outcome of rising individualism and the rejection of institutional control, which in turn encouraged a feminist movement and increased female participation in the labor force, challenging a patriarchal ―gender system.‖ As a result, men are no longer the unmarked category of universal ―mankind,‖ they are now subject to critique, self-reflection, and the ―gaze‖ of academics and the broader public. In recent years, hardly a day goes by without some aspect of men‘s position or experience or life figuring in the Italian mass media, everyday conversations,

1 ―Man‖ has until recently been the unit of measurement of the human world: the feminine has instead been considered the ―other,‖ difference, partiality, gender, specificity. Man is the norm, woman the exception (de Beauvoir 1952; Rosaldo and Lamphere 1974; Reiter 1975). This schema is recurrent across various historical epochs. The bible describes woman born as a derivation of the first Being (the rib of Adam); for centuries Medicine considered the feminine body to be an imperfect copy of the male body; we still use the word ―mankind‖ to refer to all of humanity, etc. (Bellassai 2004:31). The presumption of universality is obviously linked to power: those at the top of the hierarchal scale unsurprisingly represent themselves not as a subject, but as the subject (idem). This dissertation examines Italian masculinities and male experience as specific and varying social-historical-cultural formations. In other words, I study men as a gender, situating masculinities as objects of study on a par with femininities, instead of elevating them to a universal norm.

4 and practical activities. The gendering of men is thus both a matter of changing academic and political analyses of men in society, and of contemporary changes in the form of men‘s own lives, experiences and perceptions, often developing counter to expectations of earlier generations of men (Hearn and Pringle 2006). The very ―gendering‖ of men, however, has rendered the latter ―fragile‖ in the absence of a widespread identification and acceptance of new masculinities, combined with a crumbling of ―hegemonic‖ forms of masculinity. In other words, while men and masculinities are increasingly talked about and have become the subject of highly ideologically charged public debate, it is paradoxically much less clear what manhood consists of or how men should behave.

The process of making men explicit is not new and men have often reacted to discourses of male ―fragility‖ or ―crises of masculinity‖ by attempting to block women‘s access to the ―natural‖ realm of male power and social prestige. What is new, however, is an increasingly evident effort on the part of a growing number of contemporary Italian men to identify new kinds of masculinities, no longer rigidly intolerant towards feminine autonomy, which reject older models of patriarchy. A ―gendering‖ of men reveals new forms of male identity (e.g. caring fathers, affective men willing to share domestic duties), while recognition of multiple masculinities renders more traditional and hegemonic forms of being male superfluous. Despite such change, a widely shared and recognizable social hierarchy of masculinities has yet to be realized, and this has evident consequences for demographic outcomes. Confusion over appropriate gender roles and the fragility of men as they attempt to redefine new kinds of masculinities contribute to a delay in leaving the parental home, shape men‘s relationships with women and the formation of unions, and often negatively influence fertility outcomes.

New forms of masculinity are also embedded within the particular socio-cultural context of Italy where we find the peculiar combination of rejection of a patriarchal gender order and the continued and even enhanced commitment to the ―strong Italian family,‖ or the fundamental intergenerational links which create a safety-net for Italians in lieu of a relatively weak, or ―familistic‖ welfare state. A number of demographers have argued that the intensity of family ties and marked material and emotional investment in the family are at the root not only of the prolonged permanence of adult men in the parental home (and more broadly the delay and decline in various important life events such as marriage and fertility) but of a refusal to take on responsibility and an aversion to risk (Dalla Zuanna and Micheli 2004). In fact, one of the main paradoxes of Italian low birth rates is the association between very low fertility and a familistic welfare state.

Despite the idea, embedded in familistic welfare thinking, that welfare should not exclude family relationships and repeated assertions of the importance of family life on the part of politicians and the Catholic Church (which is also deeply invested in politics), the State does very little to encourage child-rearing (Ginsburg 2003; Billari 2008). Others scholars have instead pointed out the curious combination of rising individualism and the peculiar ways that the ―strong family‖ actually enables men to achieve goals of self-realization, such as establishing a stable career, buying a home, and building a family. More broadly, a relatively weak welfare state, a precarious labor market, and the elevated cost of housing shape not only ideas about the ―strong family‖ but assumptions about gender and notions of when, how, and what men should do as they proceed through various stages of the life course.

Anthropologist Matthew Gutmann (2007:32) has pointed out that most scholars

―know better than to think that reproduction is an affair for women alone.‖ Nevertheless, he notes that in a number of important recent collections on reproduction and gender there is a noticeable lack of contributions which deal substantially with men and reproduction (e.g. Ginsburg and Rapp 1995; Brettell and Sargent 1996). Scholars such as

Greene and Biddlecom (2000) and Dudgeon and Inhorn (2003) have also highlighted the missing presence of men from discussions of fertility, yet there still remains a dearth of studies which respond to this claim. Similar to critical ―markings‖ of the ―unmarked‖ category of ―mankind,‖ studies of reproduction often do little more than note the absence of men. In addition, studies of male fertility, notably those published out of the 1995

IUSSP (International Union for the Scientific Study of Population) seminar ―Male fertility in the era of fertility decline‖ and several years later, the 1998 IUSSP seminar

―Men, Family formation, and Reproduction‖ seem to concentrate more on male fertility, sexual behavior, and health, than on parenthood. In fact, male fertility outcomes and fatherhood are often treated as distinct issues, a reflection of the absence of studies that thoroughly investigate the ways assumptions about gender drive demographic change. In this dissertation I endeavor instead to show the ways changing masculinity, male fertility outcomes and fatherhood are deeply intertwined.

This study is indebted to feminist anthropology and postmodern critique which have challenged male bias in the social sciences and raised awareness of socio-cultural constructions of gender and the gendered politics of everyday life. Subsequent to feminist analyses there have been a growing number of studies focusing on men as gendered subjects, bound to construct their identity in relation to women and femininities, as well

7 as other masculinities. Ethnography has played a pivotal role in demonstrating the cross- cultural variance in models for and of manhood, and in recognizing the intersections of gender identities with social class, historical change, and sexuality. Building on this literature, this dissertation is thus (in and of itself) not only an explicit ―gendering‖ of

Italian men and the male life course but an investigation of the desires, values, and actions of men as they experience important life events. Simultaneously, I reveal the ways cultural, socio-economic, political, and demographic factors shape assumptions about Italian manhood and masculinity.

An anthropological analysis of demographic patterns and life course events represents one of many ways to study men. Indeed, Hearn and Pringle (2006) suggest that there are as many ways of studying men as there are approaches to social science. But given the lack of gender studies in demography which critically evaluate masculinity and men‘s relationships with women, an ethnographic analysis of demographic trends and patterns provides not only a door to understanding Italian masculinity but offers the possibility of contributing to understandings of the gendered nature of population phenomenon (Riley 1998, 2005). My hope, more broadly, is to further our understandings of heterosexual masculinity and the ways gender functions as an organizing principle of social and cultural organization.

1.1 “Lowest-Low” Fertility

Over the course of the twentieth century there occurred a general decline in the number of children born in all of Europe. In Italy, this trend was briefly interrupted after WWII during the ―baby-boom,‖ but fertility again resumed its rapid decline after 1965. In 1977, fertility fell to replacement level (2.1 children per woman) for the first time, and by 1993

8 it had plunged to 1.3 children per woman. The total fertility rate (TFR) reached a record low of 1.18 children per woman in 1995. Although the figures have been consistently well below replacement levels since, there has been a slow increase in births to an estimated TFR of 1.26 in 2002 and 1.3 in 2008. National statistics hide, however, distinct differences between the Center-North and South of the country. While fertility levels from 1920 onwards have typically been much lower in the Centre-North than the South, the very recent upward trend in fertility is due to a modest upswing in fertility in the

Centre-North, while birth rates remain stable or even continue to decline in the South.

Everywhere in Italy there is an increasing tendency to postpone the birth of a first child, often conceived by mothers over thirty years of age.

There are, potentially, considerable consequences for the future of countries such as Italy with very low birthrates. If the TFR remains permanently below or at 1.3, this implies a 50% decrease in the annual number of births and halving of the population size in less than 45 years (Billari 2008). Moreover, unless the number of children per family increases to above replacement rate (thanks, perhaps, to a highly fertile immigrant population or an unexpected acceleration of native fertility), the population structure of

Italy will eventually look like an inverted pyramid, with an ever smaller number of children and youth at the bottom, and a growing mass of old people at the upturned base.

As Paul Ginsborg (2003: 69) points out:

Whereas in the middle of the 1950s there were 27 Italians under the age of twenty for every ten over sixty, by 2038 (at present fertility levels) the ratio will have been reversed: there will be 25 people over sixty years of age for every ten under twenty. By that time Italians over the age of sixty will constitute 40 percent of the population (Blangiardo 1991). The danger, then, is not that denounced by Mussolini in 1929 - of too few Italians to fulfill their country‘s imperial destiny. In actual fact, a less crowded peninsula could only be welcome. It is, rather, of a serious imbalance in the age structure of the Italian population.

While a drop in fertility rates has occurred across a number of European countries and several wealthy nations of the Far East (e.g. Japan), the mechanisms behind such decline are diverse and specific to each cultural, political, and economic context. One common feature, however, which seems to characterize almost all countries with ―lowest-low fertility‖ or a TFR of below 1.3, is the postponement of fertility (Billari 2008). In fact, demographers such as Kohler et al. (2002) and Billari (2008) have suggested that an irreversible ―postponement transition‖ accompanies the emergence of very low birth rates. The postponement of fertility, or the choice to have children at later and later ages

(and sometimes not at all), in turn seems to depend on a number of factors (Sobotka

2004). Billari, Liefbroer and Philipov (2006) identify three principal driving forces, which I examine and expand upon here as they relate specifically to Italian low birth rates.

1.1.1 Ideational Change

The first factor concerns ideational change and what some demographers have defined as the ―Second Demographic Transition‖ (SDT). According to Lesthaeghe and van de Kaa, the SDT started in northern Europe in the mid-20th century and has since spread across the industrialized world (Lesthaeghe and van de Kaa 1986; van de Kaa 1987; Lesthaeghe

1995). The concept of the SDT embodies a number of social changes, including the postponement of childbearing, increased rates of cohabitation and birth outside of wedlock, a decline in marriages and a growth in divorce rates. These have been caused in large part by ideational change beginning in the 1960s, consisting of: increased emphasis on individual autonomy, rise of values associated with ―higher order needs,‖ and rejection of institutional control, all of which in turn encouraged a feminist movement,

10 increased female participation in the labor force and gender equality (Surkyn and

Lesthaeghe 2004). These ideational changes have led to the emergence of ―postmodern fertility preferences‖ (Ariés 1980; Lesthaeghe 1995; van de Kaa 2001)2 and the ―new‖ family behaviors mentioned above. These same themes emerge in the sociological literature, in which a number of scholars have suggested that ―new‖ family behaviors represent signs not only of an individualization of life course, but the ―evolution‖ of industrialized societies towards a ―new modernity‖ (Buchmann 1989; Giddens 1990;

Beck 1992).

While the SDT provides an interesting framework for understanding low fertility, studies that employ this theory often fail to observe the particular facets of ideational change within specific cultural, political, and economic contexts. In particular, the emphasis on the freedom of individual choice and interpersonal relations neglects the influence of norms and social expectations of individual behavior. For example, in Italy the ―cultural revolution‖3 of the 1970s did lead to greater individual choice, the spread of contraception, the legalization of abortion and the emancipation of women and their entry

2 Dirk van de Kaa (2004), while continuing to sustain the usefulness of the SDT as a research concept, recently recognized that the focus of the concept has changed, and that perhaps the term ―revolution‖ would have better fit his original vision of the concept. In fact, the ―Second Demographic Transition‖ is not so much a transition from one demographic equilibrium to another, nor does it entail changes in the mortality regime (Johnson-Hanks 2009, personal communication). The Demographic Transition (DT), after which the SDT is named, was instead very much a shift from one demographic regime to another. More specifically, the DT can be characterized, briefly, as having three stages: stage one is associated with pre- Modern times and is characterized by a balance between birth rates and death rates; stage two sees a rise in population caused by a decline in the death rate while the birth rate remains high, or perhaps even rises slightly. The decline in the death rate in Europe began in the late 18th century in northwest Europe and spread over the next 100 years to the south and east; stage three moves the population towards stability through a decline the birth rate. The decline in birth rates in developed countries began towards the end of the 19th century in northern Europe and followed the decline in death rates by several decades.

3 The 1970s in Italy saw a number of important social and legislative changes, defined by some as the ―cultural revolution‖: divorce became legal in 1970, in 1974, Italians confirmed a referendum in favor of divorce; in 1975, a new family law equalized the rights of children born out-of-wedlock with those born within marriage; in 1978 abortion was legalized, and Italians confirmed a referendum in favor of abortion rights in 1981.

11 into the labor market, but such developments were counterbalanced by more ―traditional elements‖ such as relatively few children born out of wedlock, the persistence of patriarchy, the continuing power of the ―strong family,‖ and State wariness (after the unfortunate Fascist experience), to take a strong stance in reproductive politics (Ginsburg

2003). ―It was this complex but powerful intertwining of the old and new in family strategies,‖ suggests historian Paul Ginsborg, ―that gave Italy its unexpected and unwanted global primacy [in terms of very low birth rates]‖ (idem: 74)

Another shortcoming of the SDT theory is its lack of a specific gender perspective, given that, as Bernhardt (2004: 28) points out ―concepts of autonomy and self-realization are not gender-neutral, but have markedly different meanings – and implications – for women and men.‖ Berhardt theorizes a SDT in two phases. The first phase is characterized by an asymmetry in role obligations and (partially as a result) an increase in divorce and cohabitation. In the second phase of the SDT (or what she calls the ―Third Demographic Transition‖) partnership and parenthood become ―strong positive options for both men and women, which would imply less fragile male-female relationships and the possibility of increasing fertility levels.‖ Ethnographic research on men in Padua suggests that growing individualism, the espousal of autonomy and self- fulfillment, and their encouragement of both the economic independence of women and the family changes that constitute the SDT have played an important role in the

―gendering‖ of men, testing previously unquestioned male and female gender roles and unbalancing equilibriums. In this dissertation, I examine the pluralization of masculinity that has emerged as a result of ideational change, as well as explore timid signs which suggest that some men have begun to successfully mediate between larger social

12 processes and norms and their own individual desires and values, reflecting the potential for a third demographic ―revolution.‖

1.1.2 Uncertain Adulthood

A second factor driving the postponement and related decline in childbearing in Italy, and

Europe more generally, is uncertainty during young adult years, and the related late age at which the ―young‖ in Italy exit the parental household (Billari, Liefbroer and Philipov,

2006). This issue has been especially salient in Southern Europe, although scholars have also shown how perceived uncertainty among young adults influences the postponement to parenthood in Northern Europe as well (see, for example, Liefbroer (2005) on the

Netherlands).

The high uncertainty faced by young adults, especially in terms of a precarious labor market, has been linked to a delay of all events characterizing the transition to adulthood. In fact, some demographers have equated ―lowest-low‖ fertility with ―latest- late transition to adulthood‖ (Billari, Philipov, and Baizan 2001; Billari and Rosina

2004). As Billari, Liefbroer and Philipov (2006: 5) point out, ―Southern European adults are world leaders for what concerns the length of stay in the parental home.‖ Occupation difficulties, financial dependence on the family of origin, uncertain futures, combined with the ideational change described above have, some authors claim, been accompanied by a greater tendency to live in the present, a fear of ―irreversible‖ choices and a hesitancy to take on adult responsibilities (Lucchini and Schizzerotto 2001; Buzzi,

Cavalli and de Lillo 2002; Micheli 2004; 2007).

Yet nuanced analyses of the ways that perceptions of adulthood, opinions about the ―correct‖ sequence of life course events, and assumptions about gender shape

13 departure from the parental home still leave room for improvement (Lucchini and

Schizzerotto 2001; Saraceno 2001). Better understandings of the gendered nature of the transition to adulthood would provide insight into the related postponement of fertility and low birth rates in Italy. In fact, notions and practices of fathering are shaped long before the actual event of conception and the childcare that follows. The ―chronological‖ approach I use in this dissertation thus begins with the men‘s desires, values, and ideals as men leave the parental home, before proceeding to examine various facets of union formation and family building.

More broadly, behaviors and transitions linked to age are, like gender, influenced not only by biological and individual factors but also by socio-cultural and historical elements. The meaning of one‘s age and the phases of the life course vary across time and space, as do rites of passages from one phase to another. In every society there exist norms and social expectations with regard to appropriate age-related behaviors and the transition from one phase of life to another (see, among others, Clark 1967, Kertzer and

Keith 1984; Maybury-Lewis 1984; Cohen 1994; Mandacorda and Moretti 2005).

Understanding the men‘s transition to adulthood and perceptions of age sheds light not only on the cultural construction of masculinity but provides insight into the mechanisms behind very low birth rates.

1.1.3 Women (and Men?)

A final and third factor contributing to the postponement of fertility is the general rise in women‘s education attainment and related growth in female labor force participation and gender equality (Billari, Liefbroer and Philipov 2006). Economists have suggested that more highly educated women are more likely to delay, and perhaps even forego,

14 motherhood (e.g. Happel, Hill and Low 1984; Gustafsson 2001). The basic premise in these economic models is that ―the focus of decision-making in the transition to motherhood is on timing and that opportunity costs of childbearing and subsequent long- term financial consequences of motherhood depend on the age at motherhood‖ (Billari,

Liefbroer and Philipov 2006). More broadly, low fertility has often been equated with women‘s inability to reconcile work and childcare, which in turn leads to the postponement sine die of fertility decisions. Comparative studies have, however, demonstrated that the renouncement or limitation of fertility, caused by higher levels of education and greater participation in the labor force on the part of women, has attenuated – or is even non-existent- in countries with favorable contexts to the reconciliation of work and childcare (Blossfeld 1995; Pinnelli 2001; Pinnelli et al. 2003).

Yet such studies almost always focus on women, as the sole caregivers and primary factors in delineating the timing of fertility. This dissertation asks ―What do men want? When do they desire to have their first child? Does this change based on age, education level, occupation, and relationship they have with their partners? The timing of fertility, the reconciliation of work and family life, and men‘s values, desires and relationships with their partners are especially salient issues given that Italian men are currently Europe‘s ―oldest fathers,‖ having, on average, their first child over the age of 33

(Rosina and Sabbadini 2006).

Despite the need to understand gender assumptions about men and the changing nature of Italian masculinity, public debate and national legislation on fertility remain conceptualized as a woman‘s issue, especially as this concerns the reconciliation of work and family life. For example, the labor market reforms introduced in Italy in the 1990s

15 and early 2000s,4 which endeavored to render the labor market more ―flexible‖ by introducing various atypical work contracts and enlarging the scope of part time contracts, were presented as ―women and fertility friendly‖ (despite the dubious nature of such claims).

More broadly, public debate, Italian policy discourse, and even the prevalent EU discourse (e.g. Stratigaki 2004; Lewis 2006) often fail to address the issue of gender assumptions in the division of labor or responsibilities. On the contrary, as Naldini and

Saraceno (2008) point out, ―continuing to define work/family reconciliation (and indeed fertility) as an exclusively woman‘s issue crystallizes those very gender inequalities.‖ In addition, these authors argue that debate has typically been limited to the balance of work/family responsibilities in situations involving the presence of young children; despite that fact couples continue to face ―balancing‖ challenges as children age, or when an elderly member of the family requires care (idem). They suggest that low fertility is perceived of as a male issue only in terms of whether men are capable of earning an adequate income to support a family, given problems such as the lack of adequate social protection in an increasingly flexible labor market, and the ever longer time that it take to enter secure paid labor. Anthropological contributions to the study of gender politics similarly confirm that institutions (i.e. economic, legal, political, religious) are not neutral but legitimate and reinforce male power within the family (Withers and Thorne 1993;

Lewis 1993; 1999; Naldini 2002).

Other scholars such as Zanatta (2003) suggest, however, that the lack of state intervention is perhaps not all that surprising. She encourages scholars to consider that

4 See for example, the ‗Treu‘ Act of 1997 and Law 30/2003 or the ‗Biagi‘ Act.

16 one of the results of a gradual rejection of institutional control (see ideational change, above) has been a process of ―privatization.‖ As such, social and legal norms are increasingly seen as an intrusion into private life and the sphere of individual autonomy.

There thus develops an attitude of refusal towards the authority of civil and religious institutions and of any external regulation of couple and family life, and more broadly, a disengagement from civic, professional, or community-oriented associations (Inglehart

1990; Lesthaeghe and Moors 1995). The absence of legislative intervention is perhaps a reflection of this mind-set, leaving greater space to the private regulation of couple relationships, but also leading to a transformation of institutions such as marriage and childbearing which become private affairs, more oriented to ―personal‖ self-realization5 than acquiescence to broader institutional or even social norms.

Such ideational and value change has similarly been accompanied by an increasingly evident ―pluralization‖ of life spheres, and the multiplication of roles around which individual identity is constructed (polycentrism). Italian women and men alike increasingly find identitary meaning in a multiplicity of interests and autonomous belonging, among which it is not possible to establish a relevant hierarchy (Bovone

1991). Women, for example, increasingly think of the family as one of many life spheres, which is equally, but not more important than their roles as workers, sisters, wives or lovers. In this dissertation, I show how the growing tendency to give an equal distribution of weight to multiple spheres of life has broadened (and challenged) hegemonic masculinity, as multiple masculinities are increasingly recognized and shared. It is, in fact, the slow thawing of rigid and unambiguous identities that in large part constitutes

5 Thus, for example, having a child can be interpreted as motivated by a desire to realize one‘s personal potential as a parent.

17 the gradual emergence of men as a gender, or the growing ―visibility‖ of masculinity, to which I now turn.

1.2 The Study of Men as Men

Anthropology has long entailed the study of men and produced insights into the various practices associated with masculinity (see, for example, Malinowski 1927, 1929; Mead

1949; Evans-Pritchard 1951, 1974; Lewis 1961). It was not until the 1980s, however, that anthropologists, prompted by the emergence of ―second-wave‖ feminism, began systematically exploring men as engendered and engendering persons. For example,

Brandes‘s Metaphors of Masculinity (1980) and Herdt‘s Guardians of the flutes (1981) represent two pioneering efforts by anthropologists in the study of men-as-men. By studying the folklore of Andalusia, Spain, Brandes detailed the psychological orientation toward women that was evident among men in various daily situations regardless of whether women were physically present. For his part, Herdt described how rites of fellatio were necessary for the social and physical maturation of men among the Sambia in New Guinea. These studies were followed shortly thereafter by Herzfeld‘s (1985) ethnography, the Poetics of Manhood, in Crete and Godelier‘s (1986) political economy of male domination among the New Guinea Baruya.

A variety of theoretical orientations and methodologies have been employed in the examination of men-as-men. For example, Meigs (1990) illustrated the existence of quite divergent masculinity practices among New Guinea cultures, questioning the very concept of ―masculinity‖ as an ethnocentric or even Eurocentric notion (see also Hearn

1996). Lancaster (1992), using a cultural-Marxist lens, addressed the question of sexuality and eroticism between men as a defining feature of masculinity in Nicaragua,

18 while Gutmann (1996) examined activities such as fathering, work and alcohol use in

Mexico. He traced the historical development of machismo imagery and Mexican nationalism, showing the ways these mask significant complexity and ambiguity in the everyday lives of Mexican men and women. Gutmann teases out four patterns of masculinity in the working-class urban settlement he studied, insisting that even these four are crosscut by other social divisions and are constantly renegotiated in everyday life. Other notable studies include Gilmore‘s (1990) functionalist compendium of the ubiquity, if not the universality, of masculine images in the world and Hewlett‘s (1991) quantitative behavioral study of the Aka Pygmies. More broadly, in recent years masculinity has been (among other things) studied (Ford and Hearn 1988), unwrapped

(Chapman and Rutherford 1988), rediscovered (Seidler 1989), discovered (Morgan

1992), dislocated (Cornwall and Lindisfarne 1994), theorized (Brod, and Kaufman 1994), constructed (Berger et al. 1995), understood (Mac an Ghaill 1996), unmasked (Petersen

1998), challenged (Howson 2006), manipulated (Phill 2006), and represented (Dudkin et al. 2007).

Despite, however, the increasing breadth of studies on masculinity and cross- cultural investigations which ―engender‖ men in different times and places, very little scholarship exists in Italy on this subject. In fact, even the word itself – masculinity – is not easily translatable into Italian. Mascolinitá, maschilitá, and even virilitá qualify as

Italian equivalents (Marchetti 2000; Reich 2004). The first Italian scholarly anthology to deal with the subject, Genere e mascolinità (Gender and Masculinity), published in 2000, makes great strides in tackling the issue of Italian masculinity from a multi-disciplinary, albeit materialist, perspective. This was followed, more recently, by another edited

19 interdisciplinary volume in 2007, Mascolinitá all‘Italiana (Italian Masculinity) in which

Italian historians, geographers, literary scholars, anthropologists, demographers, and sociologists examine the ―myth‖ of Italian masculinity, and the complex socio-cultural construction of diverse Italian masculinities, old and new. A worthy predecessor is

Piccone-Stella and Saraceno‘s (1996) Genere (Gender), which, although not specifically on men, addresses Italian scholarship‘s reluctance to turn the lens of gender studies onto itself. Very few Italian anthropologists have examined masculinity at home, although an exception to this is La Cecla‘s (2000) Brusque Manners. Attention in Italy has recently been paid to the legal regulation of issues concerning sexual harassment and research in this area has reexamined the relationship between masculinity, sexuality and power

(Ventimiglia 1987, 1994). Finally, a burgeoning field of scholarly work in Italy concerns fatherhood and childcare, led mostly by sociologists and demographers (Ventimiglia

1996; Rosina and Sabbadini 2006).

1.2.1 Masculinities and Challenges to Hegemonic Masculinity

Research in Italy and abroad has strongly confirmed that gender orders consist of multiple masculinities; scholars now prefer to speak of masculinity in the plural, rather than the singular, giving voice to the multitude of ways in which society and the individual construct the male gender (Connell 1995). For example, Valdes and Olavarría

(1998) have shown that even in a relatively culturally homogenous country such as Chile, there is no unitary masculinity, and gender constructions vary by class and generation

(see also Gutmann‘s (1996) study in Mexico, described above). Ishii-Kuntz (2003) similarly traces the ―emergence of diverse masculinities‖ in the recent social history of

Japan, pointing specifically to key changes in childcare, while Higate (2003) has shown

20 the diversity of masculinities to be found in particular institutions such as the military. In addition, masculinities are now recognized as ―active constructions,‖ collectively produced and reproduced using the resources and strategies available in specific social contexts; the diverse dimensions of the male gender and the various bodily manifestations which accompany the latter are constructed through social interaction. Masculinities are thus the product of a series of negotiations and bargaining which occur within the ritual dance of daily life. Boni (2004: 15) suggests that we think of masculinities according to

Goffman‘s dramaturgic model, as such ―diverse masculinities are a performative effect, the production of which is visible in the precise moment in which they are ‗staged,‘ developed and realized.‖

Given that there are diverse ways of being a man, Connell (1987, 1995), for one, has argued that masculinities are differently valued. "Hegemonic masculinities," for example, represent ideal masculine attributes (i.e. wealth, attractiveness, virility, strength, heterosexuality, etc.) while "subordinate masculinities" embody some of the opposites of these ideal attributes. Furthermore, hegemonic masculinity, or the cultural ideals of masculinity, need not correspond at all closely to the actual personalities of the majority of men or even to the characteristics of men who hold the most social power. ―The public face of hegemonic masculinity is not necessarily what powerful men are, but what sustains their power and what large numbers of men are motivated to support…. Few men are Bogarts or Stallones, many collaborate in sustaining those images‖ (Connell

1987: 184-185). Hegemonic masculinity, when embodied by at least some men over time and space, legitimates the dominant position of some men, while other patterns and groups of men and women are complicit, marginalized or subordinated (Connell 1995).

Connell encourages researchers to understand masculinity as a social position, a set of practices, and the effects of the collective embodiment of those practices on individuals, relationships, institutional structures, and global relations of domination (Connell, 2000).

There is wide consensus across the literature on masculinity that men can adopt hegemonic masculinity when it becomes desirable, and distance themselves strategically from it at other moments. ―Consequently, ‗masculinity‘ represents not a certain type of man but, rather, a way that men position themselves through discursive practices‖

(Connell and Messerschmidt 2005: 841; see also Wetherell and Edley 1999). On the other hand, models of hegemonic masculinity, or ideal masculine behavior and identity, may distress men who feel unable to achieve these ideals (Dudgeon and Inhorn 2003). In this dissertation, I argue that a growing number of Italian men feel conflicted about whether they truly desire to achieve hegemonic masculinity, which in turn motivates and affects their reproductive behavior. In fact, historically hegemonic forms of Italian masculinity are increasingly superfluous to the construction of Italian male identity, creating confusion over appropriate gender roles, and generating a general sense of ―fragility‖ as an increasingly large number of men attempt to redefine new forms of masculinity and reject hegemonic, patriarchal masculinity. This in turn influences demographic outcomes.

This thesis thus builds on a growing body of research that shows that masculinities are not simply different but also subject to change.

Morrell (1998), for example, examines gender transformations at the end of South

African apartheid, illuminating a system of segregated and competing patriarchies. In

Japan, Dasgupta (2000) has examined Japanese models of masculinities, looking specifically at the tensions that emerge in terms of the ―salaryman‖ model of manhood,

22 while Taga (2003) has documented responses to social change among young middle-class men, and their relationships with women. In Europe, Ferguson (2001) shows the ways more ―modernized‖ and market-oriented masculinities in Ireland have replaced the long standing masculine ideals of the celibate priest and the hardworking family man. Meuser

(2003) turns to Germany, tracing generational transformations among men which he suggests have been driven by men‘s responses to changes among women. A growing number of young German men expect women to reject patriarchal models of gender relations, leading them to construct their own ―pragmatic egalitarianism.‖ In Britain,

Morris and Evans (2001) have shown, using images of rural masculinity and femininity, how representation of hegemonic masculinity have changed over time, and have become increasingly subtle and fragmented.

Like Morris and Evans (2001), I similarly suggest that hegemonic masculinity has become increasingly superfluous to the construction of new Italian masculinities. This has, however, generated significant confusion as to appropriate gender roles, which in turn influences important life events. Ethnographic research on Paduan men reveals that process of individualism and self-realization (and more broadly, the ideational changes characteristic of the Second Demographic Transition) have encouraged the emergence of multiple masculinities and the ―gendering‖ of men. More specifically, the profound changes in gender relations in Italy which began during the 1960s and 70s have drastically changed the asymmetries of power between men and women, challenging previously taken-for-granted forms of social organization, and considerably weakening a concept of masculinity based on a hierarchical superiority, legitimized by a ―natural‖ or immutable norm. Over the last 50 years, men have slowly been recognized as a gender, as

23 having particular and multifaceted identities. As such, men are evermore ―incapable of crediting themselves as being a universal subject; masculinity has progressively lost one of its historical prerogatives: to be invisible,6 and as such, from this lofty position of symbolic and material supremacy, to represent the self not as a part, but as the whole‖

(Bellassai 2007: 24).

The gradual emergence of multiple masculinities, and more broadly, men as a gender, has challenged universal, invisible masculinity and has weakened hegemonic masculinity. In other words, the recognition that there exist multiple masculinities, the pluralization of life spheres (polycentrism) and understandings of men as a gender (rather than a ―universality‖) have slowly fragmented the social hierarchy of masculinities. On the other hand, a rejection of patriarchy and challenges to hegemonic forms of masculinity have generated perplexity over the meanings of manhood, as men are forced to reflect on what it means to be a man in the absence of a recognizable hierarchy.

Ethnographic work in Padua reveals the emergence of masculinities that are less tightly fastened to an a priori script, more ―self-reflective," more malleable and multifaceted, but also more of a work in progress (Giddens 1992; Saraceno 2003). While men don‘t want to be like their fathers, they struggle to identify new role models and adjust to the pluralization of life spheres, or the multiplication of roles around which individual male identity is now constructed. The combination of these various elements perpetuates a

6 Bellassai suggests that masculinity has hid behind the universal, or better, has disguised itself through the universal. ―As a gender, as a sexual part of humanity, masculinity has long remained invisible to itself. It‘s the glorification of a supremacy, but the latter produces a considerable limitation: men are incapable of seeing their own gender identity‖ (2004: 31). More broadly, one of the mechanisms of hegemony is that it operates by invisibility, removing the dominant form of masculinity from the possibility of censure (Brown 1999).

24 sense of ―fragile‖ masculinity and contributes to maintaining fertility rates at very low levels.

It is my aim in this dissertation to trace a causal pathway to low fertility through a gendered analysis of Paduan men and the construction of masculinity. In order to do so, I endeavor to show the ways that Paduan men have gradually been ―gendered,‖ or the social and historical processes through which Italian men have increasingly been recognized as ―active constructions‖ with multiple identities which constantly shift as they age, and which are collectively produced and reproduced within specific socio- cultural contexts. Understanding the gradual emergence of men as a gender, rather than a reified, universal category, allows for consideration of the consequences of the latter for the construction of male identities and an understanding of the dialogical relationship between gender and demographic processes. Of no less importance, I similarly analyze the ways that Paduan men‘s bodies and sexuality have – like gender - slowly become

―visible‖ and the potential influence this may have on demographic outcomes. The shift from ―unmarked‖ category to the recognition of men as gendered subjects has, I argue, significant consequences for men, a greater understanding of which may help us to better comprehend demographic phenomenon such as Italian low fertility. While the first half of the dissertation examines the social, economic and political shifts by which men have gradually been ―gendered‖ and relatedly, the consequences of such ―gendering,‖ the second half of the dissertation (as well as chapter 2) aims to explicitly ―gender‖ men – or to examine the desires, values, and actual behavior (and the differences between these!) of Paduan men as they pass through important demographic life events such as departure from the parental home, union formation, first births, and the transition to second births.

It is through this ―gendering‖ of men that we may gain a fuller understanding of the casual pathway to low fertility in Padua, and perhaps more broadly, in Italy.

1.3 Padua

The city of Padua (population 212,500 as of 2008; figure 1), a highly industrialized center of the northeastern Veneto region, represents an intriguing location for studying the mechanisms and consequences of men‘s emergence as a gender, diminishing patriarchy, and the impact of the latter on demographic outcomes such as fertility.

Figure 1. Italy, the Veneto region, and the 5 Provinces of Veneto, including Padua (Padova)

Italy, however, is a country of vast regional demographic, economic and social variation, making it important to recognize the unique context of Padua within these differences. What makes this northeastern city a suitable setting for exploring changing male identity and masculinity? To begin with, gender norms tend to be less traditional in the North than in the South (Sabbadini 1999), due in large part to a particularly intense feminist movement in Veneto and Lombardy in the late 1970s and early 1980s. The movement inspired many forms of vibrant and even violent mobilization. Two of the

26 primary issues raised by the Italian feminist movement were reproductive rights and violence against women. In fact, the first legal case brought to court on the issue of sexual harassment took place in Veneto, as did the first legal abortion. Feminists circulated petitions and staged mass protests which challenged rigid gender norms centered on the ―traditional‖ patriarchal family, heavily influenced by the Catholic

Church.

Thanks to these efforts, a number of reforms have since been made towards establishing reproductive freedom and combating gender violence in Italy (Plesset 2006).

The lasting effects of the strong Veneto feminist movement are also testified to by the relatively high percentage of women in the labor force in this region (Chiavola-

Birnbaum, 1986, Zanetti 2000). In 2008, the Veneto female employment rate (calculated by dividing the number of women aged 15-64 in employment by the total female population of the same age group) reached 56%, notably higher than the national average of 47% (although this remains below the EU target set in Lisbon in 2000 of an average female employment rate of 60% by 2010). This percentage also reflects an increase of

6% with respect to 2004, and is up 1.5% since 2007 (Veneto Statistical Report 2009).

Such characteristics make Padua an excellent place to observe the growing prevalence in

Italy of dual-income families, the increasing need for couples to balance household chores and childcare, and, relatedly, changing gender norms and notions of masculinity and fatherhood.

In fact, the recent upturn (however slight) in fertility rates in the Veneto (figure

2), suggests that Padua may be gradually becoming a more favorable context to the reconciliation of work and childcare and perhaps, more broadly to ―new‖ masculinities.

While the number of children per woman dropped to as low as 1.08 in 1994, the TFR has since risen to an estimated 1.38 in 2007 (Veneto Statistical Report, 2007).

Figure 2. Average number of children per woman. Veneto and Italy – Years 1999:2005 (*)

Italy

Source: Veneto Region – Office of Statistics, Regional Eurostat Data, 2006

The recent pick-up in fertility is partly due to the increasing presence of foreign residents in Veneto, who seem more inclined to have children (in 2004, 18.9% of births were to at least one foreign parent). In 2005, the average number of children per woman in Veneto was 1.32; when calculated separately for Italian and foreign individuals of the resident population, the results reveal a significant difference between the two groups, who respectively have an average of 1.24 and 2.41 children per woman (Veneto Statistical

Report, 2008).

In addition to the higher fertility of immigrants, demographers have suggested that rising birth rates can also be explained by the increasing postponement of having children (figure 3) until later ages, or until women have achieved the appropriate socio-

28 cultural prerequisites to doing so: a stable relationship, fulfilling employment and autonomous living conditions (Gribaldo et al. 2009). Thus the lower fertility rates of the early 2000s have simply masked the growing tendency of women to ―recover‖ fertility at older ages.

Figure 3. Specific fertility rates by age group of women resident in Veneto – Years 1995:2005

Source: processing by Regione Veneto 2008 - Direzione Sistema Statistico Regionale on Istat data

An increase in fertility in Veneto also hints at greater gender equality, in light of studies which link the latter with higher birth rates. In fact, recent demographic research on fatherhood suggests that men most involved in childcare and domestic chores are to be found not only in more urban areas, but particularly in northeast Italy (Spallacci 2004;

Rosina and Sabbadini 2006). More broadly, Caltabiano et al. (2007) have suggested that signs of fertility recovery emerge in contexts and social categories where childcare services are more readily available, where gender asymmetries are less evident, where economic conditions are better and where modern and post-modern values are more

29 diffused (see also Saraceno 1994; Pinnelli 1995; Del Boca et al. 2004; van de Kaa, 2004;

Rosina and Sabbadini 2006; Sànchez-Barricarte and Fernàndez-Carro, 2007).

Although public childcare services for children under the age of 3 are relatively limited in Italy, the Veneto has a more diffuse network of services for infants. In 2005, for example, public childcare was granted to 10.5% of children under the age of 3, and the Veneto Region foresees this percentage increasing to cover 17.3% of children under 3 in the near future (Veneto Region Report 2006). In addition, if we look at the percentage of women (age 33-44) employed by number of children (figure 4), women in northeast

Italy seem better able reconcile their fertility desires and career ambitions compared to

Italy as a whole (Veneto Statistical Report 2007).

Figure 4. Percent women (age 33-44) employed by number of children. Northeast and Italy 2005

Source: Veneto Region – Office of Statistics

On the other hand, increased female participation in the labor force, greater gender equality, and rising fertility rates are combined with more ―traditional‖ elements.

For example, the Veneto is reputedly the most Catholic area of Italy. In fact, some call

30 the Veneto the ―vineyard of the Lord,‖ testimony to the strong presence of both the

Church and the long reign of the center-right political party, the Christian Democrats, until their fall in 1994 (Castiglioni and Dalla Zuanna 2009). Padua is also home to the last resting place of St. Anthony of Padua, who is honored with an impressive seven- domed basilica; one of the most popular pilgrimage destinations in Italy. More specifically, Catholicism has often been equated with more ―traditional‖ family dynamics.

Yet recent studies reveal a surprising finding in terms of the relationship between gender, religiosity, and fertility. Di Giulio and Carrozza (2007: 161), in a comparative study across European countries, show that in Italy and Austria, Catholic fathers collaborate more in childcare. They suggest that being a very religious father ―might therefore mean being not so much more traditional as more sensitive to the family‘s well- being and more attentive to the needs of children, and thus sharing responsibilities more frequently.‖ On the other hand, religiosity on the part of Italian women has the opposite effect; Catholic women tend to involve their partners less in childcare compared to non- religious women (idem). Di Giulio and Carrozza suggest that, contrary to men, secularism among Italian women translates into a more egalitarian vision of parenting.

More broadly, such results challenge a simple correlation between religiosity and

―tradition.‖

Another more ―traditional‖ characteristic of the Veneto is the historical predominance of the patriarchal and patrilocal family throughout the 20th century, found most commonly in central and northeast Italy (Barbagli et al. 2003). Italian social scientists suggest that the historical patriarchal tradition still survives in the form of both

31 the contemporary tendency not to leave the home until one‘s late twenties/early thirties and the propensity for children to live near to their parents when they do. As described above, late departure from the parental home is also one of the primary factors driving the postponement (and often foregoing) of having children. In fact, despite the upturn in fertility in the Veneto, birth rates remain not only well below replacement level (2.1 children per woman), but are also notably lower than a number of other Europe countries.

Figure 5. Average number of children per woman. EU Countries and Veneto. 2004

Source: Veneto Region – Office of Statistics, Regional Eurostat Data, 2006

As the figure above shows, fertility remains well beneath the European average of 1.5, at an average of 1.33 children per woman in 2004 (Veneto Statistical Report, 2006).

A European perspective also reveals that although a greater percentage of women participate in the labor force in Veneto compared to Italy as a whole, this ratio is quite low compared to other countries. In fact, Italy is among the developed countries with the lowest level of female employment and the greatest gap between male and female

32 employment rates. Italian women represent only 38% of all employed and 53% of people actively looking for a job (Battistoni, 2003). According to Eurostat statistics, in 2006, the female employment rate was 46% in Italy (54% in Veneto) compared to 73% in

Denmark, 71% in Sweden, 68%, Finland 67%. Only Malta had a lower female employment rate at 35%, while Greece and Poland closely followed (47 and 48%, respectively).

Padua is thus a city of contrasts, where vestiges of patriarchy and strong Catholic sentiment combine with a historically strong feminist movement and a thriving university. In fact, Padua is home to over 65,000 students who attend the famed institution, renowned not only for its status as one of the oldest Universities in Europe

(founded in 1222) and for being home to the first female graduate (in 1678), but more broadly for its historical freedom and independence from the influence of the Catholic

Church.7 Luminaries such as Dante, Petrarch, Galileo, Copernicus, Mantegna, Giotto and

Donatello all contributed to the city‘s reputation as a center of learning and intellectual freedom. Today, the influence of the university is evident not only in the continuing prestige of the University of Padua, but in the diffuse, lively (and sometimes polemic) presence of university students who live and work in the city. In sum, the complex history of Padua (and the Veneto more broadly) provides an interesting setting in which to observe the slow but persistent changes in gender-based values, notions of fatherhood, and fertility decisions.

1.4 Research

7 The university was particularly famous for its research from the 15th to the 18th centuries, in the areas of medicine, astronomy, philosophy, and law. Thanks in large part to protection provided by the Republic of Venice, the university was able to maintain considerable autonomy from the Church. The University‘s motto bears witness to this period, during which the Latin motto Universa universis patavina libertas (Paduan Freedom is Universal for Everyone) was adopted.

Fieldwork was conducted from August 2007 through July 2008. The methodological cornerstone of the study was participant observation in piazzas, bars, athletic centers, discotheques, courtyards, schools, family centers and people‘s homes. The goal was to get know men of all ages, particularly those at and around childbearing age (age 25-54)8 and, for comparative purposes, men who could be their fathers (age 55 and older).

Although most of the participant observation took place within Padua, I also accompanied men to other socially important arenas, such as the regional soccer stadium, the small villages on the outskirts of Padua where people would spend a Sunday socializing with relatives and friends, or on various weekend trips where I joined a group of men rock climbing, hiking, or conducting other leisure activities. Participant observation was facilitated by the fact that I had already lived in Padua for a seven year period from 1997 to 2004. Thus I had the advantage not only of speaking fluent Italian, but of having acquired proficiency in the Veneto dialect and of having an intimate knowledge of the city, its various neighborhoods and the day-to-day rhythms of life. The life stories and fieldwork I recount in this dissertation thus reflect over a decade of experience living in and visiting Padua.

In addition to broadly participating in and observing where possible the private lives of men in their homes, around the city, and on weekend excursions, I also joined a local ping pong team, composed solely of men, age 24-52. We played once a week in a nearby gym, allowing me to interact informally with them, as well as other men who, on the same evening, played volleyball and basketball. I also frequently joined an old dance partner, Leonardo, with whom I went salsa dancing, sometimes several times a week.

8 I intend social, as opposed to biological, childbearing age.

This Latin-based dance has become extraordinarily popular in Padua, especially among

Italians in their early 30s to mid-40s, and sometimes even older. There are any number of discotheques in Padua which, on specific days of the week, offer an evening of salsa music. Going dancing with Leonardo (age 34) provided me with a certain level of

―protection‖ (instead of showing up alone, which can render observations more difficult), while also allowing me an ―in‖ to the various groups of dancers, and an interesting window through which to observe men‘s relationships with women.

Finally, I spent a significant amount of time in the ―Center for Families‖ (Centro per le Famiglie) run by the city of Padua. The center‘s goal is to provide places for parents to network, and, more broadly to create a sense of community. In various neighborhoods around the city, the Center organized, for example, meetings on parenthood with ―experts‖ (such as psychologists and sociologists) on the family, screened films chosen by the community relevant to the family and current social issues which were then followed by a discussion, and provided ―playtimes‖ to which mothers and fathers could bring their young children, meet one another, and establish a network of relationships. The fact that these activities were organized in different neighborhoods also offered the opportunity to meet men and women of different socio-economic backgrounds.

Interviews, both formal and informal, were held, the latter often taking place incidentally. Although most conversations with men were held informally, I also conducted a number of digitally recorded formal interviews using a loosely formed list of questions geared towards gathering men‘s life stories and their anticipated future goals and desires (see table 1). Topics of discussion included, but were not limited to:

35 perceived differences between the sexes, their opinions of how their lives are similar or different to their fathers‘ lives, their relationships with women (girlfriends, wives, and mothers), their thoughts on the body, physical appearance, and sexual experiences, opinions and experiences with cohabitation and marriage, their desires to have children, the pre-conditions for having them, their thoughts on fatherhood, the division of domestic labor, the importance of family ties, etc. Interviews with men were arranged, for the most part, only after I had gotten to know the interviewee reasonably well. Again, my many years of living in Padua, and the broad social network I was privy to helped enormously in contacting and spending time with men of various ages.

Table 1. Interviewed Men of “Childbearing Age” by Select Characteristics

Numer of Men of "childbearing age" (24-54) Numer of Children none 26 one 18 two 11 three 3

Education low (eight years of less) 8 medium (8-13) 24 high (14 or more) 26

Civil Status Married religious 21 Married civil 6 Cohabiting 11 Single 7 Engaged 6 Divorced 7

As changing male identity does not occur in a vacuum but is intrinsically tied to men‘s relationships with women, I also spent time with and interviewed a number of men‘s wives and girlfriends (table 2), as well as observed where possible the relationship between men and women as they carried out daily activities such as cleaning the house, grocery shopping, and caring for their children. As mentioned above, I also spent time with a number of older men, either men‘s fathers or men of similar age.

Table 2. Total Number of Men and Women Interviewed, by Age.

Age Men Women 24-29 13 5 30-34 13 7 35-39 8 5 40-44 9 4 45-49 7 3 50-54 8 5 55-60 5 4 60+ 3 1 Total 66 34

The combination of spending time with people in a variety of settings and interviewing them semi-formally allowed me to go beyond superficial responses and to verify responses through observation and by checking with other people. In addition to developing relationships with a broad group of informants, I also interviewed people occupying ―official‖ positions, such as priests, local politicians, journalists, and even the director of a dating agency.

A variety of documentary sources was also examined. In addition to pamphlets and brochures produced by the Diocese‘s ―Office for the Family‖ and Padua‘s ―Center for Families,‖ I also examined print media and television and its portrayal of masculinity, men‘s issues, and topics pertaining to fertility. As Spitulnik (1993: 293) argues, ―mass

37 media… are at once artifacts, experiences, practices, and processes. They are economically and politically driven, linked to developments in science and technology, and like most domains of human life, their existence is inextricably bound up with the use of language.‖ While scholarly and political interest in men has been fairly limited in Italy, attention to the latter in the media over the last decade has increased rapidly (Boni 2004).

Kimmel (1992: 12) suggests that ―if masculinity is socially constructed, one of the primary elements in that construction is made of representations of masculinity which we see daily in the mass media.‖ Max Weber once invited those who wanted to understand the ―world view‖ of a society to go to the cinema; today that invitation would likely extend to television and print media (cfr. Boni 2004: 50).

Newspapers articles and ―facts‖ from print media were also often brought up by the informants themselves, around which I had a number of illuminating conversations.

As Misiti (2002) claims, it is now widely acknowledged that media audiences are not passive recipients but active recipients of media messages. Therefore, the mass media neither fully represents nor shapes public opinion. The realities and characters they describe are always subject to contestation and reformulation (Georgiadis 2007).

A final factor to consider is my status as an American female, which had its advantages and disadvantages during fieldwork. A number of anthropologists have suggested that women fieldworkers enjoy a privileged position within the societies they investigate (DuBois 1970; Nader 1970; Altorki 1982). Not only do we (women) have ready access to the female world, but we are also able to observe male society. Brandes

(2008) suggests that during fieldwork we are transformed into something akin to ―social hermaphrodites,‖ accepted into the worlds of both men and women. Nader (1970: 114)

38 once suggested that ―No man, even if he was considered different from the local men, would have had access to women‘s culture equal to mine to the men‘s culture.‖ Naturally, access to the opposite gender largely depends on the society we choose to study, as well as on which aspects of that society we select for emphasis. I was pleasantly surprised by the ease at which I was able to speak to Paduan men about delicate issues such as their sexual lives and personal preoccupations. In fact, I had the sense that for them there was something very non-threatening in talking to a foreign woman; perhaps my very

―otherness‖ combined with fluent language skills and intimate knowledge of the city provided them with the possibility of sharing things that they might not have so readily spoken about with a different interlocutor.

On the other hand, I often had to ignore sexual innuendos that were inappropriate,9 and adapt to older men‘s rather paternalistic (and sometimes sexist) attitude towards me, both of which probably had an effect on what they thought they could shared with me. Men will, in all likelihood, be somewhat different around a woman than they would be otherwise with their male friends or in all male company. Regardless of how well I came to know some of my informants, gender certainly played a role in shaping my interactions and the possibility of accessing certain social arenas. For the most part, however, men seemed eager to tell their life stories, and to reflect on their roles as lovers, husbands, and fathers.

In a context such as Italy, where ―tradition‖ and ―modernity,‖ and stability and change cohabit in particular ways, this study asks, what kinds of masculinities emerge?

9 On the other hand, verbal jousting - often with sexual undertones - is a way of life in Italy, a practice which often takes the foreigner by surprise. As English journalist Tobias Jones (2003: 18) notes, ―It‘s hard to take at first, but once you can respond in kind, arguing and joking becomes a normal enjoyable pastime, a refreshing burst of sincerity.‖

How are these enmeshed in a welfare regime built upon a moral obligation to family solidarity, in essential economic ties between generations, and in a gender system which considers women to be primary caregivers? How do new models of masculinity engage with the myth of the ―Italian macho,‖ stereotypically depicted as a smooth seducer and lover? What are the social costs for men of emerging as a ―gender‖ as opposed to a hyper-normative ideal? What are the consequences for the male life course and how does this allow us to better understand Italian very low birth rates? More generally, I seek to broaden our understandings of the ways gender ideologies form a fundamental part of

Italian society, influencing its organization, the economy, the institution of the family, and the state, and as such the fundamental necessity of gaining a gendered understanding of demographic processes. In turn, I endeavor to understand the ways gender and Italian masculinity in particular, are defined and shaped by socio-cultural, political, and economic institutions.

CHAPTER 2. PATHS TO MALE ADULTHOOD: THE STRONG ITALIAN FAMILY, PERCEPTIONS OF AGE, AND DEMOGRAPHIC CONSEQUENCES

Marco, a man in his early thirties, jumped up at the sound of coffee gurgling and spluttering from the espresso maker. He quickly turned off the stove and setting two small cups on the table, gently poured the steaming brown liquid into two equal portions.

He looked up at me and smiled with a boyish grin and said, all in the same breath, ―Here you go. Would you like a cookie as well? Or I think we have some cake if you‘d like…

Do you mind if I smoke?‖ I smiled and shook my head and we returned to chatting about

Marco‘s job as a social worker in a center for children with behavioral problems and unstable lives at home (due to abuse, poverty, or other), and his ambitions for the future.

Just as Marco was describing a co-worker with whom he has an on-going romantic relationship, his mother, Paola, walked into the kitchen. She immediately reprimanded

Marco for smoking without opening the window, chastising him for not insisting that I eat some cake, while simultaneously leaning over to kiss me on both cheeks. That a conversation with a man of this age be interrupted by his mother was not an uncommon occurrence during fieldwork in Padua, where a high proportion of men in their late twenties and earlier thirties continue to live at home with their parents, despite being employed full time. As I continued to converse with Marco, the conversation suddenly became three-way, with Paola interjecting comments and observations as she tied on an apron and busied herself with preparing the evening meal. Marco was unbothered by her

41 presence, casually including her in the conversation, although he changed the subject back to the challenges of the workplace rather than his love interests, conspiratorially whispering to me when Paola briefly left the kitchen that it was better not to talk about these things with his mother present, who would only start to ask him when he planned on having children. While Marco desires to have children one day, he feels as if he has

―plenty of time‖ before he needs begin building a family; this despite that fact that he just recently turned 33.

In this chapter, I examine Marco‘s and other Paduan men‘s transition to

―adulthood‖ through the intriguing intersection of strong intergenerational family ties, relatively late departure from the parental home, and changing perceptions of age. More broadly, I explore the ways men‘s shifting notions of adulthood and perceptions of time influence their reproductive behavior, and the ways these are simultaneously shaped by larger social, economic, and political processes. In doing so, I build on a theory proposed by Livi Bacci (2001), who, turning the prevailing Second Demographic Transition (see introduction) on its head, proposed a novel theory to explain very low fertility in Italy, and potentially other societies sharing common characteristics. He argued that low birth rates might be explained not by a drive toward individual self-realization, but on the contrary by ―too much family,‖ resulting in a delay in leaving the family of the origin, retarding other steps of the transition to adulthood, including fertility choices. He

(2001:152) suggests that ―traditional Italian familism, under the pressure of social change, has taken a new direction: instead of ‗widening‘ and extending the support, allegiance, solidarity to a large number of children and kin, it is ‗deepening‘ its action, protecting, prolonging, supporting grown-up children and delaying their exit from the

42 family nest.‖ Alessandro Rosina (2007) similarly argues that rather than transmitting values of autonomy and independence, Italian parents instead emphasize values of family solidarity as they strive to make sure their children are ben-sistemati (an expression indicating material and social well-being gained through employment, a house, and marriage). More broadly, processes of individualization have not, by and large, led to family ruptures, estrangements, or distances between parents and children. On the contrary, as historian Paul Ginsborg (2003:75) points out, ―a process of negotiation, of mutual tolerance, of informal contract [has] allowed children and parents to continue to live under the same roof‖ (see also Calvi 1986).

While there has been great interest in the ways ―too much family‖ influences fertility outcomes, relatively few studies have explored the impact of strong family ties and late departure from the parental home on age norms, especially as this concerns

―young‖ adult men, and the ways values and beliefs about age influence reproductive behavior. Yet age has long been recognized as a basis for the differentiation of social relations and the distribution of societal resources, and much related work has been done to further understandings of age norms and related expectations (Riley et al. 1972, 1979;

Foner 1975; Fry and Keith 1982; Kertzer 1986; Rubinstein 1990, Settersten 2005, 2007).

As Brim (1972: 10) points out ―constraints on thought and action associated with age are, in large measure, not inherent but reflect the normative expectations of particular societies. Norms prescribe and proscribe throughout the life course, but the meaning of such norms, and the degree of conformity to them, is variable throughout history, from one society to another, and among individuals within a society.‖ In what follows, I build on the demographic literature concerning the ―strong‖ Italian family, exit from family of

43 origin and the transition to adulthood in Italy, anthropological theories of aging, and the experiences of men like Marco. The emphasis here is not on the product of the aging process, but rather on the process itself and its relationship to the construction of male identity within a particular social, cultural and historical context (Kertzer and Keith 1984, see also Halpern 1986; Modell 1986; Riley 1987). I suggest men‘s experiences in leaving the home and more generally their transition to adulthood and perceptions of time and age have significant consequences for fertility outcomes; in turn, delayed departure from the parental nest shapes contemporary Italian masculinity and male adulthood.

2.1 The “Strong” Italian Family

David Reher (1998) places Italy among those European countries that have historically had a strong family system; in which ―traditionally the family group has had priority over the individual.‖ Paul Ginsborg (2003:68) similarly writes,

A quite extraordinary unanimity reigns among those who come to Italy from Britain –journalists, historian, sociologists, novelists – regarding the peculiar importance of the family in Italian society and of its centrality in the life of the nation. Peter Nichols, the veteran correspondent of The Times in Rome, described the family in 1973 as ‗the accredited masterpiece of Italian society over the centuries, the bulwark, the natural unit, the provider of all that the state denies, the semi-sacred group, the avenger and the rewarder.‘ In The Economist‘s survey of Italy in May 1990, the family was enthroned as the universal explicandum, as ‗the enduring unit of Italian society. It explains the lack of public spirit in Italy, and even the concept of public good… It explains the Mafia, the biggest family of them all. It also explains the pattern of business. From the Agnelli down, Italians like to keep control of their affairs within the family.

One of the characteristics of the strong family is the fundamental intergenerational links which create a safety-net of sorts for Italian children both within the home and after they leave (Tuorto 2002). A number of authors have demonstrated how crucial support from the family of origin can be in starting life as a couple and in childcare (Carra Mittini

2002; Cioni 1997). In fact, 50% of couples married in the late 1990s declared that they received a considerable amount of financial help from their parents for the acquisition of a new home (Barbagli et al. 2003). The high level of interaction between married adults and their parents is further proof of the importance of the family network in Italy: 3.8% of married Italians under age 64 whose mother is alive live with their mother. Of those who are not cohabiting, 77.8% see their parents at least once a week and one third of them every day. One partial explanation of the high interaction with parents is the low level of geographical mobility: 28% of married Italians live at a distance of less than one kilometer (0.62 mi.) from their parents (ISTAT 1996). Dalla Zuanna (2001:9) reports that for marriages celebrated in Italy in the last 30 years of the previous century, only 30% of new couples settled farther than one kilometer from at least one set of parents, and one in four couples settled less than one kilometer from both sets of parents.

Interviews with men in Padua confirmed these statistics, and revealed that the adjectives ―often‖ and ―close‖ are rooted within cultural perceptions of space and time.

Most men I interviewed (all over the age of 25) spoke on the phone to their mothers about every two or three days, and many talked to them every day. The usual response I received when asking about frequency of phone calls was, ―Well, not very often, usually every other day or so.‖ Similar answers were given when I inquired about residential proximity. For example, when I asked Roberto (age 45), whether his mother lived close by, he responded ―Well, no, not really, in traffic it takes about 15 minutes, she is not really very close.‖ Proximity to the parental home after departure is thus shaped by cultural concepts of distance and family, as well as economic reasons. In fact, a recent study by Isfol, a Rome-based Institute for the Development of Vocational Training of

Workers, showed a third of all Italians entering the work force get their jobs through friends, relatives or acquaintances, and only about 5 percent find work through agencies or headhunters. Similarly, Unioncamere, which groups Italian Chambers of Commerce, reported in August that in small to midsize companies in Italy, 45.7 percent of new hires were through "word of mouth" referrals on the part of a "trustworthy person." In southern

Italy, it was even higher: personal referrals accounted for 52.3 percent of new hires and

54.1 percent in companies with fewer than nine employees. Italians thus stay close to home not only for cultural reasons but because this is frequently the most economically viable decision in terms of finding gainful employment.

Dalla Zuanna (2001) has argued that the very close relationship between children and parents and the marked material and affective investment which is at the basis of

―strong‖ family ties feed and reinforce the intense emotional involvement of parents in the lives of their children. He argues that parents tend to see their children as an extension of themselves, to the point that they consider the failures of their children as their own defeats. This leads them to adopt a particularly protective attitude towards their children, as they endeavor to guide their children‘s choices away from behaviors that they do not approve of. The prolonged permanence in the parental family, the residential proximity, and the continuous and intense relationship even after the exit from the parental family do not favor, in the Mediterranean countries, the development of what Alessandro Rosina calls, ―that ‗tolerant indifference‘ among generations10 which enables the European youth

10 Kertzer (1983) reminds to use the term ―generation‖ with care, given the diversity of meanings that have been attributed to this concept. He warns that ―generational processes must firmly be placed in specific historical contexts, and analyzed in conjunction with the concepts of cohort, age and historical period‖ (ibid: 143). Indeed, because society changes, people in different cohorts age in different ways. As Riley (1987: 7-9), points out, ―cohort membership, though often treated merely as a contextual characteristic of

46 in the weak family ties areas to freely make choices, even though these are not shared by their parents‖ (Rosina 2003; Beck, 1997). It is to this prolonged permanence in the parental home, especially among men, that I now turn.

2.2 Bamboccioni and Mammoni

2.2.1 An Infelicitous Remark

The multitude of cultural, political and economic elements that go into leaving the parental home have sparked much discussion over ―latest late‖ departure from the parental home and the transition to adulthood (Billari 2004). While doing ethnographic work in Padua (2007-2008), controversy swirled over the prolonged permanence of youth in their family of origin. This was further aggravated when the Minister of Economics and Finance, Tommaso Padoa-Schioppa, sarcastically used the term bamboccioni11

(evoking images of clumsy, overgrown male babies) on October 4, 2007 in speaking to a

Senate hearing on the 2008 draft budget. The Economy Minister offered to come to the rescue with a 1,000 Euro tax break for 20- and 30-something Italians who rent, commenting, ―with the budget we'll help young people who don't marry and still live with their parents get out of the house."

The comment was immediately condemned by politicians from all shades of the political spectrum who said young Italians could hardly be blamed for a sputtering economy and high rents. "This absurd gaffe shows how he's probably not clear about the precariousness of the situation afflicting an entire generation - the first generation that has individuals, actually channels people into particular social locations and expectations… and while many individuals in the same cohort are affected by social change in similar ways, the change in their collective lives can produce changes in social structure.‖ In what follows, I reserve (unless in a direct quote from a scholar or informant) ―generation‖ for the kinship context, using ―cohort‖ to indicate a set of people of similar age born at approximately the same period (Kertzer 1979).

11 According to some lexicographers, bamboccioni was the most popular new Italian word of 2007.

47 to deal with social conditions worse than those of its parents," said Francesco Caruso, a communist from (then) Prime Minister Romano Prodi's coalition. The mayor of Rome

Walter Veltroni, who would later lead Italy's left in the 2008 election, said he considered the comment an "unhappy quip" and that problems facing Italy's youth were the country's biggest challenge. Opposition lawmaker Isabella Bertolini of the center right Forza Italia party urged Prodi to scold his minister for the "offensive epithet.‖ More broadly, debate over bamboccioni has been contextualized within discussions over Italy‘s increasingly geriatric society where the best jobs are often occupied by those over 50, squeezing out the young and ambitious. As mentioned, the Minister‘s comment in October took place shortly after my arrival in Padua. Due to the uproar it caused both in the media and the frequency with which the topic came up in informal conversations and interviews with informants, I spent a significant amount of time investigating how both parents viewed

(their own) bamboccioni, as well the opinions and living conditions of the bamboccioni themselves.

2.2.2 Late Departure

Late departure from the parental home and the transition to adulthood are particularly significant in terms of gender, as men tend to leave the home later than their female counterparts. In fact, 90% of male youth ages 20-24 still lived at home with their parents in 1982-83 compared to 43% in West Germany, 52% in France, and 58% in Great

Britain. The respective figures for women were much lower: 65% in Italy, 31% in West

German, 27% in France, and 23% in Great Britain (Ginsborg 2003:75; De Sandre 1986).

By 1993, little had changed. Approximately 50% of Italian men age 29 and younger lived at home, compared to about 25% of women of the same age. 1998 data from the national

Family and Social Subjects Survey showed that among 30-34 year olds, 40% of men and

18% of women still lived in the parental home.

Despite signs that women are increasingly leaving the home at later ages the media portrays the situation as primarily concerning men. Articles and debates surrounding bamboccioni rarely mention women. Statistics and comments in both national and international venues either pertain exclusively to men or are proposed in a gender neutral fashion, such that one has no idea whether they are referring to men alone, or to men and women together12. For example,

More than a third of Italian men over 30 still live with their parents… the trend has been attributed to high rents, bleak employment prospects, a sharp increase in the cost of living since the introduction of the Euro and a liking for mamma‘s cooking (The Sydney Herald, Oct. 9, 2007)

In a recent sociological article, despite referencing the usual folklore based on ‗lasagna, gnocchi and ossobuco,‘ an amused Penn writes that in Italy, ‗men don‘t leave the home,‘ 82% of young people age 18 to 30 still live at home (Repubblica, Oct 9, 2007) (Note that this sentence combines, in the same breath, men and ‗young people‘).

Stereotypical depictions of bamboccioni do little to explain the very real gender differences in departure from the parental home. Similarly, recent work has only begun to question the ways that increasingly complex patterns of leaving the parental home influence the construction of masculine or feminine identity (Morgan 2004). Yet it is now recognized that, for a variety of reasons including changes in the structure of the labor market and in the development of higher education, a clear set of interrelated transitions

(e.g. departure from the parental home, obtaining a job, development of familial responsibilities through marriage and parenthood) no longer happen in quite the same

12 Conjugations of plural adjectives in Italian take on a masculine form, whether the group is composed solely of men or composed of both men and women.

49 way. This lack of clarity as to the ―rules‖ of negotiating adulthood (or, perhaps, even

―personhood‖) may have a greater impact on men than on women. As Furedi (2001) suggests, ―the issue used to be about the independent young man going out and conquering the world, but that has now taken a bit of a battering.‖ In addition to a less evident ―path‖ to adulthood, the average age at first marriage has steadily climbed (see figures 8 and 9, pgs. 246-247). This is significant in that Italians continue to leave the home primarily in order to marry (as opposed to pursue a higher education, a career, or other)13. Despite this trend, the age-gap between men and women at wedding has remained relatively steady at about a 5-year age-difference (men being, on average, older). Thus women may leave the home earlier to marry, and indeed may be more likely to meet a partner who is older and farther along on their career trajectory, while men remain in the parental home (perhaps hoping to meet just such a woman).

Paul Ginsborg (2003) suggests that gender differences in departure may be due to a more watchful eye of parents over their daughters, pushing women to assert their independence earlier. Indeed, the experience of living at home can differ dramatically for young Italian men and women where, typically, young men get looked after while young women are expected to help cook, clean, and do other chores. This may not only push women to seek freedom from the parental home earlier than men, but also teach them the skills (e.g. how to cook for themselves, etc.) that their male counterparts never pick up.

More than one scholar has suggested that Italian men simply move from being cared for by their mothers, to being cared for by their wives. It may even be that some women, who

13 However, it should also be noted that the overall number of marriages per year has steadily declined. I further address this issue, along with acceptable age differences between men and women at marriage, changes in the latter, and consequences for fertility in chapters 6 and 7, concentrating here on men‘s permanence in the parental home and transition to adulthood.

50 move out earlier than men, actually facilitate men‘s late departure from the parental home. For example, Danilo, who still lives with his parents at the age of 34 despite a successful career as a physician, often sleeps at his girlfriend‘s house. On the nights he sleeps at his parents‘ house, he mother does his laundry for him and he eats her home- cooked meals. He does not contribute to the household expenses except for occasionally picking up store bought items at his mother‘s request. A number of men with who I spent time with in Padua similarly lived at home, but regularly slept at their girlfriend‘s home.

The woman, in contrast, lived on her own with roommates.

Some scholars have suggested that female identity is constructed more around values of independence than is male identity (Rowe 2003), pointing specifically to Italian mother-son dynamics and dependency (see also chapter 4). In fact, men who stay at home until late ages are commonly known in Italy as mammoni (―mamma‘s boys‖), whose mothers constantly fret and fuss over them. Rosina et al. (2003) argue that favoring men‘s particularly long permanence in the family of origin is, on the one hand, a cultural resistance on the part of many Italian mothers (and parents more broadly), towards flexible forms of family formation, and on the other, the material difficulty young people face in acquiring economic independence. Indeed, young adults in Italy face a variety of challenges as they transition to life outside the parental home. These include a general lack of suitable low-price rented accommodations, young adult unemployment, and an unstable or ―precarious‖ job market.

2.2.3 The Precarious Cohorts

My field site, Padua, represents what Molé (2008) has called ―an intensified articulation of the neoliberal shift‖ in that it is known for its precocious development of flexible labor

51 strategies (Piore and Sabel 1984:156). This represents a remarkable shift in Italy, a country whose labor policies have been both extremely protectionist in terms of illness and disability, as well as in establishing rights that allow workers to keep long-term job positions14 (Molé 2008:192; Blim 2002; Ferrara and Gualmini 2004:39). Since the 1990s, however, the Italian state has increasingly promoted policies that legalize nonstandard

(e.g. short-term, temporary) job contracts; the aim being to create greater market flexibility (Ginsborg 2003; Vercelli and Fiordoni 2003, Molé 2008). A number of laws and policies have been passed to this end, the most noted of which include the Treu Law of 1997 which expanded both the use of flexible labor contracts and promoted privatized job placement services. In 2001, the right-wing political coalition led by current Prime

Minister Silvio Berlusconi approved the Libro Bianco (White Book), which encouraged further flexibility in the labor market. This was followed by the much contested Biagi

Law (No.30/2003)15, which significantly extended and expanded the changes made by the 1997 Treu Law. As Molé (2008:192) points out, this marked a historical moment in employment practices as employers now had a wide assortment of legal ways to hire short-term workers, as opposed to offering the greatly desired lifelong contract (contratto a tempo indeterminato) that was once expected in Italy. ―As a result, many Italian

14 Molé (2008:192) writes, ―Consider that 45.8 percent of Italians had held the same jobs for over ten years in 2005, compared with the 8.2 percent European average (ANSA Notiziario Generale 2005). Certain standard employment contracts, such as the ―lifelong‖ or ―indefinite time‖ contract (contratto a tempo indeterminato), have been likened to ―barrels of steel‖ (botte di ferro) — nothing can get through them. In other words, for companies to dismiss workers with such contracts is both legally challenging and costly.‖

15 The Biagi Law (2003) redesigned existing employment contracts (part-time work, apprenticeships, coordinated and continuous collaboration) and introduced new forms of employment (on-call working, job sharing, accessory working, work experience programs, staff leasing on an open-ended basis). The law was intended to extend the range of existing, flexible labor contracts, and attempts to tackle the issue of precarious work and sets out a reform of private and public employment services for further increasing the degree of flexibility of the labor market.

52 workers suddenly found their ―barrel of steel‖ contracts to be less than mighty, and for those entering the workforce, such contracts were reduced to unlikely aspiration‖ (idem; see also Della Sala 2004; Ferrera and Gualmini 2004).

Policies attempting to increase flexibility in the labor market have sparked much controversy. The large-scale overhaul of the labor market has been described as precariousization (precarizzazione), which sees (undesirable) ―precarious‖ contracts

(contratti precari), given the high-risk stakes the worker is obliged to take in a market oriented employment regime (Procoli 2004). The maverick comedian-turned political polemicist Beppe Grillo described the Biagi Law as ―a modern bubonic plague.‖ During the time of my fieldwork, current Prime Minister Silvio Berlusconi, infamous for his insensitive comments, told one young woman, during a highly televised evening program, that the solution to her unsteady work situation was to ―marry a millionaire, like my son, or someone who doesn‘t have such problems.‖ Outrage predictably followed.

Recent statistics published by Istat report that there are just over 2 million workers in

Italy (or 13.2% of the work force) without long-term contract. On the other hand, Italy is well within the EU average (16.8%, according to 2006 Eurostat data). One reason that precarious work contracts have generated so much feeling of insecurity is that many

Italians enter the work force when they‘re already in their late 20s or even early 30s.

Starting job training or landing a temporary job that may not offer important formative experiences at that age increases feelings of unease. Yet others have pointed out

(Tiraboschi 2005, 2006) that Italians tend to snub manual labor while post-secondary education is seen as means to personal enrichment rather than as preparation for the labor market.

A precarious labor market and low initial salaries also penalize, in the long run, the formation of a family. While possessing stable employment for both members of a couple is increasingly considered to be a prerequisite for marriage, there remains the traditional habit of assigning greater importance to the stability and retribution of the man‘s job. Difficulties reconciling female employment and childcare also mean that it is often the male member of the couple who is more invested in outside employment, notwithstanding the fact that it is ever more common to find couples in which the woman has a higher level of education (Fraboni 2006). Conversations with men in Padua revealed that the precariousness of the job market weighs particularly heavy on their psyches. The loss of stable and certain forms of work, together with the proliferation of work contracts viewed as risky and ―flexible,‖ had significant effects on men‘s ability to plan for their futures, but also more broadly, on their ability to maintain a stable self- identity. Take for example the following exchange with Federico, age 31:

M: Yes, many people feel the impact of precariousness… F: Also because there is this idea that it is the man who has to earn… the idea of a precarious woman (una donna precaria) has less of an impact; it‘s something that I feel… It‘s kind of like, when in a couple, it‘s more of a big deal if the man is the one out of work.‖

Men expressed concern over what politicians defined as ―flexibility‖ but what they saw as simply dramatic ―uncertainty.‖ They see their long-term prospects as filled by intermittent work and economic marginality, and as a result have little desire to plan or think about building a family, which they see as out of their reach materially and economically. As Aldo Nove (2006), a well-know Italian writer in his early 40s, comments, ―bamboccioni are basically adults who are obliged to remain adolescent if not

54 children, by the total lack of seriousness when it comes to salaries16 and contracts in a labor market which plays with human relationships… I hear (too many times, unfortunately) that ―paid‖ and ―certain‖ work is achieved in two phases: the first consists of the job itself, the second in the actuation of a difficult rhetoric of telephone calls, knowingly (and neurotically) studied in order to find a way to transform ‗volunteer‘ work and ‗precarious‘ work into certain and salaried work.‖

2.2.4 An ―Aspiring‖ Welfare State

Unstable employment opportunities for the young adults are also set in a context of a relatively inadequate welfare system, further delaying departure from the parental home

(Aassve et al. 2007, 2006; Rosina 2007; Billari 2004)17. While public welfare and the rights of individuals within families were significantly improved in the 1960s and 1970s18 the dual impetus – ―towards universalist welfare state and towards the expansion of individual rights‖ – has not been maintained (Ginsborg 2003:227). Ginsborg points to significant demographic shifts in the population, not least of which are the rapid growth of the elderly population as well as the cost of medical technology and the increased diversity and request for health services, as part of the problem. The delay of young

16 During fieldwork in Padua, there was much alarm over low salaries and decreasing spending power – not unfounded. The Director of the General Confederation of Workers, Agostino Magale, pointed out in October of 2007 that ―those under the age of 32 in Italy earn on average 800 (net) Euros a month – these days those who have a university degree are paid less than someone who has had a blue collar job for year. The income of neo-graduates has decreased 7.8% since 2001 and a graduate, fresh out of university in Italy, earns on average 23,000 Euros, little more than a factory worker (22,736).

17 It should also be mentioned that there is somewhat of a ―chicken and egg debate‖ as to whether people are forced to strengthen their family ties in order to adapt to a weak welfare system, or if the welfare system has simply adjusted to a society based on strong family ties.

18 State maternity schools were introduced in 1968, municipal kindergartens in 1971, family advisory clinics in 1975. Perhaps most importantly, the National Health Service was founded in 1978. ―Based on universalist principles, it offered the promise of a reduction in the gross disparities of class and region, as well as an ambitious program of preventative medicine‖ (Ginsborg 2003:227).

55 adults from the parental home has frequently been blamed on a weak welfare state which places much of the burden of childcare and fiscal responsibility on the family. As Chiara

Saraceno (1997: 301) points outs, there has developed over time ―a family politics restricted to very limited areas of intervention, circumscribed to particular social categories, often contradictory‖19 (cfr. Ginsborg 2003:228). Similarly, other scholars argue that the substantial delay (or even failure) with which the Italian welfare state has adapted to changes in individual attitudes and behaviors and in the quality of the relationships between genders and among generations has forced men and women toward very low fertility levels. Work by demographers such as Assave et al. (2007) reiterates the seemingly determinative relationship between a country‘s social policies and welfare arrangements, and young people‘s transition to residential independence. The authors show that late age at leaving the parental home in Mediterranean countries may be seen as a way by young people to avoid poverty and may reflect these countries‘ limited support and safety nets for young people.

On the other hand, surveys show that fully-employed young Italian adults say they like living in the parental home where they pay no rent, their mothers do the housework and cooking, and they enjoy a higher standard of living, spending their income on cars, vacations, and nightlife (Kertzer et al. 2006:7; Sgritta 2001; Palomba

2001). A national survey conducted in 1999 reveals that 57% of young people in the northeast (where Padua is located) state that they are both happy to stay and enjoy a fair amount of freedom (ISTAT 1999). In fact ―long families‖ are common in the Veneto region, even though unemployment is less of a problem than elsewhere in Italy. A

19 For example, infant schooling for 80% of children between 3-5 years of age, but next to no childcare available for infants 0-3 years of age.

56 number of scholars have suggested that due to the growing democratic (or permissive) character of the modern Italian family, young adults manage to have a satisfactory level of autonomy and independence, while at the same time enjoying the ―fringe benefits‖ of family life in terms of financial advantages and services (Barbagli and Saraceno 1997;

Kertzer et al. 2006). This seems to be particularly true of men. Rosina et al (2006:76) demonstrate that the large majority of young men who still live at home are stably employed, and have the minimum material conditions which would allow them to leave.

They suggest that men prefer to postpone departure until they not only have stable employment, but they have reached an income or position which they regard as satisfactory, they have the possibility of acquiring a home (rather than simply renting) and they feel ready for marriage (rather than living alone or cohabiting).

In Padua, there seemed to be more tolerance on the part of parents, especially mothers, for their male children to remain at home compared to their daughters. A number of young men with whom I have spoken continue to enjoy the resources and shelter of their family of origin, compared to their female counterparts. Lengthy cohabitation with one‘s parents, easily beyond the age of 30, in turn favors a transition of these men from the home (where they are taken care of by their mothers) directly to a new residence after marriage (where they are taken care by their wives), with no intermediate phase of living alone as a single man or sharing an apartment with age- mates. This behavior does not favor either the development of gender symmetric models among this group, nor does it push these men to share work in the domestic sphere of their new families (see also Rosina 2007: 174-75).

Delay in departure from the parental home among men is also sharply divided along class lines. Youth who come from lower-class families usually attend school for a shorter amount of time; they do not wait to join the labor market, and often find jobs at quite young ages. This group marries and has children earlier than those who remain at home longer. The tendency to remain in the home, or as one author puts it, the ―extension of youth,‖ is a privilege of children from the middle and upper classes. On the other hand, youth who have lower levels of education in a slim job market are often forced to stay at home, and ultimately push up rates of youth unemployment (Cavalli and de Lillo 1993).

Among the young men I spent time with in Padua, I found that those with lower class backgrounds but medium-high levels of education tended to live at home comparable lengths of time to ―youth‖ from a higher social class background, but longer than youth of families with a middle-class background. The length of time spent in the parental home seemed not to be solely a function of not losing the material and immaterial quotidian resources provided by wealthy parents, but rather a strategy enacted by those with modest backgrounds who have very high expectations concerning their formation and future profession. More generally, the worry of most men was that leaving the home too early would mean too great a loss. Those of a wealthier background did not want to see a decrease in their standard of living, while those of a lower social background with high expectations saw their prolonged stay in the parental home as a means of concentrating solely on their education and the consolidation of their professional career, without having to burden themselves with the cost of living autonomously or taking on familial responsibility of their own.

As Settersten (2007:264) points out, one of the most pressing issues related to departure from the parental home and the transition to adulthood is social inequality.

Young men who come from families with the means to support them can pursue higher education, try out jobs, experiment in romantic relationships and pursue activities aimed at personal growth and development. In contrast, those who come from underprivileged backgrounds and have limited options, opportunities, and resources are especially penalized in a country like Italy, whose welfare state leans heavily on the family. More broadly, the Italian welfare state rarely addresses the life course as a whole and is instead designed to provide spot coverage around specific periods of vulnerability and risk or specific transitions. As in many countries, the first and last few decades of life are heavily defined and structured by social policy systems (for illustrations, see Settersten 2005).

―As a result, a policy that affects the life course is not the same as a life-course policy designed with the whole of life in mind and connecting and integrating different life periods‖ (Settersten 2007:266; Gauthier 2007; Leisering 2003; Osgood et al. 2005).

2.3 Permissive Parents

Discussions of bamboccioni necessarily raise the question of why parents allow their children to stay so long at home. Do parents push their children to leave? Do they tolerate them staying? Or do they actively deter them from leaving? The relatively few studies that have been conducted on the parents of mammoni have underlined the diffusion of family relations which are more open, flexible and permissive than in the past (Rosina

2006:69; Donati 1995; Farina 1997; Scabini and Rossi 1997). In Padua there emerged the idea of an ―elastic‖ family which increasingly settles on new and more flexible forms of cohabitation: families in which there is discussion, negotiation, in which each member

59 defends his/her autonomy and where parents become ―accomplices‖ in delayed departure from the home. A survey conducted in 1999 by the Italian Institute for Population

Research (IRP) revealed that many Italian parents see little advantage in their children leaving them home, and when remarked upon they are seen primarily in terms of material benefits. In terms of disadvantages, 50% of parents indicated the loss of affection while

34% worried about solitude and melancholy. Parents did not declare there to be advantages in terms of increased free time and privacy. This picture is quite different from that which occurs in other European countries. For example, neither youth nor their parents in Holland experienced departure from the home as ―a stressful experience… and there is an increasing number of mothers who are content with the prospect of having more time to develop their own personal interests and free time‖ (Bois-Reymond,

1996:112). Similarly, in Germany, mothers saw the permanence of their children in the family as constituting a financial and work burden, which limited their freedom.

Richard Jenkins (1990) explains that young people in Wales proceed to leave the home (and transition into adulthood) at least in part because their parents help them to do so. ―In all sorts of way, mothers and fathers – particularly mothers – assist in this process: cajoling, bullying, supporting, constructively neglecting, pushing, whatever it takes, in fact. People have got to grow up. Most parents want their children to become adults. It is, in fact, a public testimony to their own success as parents in ‗bringing them up‘‖ (Ibid:

135). During fieldwork in Padua, I ran across quite the opposite. Italian mothers did not want their children to leave, and generally treated their sons as children, rather than adults, notwithstanding their age (25 and over). Departure from the parental home was often a very emotional moment for both sides (parents and children); mothers viewed it

60 as especially tragic, independent of the reason for leaving (i.e. university, employment, marriage). This came across especially clearly in looking for someone to move into my apartment towards the end of my field work. An excerpt from my fieldnotes reads:

Teresa is 30 years old, a friend of one of my roommates. After weeks of trying to get a definitive answer from her, she has finally announced ―that my mother has said yes.‖ In fact, it took so long for Teresa to give us an answer, because she was dueling with her mother over whether she could leave home. She currently resides in her parents‘ home in Vicenza, but works in Padua. This means a tedious daily commute, which Teresa would like to avoid by moving. When she first mentioned it to her mother, the former began to threaten hysterically her with, ―Well, then I‘ll just have to rent out your room!‖ All this because Teresa, whose employment contract ends in September, would like to rent my room for the months of June, July, and August. When I mentioned my surprise at this episode, between a grown woman and her mother, my roommate laughed, and said, ―That‘s Italian mothers for you! My mother did the same thing when I decided to move out… That is, we argued for weeks…‖

Many informants shared similar stories, of tears and drama in the family when they made the decision to leave the parental home. Mothers especially described the departure of their children as a dramatic event: ―perhaps more than the loss of a loved one, enormous pain‖ and ―an emotional tragedy, an emotional mourning.‖ More broadly, parents tend to treat their young adult offspring as ―children‖ rather than ―adults,‖ describing them as

―young‖ despite the fact that many of the parents I spoke with have ―children‖ over the age of 30 living at home with them20. What is perhaps even more surprising, I spoke with

20 In fact, delay in departure from the parental and the postponement of first births is not a unique historical phenomenon. As Lucchini and Schizzerotto (2001) demonstrate (in a comparative analysis of data from the British Household Panel Study, the Italian Household Longitudinal Survey and the Swedish Level of Living Survey), during the 20th century the timing of the transition to adulthood, rather than changing monotonically, has followed a U-shaped trend. Postponement represents a feature common to cohorts born both at the beginning of the 20th century and after the 1950s. The difference however, is how the life course is perceived, and the extraordinary treatment of young adults as children to advance stages of development. In other words, the novelty is that they ―young adults‖ stay at home in the capacity of ―children‖ where as once they remained as ―adults‖ often helping and eventually taking over the father‘s mestiere (craft or trade).

61 women who had children age 14-15 years old, who still hired a babysitter to look after them in their absence in the afternoon after school (and of course any evenings)21.

Parents‘ treatment of their sons (and daughters) as children who never grow up, rather than adults, went hand in hand with a general lament that their ―cohort‖ (today age

50-70) had been too ―permissive.‖ For example, Rosa (60 years of age, with two sons, one of whom, age 33 still lives at home) spoke to me of her family, and ―big babies‖

(bamboccioni) in these terms:

Maybe because the family, in addition to being a sentimental unit, has become a unit of assistance….In the sense that the home has become ‗open‘ with respect to the past when it was ‗closed‘… because the fact that a child remained at home… he had to follow many rules, such that he didn‘t have much private space… this naturally meant that he left earlier. Now families are more open, permissive… So on the one hand, there is economic difficulty, rents are high, there‘s a precarious labor market… on the other hand families have different rules. Because once it was unthinkable that a child who lived at home, one night could sleep somewhere else, unthinkable… because there was a whole series of rules…

Ornella, a mother of 29-year-old male twins, and I also had a long conversation about changing parenting styles and bamboccioni. I asked her how she felt about the fact that both of her sons still live at home. She answered that as a mother, she was glad to still have them, as they have a good relationship. As an individual, however, she had difficulty understanding why they would still want to live at home. Indeed, their home is not large and the twins share a small bedroom. This means that they do not have much privacy, a fact with Ornella pointed to as one of the reasons she found their permanence in the home strange. Indeed, they cannot bring girls home, and she described their living situation as lacking ―intimacy‖ and a ―private space of their own, that they could only

21 At the other end of the spectrum, I saw a number of parents treat (and clothe) their children in a very adult fashion. Children of 3-4 years of age were spoken to as if they were 7-8 years of age. So on the one hand, small children are often treated as if they older than they actually are, but once they become young adults, the parents continue to treat them as if they were children.

62 have by moving out.‖ Like Rosa, she wondered if the reason so many young adults stayed on at home was the fault of parents. She suggested that the dominant parenting style of her cohort has been too permissive. Children have been given all that they desire, such that they have difficulty making sacrifices. The permissiveness of parents has also meant that grown children have no taste for ―freedom‖ in the sense that they feel free enough at home. Indeed they go on vacation with their girlfriends, they don‘t always sleep at home, they return at whatever hour they like, but they also use their parents‘ car, they eat homemade meals cooked by their mother: ―a comfortable freedom… but a freedom without sacrifice, and therefore not understandable to us as parents.‖ Ornella described her relationship with her mother as much different from that of hers with her sons… she has much more confidenza (is much more intimate) with them than she had with her own mother. While once the rules of the home were strict, and children left the home to be free of them, this is no longer the case. More generally, many parents of mammoni commented that they had left the home, or rather ―escaped‖ from the parental home through marriage. They described their own parents as strict and authoritarian

(especially fathers), a radical contrast to their own parenting style (permissive and flexible).

My generation… we all got married earlier… to escape from home one married earlier! Now they do whatever they want at home… so they don‘t need to get married

Yes, I had to get out of the house (through marriage)… and enjoy life a bit!

Sociologist Giuseppe Micheli (1995) suggests that ―the new generations are ever more inclined to avoid risks and choices perceived as too binding. Not finding an acceptable route through flexible paths to adulthood, these youth easily adapt to the

63 advantages the ―golden cage‖ has to offer. He suggests that there exists a ―guilt competition‖ between parents and children in efforts to determine the conditions that lead to prolonged residence in the parental home. Along these lines, another mother of a bamboccione, Elenora (age 58) who has a son of 31 who lives at home, commented:

One thing that I find surprising is that we were the generation of 68, rebels and protestors… but we‘ve become soft parents… we allow our children everything, and we try to keep them as long as possible… consciously or unconsciously. So I see that we are a strange generation… We‘ve produced children that have no sense of freedom or independence… Instead they are spoiled, pampered, and afraid. They are a generation used to being so well off that they are afraid of risking, of losing a bit…

Fieldwork revealed that parents do not encourage their children to take risks, but rather will do anything to see them ben-sistemati22. This came across in numerous conversations with parents who did not want to see their children do ―just any kind of work‖ or live in

―just any kind of place.‖ Illustrative of this attitude was the following conversation with

Daniela and Matteo, who have two children (a boy and a girl) living at home (both in their early twenties). Over an afternoon tea the topic of bamboccioni came up.

D: In my opinion calling them ‗bamboccioni‘ was wrong of the minister M: Yes, certainly things are not perfect in Italy (non é rose la situazione) D: Italians are not like the Moldovans who leave their families when they‘re 16 M: Well, maybe out of desperation… D: Yes, to look for work M: Yes, they come to Italy to seek their fortune… D: They have this thing that they have to start earning… because they don‘t have any alternatives… their families can‘t support them, so they have to go look for work. And many of them find work, because they are willing to do anything, any kind of work… work that our children will never do, because we will not let them do just any kind of work! M: You can‘t just define children who are maybe 30 years old who live at home as bamboccioni… because they have precarious kinds of contracts which don‘t allow them to… it is society‘s fault… it‘s not the kids fault.

22 Expression referring to material and social well-being gained through employment, a house, and marriage

D: Yes, in Italy we have this ‗mirage‘ of the lifelong contract, steady employment….

Another father (one child, 28, lives at home), commented:

In my opinion the new generation has erased the word ‗sacrifice‘ from their vocabulary… they want everything and they want it right away. But it doesn‘t work like that… All this is the fault of parents though. I think we instilled them with all these fears… of precariousness, of this, of that… that paralyzed, they can‘t move. So this brings about an infantilization of society, because these kids stay at home so long…‖

Favoring the particularly long permanence in the family of origin are, on the one hand the difficulties youth face in acquiring a (suitable and acceptable) economic independence, and on the other, the cultural resistance of many Italian parents towards flexible forms of couple life (i.e. cohabitation – a topic I return to in Chapter 6), and

―acceptable‖ living conditions more generally. There is a broad acondiscendenza (desire to please; compliance with) with supporting ―children‖ until the moment in which ―they can take flight in great style and with a minimum of risk‖ (Rosina 2003:178). Perhaps most importantly, intergenerational (parental) kin ties are highly influential in this phase of the life course. More broadly, the interaction and experiences of parents with their adult children, reminds us that aging does not begin at some arbitrary point in mid-life.

Accordingly, no single stage in the aging process (e.g. adolescence, adulthood, etc.) can be understood apart from people of other ages (in this case, parents).

2.4 Bamboccioni Reflect

Given ambivalent parenting styles, a weak welfare state, and a precarious labor market, young adults in Italy must increasingly live with significant uncertainty and manage delay, whether actively chosen or forced by circumstance. As Settersten (2007:253) points out, ―In such a climate, personal characteristics, and resources (e.g., psychological

65 and physical health; family socioeconomic status) may become increasingly important in determining how young people fare in the face of changing opportunity structures and the absence of institutional supports, normative controls, and clear life scripts.‖ As other scholars have pointed out, this picture is consistent with the idea of a modern world that is increasingly unpredictable and full of risks that must be assumed and negotiated by individuals (e.g., Beck 2000; Giddens 2002; Heinz 2003). Men in Padua often pointed out to me that the world they are familiar with differed dramatically from that of their parents. They suggested that the expectations and understandings of their parents were out of touch with their desires and the actual opportunities available to them. They were also very much aware that their parents were not motivated to push them out of the home.

While they often joked about this, there was an underlying wariness that somehow it didn‘t feel ―right.‖ As Marco (age 32) told me,

The problem is that there aren‘t any expectations, you know? So you continue to hope that it will be others that will give you some recognition, you know like saying, ―You‘re great, you‘re a man now‖… If you continue to wait for something like that, it will just never happen, because on their part there is no advantage…

While young adults may respond ―sto bene così‖ (―I‘m fine this way‖) on surveys (when asked about why they continue to live with their parents), Rosina (2003) points out that when asked about what they think the appropriate age to leave the parental home is, many

Italians respond with an age that is older than in other countries, but younger than the actual average age in Italy, indicating that they are not entirely satisfied with this situation. The men I interviewed and spent time with often had difficulty defining their living situation, often describing the parental home as a ―strategic base‖ from which they

66 navigated. For example, Michele is 32 years old, works as a salesman and lives at home.

He describes his living situation as follows:

In reality the situation is not really very well defined, because in the end I only sleep here (at his parents) two or three times a week at most… because I sleep at my girlfriend‘s [who lives with several roommates, not her parents]. So, since I am kind of self-employed, I have kind of an office here… where I keep a bunch of stuff, so I use it as a logistic base for moving around. So sometimes I stay here, also to allow my girlfriend some freedom, because we don‘t feel ready to move in together or get married.

One of the reasons men seem to leave the home so late is also the perception that the only ―acceptable‖ reason for them to leave is if they are going to create a family; in other words if they are going to move in with or marry a woman. If instead they end up staying on at home, they often explain the motives for remaining as: ―easier to live at home,‖ ―financially difficult to leave,‖ ―unstable job market,‖ etc. but the sensation is that they are really staying at home until they have a ―good‖ reason to leave, meaning that they have constructed a serious relationship with a woman. The same often holds for women, although given lower average ages at first marriage for women, this does not delay departure as long as it does for men. When men leave for other reasons, the choice is almost never entirely emancipative in that in most cases they still bring their laundry home for their mother to do, eat lunch and/or dinner in their parents‘ home several times a week, and continue to receive financial help. Micheli (2007) writes of a ―revolving door‖ in which grown children may leave the home, only to return for significant periods of time before leaving again (i.e. after having finished university, or after a divorce)23.

While parents were willing to support their children at any point in their life course, and generally to make great sacrifices to enable them to reach their goals, many

23 A survey conducted in 2001 found that over one in five men at the moment of the survey ―had returned to the care of their mothers‖ after a divorce.

67 of the men I spoke to described the disadvantages of having such ―strong families.‖ Take for example the following conversation with Alfredo (age 39):

M: How old were you when you left home? A: When I was 24… actually no, I was 23 when I left to go to Parma to study (university). Then when I was 25 I went to the United States for a year, Los Angeles. From then on, I‘ve always lived away from home except for certain periods... maybe a month here and there with my parents… But this is a more a less a characteristic of Italy. Because here the concept of the family is very encompassing, very involving…this concept has positive aspects but is also tragic in some ways. I don‘t know, I think the setup of the Italian family is something very cumbersome compared to other countries. On the other hand, there are also positive aspects, in terms of sensibility, in terms of the ability to manage, to be emotionally complete…. But it‘s like having a blanket that‘s too short (come avere la coperta corta) because many don‘t manage to leave… It‘s comfortable and so why would I want to go out into the cold? But it‘s not always a good thing….

Such statements seem to speak directly to Livi Bacci‘s theory of ―too much family‖ which certainly seems to contribute to Padua men‘s late departure from the parental home. On the other hand, ―too much family‖ also seems to enable men to strive towards post-modern values of self realization in the socially approved-of order: finishing education, finding gainful employment, marrying, buying a home and having children

(Gribaldo et al. 2009). In other words, rather than think of ―too much family‖ as causing the delay in departure, and retarding other steps in the transition to adulthood, we might instead reflect on the peculiar combination of strong intergenerational times and ideational change which seems to create, in Padua, a system of informal cohabitation in which young adults‘ endeavors to achieve individual autonomy and self-realization are both aided and undermined by the ―strong‖ family. Linked to the discussion of the strong family, and late departure from the family of origin, during interviews and participant observation there emerged fascinating aspects with regard to the perception of time and

68 age, together with what it means to become an adult, suggesting that the way that age is perceived has significant consequences for men and their desires to have children. It is to this related issue that I now turn.

2.5 Transitions to Adulthood: Perceptions of Time and Age

Anthropologists have long been interested in age and the life course, although their contributions have been sporadic. Margaret Clark has often been cited as having started an ―anthropology of aging‖ with her seminal article in 1967. In early work on aging, much of the focus was on childhood and adolescence, seen as loci of human development. Adulthood and maturity were treated as biological plateaus upon which social and public growth and self-actualization are accrued, and old age as neither biological nor social development but gradual and inevitable erosion of both. In the late

1970s, and early 80s, attention shifted to address cultural variability in interpretation and experience of the entire human life span, especially as this concerned ethnographic descriptions of age grades, age sets, and shifts in social roles across the lifespan and the various cross-cultural manifestations of gerontocracy. An edited volume in 1984 by

David Kertzer and Jennie Keith endeavored to pay more systematic attention ―to the use of age and cultural conceptions of the life course.‖

Since then, much of the work in the anthropology of aging has focused on later phases of life. Fry‘s lament in 1980, that ―anthropology has a long history of being interested in age, but not in aging or the aged‖ has seemingly been turned on its head, with an anthropology of aging that now focuses primarily on old age, rather than perceptions of and the role of age more generally throughout the life course. Earlier work should perhaps be reconsidered, such as Maybury-Lewis‘ 1984 article, which saw the

69 essence of age group structure not in the utility of its social functions, but in age as both ideology and principle of social organization; or Riley‘s (1972; 1979a, 1979b, 1987) seminal contributions on aging in which she sets forth four central principles: aging is influenced by the society in which people live; the ways in which people age are continually reshaping society; aging is a lifelong process of growing up and growing older; and aging is a complex process, composed of interdependent biological, psychological, and social sub-processes. What I suggest here is that an anthropology of aging return to an approach which looks not only at different age groups which make up a society, but also different life phases, and life domains such as the family cycle, fertility history, occupational careers and employment, and more broadly, the normative patterns of aging. Indeed, aging is not only a life-long process, but as a person is growing up and growing older, historical trends and events influence the patterns of his or her life, and new patterns of aging can cause social change (Riley 1979). Aging is a changeable process, and differs across societies, at different historical periods, and in diverse socio- economic, cultural and political contexts.

Here I am particularly interested in perceptions of age and time, as young Italian men transition into adulthood. Certainly inquiry into the transition of persons from junior to more senior status has constituted an important focus of anthropological inquiry, especially as this is marked through rites of passage (La Fontaine 1985). Yet, rather than a marked event, the transition to adulthood in many developed countries has become increasingly fragmented, made up of a series of ―partial transitions‖ which occur over an increasingly long period of time. The result is a lengthening of youth, or that phase of life which connects ―adolescence‖ with adult life. ―What distinguishes it most from other

70 ages is that it bridges two stages of life: childhood dependence and adult independence, which are well defined but have fluid boundaries‖ (Cordon 1997:576). Jeffery Arnett

(2000, 2007) proposes ―emerging adulthood‖ as a new way to conceptualize the period from the late teens through the twenties (which in Italy could be applied to the early 30s).

He suggests that emerging adulthood is a distinct period demographically, subjectively, and in terms of identity explorations24.

Of no less importance to perceptions of age and the transition to adulthood is the impact of the state and institutions on structuring the timing of the life course (Cohen

1994). State effects on the life course include age rules in legislation such as those regarding age at school entry, legal marriage age, legal retirement age (Riley et al. 1972;

Cain 1976; Mayer and Neugarten 1982; Eglit 1985; Schoepflin 1989); ―In the welfare state, the continuous flow of life is transformed into a series of situations all of which have a clear formal definition‖ (Mayer and Schoepflin 1989). Social, legal and economic policies that are in place during a specific time period also significantly shape perceptions of age and time, as well as the transition to certain phases of the life course (i.e. fiscal policies, family policies, housing policies, labor-market policies25). In Italy, parents are

24 Although Erik Erikson (1950, 1968) did not discuss specific ages in his writing, Arnett (2000) notes that Erikson did comment on the ―prolonged adolescence‖ typical of industrialized societies and on the psychosocial moratorium granted to young people in such societies "during which the young adult through free role experimentation may find a niche in some section of his society" (Erikson, 1968, p. 156). Thus, Erikson seems to have distinguished--without naming--a period that is in some ways adolescence and in some ways young adulthood yet not strictly either one, a period in which adult commitments and responsibilities are delayed while the role experimentation that began in adolescence continues and in fact intensifies. See also Daniel Levinson (1978), whose work among middle age men suggested that they considered age 17-33 to be a ―novice phase‖ of development in which the individual gradually moves into the adult world and builds a stable life structure.

25 Billari (2004:22) writes, ―The adoption of new policies, i.e. on housing subsidies or on limits to down payment in mortgages, are clearly important determinants of how young adults shape their pathways to adulthood, and the same is true for family policies, such as maternity policies, parental-leave policies, childcare services, and child benefits (Neyer, 2003). It is difficult to disentangle whether such policies

71 responsible by law for providing material support for their children until they are economically independent (regardless of age). Italian law even foresees that a ―child‖ can bring his parents to trial if they do not see to his/her maintenance. This in turn shapes the perception of what an ―adult‖ as opposed to a ―child‖ is, especially as young adults stay longer in the home. Economists Marco Mandacorda and Enrico Moretti (2005) point out that after a 1992 reform of social security that raised the national retirement age in Italy to 64, parents continued to earn enough to keep their adult children at home. The researchers found that a 10% increase in parental income resulted in approximately a

10% rise in the proportion of children living with their parents. In a context such as Italy, where parents are potentially held responsible for their children for decades, the welfare state leans heavily on the family, and the precarious labor market and high expectations deter children from leaving the home at young ages, it is not surprising that young adults remain ―children‖ for an ever-more extensive period of the life course26.

Historical studies have shown that the role and perception of particular life stages such as childhood (Aries 1960), adolescence (Demos and Demos 1969) and old age

(Fischer 1977) have undergone change; I argue here that perceptions of age and

―adulthood‖ in Italy are also shifting in meaning, molded by a multitude of social- cultural, political, and economic elements. The changing perception of age and adulthood has been studied in other contexts as well. Richard Jenkins (1990), for example, has belong to the welfare state per se (and thus are stable in a mid-term historical perspective), or whether they belong to political choices that are continuously subject to revision. In any case, changes in such policies modify the opportunities that young adults face during their early adult years, and they can be read in the classic demographic terms of ―period effects.‖

26 The mass media also molds perceptions of age. During field work, I continually ran across numerous articles which spoke of 30-40 year-olds as ―young.‖ For example, in one article, the journalist described the recent phenomenon of the ―baby gang‖ comprised of ―young‖ delinquents age 18-22. Notwithstanding the fact that at age 18, one is legally an adult in Italy, the adjective used to describe the gang was ―baby.‖

72 explored the shift in attitudes among a cohort of young men and women in Wales, who faced (not unlike young Italians today), prolonged unemployment and a general trend towards unmarried partnerships. Jenkins shows that this pattern confounded popular expectations that one would leave school, find employment, and then get married; throwing the notion of when one attains adulthood into question. On the other hand, because this situation was shared by so many young adults, expectations were slowly modified. Employment was seen as desirable rather than a prerequisite for adulthood, and alternatives to marriage were more accepted (Spencer 1990). Jenkins shows that while the concept of ―adulthood‖ remained, the elements that give this transition meaning shifted over time. In the following sections I delve further into men‘s perceptions of age, and their thoughts on what it means to become an adult.

2.5.1 More Time, But Never Enough…

Many men with whom I spoke commented that the ―speed‖ of the life-course has slowed: one stays at home longer, attends school longer, and starts a family later; on the other hand, expectations and ―needs‖ have continually risen. In addition, many men without children explained to me that one day they would like to have children, but that there remains time before they need to think seriously about it. Men who shared this attitude with me were for the most part over the age of 30, and many over the age of 35. They explained that they still feel young, and there are many things they still want to do before having children. In a certain sense, they are young, in that many still live at home with their parents, or have only just recently left the parental home and thus do not yet feel ready to start a family.

A ―slowed down‖ life-cycle in which education, departure from the family of origin, finding work and starting a family are protracted in time is ironically accompanied by the sensation that ―there is never enough time.‖ Many men with whom I spoke lamented that fact that they never have enough time to do everything they want, they are always rushing around, and have little free time. For example, during one a conversation with Michele (age 32), he explained,

Everything is now protracted in time… Just think, my cousin just had his first child at age 38, and my other cousin is still at university. The rhythms induced by work but also biological rhythms aren‘t what they used to be… Instead you get in your car, on the phone, rushing here and there. You always there with the adrenaline… and everyone is always in a hurry!

There is certainly a paradox here between feelings of being rushed, that there is never enough time, and the lengthening of the life course. This contradiction weighs on choices to start a family and have children. Take, for example, Antonio, who is 50 years old.

Together with his wife, age 44, they have decided that they would like to have a child. In visits to doctors they have been informed that it is not impossible that Stefania can conceive, although it is unlikely. In the meantime they have been investigating the possibility of adoption. When discussing why they had waited so long to have a child, notwithstanding the fact that they have been married for 20 years, Antonio responded:

―More than anything else, it‘s a question of time… I have another job that I do in the afternoons... I have an online store which sells vinyl records… it‘s a passion of mine… but it takes a lot of time… So, for example, now that we are going on vacation, I realized that I need to work on my English… so I started a class, but I can‘t find time to study… never enough time…‖ To which I replied: And just think if you had a child!?‖ Antonio responded: ―I know! I think about it all the time... Maybe Mother Nature is trying to tell me that there is never enough time to do everything (laughs).‖

2.5.2 Forever Young

The notion that there is ―plenty of time‖ (but never enough) is complicated by men‘s statements that they still feel ―young‖ as they age into their late 30 and 40s. Certainly life expectancy in Italy has increased dramatically over the last 100 years. Around 1900, life expectancy in the West was little over 45 years; by 1950 it had increased to 66; in most

Western countries today it is between 76 and 79. This advance is due mainly to the reduction in infant mortality (still very high around 1900, even among the more privileged classes); it also reflects a very real increase in the length of life: more people are living to an advanced age. Statistically speaking, we are further now from 1900 than

1900 was from Greco-Roman antiquity (Boia 2004). In addition to longer life expectancies, death has become ever less present. For thousands of years people were

―familiar‖ with death, which was very much a part of family life, routinely claiming children and young people. In many parts of the world today, this phenomenon has abated considerably and in this respect, the twentieth century marks a turning-point in human history27 (ibid: 172). This remarkable extension of longevity has untold consequences for the shape of the life course and the ways life is experienced in a range of intermediate social structures (Parsons 1963; Preston 1976; Riley 1987). I argue that in part, Italy‘s aging population structure contributes to feelings of being ―young.‖ More broadly, ―old age‖ starts later, both biologically28 and culturally. This makes people in all age categories feel, perhaps, younger. To add to this, retirement is no longer seen as a gradual decline, but often viewed as reviving certain values of youth, first among these freedom and autonomy. People of all age categories in Padua commented that what is

27 A revolution due even more to improved hygiene than to medical advance

28 In the nineteenth century the average age of menopause for women was around 45; now it is well over 50 (Boia, 2004).

75 meant by ―young‖ has changed significantly. As one informant put it, ―biological rhythms no longer go hand in hand with the life course.‖ Maria (age 68) commented,

Once, I considered a 70 year old woman to be very old… which is now the age I‘m at… and I don‘t feel old… I know that I have ahead of me… at least, maybe 30 years…

If the retirees are not seen as ―old‖ (or even feel old) and 40 year olds feel young, what does this mean for the life course, and more fundamentally, for perceptions of time, age, and adulthood? More broadly, how does the age structure of a population shape the life course? Of no less importance are kin ties (as seen above in influencing departure from parental home) and institutions (or lack thereof in the Italian case, given the weak welfare state) (Kertzer and Keith 1984; Halpern 1984).

Among the 30-40 year olds I spent time with in Padua, the term ―Peter Pan syndrome‖29 was often used to describe the behavior of Italian men. For example, an excerpt from my field notes reads:

Enrico sat in the front seat, where he could extend his lanky frame and long legs (age 32; works nights, 11.30 pm to 6.30 am as a typographer for a local newspaper)… When I mentioned that I am interested in the male side of the equation, he laughing responded that the answer was obvious. Men in Italy suffer from the ‗Peter Pan Syndrome,‘ meaning that they refused to ‗grow up‘ and take on more serious responsibilities such as having a child. Sebastiano (age 34, gardener) concurred enthusiastically, that men wanted to continue having ‗fun‘ and the idea of ‗settling down‘ with a wife and children meant that they would probably have to stop all of their extracurricular activities. He explained that he

29 Peter Pan syndrome is a pop-psychology term used to describe an adult who is socially immature. The term has been used informally both by laypeople and several psychologists since it was made popular by the 1983 publication of The Peter Pan Syndrome: Men Who Have Never Grown Up, by Dan Kiley. The same author also wrote a similar book, entitle The Wendy Dilemma, published a year later. This ―syndrome‖ is not listed in the Diagnostic and Statistical Manual of Mental Disorders, nor is it recognized by the American Psychiatric Association or the World Health Organization as a mental disorder. The ―syndrome‖ which usually affects males, is characterized by immaturity, narcissism, irresponsibility, rebelliousness, anger, dependency, and a belief that the individual is beyond society‘s laws and norms. According to Kiley, ―Peter Pan‖ is the adult little boy who, when in a relationship seeks out a need for mothering; comparable in many aspects to Jung‘s archetype of Puer Aeternus, the eternal boy, and Marie- Louise von Franz‘s work (The Problem with Puer Aeternus) which followed.

not only practices martial arts, but is taking a salsa-dancing class, continuing with his rock-climbing, and playing soccer. Although 34, he has no immediate intentions of having children, and declared that he wants to spend at least the next 10 years exploring his interests. Sebastiano currently lives at home with his parents, not withstanding that he earns enough to be able to find an apartment to rent/or a room with others.

Matteo, a fellow ping-pong player in his early 40s, suggested to me on a number of occasions that Italian men just want to have fun, enjoy themselves; they aren‘t interested in settling down, and having to be responsible for the well-being of someone other than themselves. He suggested that an Italian version of the song by Cyndi Lauper be written, but instead of ―girls just wanna have fun‖ it should be ―boys just wanna have fun‖; they don‘t want to grow up. Along similar lines, Giuseppe (age 36) suggested to me that ―men feel as if they are younger than they really are, creating a false sense of immortality‖ where the prospect of ―settling down and having children‖ is always far off. Thus not only do men become ―adults‖ later in life, but it seems that the perception of time has changed.

The sense of being ―forever young‖ and that there is time to do everything leads to prolonging family formation. Many men I spoke with associated having children with the end of an ―idyllic‖ period when they were young, single, beautiful and autonomous.

For example Pietro, 31 years old, with a baby of 4 months commented:

It‘s more difficult, I think, for a father than a mother to see oneself dropped into this social reality of being a parent… because in this crazy world, everything is waved in your face… but being a father almost seems like committing a wrong to society. You have to be young, beautiful, and single…Sometimes I think I look stupid compared to my friends who are single… I‘ve already taken the step of living with a woman… lots of them are single, they live alone because they want to stay free… just like the ‗male target‘…you know, the winning one, the one they sell you on TV . This weighs, I think, on many men… like the ones you see walking around the piazza on a Sunday, tired, bored, with their hands in their pockets, watching their children run after pigeons. Because this thing here,

you‘re affected by it…. Because you feel… compared to these single 40 year- olds, you feel somehow stupid, like you decided things a little bit too quickly… like you could have waited, done other things… because there was time…

Other men equated ―having fun‖ with sexual escapades, which they would have to set aside once they finally ―settled down.‖ Filippo, a 33 year old psychologist, explained to me that in the past, one got married at a young age, but that infidelity was not that big of a deal… in fact, it was even to be expected (of men). Of course, for women this has never been true. He commented ―For a wife to cheat on her husband was grounds for divorce, but a man who had a few sexual escapades on the side? Bah, no big deal really… but now, women don‘t put up with an unfaithful partner anymore. The norm no longer exists, and men feel spaesato (confused). Maybe this is the real reason that now we wait so long to settle down… it‘s not really about getting everything under control (i.e. school, career, house, etc.), it‘s about having fun with many different women, before finally settling on one.‖

Alessandro Rosina, professor of demography at the Catholic University in Milan, carried out an experiment in one of his undergraduate courses (fall semester 2007), where he asked his students if they would use the word ―young‖ (giovane) to describe the following age groups: 20 years of age (100% described as ―young‖); 35 years of age

(60% described as ―young‖); 40 years of age (40% described as ―young‖). Rosina argues that the reason behind such a large percent of students describing these age groups as

―young‖ is due to the very strong links that exist between parents and children. While in other countries, when one leaves the parental home one becomes an ―adult,‖ in Italy one still remains a ―child‖ even after leaving the home. As Livi Bacci (2006:276) suggests, ―I do not hesitate to define this trend as pathological, guided by a moral measure: young

78 men don‘t want to grow up, they refuse to take on responsibility, and they take refuge in the familial cocoon, avoiding comparisons and competition.‖ In the next section, I explore the transition to adulthood in the context of the strong Italian family and delayed departure from the parental home.

2.6 Adulthood

Over the last decade, numerous studies have described the major changes that have affected the young adult years around the world: changes involving a diversification of the sequence of events forming the transition to adulthood, an alteration of its timetable, and a general delay in its key events (Gauthier 2007:218; Corijn and Klijzing 2001;

Lloyd 2005; Osgood et al. 2005; Settersten et al. 2005; Shanahan 2000). According to the

―classic‖ definition given by Modell et al. (1976), this transition is a process characterized by several events which ―mark‖ the passage from roles typically associated with youth to those which characterize adulthood: education completed, career begun, departure from parental home, first marriage, birth of first child. More recently, another event has been included in this list, that of cohabitation, which may come before or even substitute for marriage. Demographers have typically tended to focus on these five (or six) demographic markers, while psychologists have paid more attention to the subjective indicators of the transition to adulthood (Gauthier 2007). Generally, there has been the tendency to ignore other possible ―markers‖ of adulthood, outside the traditional ones on which demography has focused. Settersten (2007:254), for example, suggests that ―young people often reference other alternative markers of adulthood—atypical and unexpected experiences, and subtle shifts in everyday life and in the mind, such as sitting at the

―grown up‖ table at grandmother‘s house for holidays, being let in on family secrets, or

79 knowing the difference between what one can and what one should do.‖ More broadly entry into adulthood seems to occur not only more gradually and more variably than half a century ago, but has become much more ambiguous in meaning and process (Settertsten

2007:252; Billari and Wilson 2001; Blossfeld et al. 2005; Chisholm and Kovacheva

2002). ―Social timetables that were widely observed a half century ago have crumbled. It no longer seems possible—or as possible—for most young people to achieve economic and psychological autonomy as early as they once did‖ (Settersten 2007:253; see also

Bell et al. 2007; Coté 2000; Danziger and Rouse 2007; Furstenberg et al. 2005; Klijzing

2005).

2.6.1 When is one an Adult? Men Respond

The long delay in traditional markers of adulthood makes it difficult for young people to achieve solid identities as adults (Settersten 2007:258; Arnett 2000). Most of the young men interviewed did not feel completely adult, even into their 30s. Other research has similarly shown that young people are more likely to report ―feeling like‖ adults when they are at work, with romantic partners or spouses, or with children, but are less likely to feel like adults when they are with their parents and some of their friends, depending on whether activities with friends reinforce adult identities or are instead more similar to adolescent pursuits (for the United Sates, see Shanahan et al. 2005; for Germany, see

Reitzle 2008). Recent American public opinion data show that ―marriage and parenting are now largely disassociated from definitions of adulthood, with financial independence, completing schooling, being able to support a family, and, to a lesser extent, leaving home, most often endorsed as important indicators of adult status‖ (Settersten 2007: 259;

Furstenberg et al. 2004). These authors point out that as marriage and fertility often do

80 not occur until a person‘s late 20s or 30s, it becomes difficult to define people under these ages as ―not adults‖ (for lack of a better term), simply because these events have yet to (potentially) occur. The same may hold true in Italy, where marriage and parenting are increasingly delayed.

Certainly, most ―young‖ Italian men in this study did not seem to be in a hurry to get married or become parents. As mentioned above, men generally seem to think that there is plenty of time (but never enough) to do all the things they desire in life. It was this impression that led me to begin asking my informants, when, in their opinion, does one become an adult? Or what are the characteristics that define ―adulthood?‖ A great number of my informants responded that while one becomes ―mature‖ after having had one‘s first child, but one really becomes an ―adult‖ when one‘s parents have passed away.

For example, Lorenza (age 52) commented:

Maybe when my father died... then I said, ok, now I no longer have anyone to turn to. If I divorce, I don‘t know where to go. If something happens, there is no one who will help me… that‘s when I became an adult… this happened about 14-15 years ago. I have a sister, but it‘s not the same thing… when your father dies… I said, ok that‘s it... I have to take care of myself now.

Paolo, age 45, similarly suggested:

I became an adult when my parents died… when they died… I had the sensation that I had finished playing, that it was time to think seriously about my life.

On the other hand, Gaetano (age 51) in answer to the question of when one becomes an adult responded:

In Italy, never! Above all for males! Maybe because if your children become adults... I‘ve seen this in other parents… then you become old. So you try to keep your children at home up until absurd ages because if your son forms a family, then you become a grandfather… and so you‘re old. Around 18, 20 years of age, when your son starts shaving… many parents buy a dog!

More broadly, male informants tended to link adulthood to some kind of separation from their parents (not necessarily the death of the latter). This is perhaps not surprising, considering the ―strength‖ of the Italian family. Combining both the Peter Pan syndrome and questions of adulthood into one answer, Samuel (age 30, single, no children), responded this way:

S: So I asked myself, in the last 10 years… what have I accomplished? A university degree… I did this, I did that… As if I was putting my desk in order… or a bookshelf: check, check, check, oops, I don‘t have that! It‘s not really a discussion maybe about becoming an adult… but in my opinion…I don‘t know, you see your parents as adults… because you see that they are a generation ahead of you… maybe when you start having children, you get married, you no longer rely on your parents – and maybe they actually rely on you! You think, ‗damn, I‘ve become an adult! Because up until a certain point, you‘re always a little boy: the eternal Peter Pan, the baby, no?

2.6.2 The Impact of Women on Italian ―Adulthood‖

A comparative study on Italy, Great Britain, and Sweden revealed that age at first marriage and at the birth of the first child are correlated with the existence of social rules regarding the timing and the ―right‖ sequence of these events. The Italian women interviewed in this study were especially explicit in discussions concerning a ―normative clock‖ which foresees entering a union only after having finished one‘s studies and having found a stable job. Parenting is taken on only following the formation of a stable union. More generally, the female condition is an important cause of delay in the formation of a family, in that young women now study as much as (and in many cases more than) their male counterparts and are just as motivated to enter the world of work.

Add to this the difficulty of reconciling family and work, and it is understandable that roles such as wife and mother become less desirable (Lucchini and Schizzerotto 2001;

Zanatta 2003). This is a significant historical change in that not so long ago in Italy,

82 marriage was the central event around which members of younger cohorts obtained from their elders recognition of their full status as adults. In fact, at the peak of industrial society, becoming an adult for a young woman meant above all being ready to take on the role of housewife, wife and mother (Saraceno 1996). The changes, which occurred above all beginning in the 1960s in Italy, profoundly changed the role of women in society, and as a consequence, gender relations and masculinity (a topic I return to in the next chapter). As mentioned above, the significant increase in education30 and opportunities for self-realization in the professional sphere allowed women to obtain an increasingly important position in society. The development and diffusion of effective methods of contraception also allowed for greater control over fertility and increased autonomy in reproductive matters, allowing women to be less conditioned by undesired pregnancies.

These transformations activated a process of convergence between the sexes in the values and implications of the roles which characterize adulthood and more generally, what it means to become an adult (Rosina et al. 2003).

While the Italian women I interviewed in Padua expressed similar perceptions of age (and youth) as men, they were more aware of the biological constraints determining the span of their reproductive lives. On the other hand, when I asked women in their late

20s and early 30s (both single and in couples) about their fertility intentions, the response

I often received was that they ―still felt young‖ and that there was plenty of time before they seriously had to consider having children. I received the same reaction when I told people that I would like to have children one day (I am in my early thirties). The general

30 In 1962 the age to which schooling was obligatory was raised to 14. In 1969, new criteria for admission to university were established, making access less restricted.

83 response when I made a statement to this effect was, ―How old are you? Ah, you‘re still young…your just a bambina! (child).‖

Certainly as women continue to gain higher levels of education and their career ambitions match those of men, fertility is often delayed in lieu of these pursuits. Italian women with whom I spoke explained that they ―were not ready‖ for marriage and maternity. Such responses highlight the importance of social norms concerning the definition of the ―right time‖ for the transition to ―adulthood‖ and the formation of a family (Gribaldo et al. 2009). Increasingly, unions are formed only after long periods of education and after having established solid bases for careers which correspond to the aspirations of both partners.

Although changing female expectations do have consequences for the transition to adulthood and perceptions of time and age, it should be noted that Italy still has one of the lowest levels of female participation in the labor force in Europe. In the mid-1990s, the rate of activity for men age 25-29 years old was 85% while for women, the rate was only 51% (Rosina et al. 2003). The same holds true of political participation. In Italy, the

Lower House (Camera dei Deputati) is made up of 17% women and 83% men, while the

Senate has only 13% women and 87% men. There are no women senior ministers, and only 9% of junior ministers are women. Similarly, in the highest decision-making body in the Central Banks of Italy, there are no women (European Commission, 2007).

2.7 Conclusion

Although Meyer Fortes is perhaps best known for his work among the Tallensi and

Ashanti in Ghana, his thoughts of the processual relationship between biological, social, and cultural aging hold particular relevance for the Italian case. More specifically, in his

1984 contributing chapter ―Age, Generation, and Social Structure‖ he suggests that aging is an individual process positioned ―between two poles of social structure,‖ the domestic and the jural domains. At one end is the domain of social reproduction, which in a relatively narrow family system such as the Italian one is organized through the succession of generations of parents and children31. The opposite pole reflects the fact that individuals are not only members of a family and a generation, but are also citizens of a larger society and as such are ―subject to rules and constraints and bearers of rights and duties‖ (Fortes 1984:114). Thus, the ―recognition and consideration of chronological age as opposed to maturation and generation depend on the differentiation between the politico-jural and the domestic domains of social life‖ (idem). Fortes also suggests that intergenerational relations are characterized by both the continuity and the struggle inherent in generational reproduction (defined in oedipal terms). Both of these notions are important for thinking about age, perceptions of age, and consequences for masculinity and fertility outcomes in the Italian context.

As Fortes points out, age differentiation plays a role in both the jural domain, through formalized age organizations, as well as in the more informal and private domain. He suggests that one‘s life course position in the private domestic sphere is likely to be based on generation, while in the more public arenas outside the household age may be indicated by chronological age. In the Italian case, what is considered

―young‖ and when one ―becomes an adult‖ is very much based on intergenerational ties.

Indeed, the death of a parent often marks a subjective transition on the part of informants to bona fide adulthood. In addition, parents often treat their offspring as ―children‖ rather

31 ―Thus arises the generational calculus that his the basis of social and personal relations primarily in the domestic domain but capable of being extended to wider ranges of social life.‖ (Fortes 1984:114)

85 than as ―adults‖ well into their 30s and even 40s (and even later). Hence, one‘s life course position in the Italian domestic sphere seems to be based on relative generational position. In one man‘s (age 56) words:

When I was 25, everyone considered me to be an adult… today, if you‘re 25, they call you a ‗boy‘ (ragazzo)… On the news they say a ragazzo of 30… but to me that‘s an adult. I call my children ragazzi (ages 27 and 30) but that‘s because I am their father... they will always be my children.

In the public sphere, on the other hand, age is (for the most part) indicated by chronological age. Legislation and institutions regulate – through chronological age – the pattern of the life course: obligatory age of schooling, voting age, age when one receive retirement benefits, etc.

I would argue, however, that due to a shift towards a more flexible job market, characterized by ―precarious‖ contracts and low initial salaries (and accompanied by a feeble welfare state and an aging society), the chronological age scheme that characterizes the jural domain has weakened. In other words, as in the familial domain, what is considered ―young‖ is increasingly based on relational criteria, rather than on chronological age. The precarious labor market and the refusal of the aged to turn over power to younger cohorts means that in both the private sphere and public sphere young adults stay young and are treated as children for longer periods of time. The mass media, another important aspect of the public domain, further concretizes the perception of age as based on generational criteria (rather than chronological age), by treating men in their

30s and even into their 40s as ―young.‖

The trend towards basing age on generation, rather than on chronology, has significant consequences for men, for whom the precariousness of the job market weighs

86 particularly heavily. As described above, the loss of stable and certain forms of work, together with the proliferation of employment contracts viewed as risky and ―flexible,‖ mean that men stay in a phase of ―emergent adulthood‖ for lengthy periods of time, waiting, as many informants joked, for the older cohorts to die, so that they could take their places. The inability to plan and the long and often windy road to adulthood weakens men‘s sense of purpose and more generally male identity. In turn, fragile masculinity, shaped by the uncertain path to adulthood and perceptions of age which do not allow men to ―grow up,‖ has demographic consequences. Foremost is delayed – and sometimes, forgone - fatherhood (a topic I return to in Chapter 7).

Ethnographic evidence from Padua also supports the postulate made by a number of sociologists and anthropologists that the nature of the aging process is quite changeable (Foner and Kertzer 1979; Riley 1979a, 1979b, 1987). In other words, while aging appears, in some ways, inflexible – children become youths, youths become adults, adults become the elderly – this process is ―continually disturbed by the immanent strains between societal requirements and individual needs, as the changing social structure must accommodate the perpetual flow of one cohort after another, and individuals must try to adapt to new roles and new intergenerational relationships‖ (Riley 1979: 113). Such strains produce societal changes that will, in turn differentiate the life-course patterns of successive cohorts. Thus, the societal rules inherent in the transition to adulthood for men in the their late twenties and early thirties give rise to conflicts and tensions, as each new cohort must contend with the older cohorts it is displacing. It is perhaps foreseeable that the conflicts and tensions described in this chapter – between strong family ties, late departure from the parental home, an aspiring welfare state, a precarious labor market,

87 and shifting notions of time and age - will ultimately change the norms and practices governing the transition to adulthood. In fact, the ways that people age continually reshape society, just as the society in which people live influences values and norms concerning age (Riley 1979b). More broadly, attitudes towards old and young, and the relations among age strata, and the age structure itself will, in all likelihood, continue to change in the future, as will, consequently, the process of aging over the life course.

Investigations of the conflicts within age systems provide an indirect window through which to explore the relationships between gender, the timing of fertility, and reproductive behavior.

One of the new emerging hallmarks of the transition to adulthood seems to be that young men (and women) must live with significant uncertainty and delay, whether actively chosen or forced by circumstance (Settersten 2007:253). This carries over to all aspects of life, including (or perhaps above all) one‘s gender identity. Uncertainty in the life course makes it difficult for men to discern exactly ―what makes a man.‖ While this is certainly not the first time that youth have had to face uncertainty in the transition to adulthood (take for example those cohorts born in the early 20th century, who were especially marred by dramatic economic depression and upheaval caused by wartime), the risks that young adults must take as they navigate atypical pathways are exacerbated

―by the fact that the world they know differs dramatically from that of previous generations‖ (Settersten 2007:254; see also Beck 2000; Giddens 2002; Heinz 2003;

Settersten 2006).

Uncertainty in the life course has meant that exactly what goes into being a man is increasingly under scrutiny by men themselves and by larger social and political

88 institutions (not least of which demographers and other social scientists). In other words, the present ambiguity of the early adult years brings not only new freedom and flexibility

―to live life in greater accordance with one‘s interests and wishes than in the past‖

(Settersten 2007: 254) but also necessitates (re)definitions of male identity and masculinity. On the other hand, new forms of masculinity remain ill-defined, unaided by social policies based on past models of life. Some scholars have described contemporary

Italian masculinity as ―fragile,‖ suggestive of a ―crisis of masculinity‖ in which men struggle to orient themselves in an alternated and uncertain life course. As I describe in the next chapter, the challenges facing men and their constructions of self can hardly be described as the first (nor, likely, the last) ―crisis of masculinity.‖ On the other hand, the fragility of Italian masculinity today is unique in that men, partially as consequence of a shifting and prolonged life course, are increasingly forced to reflect on what, exactly, it means to be a man.

CHAPTER 3. CHANGING ITALIAN MASCULINITY, A HISTORICAL APPROACH

During fieldwork in Padua many of the men with whom I spent time expressed concern over a ―crisis of masculinity,‖ which they described in broad terms as a ―feminization‖ of men accompanied by an increased ―masculinization‖ of women and the disappearance of

―real‖ men. Although such sentiments were widespread, they tend to mask the fact that

(notwithstanding some inevitable variations) the languages and images evoked in today‘s

―crisis of masculinity‖ have been repeated incessantly in the Western world for more than a century; whether in political platforms, television debates, on the cover of magazines, in the news or in informal conversation. Themes most often include male sexuality and family roles, and more specifically, the concern that men are somehow becoming less

―manly,‖ that they are acquiring characteristics that are commonly associated with the female gender: fragility, sensitivity, emotionality. Such transformations are often blamed on parallel changes in the female condition. Women are seen as making dangerous headway into territory that has traditionally been reserved for men and as gradually acquiring power and a stronger position in the family and in larger society. Indeed, women‘s increasingly strong social and psychological stature is often seen as the root of any given ―crisis of masculinity,‖ leaving men with frustrated feelings of impotence.

In this chapter, I aim to historicize Italian masculinity in order to ground the latter

- and its various ―crises‖32 - in the cultural, political, and economic shifts which occurred in Italy over the last century. In doing so, I observe the ways in which perceptions of

Italian male identity have changed - and remained the same - over the last 140 years.33 In particular, I focus on the historical similarities between the turn of the 19th (1870s-early

1900s) and 20th (1970s- early 2000s) centuries in terms of the perceived fragility of men and threats to virility. Both moments were characterized by a strong feminist movement and increased female participation in the labor force accompanied by fertility decline, obliging men to reconsider the meanings of virility and bringing to the fore discussions of male identity. Of fundamental importance to understanding the present ―crisis of masculinity,‖ I also discuss how these moments notably differ in terms of men‘s reactions to threatened masculinity and virility and their efforts to defend a ―natural‖ masculinity.

More broadly, this chapter gives historical perspective to the ways that demographic trends affect gender ideologies and vice-versa. It also offers a conduit for deeper understandings of emergent models of masculinity and the ways historical processes shape the contemporary ―crisis of masculinity.‖

Certainly gender has a relational, historical dimension which is rich and complex.

A careful examination of the bonds and differences between Italian men and women over

32 Scholars such as Connell (1995) and Whitehead (2002) argue that there is very little evidence of a ―crisis of masculinity,‖ while others, such as Segal (1997), point out that change in gender relations comes about only very slowly. The historical examination which follows allows us to question whether such crises have ever existed, and whether the present ―crisis‖ is a discursive production of the media and academia, rather than reflects concrete behavioral change (Boni 2004:26). Talmon (2000) suggests, for example, that media representations of new models of masculinity do not simply reflect societal change, but tend to legitimize it. At most, the present ―crisis of masculinity‖ seems not to be unique, but rather a relative constant throughout history, if expressed in different forms. According to Magnan (1997: 4) ―crises… are a condition of masculinity. Male gender identity is never stable; its terms are continually redefined and renegotiated, and the performance of gender is continually reenacted.‖

33 A specific treatment of regional differences in Italy is beyond the scope of the chapter. I focus here on Italian masculinity broadly, although an effort is made to comment on geographical variance when appropriate.

91 time thus allows for a full understanding of the changing ―male condition‖ in Italy; indeed, masculinity and femininity are functions of reciprocal perceptions and interactions – past, present, and future (Ruspini 2005:30-31). The American historian

Joan Scott (1988) has suggested that gender best be defined as two intertwining schemes: a constitutive element of social relationships based on perceived differences between the sexes, and a principal way of signifying relationships of power. A study of gender relations in Italian history is not therefore simply a study of men‘s or women‘s history. It means, rather, ―to study the asymmetries between men and women, to chart the course of patriarchy in both private and public life. To estimate how present social trends are affecting historic imbalances of power between the two sexes‖ (Ginsborg 2003: 34).

Over the last several decades, historians have shown that notions of gender are

―historically fluid, changing over both space and time‖ (Seymour 2005:298). Feminist scholars pioneered arguments of this type (mostly with a focus on women) and their work inevitably raised questions concerning the historical construction of masculinity.

Although a substantial historiography of masculinity for many western nations now exists

(i.e. Badinter 1997, 1992; Connell 1995, 1987; Mosse 1997; Stearns 1990; Kimmel 1987;

Segal 1997), there has been relatively little interest in the history of masculinity in Italy, with exception, perhaps, of the Fascist period (Wanrooij 1990; Ben-Ghiat 1996, 2005;

Theweleit 1997; Mosse 1997; Saraceno 1995; Forgacs 2002; Benadusi 2009). Wanrooij

(2005) suggests that the lack of interest in gender issues in Italian history may be explained by the fact that the former remains very much a history of women. ―Although traditional historiography has centered almost exclusively on men, studies investigating specifically the concept of masculinity and its transformations are rare‖ (ibid: 227). In

92 other words, the lack of studies which specifically historicize the male condition has meant that the female condition has been interpreted as the result of specific historical developments while masculinity has remained an a-historical, invisible, category. Despite recent attention by several scholars (Bellassai 2004; Pustianaz and Villa 2004; Cavina

2005), the Italian contribution to the history of masculinity remains limited (and almost entirely in Italian).

Explorations of the ways ―masculinity and femininity are socially constructed within a historical context of gender relations‖ (Kimmel 1987:14) are further complicated by the fact that different forms of masculinity, or better, ―masculinities,‖ will be evident in any one time and place (Mills 1998:172; Fuller 1996; Connell 1987). In other words, even within the confines of a certain social-historical period, masculinity is not only relational, but constitutes a complex system in which multiple versions clash, unite, and exclude one another (Bellassai 2004). In addition, ―crises of masculinity‖ tend to coincide with societal and political upheaval, in which the foundations of male authority are threatened or undermined. For example, the importance of muscular strength weakened as technical innovations took over during the industrial revolution (Wanrooij 2005).

Similarly, the use of new weapons during the First World War dramatically changed the practices of warfare, giving Italian men fewer opportunities to demonstrate courage and physical strength. In the 1960s and 70s, feminists challenged male authority, and youth revolts radically reshaped the relationships between fathers and their children. In the same period, new forms of contraception (i.e. the pill) gave women more control over procreation (Wanrooij 2005:278; see also Hall 1991; Maugue 1987). The most recent

―crisis,‖ contextualized within an aging population structure, lowest low fertility, and a

93 struggling economy, has seen a renewed questioning of the male role in the household, in fatherhood, in doubts concerning men‘s virility, and more broadly, in perceptions of

―frail‖ masculinity (Faludi 1999; Reich 2004). In what follows I trace the fascinating transformations in the construction of Italian male identity, beginning with the turn of the

19th century and ending with the turn of the 20th century. I concluded with a reflection on the contemporary ―crisis of masculinity‖ in Padua.

3.1 Fragile Masculinity: 1870-1921

In Italy, as in larger Western society, the last decades of the 19th century were a period of great transformation: industrialization, urbanization, transportation, not to mention technological innovations, new means of communication and information, and the spread of education. Of no less importance, this period saw increasing social and political protagonism on the part of women. These two phenomena (an accelerated process of modernization and an increased presence of women in the public sphere) produced a historically unique situation for men. Indeed, most scholars now agree that the three or four decades joining the 19th and 20th centuries represent a fundamental historical period in the construction of western male identity. ―The transformations of female identity threatened masculine supremacy, while the decline of a value system and habits linked to tradition (and therefore unquestioned and indisputable) created profound uncertainty in many men‖ (Bellassai 2004: 52).

Research conducted on the transformation of masculinity in the United States between the two centuries reveals a similar growing sense of frustration in terms of identity construction produced by the processes of modernization (Rotundo 1993). In fact the term ―hyper-civilized‖ was coined to describe middle class men living in the new

94 urban environments of the early 1900s who possessed modern domestic comforts and technologies, but led boring and artificial lives in anonymous offices and developed sedentary habits. Such men scrupulously adhered to less ―virile‖ values such as self- control and respectability (Bellassai 2005b:32). Rotundo (1993) explains that ―hyper- civilized‖ fragile masculinity was the opposite of ―real‖ masculinity (a thing of the past), gloriously represented in the popular literature of the Far West. The latter exalted a life in close contact with nature, necessitating courage, strength, and virile passions. By contrast, the spineless, cowardly, sickly ―modern‖ man was the result of modern society which was already showing its debilitating effects on the physical and mental health of the most recent male generation (idem).

Sandro Bellassai (2004) suggests that social change of this period provoked in

Italian men contradictory feelings: on the one hand, an aversion towards modern society, and on the other, an enthusiasm for ―progress.‖ Ambivalence between the two was expressed in fears of losing one‘s virile qualities (idem). In the final years of the century such misgivings were concretized into a bona fide ―clinical pathology,‖34 ratified by developments in the scientific field. For a large part of the Italian male population, the solution to alarm over an ever more frail masculinity was to insist on rigid identity construction, clearly marking the inviolable line between male and female. Men thus reacted to the weakness that ―modern life‖ provoked in them and the increasing influence

34 Medical advice books such as On Nervous Weakness (published in 1902 by Finnish doctor Theodor Löfström) explained that ―social and economic progress was not without its drawbacks; it did not bring happiness to people, on the contrary people were becoming more and more ‗nervous‘.‖ This expression was frequently (and internationally) used in texts which ―instructed the reading public on how to maintain and to improve their health and avoid falling ill with neuroses (or so-called functional nervous illness) – neurasthenia or nervous weakness, hysteria, or hypochondria. Using the projected figure of a neurotic person, the health advice genre simultaneously dealt with the attributes of the ideal citizen. As such, the genre was closely linked to the larger framework of nation building.‖ http://www.lib.helsinki.fi/elektra/uimosum.pdf (p.192; accessed 13.12.2008).

95 of women by reaffirming a strong, dominant, and determined masculinity. In many countries, Italy included, there was frequent talk of a ―feminization‖ of society, caused by

―modernization.‖ ―Civilization‖ was blamed for having made men more similar to women, and vice versa. In this light, the very future of humanity seemed uncertain. Any hint of feminization was reacted to with accentuated misogynist and homophobic attitudes both in public and private (idem).

3.1.1 The Feminist Movement: Challenging Patriarchy

In addition to perceptions of decreasing virility, a significant part of the threat to masculinity came from women themselves35. During the last decades of the 19th century, emancipationist movements in Italy questioned traditional gender roles based on the identification of males with production and public affairs, and of women with reproduction and private affairs. The prescribed female gender role in many cases contrasted sharply, however, with reality - especially in the northern and central regions of Italy — which saw an active participation of women in the production process.36 New ideas concerning gender roles and relations were closely intertwined with transformations in political, moral and scientific debate, and to some extent in literary and artistic developments. Even women who did not participate in any of the growing women

35 The first International Women‘s Day was observed on February 28th, 1909 in the US, following a declaration by the Socialist Party of America. Among other relevant historic events, the day commemorates the Triangle Shirtwaist Factory fire (New York 1911) where over 140 women lost their lives. A lack of safety measures was blamed for the high death toll. The idea of establishing an international women‘s day came about amid rapid industrialization and economic expansion leading to protests over working conditions. In 1910, the first international women‘s conference was held in Copenhagen. On the eve of WWI, women across Europe held peace rallies on March 8th, 1913. Commemorations of International Women‘s Day took place regularly on this day during the 1910s and 1920s, but then dwindled, only to be revived by the rise of feminism in the 1960s. In Italy, March 8th is celebrated with yellow mimosa flowers which are to be given to women.

36 The need to maintain industrial production further increased of the female employment in industry during WWI.

96 associations acquired more autonomous positions with respect to men thanks to

―modern‖ salaried work in factories and the service industry, as well as their increasingly central role in the education of children and growing authority in moral and spiritual matters (Bellassai 2004). Work outside the home, while not a new phenomenon for women, began to threaten the male breadwinner, weakening his exclusive access to money and undisputed authority.

The most significant effect of the feminist movement during the late 1800s was that male identity became (more or less directly) the object of public discussion. ―Men as men have naturally always been discussed, even in public, by women, but now the talk was no longer well-versed philosophical or literary debates, nor related to satirical pieces or popular stories. What was under discussion (and accusation) was the patriarchal logic of the law, the state, and the traditional family: masculinity was dragged out into the open; it lost its untouchable nature, its namelessness‖ (Bellassai 2004:30). Indeed, one of the exclusive characteristics of the male gender had been its ―invisibility.‖ Although hegemonic forms of male identity were (and continue to be) highly visible, this taken-for- granted visibility hid the true ―gendered‖ nature of male identity and masculinity. The exceptional effect of the first wave of feminism was to make men as a gender visible. In other words, to bring to consciousness something that, before, was ―like the air itself, so omnipresent that it was breathed without one even being aware of it.‖ Masculinity definitively entered a ―crisis,‖ as ―the unspoken rule that had granted consensus for a fiction necessary for power, or that of the superimposition of masculine and universal, was finally questioned‖ (idem).

3.1.2 Virility, the Nation and Low Fertility

Feeling under attack, not surprisingly men spoke, responded, and reacted to the threat of

―visibility.‖ This historical development had much to do with the formation of modern masculinity. George Mosse (1997) suggests that at the beginning of the 19th century, the stereotype of modern masculinity in Western Europe had begun to take shape, mirroring the imperatives of modern society. The bourgeois ideals of moderation, self-control, and order supplanted aristocratic and feudal notions of excessive chivalry. Increasingly, after the French Revolution, attention was given to the athletic male body, symbolizing both physical and moral virtue. In Italy, gymnastics was institutionalized in Italian schools and in the Italian army as a way of creating ―manly men: disciplined, industrious, modest and persevering‖ (Bonetta 1990: 42). After 1870, the newly formed Italian nation was faced with the question of national identity, yet dramatic regional and economic differences made defining ―Italy‖ a challenge. Of no less importance, especially into the early 1900s, was the rise of nationalism as a political movement, and the fact that it relied on the male stereotype as a symbol of a new national consciousness (Benadusi 2009). ―The sculpted body and the brave solider contrasted with the degenerate enemies of the status quo: the effeminate man or the manly women, the androgyn, homosexual, and Jews‖ (Reich 2004:

10). As Mosse (1984) has observed, between the late 1800s and early 1900s, in Western

Europe more generally nationalism aimed at standardizing bodies and behavior and diffusing an image of man inspired by an esthetic model of classic antiquity, accentuating aspects linked to aggressiveness and heroism.

As the connection between the nation, colonialism, and virility became solidified in Italy, the topic of falling birth rates (beginning in the late 1800s) was progressively incorporated into such discourse. Concern over low fertility was often accompanied by

98 complaints in the decline of progeny, of a weakness in the blood, and of a waning in the reproductive capacities of ―civilized‖ populations (as opposed to the virile vitality of the so-called ―primitive‖ populations). During the first decade of the 20th century, low fertility was increasingly linked to a rampant degeneration connected not only to rapid urbanization and female emancipation but seen as a symptom of the senile decline of

European populations more generally. Demographers now define the decline in birth rates during this period as the ―(First) Demographic Transition‖ (FDT),37 during which fertility became increasingly confined to marriage, contraception mostly affected fertility at the older ages and higher marriage durations, mean ages at parenthood declined, but childlessness among married couples remained low.

Concern over demographic issues (including out-migration, see below), led to a

―eugenics movement‖ between the first and second decade of the 1900s, designed not only to increase population, but also the quality of the ―race.‖ On the other hand, proponents who saw declining birth rates as a sign of moral decline in civility and progeny were forced to battle with an increasing control over births (i.e. using coitus interruptus), as well as the growing movement of the ―neo-Malthusians.‖38 The latter, beginning in the early 1900s (much later than in other European countries), propagated

37Research such as the European Fertility Project conducted in the late 1980s (Coale and Watkins 1986) surprisingly disproved the causal links between modernization and the first fertility transition formerly proposed by demographers. Scientists working on the project found that ―cultural factors‖ and ―cultural setting‖ seemed to influence the spread and decline of fertility independently of socio-economic conditions. Cleland and Wilson (1987) similarly argued against economic explanations in support of a diffusion interpretation of fertility decline. Ideational change – specifically the spread of knowledge and ideas surrounding the acceptability of birth control (cf. Cleland 1985; Watkins 1987, 1990, 1991)—was a better predictor of fertility rates. The large majority of population specialists today agree that the significant decline in fertility during the 19th and first half of the 20th century was enabled by a heavy reliance on coitus interruptus and to a lesser extent, abortion (Santow 1993, 1995; Schneider and Schneider 1991; 1996, Dalla Zuanna et al. 2005, among others).

38 Malthus, an English economist, launched a warning in the late 1700s against uncontrolled population growth.

99 the advantages of contraceptive methods as part of a general advocacy for modern sexual and hygienic education of the masses. An intense battle ensued between the neo-

Malthusians and traditionalist and Catholic fundamentalists. The latter saw neo-

Malthusians as not only indecent, but their movement as potentially catastrophic, in that it could potentially bring about the biological ―death‖ of the nation. The relevance for masculinity was considerable in that, notwithstanding the use of a relatively neutral language to describe the loss of sexual power and virility of the nation, the situation clearly concerned the masculine side of the equation. Indeed, it was commonly believed

(despite advances in the field of embryology) that the only active part – and hence the absolute protagonist – in the process of human reproductive was male (Mosse 1984;

Ruspini 2007). In other words, the falling fertility level in Italy necessitated not only a rethinking of the ―health‖ of the Italian population, but above all, its masculine half.

Concern with low birth rates, as they reflected the ―virility‖ of the nation, was coupled with increasing out-migration from Italy, beginning with the agrarian crisis of the 1880s. In fact, given the frequent association between numbers and power, emigration was perceived as a ―hemorrhaging of precious masculine force (the strong arms of manual laborers)‖ which threatened to weaken the political ambitions of the young country (Bellassai 2004:73). The occupation of Libya (beginning in 1911) was in fact partly designed to offer potential emigrants with a ―national‖ objective. More generally, anxieties about Italy‘s position as a militarily weaker and economically backward country39 spurred rhetoric of ridding the nation of any feminine traits in the hopes that they could become ―a nation of citizens instead of incurable Latin minions‖ (Dickie

39 This was particularly reinforced by humiliating defeats in colonial wars, especially at Adowa (Ethiopia) in 1896.

100

1997:143; see also Huysseune 2000). Bellassai (2004:56) suggests that although obviously not simply a mechanical relationship of cause and effect, ―it‘s clear that the opportunity to adhere to a warrior masculinity carried a certain weight in the genesis of that enthusiastic attitude [towards War].‖40 Italy‘s right to a place in the ―club‖ of dominating European nations at the beginning of the 20th century was affirmed through strongly masculine language. For example, in the novels of Gabriele D‘Annunzio (a renowned national intellectual) the prevailing force of men, as in the case of the virile colonialist, is prominently present, ―as if to suggest that Italy was to return to some long lost virility, effacing an effeminacy that had crept into its people in modern times‖

(Becker 1994:161).

3.1.3 Reactions to Threatened Male Supremacy Cont‘d.

In the last two decades of the 19th century and into the first decade of the 20th century, men continued to react to changes which threatened to topple universal, taken-for-granted masculinity (and expose the true gendered nature of male identity) by denying civil and political rights to women and confirming to themselves and others their physical, esthetic, sexual, and mental virility. ―Never before had the foundation of legitimacy of male supremacy been so publicly attacked; never before had male identity undergone such tensions as those linked to ―modernity‖; male identity at the end of the 19th century appeared without a doubt much more fragile than a generation ago‖ (Bellassai 2004: 37).

The remedy had two aspects: the first was to reconstitute a gender identity that was unmistakably virile, the other, to restore to this ―re-found‖ masculinity the absolute

40 Ben-Ghiat (2005:341) writes that the Fascist culture of ―virile violence‖ had its ―immediate origins in the rhetoric and combat experiences of the First World War – from the Futurists‘ anticipation of a ‗hygienic war‘ that would harden Italians, to the notion of the trenches as crucibles of a new model of manhood – but was developed and brought into the everyday realm through fascist squadrism in the years 1919-22.‖

101 command that by natural right was his due. Popular media, colonialism, and later, war, were all aimed at curing an ―ailing‖ masculinity, feeding into the nascent (and soon to be classic) virile opposition between a comfortable (but ordinary) life and an adventurous one. Whether the latter was actually experienced or simply fantasized about through the pages of popular novels recounting the deeds of courage in colonial enterprises or war stories, there was a need to recover a fading masculinity from the luxury and comfort of a bourgeois existence.

The increased participation of women in the public sphere and the confusion over roles that ensued provoked a deep need to classify gender identity in absolute terms. Men began show signs of ―nervous breakdowns‖ (extremely embarrassing for a virile image given symptoms typically considered feminine) caused by a multitude of factors: the apparent decline of paternal authority within the family (from both a moral and economic perspective), the decline of the nation‘s reproductive power (as seen in dropping birth rates), and fears of a biological and political catastrophe for which responsibility fell primarily on men. Men saw most of these problems as a direct consequence of women‘s greater emancipation and reacted by solidifying the Victorian ideology of ―a purely masculine essence of the State‖; the aim being to block women‘s access to the ―natural‖ male realm of power and social prestige (ibid: 50).

The First World War did little, however, to ease confusion over roles given its contradictory effect on gender relations. Rather, war granted a certain legitimacy to feminine protagonism. Not surprisingly, a number of countries approved female suffrage

(Italy was not among them) immediately after the War. On the other hand, men countered changes which threatened to reveal the gendered nature of masculinity by reinforcing

102 misogynist and authoritarian attitudes. Seymour (2005) suggests that another way that men tried to protect a ―natural‖ gender order against both the rising presence of women in the public sphere and the ―demasculinizing‖ tendencies of modernity can be seen in the reluctance of Italian statesmen to introduce a divorce law.41 While much rhetoric was expended on the notion that marriage ―protected‖ Italian women, a divorce law would have potentially helped to right the radical asymmetries of power which characterized the

Italian marriage contract. For example, within marriage, the husband had complete control of his wife‘s financial and personal affairs, making married women perpetual minors in the eyes of the law. In addition, the husband not only had complete authority over the couple‘s children (patria potestà) but the civil code ensured a double standard of adultery, such that a husband could prosecute his wife, but not the other way around.

―These were asymmetries that gave the husband distinct privileges and helped to construct masculine identity. For that reason, the maintenance of marriage as a contract only dissoluble by death can be read as determination to protect traditional notions of masculinity‖ (Seymour 2005: 298).

Although fascist leaders briefly considered the idea of divorce, once Mussolini came to power any debate soon disappeared. His regime, as I review in the next section,

―ultimately stood for confining women to motherhood, reinforcing patriarchal authority, and reviving the marital masculinity of Italian manhood.‖ The brief visibility of men as a

41 Because a divorce law was not introduced in Italy until 1970, it has often been regarded as a late twentieth century issue, ―an indicator that the nation had finally shed the last vestiges of medievalism and become fully ‗modern‘‖ (Seymour 2005: 298). In realty, debate over divorce began with Italian Unification, and continued until the advent of Fascism (but was especially prominent from the late 1870s to the early 1900s). In fact, in most democratic European nations, divorce laws were introduced in the late nineteenth century. Of no little consequence, the strong presence of the Catholic Church in Italy also played a decisive role in debates over divorce, viewing any proposals ―as no less that a declaration of war on the sanctity of Christian marriage…‖ (ibid: 303).

103 gender (and their virile reaction), made possible by the first waves of feminism was to return to the realm of universality and hyper-normative masculinity.

3.2 Fascism and WWII: 1922-195042

The advent of Fascism in Italy (1922) and Nazism in Germany (1933) meant a reinstitution of virility, intended to erase (forever) any identitary doubts that had been experienced by men up until that point. The rhetoric of Mussolini‘s regime left little doubt in this regard, as exemplified by the words of magistrate and jurist Giuseppe

Maggiore,

―Fascism is male. It loves danger; it shuns small talk; it disdains for reasons of natural savageness any courting; it delivers blows, when necessary, with its hand; it is in fact a hard rock instead of a pastry made of candied fruit, which hides within – like the feminine soul – a nut hard enough to break teeth. That alone is enough to determine its sex. Fascism is, in a word, an arouser of virility against all feminization and debasement of spirit. It is against the ―Petrarchism‖ of poetry, the mystiscm of religion, the liberalism of politics, the pettiness of fancy dress and open-handed education. Can you be more masculine than this?‖ (cfr. Cavaglion 2001: 84).43

The First World War, as mentioned above, failed to definitively stop the decline of male authority (Wanrooij 2005, Benadusi 2009). On the other hand, the end of war threatened a return to previous gender confusion. Although such threats materialized in countries such as France, England, and the US, the emergence of Fascism in Italy held

42 Although work remains to be done, historians of Italian masculinity have paid much attention to the construction of male and female gender identity during the fascist period. Given this large body of work, this section will necessarily be brief, in order to leave more room for a discussion of the periods leading up to and following fascism.

43 The original citation in Italian reads: ―Il fascismo é maschio. Ama il pericolo, rifugge dalle chiacchiere, sdegna per naturale selvatichezza i corteggiamenti, mena, over occorra, con le mani; e‘ fatto di pietra dura, invece che della pasta dolce dei frutti canditi, i quali soltanto nell‘interno nascondono – come l‘anima femminile – un nocciolo capace di rompere i denti. Tanto basta a determinare il suo sesso. Il Fascismo e‘, in una parola, suscitatore di virilita contro ogni infemminimento e infrollimento dello spirito. É pero contro il petrarchismo della poesia, il misticismo della religione e il liberalismo della politica, contro il cicibeismo del costume e il manicalarghismo dell‘educazione. Si puo essere piu maschi di cosi?‖

104 the country in a perpetual state of war (Mosse 1997, Benadusi 2009). To add to this,

Fascism fostered a cult of virility brought to life by Benito Mussolini himself. Mussolini was the unifying icon of the Fascist regime: he was at once the ideal man and the male ideal all rolled into one44 (Koon 1985:16; see also Ventrone 2003; Spackman 1996;

Passerini 1991). Integral components of ―manliness‖ included sexual potency, prowess and promiscuity, but also (somewhat contradictorily) fulfilling one‘s duty as a husband and father (see, among others Mosse 1984; Spackman 1990; Ruspini 2007). The fascist regime thus simultaneously created career, economic, and reproductive incentives for men while also promising them recognition through war duties that necessarily meant sacrificing comfort and family life (Ben-Ghiat 2005).

In fact, the number of children one had was considered proof of one‘s masculinity. ―Today‘s society disdains deserters, panders, homosexuals, and thieves.

Those who can but do not do their duty towards the nation, fall in the same category. We must scorn them. Shame on the bachelors and those who do not bring children into this world; it‘s necessary to subdue them, and make them eat dust‖ (Carlo Scorza, cfr. De

Grazia 1992:105-6). In 1926, Mussolini instituted a tax on bachelors (tassa sull‘egoismo) over the age of 26 who had not yet had children. The following year, the Duce officially launched his campaign to reinvigorate the Italian population through increasing birth rates, and in this way protect the nation from the threat of the much more prolific

―savages‖ (Bellassai 2004). What‘s more, the regime‘s policy regarding reproduction was to strip the sensual from the sexual, ―reducing the male (and female) bodies to a

44 Ben-Ghiat (2005) similarly describes Mussolini as the icon of fascism‘s brand of virility. Mussolini was ―celebrated as a sexual conqueror and war hero, but also as a frugal person who worked hard, ate little, and was unafraid of personal sacrifice.‖

105 nationalistic procreative machine‖ (Riech 2004:12). More broadly, the Fascism regime‘s implicit objective was to exercise total control and dominion over the bodies of Italian population, to be modified through reform of their ―way of eating, of dressing of working, and of sleeping‖ (Mussolini 1932).

The ―natural‖ mission of women, on the other hand, was, with the blessing of the religious authorities,45 to be an exemplary mother and wife. The respectability of the nation rested on her shoulders, and her place was in the home (Reich 2004). The fascist regime reinforced the role of the male breadwinner by introducing legislation (1919) which favored male employment; women received lower salaries and had no access to certain positions in state administration. In the private sector, a quota system was introduced to limit the number of women. These measures failed to significantly reduce female employment, but did enhance a public perception that women belonged in the home.46 More broadly, the fascist regime attempted to construct, to varying degrees of success, ―proper‖ male and female appearance, behavior, and sexuality. Education, reforms, organized leisure and the mass media all contributed to shaping the proper

Fascist subject (Reich 2004: 11). Agricultural society was valued above all for its healthy and correct lifestyle, exemplifying the patriarchal tradition and protecting from the deleterious effects of ―modern life.‖ Meldini (1975: 35-39) describes how fascist ideology drew on research in anthropology, sexology, and psychology in producing new

45 Indeed, one of fascism greatest allies was the Catholic Church, which had always emphasized women‘s subjugation to male authority, doctrinally reaffirmed first by Pope Pius X in 1909, and then by Pope Pius XI in the Fascist period (Reich 2004). As Alexander De Grand (1976:956-57) notes, ―The Regime was quick to use the conservative influence of the Church to support its economic and social policies and the Vatican seized its opportunity to condition the ideology of the Fascist state.‖

46 Some suggest that the desire to conform to the traditional female role of mother and housewife explains the drop in the female employment rate coinciding with the economic boom of the 1960s.

106 theories on the ―radical irreconcilability between the sexes, men‘s spiritual and intellectual superiority over women and a woman‘s roles as housewife and mother‖ and detailing the ―natural‖ roles that were expected of each gender.

As is usually true, things turned out not to be so simple. The effects of World War

II on gender identity were enormously complex and ambivalent. Inhuman suffering and daily contact with death had grave psychological consequences for men which often resulted in total refusal of hyper-virile model of masculinity that the war itself was intended to spread. The war also meant a considerable increase in female occupation; women made an essential contribution in sectors of production and services traditionally deemed to be ―masculine.‖ The fascist regime indubitably took to an extreme a ―virile protest‖47 but this movement also ended up conferring unprecedented political value to a sphere that had been traditionally private – above all the family –as well as incorporated women into the structure of the state (Bellassai 2004). As Ben-Ghiat (2005:340) puts it,

―the regime‘s discourses and policies about masculinity were riven by the same tensions that marked the rest of fascist ideology: conflicts between the encouragement of conquest and calls for continence; conflicts between individual initiative and collective duty; conflicts between the fulfillment of the squadrist motto ardisco! (I dare!), and the domestication of action and desire‖ (see also Wanrooij 1990; Saraceno 1995; Ben-Ghiat

1996; Mosse 1997; Forgacs 2002).

In an attempt to stop the decline of male authority, Fascism developed its own brand of masculinity that, however, lost most of its appeal as a result of military defeat, the plethora of contradictions and conflicts set forth by the regime in terms of the

47 A term coined by the psychoanalyst Alfred Adler in 1974.

107 construction of male identity, and the persistence of women in ―traditionally‖ male activities. At the end of WWII, Italian women (finally) received the right to vote (1945) and in 1947 the Italian Constitution was approved, with article 3 recognizing equal rights for men and women. The years that followed saw a decline in the model of hierarchical, male-dominated gender relations. It would, however, be a mistake, as Wanrooij

(2005:279) points out, ―to presume the existence of a gradual and linear development: the history of gender relations has been (and still is) characterized by reversals and often ambiguous attempts to resist changes.‖

3.3 The Economic “Boom” and a Multifaceted Revolution: 1950-1979

The end of World War II and fascism signified a considerable rupture in Italy‘s history: a second attempt to recreate the nation, but also the beginning of an era of intense political conflict, economic swings and radical social transformation (Reich 2004). With the fall of

Fascism, virile dreams of super-masculinity fell as well, and the tragedy of war signaled a(nother) profound crisis in male identity (dell‘Angese 2007; Sinigaglia 2007; Ruspini

2007). More broadly, the period between the 1950s and the late-1970s were characterized by extraordinary change in the realms of both public and private life.

3.3.1 The Economic Boom

At the end of WWII, the Italian economy, and the country itself, were in need of reconstruction (Reich 2004: 31). Free trade and the modernization of systems of production combined to create an ―economic miracle‖ as Italy bounced back to become of one of the major players on the international economic scene (ibid).48 With the help of

48 While there did occur an enormous increase in economic activities during this period, it should be noted that Italy was also characterized by significant regional differences. While the North saw the development of small, medium and large industries and businesses, in the South many state jobs were created rather than

108

American capital in the 1940s, and the relatively low cost of labor, the state‘s strategic public investment in the economy soon began to show results. Italy was one of the founding members of the European Economic Community in the late 1950s, securing the abolition of protective tariffs and allowing the export-driven economy49 to reach a wider consumer public (ibid). By the late 1950s, the nation‘s gross domestic product was growing at an annual rate of 6.3% (Salvati 1985:47-62; Ginsborg 1990:210-53; Sassoon

1997:26-41). The success of products like the Vespa (1946), the portable Olivetti typewriter (1950) and the Fiat 500 (1956) marked Italy as a stylish trend setter. At the same time, Italians joined the ―consumption mania,‖ buying cars, televisions, and domestic appliances. ―With the introduction of RAI (Radiotelevisiva Italiana) broadcasts in 1954, television and consequently advertising were tuned to the national consumer, now with more disposable income to spend in this growing consumer culture‖ (Forgacs

1996: 273-90). This rapid phase of economic development, accompanied by an exponential rate of private consumption remolded the daily lives of families and introduced new lifestyles.

The ―economic miracle‖ also reshaped gender ideals and relations. A new market of consumer goods demanded, by its logic of rapid expansion, men and women who were moderately open and tolerant, laic and favorably disposed to moral and material novelties: ―where the desire for a more comfortable life, the need to invest more in ‗self- industries, later leading to northern complaints of parasitical South. In the early 1950s, the government set up a ―Cassa per il Mezzogiorno‖; a fund intended to provide economic resources for infrastructure, modernization, and offer easy credit to southern companies, with somewhat mixed results. Consequently, many southerners migrated to the North in search of work and remittances sent back to the South became an important aspect of the southern Italian economy. This distinguished the North from the South, with the exception of the Veneto region which, in contrast to other northern regions, initially also experienced heavy out-migration, not joining the ―economic miracle of the North‖ until the early 1960s.

49 Exports initially drove expansion, growing 14.5% during the years of the ―economic miracle‖ (1958-63).

109 care,‘ the legitimization of a certain level of superfluous consumption were not condemned but rather functional to the interests of the national economy‖ (Bellassai

2005b:126). This marked an enormous change from the past ethics of a patriarchal-rural world which saw senseless spending as a sin. In the mass media, the new image of

―woman‖ that emerged was one of housewife and consumer, who aspired to be a

―modern‖ intelligent and prudent family administrator, but who could also allow herself to satisfy small aesthetic whims (ibid: 108).

Thanks to the persuasive power of mass culture, the uprooting of millions of families from rural communities, increasingly diffuse economic well-being, and new prospects of education and social mobility, an epochal break was made in the link between virility and tradition. Unlike that which happened at the turn of the 19th century, men‘s reaction to rapid ―modernization‖ and the increasing participation of women was not to emphasize or defend the more rigid aspects of masculinity (tradition and patriarchy as untouchable foundations of civilization itself). For the first time, there opened the possibility of constructing a large consensus around a male identity that was no longer a

―warrior, crudely authoritarian, or rigidly intolerant towards any manifestation of feminine autonomy‖ (ibid: 114). The next several decades would see a radical transformation in gender relations with significant consequences for Italian masculinity.

3.3.2 Revolution: The Second Demographic Transition Begins

Economic development was only one aspect of the changes which characterized the post- war period in Italy. In terms of gender, and specifically male identity: ―over the last 40 years the ‗structure‘ of masculinity has become more complex, multifaceted, and uneven‖

(Ruspini (2007: 291). Bellassai (2005b) similarly suggests that masculinity, beginning in

110 the 1960s, emerged in a variety of ―shades‖ or variants and that this was above all a product of the great transformations occurring in Italian society at the time:

Mass communication enormously extended its influence on the system of values and imagery of a part of the population who had until this time been at the margins of ‗modernization‘; women obtained full civil and political rights and became (theoretically) equal to men, while their presence in the public sphere earned an unprecedented legitimacy; in the private sphere, traditional models were increasingly discredited and abandoned; a new generation of students gained public attention as social and political subjects to some extent autonomous; neo- feminist movements questioned traditional gender relations and identity (Bellassai 2004: 99)

While historians have well-documented these social, political, and gender dynamics, demographers often use the term ―Second Demographic Transition‖ (SDT) to describe the complex of family and demographic changes that have occurred in much of the industrial world since WWII. Of particular interest to discussions of changing Italian male identity, the appearance of more complex and variant forms of masculinity seems to coincide with the beginning of the SDT. According to Ron Lesthaeghe (1995), the SDT started in the 1960s with a multifaceted revolution: contraceptive, sexual, and gender. In particular, more efficient hormonal contraception and IUDs were introduced in this period. This was accompanied by a declining age at first sexual intercourse. Perhaps most importantly, a gender revolution questioned the sole breadwinner household model and the gender division of labor that accompanied it. Together, these three ―revolutions‖ translated into a ―rejection of authority, an assertion of individual freedom of choice

(autonomy) and an overhaul of the normative structure‖ (ibid: 45).

Among the consequences has been a persistent decline in fertility, a rise in cohabitation, and out-of-wedlock births. In the specific period under consideration (or the

111 first phase of the SDT 1955-197050), divorce was brought back to the table for discussion and eventually approved in 1970. Fertility began to decline at all ages (the baby boom had come to an end) and the proportion of marriages occurring before the age of 25 dropped considerably (Lesthaeghe and van de Kaa 1986; Lesthaeghe 1995; Mason and

Jensen 1995). Lesthaeghe (1995:19) argues that this second fertility decline, beginning in the 1960s, marked the end of an ―Ariès‘ era of the ―child king‖: ―It inaugurated adult- centered preoccupations with self-fulfillment and hence with more attention being paid to the quality of the dyadic relation between partners. Children are still very important, but their position at the top of the value pyramid is not a given anymore.‖ In the following decade, defined by some as the Italian ―cultural revolution,‖ divorce (as mentioned) became legal (1970) as did contraceptive advertising (1971). In 1974, Italians confirmed a referendum in favor of divorce; in 1975, a new family law equalized the rights of children born out-of-wedlock with those born within marriage; in 1978 abortion was legalized, and Italians confirmed a referendum in favor of abortion in 1981. While the beginning of the SDT was, in many ways, very much a ―revolution‖ – and is often described as a decisive break with the past - there are a number of historical similarities to the turn of the 19th century.

In fact, the Second Demographic Transition and the First Demographic Transition described above (low fertility, female emancipation, and fragile masculinity at the turn of the 19th century) have much in common. Similar to six or seven decades earlier, male identity in the late 1950s still held on (to the coattails perhaps) of a virile idea which saw

50 In the second phase of the SDT (roughly between 1970-1985) premarital cohabitation, starting in North European, spreads, while in the third phase, divorce rates begin to plateau in countries that had reached high levels, and continue to rise in those that had not (Italy).

112 relations with the opposite sex and ―deviant‖ men as structured in a dynamic of superior as opposed to inferior beings.51 On the other hand, male ―hegemony‖ was much less solid than in the past; the once triumphant Mussolinian call to action (and the preceding appeals to nationalism and virility at the turn of the century) was increasingly seen as unfit in this new context, making pleas to save ―authentic masculinity‖ from extinction desperate indeed.

Although the response to signs of frail masculinity necessarily had to be different given historical antecedents, the situation itself in many ways mirrored that of the turn of the century. Then too, ―traditional masculinity‖ seemed to be increasingly weak and fragile, spun about in vicious cycle of modernization and the new public visibility of the female gender. Back in vogue were expressions such as ―the feminization of society‖;

―the masculinization of women‖; ―the extinction of men‖ (Bellassai 2004: 100). Again, similar to the late 1800s/early 1900s, the devirilization of men could be blamed on the increasing protagonism of women, and more broadly the processes of modernization. In other words, it was not simply that women seemed to be acquiring more power in a

―modern‖ society, but that the ―modernized‖ man risked being less ―virile‖ than his predecessors. ―Similar to several decades ago, new nervous disorders linked to modern life began to spread, the principal victim of which was always someone of the male sex, for whom the accelerated rhythm of life caused anxiousness, physical and mental malaise, and a general weakening‖ (idem.)

Another aspect that similarly characterized both the turn of the century FDT and the SDT was the increasingly widespread use of contraception and the ability of birth

51 Bellassai (2004) describes the persistence of a hierarchical gender ―structure‖ between men and women, and among men, using Connell‘s (1996) notion of ―hegemonic masculinity.‖

113 control choices to represent elements of identity construction (Schneider and Schneider

1996; Gribaldi et al. 2009). Both ―transitions‖ were characterized by a ―contraceptive revolution,‖ which exhibited the increasing importance of individual autonomy as well as the links between birth control and secularization (Lesthaeghe 1995; Bellassai 2004).

During the First Demographic Transition, individuals, in their endeavors to control fertility, were simply no longer accepting of the religious impediments to contraception.52

The ―act of dissent,‖ however, occurred in total privacy (Lesthaeghe 1995:21). In other words, the first demographic transition was a very quiet one. Conversely, the philosophical and moral theories which began to emerge in the 1960s were not so quiet; rather they were publicly anti-authoritarian, and reactions to the Catholic Church, patriarchy, and the very structure of society were highly visible53 (idem.).

More broadly, men at the end of the 19th century (in the midst of the first demographic transition –as discussed above) reacted to female emancipation and declining birth rates by accentuating their virility and concretizing rigid boundaries between the sexes. The SDT similarly saw a strong wave of feminism. Political non- conformism and the adoption of ―post-materialist values‖ encouraged both the economic independence of women and the family changes that took place during this period. The reactions and consequences for men, however, were in many ways different than at the turn of the century. In the section that follows, I more fully explore the gender component

52 Most scholars now agree that the dramatic birth decline in Europe over the course of the late 19th and early 20th century was enabled by a widespread reliance on coitus interruptus and, to a lesser extent, abortion (Santow 1993, 1995; Schneider and Schneider 1991; 1996, Dalla Zuanna et al. 2005, among others).

53 ―…student revolts drew headlines all over the world, the ‗Green‘ parties manifested themselves in parliaments, and the ‗second feminist wave‘ became a force to be reckoned with‖ (Lesthaeghe 1995:21)

114 of the SDT ―revolution‖ and the impact that the second wave of feminism had on male identity.

3.3.3 The Gender Revolution and (Re-)Reactions to Threatened Male Supremacy

As Ginsborg (2003:35) points out, during this period, ―time-honored patterns of gender differences were interrupted… Women were moving out, making contact with a wider world, and few aspects of modernity were to produce so great a feeling of liberation as well as so much angst.‖ The mass media, now consumed by an ever wider public, showed

Hollywood images of unabashedly sensual women in pants, smoking; men were depicted as understanding, tolerant, and even somewhat willing to pitch in with domestic activities, without being, however, any less ―manly‖ (Bellassai 2005b:101). Groups such as Lotta femminile (Female struggle) and the Movimento della liberazione della donna

(Women‘s liberation movement) condemned women‘s economic exploitation in the home, and advocated a wages-for-housework campaign. They also encouraged women to take control of their bodies, use birth control, fight for their right to abortion, and ignore the traditional gender dichotomy Madonna/puttana so prevalent in Italian culture (Reich

2004:94).

On a legal (and sexual) level, women attained increasing equality with men. In

1960, the Constitutional court eliminated the 1919 law excluding women from many higher-ranking positions in the public sector. In 1968, the law which considered adultery a crime for women (whereas men could be punished for adultery only in special circumstances) was abolished. Other discriminatory conditions deriving from the male position as head of the family survived until the general revision of family legislation in

1975. This new law, as mentioned above, was based on the principle of male-female

115 equality and on the recognition of the rights of children, abolishing the position of the head of the family, and attributing equal rights and duties to husband and wife in terms of residence, work, and the education of the children. In 1977, the state approved a law which guaranteed equal rights for males and females in hiring processes54.

In contrast to the turn of the century, men shied away from mounting a counter- offensive based on the rhetorical notions of virility, nationalism or pronatalism, given the all-too-recent ill-memories of the fascist period.55 Affirmations of the fundamental differences between the sexes, as employed at the turn of the century, were also more difficult to implement, given the opposition of new generations of women who refused to be locked into subordinate positions. In fact, one of the major social changes of the 1960s and 70s was that women workers became visible in great numbers: ―there were women ticket inspectors on Italian trains, dust women shifting heavy containers of rubbish, women police patrolling the streets. To the casual eye, it seemed as if the habitual gender division of work, so heavily centered in the past on the public-private divide, was being radically reformulated‖ (Ginsborg 2003: 35). Female emancipation did not simply translate into major social change for women alone.

54 The struggle for parity continues in Italy. For example, on February 27th, 2008, the Council of Ministers finally approved the design of a legislative decree with acknowledges the European directive 2006/54/CE concerning the implementation of equal opportunity between men and women with regard to occupation and employment.

55 Fascism is very much alive in the social memories of both the young and old Paduans I spent time with, and often came up often in discussions of changing masculinity. On a political level, neo-fascist groups have distanced themselves from Mussolini‘s platform by making efforts to improve relations with Jewish groups (although not always entirely convincing or successful). The Veneto is not without staunch supporters of neo-fascist parties such as the Tricolor Flame, New Force, the National Social Front, and National Alliance. Mussolini‘s granddaughter is in fact quite active in politics, after having had her beginnings within the neo-fascist political groups.

116

Bellassai (2004) suggests that during this period, male identity seemed to diversify as never before, into an ―infinite number of shades.‖ Unlike the turn of the century, these ―masculinities‖ were neither ignored nor branded as pathological. Instead, an increasing number of influential observers (journalists, writers, film directors, various intellectuals) look upon the emergent pluralism of masculinity with benevolence; ―even those who argued that new anti-conformist masculine attitudes were a sign of moral and social decline ended up, paradoxically, rendering the masculine, visible‖ (idem:110). The multiplication of identitary options is, the author suggests, typical of historical phases of crises and profound cultural transformation. Beginning in the 1960s and into the 1970s, young men refused traditional male clothing, preferring instead to grow their hair, use uninhibited language, and mock the traditional values of family, respectability, and authority. These men were not, however, simply protesting against a bourgeois society, but against the model of masculinity that their fathers had tried to pass on to them as foundations of that society (idem).56

Yet the relatively hierarchical nature of power in Italy did not entirely disappear.

Neither did a public sphere which continued to be based on competition, aggressiveness, and toughness. Moreover, the upper echelons in both private and public administration

56 The film ―Monsters‖ by Dino Risi (produced in 1963) reflects the radical changes that accompanied the ―economic miracle,‖ industrialization, and changing values and behaviors (especially of men). For Dino Risi, the average Italian is a civil and social ―monster‖ (hence the title) and is represented throughout the film in his inability to become an honest citizen, a strict educator, sincere friend, trustworthy husband and reliable judge. One of the most famous episodes of the film, ―A Sentimental Education‖ sees Ugo Tognazzi as a father who educates and socializes his son by acting out a series of examples and lessons motivated by absolute dishonesty and a total lack of respect for others, albeit paying the consequences in the end. In another episode, ―Like a Father,‖ a young jealous husband goes over to his best friend‘s (Tognazzi) house in the middle of the night in order to show him the irrefutable evidence that his wife is cheating on him. His friend reassures him, advises him to return home tranquilly and serenely. In reality, however, it is the friend who is having the affair with the man‘s wife. More generally, the film is a cynical and comical portrayal of Italy in the mid-sixties.

117 remained almost exclusively male.57 What did take place, of historical importance, was a crisis in the fundamental link between male identity and tradition – which had its beginnings in the late 1800s – but which in the final years of the 1960s and into the 1970s became ever less convincing. The inability to legitimate a rigidly patriarchal masculinity had ground-breaking consequences, as the former was founded on a ―divine norm‖ or

―natural law‖ of universality. In other words, the very questioning of a hyper-normative masculinity made men as a gender visible. Much like at the turn of the 19th century,

Italian men were threatened by such visibility and the fragility it created, hence entering a

(new) ―crisis of masculinity.‖ Bellassai (2005b:126) suggests that,

By the time of the emergence of neo-feminism, during the early 1970s, the Italian man was already in a condition of deep identitary redefinition (or crisis: in the sense of transformation or overcoming of preceding cultural configurations). Having by now cut the umbilical cord that linked male identity and tradition, and in a context of galloping secularization that abolished the very notion of transcendence, renewed appeals to a transcendental and absolute norm for which women had to be subordinate to men, appeared less convincing. The notion that men should find, in the exercise and reproduction of supremacy, the essence of virility, was fundamentally shaken.

More broadly, during in the 1970s, the late 19th century attempt to protect the ―identitary castle of traditional masculinity‖ from ―modernity‖ and female emancipation definitively failed; it marked the end of an era, and the beginning of a new one in which the exaltation of virility, misogyny, and homophobia - the essential ingredients of the virile revolt of the late 1800s/early 1900s – did not entirely disappear, but lost its monopoly as the only

57 Marina Piazza (1994) has written perceptively of ―a paradoxical phase, in which women genuinely acquired a new social force, but within a general context that safeguarded the basic structure of gender roles.‖ This continues to hold true today. By 1991, the Italian female employment rate (number of employed women as a percentage of all those who work) was 37.2%, compared to 61.1% in Great Britain and 70.1% in Denmark (Ginsborg 2003: 35). Fifteen years later, in 2006, the United Nations reported that female labor force participation in Italy had barely increased, estimated at 38.1%.

118 indentitary solution able to guarantee the well-being of men and society itself (Bellassai

2005b: 127).

One of the most explicit signs of emergent masculinities and men as a gender was the unprecedented phenomenon beginning in the mid-1970s of men gathering together to collectively discuss the ―male condition.‖ Groups advocating male ―self-consciousness‖ congregated for the most part in other countries such as Germany, Great Britain, and the

United States58 (and to a lesser extent in Italy), where they even published magazines that circulated their experiences. The novelty of these groups was that for the first time in history, men began to consciously refuse to accept the equivalence of non-power with impotence; and effeminacy with some sort of explicit dissidence of virility. In the years that followed, the ―therapeutic‖ orientation of these collective explorations of masculinity was ―considerably accentuated in the rare experiences that survived the political ebb, and in some cases, accentuated in a kind of victimization which was increasingly recriminatory towards women‖ (Bellassai 2004:120).

More broadly, Italian feminism of the 1970s in Italy changed men,59 because it changed women. The feminist movement meant that for men it became ever more difficult to continue avoiding reflection – or at least to complete ignore - subjects such as equality and autonomy, given that ever fewer women took for granted the acceptance of more traditional gender roles (ibid: 121). Traditional masculinity and its multiple

58 The first ―Men‘s center‖ was found in 1970 in California. Research on men, born out the feminist movement and such men‘s groups and centers soon followed. For the first time, work began to focus on men as gendered agents ―with beliefs, behaviors, and characteristics associated with but not dependent upon biological sex‖ (Dudgeon and Inhorn 2003; Bourgois 1995; Gutmann 1997; Seidler 1994; Lancaster 1992; Connell 1987).

59 By men, it is intended a portion of men, not all individuals of male gender, and neither, perhaps, even the majority of them, given the multiple masculinities that may exist at any given point in time (Connell 1987).

119 manifestations were thus detracted from a condition of unquestioned universality, where until now they had been held ―thanks to the myth of their absolute divine or natural supremacy.‖ This was the end of a long process that had almost a century of feminism behind it. The final attack on hyper-normative masculinity came at a moment of great weakness for male identity; a time when the process of modernization had on all levels weakened the sacredness of ―tradition‖; and when female protagonism was so accentuated that it conferred to women a socially recognized authority and an unprecedented negotiating power (ibid: 122). Men came into being men as a gender, rather than an intangible ideal. The accompanying elements of a Second Demographic

Transition were of no less importance in contributing to and maintaining this new visibility as a gender. Among the novelties of this process were: a reversal in the social acceptability of sexuality; a rapid weakening of social control of institutions accompanied by a rise in individual autonomy; the introduction of highly efficient female contraception and consequent increase in female control over reproduction;60 the rise in the adult dyad

(as opposed to the child king), declining birth rates, and the emphasis of individual aspiration within unions (Lesthaeghe 1995: 57).

3.4 Fragile Masculinity at the Turn of the Twentieth Century: 1980-2008

The rapid change that dominated the after-war period began to slow during the mid-to- late-80s with respect to a number of issues. Nations that were the forerunners of change during the preceding period saw a slight recuperation effect in fertility and not long

60 On the other hand, several scholars have suggested that women‘s control of contraception is not necessarily always positive. In an unequal gender system, where men do not share the daily burdens of domestic work, such responsibility simply adds to the unequal division of labor. Technological methods may also pose risks to women‘s health; indeed, the ―medicalization of women‘s bodies has been criticized as the ultimate manifestation of patriarchal power‖ (Gribaldo et al. 2009; see also Martin 1987; Dalla Zuanna et al. 2005; Krause 2005).

120 afterwards a plateau in divorce levels (Lesthaeghe 1995: 57). In Italy, fertility continued to decline, although similarly, a ―return to order‖ characterized much of the 1980s. A growing sense of defeat and a retreat to the private sphere, and in many cases, a renouncement of revolutionary projects spread across Italian society.

In terms of gender identity, many ex-revolutionaries now in their 30s and 40s

―looked in the mirror, and discovered that they had become more similar to their fathers than they ever imagined possible‖ (Bellassai 2005b: 134). The ―man of success‖ became the new ideal to aspire to in a society bombarded by unprecedented consumerism, aided by the increasingly persuasive means of television advertisements (idem). At the same time, the tensions surrounding masculinity moved from one of collective action of the preceding decade, to the individual level. In a number of Western countries, Italy included, reflections of masculinity were increasingly framed within a ―self-help‖ framework, which ―did not have its origins in a radical criticism of patriarchy, but rather stemmed from the widespread need to cure individual wounds (which were increasingly blamed on women)‖ (idem).

By the 1990s, men‘s unease at having become ―visible‖ as a gender began to emerge ever more prominently in the media and discussions of the current ―crisis of masculinity.‖ Somewhat paradoxically, the media itself has, over the last 15 years or so, concretized the definitive loss of men‘s ―natural‖ supremacy through fashion, advertisements, and the spread of new magazines for men in which the male gender has become the subject (and object) of a variety of products and services. Commercial representations of men make explicit his gender: ―where his sexual nature is often the fundamental dynamic of consumption‖ (Bellassai 2005:123). Men‘s definitive emergence

121 as a gender has been reacted to in a variety of ways, ranging from outright refusal, to pessimism and skepticism, to simple recognition, as in the case of author Alberto Leis

(1997: 105-106):

There is a step, which at a certain point one takes, when you realize that the cultural and symbolic that surrounds us is a construction based predominantly on a masculine claim to universality. It is incredible how many intelligent men have trouble recognizing this truth that to me has long been evident. When one takes this leap, there is more than rational recognition… the world itself appears no longer to be the same.

Accompanying the gradual emergence of men as gender and the transformations brought about by the Second Demographic Transition, there has been a progressive diffusion of recognizable pluralized forms of masculinity in Italy. In other words, while multiple forms of masculinity have always existed, since the 1990s they are ever less organized in a hierarchical structure. As Chiaria Saraceno (2007: XIII) has similarly pointed out, ―the contemporary ‗novelty‘ is not, therefore, the plurality nor the multifaceted nature of models of masculinity, but the fact that it seems that they no longer fit into a hierarchy that is socially recognized and shared.‖

3.4.1 The Current ―Crisis of Masculinity‖ in Padua

Recent scholarship on masculinity has endeavored to understand multiple forms of masculinity. According to Beynon (2002:6) we are currently witnessing the birth of a

―hybrid masculinity‖ which is ―breathed and exhibited in diverse manners in different moments in various situations.‖ Building on Bauman‘s (2000) model, he suggests the existence of a more ―liquid‖ masculinity or a ―crafted masculinity, the result of a constant

‗changing of channels‘ between different versions of masculinity‖ (idem). Part of what defines the present ―crisis of masculinity‖ in Italy, and Padua in particular, is this very

122 fluidity and lack of a recognizable hierarchy in terms of masculinities. In what remains of this chapter, I briefly describe Padua‘s most recent ―crisis of masculinity,‖ set within a context of low birth rates, an aging population structure and a struggling economy.

Coupled with concerns over male identity, the Second Demographic Transition appears to be, in many ways, in full force in Padua, as testified to by continued very low birth rates, increasingly high levels of cohabitation, divorce, and births outside-of-wedlock.

Informants whom I interviewed and spent time with in Padua were eager to voice their concerns about a masculinity that they deemed to be ―in crisis‖ (a term that they often picked up from the mass media). Given the last century‘s history of ―crises‖ their apprehension sounded all too familiar. As suggested above, themes of ―male crises‖ often include male sexuality and family roles, particularly the worry that men are somehow becoming less ―manly‖ and in doing so are acquiring more ―feminine‖ characteristics.

Many Paduans (both men and women) spoke of an increasing ―feminization of men,‖ as well as a ―masculinization of women.‖ For example,

Then there is this feminization of men, for example… in professions, in schools, in clerical work (impiegatizia). And men are made feminine by certain jobs…It used to be that professors were a respected figure, like the pharmacist and the mayor… but now there has been this feminization of school and other jobs... (Marco, age 51)

Feminization of men was also carried over into the sexual sphere, with men being described as less ―virile.‖

There has been an increasing feminization of men, this is seen sexually as well… these ‗effeminate‘ men have little sex drive, little virility… They are just happy with their computers or playing cards or at most going to the prostitutes once a month, every two months. (Ilaria, age 43)

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Others noted that while some men did seem ―fragile‖ others ended up on the opposite side of the spectrum, as one man described to me,

On the one hand, you have this crisis of men, you know, the one you hear about on the radio, and you can even feel in the air, I think. Women are just taking over, and men don‘t seem to be doing anything about it. On the other hand, you have these men that are too aggressive… they have aggressive cars, and they always want to wear designer clothes, go to clubs, take drugs, and get into fist fights… like the ‗ultras‘61 in the soccer stadiums… they want to demonstrate their virility in the physical sense of the word… even in politics it is like this… (Marco, age 32)

In addition to concerns regarding the ―feminization of society‖ men often described women as ―more aggressive‖ (both in the public sphere, but also sexually); women were seen as better able to adapt to the complexities of the ―modern‖ world (topics I return to in the next chapter). Themes that emerged from discussions about contemporary masculinity included not only sexuality (as seen above), but also family roles and more specifically, the concern than men are somehow becoming less ―manly,‖ that they are acquiring characteristics that are commonly associated with the female gender - fragility, sensitivity, emotionality. As one male middle school teacher described to me:

Sometimes parents come in and talk to me… it used to be just mothers came in, but now lots of fathers do too…but they are just like the mothers, or even worse. In the sense that the mother spoils her son, and you speak to the father and you say that the son is completely spoiled, and he always fails, that he never does anything, and that tomorrow he is going to have to go to work… [Imitating father]: ―eh, but my wife doesn‘t want that.‖ It doesn‘t make sense, you understand? She commands but with excessive feminine hyper-protection… so he is also feminized because he isn‘t able to make any decisions, he is just as emotional as she is. (Antonio, age 48)

61 According to Guschwan (2007:254), ―Throughout Italy, many of the most committed tifosi (soccer fans) become ultras. Ultras are organized groups of fans committed to supporting their team and are a significant element of youth culture throughout Italy and Europe. Ultras meet during the week to socialize, to raise money, to arrange travel to away games, and to choreograph the demonstrations and songs that they perform inside the stadium. Ultra groups are usually responsible for the violence and intimidation that makes the news. The ultra mode of participation is encoded in the notion of La Mentalitá (the mentality or mind). La Mentalitá dictates that the ultra must be an active spectator, overtly display identity, and confront authority and other ultras within the limits of an honor code.‖

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Concerns over the failure of men to meet certain expectation in their family roles or of expectations in larger society, were often explained by either the ―feminization‖ of men (as seen above), or as simply caused by the ―disappearance‖ of masculinity. More specifically, informants suggested that ―real‖ masculinity is a thing of the past, or that it exists in the South, but not in the North; again suggestive of the cyclical nature of the history of masculinity.

Well, here in the Veneto, 50 years ago, ‗real masculinity‘ existed… but you have to understand that we have certain kind of culture here... I remember my grandmothers who were chatterboxes… clucking away... and the man, usually, was quiet, good... and he sort of put up with these hysterical females. The Veneto man has always been a worker... who returned home tired, and had a wife who broke his balls… but these women didn‘t leave the house. Now things have changed... women continue to break men‘s balls, but they leave the house, they work too. But now the men… they are a little, I‘m not saying they‘re effeminate, but… but I don‘t think of them as ‗real men‘ (Walter, age 41)

My grandfather was a fascist and embodied a real masculinity in that the woman, the wife was something subordinate to him …but with respect and great love… so my grandmother, never made decisions, didn‘t take responsibility, and he loved her to pieces, he was always there for her, in sickness and in health, but he made the decisions and provided for the family. On the other hand, he was very virile and it was understood that he looked for sexual pleasure and a blow-job outside of marriage. My grandmother, god bless her, was Catholic, beautiful and faithful, but sex was a martial duty, not to be considered pleasurable… Now, in our world of precarious employment, and a sexual sphere which no longer sees men as the dominant figure - women are more open, demanding, and aggressive sexually – men have lost that sense of masculinity that was so natural for my grandfather (Sandro, age 34)

Comments such as these, accompanied by a growing sense of frustration in terms of identity construction, are also linked to processes of ―modernization.‖ As seen at the turn of the century, the possession of domestic comforts and technologies in ―civilized‖ and urban environments threatened to all but obliterate a more ―glorious‖ and more virile masculinity of the past. In present day Padua, the consumeristic ―modern‖ world,

125 characterized by an accelerated rhythm of life and a multitude of choices is also seen as threatening a ―real‖ masculinity that has all but disappeared. The victim of a more complex world is predominantly of the male gender, and similar to the 1950s and 60s, the consequence is a general weakening of the male sex. Women, on the other hand, ever more predominantly in the public sphere, are not only described as ―overly aggressive‖

(evoking threatening images) but are seen as better able to adapt to the complexities of the ―modern‖ world.

3.4.2 The (Fragile) ―New Man‖ and the (Return of the) ―New Lad‖

Over the last century, the mass media has played no small part in molding (or perhaps producing) ―crises of masculinity,‖ whether suggesting cures to ―ailing masculinity,‖ feeding into virile opposition to female emancipation, modernization, or simply defining emergent masculinity. In fact, media representations of new models of masculinity do not simply reflect societal change, but tend to legitimize it (Talmon 2000). Of interest to current day Paduan masculinity, scholars have identified at least two dominant models of masculinity which have emerged over the last two decades: the ―new man,‖ who is vaguely feminine, sensitive, nurturing, and caring, if somewhat narcissistic; and the ―new lad,‖62 a more sexist model of masculinity; a less communicative ―man‘s-man‖ who embraces traditional male attitudes (Boni 2004:30; see also Jackson et al. 2001; Benwell

2003). While these stereotypes have been identified, for the most part, out of men‘s

62 An offshoot of the new lad has been the development in Britain of ―laddism‖ or ―lad culture‖ commonly associated with Britpop music of the 1990s. It stereotypically involves a liking for alcoholic beverages, football, fast cars and men's magazines such as Loaded and Maxim.

126 lifestyle magazines63, they can be understood as cultural phenomena reflecting broader social trends. Initially materializing predominantly in the UK, the archetype of the 1970s was the ―new man‖ while that of the 1990s was the ―new lad‖64. I argue here that both of these models reflect important emergent masculinities in Padua‘s current ―crisis of masculinity.‖

More broadly, sociological and anthropological studies have revealed the ―new man‖ stems from the ―new woman,‖ the liberated feminist of the 1970s. Thus the ―new man‖ takes on qualities traditionally associated with females, including emotional sensitivity, egalitarian relationships with others (especially women and ―other‖ men from racial or ethnic minorities), nurturing and caring sentiments (especially as fathers), and an interest in consumption of fashion and personal grooming commodities. The ―new lad,‖ on the other hand, is a response to the visible deterioration of men‘s power expressed by

―new man‖ masculinity. Willing to outwardly pose as a ―new man‖ for bedding women, the ―new lad‖ is committed to established male pastimes such as ―booze, babes, and football.‖ These men share a ―man‘s world‖ mentality that reinstates women to the realm of ―object,‖ and racial, ethnic, or sexual minorities to the realm of ―other‖ (Edwards,

2003, 2006; Benwell 2003).

63 Boni (2004), in his review of men‘s magazines writes, ―In the 1980s, the number of men‘s ‗lifestyle‘ magazines increased dramatically. In contrast to earlier ‗men‘s interest‘ magazines, which focused on activities traditionally performed by men such as fishing, hunting, or car racing, men‘s lifestyle magazines recontextualized masculinity as an identity sign that both purchases and performs.‖

64 Cross-cultural comparisons have identified variants and differences with the UK archetypes. For example, Keiko Tanaka (2003) analyzes Japanese men‘s lifestyle magazines and finds significant differences between the British ―New Lad‖ and the Japanese ―City Boy,‖ an apolitical, urban young man preoccupied with young women‘s opinion of him as a potential dating and/or marriage partner. Boni (2004) examines these concepts with Italian men‘s magazines, and finds both the new man and the new lad equally prevalent and meaningful.

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With specific regard to the Padua case, I argue that the ―new man‖ and the ―new lad‖ are a reflection of the current ―crisis of masculinity‖ and its multiple causes: changing work conditions (see chp.1), rapidly shifting new technologies, the advent and consequences of feminism. While I have pointed out the numerous similarities between the contemporary ―crisis of masculinity‖ with that of previous ―crises,‖ today‘s ―new man‖ represents a unique change in the history of masculinity. While the ―new lad‖ is a typical portrayal of virile defensive reactions to threatened masculinity, the ―new man‖ is very much, well, a new man rather than a boyish macho counter-offensive to female emancipation. Rather than react to the definitive toppling of the ―unmarked‖ category by a revanche of virility, the ―new man‖ represents an, albeit fragile, attempt to redefine a new kind of masculinity.65 Adding to this fragility is the fact that men‘s new ―visibility‖ as a gender (or perhaps better said, ―visibilities‖ given multiple ―masculinities‖) has consequently meant the disappearance of a socially recognizable and shared hierarchy of masculinities. To be a ―new man‖ is thus to take steps on a little known path, whose ultimate destination is not yet known. As mentioned above, the ―new man‖ contributes to domestic chores, to taking care of his children, without leaving out the emotional aspects.

On the other hand, the ―new man‖ also has a very ―consumeristic‖ aspect, again the consequence of a new kind of visibility which renders men objects as well as subjects

(something women have long experienced, but that for men is very new). The increase in men‘s beauty products (and sales) and advertisements portraying men increasingly sell not only consumer goods, but ―lifestyles‖ (Chapman 1988; Boni 2004; see also chp. 5).

As one informant commented,

65 This is not to say that the ―new lad‖ and the ―new man‖ cannot co-exist within the same man in different life spheres or even over the life course (Daniel J. Smith, 2009, personal communication).

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In the city I see 30-somethings who really groom themselves a lot (curarsi) … they become sort of a ‗man-object‘ (uomo-oggetto), going to the gym, caring for their faces, plucking their eyebrows… In my opinion, men have been this way for at least the last 10 years… this man-object… (Sergio, 48 years old)

Sergio himself is very much a ―new man.‖ When I met him for the first time in 2001, he was newly married, and he and his wife were adamant in continually discussing the division of domestic and paid labor, both wanted to make sure that it was ―fair.‖ By the time of my fieldwork in 2007, Sergio and his wife had had a child, who Sergio often pushed in a stroller as we went for long walks in and around the city. While Sergio happily spent time with his child and insisted on sharing household chores, he also confessed confusion over what men should be like and act like. As I return to in the next chapter and in chapter 7, Sergio adamantly insisted he did not want to be like his father, but had more difficulty defining what it means to ―be a man‖ in today‘s society.

Generally, Sergio showed a willingness to reflect on his identity as a man and to discuss the ―male condition.‖

The “new lad,” quite differently than Sergio, is a return of the virile colonialist man at the turn of the century, or a (veiled) renewed response to Mussolini‟s call to action in the 1920-30s. Take for example, Mirko (age 35) who, when I asked about the division of labor in the home, which saw his wife do most of the cleaning, cooking and childcare (despite the fact that she was also employed outside the home as an accountant), he responded, “but I do pitch in… it‟s just more about who‟s naturally better at doing certain things.” The “new lad” thus represents a kind of sexism, a kind of drawing of old boundaries between the woman (the dangerous other) and man. More specifically, the “new lad” is not just about reaffirming virility, but is an effort to make

129 this identity seem “natural” and thus return masculinity to its universality, to render the male gender “invisible”; it is a reestablishment of gender divisions reminiscent of Ulrich

Beck‟s concept of “constructed certitude,” which acts as a form of magic that sweeps away doubts and uncertainties, offering magical solutions to questions of identity. The

“new lad” emerges as the eternal masculine—as “right as rain.” Unlike the “new man” who is seen as a reactive response to feminism‟s attacks on patriarchy, “the new lad is a regular bloke, doing what blokes have always done and always wanted to do. Unlike traditional blokes, however, the new lad is very interested in style and consumerism, and his likely purchases include a full range of fashion and lifestyle products” (Barthel-

Bouchier 2001). Boni (2004:33) suggests that the “new man” is an “imagined masculinity,” if limited perhaps to a restricted group of wealthy urban consumers, while the “new lad” is no less “imagined” in its proposition to the middle and lower classes of a

“macho” working class archetype. Edwards (2000) argues that whereas the “new man” is narcissistic, sexually ambiguous, vaguely yuppie and anti-sexist, and the “new lad” is more conservative when it comes to fashion, has an almost “pornographic” concept of the female gender and is given to drinking, both models are mediatic creations and reproductions, motivated by purely commercial objectives.

Fieldwork in Padua revealed that there were very real class divisions in terms of thinking about who the “new men” are and who the “new lads.” As mentioned above, the

“new men” are those who contribute equally to domestic chores and childcare, are aware of sexism and gender equality and try consciously to avoid it, and are more willing to share emotions. On the one hand, they are bearers, in some ways, of a more fragile male identity, demonstrated in their attempt to define a new kind of masculinity that is still not

130 widely recognizable. On the other hand, it is precisely the fact that many of these men have higher levels of education, more material resources, and live in urban areas (such as

Padua) that allows them to explore new facets of masculinity66 and to feel more

“comfortable” as a gender rather than feel the need to defend a “natural” right to male supremacy.

The “new lads” were instead from the lower, and to lesser extent, middle classes, where gender equality often remains a more ideological concept that reflected in actual behavior (see chp. 8 on the “real” and “ideal”). Yet even where mediatic images of the

“new lad” resonant more strongly, there remains confusion over what exactly “being a man” consists of.

So now there are just the „leftovers‟ (rimasugli) of the „blue-collar worker‟… the one who resolved problems with his fists… because working class cultural has become „technologized‟… apart for a few jobs… and then they are done by the immigrants (extra-communitari)… physical work like porters or dockworkers.. Now these are all mechanical, there is no need for physical strength… so men go to the gym, but that doesn‟t necessarily make them strong. If I wanted children, I wouldn‟t be thankful for a buff man (palestrato)… Who needs muscular children? The species needs to advance… (Sara, age 29)

Among almost all of my informants there was a sense that the male figure (figura del uomo) had changed somehow, but identifying contemporary models of masculinity was extremely difficult.

I think many things have changed… our needs have changed… it seems to me that the things that are required of men… maybe they are the same… but the modalities, the environmental conditions have somehow changed… so social, economic, etc. It seems to me that today, many men, aren‟t men… they aren‟t

66 In Italy, studies have shown the involvement of the father in childcare as markedly higher for those who live in the Central North. The proportion of fathers involved in childcare for small children increases proportionally to the degree of urbanization of their place of residence. Rosina and Sabbadini (2006) point out that in cities, gender relations and roles tend to be less traditional. Fathers associated with higher levels of participation in childcare are those ―in professions like office workers, teachers and public servants,‖ perhaps because they often have more flexible working hours. When the fathers have higher levels of education, they also participate much more in childcare (ibid: 155-56).

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able to be. Once, if I think about my father‟s generation, the environmental, economic conditions forced one, without a lot of mental masturbation… forced you to be a man. Being a man meant finding a job, maintaining a family, etc. If you were a man, you did these things… doing these things, you were a man. It stands to reason that in this way, in this role, you found your identity… without having to be aware of it. Now things are more confusing… also because the labor market has changed and women, fortunately, are not there waiting for the man to bring home… etc, etc. So now to construct a male identity, you need something else… you need a consciousness, an inward gaze… (Edoardo, age 32, no children)

In fact, it seems that many Italian men today have become reluctant to see themselves as men, as male. “This is often caused by the perception, increasingly diffused, of an uneasiness (disagio), difficult to describe using a „gendered‟ language; increasingly evident is also the impossibility, for an increasingly large proportion of the male population, to enthusiastically identify themselves using identitary models of virile and strongly normative inspiration” (Bellassai 2005b: 137). More than due to feminist critique and pressure, as occurred in 1970s Italy, the male “gaze” is today focused on men themselves, pushed by a confused malaise, feeling of frustration, and lack of (and perhaps impossible) balance between new questions and anachronistic responses.

Contextualizing masculinity historically and observing the ways perceptions of

Italian male identity have changed and remained the same over the last century provide a window through which to understand contemporary understandings of gender, as well as reveals the fascinating interrelationship between population patterns and the construction of male identity. Indeed, what demographers have defined as the (first) Demographic

Transition (FDT) and the Second Demographic Transition (SDT) are both deeply intertwined with two of Italy‘s most profound ―crises of masculinity.‖ A closer look, however, reveals that along with the commonalities, there exist fundamental differences

132 in the relationship between each of these ―demographic transitions‖ and the formation of

Italian male identity. During the First Demographic Transition, Italian men reacted to declining birth rates, increased female literacy and employment, rapid urbanization, and the consequent public discussion of male identity (and hence questioning of the untouchable nature of masculinity) by accentuating their virility and battling to return masculinity to its privileged pedestal of ―invisibility.‖ During the ongoing Second

Demographic Transition, many men have likewise reacted to the economic emancipation of women, family changes, and declining birth rates by defending and reaffirming their virility, and more broadly, attempting to return masculinity to its universality. Efforts of this nature are typified in the stereotypical ―new lad‖ described above.

The SDT differs, however, from the FDT in that the latter has been described a

―quiet revolution‖ characterized by dissent in the private sphere (for example, refusals to accept religious impediments to contraception). The SDT, on the other hand, has been characterized by very public anti-authoritarian reactions to the Catholic Church, patriarchy and even to the very structure of society itself. Since the late 1960s, the accentuation of individual autonomy, the rejection of institutional control, and a rise of values associated with ―higher order needs‖ (Surkyn and Lesthaeghe, 2004) accompanied by a strong feminist movement, have fostered the family changes and dramatic drop in fertility rates. And while this has provoked in some men hostile reactions and efforts to return masculinity to its unquestioned hegemony, the very essence of the SDT - political non-conformism, the adoption of the ―post-materialist‖ values such as autonomy and self- fulfillment – have simultaneously aided other men to take tentative steps towards exploring new and ―visible‖ forms of male gender identity. The ―new man‖ described at

133 the end of the chapter represents a unique reaction to the demographic and social change inherent in the SDT; a fragile attempt to define a new kind of masculinity in which men emerge as a gender, rather than a hyper-normative ideal or a hegemonic concept. In the next chapter, I continue explore Padua‟s current “crisis of masculinity” and more specifically Paduan men‟s relationship with the opposite sex and perceptions of male identity.

CHAPTER 4. PADUAN MALE IDENTITY

Francesco, age 29, zoomed up in a battered two-door white Fiat Panda to the church steps where I sat waiting for him. Before I could get into the car, Francesco leapt out of the car to hastily kiss me on both cheeks, and began tossing the infant clothing and toys which littered the front passenger seat and floor to the back of the car. He dumped an armful into the child‘s car seat strapped into the backseat while explaining that he had just stopped off at an organization which sells and redistributes used infant and children‘s items. As we drove towards his apartment, located on the outskirts of the city where we had agreed to have lunch, Francesco excitedly described the goods he had obtained for next to nothing. ―See that clown doll? My daughter (age 2) is going to love that… and all of these clothes… well by tomorrow maybe my son (6 months) will have already outgrown them, but what do you want, they were free!‖ Francesco‘s enthusiastic and detailed description of onesies, pants, dresses, and shoes obtained at bargain prices was striking for a number of reasons. One is that Francesco felt at ease describing not only his shopping skills, but children‘s items that his own father, in all likelihood, would never have noticed, let alone procured.

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I teasingly interrupted Francesco, noting that he is becoming (for lack of a better word) a true mammo.67 He laughed at this, and then simultaneously sighed, ―Well, yes, I suppose

I am a bit of a mammo, but I‘m also not a mammo… What I mean is that I don‘t just think of myself as caring for my children – although that seems to be an overwhelming aspect these days – but I‘m also really into my job68 and I still think of myself as a soccer player, even if I just play with the local league on Sundays!‖ While I replied, ―Well there nothing wrong with that…‖ Francesco shook his head, coughed violently, and clearing his throat replied, ―No, what I mean is that I‘m not embarrassed to be excited about this stuff

[indicating towards the backseat], at the same time, I‘m ok being like this around you… but I would never act like this with my father… or maybe even men I don‘t know too well… You know, with all this talk about the ‗crisis‘ of men (la crisi del maschile), I don‘t want to be judged either, you understand?‖ Francesco‘s reference to a ―crisis of masculinity‖ combined with an evident pluralization of roles hints at the slow thawing of rigid and unambiguous masculinities, but also reveals a general malaise in the construction of male identity.

As suggested earlier, the contemporary ―novelty‖ is not, in fact, the plurality nor the multifaceted nature of models of masculinity, but rather that masculinities no longer seem to fit into a hierarchy that is socially recognized and shared (Saraceno 2007: XIII).

67 Plesset (2007: 29) has aptly describes this word as: ―a gender-bending term used to describe a man who participates in childbearing duties once associated exclusively with women.‖ Mammo is the (newly) masculinized word for ―mother‖ (mamma). In Italian, feminine nouns and adjectives end in either ―a‖ (singular; i.e. mamma) or ―e‖ (plural; i.e. mamme), while masculine nouns and adjectives end in either (―o‖ - singular, or ―i‖ - plural). Increasingly common usage of the word mammo (ending in ―o‖ to render it masculine) underlines the lack of available expressions to describe emergent forms of fatherhood. See also Chp 7.

68 Francesco works as a cameraman, and has collaborated with a number of directors and worked on a range of projects, included several independent films and television shows.

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One interpretation of this pluralization (without a hierarchy of masculine models) is that that there has been a gradual emergence of identities that are less tightly fastened to an a priori script, more ―self-reflective‖ (Giddens 1992), more malleable and multifaceted, but also, seemingly, more of a work in progress (Saraceno 2007). This chapter delves deeper into the contemporary ―crisis of masculinity‖ in Padua. In particular, I ask why the development of a new hierarchy or even simply a new model of masculinity has been such a seemingly difficult task. Certainly there are signs of change. Young Italian fathers increasingly demonstrate more caring attitudes towards their children (even infants) while older men, especially those of the 60s generation69 have, if somewhat hesitantly, learned to express affection without worries about being misinterpreted. On the other hand, the recognition of a pluralization of male models and the crumbling of any recognizable hierarchy are occurring in a context of profound change in the settings and resources which men are accustomed to. For many men, the traditional definitions of adult modern masculinity have weakened (i.e. relatively secure employment, low social mobility, etc; see also chapter 2). I argue that the growing ―visibility‖ of men as a gender has meant that hegemonic concepts of masculinity simply hold ever less meaning. Central to the maintenance of hegemonic masculinity is any practice that prevents other models of masculinity or femininity from gaining cultural articulation. Yet as men assert themselves

(and are increasingly treated) as a gender, the resonance of hegemonic masculinity sounds less strongly.70

69 Men who were 20-25 in 1968 are now 59-64 years of age.

70 Fuller (1996:228-9 –her italics) somewhat more optimistically suggests that ―cultural scenarios relating to hegemonic masculinity are available as patterns for the individual productions of corresponding interpersonal and intra-psychic scripts: individual men are presented with an idealized form of masculinity

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Using ethnographic data collected in Padua, I explore three important aspects at the root of the problem of defining contemporary Italian male identity – both on the part of social scientists and Paduan men themselves. The first concerns a central paradox inherent in anthropological approaches to studying masculinity, inhibiting a thorough understanding of the latter. More specifically I argue that anthropology, and other social sciences more generally, have, on the one hand, tended to see masculinity as something that is not ―given,‖ but that a man must constantly prove and defend (a man must be a man). On the other hand, scholars often underline the universal nature of masculinity, or the hyper-normative state of not being subject to critique. I explore the ways these perspectives directly contradict one another, and their applicability to the Paduan context.

The second aspect regards the thoughts of men themselves. How do men in Padua define

―masculinity‖ and what it means ―to be a man?‖ How does this play out in their everyday lives? Ethnographic evidence suggests that many men feel an outright aversion to the term ―masculinity,‖ indicative of the contradictory emotions that emerge as men increasingly reflect on the ―male condition.‖ Finally, the third aspect concerns men‘s relationships with women and vice versa. In research on men and masculinities, the latter often drops out of focus (Connell and Messerschmidt 2005; Gutmann 1997, 2007), yet gender is always relational and patterns of masculinity have always been socially defined in contradistinction from some model or threat posed by femininity (idem).71 Women are

which they may adopt in full, or part, or reject‖ (cfr. Mills 1998:173). What I argue here is that more and more men are rejecting idealized forms of masculinity, which no longer seem to make sense in the absence of a hierarchy of masculinities and a pluralization of male models.

71 Kimmel (1987:14) suggests that men, as a group, are unlikely to change existing definitions of masculinity and femininity to the extent that they are ―historically reactive to changing definitions of femininity.‖

138 central in the processes constructing masculinities – whether as mothers, girlfriends, or wives.72 A particularly interesting discourse emerges concerning ―responsibility‖ both at the familial and civic levels, highlighting the intricate relationship between demographic change and gender dynamics. More broadly, I argue that the lack of a recognizable and shared hierarchy shapes demographic processes. Vice versa, demographic changes (such as those denoting the SDT) play a significant role in shaping male identity and eroding hegemonic masculinity.

4.1 A Theoretical Paradox

The notion of ―masculinity‖ as gender identity and as object of anthropological reflection has long been a sort of ―paradox.‖ As Gallo (2007: 263) points out, ―comparative anthropological studies have shown that in a number of societies, the forms of ‗masculine belonging‘ are culturally represented by a condition that is not given by nature, that is not something that can be assimilated to a state that is spontaneously produced by a process of biological maturation.‖73 Rather, ―masculinity‖ is generally conceived of as an

72 In the words of Ventimiglia (1996:30) the objective is to ―reveal the places and manners of the interconnections and ambivalence in the relationship between genders, to consider them as dependent rather than two autonomous categories… We examine them within the same dimension of relational circularity, demonstrating interdependence, at times reciprocally collusive, rather than transcendence of one over the other.‖

73 One of the earliest examples of this literature includes Mead‘s work in Samoa and New Guinea. Mead stressed the importance of culture and/environment in the formation of gender difference. Her work represents an early attempt to counter theories of biological determinism and examine how relationships based on gender difference vary cross-culturally. While Coming of age in Samoa (1928), and Male and Female: A Study of the Sexes in a Changing World (1949), both challenge western conceptions of gender and identity as these relate to sex, her later work, Sex and Temperament in Three Primitive Societies (1963) was a clear attempt to debunk simplistic claims that biological differences are causal to (western) notions of gender identity. Her study of the Arapesh, Mundugumor, and Tchambuli showed that stereotypical behaviors associated with men and women in Western society do not necessarily match up with their non- western counterparts. She concluded from her study that ―many, if not all, of the personality traits which we have called masculine or feminine are as lightly linked to sex as are clothing, the manners, and the form of head-dress, that a society at a given period assigns to either sex‖ (1963:280). Derek Freeman (1983) later accused Mead of cultural determinism, further igniting the debate still raging today over the force of biological versus cultural factors (see also Ortner and Whitehead 1981).

139 artificial state, a right to an identity that is socially recognized, but that must be conquered or won and defended in everyday life: a man must ―be a man‖ (Gilmore

1990:9). This differs from the model of femininity which has frequently been constructed in reference to the biological and is not subject, as is ―masculinity,‖ to tests or trials of belonging.

On the other hand, the performative character of masculinity just described has been accompanied by an ideological invisibility (Bellassai 2004). In other words, a hyper- normative aspect, intended as a state of being not subject to critique, driven by rules and values implicitly adopted as universal. Bellassai (2004: 30-31) writes, ―Traditionally, man perceives and represents himself as a totality rather than a partiality, as a universal human being. […]. The masculine figure thus functions as the unit against which the human world is measured; the feminine figure is instead perceived as difference, partiality, gender, other, specificity. Man is the norm, woman the exception‖.74 This paradox between the ―performative character‖ of masculine identity and simultaneously man‘s ―universality‖ renders investigation of masculinities difficult. Of no less magnitude, the validity of both aspects is somewhat suspect in terms of contemporary

Paduan male identity. Not only has the ideological invisibility of men become increasingly weak, but so too have the ―rites of passage‖ and the ―defense‖ of

74 Since, Simone de Beauvoir‘s (1952) The Second Sex, feminist scholars have often pointed to the symbolic structure which defines male and female behavior. De Beauvoir argued that ―Masculine is associated with culture, feminine with nature.‖ Within this framework, males are always in a position to exploit women in the same way that culture exploits nature. De Beauvoir argues that women throughout history have been defined as the "other" sex, an aberration from the "normal" male sex; woman "is the incidental, the inessential, as opposed to the essential. He is the Subject, he is the Absolute - she is the Other." Work which later took up de Beauvoir‘s argument include, among others: Ortner‘s (1974) ―Is Female to Male as Nature is to Culture?‖ Rosaldo‘s (1974) "Woman, Culture, and Society: A Theoretical Overview," MacCormack and Strathern‘s (1980) Nature, Culture, and Gender and Ortner and Whitehead‘s (1981) Sexual Meanings: The Cultural Construction of Sex and Gender.

140 masculinity. In what follows, I address more specifically both the performative, ―artificial state‖ of masculinity (and its related rites of passage) as well as ideological aspects of male identity as they pertain to men‘s experiences in Padua.

4.1.1 Conquering Masculinity

Scholars such as Ciccone (2005a, 2005b, 2003b; see also cfr. Gallo 2007: 172) have suggested that one of the keys to understanding the ―precariousness of virility‖ lies in the fact that becoming a man is not a given. ―It‘s not enough to be born with a male body. On the contrary. The history of masculinity appears to be marked by uncertainty that men have endeavored to respond to with the construction of social and linguistic institutions; a history marked by an emptiness (un vuoto) which men have tried to fill with power…

The male body is a silent body: a body that is not subject to cycles, nor sees events signaling the attainment of adulthood or the end of fecundity.‖ He suggests that men must become men and demonstrate that they are indeed men, an achievement that is not given by their bodies alone: ―as youth, we discovered that we did not have ―days‖ in which we could not take a bath, growing up, no one asked us if we intend to have children in an job interview, we never had to renounce careers opportunities for a pregnancy…‖ Virility is always uncertain and subject to testing; in constant need of external confirmation

(Kimmel, 2002). Following this perspective, one does not become a man through menarche but through rites of passage and recognition on the part of the male community.

David Gilmore (1990), through his work on Mediterranean manhood, has come to similar conclusions. Subscribing to the theory that masculinity is not predetermined but, rather, ―culturally and publicly sustained,‖ he notes how Mediterranean masculinity is

141 defined publicly rather than privately. Gilmore unifies the Mediterranean countries of

Spain, Italy, Morocco and Greece in their ecology, settlement patterns, economic adaptations, and –most significantly – a ―sense of cultural homogeneity‖ in a shared image of manhood. A good Spanish/Italian/Greek man is ―good at being a man‖: public space is the proving ground of his masculinity through sexual potency (the spreading of the seed), and then providing for and protecting the family (Gilmore 1990:30-36; cfr.

Reich 2004:2-6). This separation between masculine/public and feminine/private is necessary, according to Gilmore, because the greatest threat to masculinity is precisely feminization.

While Gilmore‘s work is based on field research, psychoanalytic models of male subject formation have reached similar conclusions regarding the masculine/feminine dichotomy. Traditional psychoanalytic theory has attributed the formation of masculine identity to the castration complex, when the male child must renounce the pre-Oedipal world of the mother and identify with the authority of the father. Pre-Oedipal desire is either repressed into the unconscious or channeled into socially acceptable heterosexual desire in the post-Oedipal economy. In order for the masculine ideal to be sustained, the penis must be equated with the phallus. Somewhat differently from Ciccone‘s remarks on the ―silent‖ male body, Gilmore (1987: 16-17) observes that man‘s glorification of the phallus is an essential factor in the construction of Mediterranean masculinity: ―Faced with these challenges to masculine autonomy and sensing peril in a world run secretly by women, Mediterranean men seem to fall back on the one unambiguous distinction between the sexes: anatomy. Thus they honor the penis as the repository of manhood and

142 the mirror of masculine ego. The proof of this precarious manliness is the demonstration of phallic potency through erotic triumph.‖

Gilmore notes, however, that in Mediterranean countries, primary pre-Oedipal identification is difficult to overcome because of the primacy of mother/son intimacy and father distance. Because the man‘s domain is the public sphere, precisely the proving ground of his masculinity, he spends as little time as possible at home and even less in the child-rearing situation. The primary responsibility of raising the child falls on the women

–mother, grandmother, and/or female siblings –resulting in a greater symbiosis with the maternal figure. Although puberty marks the time when the young male leave the domestic arena for the homosocial public sphere, there is no rite of passage to initiate this transformation, and thus no clear-cut rupture with femininity. As a result, the feminine is a constant menace to the masculine, for the boundaries between them in the construction of masculinity are tenuous at best.

A number of counter arguments have been provided against the rather extreme positions put forth by authors such as Ciccone and Gilmore, and more generally against ethnographers who have emphasized what they see as fundamental differences in rites of passage for men and women.75 For example, scholars have questioned whether such mind-body and male-female distinctions might not reflect ethnographic bias more than the views of anthropological subjects of study. Inspired by Gillison‘s work (1980) among the Gimi, Strathern (1988) proposes that various aspects of each sex, male and female, are contained within each person. Rather than focus on metaphors of possession (that phalluses are male or that breasts are female, for example), she recommends that we draw

75 More necessary for men than women since, some hold, men are ―culturally made‖ while women are ―naturally born.‖

143 on metaphors of interaction and transaction. As Westerners, we feel a need to identify things by their attributes: to decide whether flutes are "male" or "female." However, identity cannot be derived from inspection alone, but is an outcome of inter-action (idem:

127-128). People are not necessarily male or female, but both, and organs can be either, depending on what one does with them and the relations in which they are engaged

(idem: 211-212). Putting a somewhat different twist on the idea of shifting male and female substances, Strathern (1988) asserts that both male and female aspects are contained within each composite person, and thus a singular or unitary gender – being male or female – is provisional and only emerges, or is elicited by others, in particular social contexts in order to achieve particular ends.

In the Italian case, significant changes in the activities of Italian men - ranging from caring fathers to affective partners - cast doubt on whether the ―feminine is truly a constant menace to the masculine,‖ hinting at new forms of (albeit tenuous) masculinity.

On the other hand, conversations with men in Padua revealed a general confusion over exactly what being a man consists of. Closely linked to this were worries that certain stepping stones – or rites of passage - in the male life course were becoming all but obsolete. A long conversation with Roberto (age 35) and Luigi (39) is representative of many of the themes that emerged in the time I spent and spoke with men in Padua. As we sat drinking a glass of wine one late winter evening, the men described to me what they termed the ―fragility‖ of contemporary Italian masculinity:

R: You see, whereas once men had an obvious path to follow, that is, find a job and support a family, now we have so many options available to us… and a number of ways to reach our objectives – that is if we don‘t get lost along the way!

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L: Well, there is no more ―warrior‖ masculinity… I mean we don‘t even have to do military service anymore76 R: It‘s not just that, it‘s all the other things – or steps- that you once took to become a man – entering the labor market, becoming a breadwinner, taking care of a family… these sorts of things – these have been taken away from us in this crazy world where everything is more complex, flexible, and even roles (between men and women) are interchangeable… L: Women, on the hand… they have it easier. No one takes away their rites of passage: pregnancy, child birth… R: Without these sorts of steps, and given so many options and interests, it‘s no wonder that men have become so fragile.

More generally, the men I spoke with in their late 20s to early 40s often suggested that there had occurred a radical change in terms of ―becoming a man‖ from that of their father‘s generation. For example, in Silvio‘s (age 45) opinion, everything occurred more

―quickly‖ for his father, all the ―phases of life‖ were shorter and by the age of 22 his father had already finished school and military service, had found a job and was ready to have a child. Similar to Luigi (above), he noted that the conclusion of military service meant that one was now a full-fledged man. With ever fewer opportunities to ―prove‖ one‘s male identity in socially recognized ways, the idea that ―a man must be a man‖ holds ever less strongly.

Other men I spoke to held onto the idea that indeed, a ―man must be man,‖ yet when pushed, they found describing exactly what this means challenging:

Masculinity means a man must be a man… a man can‘t be a woman! Being masculine… what I mean is to be a man… as an attitude, you know? By that I mean… well… he has to be a man! If one acts like a wimp (femminuccia)… that‘s just not right. I admit there is a bit of confusion in the world right now… sometimes you cannot tell if men are men or if they‘re women. I‘m not saying that a man has to be macho… that he has to be in command, no. Man, in terms of masculinity, I just think he has to be a man. There. In terms of sex, in terms of

76 Italy had mandatory military service, for men only, up until December 31, 2004. The right to conscientious objection was legally recognized in 1972 so that a ―non-armed military service‖ or community service could be carried out as an alternative to the former. The Italian armed forces are now entirely composed of professional volunteer troops, both male and female.

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leading… that he acts like a man, not a woman. And it is right that woman act like woman. (Antonino, age 54)

More broadly, attaining a ―culturally and publicly sustained‖ masculinity is quite difficult for men in contemporary Padua given that the ―steps‖ one should take and the opportunities one has to achieve and defend male identity have dramatically diminished.

Closely linked to the former is a weakening ―homogeneity‖ in shared images of manhood and more broadly, in confusion concerning the roles of men and women in society.

Gilmore (1990) has suggested that manhood ideologies force men ―to shape up on penalty of being robbed of their identity,‖ yet ethnographic work with men in Padua suggests that the means of establishing male identity and the opportunities to defend it are ever less external, requiring instead self-reflection. Similarly, male identity has become increasingly the object of public discussion, this time on the part of men themselves. Such discussion has dragged masculinity out into the open, contributing to making men as a gender visible.

The definition of (gender) roles, that we used to have… these are not necessarily the means of constructing male identity. We need something else… We need awareness (consapevolezza), and an interior gaze… and the ability to work on yourself as a person… But this is a problem, I think, because men are still learning how to do this (Sergio, age 48)

4.1.2 Visible Confusion

Over the last few decades, the slow dismantling of the untouchable nature of masculinity has made evident not only the multitude of masculinities but the absence of any hegemonic concept of masculinity. As Saraceno suggests (2007: XIII):

It is difficult in today‘s Italy to identify a univocal male gender model. The repertory of ‗the ideal male‘ includes, seemingly without distinction: the soccer player, the more or less ephemeral television hosts, famous actors known for their talent or simply for their aesthetic presence, ‗Casanovas,‘ and caring fathers, men

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who are imitated and admired because they are young and personable, old politicians who boast that they never grow old, and elderly ‗founding fathers‘ whose age and history are employed as a sort of ‗coat of arms‘ that allows them to continue to engage the public eye.

More broadly, whereas once men could represent themselves as ―a totality‖ not subject to critique, social and demographic processes (i.e. drop in birth rates, family changes, and increase in female participation in the labor force)77 have slowly eroded this position, such that men are increasingly forced to question their social positions and responsibilities.

Similarly, one might suggest that competition with women for jobs in the public sphere serves to hide the fact that a number of work conditions – precariousness, lack of adequate incomes, and dependence on family members78 - make men resemble

(especially for the younger generations) women of all generations. Such conditions also distinguish these men - in terms of opportunities and expectations – from previous generations of men, many of whom are still firmly placed within the job market.

I understand why young men today go out of their heads… because the messages we get are so contradictory… in the family you have the model that transmits tradition… that says get married, have a family – support a family! On the other hand, the ―I command‖ (commando ‗mi) model just doesn‘t really work anymore, for men either, eh – not just for women. I want to participate in raising my children, and even doing housework – that‘s fair – I‘m embarrassed that my mother still bring my father his slippers…Anyways, my girlfriend and I are in the same boat… precarious contracts and uncertain futures! (Fabio, age 29)

77 Paul Ginsborg (1998: 179) argues, on the other hand, that it is not the feminist movement but rather ―incomplete female emancipation that is one of the most significant causal factors‖ affecting the current state of social and demographic affairs in contemporary Italy. Micheli (2007: 206) similarly agrees that the feminist revolution remains incomplete, and ―will remain incomplete until man has also been ‗emancipated.‘ Presently the ‗role cage‘ in which the Italian man remains entrapped, does not allow him to access the password needed to enter the world of expressivity.‖

78 See also Chapter 2 for an in-depth discussion of the labor market and precariousness.

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The increasing similarity of life-conditions for men and women can have different effects. One is a stiffening of gender identity and mechanisms of self-defense. Indeed, it is not surprising that change originates from men who have greater job stability and professional satisfaction and are thus more willingly to risk exploring ―traditionally‖ more feminine terrain such as childcare and expressions of affectivity. The hesitant steps that the ―new men‖ described in the previous chapter take towards resolving the contradictions inherent in new kinds of male identity are perhaps paradoxically facilitated by an assurance that in some ways these men have succeeded in achieving some markers of a more ―traditional‖ manhood (i.e. material wealth, job stability, etc.). Men with lower socio-economic backgrounds and education instead tend to accentuate distinctions between the sexes, especially when these are associated with chores and activities with little social value or visible gratification. In other words, like the stereotypical ―new lad‖ described in the previous chapter, these men often respond to the increasing resemblance between the sexes through virile defensive reactions to a ―threatened‖ masculinity.

Men who do opt to adventure onto paths less traveled in terms of gender identity are often stymied by a lack of role models to which to aspire. Without a recognizable hierarchy or a clear set of characteristics defining ―ideal‖ masculinity, what West and

Zimmerman (1987) have termed ―doing gender‖ becomes difficult indeed. According to these sociologists, everyone must ―do gender‖ to be classified as a man or woman and be judged competent members of society. This is not an optional activity, but a requirement of everyday life. Doing gender consists of interacting with others in such a way that people will perceive one‘s actions as expressions of an underlying masculine of feminine

―nature.‖ Thus, one is not automatically classified as a man or a woman on the basis of

148 biological sex, but on the basis of appearance and behavior in everyday social interaction

– reminiscent of conquering and defending one‘s masculinity (Coltrane 1996; Gilmore

1990; Berk 1985). Yet when new forms of masculinity emerge which are not easily classified within a recognizable hierarchy, they are difficult to enact and, perhaps even more so, to be perceived of as ―natural‖; not surprisingly, confusion ensues.

A number of men with whom I spoke and spent time with in Padua expressed their perplexity over the roles of men and women in today‘s society. For example:

Things have changed… It seems to me that the things that are asked of men… they are kind of the same things as in the past, but the ways of achieving them, and even the conditions – like social, economic, factors – I don‘t know, it seems to me that many men today, aren‘t men… that they aren‘t able to be men… (Sebastiano, age 34)

You want to know my theory? Roles no longer exist. Men are no longer men, and women are no longer women. There is mixing of roles that brings about confusion in terms of relationships; one is no longer identified in a certain way nor has a certain role in the couple. The whole feminist movement isn‘t really what I‘m talking about here… nor am I talking about chauvinism… what I‘m trying to say is there is confusion, and one doesn‘t really know who should do what. Men feel a bit like women, and women are forced to act like men, because there no longer are any ‗real‘ men… in the sense that there so many men around that are just garbage. (Franco, age 42)

The definition of roles that we used to have… it is not necessarily a means of constructing male identity today. One needs something else. One needs awareness, a self-reflection… and ability to work on yourself as a person… but this is a deficit; nobody (man) does this… (Giuseppe, age 36)

Informants also linked their confusion over gender roles to current low birth rates in

Padua – testimony to the intertwined nature of demographic processes and gender dynamics.

There is a quite bit of confusion now… about the fact that there is masculinity in a woman and femininity in man. I believe in characteristics... such that masculinity is a part of somebody‘s soul… femininity is another part. There can be a man who is super masculine or super feminine, just like there can be a woman who is super

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masculine. But there is this paradox, you see… because in my opinion it is difficult these days for men to recognize and knowingly express their own masculinity, and women no longer have any incentive to live their femininity. This creates a strange sort of gap… and has an impact on creating a family, having children. It‘s no wonder that there are so few children these days. (Alfredo, age 39)

People think too much before having children nowadays. While once it was clear what everyone‘s roles were: women were in charge of the house, while men were responsible for earning an income, now everyone does everything, yet no one is sure what to do. So couples end up thinking too much, and then they have few children. (Antonio, age 48)

As mentioned above, contributing to the confusion over roles is the lack of new, convincing, role models of masculinity. In other words, notwithstanding the crumbling of hegemonic models, the emergence of man as a gender (testified to, for example, by men‘s self-reflection) is made difficult by uncertainty as to what exactly new models of masculinity should look like.

I think we happen to be in a moment of transition… in lots of things, but above all from a cultural point of view. So, I know how my father was with respect to my mother… but that role there, it no longer exists. I don‘t have it. So I don‘t know… what being a man exactly means now, it‘s something our fathers never even had to ask (Walter, age 41)

Fieldwork revealed that whenever there was not sufficient continuity with ―traditional‖ behavior, men, for lack of a satisfactory male role model, often looked (somewhat reluctantly) to models of femininity and even maternity (at topic I return to in chapter 6).

Ventimiglia (1996), in his research on men in the Emilia Romagna region, found similar results. He writes, ―among male informants it seemed there was a general uneasiness caused by the lack of apparent signs in the memory of the gender able to shape male identity with a specificity (for the purposes of their own recognition and legitimization) which would not require blatant encroachment onto female territory nor further proxies to

150 the exclusive ―competence‖ of maternity.‖ Along these lines, an excerpt from my fieldnotes reads:

I went over to Ivano‘s (age 47) house today, accompanying him home from his studio and picking up his daughters (age 12 and 8) from school on the way. While Antonio does quite a bit of the childcare, and describes himself as a ―mammo,‖ he simultaneously spoke to me with great admiration for his wife (and women in general) and her ability to care with ―sensitivity and determination‖ for their children. ―They (women) have this talent of establishing a relationship of intimacy and sharing that goes beyond that which I can create.... notwithstanding that I consider myself to be a doting and devoted father… While I am constantly spending time with them (daughters), provide them with affection and care… I see that my daughter runs to my wife when she wants to share her innermost feelings… While their triumphs are my own, I think my wife experiences an emotional side to raising our children that I somehow don‘t have access to.‖ Ivano continued, ―Deep down, sometimes I feel jealous of my wife… and her ability and competency in developing a relationship with our daughters.‖ Take for example the other day… Susanna… I don‘t know, maybe because she‘s starting to hit puberty… was locked inside the bathroom, weeping. I knocked on the door to ask her what was wrong, and she told me to go get Catrina (his wife). I had this absurd sense of envy towards my wife… I marched off pouting to go get her… It ended up being nothing but a pimple! But still, when Catrina asked if I could take the girls to their music lesson, I responded, for no reason at all, in an ornery way! On the other hand, Catrina is amazing with the girls… although I can‘t complain that my relationship is a poor one… I too have a deep relationship with the girls, although I can‘t help but admire my wife‘s way with them.

Deriu (2005: 156) comments that ―Italian men today can learn to be fathers by comparing themselves not only with their own fathers, but also their mothers and their wives.‖ He suggests that this possibility diverges from the past, when the only way to establish one‘s paternal role was solely through identification with male models. Deriu argues that men have much to learn to from women, in terms of the ―management of the affective, intimate, and bodily dimensions of the relationship with one‘s one children,‖ and that this becomes a possibility only when men are able to experience asymmetry in caregiving abilities in terms of admiration, rather than jealousy.

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Today women represent a double comparison for their partners. They demonstrate an autonomy and freedom which until a few years ago was unimaginable. In the past, men gained much of their recognition from their social role and from their public identity, their work, and politics. Today, men are increasingly judged on the basis of their relational capabilities of listening and understanding the experiences of the companions, and their ability to value them (Deriu 2005: 159).

Given the confusion over gender roles expressed by men and lack of male role models available to them, it seems both urgent and useful for men to discover the ability to talk about themselves – something they are just beginning to do – and from this starting point, activate their consequent behavior on the level of inter-personal and parental relationships. In other words, while men seem to have recognized that old, hegemonic forms of masculinity are no longer applicable to contemporary lifestyles, they struggle to define acceptable new forms of masculinity.

There used to be a male model: paterfamilias. That expression, in fact, ―father of the family‖/ (padre di famiglia) in and of itself said everything. There was this idea of a man, which was identified and recognizable. My father belongs to this period, when these criteria still had meaning – the value of the family… my mother was a housewife. Now, I think men are a little lost. There is no longer any model to imitate, or at least, there is, but it has become too old… So, either you hammer yourself in (ti incastri a martellate) and you adapt to the older model or you… If I think of a man… I see my father as a man. And I would like to have the maturity, seriousness that he has. But I‘m afraid that if I don‘t find any commitments (impegni) which force me to be so… serious… I‘ll never be serious… you understand? (Michele, age 32)

There is little doubt that men are experiencing a particular season of crisis, due both to the emancipation of women and to a culture that has upset pre-existing male ideals

(virility, strength, sense of community) in order to privilege a model of a more uncertain delineation (Garelli 2000:43).79

79 Gauntlett (2002:170) voices a similar opinion, writing of men‘s magazines: ―Today‘s ‗magazines for men‘ are all concentrated on the social construction of masculinity… In the past men didn‘t need these magazines because it was clear what being a man consisted of and how they were supposed to behave. It‘s

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4.2 Meanings of Masculinity

In order to further delve into how men themselves define contemporary masculinity, and their own personal gender identities, I often asked the men I spent time with to discuss with me how they would define the words ―male identity,‖ ―masculinity,‖ and

―manhood.‖ Several themes emerged from these discussions. To begin, among men of all ages, there was a general consensus that ―real‖ masculinity no longer existed. At best, it still exists, but not in the North of Italy - only in the deep South (see also chapter 3).

I well recognize some masculine figures, because I am from a little town in the south. I was born in Padua, but my father and my mother are from a village in the South and I can clearly see the difference between my behavior and that of someone who is really a ‗man,‘ really ‗masculine‘… in the sexual sense of the word, no? There‘s a profound sensation… well, clearly I also have experienced this a number of times, I felt ‗manly‘ with a number of women but… my characteristic is not really this... sometimes I enjoy ‗being a man‘ and it‘s something that I like… but deep down I don‘t have that ‗thing‘ that I‘ve seen and felt in the really masculine men of the South. I have a much more developed ‗feminine‘ side (Ivano, age 47)

Masculinity, to me, is a sort of idea… something that now is part of mythology! (laughs) The truth is… it‘s an idea that is linked to a man who, besides being masculine, is maybe also somewhat chauvinistic… the ‗om‘ (man), like they say in southern dialect. (Federico, age 31)

When I think of a ‗masculine‘ man, I think of the Southern man… not necessarily physically, but he believes in certain things… like the family, respect… he knows how to protect. The flip side of the coin though, with this kind of man, is that when he crosses ‗a line‘ it can be perceived of as chauvinism… you know, like ‗I‘m a man, and so I can do whatever I want‘… that I find excessive… On the other hand, there this balance… you know: ‗I‘m the man, and you are the woman‘… I think of this as very southern. (Sandro, age 34) only recently, in today‘s world in which we are all aware of the many choices available to us… and of the fact that roles related to one‘s gender can change – and have changed – that men have begun to need magazines that tell them how to be a man today.‖ Gauntlett argues that rather than telling men what masculinity is, men‘s magazines concentrate on how to construct masculinity. He points to references to a mythical ―community of men,‖ legitimized by a presumed ―tradition‖ or ―naturalness,‖ but clarifies that the actually message one reads between the margins, is ―the process of manhood building,‖ or the ―effort to construct a model of masculinity which brings together different models – again for the most part media constructions – like the new lad and new man or the ‗traditional‘ but ‗marketed‘ man and the ‗new‘ man, open to emotions and sentiments‖ (idem).

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Comments of this nature notably contrast with Italian gender stereotypes developed at the end of last century portraying southerners as effeminate and northerners as masculine.

The typology that opposes a masculine North with a feminine South emerged at the end of the 19th century,80 in debates over the perceived weakness of the Italian state, which was linked in part to the North-South divide (see also chapter 2). The divide between a

―backward‖ South and a progressive North has also often been explained in terms of the

South‘s ―amoral familism‖ (Banfield 1958), or the exclusive focus on the interest of the family at the expense of civic engagement. Amoral familism also expresses the supposedly excessive influence of the ―female‖ private sphere and has been opposed to a northern, civic and ―masculine‖ family model (Huysseune 2000).

The interesting reversal in this typology, with the North as lacking ―real men‖ and characterized by a confusion over gender roles, as opposed to the South, where ―real men‖ continue to exist, could hypothetically be explained in several ways. Describing the

South as the place where ―real men‖ still exist, maintains the ―backward‖ connotations of

South which have been so persistent over the last century. Informants‘ comments on the lack of the paterfamilias may also be an expression of ―modernization‖ which associates modernity with the emancipation of women; or the perception of a divide between the

North, where women are emancipated, as opposed to the South, where women are supposedly more submissive to patriarchal authority. Recognition of female emancipation which portrays the North as ―progressive‖ as opposed to a ―backwards‖ south may also

80 For example, in a book entitled l‘Italia Barbara Contemporanea (Contemporary Barbarous Italy) published in 1898, Alfredo Niceforo attempts to analyze the ―backwardness‖ and high crime rates of southern Italy. Niceforo describes southerners as the popolo femmine (female population). Their effeminacy is, according to him, reflected in their preference for obscenities, dancing and singing. Since Naples is the moral capital of the South, this effeminacy can be considered as characteristic of the whole of southern Italy, although Sicily and Calabria are ―masculine‖ exceptions (Niceforo 1898: 247-9) – Perhaps not surprisingly, considering that Niceforo himself was Sicilian!

154 allow men to express their ―feminine‖ side in a more acceptable way. In fact, a number of the men I spoke with explained that they had difficulty describing what ―masculinity‖ means to them, precisely because they have such a prominent ―feminine side.‖

Masculinity? I don‘t know, each one of us has a feminine and a masculine side to our personalities… people have always told me that I have feminine side that is very developed… so I don‘t know if I can really tell you what masculinity means exactly. (Riccardo, age 30)

More broadly, men often expressed an aversion to the term ―masculinity,‖ some equating it negatively with the Fascist period of Italy‘s history (see also chp. 3) others as a concept that is ―outdated‖:

I‘d say that ‗masculinity‘ is a thing of the past… when the man was the mainstay of the family…But now I think this concept have been ‗overcome‘ (superato), I personally would guarantee the same rights and duties to men and women… It‘s not important if you‘re a man or a woman… the important thing is that you are capable of doing things… (Davide, age 44)

Mhm… I‘d say it (masculinity) calls to mind negative ideas… not just strength, power, but something sort of fascist… (Sandro, age 34)

I wouldn‘t say it‘s a negative term exactly, but I would say it‘s something that has changed over time. I mean, I might use it to describe a woman who has ‗masculine‘ characteristics, but I don‘t think I would really use that word to describe a man, you know? (Edoardo, age 32)

That‘s a difficult word for our generation, we who are post-fascists… it a concept linked to fascism and a culture in Italy that we looked at with disgust… men like me who have an education, we fell in love with other models, with equality in our relationships with women… I think we‘ve learned a lot from our female companions… Personally, I don‘t have a very pleasant image of masculinity… it almost frightens me…In Italy it was unpleasant, an aggressive way to manage relationships within the family… authoritarianism… that was not a good model of masculinity. (Carlo, age 67)

Another related issue that emerged from interviews with men in Padua was their inability to define themselves as ―the strong sex.‖ All of the men shared a common idea of contemporary weakness in the male gender, or a ―crisis‖ which men are currently

155 experiencing. Women, on the other hand, were attributed a number of ―strengths,‖ revealing in some cases an explicit sense of admiration on the part of men for the ability of women to adapt to the ―complexities of the modern world.‖ In it an extreme form, some men even expressed a desire to have female children instead of male children.

Women are the strong sex… She is the one who commands. She‘s the one who decided how many children to have… which house to buy…‖ (Claudio, age 43)

I think the female gender is more balanced… no maybe that is not the right world…. I think women are more ‗complete‘…mmh… or more suitable… I don‘t know, it seems men are at a disadvantage… because they are unable to juggle many things at the same time, like women do… In a complex world, women are more ‗fit‘… That‘s why I would like to have a daughter… (Marco, age 32)

A: It there a weak sex and a strong sex? I: No, I don‘t think so. Rather, there are generations… waves… I think there are waves and right now, we‘re in the female wave… (Davide, age 44)

Women especially noted the ability, in their opinion, of the female sex to better adapt to the ―modern world‖:

I think men are having difficulty because, well, women for thousands of years have been used to putting together… I mean, they‘re used to facing challenges and limits… you know, like once a month with menstruation… we are used to dealing with complexity. We can multi-task when things get complicated. Men can‘t, and this is a problem. In the sense that things are not so linear or simple as they used to be… men don‘t necessarily do the same jobs their fathers did… In today‘s world you have to find things, invent yourself, you have to be more of an ‗entrepreneur‘ in life…I think men have more difficulty putting things together… (Marina, age 36)

Women are much more able to deal with complex situations… they are better able to see the ‗whole picture‘ and give each part its just weight. Men, on the other hand, take one thing at a time, and tend to forget about the other pieces in the meantime. This is ultimately a poor strategy in today‘s world, and makes men fragile. (Ilaria, age 43)

More broadly, discussions of men‘s views of women as a gender, stemming from questions concerning the existence of a ―strong sex‖ as opposed to a ―weak sex‖ led me

156 to ask women the same question. In the section that follows I discuss women‘s views of men and how such views are intertwined with the notions of power and virility. I also delve into the mother-son relationship and more generally the relevance of psycho-social theory for understanding contemporary Paduan male fragility. Finally, given that men made numerous references to women (and often to their partners specifically) in their efforts to described themselves in discussions about masculinity, I endeavor to explore this relational dimension.81 In other words, descriptions of the opposite gender have a central function in the representations of one‘s own gender identity, and as such play an essential role in constructions of masculinity.

4.3 A „Crisis‟ of Gender Relationships

4.3.1 Women‘s Views of Men

Notwithstanding many men‘s admiration for women, neither sex lacked in terms of complaints against the other sex. Conversations stemming from the question concerning a

―strong‖ or ―weak‖ sex revealed the multitude of concerns, and in some cases, angst, towards the opposite sex. Giddens (1992:149) has caricatured this ―crisis‖ of gender relationships in the following terms:

Men‘s anger against women today in some substantial part is a reaction against women‘s self-assertion in the home, the workplace and elsewhere. Women are angry at men in turn because of the subtle and not so subtle way in which men deny them material privileges claimed for themselves. Economic poverty for women, emotional poverty for men: is this the state of play in the relations between the sexes? The self-appointed advocates of men and women on both sides would say so, although each is likely to accuse the other of not fully acknowledging the sufferings of the other side.

81 As one informant (age 31) described this dynamic, ―I feel ‗masculine‘ when I make a woman feel ‗feminine.‘‖ He suggested that ―While a woman may self-identify as ‗feminine‘ by the way she dresses and moves - ‗femininity‘ does not necessarily depend on the other sex - a man feels ‗masculine‘ in function of his ability to make a woman feel that she is ‗feminine.‘‖

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In Padua, the principal complaints women voiced about men, and more broadly, masculinity, mirrored in many cases the concerns of men: the disappearance of ―real men‖ and observations that men and women are becoming increasingly indistinguishable.

These worries were often voiced as remarks about the ―demasculinization‖ of men (see also chp. 3). Take for example, the following excerpts from interviews with women:

I think there has been a progressive feminization of men… That‘s why men have so little sexual drive these days… They have little virility… (Carla, age 52) Men? They‘ve become women… they‘re completely out of it (ricoglioniti)… They aren‘t any men anymore... (Sandra, age 48)

So many men these days have a very feminine attitude… they‘re not even gay, they are just men who are feminine! (Marina, age 36)

Concerns about the ―demasculinization‖ of men were also linked with feelings of irritation, in that women complained that men were ―invading‖ their domain. A number of women commented that they did not want their male counterparts to be ―an extension‖ of themselves (un prolungamento), but desired ―men to be men.‖ This quickly became confusing, given that when pressed, exactly what it means ―to be a man‖ was difficult for them to describe. Women did not want to return to patriarchal models of male identity, but neither did they feel comfortable with what they described as an increasingly similarity between the sexes.

With my husband, I like to pamper him… I cook for him… I like to do these things, but I‘m in favor of parity, you know? I‘m really against the old model: ‗division of roles.‘ But you know, maybe some things come more natural to me… like cooking a good dinner, and maybe you‘re better at, I don‘t know, giving me a massage while we watch TV one evening. But, there should never be this thing where… I don‘t know, I don‘t want a man who compliments me on my new bag, or asks me where I bought my pants…it‘s ok if I ask you that, because I‘m a woman damn it. (Paola, age 37)

I: A husband should not be an ‗extension‘ of his wife… A father should be a father and so… each person should demonstrate their own identity… it shouldn‘t

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be that a woman tells her husband, ok, you have to do this and that with the children. No. it should be that a man demonstrates his own individual aspects… that everyone can identify – I‘m not saying that the man commands, but just that he shouldn‘t be a copy of the woman, you know? A: Why do you think this happens? I: I think it is because women tend to be stronger…and men tend to just kind of follow her lead. I mean ok, I realize that men now want to play a more important, affectionate role in the lives of their children, but it has to be different than that of the mother. (Ilaria, age 43)

While women expressed contentment when their partners and husbands participated in childcare and housework, they also expressed concern that there needed to be a greater distinction between men and women. They worried that men were becoming too

‗effeminate‘ and arguments erupted frequently over who should do what (an issue I return to in chp. 8 on domestic work). A number of women complained that their partners were too present; labeling their efforts to participate as a nuisance (―they really can be rompi-palle/ ball-breakers‖).

4.3.2 Responsibility, Masculinity, and Demographic Change

Women also voiced concerns that men shy away from taking on what they termed

―responsibilities,‖ such as getting married and having children. Other women equated masculine ―responsibility‖ with courage, or as one woman said: ―someone who is not afraid of taking on responsibility, or if afraid, works on resolving the problem with courage (con le palle). Men similarly described masculinity as the ability to ―take on responsibility and resolve problems.‖ As Matteo (age 36) once told me, ―I feel like a man when I am able to find a solution to a problem, especially where Sara (his partner) is involved… but we (men) these days are always being criticized for running away from our responsibilities.‖ A conversation with Lorenzo (age 37) revealed an interesting age dynamic to notions of ―responsibility.‖ An excerpt from my fieldnotes reads:

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After eating, Lorenzo (age 37) and I sat in the kitchen and talked about his experiences as a father, husband, and Italian male. By the time we sat down to do the interview he had had several glasses of wine, and while by no means drunk, his face was slightly flushed and he answered the questions openly and uninhibitedly. We spoke at length about his notion of ‗masculinity.‘ He thinks that what is intended by the word ‗masculine‘ and ‗masculinity‘ changes throughout the life-cycle of a man. For a man in his twenties, masculinity means physical strength, burliness, ‗care-freeness,‘ a lack of responsibility, and sexual conquest. For a man in his thirties, ‗masculinity‘ becomes being a ‗pillar of the family,‘ a role of responsibility and strength. But a strength that is measured by the degree to which is wife can count on him in times of need.

While men and women associate ―masculinity‖ with ―responsibility‖ and more specifically, the ability of men to provide direction, take on and solve problems

(especially within the familial domain), the opportunities and even the desire to embody such ―responsibilities‖ were often reacted to with a sort of hesitancy to comply; as if men recognized that ―masculinity‖ should be associated with a ―responsible‖ figure, but that they often had difficulty personifying such a model, caused by different goals and somewhat strained relationships with the opposite sex.

You know, nowadays it‘s much easier to avoid taking on responsibilities, or to postpone them… I‘m not talking about work necessarily… I‘m talking about relationships with women, you know? Now it is much easier to live these ambiguous and undefined relationships with women –no matter how hard they might try to press you! I mean I want to explore, not only with other women, but also different sides of myself, as well as… well… just see what I can do with my life before I have to settle down… or take on too much responsibility… (Giuseppe, age 36)

Women similarly described men as ―inconsistent,‖ in the sense that they are unable to make decisions and stick with them. As one woman put it

Men are perhaps more ‗sensitive‘ than they used to be… but they can‘t really do anything with this newfound sensitivity… In the sense that they change their minds constantly, or more generally, they just seem confused. (Manuela, age 39)

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As described in chapter two, men often expressed desires to explore different directions, and aspirations of self-realization and autonomy; such sentiments do not meld well with notions of ―responsibility.‖ Indeed, a conflict arises between the idea that men should take on the ―responsibilities‖ of a family and children, and the diffusion of higher order needs associated with the Second Demographic Transition: self-actualization, and individualistic and non-conformist value orientations (Lesthaeghe and Meekers 1986;

Lesthaeghe and Surkyn 2004).

Masculinity? Well, I suppose some would equate it with the responsible father figure, but I think we (men) don‘t always want to be ‗responsible.‘ In fact, who cares about ‗responsibility‘?! I have so many other things to worry about – Besides the ‗classic‘ family doesn‘t really exist anymore, it is more about how you want to do things, the way you want to live life… maybe that is what being a man is about… I don‘t know… I don‘t think people really use that word (masculinity) anymore. (Alfredo, age 39)

Well, to be a man used to be equated with ‗seriousness‘ and ‗responsibility,‘ but now I think it is more about creating something beautiful with a woman… being together, living together. It not really about providing support, but more about making her feel like a woman, and building something you desire, not just what society expects… (Leonardo, age 34)

My father, I guess you could describe him as a ‗real‘ man because he took on his responsibilities… I know that if there is a responsibility, he will take it… I, on the other hand, tend to take the easier route, the thing that I want to do…does that make sense? (Franco, age 30)

While much of the ideational or cultural shift which characterizes the SDT has been portrayed positively, rarely has it been noted that the SDT also rouses conflicting notions of gender identity, creating significant malaise and fragility among men. This in turn has consequences for demographic phenomena such as fertility. If at the individual level, the choice for new types of households (premarital single living, cohabitation and parenthood within cohabitation) is linked to individualist and non-conformist value

161 orientation in a great variety of spheres, the actual decision to adopt such orientations necessarily requires confrontation with prior gender values and cultural schemas. In the case of men in Padua, the contrast between ―responsibility‖ and the desire of men to explore new forms of gender identity results in perceptions of masculinity as ―fragile‖ and men as ―egoistical.‖

To have children in this day and age means taking on responsibility… Up to now I haven‘t really thought about it, because I‘ve been busy doing my own thing… … combined with the fact that I feel sort of afraid… I mean, some people say that not having children is egotistical because you refuse to take on responsibility, but I see that a lot of people wait and wait… because there are so many things to do before you decide to take that on. It‘s not about being weak, or fragile, it is really more about deciding what you really want in life, and then putting all the right elements together…(Enrico, age 32)

Notions of ―responsibility‖ as they relate to masculinity have both a ―familial‖ and

―civic‖ dimension, mirroring again traits of the Second Demographic Transition. More specifically, the SDT has occurred in tandem with the growth of ―postmaterialism‖ (e.g.

Inglehart, 1990) and political or religious ―depillarization‖ (e.g. Lesthaeghe and Moors

1995), and the disengagement from civic, professional or community oriented associations. Informants in Padua frequently linked a weakening sense of ―responsibility‖

(as it relates to masculinity) not only to individual desires for self-actualization and autonomy but also to a broader ―lack of responsibility‖ in terms of civic and community participation.

I come from a family where there has always been an accentuated interest in politics and civic duty… But if I compare my generation with that of my parents, I see many differences. My parents married when they were young, my mother was 24 and my father 26 and I was born soon afterwards… they started working early… but even if they were busy with work and children, they kept their political and community spirit alive. In this sense my father, was a ‗real man‘: he had a sense of responsibility that is just very different from what you see in men today.

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There used to be this sharing of greater ideals… that went beyond the family sphere. Nowadays, we are much more individualistic… Values, a civic sense… You don‘t really feel this now… not like you did once… it‘s sort of gotten lost (si é un pò persa)

One of the outcomes, according the SDT theory, of diminished civic and community oriented values combined with rising individualism has been fertility postponement:

―mean ages at first parenthood rise, opportunities for childbearing are lost due to higher divorce, the share of childless women increases, and higher parity births (4+) become rare. The net result is structural and long term below replacement fertility‖ (Lesthaeghe

2002).

Anthropologist Elizabeth Krause (2005:184) suggests that ―low fertility is the outcome of a deep, horizontal, quiet revolution that began nearly a century ago against the rigid pecking order of the patriarchal family.‖ She argues that the demographic changes of the 1990s in Italy are ―a consequence of society‘s embrace of an egalitarian model of the family, and of a generation‘s grappling with the implications for the cultural politics of gender in a context where the so-called culture of responsibility weighs most heavily on women‖ (idem:184).‖ Yet she also carefully warns against equating record low fertility with record-high gender equality (idem: 160). In fact, it is within this climate of low fertility that questions about gender proficiencies continue to be negotiated. As

Krause aptly notes the dilemma of ―low fertility is very much about struggles over male and female relations. It is about men figuring out how to be men beyond the rigid patriarchal family, and women puzzling over how to be women in this transforming gender regime that strives toward equality‖ (idem). Individualistic strategies enacted on the part of Paduan men contrast with ingrained family ones and orientations towards

163 community engagement. Not surprisingly women lament that masculinity as a signifier of

―responsibility‖ is increasingly weak (both familial and civic). Men on the other hand, make tentative efforts to remove themselves from the association of ―responsibility‖ with

―masculinity‖ as they construct new forms of male identity.

4.4 Men‟s Views of Women

Similar to women (and as described above), men had considerable difficulty describing masculinity, and often voiced concerns over the disappearance of ―real masculinity.‖

Interestingly, however, they had no trouble describing women as ―masculine.‖ More specifically, men‘s descriptions of ―masculine‖ women often began with the preface that while ―masculinity‖ brought to mind notions of ―virility‖ and ―strength‖ it was easier to use this word to depict contemporary women.

Masculinity… has meanings like ‗erotic‘ and ‗sexual‘ and also ‗virility‘ but it can also be about the role of man in society… But really, it‘s much easier to think about the contrary… you know, when you see a girl and you say, ‗hey she‘s is kind of ‗masculine‘… then it‘s easier to take in the ‗masculine‘ aspects (Roberto, age 35)

Linked to descriptions of ―masculine‖ women, one of the predominant complaints that men voiced about women was that the opposite gender was increasingly ―bitter‖ and

―aggressive.‖ This descriptor applied to both the private sphere and the public sphere, and was perceived as hindering an easy relationship between the sexes. In the private sphere, in particular, men linked the ―aggressiveness‖ of women to demographic dynamics such as marriage and childbearing. For example, one evening as we were returning from ping-pong playing and I was discussing with Matteo (age 44) the merits of tango dancing, he explained to me:

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Tango dancing is kind of like a metaphor for the relationships between the sexes… to be a man, you have to give a strong support to the woman, you have to lead her… and you have to lead in a convincing way, give a strong signal, not weak (leggero)… If you don‘t she doesn‘t understand, and she stays where she is… So men are kind of like this for women… a strong reference for the family, who supports… Although now these things are changing… so this idea is sort of wrong. Nowadays, it‘s the woman who wants to lead… and when you dance tango, this doesn‘t work. Like in the family, no? If two people are together, and both want to lead, it just doesn‘t work. I think this is also why some women just decide to stay single… either because they don‘t accept an interlocutor (interlocutore) or they want to find a man they can overpower (stovrastare)… it‘s not surprising that it takes a while for a couple to find stability and settle down… to find the right dynamic….

While the term ―aggressiveness" came up in a number of conversations concerning women in the private sphere, it was predominately used in discussions about the public sphere. In other words, men generally felt threatened by the increased participation of women in the work force, which in turn led them to either describe women as aggressive or as having accentuated ―masculine‖ characteristics (at the cost of losing their femininity). One man suggested that women, in their pursuit of a career and finding a job, have forgotten their maternal, feminine side: ―which is a great loss to everyone; sort of like having a Ferrari, but driving a Fiat.‖ Comments concerning the increased assertiveness of women, the ensuing confusion over gender roles, and concern about the loss of power included:

Men have become more fragile because women… over the last 40 years or so… have become much more present in the workplace. But it‘s not just that. They are also more determined, more aggressive, than men… and this creates a kind of comparison man vs. woman…

Women want to do everything these days… they know they can and they tend to throw it in your face (sbandierarlo). Why do you think men end up going to prostitutes? Because they [prostitutes] have respect for us… They are like Italian women used to be… They don‘t intimidate men… It‘s simple, in Italy today, men have become women, and women have become men!

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There is nothing worse than an aggressive show-off female at the workplace… The one who says: I‘m better than you! Men, who are used to being the ones in charge, now they are lost and confused (spaesato)… I think this is why marriages break up…. I mean I‘m not against women working, but they shouldn‘t say ‗I‘m better than you… I‘m more able than you are‘… everything in moderation, you know?

Women were very well aware that men think of them as increasingly aggressive, one woman‘s scoffing reply reflects the opinion of most women I interviewed:

Yes it‘s true I suppose that women are more aggressive, but I don‘t think of this as a lack of femininity. If for men, being ‗feminine‘ means being ‗little dolls‘ (bamboline)… I don‘t know!

4.4.1 Persistent Inequality

Men‘s dramatic reactions to the entrance of women in the labor force in ever greater numbers is to some extent surprising, in that the female labor force participation in Italy still remains relatively low compared to other European countries. More specifically, for all the talk about the ―fragile‖ male, weakened masculinity, and the ―aggressiveness‖ of women, there remains a distinct lack of equality between the sexes in Italy. If to some extent the Second Demographic Transition has contributed to increasing equality and has challenged hyper-normative forms of masculinity, Italy continues to remain one of the most patriarchal countries in Europe. In other words, men‘s determination to maintain a firm hold on powerful positions is closely linked with their ―fragility‖; when universal forms of masculinity are threatened, men react by holding on more tightly to roles of power and a status quo which sees women come second place to men.

In a recent newspaper article (March 2008), ―Chauvinism in Europe, from the office to the Parliament. Many women work, few make decisions,‖82 journalist Alberto

82 The title of this article in Italian is: Maschilismo in salsa europea tra ufficio e parlamento tante lavorano, poche decidono, published in La Repubblica (3/8/08).

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D‘Argenio points out that in the realm of politics men indubitably dominate. ―In 1995, women who had seats in parliaments across the world made up only 10% of the total, today this percentage has risen to 17% in the world, and 24% in Europe. Italy is behind with respect to the rest of the continent, with a feminine presence in parliament which makes up only 15% of the total, while in Sweden and Finland women have the greatest voice in politics (48%).‖ According to the European Commission website (data collected in 2007), in Italy the Lower House (Camera dei Deputati) is made up of 17% women, while the Upper House sees only 13% women senators. There are no women senior ministers, while only 9% are junior ministers. Similarly, in the highest decision-making body in the Central Banks of Italy, there are no women in Italy.

In the private labor market things are little better. While in Europe as a whole almost half of the European workforce is female (44%), in Italy this percentage is 36%

(only Malta and Turkey have lower percentages). In addition, in Italy, only three female workers out of every 10 are employed in decisional roles. This gap increases in large companies, where men hold 90% of positions of power. Italy finds itself in penultimate position in this sense (3%), compared to other Europeans countries (EU 9%) and the

USA (14%). Some have argued that women have difficulty building a career because they are cut out from more informal communication channels at the top of the power hierarchy. For women workers it may be quite difficult to find a protective guiding figure

(a mentor) or even simply a female model to aspire to. Company culture, in addition, expects constant ambition and dedication, and women are often defined as too passive or limited due to family responsibilities. Oppositely, they are described as too aggressive

167 when they become ambitious - one of the many forms gender discrimination in the work place may take.83

While there has been a dramatic increase in female participation in paid labor,84 this has occurred in part thanks to a growth in professions considered to be ―typically feminine‖: teachers, secretaries, nurses, sales, waitresses, cleaners (Ruspini 2007:297).

This trend has protected women from male competition; it has also concentrated females in certain sectors, preventing them from accessing others (Reyneri, 2002). On the other hand, men are kept from many professions that have to do with caring and ministering to the needs of others. Throughout the industrialized world, female-dominated occupations tend to have lower wages, fewer possibilities for occupational advancement, and less on- the-job training and occupations dominated by males (Rubery 1988; Haavio-Mannila

1989; Charles 1992; 2003). In recent decades, scholars and policy-makers have devoted increasing attention to the uneven distribution of women and men across occupations (i.e.

―occupational sex segregation‖).85 Underlying the growing interest is a longstanding commitment to improving women‘s economic status, combined with mounting evidence that gender-typical employment has deleterious economic consequences for women (e.g.

Cotter et al., 1997; Jacobs, 2003). Invoking universalistic ideals and citing a ―wastage‖ of

83 I spoke with a number of women who mentioned that when seeking work, they were told in the interview they couldn‘t have children within the next few years if they were interested in working in that particular place. This is illegal, but happens regularly.

84 Machado (2007) reports that female labor force participation in Italy increased from 21% in 1950 to 25.7% in 1980, 30.7% in 1990, and 33.4% in 2000.

85 There is an extensive literature on occupational sex segregation, a review of which is beyond the scope of this chapter. It should be noted, however, that several scholars have pointed to rather puzzling evidence that suggests that levels of sex-segregation are actually lower in reputable ―gender-traditional‖ countries (such as Italy, Japan, Portugal, etc.). Charles (2003) has suggested the need to look more carefully at the hybrid nature of sex segregation (vertical segregation or status differentials within sectors, and horizontal segregation, or the manual-non-manual divide), as well as broader cultural and structural factors.

168 female human capital resources, feminist interest groups, national governments, and international organizations of all sorts have developed countless programs and initiatives aimed at integrating women into traditionally male domains (see, e.g., Ramirez, 1987;

Berkovitch, 1999).

In the Veneto region, statistics on job placement after graduation reflect a number of gender differences (fig. 6), hinting at broader levels of sex-segregation in the labor market.

Figure 6. Percent distribution of university graduates 1 year after graduation working in Veneto 2006, by position and gender

Management 4 Men Medium/highly 3 27 qualified employee 28 26 Teacher Women 35 Other employee 7 position 20 19 15 Self-employed 3 12 Atypical employment

Source: Veneto Region Statistical Report 2007

As the graph shows, many more women than men (20% as opposed to 3%) enter the profession of teaching, while many more men, than women enter self-employed positions

(19% and 7% respectively) or employment that requires medium to high qualifications

(35% and 26% respectively). Veneto women have also been shown to hold relatively few executive posts. In 2006, only 25% of such positions were held by women (data from

Infocamere and reported in the Veneto Region Statistical Report, 2007).

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Schizzerotto (2007) points out that beginning with the cohorts born in the 1940s, differences in levels of education between men and women began to slowly decrease.

The gap in education levels then diminished quickly up to the current generation of youth

(those born in the 1970s on). It is now women, in fact, who tend to study for longer periods of time than men. The recent inversion in education has not, however, meant a disappearance in the disparities between men and women in terms of materials studied.

Few women attend technical and scientific high schools86 while linguistic, socio-psycho- pedagogical schools see a much higher presence of females than males. This division between the sexes continues at the university level with more men in the departments of engineering and the sciences, and more women in the humanities and social sciences. The differentiation in scholastic choices has practical consequences in that the paths chosen by women often lead to less well paid and less prestigious positions than those disciplinary areas selected by men (Bison, Pisati, and Schizzerotto, 1996; Schizzerotto

2002; Schizzerotto and Lucchini, 2004).

4.4.2 Female Labor Force and Male Psychology

If such inequality between the sexes persists, one might logically ask, why then do men appear to be so ―fragile?‖ Why do they lament the increasing ―masculinity‖ and

86 Once a student finishes middle school (at age 14), he/she has various options available to them when it comes to choosing a secondary school, which in Italy are differentiated by subject and career orientation. The main division is between Liceo (high school), Istituto tecnico (polytechnic school) and the Istituto professionale (professional or tertiary school). Those who choose to go to high school (and a number who attend polytechnical school) usually envision going on to university. Those who go to a professional institute usually imagine a future without a university education. There are four different types of high schools: Classical (Humanities); Scientific (science and math); Linguistic (Languages); Artistic (the Arts). The polytechnical schools are more oriented toward practical subjects, such as aeronautics, business administration, computer science and chemistry, while professional schools offer a form of secondary education which enables the students to start searching for a job as soon as they have completed their studies (sometimes sooner, as some schools offer a diploma after 3 years instead of 5) and are even more specific in terms of vocational course offerings than the polytechnical institutes.

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―aggressiveness‖ of women? If female participation in the labor force – while on the rise

– remains limited and women occupy less prestigious positions, why are men so worried?

I argue that while true that the increasing number of women employed in more typically

―male‖ domains has rendered men more fragile, there is an important psycho-social component which must be explored in order to get at the deeper meanings of contemporary visible masculinity.

Let us reconsider for a moment, the psycho-social theory proposed by Margaret

Mead (1949), Nancy Chodorow (1978) Mary O-Brien (1981) and David Gilmore (1990)

(among others) mentioned earlier in this chapter. Mead (1949:191) saw women‘s maternal identity and their nurturing ties to their children as so deeply rooted in biological conditions that ―only fairly complicated social arrangements can break it down entirely.‖ Men, on the other hand, had to overcome a weak link to children and family by creating exclusive male activities and devaluing female activities. Although some later theorists reject Mead‘s claims for the universality of such patterns, many support Mead‘s central insight that men exclude women from public pursuits because they feel excluded from the birth process. Reversing the typical Freudian idea that women envy men

(―castration complex‖ and ―penis envy‖), Mead and others focus on men‘s ―womb envy‖ stemming from their peripheral role in the magical processes of human reproduction.

Masculinity is thus seen as a compensatory reaction to men‘s insecurity (Mead 1949; cfr.

Coltrane 1996)87.

87 Chodorow, Mead and others propose that men must form a rigid sense of self and that masculine identity is fundamentally oppositional and insecure. Boys raised in father-absent cultures are expected to fear women and continually reaffirm their superiority by restricting women‘s access to power. Other neo- Freudians have looked at all-male rituals in pre-modern societies, suggesting that circumcision, initiation

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Michelle Rosaldo (1974), Sherry Ortner (1974), Nancy Chodorow (1976, 1978),

Dorothy Dinnerstien (1976), Mary O‘Brien (1981), Miriam Johnson (1988), Gardiner

(2002, 2005) and other scholars have written about men‘s feeling of exclusion as related to the psychodynamics of childrearing. Most of these discussions are dependent on

Freudian theoretical models, wherein men are responding to a deeply submerged ambivalence toward their own mothers. Since infants are completely dependent on mothers, both boy and girl infants experience the mother as omnipotent, and eventually come to symbolically internalize the mother in the normal process of development. As girls develop their own sense of self, they can stay attached to the mother and those parts of themselves that are mother-like. Boys, in contrast, must reject both mother and the feminine self within, if they are to establish a masculine identity (cfr. Coltrane 1996).

Some psychoanalytic theorists, like John and Beatrice Whiting (1975a, 1975b), postulate a positional identification. They conceptualize the boys‘ identification with the father as reflecting a desire to possess power as exercised by men in the society (see also Slater

1961). Phallocentric theories tend to focus on the father and inequities in the institution of marriage (e.g. Miriam Johnson 1988), whereas gynocentric accounts tend to focus on the mother and the importance of childrearing during the preoedipal period (e.g. Chodorow

1976; Dinnerstein 1976; Balbus 2002).

More specifically, theorists like Chodorow (1976) and Dinnerstein (1976) see boys‘ identification with the father and repudiation of the mother in personal intrapsychic terms. Unlike radical feminist theories which posit a dominating masculinity as the origin of gender inequality, Chodorow‘s 1978 psychoanalytic theory explains masculinity as a rites, bloodletting, and the couvade symbolically resolve men‘s gender-identity problems that stem from father-absent childrearing (Monroe, Monroe, and Whiting 1981; Coltrane 1996; Gilmore 1997).

172 defensive and compensatory formation in individual men‘s development (cfr. Gardiner

2005). Identifying with their individual mothers, women become mothers in turn, but men become masculine by identifying with male roles in society. ―Masculine identification‖ she says ―is predominantly a gender role identification. By contrast, feminine identification is predominantly parental‖ based on a girl becoming like her mother, whereas being a father has been a minor part of most modern men‘s identity

(Chodorow 1978:176). Thus gender is defined by men‘s difference from women in these theories but asymmetrically rather than in a relation of either simple opposition or negation. According to Chodorow, this leaves contemporary men confused about how to be masculine. She asserts that it is ―crucial for everyone… to have a stable sexual identity. But until masculine identity does not depend on men‘s proving themselves, their doing will be a reaction to insecurity rather than a creative exercise of their humanity

(idem: 44).88

To relate this back to the current situation in Padua, the increasing participation of women in the labor force and public sphere has had dramatic consequences for both men and women. Men have difficulty adapting to more equable social roles in that they are structurally (or better psychologically) weaker. From the time they are born, women are immediately in contact with their same sex – the mother. They consequently may maintain that identification as they grow into their social and gender roles. Men, on the other hand, must, at a certain point, reject the mother in order to identify with the father,

88 Furthermore, Chodorow (1978) describes masculinity as so limiting for men‘s lives, rather than so enjoyably privileged, that men should also have incentives for change. If fathers take equal responsibility with mothers for early child care, she argues, gender inequality would disappear, women would be relieved of the unfair burdens of care giving, and men would gain a satisfying intimacy with their children, women and each other.

173 causing a perennial search for a lost sense of security that only the female figure can give him.

The consequence of women challenging men (or in men‘s words, become increasingly ―aggressive‖) is that men, already structurally the weaker sex, ―lose‖ in the sense that they cannot confirm their virility, or their masculinity.

To me masculinity is when a person demonstrates that they are truly… virile. I mean that‘s when someone shows that he is a man… like when you court a woman… he is the hunter… but with women these days, it‘s hard, because sometimes they are more aggressive than you! How am I supposed to hunt a prey that might attack me? (Lorenzo, age 37)

Women on the other hand, end up frustrated, lamenting the lack of ―real men‖ (see section on women‘s view of men). While the case might be made that women identify ever-less strongly with their mothers, refusing their ―social role‖ as caregivers, labor market and education statistics show that women have instead ―ghettoized‖ themselves in professions requiring the care of others: social workers, psychologists, nurses, teachers, etc.89 Furthermore, given that women now fulfill many ―caring roles in the public sphere of paid labor, male children increasingly grow up (especially those who have more absent fathers) having most of their daily encounters with women, and hence lacking relevant male reference figures. This adds to the difficulty of constructing and perhaps defending one‘s masculinity.

4.5 The Power of the Mother Figure

89 Economists Dolado, Felgueroso, and Jimeno (2002), show higher gender occupational segregation in the European Union than the United States mainly due to a lower share of women in managerial and professional jobs. They also observe a strong positive correlation between occupational segregation and the share of part-time jobs. Women were disproportionately concentrated in jobs like salespersons, domestic helpers, personal care, secretaries and, at a higher skill level, primary and secondary school teachers (idem:13). Barbara Petrongolo (2004) similarly finds gender segregation in employment contracts across the E.U, above all in southern Europe, where women are especially overrepresented in part-time jobs and in fixed-term contracts.

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Of no less importance, especially in the Italian context, is that of the mother figure, and more specifically, mother-son relations (Giovannini 1981; Schneider 1971). As several informants put it:

You have to understand that there is a form of matriarchy in Italy… It‘s like… how do I say it…an ancestral type of thing in which… the mother is the real director of the family… she is the one that really commands. The father? Well he just intervenes sometimes… especially nowadays, where men tend to shy away from taking on any responsibility… sometimes it happens to me… I notice it. (Matteo, age 44)

The mamma has always been important in Italy… in fact, I would say ‗legendary‘… It‘s the mother who commands… at the end of the day, she runs the show. There is this strong form of matriarchy; it‘s not true that Italy is a patriarchy. Patriarchy is a tribal thing that exists in Africa where there are… how can I say… it‘s a tribal thing! In Italy, it‘s something else… a cult of the Madonna, do you understand? (Luca, age 38)

Ginsborg (2003:78) reports that the ―Mediterranean Mother-God‖ was distinguished by psychoanalysts as early as 1960, when Ernst Bernard (1969:171) made a number of telling observations on the importance of the complex of the Grande Madre for mother- son relations in contemporary Italy:

The Mediterranean ‗Grande Madre‘ is in Italy a primitive mother. For the most part she spoils her sons with the maximum on instinctiveness, and as a result her sons are exigent. But the more she spoils them, the more she makes them more dependent upon her; and the more natural come to appear her own demands upon her sons, the more they come to feel tied to her. At this point the good mother, protective and nourishing, is transformed into her own negation.

More generally, the literature paints a picture of Italian motherhood couched in terms of sacrifice, purity, and possessiveness, with a key element being the mother-son relationship.90

90Ginsborg (along with many other scholars) also likens the Virgin Mary to a symbol of motherhood in Italy, defining the latter as ―pain and sacrifice borne with wisdom, humility, and forgiveness.‖ The Virgin Mary in this capacity serves as role model not only as an example of purity, but also as a mediating figure (in Catholicism), interceding between God the Father and God the Son (2003:78; for related work on role

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Anne Parsons (1964) suggested that southern Italian families were built upon two contrasting axes: mother-son and father-daughter. With regard to the former, sons tended to create a feminine rather than a masculine ―super-ego,‖ couched in Madonna-like terms, as well as lasting oral dependence and a ―continual expectation of maternal solace and giving, rather than a gradual or sudden emancipation from it‖ (ibid: 46-7). The resulting centripetal tendencies made for an ―unbroken continuity of the primary family‖ (ibid: 42 and 52). ―In other words, left to themselves, mothers and sons would never look elsewhere in emotional terms, and indeed often did not‖ (cfr. Ginsborg 2003:78).91 The intense mother-son bond, in the face of father absence, intensifies erotic ties to the mother and inhibits libidinal attachments to other women. ―This liability is later resolved through a splitting of the feminine love object into contrasting poles: the desexualized Madonna and the seductive temptress with whom one may have sex‖ (Gilmore 1986; see also

Giovannini 1981; cfr. Gutmann 1997b:38).

―Father-daughter relations, on the other hand, caused the release of a ‗spring mechanism,‘ which broke asunder the original family unit‖ (Parsons 1964; cfr. Ginsborg

2003:78). For Parsons, this mechanism has its origins in the often dramatic quality of father-daughter relations when the daughter reaches the age of courtship. Given that the incest taboo between them is less strong than that between the mother and son, the tension accumulates to such at point that the daughter must exit from the family of origin: of the Virgin Mary see Warner 1976; Accati 1992; Fiume 1995; Goddard 1996). In a rather tongue-in- cheek comment, Ginsborg adds, ―She is also, though it is rather wicked to point it out, a very modern Italian figure, being the mother of a single, male child.‖

91 One informant suggested that that the love mothers tend to engulf their sons in might be read as a sort of ―revenge‖: or a ―compensation‖ (rivalsa) for that which they don‘t have with their husbands. The informant commented: ―I‘ve seen, in women, for example, who have problems with their husband, a love with their sons that reaches pathological dimensions.‖ This observation rings true for a number of situations I came across in Padua.

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―the daughter has to seek an object outside of the family, the father has to rid himself of a woman who he perceives as very desirable but cannot possess‖ (Parsons 1964:51).

Saunders (1981), while not discounting oedipal conflicts, emphasizes the role of pre-oedipal attachments to the mother, especially oral gratifications. In his view, the moral conflict is generated by an "intense, indulgent, smotheringly affectionate but simultaneously aggressive style of mothering" (1981:457). This sort of mothering not only satisfies infantile dependency, but prolongs it by discouraging separation- individuation. Thus later attempts at asserting masculine independence are

"correspondingly frustrated" (1981:457; cfr. Gutmann 1997). In order to separate himself from the engulfing, binding mother, the boy consequently "splits" the image of the nurturing mother from that of the "hostile, devouring, grasping mother. This is the ambivalence reflected in culture" (1981:457, Gilmore 1986)92.

More broadly, Saunders suggests that such smothering creates a sense of anxiety in the mother-son relationship, which can produce a "sense of frustration and hostility in the child" (Saunders 1981:458). This ambivalence of dependency and hostility may be carried throughout life in relations with women. The mother is fundamental because she is the person with whom her son initially identifies. Men in Padua similarly expressed somewhat ambivalent feeling of love and hate.

It‘s not like I have this great relationship with my mother…Kind of like a love- hate relationship, in the sense that we argue about everything but we always speak

92 Gutmann (1997:838) points out that ―Similar arguments have been made for Hispanic culture by Suarco- Orozco and Dundes (1984), among others… [concerning] childhood ambivalence toward the mother in the elaboration of later "cultural" attitudes about women. This ambivalence seems to be conveyed through an affective dualism contrasting the "good" nurturing mother with frustrating others. Thus the early mother- son relationship becomes a precursor in affective terms to later moral ambiguities in object relations and to a characterologically dualistic connectedness to the real world of mature heterosexual attachments. This accords well with the standard Freudian notion that the shape of the boy's libidinal tie to his mother provides a psychic model for later heterosexual attachments‖ (see also Gilmore 1986).

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on the phone. Almost every day. More than anything else, she worries… if I‘m out late, that it is dangerous… But she should stay calm, it is now years that I‘ve been out of the house… but, then again ―one‘s mother is always one‘s mother!‖ (Vero, age 28)

I have a beautiful relationship with my mother –discordant (conflittuale) but beautiful, so there is this need that we have to always talk to one another … you know about daily, normal things. She is a constant (continua e costante) presence in my life. (Michele, age 32)

More broadly, Gilmore (1986) points out that the ―the mother-son bond is deep and abiding and culturally idealized. It is thought of as the exemplary social tie, one of selfless dedication, love, warmth, and closeness. The mother is said often (too often?) to be self-sacrificial out of natural inclinations (naturaleza). She is motivated by purely altruistic concern for her children that precludes even the hint of self-interest.‖ He suggests that this maternal loyalty is glorified as providing ―the only true solace and emotional security.‖ Children, and men in particular, grow up believing that their only trustworthy confidant is their mother. ―This attitude remains true of girls after puberty, while boys later seek ‗trusted‘ friends among their peers who are ‗true as your own mother‘‖ (Gilmore 1986).

Certainly, it is all too easy to translate archetypes into stereotypes, and ―dangerous to use either as the basis for generalizing about contemporary Italian families‖ (Ginsborg

2003:79). On the other hand, official statistics tend to confirm the picture of mother-son dependencies. According to a recent study by the Italian National Institute of Statistics

(Istat) a third of married Italian men still saw their mothers every day, while another 27.5 percent saw them more than once a week (idem). As described in chapter two, a large number of unmarried Italian men under the age of 35 still live with their parents (as do one in four who are divorced). Laurenzi (1997), commenting on these statistic, noted:

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―Therein lies the confirmation that Italian men –whether single, regularly married, cohabiting, separated or divorced –demonstrate an evident reluctance, whether from choice or necessity, to distance themselves from the maternal embrace and from that formidable supplier of services constituted by a matriarchal home in which everything functions‖ (Gumbel 1997; cfr. Ginsborg 2003).

Most men I spoke to in Padua saw and/or spoke to their mothers frequently. The majority of men (of all ages) spoke to their mother on the phone about once every other day. This was seen as quite normal, in fact those who ―only‖ spoke to their mother every two or three days, often said ―I don‘t speak with her that often.‖ For example:

A: How often do you speak to your mother on the phone? I: Two or even three days pass…. It‘s not like we talk that often. If there is something in particular maybe we talk every day, otherwise every other day… in the evening… you know, just a brief hello, how is it going…

Many mentioned the ―special bond‖ that exists between mothers and sons (as opposed to their relationships with their fathers, often described as more stressful). Indeed, a number of men commented on the lack of a father-figure which they felt they could identify with

(a topic I return to in Chapter 7 on paternity).

The mother is an entirely different issue (as opposed to the father). In my opinion, the word ‗love‘ exists only between mother and son. They really have a special universe… (Andrea, age 36)

One expression that came up frequently, in fact, was ―your mother is always your mother‖ (la mamma é sempre la mamma),93 which men described in a slightly embarrassed, yet proud manner as the strong ties that exist between mothers and their children, sons particularly.

93 A variant of this is ―even cockroaches are beautiful to their mothers‖ (anche gli scarafagi sono belli per la loro mamma).

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A: What do you mean by that, la mamma é sempre la mamma? I: I think it‘s a phrase that means more for men than it does for women. For a man, his mother remains the first woman of his life. And anyways, it‘s one of the most important relationships in one‘s life.

What we may gain from psycho-social theory as it pertains to Paduan men is that the very strong bonds men form with their mothers (or that their mothers form with them!) lead to difficulties in asserting themselves as a gender. In other words, if men must extricate themselves from the tightly woven fabric of the mother-son bond, in order to identify with a father figure (and repudiate the mother), and if this ―father‖ or ―male‖ figure is increasingly nebulous, then men will have difficulty recognizing and proving their masculinity. In fact, ―proving‖ one‘s masculinity is becoming an increasingly obsolete task; as the ―rites of passage‖ which allow men to do so are increasingly few and far between. This returns us to Chodorow‘s (1979:44) theory, mentioned above, that

―until masculine identity does not depend on men‘s proving themselves, their doing will be a reaction to insecurity rather than a creative exercise of their humanity.‖ If there has been a ―slow thawing of rigid and unambiguous identities,‖ and a hesitant emergence of men as gender, masculinities which are more ―self-reflective‖ are indubitably still a work in progress (Giddens 1992; Saraceno 2007). Take for example, the following conversations, the first with Antonio, age 48, who explains to me why he has never had children and then with Davide, age 44:

I think on a subconscious level, it‘s not by chance that I‘ve been drawn to women with whom this was not a possibility (having children)… this happened for a reason, I suppose. I think part of me for a long time didn‘t want to give up being a ‗son‘…and perhaps I was even looking for a ‗father figure‘… This took up a lot of time and energy, and I don‘t think I came to terms with this until I was older… and I had had time to look within myself, and think about how I wanted to be a man… by the time I had figured this out, it was too late to have children.

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You have to understand that the mother figure in Italy is fundamental. I mean it is no wonder that there are all of these ‗mamma‘s boys‘ (bamboccioni)… I mean nowadays not only are the ties with your mother strong, but you live with her for even longer… maybe that explains why there are no ‗real men‘ around anymore.

Finally, while Italian mothers maintain a myth-like reputation in Padua, they have been blamed for the still rampant gender inequality that exists between men and women.

Although less true today, given mothers‘ increasing level of participation in paid labor

(and hence diminished time spent at home), mothers have typically differentiated between their expectations of domestic ―contribution‖ on the part of their sons and that of their daughters. More specifically, sons are often ―shooed‖ out of the kitchen should they attempt even something as simple as making a coffee, or clearing the dishes from the table. Girls are instead expected to help around the house. This often leads men to directly transfer similar expectations to their prospective girlfriends and wives. Women as young as their mid-20s and early 30s described growing up in households where they were expected to help in domestic activities (i.e. cooking, cleaning, etc.) while their brothers were not – and in fact were not allowed to participate. This gender dynamic continues among young ―adults‖ continue to live at home. A recent study by Menniti et al

(2000) which combined a quantitative telephone survey with focus group discussions with young people age 20-34 still living at home in Rome, Brindisi, Naples, and Treviso found, for example, that daughters help more around than house than sons -only 7% do not help at all as against 23% of males (see also figure 7).

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Figure 7. Respondents who did not contribute to family organization according to several characteristics, 1998 (%)

Source: Menniti et al. 2000

Despite such disparities, there are signs that the some men (especially higher educated men in their mid-20s and early 30s) are increasingly distinguishing themselves from older gender systems, leading not only to the emergence of more gender-equal households but also new forms of masculinity (I return to a discussion of the division of domestic labor and its implications in Chapter 8).

4.6 Rethinking Masculinities

In this chapter, I have endeavored to dig deep into the heart of contemporary ―fragile‖ masculinity in Padua. In doing so, I have suggested that not only do two predominant anthropological paradigms, typically used to examine constructions of masculinity, contradict one another, but neither is entirely sufficient to describe male identity in Padua today. A performative theory which sees masculinity as an artificial state, something that a man must constantly prove and defend (a man must be a man) contrasts oddly with a

182 universalistic theory which would see men as hegemonic concept, and more broadly a hyper-normative state of being not subject to critique.

More specifically, performative theories of masculinity might be questioned in a context such as Padua, where ―rites of passage‖ such as completing military service and the previously unquestioned sequence of events – school, military service, job, wife, kids

– have increasingly wavered with new forms of family building and the elongated transition to adulthood. Hegemonic and universalistic views of masculinity are similarly problematic in a context where men have slowly begun to emerge as a gender and to construct (however tenuous) new forms of male identity, breaking ties with older models of masculinity. The challenges posed to masculinity – by increased female participation in the labor force and male reflexivity - have had, however, a number of consequences.

Men and women speak about a ―crisis of masculinity‖ characterized, among other things, by confusion over roles, a perturbing increase in the similarities between the sexes, and the disappearance of ―real men.‖

Psycho-social theory may provide the tools with which to understand men‘s perceptions of increasingly ―aggressive‖ and ―masculine‖ women, as the latter emerge in ever greater numbers in the work place. Indeed if men must weaken the extremely strong bonds with their mothers in order to identity with the ―father‖ and demonstrate and confirm their ―virility‖ to other women (and hence, prove and defend their masculinity), they are stymied by women‘s refusals to provide that ―sense of security‖ so lovingly (or smotheringly?) provided by their mothers. Psycho-social theory also provides us with an understanding of the difficulties men face in their efforts to emerge as a gender. Not only are dissolving the bonds with one‘s mother difficult in a context such as Italy, but the

183 father figure with which one must theoretically identify is increasingly being refused by men (see also chp. 7). Concrete alternative role models – such as affectionate fathers and self-reflective affective men who equally share the burdens of childrearing and domestic work with their partners – are not easy to identify, above all because they require a redefinition of men‘s roles. In other words, if men do not want to imitate their fathers, neither do they simply want to emulate women, forcing them to redefine male identity in original terms: a heady venture.

Women similarly lament that they do not want men to be ―extensions‖ of themselves and blame men for not taking on the ―responsibilities‖ of real ―manhood‖ - both at the familial and civic levels. Discourse concerning ―responsibility‖ reveals the interesting relationship between demographic change and gender dynamics. The higher order needs associated with the Second Demographic Transition - individualism, the drive for self-realization, and non-conformist value orientations – often conflict with the notion that Paduan men should take on the responsibility of a family and children.

Indeed, it may be argued that the ideational and cultural shift which characterizes the

SDT has created malaise and fragility among men, as they struggle between the choice to form new meanings of male identity, embrace more egalitarian models of the family, and a ―culture of responsibility‖ when it comes to building a family. Low fertility is in part an outcome of this struggle. As Krause (2005: 184) puts it, ―It is about men figuring out how to be men beyond the rigid patriarchal family, and women puzzling over how to be women in this transforming gender regime that strives toward equality.‖ Of no small consequence to such endeavors are the ways men navigate sexuality and the body, a topic

I turn to in the next chapter.

CHAPTER 5. ITALIANS DO IT BETTER? THE MALE BODY AND HETEREOSEXUALITY

As Pietro (age 28) and I were standing at the bus stop one day, passing the time by idly chatting about his band‘s performance the evening before, Pietro suddenly changed the subject, pointing to an advertisement depicting a male model‘s perfectly muscled body, sculpted to perfection and posed as if natural. ―Is that what a real man is supposed to look like?‖ he asked, half aiming the question at me, half at the brisk autumn air. His question struck me as common enough, although not always consciously put forth by men.

Certainly a walk around the city center reveals any number of images of male flesh on screens, pages, and billboards. While there exists a considerable body of literature on the ways the media has objectified women and the negative consequences of such images, less attention has been paid to the ways these affect men. Yet over the past several decades the gender gap in media objectification has closed. Every bit as unattainable as

Barbie-doll proportions are the broad-shouldered, narrow-waisted, fat-free, and muscle- sheathed male physiques littering the media, and scholars have developed an interest in what these stimuli do to male body image and to male sexuality. For example, one study, focusing on U.S. males, found that watching prime-time television and music videos not only appears to make men uncomfortable with themselves, but that such discomfort leads to sexual problems and risky behaviors (Schooler and Ward 2006). The authors suggest that men who feel uncomfortable or ashamed of their bodies detach emotionally and

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185 mentally from sexual situations—they aren‘t attentive to their partner‘s needs or open with their own, and are more likely to be careless in terms of protection.

In this chapter, I explore how heterosexual men in Padua define and negotiate their bodies and sexual roles in light of the collapse of (relatively) stable models of masculinity. A new regime of ―gender visibility‖ passes inevitably through the logics of the popular media and larger socio-economic and political process, but also through men‘s reactions to the former, their sexual experiences with women, and individual perceptions and understandings of the body. Redefinitions of sexuality and the body may in turn influence demographic outcomes, such as fertility.

Just as men have gradually become visible as a gender, so too has the male body.

Robert Nye (2005) suggests the male body has become both a ―personal habitus94 that can no longer be concealed‖ and ―an object of the erotic gaze of women (and men).‖

Similarly, scholars have pointed out that men‘s bodies have been made into objects of consumption, and used to spread other material goods (Featherstone 1982; Mishkind et al. 1987; Bordo 1993). MacMullan (2002:2), in his introduction to Tuana et al.‘s

Revealing Male Bodies, points out that men have a ―new body‖ which is no longer the

―male body qua universal‖ but ―the male body qua male.‖ The collapse of the privileged monopoly of the objective gaze has meant that ―the image of the (ideal) male physique has become a product of ideology and fantasy; just as the images of ‗perfect womanhood‘ have long been shown to be‖ (Still 2003:6; Nye 2005). In a similar vein, Boni (2004:9)

94 The notion of habitus as proposed by Bourdieu (1977) signifies the socially constructed system of cognitive structures on the basis of which individuals, relative to their status, categorize their daily life experiences. The ways that individuals act on their bodies and treat their physicality reveals some of the most profound dispositions of the habitus. Bourdieu considers the body to be a bearer of physical capital which, like all of the other kinds of capital available (cultural, economic, social, linguistic, etc) can be converted into another, according to the possibilities available to each individual and the strategies adopted.

186 suggests that Italian men‘s bodies are ―at risk,‖ in that their identities are constantly being redefined and renegotiated given the disintegration of ―those certainties which gave legitimacy to (relatively) stable models of masculinity and sexual roles.‖

Douglas has suggested that culture‘s views of the human body are intimately connected to its concerns and fears of the world at large (Douglas 1970). The body is, in

Douglas‘s words, ―good to think with.‖ In this chapter, I am interested in studying the

―direct grip‖ that culture has on Paduan men‘s bodies, through ―the practices and bodily habits of everyday life‖ (2007: 4, see also Bordo 1993: 16) How is culture inscribed on male bodies through beliefs and practices associated with their sexuality? How have the mass media and those who ―know‖ (i.e. the Minister of Health, doctors, and public figures) shaped Paduan men‘s beliefs about the body and sexuality?

In examining these questions, I take the view that sexuality is socially constructed and specific to any culture at any particular time. As Kimmel (2005:141) suggests, ―That we are sexual is determined by a biological imperative toward reproduction, but how we are sexual – where, when, how often, with whom, and why has to do with cultural learning… sexuality varies from culture to culture; it changes in any one culture over time; it changes over the course of each of our lives.‖ It is in part through perceptions of the body and understandings of masculinity that Paduan men construct their sexualities, as well as confirm their gender identity. Gender thus informs sexuality and the body; sexuality and the body confirm gender. These three elements are in constant tension as men redefine and renegotiate male identity. Certainly, the gendered body is not always the sexual body, but I argue here that the connections between the gendered body and the sexual body require further exploration – we cannot reduce one to the other, but need to

187 explore the relationship between them (Butler 1990, 1993; Jackson and Scott 2001; see also Garfinkel 1967; Goffman 1969; Kessler and Mckenna 1978).

An investigation of men‘s perceptions of the body and their sexual experiences allows for a closer examination of male heterosexuality, which ―despite and perhaps because of its hidden dominance in models of sexuality, has nonetheless too long gone over determined and understudied‖ (Gutmann 2007: 30). I now turn to the specific case of Paduan men‘s negotiations between embodiment95 and discourse surrounding heterosexuality. I begin with a discussion of men‘s bodies in the public eye, and how consumption molds Paduan men‘s perceptions of the latter and their sexual experiences.

Ethnographic data also reveal informants‘ growing ―awareness‖ of ever similar and

―evolving sex characteristics‖ of men and women. Men react to a blurring of male and female sexual roles (framed both biologically and culturally by ―experts‖ and the mass media) in different ways. While some informants suggest that men (and Italians in general) are simply having ever less sex, others insist on their promiscuity and boast of their sexual adventures. More generally, I argue that men of different ages and classes

―see‖ women and experience sexuality differently, especially as this is molded by a shift in Italian consumption. Despite changing (and improved) views of women, however, the construction of Paduan male heterosexuality remains embedded in persistent gender inequality.

5.1 Gazing on the Male Body

95 By ―embodiment‖ I intend, along with Wearing (1996:80), ―the values, perceptions and gestures that are inscribed in and through the body and how we live these experiences through our bodies as men and women. Thus the body is engendered – inscribed with gender specific meanings that reflect the social, cultural, economic and political milieu of its experience.‖

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Over the last two decades the body has been the subject of a vast corpus of literature in both social sciences and humanities, occupying what some have defined ―the forefront of a paradigmatic shift‖ (Noy: 2007: 49). Inspired by the works of Douglas (1966) and

Foucault and Gordon (1980), feminist thought has illustrated the myriad ways by which women‘s bodies have been suppressed and policed by institutional chauvinist ideologies and patriarchal discourses (Martin 1987; Butler 1993; Grosz 1994). Feminist and feminist-inspired work has determinedly broken away from the Cartesian view of the body as distinct from the mind and therefore ―tied to a fixed essence or reduced to naturalistic explanations‖ (Johnston 2001: 183) and has instead promoted viewing the body ―as the primary object of social production and inscription‖ (idem).96

While emancipator notions of this type are certainly applicable to the study of men, it is interesting to note that feminist insights and observations have commonly been reserved to the research of women and their bodies, and are more rarely seen in studies of heterosexual men, their bodies, and sexuality.97 Relatedly, body images within broader

96 Feminists have critiqued a Cartesian mind/body dualism which divides human experience into a bodily realm and a consciousness realm, arguing that the female body is used exclusively as the metaphor for the corporeal pole of the dualism: the female body often represents nature (Mother Nature), emotionality, irrationality, and sensuality, standing in contrast to the masterful, masculine will, the locus of social power, rationality, and self-control (Gowaty, 1997). Within this duality, the female body is often ―other,‖ mysterious and unruly. A myriad of feminist scholars, building on Simone de Beauvoir‘s famous statement ―Women are made, not born‖ have sought to demonstrate how gender is socially, not biologically constructed.

97 Important exceptions to this are the contributions made by Connell (1987, 1995) and Peterson (1998), both of whom highlight the relationship between gendered bodies and gendered power (see also Morgan 1993). Most research using a critical gender lens to study the male body has delved into the relationship between men‘s sense of embodiment, masculinities, and sports (Messner and Sabo 1990; Messner 1992; McKay, Messner and Sabo, 2000). Other topics considered include the relationship between the male body, masculinities, and organizations (Kerfoot 2000); how notions of ―hardness‖ come to inform embodied masculinity (Jefferson 1998); and more broadly, cultural expressions of masculinity (Cornwall and Lindisfarne 1994). Mosse (1997) has conducted a historical analysis of male physicality and the creation of modern masculinities while Silverman (1992) has discussed symbolic castration and male subjectivity. Sabo and Gordon‘s (1995) and Gutmann‘s (2007) work also intimately studies men‘s bodies in health and

189 patriarchal systems have traditionally been perceived as a woman‘s issue. Women‘s concern for appearance has been linked to female sex-role stereotypes, and until recently, physical appearance and body image of men have been ignored. Yet an examination of women‘s bodies which excludes men‘s relationship to their bodies tends to support and reproduce the Cartesian dualism of mind/man, body/women. As Johnston (2001:65) puts it, ―assuming men are above or beyond having a relationship with their bodies assumes men are just minds without bodies.‖

In contrast to academia, the media now endlessly pore over and scrutinize men‘s bodies. As Whitehead (2002: 182) comments:

This is the case whether the male body undergoes very public symbolic castration (as happened to Bill Clinton during the Monica Lewinsky affair), actual castration (as in the case of John Wayne Bobbitt) or suffers economic emasculation and commodification as entertainingly portrayed in the film The Full Monty (see Goddard, 2000). Some might argue that the male body is now subject to objectification and (patterns of) consumption in a similar way to that which has long been experienced by female bodies. Though, to be sure, the ‗beauty myths‘ (Chapkis, 1986) informing female embodiment arise for a quite different set of power equations to those informing male embodiment.

Certainly a myriad of new discourses concerning the male body have emerged in the public domain, ranging from concerns about men‘s health, to their body shapes, and dress

(Whitehead 2002). As a result, increasing numbers of men pursue individual legitimation through their bodies, whether in the form of exercise regimes, cosmetic surgery, or beauty products. A number of scholars have labeled this shift the ―Adonis complex‖ and have connected it with a ―crisis of masculinity.‖ Authors such as Featherstone (1982);

Mishkind et al. (1987) and Pope, Phillips, and Olivardia, (2000) suggest that in an age

illness. While these contributions have made considerable inroads into understanding men‘s embodiedness, much work still needs to be carried out when it comes to heterosexual men.

190 when women have ―invaded‖ all other male domains, ―the pursuit of muscle‖ remains the one avenue left for men to exhibit their true masculine self.

From the work Butler (1990, 1993), we learn that bodies do not exist outside of the cultural conditions of their own materialization.98 We might similarly delve into the regulatory and disciplinary process of embodiment through Foucault‘s (1995) notion of the ―panoptic gaze.‖ Foucault took the physical model of the panopticon – or the 18th century form of prison designed to ensure prisoners could always be observed from any viewpoint – and likened it to the power of the institutional gaze of the fields of medicine and psychiatry on individuals (see also; Cousins and Houssain 1984; Rabinow 1991,

Danaher, Schirato and Webb 2000). Whitehead (2002: 194) suggests that in gender terms, such a gaze is equally applicable to women‘s and men‘s bodies. Furthermore, this gaze is not neutral, but ―invested with powers in so much as it comes with a set of moral, social and cultural codes or assumptions; an economy of looks that places values on the body, and different values on different bodies.‖ While recognizing that for many feminists the authoritative gaze is male (Mulvey 1989; for discussion see Waterhouse

1993; Shildrick and Price 1999), Whitehead reminds us to recognize that male bodies are

98 In her studies of biologically sexed and socially constructed notions of gender, Butler challenges the assumption that genitals define the boundary between the two sexes and two genders. Instead, she suggests each individual body enacts and can be read as a ―gender performance‖ (Butler 1990). Yet gender is not simply ―put on‖ in the morning and discarded at will. Butler (1993) makes it clear that we are constrained into gender, arguing that sexed bodies are forcibly materialized through time. In Bodies that Matter (1993), Butler suggests that sex is materialized through linguistic performatives which are both normative and regulative – and hence coercive and constrained (if never totally effective). Lacking, perhaps, form Butler‘s work is the question of where these norms come from or why they so often produce heterosexual hegemony, male dominance, or any other imbalance of power (Ramazanoglu 1995; Jackson and Scott 2001). The gendered body is not just a straightforward product of the linguistic categories which we impose upon it. Every day practices also organize our gendered experiences of the body, and relatedly, our sexuality (Connell 1987; Bordo 1993; Hopper 2000).

191 not outside of the ―panoptic gender gaze.‖ Indeed, men too are subject to multiple gazes, including that of women (Goddard 2000) and other men.

In Italy, interesting work has recently been done on the portrayal of men‘s bodies in the mass media, and men‘s lifestyle magazines in particular. Indeed, the sheer number of these publications now available has itself caught scholarly attention. According to some, this trend reflects men‘s changing gender relations and bodily self-identities (the so-called ―new man‖). Others have argued just the opposite; that this generation of ―new magazines‖ stabilizes the traditional relationship between hegemonic and subordinated masculinities. Either way, the male body seems to be at the core of a concern (and a gaze) centered on a consumerist use and representation: ―the male body is a desirable and desiring one, concerned with health, fitness and beauty, issues which define an

‗embodied masculine lifestyle‖ (Boni, 2002:466). As Johnston 2001: 65) points out,

―men may focus on different aspects of their bodies and discuss their bodies with a different vocabulary, but their various body parts are now being made into objects of commodification.‖99

Boni (2004) notices that over 40% of the content of the Italian men‘s magazines he analyzes are dedicated to advertisements. In line with the content of the articles, advertisements tell men how they must present themselves, take care of themselves, what they should smell like, and what their physiques should look like (2004: 474). Diane

Barthel (1992: 148–9) has suggested that ―advertising has encouraged a ‗feminization‘ of culture, as it puts all potential consumers in the classic role of the female: manipulable,

99 See also Bourdieu 1977; Csordas 1990; Featherstone et al. 1991; Bordo 1993, 1999; Faludi 1999 – These authors have been credited with plucking the human body out of its previous (ideologically) naturalized state, and suggesting that in modern and late-modern (consumer) societies, the body is the embodiment of dynamic social processes; of ceaseless socio-cultural pressures and manipulations

192 submissive, seeing themselves as objects. The feminization of culture is evident in men‘s advertisements, where many of the promises made to women are now being made to men.‖ Boni (idem) suggests that

Men are now encouraged to use a whole set of beauty and body care products that were traditionally associated with women; for this reason, advertisers must legitimate these products for masculine use, one strategy being that of using stereotypical images of the male body. Cologne and underwear ads, for example, display pictures of muscular male torsos and assertive faces with penetrating eyes staring out at the reader.

While Susan Bordo (1999: 186), in her study of the male body, notes that magazines ads often display a wide set of ―powerful, armored, and emotionally impenetrable‖ male bodies, Boni (2004:134) points out that other models of men are increasingly emerging, and tend to be more closely linked to the ―feminization‖ of publicity culture, as suggested by Barthel (1992) above. He describes (somewhat ironically with a citation from Bordo) a Calvin Klein advertisement, in which the young male model assumes an ambiguous attitude:

The model‘s languid body posture, his averted look are classic signals, both in the ‗natural‘ and the ‗cultural‘ world, of willing subordination. He offers himself non- aggressively to the gaze of another. …Such an attitude of male sexual supplication, although it has classical antecedents, is very new to contemporary mainstream representations… For many men… to be so passively dependent on the gaze of another person… is incompatible with being a real man (Bordo, 1999:171-72).

Perhaps Frank Mort (1988) puts it best, when he writes, in simple terms, ―young men today are encouraged to look at themselves and others as objects of consumer desire.‖

The commercialization of the male body and the ―feminization‖100 of a market geared towards a public of male consumers are also reflected in consumer data. In the

100 One might also argue that we are seeing a consumer homogenizing of the body, independent of sex, rather than a ―feminizing‖ of the male body on the part of the media and through rampant consumerism.

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United States alone men spend over 3 billion dollars a year on beauty products such as perfumes, deodorants and hair products, an estimated 507 million dollars a years in plastic surgery, and more than a billion dollars a year in hair transplants (Dotson 1999). A recent article in the Italian national newspaper, La Repubblica (February 24, 2008), headlined the article ―XY Neobeauty. While testosterone-saving creams and lotions are launched, men discover that wrinkles are a sign of age. Even for them.‖ The author,

Silvia Manzoni, announces that cosmetics for men have now begun to advertise properties of creams and lotions which endeavor to block the degeneration of testosterone. Eric Gooris, the manager of the laboratory which produces such a product, is quoted as stating ―Men have now become aware of having aged skin, and see that their wrinkles, once perhaps seen in a positive light, are no longer well accepted, and may affect their social, sexual, and professional lives.‖ Note the direct link between objectifying the male body and connecting it to men‘s sexuality. This issue came up explicitly in interviews and during the time I spent with men, who worried not only about the signs of aging, but other bodily dimensions such as their weight, body hair, and baldness and whether, as a consequence, whether women would find them attractive.

More broadly, the consumer ―gaze‖ is fundamental to thinking about how men view their bodies, as it is intimately linked to a toppling of ―hegemonic masculinity.‖ Not only has a feminist movement challenged dominant and hyper-normative models of masculinity by rendering them men as a gender ―visible‖ (i.e. questioning patriarchal authority, and critiquing an unbalanced gender system), but so too a consumer world has

―objectified‖ the male body, rendering it not only more similar to women‘s bodies, but again, making it ―visible‖ and hence subject to critique.

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5.1.1 Commodification and Paduan Men‘s Bodies and Sexuality

The influence commodification has had on the perceptions men have of their bodies, and the links of the latter to sexuality emerged in a number of ways during the year I spent in

Padua. To begin with, ―young‖ men (late-teens to mid-twenties) behaved in ways that previously would have been considered as pertaining exclusively to the ―female domain.‖

Most men of this age buy and use products for the face and body, and a number turn to nutritionists and beauty shops for advice about how best to ―control‖ and ―treat‖ their bodies. But not only are they buying and using these products to greater extents, the very use of the latter molds their gendered behavior, perceptions of the body, and relatedly, their sexuality.

By way of example, I share an excerpt from my fieldnotes, written after spending a typical day in my apartment in Padua, with my four male roommates (ages 23, 23, 26, and 30):

I came home today to find one of my roommates Filippo (age 23), hanging up his laundry. As I watched him pull out his designer jeans, embroidered with a colorful pattern, from the washing machine, I teased him about how much he invests in his clothes and his looks. He and his roommate, Giorgio (also age 23) constantly express concerns about their appearance and bodies, often asking me for advice before leaving the house.

They also tend, for lack of a better word, to ―shriek‖ about things, making exclamations of a sort that I –admittedly from an ethnocentric point of view - would not necessarily expect from a young heterosexual man.

To add to a bathroom filled with beauty products, their obsession with clothes, and ―feminine‖ behavior, Filippo and Giorgio share not only a room, but sleep in the

195 same double bed. Although Filippo had originally moved into the apartment with his girlfriend, the couple broke up shortly afterwards, and Giorgio became his new roommate. When I asked Filippo whether they intend to get another bed, Filippo responded astonished, ―But why? I don‘t mind sharing the bed with him… we just each keep to our own side… it‘s not a problem at all.‖ While I found this surprising for two young men, neither Filippo nor Giorgio thought sharing a bed indicating anything odd about their sexuality.

Since breaking up with his girlfriend, Filippo has since found a new woman, with whom he spends a significant amount of time (Giorgio, meanwhile, has dated his girlfriend for several years). Filippo describes his new girlfriend to me enthusiastically, recounting how much he likes her and how much he is attracted to her. To me, however, his manner of talking about her remains effeminate, and reminds me of when my female friends talk to me about men they are interested in, above all because he describes how he dresses to impress her, and more generally, about his efforts to do everything he can such that she finds him attractive and desirable.

Filippo‘s behavior resonates with other observations during fieldwork in Padua, such as those during the week I recently spent in a nearby technical high school (99% of the student body is male –see footnote 20 in chapter 4 for an explanation of the different kinds of schools in Italy). A large portion of the student body acted in ways that I – again, admittedly ethnocentrically – would consider typically ―feminine.‖ Similarly, numerous teachers mentioned that they have observed their male students growing increasingly

―effeminate‖ over the years. When asked what they meant by this word, the teachers define the latter as a noticeable interest in fashion and clothing; one teacher described

196 what he felt was a ―feminine body language.‖101 More broadly, in discussions of such behavior with men and women who are in their mid-30s and older, there emerged a general consensus that what they consider to be feminine behavior, to men in their early twenties and younger is not effeminate at all. In fact, they consider themselves to be completely masculine. Generally, it appears that young men and women are becoming ever more similar, in the way they dress, their interests, they way they express themselves, and relate to one another, or express their sexuality.

Going back to my conversation with Filippo, as he hangs his designer jeans to dry, and I tease him about his obsession with brand name clothes, and he explained to me that he had found them on sale somewhere, and that he had gotten a really good deal (this too seemed to be a ―female‖ conversation). He went on to say, ―I try to find good deals, but in the end I‘m not vain… not like some of the people I know. This past weekend I went to the beach, and one of the guys I was with refused to go in the water because he didn‘t want to ruin his hairdo! I mean I go to the gym and use some perfume but that seems like it is appropriate.‖ Giorgio walked in while in the midst of this conversation and broke in, ―Well I don‘t see why there should be any taboos about using beauty products… I mean in ancient Rome and Athens it was more the men who used ointments and beauty products, and they weren‘t considered any less virile for doing so…. Rather it was exactly those men who went off to fight in wars!‖ Filippo responded to this by saying, ―Well, I guess that‘s true, I know some of my classmates (at university) use foundation in the wintertime… anyways, using creams or other products for one‘s health

101 As one teacher (age 57) put it ―I used to see the boys courting the girls… but now the boys seem to not even notice the girls… it‘s as if they don‘t even care. In the sense that – man, woman- it‘s as if it‘s the same thing, the same sex… and no one cares. The boys are effeminate (effeminati), the girls are masculine (mascoline). I see this in their gestures, the way the move their bodies, they way they dress.

197 or to take care of one‘s body is not an activity that is automatically feminine. I think a man has all the right to be interested in taking care of himself and his image, and if this means using methods different from water and soap, I don‘t see why not…‖ Giorgio responded, ―Yes, well I use creams and I don‘t see anything wrong with that… of course it‘s not like I buy creams for the body and things like that, that women use, but during this season (Spring), I use just a bit of ―aftersun cream‖ (doposole) right after I take a shower, and all year long I use a bit of cream for my face, something for pimples, and something to cleanse for my face… normal things that is.‖

For men like Giorgio and Filippo, and many other young men I spoke to, a consumer culture latches onto a prevalent self-preservation conception of the body, encouraging men to adopt strategies to combat ―deterioration‖ and ―decay‖ (even when there are no signs of it!). As Featherstone (1982:79) suggests, ―Images of the body beautiful openly sexual and associated with hedonism, leisure, and display, emphasize the importance of appearance and ‗the look.‘‖ In a consumer culture, the body becomes a vehicle for both the display of pleasure and the experience of pleasure. The construction of body parts around youth and appearance, however, demands increasing personal investment as individuals consciously attempt to transform their bodies to fit culturally mediated appearance ideals (Johnston 2001). As body image issues have often been perceived of as a woman‘s problem, and masculinity has been defined in opposition to all things feminine, perhaps it is not so surprising that I found Giorgio and Filippo‘s behavior ―effeminate.‖ On the other hand, as men increasingly serve as marketing targets for products such as cosmetics and health products, changing attitudes towards men‘s

198 bodies, along with changes in men‘s behaviors regarding their appearance prompts us to rethink the role of body image in men‘s lives.

5.1.2 Objects of Desire

Similarly, the fact that Filippo and many other men I interviewed spoke of a preference to be an object of desire to their female partners deserves further attention. Historically

(successful?) heterosexual femininity has largely been constituted as becoming an object of desire (Connell 1987; Bordo 1993; Lorber 1995; Tolman, Striepe, and Harmon 2003);

―being desired‖ is equated with success as a woman. Being an object of desire for heterosexual men has been much more contentious in the private realm, as it has

―traditionally‖ indicated vulnerability, has been a signifier of male homosexuality, and can be linked to other forms of gender subordination (Bordo 1999; Connell 1987; Eck

2003). Objects of desire historically have been defined by a (simplistic) dichotomy of feminine and masculine opposites that form the basis for (some) heterosexual practices

(Connell 1987, 1995; Pringle 1990; Weeks 1985). Ethnographic data from Padua, however, reveal that such categories are now contested and ―at play‖ in a field of shifting power relations that commonly include heterosexual men as sexualized in media imagery, as bodily commodities, and as objects of desire in post-industrial consumer culture

(Messner 1992; Dowsett 1994; Bordo 1999; Miller 2001; Heywood and Dworkin 2003).

Indeed, as described above, mass media exposure to an array of proliferating images assist in the constitution of both women and men as bodily object.

Dworkin and Sullivan (2007:116) comment that this relatively new phenomenon in which it is publicly permissible for men to be passively gazed upon and desired is dangerous and destabilizing, ―for it blurs the generally accepted gender distinctions

199 between men and women, and generates uncertainty as to what appropriately constitutes the masculine and the feminine. In this way, sexual desirability is revealed as a project of active processes of social change, rather than the ‗laws of nature‘‖ (see also Dowsett

1994). While perhaps not ―dangerous,‖ ethnographic data from Padua does suggests that the objectification of the male body not only blurs gender distinctions between men and women (which for some be can ―destabilizing‖) but also creates a ―standard‖ that is difficult for many men to live up to. This in turn has consequences in their sexual lives.

For example, one evening I sat sipping a drink at a bar where a friend was showing her art work – a gallery opening of sorts. I began chatting with a male acquaintance about my research, and more specifically about men and sexuality. Fabio

(age 25) mentioned that he had recently gone to an andrologist,102 and complained about his troubled sex life. When I asked what the problem was, he shook his head, gave a glance around the busy bar, took a deep drink from his cocktail, and in a sheepish tone admitted that he can‘t seem to stop ejaculating early during sexual intercourse. He explained that his urologist reassured him that premature ejaculation is common enough, telling him that more than 4 million Italian men between the ages of 18 and 30 are

―sprinters‖ or ejaculate within three minutes of the sexual encounter. We sat in silence for a moment before I asked what he thought might be at the root of his ―problem.‖ Fabio took another long sip from drink and a bit drunkenly told me that since he broke up with his girlfriend of two years, he has tried having sex with various other woman, but each

102 Andrology is the medical specialty which deals with male health, particularly reproductive and urological issues. It is the counterpart to gynecology, the field of medicine primarily concerned with women‘s reproductive health. Andrology became a distinct specialty in the 1960s. Italian men concerned with their fertility or sexuality might either see an andrologist (andrologo) or a sexologist (sessuologo), the former has a degree in medicine, while the second has a degree in psychology.

200 time he manages to ―get her into bed‖ he becomes suddenly nervous about not measuring up to her expectations. The biggest problem, he laughingly explained, is that he constantly sees ―supermen‖ on TV and in magazines, with outstanding bodies, and immaculate and fashionable clothing; ―you know, ‗real men.‘‖ Fabio continued, ―I know it is stupid to make comparisons but I‘m afraid of being judged.‖ When I asked ―About what?‖ he vehemently replied, ―Maya, come on, you know, everything, from my dick to my love handles!‖ For men like Fabio, the increasing pressure to match their bodies to the images which pervade the media and men‘s magazines goes beyond a simple blurring of gender boundaries or a ―feminization‖ of the male body. The objectification of men‘s bodies has far reaching consequences for men as they compare their bodies to the ones they see on billboards, television, magazines, and newspapers.

Similarly, men often directly linked the plethora of images of half-naked women in advertisements, magazines, and TV to their sexual related ―difficulties.‖ Indeed, Italian television shows often show buxom women in mini-skirts and low-cut tops dancing as cameras zoom in on their breasts and long legs.103 Scantily dressed females are everywhere – a shapely woman in a leopard-print thong looking coyly over her shoulder in an advertisement for bottled artichokes; or another wrapped only in spaghetti noodles to advertise cookbooks. As Roberto (age 24) put it, ―you‘re constantly bombarded via

103 Among the most famous and most coveted showgirl spots on Italian TV are that of the veline. Every couple of years auditions are held for the two slots - one reserved for a blonde, the other a brunette- the ultimate goal being to spend the next year dancing and hopping in skimpy clothes on the desks of the male presenters of Striscia la Notizia ("Hot off the Press"), a news satire. In other countries this format has been satirized out of fashion or lambasted by women's rights campaigners, but in staunchly Catholic Italy, Striscia La Notizia has featured veline for over two decades. While the veline on Striscia la Notizia are the most popular, showgirls in revealing outfits can be seen everywhere from variety shows to the Italian version of "Who wants to be a Millionaire?," without having any obvious link to the content. In fact, becoming a showgirl is often a quick ticket to lucrative advertising contracts or a dalliance with a football star. Things are not likely to change soon. In fact, Italy‘s present Minister of ―Equal Opportunities‖ (2008), Mara Carfagna, rose to fame partially out of her stint as a velina.

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TV, you see naked women, beautiful people, and I always felt like I was ugly. They bombard you with these beautiful things… and when you‘re 14, you don‘t understand anything, that comes later, you know? But I think a lot of men stay stuck in this puberty phase of pre-adolescence… and stay there even until they are 40 years old. Maybe they have a sexual life, but they remain ‗stuck‘ with regard to certain things.‖ Another man,

Riccardo (age 26) and I had the following conversation,

R: We constantly see these naked women in print, on advertisements, TV, etc, and it creates this dynamic… A: What do you mean? R: I mean you have to ‗hold yourself back‘ in front of all these images, until the right moment arrives in which you can let yourself go… that is, if you can! I mean, given that you‘ve been holding yourself back from getting too excited over these images that you‘re constantly surrounded by, but that are not immediately accessible… I don‘t know if I can explain it to you… A: What do you do to avoid any problems? R: Lots of masturbation (laughs)… but what happens is that there are lots of couples in which the man continues to masturbate a lot (continua a farsi le pipe)… he can‘t do without it, I think this bombardment of images creates an ‗imbalance‘ (scompenso). But it‘s not only a sort of ‗containment‘ that‘s the problem. Once men actually have the opportunity to have sex, they‘ve not only been holding themselves back for so long that it‘s hard to let go, but you‘ve created this image in your head about what things should look like… your body, her body… you know?

During fieldwork, I ran across a related item in the newspaper Corriere della Sera104 (in the Medicine and Health section) entitled ―Men at risk for ‗sexual anorexia‘‖ which argues that young men (around 35 years of age) are tired of sex (a topic I return to below). Symptoms of ―sexual anorexia‖ include premature ejaculation and a drop in libido. This ―condition‖ is described by the president of the Andrology Association of

Italy, who suggests that those who suffer from ―sexual anorexia‖ are mostly libertine

―playboys‖ who grew up bombarded by images of women without clothes or taboos. At

104 The article actually dates to 05/16/06, and was found by scrolling through past issues of the newspaper online.

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25-35 years of age, they must face adult love and intimate relationships yet all they want to do is to let their ―overused senses rest in peace.‖ The article suggests that the liberalization of customs regarding nudity and sex may have positive effects, but there are also negative consequences. When taboos are dropped, young men grow up developing an inadequate understanding and knowledge of their bodies and more generally, sex.

When they eventually try the experience of building a relationship, they find that they are ill-prepared. The president of the association suggests that such a condition may affect as many as one in three men in Italy, and stems from physiological medical problems, but just as importantly, social issues: ―Behind the drop in desire, there is also the image of the ultra-sexy woman diffused throughout advertisements and the media. In front of such continual temptation, the young man grows up accustomed to blocking his instincts. In this manner, a mechanism between neurons is created which triggers inhibition, and which then leads the man to be blocked in the moment when he can actually let himself go.‖ Images of women‘s and men‘s bodies thus create a double bind. On the one hand, men are ―bombarded‖ by very sexual images of women which can influence their sexual lives, on the other they are constantly confronted with a ―consumer gaze‖ which objectifies the male body and creates impossible standards, again negatively impacting the sexual sphere for some men.105

Mishkind et al. (1987) suggest that one index of men‘s bodily concern is the degree of their satisfaction with their physical appearance. They surveyed college-age

105 Relatedly, Swartz (2007:83) writes ―Just being male used to be enough to be granted provisional heterosexual status. However, increasingly, in some sort of cosmic justice, men seem to be following suit: commercial interests have finally realized that having both sexes terminally insecure is better for business than just having one sex feel inadequate, so now men are in the mix of creating better bodies, more hair (on their head; now many men feel required to get electrolysis for the stuff on their back!), and stiffer erections to make sure that they look and act like the cultural cut-outs they believe will ensure their sexual selection by women. The medical establishment is only too happy to oblige these neuroses.‖

203 men and found that 95% were dissatisfied with some aspect of their bodies, and more broadly, men‘s images of their own bodies and their ideal bodies almost never match up.

―When shown a line drawing depicting seven body types, more than 70% of undergraduate men saw a discrepancy between their own body and their ideal body type‖

(see also Tucker 1982). They suggest that the cause and consequences of men‘s bodily concern represent a growing trend which can be attributed to ―an increased emphasis on self-determination of health and the ambiguity of current male and female roles.‖

During the time I spent in Padua, I had the chance to meet with a professor in the field of forensic sciences who has taught at the university level for 26 years (since 1981).

She described the following scenario. After explaining to her students (ages 19-23 or so) that the loss of a kidney is legally considered to be a ―severe injury‖ while a scar to one‘s face is considered to be an ―extremely serious injury,‖ she asked her students, ―If you had to choose between losing a kidney, and having an ugly scar on your face, which would you choose?‖ In the early 1980s, 100% of her students responded that they would rather have a scar on their face, than lose a kidney. Over the years, however, more and more students, beginning with just a few and steadily increasing, have begun to respond that they would rather have only one kidney, than have a scar on their face. The professor explained that now over 60% of her students respond that they would rather have one kidney, a dramatic change from the responses 25 years ago. In addition, she mentioned that it is predominantly the men, rather than the women who respond that one‘s aesthetic appearance is more important than having both kidneys.

Similarly, a number of the men I interviewed and spent time with in Padua perceive and suffer from worries that parts of their bodies may be judged to be

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―abnormal‖ or ―not enough.‖ Ruspini (2007:302) notes in her work on Italian men that such ―worries may refer to a variety of situations (real or supposed abnormalities of the genital organs, infertility, impotence, illness) which in turn may generate situations of psychological malaise.‖ More broadly to ―feel good in one‘s skin‖ has ambiguous meanings for men in Padua. On the one hand, the objectification of men‘s bodies gives men very specific ideas and images about what their bodies should look, smell, and feel like. On the other hand, these images are often difficult to live up to, and the objectification of both women‘s and men‘s bodies can have adverse consequences for men in the sexual sphere. More profoundly, the underlying issue of becoming an object upon which one can ―gaze‖ is relatively new to men. This new and very visible

―consumeristic‖ or ―objectified‖ masculinity tends to blur gender distinctions between men and women, creating confusion over what exactly is masculine and what is feminine.

While younger men like Filippo and Giorgio (and more generally those in their teens and early 20s) seem to increasingly assimilate this objectified masculinity into their daily habits and lifestyles (if somewhat adversely in their sexual lives), the blurring of gender boundaries is not always so easily incorporated (bodily and in practice) into all men‘s actions and attitudes.

5.2 “Evolving” Sex Characteristics

During the time I spent in the field, this became very apparent shortly after two leading national newspapers, La Repubblica and Il Corriere della Sera, published an interview with Italy‘s ex-Minister of Health, Umberto Veronesi, who boldly declared that

―humanity is becoming bisexual.‖ Without any prompting on my part, for weeks after this article was published, the men I spent time with brought up and reacted to the

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Minister‘s audacious statements. Humans, said the prominent physician, are evolving towards a ―one size fits all model‖ (modello unico) in that the biological differences between men and women are lessening: men, who no longer need to fight as they once did for their survival, consequently produces less androgenic hormones, while women, who increasingly fulfill new social roles, produces less estrogen. As a result, our reproductive organs slowly atrophy. This phenomenon, taken together with artificial fecundation and cloning, will eventually mean that sex will no longer be the only route to procreation, and in fact will eventually have nothing to do with reproduction. Sex, the ex-

Minister warns, will become simply a ―gesture of affection, and therefore no longer so important whether we chose to practice it with a partner of our same sex.‖ More broadly,

Veronesi suggests that such changes represents a positive natural evolution of the species, given that it is born of efforts to achieve equality between the sexes: ―Over the last twenty years women have taken on ever more active roles in society and this will attenuate sexual differences. At the same time, men are becoming less virile – since

WWII the ‗vitality‘ of spermatozoid has declined 50% on average; similarly, women are become more masculine.‖ Chiara Simonelli, a well-known sexologist, supports

Veronesi‘s theory, and is cited as saying, ―This phenomenon is just in its beginnings; to reach its full ‗effect‘ will we have to wait at least two or three generations.‖ More generally, sexologists and physicians in Veronesi‘s camp see such change as having both biological and cultural roots, both slowly altering the human species into a bisexual society. Along these lines, a surprising number of men referred to a ―natural evolution of mankind‖ and gave metaphorical examples of the fading ―instincts‖ of caveman or early man in order to discuss (and explain to me) why they thought that the sex characteristics

206 of men and women were becoming increasingly similar. Many commented that men ―are becoming less manly,‖ biologically speaking, in that they have less testosterone, less facial hair, and even smaller penises.

The predominant reaction to this article on the part of men was that indeed, there is no doubt that men and women are increasingly similar in terms of their sexual behavior; this was often framed in terms of comparable ages at first sexual intercourse and number of partners. But rather than this being a ―positive‖ development, many expressed concern. Men anxiously declared that, as a consequence of this phenomenon, women have increasingly high expectations of their male sexual partners. This often makes men feel nervous about their performances and whether they can live up to such expectations (and perhaps more broadly, to the images they see of men in the popular media).106 Interestingly, men often prefaced discussions about their heterosexuality with disclaimers that their sexual escapades are absolutely satisfying even if they were more

―feminine‖ that one might ―typically expect of a ‗macho, virile man.‖ For example:

I suppose Veronesi is right, that there is this evolution going on… but it‘s too fast… I suppose in some ways women are taking back a role that is simply ‗human‘ beyond what it means to be a woman, but this is frightening to men… women are experienced as being aggressive…It has happened to me sometimes to feel this way. But what does this ‗aggressiveness‘ mean? Simply that she is taking initiative…so an enterprising woman is seen as aggressive and this is taboo… because otherwise we would discover the truth, or the fact that men can only have power if he can exercise it in a unilateral fashion, otherwise he is forced to mediate… so basically what I see as the problem is that men, in terms of their sexual relations, can‘t handle having someone by their side who is equal to them, but they can‘t really pretend otherwise… (Sebastiano, age 34)

The idea that you take a woman and you throw her around (la sbatti da una parte all‘altra)… like a really virile man would do…. I don‘t really do that… I mean it‘s not like I balk at taking initiative, and like any man I like a good fuck… but

106 In their research on heterosexual men, Seal and Ehrhardt (2007: 392) similarly report a common belief that dissatisfied female sexual partners would seek other men.

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there are other things that count in a sexual encounter… Veronesi might have something in terms of bisexuality… I mean in terms of the ‗bi‘ or both parts being equal… it‘s just not exactly clear what this means anymore… what happens to virility, what happens to femininity in all of this? Or maybe it‘s just that women have higher expectations of us, which is intimidating for the really macho man, but I think I like the intimacy that women, I guess, expect… (Gianni, age 41)

Italian women now have multiple partners before settling down with one man. This means they are able to judge and tell a difference between skills and penis sizes. Italian men find this intimidating (Andrea, age 36)

A study recently released on data collected in 2007 provides interesting material for reflection relative to a model of increasing similarity between the sexes. Researchers working with the GPF institute107 conducted 2000 face-to-face interviews with a representative sample of 18-74 year-old Italians (by sex, age, geographical area, size of place of residence, and education). Particular attention was paid to the following aspects:

1) manner, contexts, images in the production of desire; 2) variables perceived as influencing desire and sexual activity – from physiological to psychological aspects; 3)

Codes and language used in approaches towards sexual contact between the two sexes; 4) communication channels used and preferred in the sexual sphere. According to Fabris, the sociologist who analyzed the results for GPF, ―the alignment of women‘s and men‘s answers on sexual roles reveals new and interesting problems: 70% of the respondents declared that ―today, between a women and a man, it is no longer clear who should make the first pass.‖ The affirmation, ―It is not possible to have satisfactory sexually relations without affective involvement‖ was higher among women than men (85.6% women vs.

76.6% men) and among the older generations (for 45-54 year olds, 83.1% vs. 73.1% of

18-24 year olds). More men, on the other hand, agreed with the statement ―sexuality is

107 A private research institute and strategic consulting firm founded in 1979 which investigates issues concerning social change, consumption, and communication. Over the years GPF has put together numerous datasets on the structure, dynamics, values, and lifestyles of Italian society.

208 one of the most important aspects in the life of a person‖ (78.2% vs. 68.6%). Fabris comments, ―There emerges sexuality not free of doubts: 76% of Italians affirm that today sexual troubles are more widespread, and half of the sample declared that they suffer from sexual related problems.‖ The sociologist continues ―The foremost macro-evidence from this study is the alignment of men‘s and women‘s answers on a number of issues, revealing a likening – but also confusion – among the two genders, based on the process of a reassessment of sexual roles.‖

According to the GPF results, men are more open (than in the past) to speaking about their own sexuality and problems related to this sphere. They are also more inclined to resolve troubles using an approach that joins comprehension and listening, as well as the use of medical support. On the other hand, men distinguish themselves from women, in that they more frequently correlate their level of sexual satisfaction with the frequency and duration of intercourse. When asked about their desire to have intercourse a second time, shortly following the first episode, 23.5% of the male interviewees responded ―always‖ or ―often‖ compared to 12.7% of women. 47.6 % of men said

―rarely‖ or ―never‖ compared to 56.3% of women; 90.4% of the sample (90.8% men;

89.6% women) agree that ―today, a man, in order to seduce a woman, needs to know how to talk and listen to her.‖ Finally, 83% of the sample agreed that ―a man who changes his child‘s diapers does not lose strength and virility‖ (80.9% men; 85.7% women).

Despite men‘s preoccupations, the underlying message seems to be that the sexual gender gap is steadily narrowing, as women‘s and men‘s sexual experiences come to

209 more closely resemble one another‘s.108 Or rather, women‘s experiences have come to resemble men‘s. Kimmel (2005:1) argues that in Western countries, our experience of love has been feminized and our sexuality has been increasingly ―masculinized.‖ ―While men‘s sexual behavior has hardly changed, women‘s sexuality has changed dramatically, moving increasingly closer to the behavior of men (this probably both thrills and terrifies men).‖109 As Rubin (1991:5, 46) points out, while once a premium was placed on women‘s virginity, ―in the brief span of one generation…we went from mothers who believed their virginity was their most prized possession to daughters for whom it was a burden.‖ Virginity was not longer ―a treasure to be safeguarded‖; now, it was ―a problem to be solved‖ (idem).

Studies conducted specifically on Italy indicated that girls are now having sex earlier than boys in those regions where the sexual revolution began earliest (in the central and northern regions), although such change has appeared only recently (Billari and Borgoni, 2002; Borgoni and Gabrielli 2004). Ongaro (2001:1) notes that in Italy, changes in sexual behavior have above all concerned women: ―female virginity has

108 This transformation is in large part the result of the ―sexual revolution‖ or the technological breakthroughs and ideological shifts which took place in the 1960s (see also chapter 3). Over the last 50 years, ―the pursuit of sexual pleasure for its own sake has been increasingly available to women, as adequate and relatively safe birth control and legal abortion have made it possible to separate fully sexual activity from reproduction (men, or course, always were able to pursue sexual pleasure for its own sake; thus, in this sense, women‘s sexuality has come to more closely resemble men‘s) (Kimmel 2005:11-12). ―I guess sex was originally to produce another body; then I guess it was for love; nowadays it‘s just for feeling good,‖ was the way one 15 year-old boy summed up this shift (Rubin 1991:13).

109 A survey conducted by Carlo Buzzi (1998) showed a higher rate of sexual activity among young Italian women (under the age of 25), 33.8% of whom have sexual intercourse two to three time as week (against 27.4%) for Italian males. Also, the percentage of young Italian women who had no sexual intercourse during the previous three months turned out to be almost half that of Italian men (12.4% against 23.5%). On the other hand, statistical data concerning the frequency of sexual intercourse should be treated with caution. Statistical averages ignore the fact that responses may be influenced by the desire of those interviewed to satisfy the presumed expectations of the interviewer, or—more generally—by the desire to make a positive impression. Sexuality is a sensitive topic which may have consequences for the amount of information interviewees are willingly to share.

210 stopped being an important value and premarital relationships are no longer sanctioned; female infidelity is considered the same as male infidelity; generally the asymmetry of behaviors between males and females has been reduced.‖ The model of entry into adult sexuality has also been influenced by these changes: first sex is no longer regulated by outdated norms and is instead guided by individual ethics that leave the responsibility of when, with whom and in what circumstances to experience it to the individual (idem).110

Ruspini (2005:26) suggests that the increasing similarity between the genders points to the necessity of ―redefining the self for ‗new‘ women and ‗new‘ men.‖ Social change such as increasingly if still limited equality between men and women, rising participation of women in traditionally ―male‖ work sector, and the calling into question of

―traditional‖ organizations of family life have forced men and women to also reconsider their sexual roles and expectations.

Perhaps one reason that men find the idea of the sexes becoming ever more similar so concerning has to do with a problem suggested by Schwartz (2007:84), or the fact that in order to be considered heterosexual, individuals ―are presumed to be singularly and unproblematically aroused to the opposite sex and to the opposite sex only… Heterosexuality is unitary - all or nothing.‖ Any indication of flexibility (in this case, an increasing similarity between men and women) may be experienced as discrediting heterosexuality.111 Although in some American Indian cultures bisexuality

110 Compared to other countries, however, Italy stands out for the fact that age at first sexual intercourse has never reached particularly low levels and with the most recent cohorts, rather than continue to decrease or stabilize at low levels, some scholars have shown that age at first sex has actually risen (De Sandre et al 1997, 2000; Cazzola 1999; Buzzi 1998; Ongaro 2001).

111 Invariably, the term ―male sexuality‖ has assumed heterosexuality as the ―norm.‖ Yet what is considered ―normal‖ sexuality is not necessarily ―natural.‖ Rich (1980) pointed out several decades ago that ―the taken for granted category of male heterosexuality has long been employed as a stand-in, the unmarked, for all

211 fits into the acceptable spectrum of sexual behavior, same-sex arousal, or even the idea that society may be becoming bi-sexual ―immediately incurs identity reassignment; we do not want to think of our sexuality as polymorphous‖ (idem). More broadly, Schwartz suggests that ―if heterosexuality was indelible, easy to achieve and easy to keep, we wouldn‘t make all this fuss over it… Far from being normal, heterosexual identity is fragile. Very fragile. Easily polluted. Given all the possible paths leading to failure of sexual competence, we are warned that we must be very careful in our construction of it.‖

(idem: 92; 84). Boni (2004:142) similarly suggests that male heterosexuality is defined on the basis of that which it is not (i.e. not feminine, or homosexual).112 This, similarly, renders discussions of male heterosexuality difficult, given the increasing similarity between the sexes. In discussions with Paduan men about their constructions of heterosexuality, and more specifically, their sexual lives and experiences, two broad issues emerged. On the one hand, many suggested that Italians and men in particular, are simply having less sex. Others, on the contrary, boasted of their multiple partners and sexual escapades. While stereotypical depictions of the ―new man‖ and ―new lad‖ do not include detailed descriptions of their attitudes towards sex, one might broadly include

―new men‖ in the first group, and ―new lads‖ in the second group. While such forms of sexuality‖ (cfr. Gutmann 2007:33). In other words, to speak of a singular ―male sexuality‖ is to imply a gendered embeddedness to sexual practice. To their credit, queer theorists and second-wave feminists have done much to ―mark‖ the ―unmarked category of male heterosexuality‖ as normative. On the other hand, Gutmann (2007:33) has pointed out that not much has been done beyond this ―marking‖ or ―outing‖ of the heterosexual man from their ―unmarked closets.‖ He comments, ―showing [heterosexual males] to have particular and not universal kinds of sexualities, is in many ways all that has been done with them. And so until recently, in feminist scholarship, they have analytically remained in the shadow of the closet, albeit rather naked in their heteronormativity‖ (idem.).

112 The negative definition of male heterosexuality (i.e. defining it by what it is not) is at least important as a positive definition of the latter. Homophobia thus becomes an integral part of defining heterosexual masculinity, as it allows men to express what they are not (i.e. homosexual) and thus affirm what they are (heterosexual) (see Messner 1992; Kimmel 1994; Seidler 1997) for a discussion about homophobic behavior on the part of men.

212 categorizations may be useful, one should also keep in mind that male sexuality is most certainly not any single shared experience for men; ―It is not any single or simple thing at all - but the site of any number of emotions of weakness and strength, pleasure and pain, anxiety, conflict, tension and struggle‖ (Segal 1997: 215). I discuss each of these reactions below.

5.2.1 Latin Lovers on their Last Legs

Surveys which have tried to demonstrate the frequency of sexual intercourse have documented mixed results. On the one hand, the GPF data suggests that Italians have more sex compared to 30 years ago. Researchers point to a similar study by Fabris and

David conducted in 1978 which reported that Italians have sex four times a month, while the 2007 study showed 6 times a month (or 2 more times a month, 24 more times a year).113 On the other hand, a recent study conducted by Simonelli (2006), a sexologist at the University of Rome, suggests that ―the old myth of the carefree and indefatigable

Latin lover and of his passionately feminine counterpart is on its last legs.‖ An interview

(2008) with the sexologist cites her as saying ―In both sexes there is an increasing fall-off of desire and a loss of interest in sexual activity. In a strictly sexual sense, the men are the ones who are suffering most.‖

Simonelli et al. (2006) studied a group of 18 to 28-year old Italian males, many of whom reported a psychological gap between the sexual act itself and any kind of emotional involvement. They reported, according to Simonelli, ―a general coldness and detachment, a lack of enthusiasm, to the point that these young men gradually lost interest.‖ Many men declared that they resorted to occasional masturbation to satisfy the

113 Statistics on frequency of intercourse are, however, highly age related.

213 purely physical needs, but that sex with a partner was increasingly rare. "At the same time‖ continues Simonelli, ―many of them told us that they were waiting for a woman,

'the' woman, to come along and sweep them off their feet and save them from their own sexual indifference. In other words the traditional Italian hunter-killer is turning into a passive and bored recluse waiting for Princess Charming to come along." Simonelli, who is also the Deputy Chairman of the European Federation of Sexology, reports that an increasing number of individuals and couples come to her clinic because of a loss of sexual interest in their partners; they often request help to make their sexual desires coincide with their sentimental and family situations. She suggests that "It may be that a culture which until recently accepted that the joys of family life and the joy of sex need not necessarily coincide now wants to conform to a more American model in which the two things are part and parcel of each other."

During the time I spent in Padua, the popular media and newspapers became increasingly vocal over a supposed declining lack of interest in sex. On April 12th of

2008, La Repubblica published an article by Alessandra Retico entitled ―The desire for sex is decreasing, 4 out of 10 no longer do it.‖ According to the journalist, a decline in the male sex drive is seen as the principal cause. Turning to a report presented at the IX

Congress of the European Federation of Sexology (held in April 2008), Retico quotes,

''Comparing sex to eating habits, one could say that Italian couples fall into four basic categories: the anorexic, the bulimic, the satiated and those who are not hungry.''

According to the report, ―anorexic‖ Italian couples are usually around 40 years of age, in a solid or long-term relationship, and have children. Among these couples, men often avoid sex with their partners, preferring instead to go to a prostitute or engage in virtual

214 encounters on the Internet. The ―bulimics‖ have the opposite excess, typically 50 year- olds who try anything, 1 out of 10 swaps, practices sadomasochism, and/or other alternative practices. Then, they get bored. But there are also the ―satiated,‖ the majority of whom are between the ages of 30-35, and are content. Most of the ―not hungry‖ are stressed 40-50 year olds, who have sex sporadically, when it happens, if it happens. He escapes to the web,114 while she goes to the surgeon: there are waiting lists for 30-35 years-olds in hospitals for reconstruction of the hymen (47 operations in 2005). Or they buy a ticket for South America from where to return ―virgin‖ costs only 1350 Euro.

The basic underlying message to these articles and studies is that the male sex drive is declining. What‘s more, many of my male informants agreed. The causes, they explained, were due to simply being over worked and tired, or even simply being less interested due to other ―distractions.‖

I think sex is important, I think that if it‘s done with affection, a lot of other problems can be avoided, you know? Because it is also a stress releaser… but in today‘s world, women work and are tired, men work and are tired… the work hours take you far away, and we have less and less free time… so maybe you have less and less sex. You know, that joke… I make fun of my wife too… You know, the famous ‗g spot‘ in women, is to be found in the ‗g‘ in shopping! For women, they‘re really taken up with shopping and they are less interested in sex… but I think that it is also maybe true of men these days… (Sandro, age 34)

Some people say that Italians are having less sex, and I think the reason for this is that we are surrounded by so many technological devices –from TV to our cell phones and computers – and generally things that people are distracted by… or maybe we‘re just too tired to have sex (Giuseppe, age 36)

114 The role of the internet in shaping men‘s sexuality is an area that might fruitfully be further explored. Take for example, Jacopo (age 28) who recently broke up with his girlfriend, and has since spent a considerable amount of time online, looking at pornographic websites, especially after smoking a joint. He laughingly admitted that he has ―temporarily transferred love to the web. I have a very sweet ‗girl-web- friend or web girlfriend‘ who is magically there when I connect to internet (or even when I turn on my phone –which has internet access) and then not there when I disconnect or turn off my phone!‖

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People are distracted by the numerous activities one can do to be ‗self-fulfilled‘; they pursue their interests, and want to be entertained. In doing so, however, they go to bed late, and they are simply too tired and stressed to have sex (Lorenzo, age 37)

Similarly, when out drinking a beer with Andrea (age 36), we began discussing my research and the questions I had been asking during interviews. Andrea, amused by the questions, asked laughingly, ―ok, those all sound like good questions, but are you asking specifically about sex? You know that Italians don‘t have sex anymore.‖ He suggested that the era of ―No sex, we‘re English‖ and ―Italians do it better‖ made international by

Madonna‘s t-shirts, is over. He mentioned that while waiting in the dentist‘s office one day he read a recent issue of Men‘s Health, which compared sexual satisfaction across countries, giving them a grade from A to F. While Great Britain received an ―A,‖ Italy was the last ranked of twenty and given a grade of ―F.‖ The grade was given based on a number of factors. In Italy for example, more than 25% declared that they had cheated on their wives, the number of divorces has increased, and only 36% of those interviewed declared that they were happy in bed. In Andrea‘s opinion the reasons that Italians have less successful sex lives included: their overly busy schedules, and simply being

―distracted‖ by other things, but he also emphasized that men‘s ―Italian‖ reputation as skillful lovers has meant that they don‘t try very hard, leaving women unsatisfied.

Other men contrasted themselves with the ―virile macho men of the past‖ who they described as having sex frequently and somewhat violently. They described themselves as shying away from the role of the ―sexually potent man‖ or as one man put it ―the Italian stallion that hurls the woman onto the bed and fucks her‖ (Ivano, age 48).

Such discourse was often accompanied by comments about the importance of

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―tenderness‖ and complicity with their sexual partners. To this regard, anthropologist

Salza (2008) recently wrote an article entitled: Donni e Uome.115. Salza suggests we should differentiate Italian‘s sexual behavior based on primary sex and secondary sex characteristics, suggesting that sex is no longer considered that which is enacted towards the genitals (primary sexual characteristics) but that which concerns secondary sexual characteristics (bottoms, breasts, feet, lips, bellybuttons, backs, hair, muscles, and penises). This, he comments, is the ―now the kingdom of tenderness (tenerezza) as taught by the (new) Latin lover. Primary sex is blood and sweat; secondary sex is a eulogy to the temporary (impermanenza). That is why it is so marketable. Tenderness does not leave consequences, coitus does. Tenderness can be bought over and over again. Coitus tires.

So we must reconsider sexual satisfaction: does this refer to primary or secondary sex?‖

Salza believes that many Italians report ―satisfactory‖ sex lives in reference to the second, new form of sex linked to secondary sex characteristics: ―men are all peeping toms and quite able in ―copping a feel – if nothing more‖ (fare la mano morta)116; women have become exhibitionists.‖

5.2.2 Never Enough

A number of the Italian men I spent time with spoke of having very ―satisfactory‖

(primary) sex lives. In direct opposition to men who suggested that Italians are simply having less sex, these men crowed of their sexual exploits and more generally, of the

115 I leave the first part of the title in Italian, as it requires some explanation. Normally, one would write ―donnE‖ (woman) and ―UomINI‖ (men). Words that end in ―e‖ are feminine while those that end in ―i‖ are masculine. The author plays with the endings, reversing their gender specific endings such that the word ―women‖ becomes ―masculine‖ and the word ―men‖ become ―feminine.‖

116 In other words, men who let their hands wander onto a thigh or other intimate part of a woman all the while maintaining the air of not having done it on purpose.

217 sheer number of women that they had slept with.117 These men that were often in their early 30s and were either single or had a girlfriend (but were nowhere near thinking of marriage). Among others, Leonardo (age 34) spent hours recounting to me his amorous adventures, and as we often went salsa-merengue dancing in the evenings (a scene of much ―coupling‖) he would even introduce me to his sexual partners, old and new.

One late November afternoon, Leonardo called me, as he was sitting in traffic and bored, and recounted his latest fling. He had gone out the preceding evening with a woman named Paola who at the end of the evening kissed him. He felt somewhat taken aback, as the two are trying to reestablish a relationship after they initially got off to a rocky start. Although surprised by the kiss, he felt that he couldn‘t avoid kissing her back, as ―it would be rude not to kiss a woman back who has just tried to kiss you.‖ On the other hand, he felt uncomfortable, as he is not as taken with her as he once was, and was not sure if he wants to develop a relationship with her (hence his phone call to me, to discuss the matter). In fact Paola asked him to go out this evening, but he came up with an excuse, saying that he was going to dinner with another female friend, with whom he has ―kind of a relationship‖ (i.e. he is sleeping with her). When Paola responded with

117 Men‘s sexual rapacious appetites is one aspect of men‘s (hetero)sexuality that has been pursued extensively in the literature (and certainly to no less extent in the Southern Mediterranean), and is in some disciplines considered to be ―primal.‖ Gutmann (2007:29) points out that evolutionary psychologists claim ―a built-in compulsion on the part of the male of the species to spread their seed‖ and quotes the words of Wright (1994:45), an evolutionary psychologist, who challenges someone to ―find a single culture in which women with unrestrained sexual appetites aren‘t viewed as more aberrant than comparably libidinous men‖ (original emphasis). Radical feminists such as Mackinnon (1982), Dworkin (1981), and Griffin (1996) have argued that such views of men‘s uncontrollable sexual appetites and more broadly male sexual dominance underpins or is the defining characteristic of all expressions of male power and oppression, from racism to class exploitation. Scholars such as Segal (1997), on the other hand, have noted that this raising of male sexuality to such heights of importance inadvertently resonates with the views of (predominantly male) scientists who often repeat ―the dominant contemporary cultural discourses and iconographies surrounding sexuality‖ (Segal 1997: 208; Weeks 1985); that is, that male sexuality is an ―overpowering instinct,‖ barely controllable, and irreducibly sustained and necessarily validated by the centrality and functionalism of the gender order‖ (cfr. Whitehead 2002: 161). More generally, she warns that a ―natural‖ male sexual dominance can too easily be equated with a ―natural‖ male political and social dominance.

218 surprise, ―ah you have another relationship,‖ he replied, ―well what do you expect; we haven‘t seen each other for several months… besides, you never even asked before you decided to kiss me!‖ He purposely provoked her he explained, in order to ―put her in her place… she can‘t just have me back after what happened.‖ When I asked him if it was true that he was ―somewhat dating‖ (ho una mezza storia con questa qua) the other woman, he laughed and said, ―Maya, I have lots of ―somewhat stories‖ but I can‘t seem to concretize any of them into something real! I don‘t know if I‘m just not convinced, or if I‘m simply looking for something else.‖

Many of the men I spoke to had similar situations as that of Leonardo, in that they described sleeping with many women, but never quite finding what they were looking for. Others, relatedly (again in their early to mid-thirties), would explain to that they were

―still just having fun‖ and that there was ―plenty of time‖ until they ―had to start thinking about settling down.‖ Many described this behavior as fitting into a ―Peter Pan‖ attitude, in that until they really were ready to start a family, they wanted to have as much ―fun‖

(i.e. sleep with as many women) as possible. As I discussed in the second chapter, men in this age group often suggest that they are not ready to be responsible for the well-being of someone other than themselves. One informant even suggested that they make an Italian version of the song by Cyndi Lauper, but instead of ―girls just wanna have fun‖ it should be ―boys just wanna have fun‖; they don‘t want to grow up. In chapter two I described

Giuseppe (age 36), who suggested that ―men feel as if they are younger than they really are, creating a false sense of immortality‖ where the prospect of ―settling down and having children‖ is always far off. Thus not only do men become ―adults‖ later in life, but it seems that the perception of age has changed. The sense of being ―forever young‖ also

219 seems to carry over into men‘s sexual lives, where a prolonged life-cycle also means drawing out the period in which men desire to be ―young, single, beautiful and autonomous.‖ As argued above, these characteristics are also encouraged by a popular media which portray the ―ideal‖ man as such, and transform the body into an object to be consumed.

Interestingly, the ideas that 1) men are simply having less sex because they are distracted by ―technological devices,‖ and more generally, the desire to pursue

―diversions‖ and activities in order to be ―self-fulfilled‖ or simply entertained and 2) the idea that men are ―Peter Pans‖ who want to have as much fun as possible, before settling down might both be seen as fitting into the larger framework of the Second Demographic

Transition theory. SDT theory foresees a disengagement from civic, professional or community oriented associations in order to pursue individualistic goals of self- actualization (Lesthaeghe and Meekers 1986; Lesthaeghe and Surkyn 2004). In other words, whether men are having less or more sex, both are described as the need to satisfy individual needs and a drive for self-realization, whether this be in terms of the number of women they‘ve slept with and the desire to ―explore as much as possible‖ or in terms of

―distractions‖ which similarly provide a means of self-realization and the pursuit of individualistic interests. Both orientations are also framed within a consumeristic world which molds men‘s expectations, attitudes, and sexual experiences. We might further surmise that individualistic goals within the sexual sphere, especially as they are framed with a ―second demographic transition‖ are in part responsible for the persistence of low fertility levels. As Andrea half-jokingly said to me one day, ―to have kids, you have to have sex, right? Well, no one has sex anymore! And to have sex, you have to become

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‗responsible‘ so men either just walk away because they‘re afraid or they sleep around to avoid making any commitment!‖

5.3 A Shift in Consumption, a Shift in Sex

Ethnographic data collected in Padua thus hints at a gradual shift in men‘s attitudes and practices in things sexual. The youngest cohort of men – or those in their late teens and early twenties - seems to be increasingly comfortable with a growing similarity to women, especially as this is shaped by a consumeristic gaze on the body. On the other hand, correlated with an ―objectification‖ of men‘s bodies seem to be a rising number of sexually-related problems connected to images in the popular media. Men in their early

30s to mid-40s spoke of being intimidated by women‘s increasingly high sexual expectations and react with concern and preoccupation to the idea that men and women are becoming increasingly sexually similar. More broadly, many men in this age group either laughingly suggested that ―Italians are having less sex‖ or vaunted their sexual adventures and their desire to ―explore‖ for as long as possible before ―settling down.‖

Older men, or those in their 50s and beyond, further testify to the fact that there has occurred a pronounced ―generational shift‖ in the ways men think about women and heterosexuality, especially as this ties into a changing ―consumer culture.‖

In fact, the shift in how men perceive the body and think about sexuality is closely linked to changes in Italian consumption. Ginsborg (2003:83) suggests that we can discern two relatively distinct moments in the history of Italian consumerism. The first occurred during Italy‘s ―economic miracle‖ during the 1950s and 1960s118 which saw

―the passage from a society where basic needs were not satisfied, to one in which they

118 See chapter 3 for a more detailed account of Italy‘s ―economic miracle.‖

221 were for the great majority, if not all, of the Italian population.‖ Ginsborg argues that consumption during this period was characterized above all by its homogeneity. He points to the Fordist nature of production, as well the ―attention to the newly discovered joys of home living‖ and above all, its utilitarianism. ―Typical items such as fridges and washing-machines, as well as new furniture, were purchased for the material enrichment of the home, and for the reduction of women‘ chores within it‖ (idem: 83; see also

Minestroni 1996).

Towards the end of the 1970s, and after the economic crisis mid-decade (D‘Apice

1981), a crucial transformation in consumption practices took place. Italy experienced an

―information technology revolution, a shift from standardized goods to more personalized ones, and a growth of entertainment as a major service industry119… The combination of these factors unleashed a wave of consumption that was much richer, in every sense of the word, and more complex than the preceding one‖ (Ginsborg 2003:84). Of paramount importance was what Colin Campbell has called ―modern autonomous imaginative hedonism.‖ Central to this concept is the place of day-dreaming and longing in modern consumption: ―the visible practice of consumption is thus no more than a small part of a complex pattern of hedonistic behavior, the majority of which occurs in the imagination of the consumer‖ (Campbell 1987:89). Individuals enjoyed as never before the possibility of being their own despot‖ (ibid: 76), exercising control over an ever-widening choice of stimulae.

Ginsborg (2003) suggests that an equally strong component to this transformation was ―cognitive‖ in that the availability and consumption of knowledge in the home

119 For example, in 1986 only 3.5% of Italians has a VCR at home, but 1992 this had risen to 45.4% (Ginsburg 2001:84).

222 environment increased dramatically (for example, personal computers for educational purposes). Of no less centrality, was a third and final element, or an ―aesthetic‖ component, testified to by the spectacular success of the Italian fashion industry, but also

Italians‘ increasingly disposable income and the mass marketing of haute couture (ibid:

85).120

5.3.1 Old Men, Young Men: Moving Towards ―Pure‖ Relationships?

The transformation of Italian consumption has been commented on from a number of different quarters. Ginsborg (2003:87) notes that the Catholic Church121 has directly tied consumer indulgence to the dramatic decline in Italian birthrates; ―with the paucities of the former being attributed to the egoistical excesses of the latter‖ (see also Agnew

1993).122 On the other hand, some have argued that ―autonomous imaginative hedonism‖

120 Ginsburg writes that ―By 1992 a startling 37 percent of Italians claimed to wear garments that had designer labels. Obsession with look and smell found new and expensive commodities to devour, with after-shave lotions and anti-wrinkle creams enjoying rocketing sales. Nearly one in three Italians (not all female) was habitually using face creams at the time.‖

121 Of no less importance to thinking about Italian men‘s heterosexuality is the Catholic Church, a thorough examination of which is beyond the scope of this chapter. Studies conducted in Italy, for example, reveal that the frequency of church attendance for both sexes is positively correlated with delayed entry into adult sexual life (Fabris and David 1978; Cazzola, 1999; Dalla Zuanna and Guerra 1998; Ongaro 2001b). In Padua the influence of the Church lies just beneath the habits and practices of everyday life, and while not always explicit in its influence, it is always an underlying presence. As one informant put it, ―This aspect of sexuality that is Catholic, which… we‘re in Italy and so there are many religious teaching which tell you… you should, for example, stay a virgin until marriage… these are things I don‘t agree with… and then there are the feelings of guilt… and I don‘t even think of myself as very Catholic!‖ (Sandro, age 34). More generally, notwithstanding an ongoing process of secularization in Italy (Ginsborg 2003), Catholicism is still one of the main sources of values affecting sexuality, and the public pronouncements of the Pope are widely discussed in the mass media. In fact, because of the Catholic Church‘s opposition to a separation of procreation from sexuality, the introduction of clear legislation regarding artificial insemination and other forms of medically assisted procreation have faced considerable obstruction (Dalla Zuanna et al 2005; Krause and Marchesi 2007). Relatedly, the introduction of sexual education as part of the regular program in schools has met with opposition from the Church who questions their content. More specifically, the Church is wary of the value of sexual education that focuses on the physical aspects of sexuality rather than contextualizing sex within broader moral (i.e. Catholic) issues (Wanrooij 2004).

122 Ginsborg (2001: 88) rather comically notes that much consumption is indeed ―futile, damaging or simply idiotic, like endless ‗zapping‘ between television channels (which produces, after a time, a profound

223 accompanying ―new consumerism‖ also enriched life through a greatly increased ―wealth of experience and personal choice, both in the realm of goods and that of services‖

(Ginsborg 2003:89).

Interestingly, discussions of sexuality with Paduan men of different ages revealed significant parallels with the historical shift from utilitarian consumption, to one of a hedonistic, cognitive, and aesthetic dimensions. Older men (mid-50s and older) often remarked to me that young men no longer appreciate the sex characteristics of women, and their discussions of sexuality often depicted women as objects to gaze upon (and, hence, men as the universal observers who are not gazed upon). Many saw sex as having become too easy, in that there is simply no more ―conquest.‖ Sex used to be something that was ―accomplished through effort, through romance and time spent running after a woman‖ said Luigi (age 56) to me one day. Luigi lamented that there is no longer a real appreciation of beauty, women go around half naked and no one notices them. He ―still appreciates good looking women, unlike my sons, who even when they see a beautiful woman remain somehow unaffected.‖ Other men Luigi‘s age similarly commented on the differences between their sexual experiences and that which they saw among younger men:

Sex simply no longer interests young people these days… in my day…let me give you an example. To ‗accidently‘ brush against a woman‘s breast we would bend over backwards… mamma mia… But now they (women) are all half-naked, available, and nobody is interested in them… (Marco, age 64)

It used to be that there was this period of ‗waiting‘ or ‗expectation‘ in life and, more specifically, sex. For example, I really used to like motorcycles when I was a kid. Many years passed until I could actually have one. And at first it was a small motorcycle, used, second-hand… and then I could get a bigger one, newer. sense of depression), taking hard drugs (which produces much better, then much worse effects), or using a portable telephone to say Ciao mamma or ‗I have just got off the train‘ (which produces no effect at all).‖

224

Now you don‘t even have the time to formulate a thought or a desire, and you already have it in your hand… you have no idea how much it‘s worth, because it didn‘t really cost you anything. That is what sex has become. (Alessio, age 68)

Now and then I think… these kids growing up now… I mean now they buy Viagra… because they have an idea of sex… not as something rich, complete, and to enjoy slowly (con i suoi tempi) … but as something to consume rapidly and in a hurry… I hear about these 14 year olds that have sex in the bathroom of a discotheque in exchange for a recharge of their telephone. It‘s sad to think about this… it is as if one can‘t perceive the smells or tastes of that which you eat… It‘s something easy to obtain, and thus has no value to me… (Francesco, age 57)

Now, there is this easiness to relationships that… I mean you don‘t have to… there are no longer any scruples… and everything is just quicker… and so even relationships are consumed more rapidly. All they (younger men) think about are trivial matters (il futile). Personally, I‘m for the ‗useful‘ not the trivial (sono per l‘utile, non il futile) (Bruno, age 59)

Generally, older men tended to talk about women either directly or through the use of metaphors (i.e. motorcycles, food) as objects, something that might be ―won‖ or

―conquered‖ through romanticism and ―hard work.‖ They criticized younger men for not appreciating this aspect and for their tendency to ―consume‖ sex. More broadly, older men tended to frame their discourse about sexuality in terms of achieving a ―goal‖ and they fleshed out their strategies for ―conquering‖ women in practical terms. Sex was also often framed in utilitarian terms relating to the satisfaction of ―basic needs.‖ Speaking of women as objects, albeit to be admired, is suggestive of the ―material enrichment‖ which characterized Italy‘s ―economic miracle.‖ What is more, this group of men was critical towards the younger generation for precisely the attributes which characterize Italy‘s shift in consumption: a hedonism in which life is enriched through an increased wealth of experience and personal choice, but also, perhaps, a suspicious ease in which such

225 consumption is achieved.123 Campbell‘s ―modern autonomous imaginative hedonism‖ which characterizes today‘s consumer world, and older men‘s critiques of today‘s

―youth‖ (or those in their mid-thirties and younger) certainly rang true in a number of younger men‘s discourse about their sexuality, if perhaps somewhat more complex than that envisioned by older men. While true that younger men often spoke of sex as something ―light‖ and ―swift‖ and easy to consume (Bauman 2003), much emphasis was also place on both the importance of ―creativity‖ and ―intimacy‖ in sexual relationships.

Zygmunt Bauman (2003), in Liquid Love: On the Frailty of Human Bonds suggests that in ―liquid modern times,‖ individuals tend to be inveterate shoppers and insist on onsumer rights: love and sex must give us what we have come to expect from our other purchases - novelty, variety, disposability.124 He argues that: ―The major and probably the most seminal success of the market offensive so far has been the gradual but persistent crumbling away of the skills of sociality.‖ Consumption is a solitary activity, writes Bauman, and cannot serve as a solid base for the construction of bonds or relations—at best we can find companions in individual consumption, whose presence serves to intensify its pleasures. The untethering of sexual activity from its social context and the transformation of sex into a light and swift event that can be consumed are but

123 In her book on American manhood, Susan Faludi (1999) comments that the men of the World War II generation were raised in the "Ernie Pyle ideal of heroically selfless manhood, they were taught to be brave and heroic and take one for the team. But for various reasons, they failed to pass these lessons on to their baby boomer sons. Instead they got their models from "ornamental culture"-TV, movies, and celebrity culture, which peddle a primping cartoon of manhood, unmoored from the old patriarchy."

124 Bauman (2003) suggests that individuals talk about sex endlessly and read manuals to give them the necessary information to maximize the return on our investments. He quotes a sex therapist as cheerfully saying: "Today everyone is in the know, and no one has the faintest clue." We want sex to be more like shopping, for it to be transparent and easily gratifying. But, Bauman argues, it isn't. We are trying to make it into a technique to be mastered. "Concentration on performance leaves no time or room for ecstasy," he counsels.

226 examples of a larger trend, in which other humans are no longer related to, but consumed as objects. While this may be partially true for the young men I interviewed, sexual activity was not simply reduced to a ―body to be consumed.‖ These men often commented on the need for ―complicity‖ and ―intimacy‖ as well as ―creativity‖ and

―fantasy‖ in the bedroom, reminiscent of historian Paul Ginsburg‘s argument outlined above that consumerism has now become a constant hedonistic search, with cognitive and aesthetic dimensions.

My father thinks that sex these days has become something almost sleazy (squalido). He sees me as not really thinking about sex, because I don‘t twist around in my chair to stare at a woman, or whistle – good God- after her. It seems to my father that we (my generation) just have easy simple sex, and that there‘s no conquest, or that we simply don‘t care. While maybe we do have sex more easily, I think that men and women want something different from it. Sex, when there is harmony, when there is intimacy, then it becomes something else, you know? (Federico, age 31)

I like creativity, fantasy… the fact that you always do the same thing… it gives me the idea that it somehow becomes kind of ‗mechanical.‘ The fact that you change, means that you are interpreting the situation each time… that you are present in the relationship… when it becomes routine… it means that you are no longer choosing each time. But in order to be able to choose, and to feel comfortable sharing your fantasies, there has to be a certain sense of complicity with your partner, you know what I mean? (Fabio, age 29)

Younger men‘s desire for complicity in their sexual relations also suggests greater gender equality between the sexes in that the route to achieving their fantasies and desires often seemed to be better communication and intimacy. Some scholars have argued that the successful transition from sex as an object to sex as a component of personal intimacy requires that men move away from sex as an endpoint and toward sex as an integrated and enhancing part of growing and changing emotionally intimate relationship (Seal and

Ehrhardt 2007[2003]:393, Brooks 1995; Levant and Brooks 1997). More specifically,

227

Giddens (1992) suggests that ―a generic restructuring of intimacy‖ has taken place in modern societies. For Giddens, this ―transformation of intimacy‖ heralds the possibility of a radical democratization of gender relationships arising from women‘s emancipation from the nineteenth century discourses that located sexuality in the rule of the phallus. In contrast to a privileging of male sexual pleasure and experiences, Giddens (1992:2) argues that ―plastic sexuality‖ - freed from the needs of reproduction – will be the basis and impetus for the pursuit of the ―pure relationship.‖125 More specifically, he argues that late twentieth-century processes of change ushered in a desire for ―pure relationships‖ wherein lovers ―enter into a situation for its own sake‖ and remain in the relationship

―only so far as it is thought by both parties to deliver enough satisfaction of each individual to stay in it‖ (ibid: 58; see also Beck and Beck-Gernsheim 1995). Thus the pure relationship comes to exemplify women and men‘s desire for emotional fulfillment and thus, new forms of intimacy between equals (Whitehead 2002: idem).

5.4 Inequalities, Power, and Change

While young Paduan men‘s desires for ―complicity‖ with their sexual partners perhaps suggests that a change in gender relationships is occurring, scholars such as Jamieson

(1998, 1999) have argued that there exists a lack of evidence to indicate that the pursuit of intimacy is an organizing principle of men and women‘s lives. She (1998:170) suggests that consumerism and ―rampant self-interest… may have catastrophic consequences for personal and social life.‖ These factors, when aligned with persistent gender inequality, shed doubt on the ability of couples to experience intimacy unhindered by power imbalances. Put simply, ―intimacy‖ is not ungendered. Whitehead (2002:160)

125 A social relation which is internally referential, that is, depends fundamentally on satisfactions or rewards generic to that relation itself.

228 similarly points out that ―given the historical and continuing unequal balance in public- private gender relations, the notion of a sudden emergence of equality between women and men, which the pure relationship demands seems somewhat naive.‖126

While possible to distinguish between younger and older men‘s discourse about sexuality, especially as this is linked to a shift in consumeristic practices, regardless of age all of the discussions I had with men about sexuality were embedded to some extent in gender inequality. In the case of older men this was manifest in the manner in which many likened women to objects, and the ways in which their discourse can be linked to a utilitarian phase of Italian consumption. And while younger men are seemingly advocates of complicity and creativity in the bedroom, this was often framed in terms of women‘s responsibility. In other words, it is her job to keep the creativity alive through new lingerie and perfumes, and it is thanks to her that complicity in the relationship is established in the first place.

What do I find sexually attractive? Well I like things to be new… I don‘t know, take lingerie for example… not like it‘s super important but after a year that you always see the same underwear… always the same thing… the same perfume… the same ways, you know? I think it probably happens to everyone… but I get bored (mi rompono i coglioni) so I go looking for something new elsewhere. Maybe in a more sublime manner, like changing my motorcycle… or instead of getting a chocolate ice-cream -which I always get- I start getting licorice flavor. But something has to change… and then when I just can‘t handle it any longer, I change partners. And maybe in general I don‘t even give a damn about having sex with her, you understand- a relationship goes deeper than that. On the other hand, there is something about smelling a new perfume, the novelty, things that change. I don‘t know, maybe I sound like a Peter Pan, but what can I say? I feel this way, after a while I get bored, that‘s the point. (Christian, 31)

126 Whitehead (2002: 159) points out that the ―pure relationship‖ can also be seen to be less about relationships as such, and more about the need for the ontologically insecure individual to mitigate the existential dilemmas that arise for her/him in a contingent, fragmented, increasingly secularized ―risk‖ society (see also Giddens, 1991; Beck 1992; Beck and Beck-Gernsheim 1995; Bauman 2003).

229

Jameison (1999) suggests that the ―fragility‖ of today‘s heterosexual couples (e.g. high divorce rates, declining marriages, and more broadly changing family formations) is a consequence of ―the tension between strengthening cultural emphasis on intimacy, equality and mutuality in relationships and the structural supports of gender inequalities, which make these ideals difficult to attain.‖

We might further reflect on gender inequality in the bedroom in terms of the ways younger men talked about female as opposed to male initiation in the sexual relationship.

Interestingly, young Paduan men who came from working-class backgrounds expressed a preference for female patterns of initiation. Dworkin and O‘Sullivan (2007:116) suggest that men who come from working-class backgrounds may have grown up in households where both parents had to work, and thus extend their understanding of shared labor into the sexual realm (see also Collins 1990). In fact, despite the common belief that working men hold more traditional gender ideologies than middle and upper class men, a number of studies have shown that the former are actually more likely to share power in certain realms (John and Shelton 1997; Stohs 2000). While most young Paduan men expressed a desire for more companionate relationships (or ―complicity‖) the fact that working-class men expressed a preference for female initiated sex could reflect greater equality in the relationship. This result contrasts with the more stereotypical images of the ―new man‖ and ―new lad‖ in which the theoretically lower educated, lower-class ―new lads‖ might be expected see and treat women more as objects, like the older men described above.

Although both ―new men‖ and ―new lads‖ had, at times, a rather ―pornographic‖ concept of the female gender, there were definite signs that younger men of all different levels of

230 education and social-economic backgrounds were moving away from the more biased views of their fathers, a topic I return to in Chapter 7.

Alternatively, younger men may be more influenced by the popular media127 than their fathers, and thus more likely to want, themselves, to be ―objects of desire‖ as outlined above. Dworkin and O‘Sullivan (2007:117) further point out that a preference for female initiated sex may simply indicate a reinforcement of old rules: ―a discourse of women pleasing men (no matter who initiates)‖; they question whether sexual egalitarianism can or will translate into egalitarianism in other realms (e.g. household labor and child care). Along these lines, the authors suggest that men may speak as if they approve of gender equality while simultaneously enjoying the ―benefits‖ that women‘s dual burden supplies. ―That is, women‘s increased immersion in the occupational structure, increased contributions to household income, and little change in their already disproportionate levels of household labor may now be coupled with increased pressure to or willingness to initiate sex‖ (idem). This may mean that images of superwomen

(juggling multiple realms) might now also extend to expectation for women in the bedroom. In short, relationships are not easy, and negotiations of sexuality and the body within them soon become a complicated matter. To confuse matters even further, relationships are not just about sexuality but, in Giddens‘s (1992) terms, they require a conscious ―effort bargain‖ by both parties.

More broadly, ethnographic investigation into men‘s perceptions of the body and heterosexuality provides a window through which to understand the ways men construct male identity and their gendered positioning vis-à-vis women. Although a discourse of

127 In fact, a number of studies have shown that the lower classes watch more television than the higher classes.

231 intimacy and complicity remains embedded to some extent in inequality, growing similarity in the behavior of young men and women hints at increasing equality between the sexes. Indeed, if the body is gendered – and hence inscribed with gender specific meanings reflecting the cultural, economic, and political milieu of its experience, we may very well have cause to interpret the perceptions and gestures inscribed in many young

Paduan men‘s bodies as a growing similarity to women, or, more broadly, a growing homogenization of gender and sexuality. On the other hand, growing resemblance between the sexes may be a double-edged sword, as men are increasingly objectified in the mass media and through consumer culture. This in turn has consequences for their sexuality, as they compare their bodies with those they see on billboards and in magazines and are bombarded by sexual imagery that is not physically accessible.

Ethnographic data on men‘s heterosexuality also grants a means through which to think more specifically about the links between sexuality and demographic processes.

Discussions with men reflect both a general impression that men are having less sex due to ―distractions‖ such as entertainment and activities meant for self-fulfillment (i.e. salsa dancing classes, English courses, rock-climbing, etc.), and that men are ―Peter Pans‖ who want to have as much fun (i.e. sex) as possible before they settle down with one woman.

Both attitudes fit into the larger framework of the Second Demographic Transition theory in terms of a disengagement from civic and community associations in order to pursue individualistic goals of self-actualization (whether this be sex or other). Growing individualism in the sexual sphere may also in part be a cause of Italy‘s very low fertility rates. Certainly, ethnographic data collected in Padua hints at a gradual shift in men‘s attitudes and practices in things sexual. In the next chapter, I examine another gradual

232 shift, of that of the increasing number of cohabitations in Padua, and more broadly, men‘s union related experiences.

CHAPTER 6. UNION FORMATION: CONJUNCTURES AND CONSTRUALS

Over the last several decades Italy has seen a shift in the timing and types of union formation, and Padua is no exception. One aspect of such change has been the spread of cohabitation, beginning in the 1970s. Some scholars have explained the rising popularity of cohabitation as a reflection of growing individualism and secularism (Lesthaeghe and van de kaa 1986, Lesthaeghe 1995), while others have pointed to economic aspects such as growth in industry, increased female participation in the labor market, and changing gender roles (Smock 2000; Löffler 2009). Recent data from the Italian National Institute of Statistics (2005) show that non-marital cohabitation has steadily increased in Italy beginning with the cohorts born in the mid-1960s (Rosina and Fraboni 2004; Istat 2005) as has the proportion of women with at least one experience of cohabitation (Castiglioni and Dalla Zuanna 2009). In addition, the number of marriages preceded by cohabitation has rapidly risen, especially in the Centre-North regions of Italy (idem).128

Yet Italy and other Southern European countries differ from the rest of Europe with regard to the prevalence of cohabitation. In the mid-1990s, about 30% of women age

25-29 in Sweden and Denmark were cohabiting, more than 25% in France, about 17% in

128 Castiglioni and Dalla Zuanna (2009) report that while only 6% of first weddings celebrated in the 1980s, and 12% of those celebrated in the 1990s, were preceded by cohabitation, this rose to 22% of first marriages celebrated from 1999-2003 (data from Family and Social Subjects survey 2003). Of particular interest to this study, among those married between 1993 and 2003, the highest proportion of marriages preceded by cohabitations is found in Northeast Italy (22.1% during the period of 1994-1998, rising to 34.1% in 1999-2003), with the Northwest area is a close second (14.8% and 33.7% respectively during this two periods). Indeed, distinct regional patterns characterize Italy. For example, while cohabitation in 2000- 2001 ranged from 5-8% in the northern regions this dropped to less than 2% in the South (Istat 2001). 233

234

Germany and the Netherlands, compared to less than 5% in Italy (Kiernan 1999). By the turn of the 20th century 40% of Swedish adults aged 25 to 34 were living in cohabitation compared to less than 10% of young adults in Portugal and Italy (Kiernan 2004). Such differences are embedded in the particular context of union and family formation in Italy where youth not only postpone events related to the transition to adulthood (i.e. leaving the home, forming a union, becoming a parent), but there is typically a high synchronization between departure from the parental home and entry into marriage

(Billari et al. 2000; Billari 2004; Ongaro 2004; Schröder 2008: 1694). Generally, it has been argued that economic dependence on the family, a rigidly structured housing market, high youth unemployment rates, and strong family ties are responsible for the limited diffusion of cohabitation. In this chapter, I explore men‘s union related experiences especially as these concern the emergent phenomenon of cohabitation and the effect of increasingly delayed unions on fertility outcomes. I argue that we can learn much from the bargaining between, and influence of, peers, parents, and partners as men navigate the ―conjunctures‖ of cohabitation and marriage (Johnson-Hanks 2007).

Interestingly, the relative lack of non-marital cohabiting unions compared to other countries does not appear to be due to a limited interest of Italian youth towards this type of union. In fact, as early as the 1980s, surveys have shown high levels of positive attitudes towards non-marital cohabitation, and a majority of youth who declare they would be willing to cohabit (Di Guilio and Rosina 2007: 447). In their edited volume,

Buzzi et al. (2002) use a survey conducted every 4 years (starting in 1983-2000) on a nationally representative sample to show that over time, the number of youth age 15-24 who consider cohabitation to be permissible and do not exclude the possibility of doing it

235 themselves slowly increased, from 76 to 87% with regard to the former and from 65 to

80% with regard to the latter, over the period 1983-2000. Their perception of societal acceptance towards cohabitation rose even more dramatically, from 36 to 66% during the same time period.

Scholars such as Barbagli (1997), Rosina (2002), Rosina and Billari (2003),

DiGiulio and Rosina (2007) and Castiglioni and Dalla Zuanna (2009) have argued that mechanisms related to strong intergenerational relationships (i.e. between parents and children) and a weak welfare state are the primary factors driving the relatively scarce diffusion of cohabitation in Italy. Despite such overwhelming positive attitudes towards cohabitation, these scholars suggest that youth may ―avoid choices which openly clash with the values of parents‖ and hence circumvent any financial or emotional sanctions which might result from the choice to cohabit (Axinn and Thornton 1993; Goldscheider and Goldscheider 1993, 1999; Rosina and Fraboni 2004: 162). Indeed, Rosina and

Micheli (2006) recently demonstrated that during the ―decision-making processes of forming household, Italian parents are very willing to provide generous support to their children if they conform to parental expectations‖ (Di Guilio and Rosina 2007: 445).129

Along similar lines, Castiglioni and Dalla Zuanna (2009) suggest that the limited diffusion but (gradual) rise in non-marital cohabitation can be linked to the age of parents. More specifically, they point to the difference in the age of the parents of youth who responded in 1996 and in 2000 to Buzzi et al.‘s (2002) cohabitation survey cited

129 Castiglioni and Dalla Zuanna write, ―Parents are extremely influential and powerful in their ability to conduct their children towards marital behaviours which are in line with their expectations. Not only do they use moral pressure (enhanced by a significant portion of life spent together) but parents can also adopt more concrete tools of persuasion, such as substantial monetary help for the construction or purchase of a home. Indeed, more than 50% of couples in Italy who married in the 1990s received this sort of aid from their parents‖ (see also Barbagli et al. 2003).

236 above, noting that there occurs a considerable increase during these years in the perception of social acceptance towards cohabitation (from 46 to 66%). The higher percentage in 2000 reflects the fact that the respondents‘ parents were young just before or during Italy‘s ―cultural revolution‖130 of the 1970s. They argue that cohabitation could begin to spread in Italy only with the acquiescence of (more open-minded) parents and that Italy –despite a delay of 20-25 years– has begun to resemble other European countries.

While scholars interested in changing family formation have looked both at intergenerational relationships and women‘s union related experiences, little work has been done on how men navigate the period leading up to and the decision to cohabitate or marry. In this chapter, I aim to provide a more nuanced understanding of why such an overwhelming number of young Italian men declare that they find cohabitation to be acceptable and would consider doing it themselves, yet in reality few actually do so.

What happens in the relatively few cases in which young men decide to cohabit instead of (or before) marriage? Why do so many men live with their parents until marriage, if they feel so positively towards cohabitation? I argue that it is not only broader social processes such as the SDT that shape fertility outcomes, union formation, gender relations, and male identity, but individual agency which shapes larger social and demographic developments. Building on theorists such as Kertzer, Carter, Bledsoe, and

Johnson-Hanks, in this chapter I treat Italian culture not as a ―laundry list of traits‖ but

130 The so-called ―cultural revolution of the 1970s in Italy saw the a number of changes in legislation concerning the family: in 1970, divorce became legal; in 1971, contraceptive advertising was legalized; in 1974 an abrogative referendum failed to change the law on divorce; in 1975, a new family law equalized the rights of children born out-of-wedlock and those born within marriage; in 1978, abortion was legalized; and in 1981, an abrogative referendum failed to change the law on abortion (Castiglioni and Dalla Zuanna 2009: 7).

237 rather as both the degree of autonomy or ―agency‖ with which ―individuals may manipulate culturally produced norms and beliefs for their own ends‖ (Kertzer 1997:144) and culture which ―does not dictate a particular code of conduct, but instead involves an endless process of negotiation‖ (Kreager 1985: 136). Through use of Johnson-Hanks‘ theory of the ―demographic conjunctures,‖ I describe both specific contexts of action concerning union formation, and the ways in which men make sense of, and engage with the former. After providing historical perspective to marriage and union formation in present day Padua, I analyze two cases studies through the lens of conjunctures and construals. I conclude by reflecting on the usefulness of this approach, and its implications for understanding changing male identity, union formation, and low fertility.

6.1 Conjunctures and Culturally-Configured Construals

In her book, Uncertain Honor: Modern Motherhood in an African Crisis, Jennifer

Johnson Hanks (2006) explores the role of the Beti honor system in shaping the relationship between formal schooling and delayed childbearing in southern Cameroon.

Interested in ―the social causes of statistical patterns,‖ Johnson-Hanks skillfully shows how Beti schoolgirls delay ―social motherhood‖ or the socially recognized status of being a mother, which goes beyond simply giving birth, but includes wider aspects such as marriage (ideally with the blessing of the Church) and taking on the responsibility of caregiving. Other states of motherhood are seen as conditions of ―uncertain honor.‖

Women postpone social motherhood by regulating, or ―disciplining‖ their reproduction, not only before and after conception, but also during pregnancy. Should they have an unexpected pregnancy, they have abortions or send their children away to be raised by relatives, and consequently are able to continue their education despite having given

238 birth. Johnson-Hanks shows that Beti schoolgirls are less likely than uneducated women to experience first births and entry into culturally acknowledged motherhood at the same time.

In order to capture this remarkable behavior, Johnson-Hanks develops a theoretical approach she defines as the ―vital conjuncture,‖ which builds on the work of scholars such as Bourdieu, Sahlins, and Bledsoe and allows her to explore the relationships between the individual and society, or agency and structure. In her words, vital conjunctures are ―socially structured zones of possibility that emerge around specific periods of potential transformation in a life… temporary configurations of possible change, critical durations of uncertainty and potentiality‖ (2006: 22). More specifically, she uses case studies to show how pregnant Beti schoolgirls navigate uncertain periods in their lives when ―potential futures are galvanized and others are made improbable‖ and illustrates how these vital conjunctures unfold as women sort out the contradictory expectations of the Beti honor system: a woman should have children when young, they should stay in school, and they should marry before having children

(2006:3). Through vital conjunctures we can understand Beti women‘s reproductive histories as social – instead of as events which happen to individuals – and examine the

―horizons of the conjuncture‖ which orient action…―translating local values into population facts‖ (2006:234).

There are several broader implications of this interpretive paradigm for understanding demographic phenomena. One is that demographic outcomes like the correlation between women‘s schooling and education, or, in this case, the ―strong Italian family,‖ processes of individualism, and men‘s union formation, cannot always be

239 explained in terms of a causal model. Rather, Johnson-Hanks encourages us to think of demographic outcomes as the result of culturally mediated aspirations and attempts to capitalize on perceived opportunities. A second implication is that conjunctures are not discrete or conceptually instantaneous occurrences, but they have a duration and are variable in character (2006: 25). When thinking about men‘s decision to cohabit or marry we may do well to remember that these events are not simply outcomes in and of themselves, but that the vital conjuncture leading up to union formation may have multiple outcomes over different time frames (idem). In Johnson-Hanks‘ (2006: 25) words,

Concomitant with the departure from an event-based model is the move from actuality to potential, for vital conjunctures are defined in part by their horizons, their structured sphere of possibilities. In an analysis of vital conjunctures, we need to ask what kinds of futures are imaged, hoped for, or feared, and how these orientations might motivate specific courses of action. By thinking about life histories in terms of vital conjunctures, rather than in canonical stages, we can ask whole new sets of questions. When and how do life domains cohere? Which elements of the life course are cumulative, periodic, or waxing and waning? How are transitions in specific life domains navigated, and their implications for other life domains interpreted?

Johnson-Hanks (2007) pursues these questions in a recent article entitled What kind of theory for anthropological demography? in which she reflects on the prospects of further developing the budding discipline of anthropological demography. More specifically, she (2007: 4) develops a preliminary theoretical model of ―demographic conjunctures‖ for the intersection of cultural anthropology and demography which integrates Bourdieu‘s (1977, 1984, 1998) social practice and Sewell‘s (1992, 2005) duality of structure, with classical population analysis (e.g. Leridon 1977; Halbwachs and

Sauvy 2005). Johnson-Hanks suggests that we might better understand demographic rates

240 as ―events divided by exposure to the risk of events… [allowing for the] modeling of social conjunctures in which events occur.‖ In other words, she sees rates as the product of numerous ―conjunctures‖ or contexts of action (located within the larger social structure) and culturally configured ―construals‖ (or the processes through which individuals make sense of, and engage with, conjunctures). We can think of this in somewhat simplified terms as:

Rates = distribution of conjunctures* x culturally configured construal**

*Specific contexts of action within the broader ―structure‖; can be mundane or vital **Actor‘s interpretation of and engagement with the conjuncture

Conjunctures refer broadly to all of the conditions relevant to the ―flow of action‖ and as such are historically specific but also constantly in flux (and thus represent more than simply the ―context‖). Conjunctures capture both the particular configuration of the conditions in which the action takes place as well as the juxtapositions of different life domains (2007: 13). Conjunctures can be either ―mundane,‖ when common changes occur gradually, or ―vital,‖ when ―structural elements converge that dramatically reconfigure the kinds of futures that are possible or even desirable.‖131 Below I introduce two stories, those of Claudio and of Danilo. The first tells the tale of a ―vital‖ conjuncture, or when Claudio and his partner experience an unintended pregnancy, and represents a rather unusual case given the broader circumstances of Claudio‘s family relations (or the absence thereof). The second story recounts a relatively ―mundane‖

131 Examples of ―vital‖ conjunctures include ―an unintended pregnancy, health emergency or sudden job loss [which] may instigate a time of uncertainty and reevaluation of all major life domains. (2007:14; see also Johnson-Hanks work described above in Uncertain Honor 2006).

241 conjuncture or that of the context of action leading up to Danilo and his partner setting a wedding date, within which, however, there also occurred a notable ―vital conjuncture.‖

Construals, on the other hand, represent the actor‘s ―interpretation of and engagement with the conjuncture in the form of demographically relevant action‖

(2007:14). In this chapter on union formation, these might be attending Church regularly, taking time off of work to look for an apartment, eating Sunday dinners at a partner‘s parents‘ house, leaving clothes or a toothbrush, or sleeping regularly together. These actions interpret the ―complex set of relevant structural elements into a concrete behavioral stance‖ (2007:14). Drawing on Sewell (1992, 2005) and Bourdieu (1977,

1984), Johnson-Hanks is careful to point out that we do not choose the schemas and resources used to interpret our surroundings but they are unavoidable components of human engagement with the world (idem). Importantly, although construals may entail or imply a decision, they are to be understood as interpretations of context, ―so routinized and normalized that they never surface as mental schemas, let alone as ‗decisions‘.‖

Rates are thus the product or interplay of (vital or mundane) conjunctures (or

―short term configurations of social structure‖) and the ways in which the actors involved construe the conjuncture, ―refracted through the habits of thought and interpretation‖

(2007:16). This theory of demographic conjunctures is appealing in that it allows for both a temporal dimension and contextual specificity. It is also attractive because it incorporates an issue dear to anthropologists, or the fact that our interest lays not so much in to what degree individuals can

―effectively translate their fixed intentions into concrete action, but rather the processes of subject formation that inculcate people with certain kinds of aspirations, habits and intentions in the first place…In this perspective, there is no

242

use in thinking about intentions, goals, or choices without considering the social processes through which the categories of intention and choice are formed‖ (Johnson-Hanks 2007: 8; see also Foucault 1990, 1997; Keane 1997; Mahmood 2005).

The man who wants to live with his girlfriend, for example, finds himself facing different possible futures. The conjuncture continues as long as there remain possible and imaginable future trajectories, and ends when one takes on the ―fullness of actuality, displacing all others in the ―future perfect‖ he imagines‖ (Shutz 1967:67 cited in

Johnson-Hanks 2006: 194). The man may move in with his girlfriend, forming a non- marital cohabiting union with no intention to marry at the time of doing so. He may cohabit, but decide - beforehand or afterwards - with his partner to marry. Or he may choose to marry, opting out of cohabitation. Of these options, many men describe a preference for cohabitation, yet few actually choose cohabiting over marriage. An analysis of two case studies (or conjunctures) allows us to gain a better understanding of this difference between what people say and what they actually do. The case studies also allow, as Johnson-Hanks (2007: 6) might put it, to make sense of situations in which social motivations for behavior (e.g. a preference for cohabitation) directly contradict statistical norms (e.g. low cohabitation, high marriage). Depending on the particular circumstances that the decision to live together initiates (or the specific conditions of the conjuncture and construal) one or another option may appear more viable. In other words, the trajectory that a man follows often results from a series of choices made possible by the available means to reach one of a variety of potentially desirable ends, rather than from an effort ―to optimize the chances of achieving a specific, predetermined end by whatever means possible‖ (Johnson-Hanks 2006: 194).

243

After providing historical background to union formation and marriage in contemporary Padua, I introduce the conjunctures of Claudio and Danilo. These case studies illustrate the wider applicability of Johnson-Hanks‘ theoretical paradigm of conjunctures and culturally constructed construal. Both men resolved their conjunctures in different ways, although their actions were oriented towards similar horizons and molded by similar construals. In other words, like the case studies Johnson-Hanks describes in her own work, Danilo and Claudio‘s stories and outcomes are different, but their arrangements of alternatives are similar.

6.2 A Brief History of Union Formation in Italy

In order to fully understand the characteristics of contemporary union formation in Italy one must take a step back to observe the history of residential and family patterns which characterized the last century. An enormous body of literature testifies to the distinct regional patterns of family formation in Italy, a thorough review of which is beyond the scope of the chapter.132 My intent is simply to provide a background to contemporary behavior, and an indication of the larger structural, material, and cultural elements leading up to the latter. Padua provides a particularly interesting setting for investigating rising cohabitation as Italians living in the Veneto region have historically followed a patrilocal pattern of residence. Indeed, throughout the 20th century, the patrilocal, complex family was most common in central and northeast Italy (Barbagli 2003 et al.:

49). This has meant that over the last century, Italians (especially men) in the area have

132 For scholarly work on the family in Italy see, among others, Barbagli (1977, 1984, 1997), Kertzer (1984, 1987, 1989, 1991a), Kertzer and Saller (1991b), Barbagli and Kertzer (1992), Barbagli and Saraceno (1997), Kertzer and Barbagli (2001), Yanagisako (2002), Barbagli, Castiglioni, and Dalla Zuanna (2003), and Viazzo (2003). For a thorough review of regional differences in terms of cohabitation, see Christin Löffler‘s excellent dissertation Non-Marital Cohabitation in Italy (2009, Max Planck Institute for Demographic Research).

244 tended to leave the home later, a fact that is still true today, and one of the primary variables pushing low-fertility (see chapter 1). Barbagli, Castiglioni, and Dalla Zuanna

(2003) hypothesize that the historical effects of the patrilocal tradition can be noted both in the contemporary tendency to leave the home in one‘s late twenties and the propensity for children to live near to their parents when they do depart. Underlying, lasting patriarchal sentiments continue to have an effect on ideas of marriage and, more generally, gender roles.

If during the pre-industrial era, the institution of marriage went largely unquestioned in Catholic Italy, the prospect of actually forming a family through wedding was not universal. Marriage was in fact conditioned by the availability of economic and material resources necessary to support a future family. Hereditary rules governing the passage of land meant that eldest sons would not inherit their own terrain until rather late in life age (when their own fathers became infirm or passed away). This often delayed forming a new family, and could in fact preclude the very possibility of doing so (Rosina et. al 2003: 173). So while the Veneto has traditionally been and continues to be a very Catholic region, this has not meant that marriage rates have always been high. In fact, the proportion of marriages at the beginning of the 20th century was relatively low, a consequence of both war and economic crises (see chp. 3). With the industrial revolution, however, more youth could gain the resources and capital to leave the paternal home and begin –through marriage133 – an autonomous life. During this

―golden age‖ of marriage (from the 19th century up until the mid-1960s), the number of weddings steadily increased due in large part to a declining age at first marriage and

133 This era continued, however, to be marked by asymmetrical relations between generations and genders.

245 population growth, reaching a peak in the 1960s (Rosina et al. 2003). Marriage was increasingly accepted as an event which simultaneously signaled a separation from the family of origin, the entrance into married life as a couple, and the beginning of reproductive activity.

Beginning in the late 1960s, the number of marriages in Italy began to decline, reaching the lowest levels during the 1990s, caused in large part by an increasingly late age at first marriage on the part of both men and women.134 This period also saw an increased presence of women in the labor force (Becker 1981), growing secularization, a feminist movement which questioned ―traditional‖ and patriarchal family forms,135 and more broadly, a change in the meaning of marriage itself. Up until the 1960s, marriage for women meant, for the most part, the beginning of their sexual and reproductive lives.

By the 1990s, however, the majority of brides married at least 8 years after having had first sexual intercourse. In Italy, marriage now tends to coincide with the departure from the natal family (for both men and women), and/or the beginning of economic autonomy and living in a different house. Over the last 30 years, the model of the ―modern‖ family based on affective relations has begun to evolve toward a ―late-modern‖ family in which aspirations of couple happiness have given way to the search for individual happiness (de

Singly 1993; Pocar and Ronfani 2003; Zanatta 2003). From a demographic perspective,

134 Paul Ginsborg (2003) notes that in 1981, 62.3 percent of men age 28 and 66.2 percent of women aged 25 were married. Ten years later, these figures had dropped to only 36.7 percent of men and 53.1 of women (see also Golini and Silvestrini 1995:91). ―At the same time the dominant practice continued to be that of having children only within marriage, a choice that revealed the deep residual legacy of Catholic teaching‖ (2003: 71).

135 Christin Schröder (2008: 1694) points out that the drop in marriage rates was not compensated for by ―a rise in the incidence of alternative living arrangements, such as cohabitation. Rather, it created a vacuum as a large proportion of young adults continue to stay with their family of origin rather than form a union‖ (De Sandre 1997; Kieran 1999)

246 this shift has rendered the institution of marriage more fragile. Marriage rates have continued to decline, while cohabitation and births out-of-wedlock have increased, as has divorce.

On the other hand, scholars have consistently demonstrated that beliefs in the value of the family, marriage, and births within marital unions still hold much sway in

Italy (De Sandre et al. 1997; Paloma 1999). Differently from other European countries, a large proportion of young Italians continue to attribute importance to marriage. In the nationally representative survey Family and Social Subjects (FSS) conducted in 1998, a relatively low percentage of youth in Italy (between the ages of 18-24) declared that

―marriage is an out-dated institution‖ (12% women and 15% men), yet this percentage is on the rise. In the 2003 FSS, 20.2% of women and 26.2% of men declared the same. On the other hand, among those of ―marrying age‖ (25-34 years of age), a lower percentage agreed that marriage is outdated: 15.8% of women and 22.5% of men. These statistics are somewhat surprisingly accompanied, as described in the introduction, by increasingly favorable attitudes towards cohabitation (Gubert 2000), as well as declining numbers of marriages per year (see Figure 8).136

136 Almost 400,000 marriages took place in 1972. This number was almost halved in 2007, when only 217, 290 marriages took place (Istat 2009).

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Figure 8. Number of marriages celebrated in Italy from 1950 to 2005 (Istat 2007)

Although all Italians are marrying less and later, this is especially true for men. A recent

study released by the National Institute of Italian Statistics (Istat) revealed that in 2006

almost 60% of women age 23 were married, compared to only 23% of men age 23. The

difference in age between spouses also sees men marrying women younger than

themselves, although age differences diminish as level of education and age at first

marriage increases - up until age 30 for women- when this tendency is reversed and

women begin to marry men younger than themselves by several years. On the contrary,

the older men get, the more likely they are to marry women much younger than

themselves; among men who marry between the ages of 35-39, only 13% marry someone

their age or older (Rosina and Sabbadini 2006: 143).

248

Figure 9. Average age of bride and groom at first marriage. Years 1952-2004 (Istat 2007)

Age

Groom Bride ss

The average age at first marriage in Italy is now 32.8 for men and 29.7 for women, on average 4-5 years older than that among their parents (Istat 2007, 2009). This delay is in many cases due to a desire to finish one‘s education, search for stable employment, or continue to spend time enjoying the economic, organizational, and sometime emotional advantages of staying in the parental home (Istat 2007: 2)

Civil marriages in Italy spread somewhat later than in other countries, in part due to the fact that civil value is given to weddings celebrated in the Catholic Church, without the necessity of couples having to repeat the ritual in the town hall. Couples who marry in the Church, however, must attend a pre-matrimonial preparatory course of about 10 weekly meetings. The most recent data available from Istat show that 34% of marriages

(and 25% of first marriages) are civil rather than religious, up 50% from 15 years ago.

This rises to 43% in the North, and declines to 18% in the South (Istat 2009). The decision of whether to marry in the Church on in the Town Hall has not been correlated with social class or education (either of the spouses or their parents). Rather, age is

249 positively correlated with civil marriages. Some have surmised that the older one is the less subject to the very strong ties that bind families and solidify social norms. Civil weddings are also much more common among couples who have cohabitated before marriage (Istat 2007).

Certainly, the meanings and attitudes associated with marriage and cohabitation are closely intertwined, and can hardly be defined independently of one another

(Mynarska and Bernardi 2007: 521). As outlined in the introduction, a number of reasons have been given for the increasing number of cohabitations in Italy, from growing individualism (Surkyn and Lesthaeghe 2004) and secularism (Coppi 2005; Castiglioni and Dalla Zuanna 2009), to increased gender equality and a desire to form unions outside of a patriarchal mold (Pasquini and Samoggia 2003; de Singly and Cicchelli 2003).

Castiglioni and Dalla Zuanna (2009) have shown a strong correlation between, on the one hand, premarital cohabitation, out-of-wedlock births, and legal separations, and on the other hand, votes in favor of divorce in the 1974 referendum (a very relevant indicator of secularization in Italy, see Livi Bacci 1977). Similar results were obtained by Dalla

Zuanna and Righi, (1999) and Billari and Borgoni (2002a, 2002b). More generally, scholars have shown that Italians more involved in the Catholic Church are less likely to cohabit and divorce (Castiglioni and Dalla Zuanna 2009). More broadly, women and men who do cohabit tend to be young, not religious, have higher levels of education, and live in urban areas in the North (Nazio and Blossfeld 2003; Pasquini and Samoggia 2003).

Cohabitation has also been linked to economic difficulties connected with entering marriage (among lower class individuals) or, alternatively, with new values and social change (Di Giulio and Rosina 2007). These motives seem to exist concurrently, and can

250 even overlap. Among the ―young‖ men I interviewed (age 25-35) perceptions of cohabitation ranged from a premarital step, a test of compatibility and the strength of the relationship, one experience among many, or as an alternative to marriage. None of the men I spoke to under the age of 40 were against cohabitation, while as age increased more and more men dismissed cohabitation as ―too easy‖ and as a ―refusal to take on responsibility.‖

In the case studies of Claudio and Danilo which follow, I examine two specific union-related conjunctures, the resources available and the schema through which these two men interpreted and engaged with the conjuncture. I argue that although the men resolve their conjunctures in different ways, their actions can be understood as oriented towards similar horizons. An analysis of the dialectical product of these conjunctures and construals allows for a better understanding of the spreading phenomenon of cohabitation, the potential consequences for fertility outcomes, and changing male identity. More broadly, I aim to examine why, if so many men profess an acceptance of cohabitation and even a desire to cohabit themselves, so few actually choose to do so.

Finally, the application of a demographic conjuncture model allows for a reflection concerning the usefulness of this approach for examining demographic rates.

6.3 Case Studies

6.3.1 Claudio

Claudio‘s (age 28) vital conjuncture began in late January of 2008 when he and his girlfriend, Francesca (age 32) discovered to their surprise that she was pregnant. When I met them, they had been dating for about a year-and-a-half and felt very much in love.

Their relationship began during a training session for the employees of a furniture

251 company where Francesca worked in the restocking and warehouse department. Claudio happened to instruct the course, and soon after the training ended, the two started dating.

Claudio soon left his position as an employee of the company and found a job more closely related to his area of expertise in economics and business finance (he graduated from the University of Padua in 2006). At the time of my fieldwork he worked in the managerial division of a medium-size supermarket chain, while Francesca, who had a degree from a technical high school, stayed on in the furniture company. Over a number of interviews and time spent together, I spoke at length with both Claudio and Francesca about the events leading up to and following her unexpected pregnancy.

The vital conjuncture in which I found Claudio and Francesca included a number of life domains, ranging from their residential situations and employment statuses, to the very physical changes Francesca experienced as her belly grew. As Claudio engaged with this vital conjuncture, the conjuncture itself was in constant flux, and at times certain elements appeared more important than others. The focus here is on ―which elements of the context mattered and when and how these elements are related‖ (Johnson-Hanks

2006). For example, leading up to the pregnancy, Claudio was working hard at establishing himself in his first stable (not precarious) job, which allowed him to live reasonably comfortably (1600 Euros a month). Meanwhile, at the furniture warehouse,

Francesca earned 800 Euros a month, a salary that just allowed her to scrape by, although she supplemented her income by teaching dance lessons several evenings a week. Both

Claudio and Francesca had been living (separately) autonomously for a number of years, without any financial help from their parents.

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Around the time of our first encounter, the couple found themselves debating whether or not to move in together. In the meantime, they insisted on not sleeping at one another‘s houses. Claudio explained that he and Francesca simply preferred to maintain a net distinction between living together and dating, such that the decision to move in together would represent a considerable –and very much desired - next step for both of them. Claudio, in particular, favored marriage; he felt that cohabitation translated into ―a sort of any easy way out‖ and viewed the latter as a temporary, and hopefully, brief phase along the way towards the ultimate goal of making ―the big step‖ (il grande passo).

Francesca, on the other hand, while raised in a very Catholic family, felt relatively indifferent towards marriage and had for some years refused the Catholic teachings of her youth. She envisioned marriage as something that she would like to do, but in a very non- religious fashion – ―a party in which our friends would help us celebrate our union publicly.‖ When the couple discovered that Francesca expected a baby, however, they suddenly put their views of cohabitation and marriage on the backburner while they decided how to deal with the pregnancy. Indeed, the unintended pregnancy brought about a time of uncertainty and reevaluation of many of Claudio‘s life domains (Johnson-Hanks

2007). The couple instantly agreed that they would keep the child, but this decision opened up a period of ambiguity, as they struggled to plan their futures.

Vital conjunctures of this kind – births-out-of-wedlock – represent an uncommon, but growing phenomenon in Italy, reflecting the spread of a Second Demographic

Transition. In fact, according to recent estimates from Istat, about 18% of births in Italy now occur out-of-wedlock (or about 80,000 births a year), more than double that of 10

253 years ago when this value equaled 8%.137 On the other hand, these percentages seem quite low when compared to other countries such as Sweden, Norway, Estonia, and

Bulgaria where more than 50% of babies are born outside of marriage (Eurostat 2006).

Other countries are close. In 2006, the rate was 46% in Denmark, 47% in Slovenia and,

44% in Britain. Even Spain has a higher rate of births out-of-wedlock at 27%. This comparative perspective reveals the relatively high social stigma towards births outside of marriage which still characterizes much of Italy.138 Indeed, when Claudio and

Francesca discovered the pregnancy, they immediately had to face questions of how, when, and in Claudio‘s case if, to tell their parents; when and if they would get married; and when and where they would start living together.

Ultimately, the couple decided to live together in a non-marital cohabiting union, and to reconsider marriage after the birth of the child. A full understanding of this decision necessitates a closer look at both Claudio and Francesca‘s perception of cohabitation, as well as their parents, and peers, attitudes towards the latter. Indeed, given the strong influence of parents in Italy in guiding the union-related decisions of their adult children, the fact that Claudio and Francesca decided to cohabit rather than marry – especially considering the pregnancy – reflects a particular engagement with this vital conjuncture. As outlined in the introduction, studies have suggested that adult children may decide against cohabitation in order to meet parental expectations or to avoid negative sanctions, such as refusal of economic support. Claudio and Francesca‘s

137Istat: ―Natalità e fecondità della popolazione residente. Caratteristiche e tendenze recenti‖ http://www.istat.it/salastampa/comunicati/non_calendario/20060801_00/. See also Billari (2008:9).

138The percentage of out-of-wedlock birth in Italy is characterized by significant regional variation. In the northern regions of Italy, in fact, recent estimates show that 25% of births occur outside of marriage, a level almost equal to that of Spain. In the South, on the other hand out-of-wedlock births are much less common.

254 financial independence translated into a lesser inclination to seek parental endorsement.

In fact, Claudio had a falling out with his family and hadn‘t spoken to them for several years, making this a highly atypical case in the Italian context. Nonetheless, Silverstein and Bengtson (1997) have found that not only the actual exchange of goods holds importance but also the potential for future support, what they define as ―latent solidarity.‖ In addition, we might think of Claudio‘s conjuncture as a mathematical outlier, which not only puts into perspective the ―typical‖ situation of the ―strong‖ Italian family, but provides an occasion to investigate what happens in the absence of the latter.

In Claudio‘s case, however, the lack of contact with his family signified that the latter played no role in his decision to cohabit with Francesca, perhaps again suggestive of the normative control parents have over their children.139 While Claudio finally told his parents of Francesca‘s pregnancy during her 7th month of gestation – he adamantly explained that he had no intention of accepting help from his parents, nor listening to any advice they might have to offer. More broadly, Claudio enacted his interpretation and engagement with the conjuncture through a complex set of relevant structural elements – financial independence, limited contact with his parents, a belief in marriage but nothing against a period of cohabitation – that translated into his ―reading‖ of the situation and later, his concrete behavioral stance.

Claudio could, however, only interpret his experience through the set of schemas he had been socialized to ―see‖ through. As Johnson-Hanks points out, ―We do not choose the schemas through which we interpret our surroundings, and can step outside

139 Di Giulio and Rosina (2007) similarly link the strength of father-daughter relationships to the likelihood of women cohabiting. They find that daughters who lived most of their childhood without a father have a higher risk of experiencing cohabitation.

255 them only with extraordinary difficulty.‖140 Similarly, Francesca ―read‖ the situation through her own existing categories, values, and resources, in ways that were ―more or less conscious, more or less consistent, and more or less effective‖ (2007:15). While on good terms with her family, Francesca felt very strongly that their decision to keep the child, and her preference to cohabit rather than marry should ―belong‖ to her and Claudio alone, consciously choosing to refuse parents‘ wishes to see her marry immediately.

Unlike Claudio, however, Francesca felt conflicted because several schemas seemed to apply to her situation, yet they indicated contrasting courses of action. How could she maintain a positive relationship with her parents and hope to receive support from them in the future, without giving up her desire to cohabit with Claudio and have the baby first, before thinking about marriage? As Schröder (2008) points out, young adults who decide for cohabitation may be ―punished‖ in that they receive less generous help from their parents (Holdsworth and Irazoqui Solda 2002; Di Giulio 2004; Di Giulio and Rosina 2007). To make matters worse, Francesca‘s strongly Catholic parents expressed great reservations towards both cohabitation and births out-of-wedlock.141

140 She gives by way of example, the impossibility of listening to people speaking a language one knows and hearing only the pitch, tone, and volume, but not the meaning of the words. Similarly, ―schemas are unavoidable components of ordinary human engagement with the world. This inescapability of schemas applies to conjunctures as well: social actors must ―read‖ the short-term configurations of context through existing categories and values. Social actors draw on both shared, cultural frameworks and individual predilections in making construals, which may be more or less conscious, more or less consistent, and more or less effective‖ (Johnson-Hanks 2007: 14-15).

141 Both of Francesca‘s parents also have very low levels of education (middle school and technical school). Schröder (2008) finds that the mother‘s level of education has a strong impact on her daughter‘s entry into cohabitation. She suggests that mothers with higher levels of education may have more open-minded attitudes towards any modern living arrangements of their daughters. ―We suppose that these mothers either use their autonomy to provide greater emotional support when their daughters enter cohabitation (against the wish of the father), or that they transmit modern values and attitudes to their daughter right from the start‖ (see also Billari and Rosina 2005; Schröder 2006).

256

Francesca recounted with much trepidation the scene in which she revealed both her pregnancy and their intention to cohabit. She had mentioned beforehand to her parents that she ―had a surprise‖ for them, and had carefully picked a restaurant for the revealing moment. When they sat down, she anxiously sought for a good way to divulge the news, finally managing to blurt out, ―Well, here we are… the surprise… Claudio and

I are moving in together… and we are expecting a baby!!‖ Her father (retired factory worker), after tightly gripping the table in anger, leaned back, smacked his hands together, and said, ―ah… look what you‘ve gone and done!‖ (Guarda, cosa hai combinato!). Francesca translated this reaction into: ―ah… look what you‘ve brought onto the family…now we‘re going to all have to find a way to help you‖ given that her father then immediately inquired about Claudio‘s job, its stability, and questioned their ability to provide for the child. Her mother reacted with stunned surprise, followed by an urgent questioning of when they planned on getting married and a determined effort to convince them to tie the knot before the birth of the child. Francesca‘s mother‘s ultimate concern lay in how to face their other relatives, or rather, how to avoid the embarrassment of explaining Francesca‘s pregnancy in the absence of marriage. She irately commented, ―Well, it‘s better than being in an accident!‖ The tension subsided considerably, however, when Claudio calmly reassured Francesca‘s parents that they planned to marry, if not until after the birth of the child.

In a later conversation with both Claudio and Francesca, Francesca described her disappointment in the ideological gap between herself and her parents. Although not surprised by her parents‘ reaction, she had held a timid hope for a more positive reaction given her contentment with the pregnancy and her desire to maintain a strong relationship

257 with her family.142 Francesca hoped to find a way to interact with her parents in a more neutral fashion after the birth of the child, concerned that the latter should have contact with his/her grandparents, even if Francesca did not see eye to eye with them. Claudio supported Francesca in her preference for cohabitation, although he expressed awareness that this decision meant that they could count on little material support from her parents or his estranged parents. Although financially able to provide for themselves, they worried about how to manage upon the birth of the baby.

Certainly, the need to receive help –given a weak welfare state and low salaries - places young Italians at a disadvantage should they make choices their parents do not approve of. Perhaps fortunately for Claudio and Francesca, the couple mutually agreed on their course of action, had the financial means to back up their plan, and presented a united front towards their respective parents (in the case study which follows we will see that this does not always occur). As Di Giulio and Rosina (2007: 461) point out, ―partners may have different opinions and wishes about union formation, or they may suffer from different kinds of social and family pressures regarding their future relationship as a couple.‖ In this case, Claudio and Francesca prioritized – and had the means to do so - aspirations of couple and/or individual happiness, and as a result went against the grain of the ―strong Italian family‖ by negating Francesca‘s parents‘ wishes, cohabiting, and having a child out-of-wedlock. The independence they expressed and their alternative

142 In an effort to identify the strength of family ties on women‘s the decision to marry or cohabit Schröder (2006) defines, through ethnographic research, three different, if not mutually exclusive ―clusters‖ of women. These groups overlap interestingly with Paduan informants‘ union related conjunctures and include: a ―clashing of attitudes‖ cluster, a ―striving towards conformity‖ cluster, and a ―benefiting from parental support‖ cluster. Schröder also employs a methodology somewhat similar to a ―demographic conjunctures‖ model which allows her to capture both individual and social determinants of cohabitation: individual attitudes, perception of social pressure to conform to norms surrounding cohabitation, and women‘s motivation to comply with their parents wishes.

258 choice of forming a union and building a family reflect both the individualism and changing family formation characteristic of the Second Demographic Transition.

The outcome was also ―at once the product of [the couple‘s] construal of the conjuncture, and an element in the reinforcement or partial transformation of the social structures that brought it about‖ (Johnson-Hanks 2007:16). In other words, Claudio (and

Francesca‘s) inclination and intuition - produced out of their daily experiences where capital is unequally distributed - allowed them to partially recreate a world in which cohabitation and out-of-wedlock births are slowly becoming diffused. The particular set of schema and resources – financial independence, a willingness to cohabit rather than marry, individualistic attitudes, and aspirations towards couple happiness - which they used to interpret and engage with the vital conjuncture, combined in such a way that the outcome superseded other conflicting (especially in Francesca‘s case) schema and potential resources derived from the ―strong Italian family.‖

On the other hand, Claudio‘s use of a schema which sees marriage as an important step in life in some ways reinforced the social structure of life in Padua. The resolution to the conjuncture was also - in part - successful in that his future in-laws accepted their cohabitation and developing unwed pregnancy as (hopefully) temporary states. Although Francesca‘s parents refused to provide immediate financial support, there remained the possibility of potential future assistance. Indeed, as the Francesca‘s pregnancy bloomed, contact with her parents and material and emotional support increased. Francesca, however, continued to keep her parents at arm‘s length, and

Claudio did not rebuild his fragmented relationship with his parents, continuing to

259 prioritize a schema based on couple happiness rather than appeasing kin relations in return for emotional and material rewards.

Their prioritizing a construal of individualistic/couple happiness (made possible by financial and emotional independence) over the ―strong family‖ (or a strong motivation to comply with parental desires) may lead to more of their peers construing pregnancies (unintended, mistimed, or planned) in this way. On the other hand, the unusual circumstances which saw an absence of strong family ties in Claudio‘s life means that this case is more of an exception than the rule, and if anything confirms that parental attitudes are a driving factor behind low rates of cohabitation. More broadly, the outcome of the vital conjuncture suggests that ―ideational changes in societies which follow the direction of self orientation, individualism, and de-normitization are ideal conditions for attitudinal changes towards cohabitation and are the driving force behind the transition from one stage to the next‖ (Mynarska and Bernardi 2007:528, see also

Lesthaeghe 1983, 1995, van de Kaa 1987, Lesthaeghe and Surkyn 1988).

6.3.2 Danilo

The second case study differs substantially from the one just recounted, yet the horizons towards which the conjuncture was oriented are very similar to the conjuncture with which Claudio and Francesca were engaged. This is the story of Danilo (age 34) and

Agata (age 30) and their setting a wedding date. Over the course of my fieldwork, Danilo,

Agata and I had many opportunities to talk and spend time together and I closely followed the developments leading up to their decision to marry. Danilo and Agata both had high levels of education and somewhat similar professions: Agata an ambitious clinical psychologist and Danilo a medical doctor. Otherwise, their backgrounds differed

260 considerably. Agata, a deeply Catholic woman, lived on her own in a small run-down apartment, and believed in the value of marriage. Despite working long, hard hours, she struggled to make ends meet as she determinedly built up a client base (working for free in a number of settings, a typical situation for psychologists looking to strike out on their own but needing the structural support of larger institutions and/or established colleagues). Danilo, on the other hand, still lived with his parents, despite the fact that he had been working for several years as an occupational physician143 and earned a significant salary (5,000 Euros/month). He described himself as not Catholic, although he would like to marry one day. He viewed cohabitation as a step towards that goal; as a test of the relationship.

The couple‘s relationship began quite some time ago - going on 6 years at the time of my fieldwork - and they had established a routine common among many Italian couples. Apart from seeing each other often, they regularly ate Sunday dinner with

Danilo‘s parents, occasionally making the trip to a nearby town where Agata‘s parents lived to share this meal with them as well. In the summer months they often spent a week or more vacationing with Agata‘s parents, staying with them in their small apartment in a nearby beach town outside of Venice. When referring to each other‘s respective parents, both Agata and Danilo often used the word ‗in-laws‖ (suoceri) despite the absence of a formal union. Danilo frequently slept at Agata‘s house, which Agata enjoyed, although preferred that Danilo not stay over too many nights a week. In fact, this conjuncture began when Danilo asked Agata if he might live with her temporarily, while he searched

143 An occupational physician works on preventing, diagnosing, and curing illnesses causes by work activities. They are especially trained to identify symptoms cause by workers‘ exposure to various chemicals, toxics, radiations, etc. Italian law requires all companies over a certain number of employees to have an occupational physician.

261 for an apartment of his own. When this temporary period began to seem not so impermanent to Agata, discussions about marriage and cohabitation became more frequent and in many ways contested as a result of their differing construals.

A demographic conjuncture model thus allows us to capture both the highly structured nature of the mundane event – marriage – as well the different life domains it conjoins (household structure, opportunities for career advancement, and the recent union behavior of friends) and its gradual unfolding over multiple time frames. The conjuncture that Danilo and Agata found themselves might, in fact, be considered a ―mundane conjuncture‖ is that their story is relatively common in Padua; many couples remain fidanzati (literally fiancés, although promises of marriage tend to be implicit rather than explicit)144 for extended periods of time (Bernardi, 2009). Furthermore, Danilo‘s

(eventually permanent) departure from the parental home in order to marry and the ages at which the couple chose a wedding date reflect broader trends in Italy (see above).

Yet Danilo‘s moving (temporarily) in with Agata opened up a period of uncertainty and ambiguity for both actors (and their parents and peers), as they interpreted and engaged with the conjuncture in the form of demographically relevant action. Indeed, we might consider this new living situation to be a ―vital‖ conjuncture, within the broader ―mundane‖ conjuncture of setting a date for the wedding. Certainly this change reconfigured the kinds of futures both Danilo and Agata imagined to be possible or even desirable. In fact, rather than distinct conjunctures, perhaps mundane and vital conjunctures intertwine in ways that become noticeable only to the eye of the

144 In Italy, couples often spend extensive period as fidanzati, often lasting many years. Nationally representative surveys reveal that the average length of time spent as fidanzati for couples married before 1964 was on average 3 years and 4 months. This rises to over five years on average for couples married after 1993.

262 outside observer. Indeed, to Danilo and Agata themselves, their setting a wedding date was a common enough change and they perceived it as occurring, in many ways, gradually. Yet Danilo‘s decision to move in translated in to a very specific period of potential transformation, ―a temporary configuration of possible change, a critical duration of uncertainty and potentiality‖ (Johnson-Hanks 2006: 22).

More broadly, in the process of ―reading‖ the situation Danilo and Agata called on competing schema (and resources) which ultimately shaped the outcome in ways that both reinforced and recreated the larger structure. Danilo knew that Agata did not feel ready to cohabit, yet disregarded her desire for space and continued to stay in her apartment, justifying his presence by contributing to the rent and occasionally doing some grocery shopping. He did imagine the possibility of marrying Agata one day, although he was in no hurry to press the issue. In fact, Danilo in part (perhaps ironically so) disregarded Agata‘s growing discomfort with his prolonged ―stay‖ because he deeply wanted to experience ―what living together is like… almost like a test of the relationship, its strength, and most importantly, its future.‖ He was open to the idea of marriage, and knew that Agata had a preference for marrying in the Church. On the other hand, he felt no pressure from his parents to marry; although the latter did often ask when he planned on having children. He thus faced several conflicting schema and resources: the desire to cohabit and then marry but also rising pressure to form a family and the desire to conform to his parents‘ desires (with whom he had a close relationship). He simultaneously possessed sufficient resources to provide for himself and live on his own, but this was complicated by the different career stage Agata found herself in.

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Agata interpreted the context and more broadly the routines of coupled life mentioned above (Sunday dinners, a growing kin network, etc) as appropriate for ―the point we are at in our lives.‖ She envisioned pursuing her career and once she felt more stable work-wise, she imagined that she and Danilo would eventually get married. More broadly, Agata ambitiously pursued her dream of becoming an accomplished psychologist, and didn‘t want (or wasn‘t ready) to share her time and space entirely with

Danilo. On the other hand, she felt pressure from her parents, who often asked her when she and Danilo planned to get married.145 The temporary cohabitation further complicated her situation, as Agata struggled to decide on a course of action. She too had a strong relationship with her parents, and their desires to see her marry (and eventually, have children), as well as their antagonistic sentiments towards cohabitation influenced her view of the world. She also knew that in the event of her marrying, she could count on their financial and emotional support. On the other hand, Agata feared that should she marry (or even cohabit) with Danilo ―too early,‖ she would end up ―stuck‖ (bloccata) in what she feared to be a traditional role set. Danilo‘s attempt to cohabit further increased her preoccupation.

In fact, when Danilo moved in, he did little to help around the house – never washing the dishes, cleaning, or cooking – and Agata felt torn between insisting that he participate in the division of domestic labor and continuing to treat him as ―a guest,‖ given the temporary nature of his stay (or rather justifying the fact that she was taking on the majority of the domestic burden and that she was cohabiting by declaring that Danilo

145 Fieldwork revealed that men‘s parents often asked them when they were going to provide them with grandchildren (despite whether they were single or not yet married) while women‘s parents often hinted that they should marry. For women, pressure to have children comes after marriage.

264 was simply a temporary guest). When, after several months, Danilo failed to show any sign of looking for a new apartment, Agata began to increasingly lament his presence and the two started to bicker and fight. Agata also felt pressure from her parents, who had grudgingly accepted their temporary living situation, on the basis of its transitory nature.

Agata found herself, on the one hand, reassuring her parents that ultimately she intended to marry and have children, as a way of convincing them that the cohabitation was nothing but a passing moment. On the other hand, she began to insist that Danilo move out. In a very private moment, Agata admitted that despite the fact that she gave Danilo a hard time, part of her didn‘t want him to leave, in that she sensed that Danilo was

―testing‖ their relationship. She expressed the fear that if she did succeed in making him leave, then it would also mean the end of their relationship. More broadly, she liked the idea of a ―strong man, who knows how take charge,‖ and who made her feel ―protected.‖

The contrast between her strong personality in the public sphere and her somewhat submissive attitude in the private sphere created significant confusion.

We might do well to consider the power dimensions at play here, as Agata struggled between expectations in the private sphere with her ambitions in the public sphere. Certainly power is a central issue for understanding demographic processes by which not only political and economic aspects are underlined but also previously neglected domains such as the differential distribution of power within households is illuminated. More broadly, considerations of changing power relations among men and women are central to discussions of fertility decline (Tazi-Preve 2004); the tendency of many demographers to speak of the family or household as an undifferentiated, harmonious unit should be revisited. Closer to home, Agata worried that cohabiting (and

265 preferably marrying) earlier than she would have liked, would translate into an inability to pursue her career to the full extent she desired. This, coupled with the troubling absence of shared domestic work, eventually won out over her preoccupation that Danilo would equate the end of their cohabitation as the end of their relationship. After a series of long discussions, Danilo moved back in with his parents. The two slowly returned to their previous routine, but this time their discussions of marriage became more frequent.

Danilo began to explore the housing market more seriously and contemplated buying a home, envisioning that Agata would one day live there with him. Agata, relieved that

Danilo had moved out, accompanied him to several open-houses, and they slowly developed the idea of living together over discussions of when and how this would occur.

Also important here is the constant flux of this conjuncture. The couple‘s brief cohabitation reveals more than the synchronic dimensions of the conjuncture as it unfolds over time; rather we might think about the ways in which conjunctures are ―durations outside of normal time‖ contingent on the horizons and schema which orient action and the resources available. Johnson-Hanks (2006: 231) cites Wagner-Pacifici (2000:6), as saying ―[W]hile we normally associate contingency with fluidity, I need to conjure up a different image of it, an image more bumpy and prone to stops and starts, both frozen and leaking at the same time.‖ Like departure from the parental home, Danilo‘s brief cohabitation with Agata also reveals the ―revolving door‖ of co-residence and the ways the ―boundaries‖ of the conjuncture were continually shaped by the schema and resources available (Micheli 2007, see also chapter 2).

The resolution to the conjuncture came when Danilo and Agata decided to announce their intentions to get married (and set a wedding date) to their respective

266 parents. After much discussion, they set the tentative date at about one-and-a-half years from their announcement, time enough for Agata to, hopefully, feel more secure in her career efforts and for Danilo to find a suitable house for the two of them. The closing of the conjuncture and the events leading up to it can be understood as the continual product of the interplay of resources and schema utilized by the actors involved (Sewell 1992,

2005), in a social world where authority and capital are unequally distributed (Bourdieu

1977, 1984, see also Johnson-Hanks 2007). Their actions reproduced the social structure at the same time that, in ways, they recreated it in a slightly different form. Their behavior also reflects the habits and predispositions produced from past experiences, such as routinely eating with their soon-to-be in-laws, vacationing together, sharing the same bed on occasion, and more broadly, growing up in families characterized by strong bonds and a deep desire to not disappoint their parents‘ wishes. The resolution also reflected the resources available to each, which saw Danilo established in his career and able to afford housing while Agata determinedly worked towards that goal, and lacked the material resources to bargain on the same level.

Generally speaking, the outcome of the conjuncture – the decision to marry

(rather than a different outcome –e.g., ending the relationship, deciding to cohabit, or returning definitively to their formal relationship pattern) was ―at once the product of their construals of the conjuncture, and an element in the reinforcement or partial transformation of the social structures that brought it about‖ (Johnson-Hanks 2007: 16).

The decision to marry reinforced and partially transformed the social structure in that as a result of their differing schema and resources (and that of their parents), Danilo and

Agata ended up arriving at marriage (the predominant social structure of community)

267 through cohabitation (thus contributing to the rising number of marriages preceded by cohabitation). Their interpretation of the event was successful in that both sets of parents were enthusiastic about the wedding (especially Agata‘s) and the prospect of one day having grandchildren (especially Danilo‘s). Agata‘s drive to succeed in the public sphere and her (somewhat incongruous) refusal to adhere to a more ―traditional‖ division of domestic labor by justifying Danilo‘s presence as a ―guest‖ and then later insisting he leave, ultimately (and perhaps ironically) concluded in the setting of a wedding date (a more ―traditional‖ result). Although the setting of a wedding date closed the conjuncture(s), clarifying Agata‘s future path, in some ways it ―lingered half open‖ in that Agata still worried over defining her career path and realizing an equal division of domestic labor. Finally, external circumstances such as housing and the employment market may have reinforced her parents‘ power in pushing her towards marriage.

Danilo, on the other hand, managed to both ―test‖ their relationship through cohabitation (perhaps in part due to his greater financial autonomy and resources available), as well as make ―the big step‖ towards marriage which he desired and his parents approved of. Yet because he saw cohabitation as a step towards marriage, this further delayed the setting of a wedding date (set to occur at around age 36 for him), notwithstanding the already considerably long-term relationship between the two. These construals also resulted in actions that led to changes in the distribution of resources, as both sets of parents began to discuss contributing to help Agata and Danilo buy a home and furnishing it. In doing so, the parents ended up - indirectly - supporting cohabitation before marriage, given the actual unfolding of events (and the raw data one would observe, if Agata and Danilo filled out a survey). Thus we see how, in Johnson-Hanks‘

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(2007:17) words, ―mobilizing structure to navigate a specific conjuncture both reinforces aspects of that structure at the same time as it makes incremental changes to it…We also see how concrete events are not only the basis of calculating demographic rates, but are also the pivots for subject formation, social structure and social change.‖

6.4 Conclusion

6.4.1 Demographic Conjuncture Theory: a Reflection

A paradigm of conjunctures has an undeniably suggestive power for demographers, who typically analyze population processes in terms of age and events, rather than the meanings and expectations related to demographic choices. As others have pointed out, a theory of demographic conjunctures also allows the researcher to view selectivity processes as a defining element rather than as a ―disturbance‖ in the causal interpretations

(Bernardi 2007: 210). This chapter has also shown that a theory of demographic conjunctures is applicable in diverse social contexts, and might be further employed in different countries and settings. Demographers might develop a set of methodological tools that would allow them to more systematically (and with larger samples, perhaps) analyze vital and mundane conjunctures on a broader scale in terms of both space and time (see also Bernardi 2007). Indeed, one of the most fascinating dimensions of this theory is that it allows for the analysis of a specific historical moment, but is flexible enough to allow for the incorporation of change. The observer can thus understand

―conjunctural‖ dimensions as continuous rather than categorical; rates – in this case rising cohabitation - are the outcome of a constantly shifting set conjunctures (and more broadly, contexts of action) and construals (actors‘ interpretation of and engagement with the conjuncture) embedded in the larger social structure.

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Demographic conjuncture theory also allows us – and perhaps this aspect is not yet explored to its full potential by Johnson-Hanks – to investigate the relational and power dimensions of demographic events. This perspective seems nascent in Johnson-

Hanks proposal, in her brief reference to Sewell‘s work, but might be made more explicit.

Sewell, in fact, builds on Giddens‘ (1984) notion of the duality of structure, defining the latter as ―composed simultaneously of schemas, which are virtual,146 and of resources, which are actual‖ (Sewell, 1992: 12). That is, resources need schemas to activate them, and schemas are only observable in practice on resources. Furthermore, there are two types of resources: allocative (power over things) and authoritative (power over people).

Thus, when we define structures as dual, we mean that they have on the one hand a virtual existence in the minds of actors, on the other hand a real existence in the world of resources. If this is true, suggests Sewell, then it must be true that schemas are the effects of resources, just as resources are the effects of schemas. More importantly, for the argument here, is that Sewell incorporates notions of power and the essential role the latter plays in shaping the structure. In the vital and mundane union-related conjunctures outlined above, we see just how important the bargaining power and related relational dimensions were to the resolution of the conjuncture. In a context like Italy, where the

―strong family‖ is in constant tension with processes of individualization, the ways union formations play out are directly related to relational dimensions between partners as well as the rapport between adult children and their parents. More or less bargaining power –

146―Schema,‖ in Sewell‘s opinion, are ―generalizable‖ in that that they can be applied to many different areas. This generalizability is what is implied by saying a rule is ―virtual‖ -- it exists outside of the particular practice that is using it (Sewell 1992: 8).

270 often dependent on the resources available and schema enacted – shapes the horizons of the conjuncture and ultimately, its resolution.

More broadly, power is fundamental to any analysis of the family (Scott 1988,

Watkins 1993, Riley 1998,) and a demographic conjuncture model has the potential to incorporate the latter into nuanced analyses of population processes. Analyzing demographic ―rates‖ through a conjuncture lens also places center stage the importance of individual actors in building social constructs and the need to understand union formation as it is embedded in particular settings (Hammel 1990). We might do well to revisit Hammel‘s ―theory of culture for demography‖ in which he suggests that actors continually seek to alter their surroundings, constantly elaborating and changing symbols and institutions through actions that are in and influenced by the cultural setting. He calls for attention to be paid to individual agency as well as to ongoing cultural processes in the exploration of demographic issues. He suggests that ―actors move in an intensely evaluative cloud of commentary, in the presence of which they select behavioral alternatives, balancing and choosing those they think will minimize moral risk and maximize moral gain. This is the real miasma‖ (idem: 467, see also Kreager 1985,

Kertzer 1997). In challenging the ways that ―demographic rates‖ occur, anthropologists can confront the often incompatible perspectives born out of formal demography. What do we mean when we speak of intentional action or uncertainty? What roles do these, and power and relational dimensions, play in the unfolding of population processes?

The case studies examined in this chapter allow for a reflection of the ways men‘s union formation reflects strategizing behavior that seeks to maximize resources, and the ways the latter is contextualized in terms of culture, social organization, and political

271 power structures (Carter 1998; Kertzer 1997). The case studies also allow for a more general reflection of the implications for union formation and fertility outcomes. Young

Italian men orient their actions towards horizons of the possible and imaginable, and these often include marriage and children. Daily habits and routines thus translate into a

―management‖ of the conditions under which he will eventually become a partner, husband, and/or father; men (and women) constantly draw together the conditions favorable to the outcome s/he desires (Johnson Hanks 2006: 256). In Padua, men often intertwine their individual objectives with those of their parents‘ and partners. They are simultaneously constrained by a prohibitive housing market, a weak welfare state, and high youth unemployment. It is thus perhaps not so surprising that although many men declared they were favor of cohabitation, the majority chose instead to marry (and many do so without a previous cohabitation). On the other hand, an increasing number of men like Danilo may seek to cohabit before marriage, as a way of ―testing‖ the relationship. If men desire to cohabit before wedding (whether or not they actually end up doing so), then marriage may continue to be delayed, as will, in all likelihood, births. Indeed, cohabitation may simply prove to be yet another element in the prolongation of the life course, and, similarly the delay (or even stoppage) of first births.

On the other hand, the vital conjuncture faced by Claudio reveals that when resources are sufficient, and parental ties are weaker, Italians may choose not only to cohabit (albeit with marriage still on the horizon) but to have first births outside of wedlock. A study of Milan in the late 1990s conducted by De Sandre and Ongaro (2003) showed that cohabitations and first marriages preceded by cohabitation have steadily risen since the cohorts of women born in the 1950s. Moreover, 52% of first unions were

272 cohabitations during the four year period 1995-1999 (idem). Castiglioni and Dalla

Zuanna (2009) point out that the increase in cohabitations in Milan was not, however, accompanied by an increase in births out-of-wedlock. Rather they suggest that this behavior actually accelerated the shift to marriage and to legitimate births, given the younger age (of about a year on average) of individuals in first cohabiting unions compared to first marriage (idem: 4). Yet in the greater scheme of things, an average difference of year in age between cohabitation and marriage may mean very little. More specifically, given the analysis of Claudio and Danilo‘s conjunctures, we might surmise that cohabitation potentially causes a delay in the forming of marital unions and relatedly causes the postponement of fertility, given the importance that legitimizing births through marriage seemingly continues to hold for men, women, and perhaps, above all, their parents.

We would also do well to remember that in Italy, compared to other European countries, cohabitation remains relatively rare and practiced primarily by Italians living in urban areas, especially in the northern parts of the country (Prinz 1995; Pinelli and De

Rose 1995). Yet in many Central European countries like (former) West Germany and the Netherlands, cohabitation has become more socially accepted, above all as a short- term prelude to marriage typically transformed into the latter when couples have a child

(De Jong Gierveld and Liefbroer 1995; Mills 2000). In other countries such as (the former socialist) East Germany, Austria, France, Great Britain, Finland or Norway, cohabitation has developed into an accepted alternative to marriage connected with a high rate of extramarital births (Huinink and Wagner 1995; Leridon and Toulemon 1995;

Toulemon 1997). And finally, in Denmark and Sweden, where the rates of cohabitation

273 are highest, marital and cohabiting unions seem to have normatively and legally converged to such a degree that for young couples the choice between marriage and cohabitation seems to be solely a matter of private taste, even when children are involved

(Hoem 1995; Leth-Sorensen and Rohwer 1997; Duvander 2000).147 Certainly the remarkable societal changes (e.g. feminist movement, increased female education and participation in the labor force, etc.) that have occurred in Europe over the last 50 years have transformed societies in different ways and with different intensities, and we may have much to gain by further comparative studies of the ways that notions about marriage, and sexual relations outside of marriage, have influenced the spread of cohabitation. In the next chapter, I delve further into another increasingly common pattern across Europe, or that of delayed first births, the possibilities of ―recuperating‖ family formation, and the particular ways these take shape in Padua.

147 Certainly, it has been recurrently emphasized that cohabitation is a complex phenomenon that involves different meanings. Cohabitation might be seen as pre-marital phase, as trial marriage, as temporary union, as alternative living arrangement – with or without children– and so forth (Villeneuve-Gokalp 1991; Prinz 1995). The meaning of cohabitation may also change over time or might be different for both partners involved (Manting 1996; Seltzer 2000).

CHAPTER 7. MAMMOS AND PATRIARCHS

One late spring afternoon, as I pedaled my bicycle to the center of town, I happened to run into one of my fellow ping-pong players, Lino (age 37), accompanied by his wife

Silvia (age 34), their young daughter (8 months), and Silvia‘s father, Sergio (age 71).

Lino and Silvia had come to take a stroll through the center of the city, and to drop of one of Sergio‘s smoking pipes at a small store specializing in tobacco and pipes which they hoped would be able to repair Sergio‘s damaged device. As we chatted, Silvia picked up her daughter, Serena, from the stroller which Lino had been pushing and gently rocked the child against her hip. The conversation concluded when Silvia suggested that Lino and Sergio go on ahead with the baby to the tobacco shop, as she had seen a pair of shoes that she wanted to quickly try on. Promising to be swift, and to catch up with them at the tobacco shop, Silvia glanced rapidly from one man to the other, seemingly deciding on which one to hand off the child. The physical dynamics were fascinating to observe.

Sergio, picking up on Silvia‘s hesitation, gave an almost imperceptible shake of his head and took a half-step backwards, obviously intimidated at the thought of having to hold the child. At the same time, Lino reached in and tossing Serena air - who erupted into a peal of giggles - said ―Ok! Off we are to the tobacco store…‖ He swiftly replaced Serena back in the stroller, adeptly settling her in and, when recognition that her mother was about to depart began to crease Serena‘s small face with lines of worry, Lino produced a pacifier and a small stuffed animal, both of which immediately distracted the infant.

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Sergio in the meantime stood, rocking back on his heels, smiling with a hint of relief and, perhaps, even a bit of awe at his son‘s skillful handling of his granddaughter. This scenario echoed a salient narrative that constantly resurfaced during my fieldwork in

Padua, or that of the contrast between an older cohort of stern, rather authoritarian fathers who, much like Sergio, expressed little physical affection towards their children, and that of a younger generation of more nurturing fathers, like Lino, who clearly strive towards models of fathering different from that of their own fathers.

Certainly in Italy and elsewhere, an increasing amount of attention has been paid to the roles of fathers and changes in paternal identity (Hewlett 1991; Pleck 1995, 1997;

Coltrane 1996; Townsend 1996, 2002; Parke 2000; Lamb 2000, 2004, to name a few).

This holds true not only of academic work, but is also reflected in a number of recent

Italian films148 and the growing number of associations of Italian men149 which endeavor to defend a different, less patriarchal form of fatherhood. In the literature, we read of soft males, affectionate and maternal fathers, and mammos. 150 Yet, as Deriù (2005: 147) points out, ―this by no means signifies that a revolution has been achieved, but rather hints at the possibility of an occasion of change whose outcome is yet to be decided.‖ In this chapter, I explore ―young‖ (age 28-45) Paduan men‘s desires for children and family-

148 For example, La Stanza del Figlio (The Son‘s Room) by Nanni Moretti (2001), Non É Giusto (It‘s Not Fair) by Antonietta De Lillo, Le Chiavi di Casa (The House Keys) by Gianni Amelio (2004), and the documentary Sono Incinta (I‘m Pregnant) by Fabiana Sargentini (2008) on the reactions of 69 men to the announcement of pregnancy.

149 To name a few: l‘Associazione Padri Separati (the Association of Divorced Fathers), l‘Associazione Padri presenti (the Association of Present Fathers), l‘Associazione Padri e Madri (the Association of Fathers and Mothers), Padri Negati (Denied fathers), le Associazioni Padri Italiani Uniti (the Association of United Italian Fathers), Uomini Casalinghi (Men House-Husbands).

150 Mammo is the masculinized word for ―mother‖ (mamma). In Italian, feminine nouns and adjectives end in either ―a‖ (singular; i.e. mamma) or ―e‖ (plural; i.e. mamme), while masculine nouns and adjectives end in either (―o‖ - singular, or ―i‖ - plural). Increasingly common usage of the word mammo (ending in ―o‖ to render it masculine) underlines the lack of available expressions to describe emergent forms of fatherhood.

276 building goals, the meanings they associate with fatherhood and the implications these have for paternal involvement and fertility outcomes.

A focus on the transition to first births provides an interesting window onto the progressively more ambivalent, difficult, and contradictory character of the road leading towards fatherhood in Italy. Italian men increasingly delay forming unions and having children, privileging instead finishing their education and stabilizing their career paths. In fact, the average age of Italian men at the birth of their first child has risen to almost 34, entitling the latter to the dubious title of ―Europe‘s oldest fathers.‖ Rosina (2007) has argued that Italian men‘s postponement of important life events ultimately makes them more ―desirable‖ on the marriage market and increases their probability of wedding a younger woman. Moreover, he suggests that a ―strategic‖ pattern of delayed marriage to a significantly younger partner actually augments the possibility of recovering family formation. Using nationally representative survey data, he demonstrates that the most favorable combination in terms of final (highest) fertility is constituted by a combined age marriage in which the man is older than 35 and the woman is younger than 30. Such results hint at a different kind of family formation whereby some men may be achieving higher levels of fertility by first finishing their educations and becoming more solidified in their careers. This is significant in that research on male participation in childcare in

Italy reveals that the latter is greatest among educated men living in urban settings in the

North of Italy (Di Guilio and Carrozza 2003). In other words, men who delay unions and first births - and hence solidify their social positions, and perhaps, male identity – seem not only more likely to have more children, but also more likely to participate in caring for them, suggesting they may also be more gender-equal companions. Moreover, such

277 links highlight the often overlooked relationship between fertility and the social aspects of fatherhood.151

This chapter is motivated by a series of questions: What contributes to the delay in first births? Who are the so-called ―affectionate‖ and ―maternal‖ fathers and why have these forms of fatherhood emerged, as opposed to others? What are the causes and consequences of new forms of fatherhood? Are delayed first births and the emergence of mammos related? I am especially interested here in the abandonment, particularly on the part of young men, of forms of ―traditional‖ fatherhood and, more specifically, a distancing from their own patriarchal fathers. While the subject of the ―new‖ role of the father has been developed extensively by sociologists, psychologists, and, to a lesser extent, anthropologists, much of the literature focuses on issues such as fatherlessness and ―deadbeat dads,‖ the interaction between fathers and children in the provision of care, and relationships between fathers and mothers. In this chapter I focus on an issue that often remains unaddressed, or the ways men‘s perceptions of their own fathers‘ lives and parenting roles affect their expectations and attitudes towards fathering. I begin with a reflection on the increasingly diffuse delay of first births among Italian men, and the expectations and strategies men adopt as they move toward family-building and experience having their first children. I argue that men‘s ideological refusals and material inability to follow paths similar to their own fathers‘ shape their family building goals. A

151 Studies of male fertility, notably those published out of the 1995 IUSSP (International Union for the Scientific Study of Population) seminar ―Male fertility in the era of fertility decline‖ and several years later, the 1998 IUSSP seminar ―Men, Family formation, and Reproduction‖ in addition to the work of scholars such Green and Biddlecom (2000) and Dudgeon and Inhorn (2003) have done much to highlight the missing presence of men from discussions of fertility. On the other hand, studies of male fertility often tend to focus more on sexual behavior and health than on parenthood. In other words, the literature on male fertility and that on parenthood rarely intertwine, despite the fact that sexuality, fertility, and procreation may have considerable consequences for social aspects of fatherhood; and the latter, in turn, may influence fertility outcomes.

278 distancing from patriarchal and authoritarian models of fathering also changes the meanings men associate with fatherhood. On the other hand, a lack of role models, a shortage of widespread images of ―new‖ kinds of fatherhood, and the persistence of more

―traditional‖ forms of parenting complicate men‘s endeavors to create recognizable alternatives. In fact, the very resistance to imitating their own fathers may reveal stronger patterns of continuity than of change. I conclude by reflecting on the implications that an age-gap in union formation coupled with delayed first births may have for broader trends in fertility rates, fatherhood, and gender equality.

7.1 Europe‟s Oldest Fathers: Why the Delay?

Marrying after the age of 35 has become, over the last few decades, an ever more common choice among Italian men (Rosina 2007). Given that most births in Italy occur within wedlock, gaining more knowledge about the mechanisms behind men‘s family building expectations and goals is vital to understanding changing male identity and low fertility in Italy. Compared to other Western European countries, the delay in first births in Italy is remarkable (Figure 10).

279 Figure 10. Average age at first birth by sex. Cohorts born in the 1960s – several European countries*

Men Women

Italy Spain France Belgium Austria Norway

*Source: Diventare Padri (Rosina and Sabbadini, 2006; data from FSS)

For most of the countries in Figure 10, the average age at first birth is under 30 for men, but rises to almost 34 for Italian men.152 In just a generation - from the cohorts born in the

1940s to those born in the 1960s - the average age at first fatherhood in Italy rose almost

4 years, from 30 to 34. Among men with university levels of education, this difference increases to 5 years. (Rosina 2007). Again a comparison with past cohorts reveals rapid change in that only 20% of men born in the 1940s were still childless at the age of 35.

This rises to 45% (and 60% among those with a university level education) among men born in the 1960s (idem). Rosina and Sabbadini (2006) link the delay in first births to a reduction in final fertility outcomes, pointing out that the tendency to prolong family

152 Late age at first fatherhood is also linked, as described in the previous chapter (5), to an increasingly late average at first marriage: 32.8 for men and 29.7 for women, on average 4-5 years older than that among their parents (Istat 2007, 2009). In turn, delayed marriage is in part caused by the unusually late average at departure from the parental home compared to other European countries (see chapter 1); almost 40% of men and 20% of women over the age of 30 still live with their parents.

280 formation has been accompanied by an increasing number of individuals who renounce having children.

As discussed above and elsewhere (see previous chapter, in particular), delayed first fatherhood is also in large part due to increasingly late ages at first marriage for both men and women, accompanied by low levels of births outside-of-wedlock. While age at first marriage has risen (now 32.8 for men and 29.7 for women, see figure 9, chp. 6), the age-gap between spouses has remained relatively steady at about a 3-4 year age difference. Yet the older men are at first marriage, the more likely they are to marry women much younger than themselves. Among men who marry between the ages of 35-

39, only 13% marry someone their age or older (Rosina and Sabbadini 2006: 143).

Although somewhat counter-intuitive, we might hypothesize that a delay and prolongation of important life events combined with an age-gap at first marriage may actually translate into higher fertility for men. In other words, although low fertility in

Italy has consistently been linked with delayed departure from the parental home and the late formation of first unions and first births (Livi Bacci, 2006; Seward and Richter,

2008) such delay may to have a positive effect on parity levels. Indeed, Rosina (2007) reports that when a woman marries a man older than her, in over 3 out of 4 cases the couples has at least two children. This ratio declines to 2 out of 3 for women who marry someone their own age. I return to this aspect – through an analysis of Paduan couples who married when the man was older than 35 and the woman younger than 30 - at a later point in this chapter.

Delays in births on the part of both men and women create a number of particular gendered dynamics. For one, women cannot delay first births as long as men; they are

281 forced to balance career commitments and family responsibilities to a greater extent than their partners. Indeed we would do well to remember biological constraints when investigating social-cultural constructions of gendered roles and expectations. If men may delay – biologically as well as socially - first births, women face a more severe time constraint with regard to the timing of childbearing. Men‘s greater delay (and older age) may in turn mean they have greater bargaining within the couple, despite apparent equality given more participation in childcare. As Zanatta (2003:148) points out, the life course has strong gender dimensions, and male and female biographies can vary significantly in different phases, given that the ―appropriate‖ behaviors from men and women based on age are socially constructed and defined, and still find women largely at a disadvantage (see also Arber and Ginn; Moen 2001; Saraceno 2001). More broadly, the

―culture of fatherhood‖ seems to have changed more rapidly than the actual behavior of fathers (Pinnelli and Racciopi 2007; see also La Rossa 1988) and ―in spite of all the talk about egalitarian ideology, abstract beliefs about what women and men ‗ought‘ to do are not seemingly directly connected with the division of family work‖ (Thompson and

Walker 1989).

7.2 Moving Towards Family Building

Despite delays it seems men‘s and women‘s attitudes towards having children remain quite positive. In fact among what Rosina (2007) calls childless ―young adults‖ between the ages of 33-37, only 8% declared they would not have children even in the absence of any constraints, and only 10% report that they would have only one child. Fifty percent desired two children and more than 30% wanted three or more. A closer look, however, reveals significant gender differences in that, especially for women, reaching the age of

282 35 brings about a restructuring of fertility expectations. For men, aging is much less of a concern. Rosina (2007) specifies that the majority of men who reach the age of 35 without having had children realistically think they still have time to have two or more children. The majority of women, on the other hand, who reach the age of 35 without children, think that they will not be able to have any, or at most have only one.

Throughout fieldwork in Padua, I had a number of conversations with childless men (age 28-45) about the number of children they desired, and the ideal moment to have them. The overwhelming thread of such conversations reflected an absolute desire to have children one day, often coupled with an insistence that they felt ―too young‖ to need to think seriously about building a family. As Massimo (age 33) put it to me one day,

You see, a man in his 30s or really, even in his 40s, he still has time… I mean if you‘re single, you still want to go out late, have fun, meet women… and even if you‘re not… you still want to take your time and do all those things that with children would be more difficult… Like getting a masters, or going abroad, or working long hours to ‗get ahead,‘ or simply saving up to buy your own house.

In other words, the ―Peter Pan‖ syndrome described in chapter 2 carried over into schemas surrounding family-building and potential fatherhood. On the other hand, among single men still ―having fun‖ there seemed to come a time, often around the age of 35, in which they consciously decided they felt ―ready‖ to take the next step: meet ―the right one‖ and build a family. While men saw the ideal time to have a child as in their late-30s; women, once they hit the age of 30, described suddenly feeling ―psychological‖ pressure to find the ―right‖ person and start childbearing. Several men, aware of this change, jokingly commented on their wariness of accidentally impregnating a woman over the age of 30, in that a woman of this age will certainly keep the child, regardless of the

283 circumstances.153 On the other hand, men often laced such conversations with concern that an age-gap between fathers and children can have different outcomes, comparing scenarios of a 25, as opposed to 30, 40 or more year difference in age.154 Although men debated the appropriate age-gap between fathers and children, most ultimately decided that age was less of a concern than making sure one achieved the conditions possible in which to raise them. These conditions included not only economic security, but equally – if not more importantly – emotional maturity and a stable relationships. Many described the necessity of attaining ―psychological peace with one‘s self before becoming a father.‖

Scholars such as Sgritta (2002), Livi Bacci (2004), and Rosina (2007:173) have suggested that the notable delay in first fatherhood is due, in part, to socio-cultural and economic factors which see ―men, more so than women, at risk of sliding towards a pathological condition of postponement of taking on adult roles and responsibilities.‖

Livi Bacci (2005) commented that ―young Italians have the lowest rates of employment in Europe, and they have seen their entry salaries decrease the most. Less income means, in practice, less autonomy, greater dependence on the family, greater sluggishness in transitioning into adulthood. It is not surprising that, gripped in pincers of little and late income and a lacking system of social protection, Italians become fathers later and with less children.‖ Other scholars underline the very strong ties that bind parents and children, resulting in greater investment – affectively and instrumentally – in their offspring. Indeed (as described in chapter 2) parents quite willingly maintain their children in the home and make great sacrifices such that they may successfully finish

153 ―Perche dopo trent‘anni le donne i figli lo fanno, il figio se lo tengano.‖

154 We might also do well to consider how increasingly older first fathers will shape perceptions of age of the next generation (see also chapter 2).

284 their education, find stable, well-paying employment, suitable housing, and can leave the parental home ready to build a family. Parents seemed especially permissive and protective when it comes to their sons as opposed to their daughters (see chapter 2, and

Rosina 2007).155

Although parents may do their utmost to ―prepare‖ their sons for departure from the home and family-building - thus making having children very much a ―family endeavor‖ - men typically expressed family-building as an individual goal. In other words, guiding the decision towards having children was a maximizing of one‘s own well-being (see also Micheli, 1995, 2004) despite (or perhaps thanks to) the emotional and material support of the ―strong family.‖

You see I want to have children, and I‘m sure it will happen one day, but I want to be in the best place possible before doing so. I mean, having children is a goal, but it‘s a goal that goes along with so many other things I want to achieve… with the ways I imagine living life… (Alessandro, age 32)

Rindfuss, Morgan, and Swicegood (1988) have warned of a selection effect in the delay of fatherhood, in that those who marry later may feel more inclined to pursue individualistic goals than to build a family. Ethnographic evidence from Padua further suggests that individualism and goals of self-fulfillment characterizes both sexes and this often leads to conflict between partners, potentially delaying first births. More specifically, men‘s prioritizing the workplace and self-fulfillment over family-building now necessarily means negotiating with their partners, as women increasingly join the labor force and have similar goals to those of men. A number of childless men in couples

155 Such an aversion to risk is manifest in a wealth of Italian life spheres. Parks (2000: 41), for example, aptly comments ―As part of the obsession with security that manifests itself in tall iron fences defending bristling vegetable patches, prescriptions of every medical test under the sun and an instinctive fear of any food that does not form part of the traditional national diet, it has become a generally acknowledged truth in Italy that a couple should not embark upon a family until they own the bricks and mortar they live in.‖

285 recounted struggling with their partners to achieve a balance between ―couple happiness‖ and career objectives. In fact, when both men and women pursue paths of personal investment and the post-modern ambition of couple intimacy, conflict arises as endeavors to achieve career goals (on the part of both members of the couple) puts a strain on relationships, delays fertility, and can even lead to the dissolution of unions.

We were living together, in love… but then I broke with her because…well, because she was following her projects, her career, and she didn‘t put enough effort… I mean we were together, but it was as if she put me second… like she took for granted, he‘s there, and I can count on that, and in the meantime she was thinking about work… (Federico, age 31, childless)

I don‘t know sometimes I have the sensation that… we‘re together, but I follow my career and you follow yours… and we do what we can. In a while, we‘ll have children, and we‘ll still be together… maybe… or maybe we‘ll have children, and that will be our ‗base‘ what holds us together, but in the meantime we‘ll be following our career pursuits. I‘m not saying a couple should just cancel each other out in order to be together… But, if you‘re together, and your partner makes reservations for vacation to go study turtles because she is a veterinarian… and so in the summer it‘s the turtles, in the winter the birds, and every weekend there is something else… I don‘t, I have things to do too… but or we‘re together in a ‗thick‘ enough way that makes it worthwhile to say we‘re together… or forget about it. (Massimo, age 30, childless)

Rather than focusing on goals of self-realization, Micheli (1995b) hypothesizes a general malaise among the youngest generations of men of childbearing age, typified by the inability to make decisions about experiences that are not entirely controllable or cannot be reversed (e.g. marrying, having children, etc). ―The emancipative and ‗rational‘ fall of many barriers to the deployment of individual life destiny, beyond destinies of gender, class, and age (even biological), seem to step aside for an instinctive and paralyzing repulsion towards every destiny that is in any way irreversible‖ (Micheli

1995b:85). Although interviews and time spent with men in Padua similarly revealed a fear of making ―irreversible‖ decisions such as building a family, men - perhaps

286 ironically- masqueraded the latter as a desire for individual self-fulfillment, autonomy, and, above all, choice. As mentioned above, in describing their family-building goals, men would often express the wealth of time still available before they had to seriously consider fatherhood and myriad of things they wanted to do before then. Yet despite the fact that men depicted these paths as clearly their own personal choice to pursue self- fulfillment, self-realization and personal autonomy, these men often still lived at home, and/or were employed in precarious jobs and in various phases of developing a union (i.e. from dating several women, to long-term girlfriends) and as such were nowhere near to meeting the ―social‖ requirements of having children156 (despite being in their early 30s).

In other words, the impossibility of fully deciding their life trajectories, given multiple socio-cultural, political, and economic constraints (such as high youth unemployment, a precarious labor market, and the high cost of housing, and perhaps, a ―repulsion‖ towards irreversible choices), combined with the sensation that they should be able to decide, was expressed, in fact, as a desire, even as a choice they were making in order to achieve goals of self-realization, social mobility, and eventually parenthood.

7.3 Progetti di Vita: The “Life Projects” of Two Different Generations

Men in their early 30 to 40s often described such life trajectories by clearly differentiating themselves from their own fathers. In fact, men often explained to me that while their fathers worked because they had a family, they preferred instead to establish themselves in the workplace first, and then have a family.

Take for example, my father. His ―life project‖ (progetto di vita), his most important project, has been the family. Work, yes, it‘s a project, but I don‘t know

156 As Gribaldo et al. (2009) write, ―For the [Italian] middle class, discourse on having children centers around the impossibility of choosing an optimal moment to do so, in that the preconditions for having a child - a large enough house, stable employment, personal satisfaction at work, economic security, couple stability, adequate maturity – are always too many and too difficult to obtain in the desired timeframe.

287 how much my father really wanted to do that job… I don‘t know if he thought about it, if that is what he desired… in fact, the other day I was talking to him, and he told me that the most important project in his life is his family…he said ‗I have a job that allows us to live, it allowed me to have children, and a family… work is peripheral…‘ (Samuele, age 29, childless)

Now, I think for many men, one‘s life project starts with finding work; one‘s life project is not to start a family. Or better, the life project is to find a job and then start a family. Now, everyone says ‗now I have a job, everything is going well, I have a car, a motorcycle, a house, now a can build a family.‘ My father, he would have said ‗I want a family, so I have to work… so for him it wasn‘t really important what job you had, but the fact that you had a job. Now men want that particular job, their own car, their telephone, their house… (Nicola, age 36, childless)

Young men today think that they can only take on the responsibility of having a child when all the problems have been resolved - a house, economic stability, a job - but before, things were different. I was born when my mother was 19 and my father was 23… One got married in order to have children… and problems were resolved because there was a child. Now things are different. Today, everyone tries to resolves all the problems before they have a child… and this is not necessarily a positive thing. (Fulvio, age 61, one child)

Ginsburg (2003:72) has suggested that whereas once fathering children was an important demonstration of virility, this has now been subordinated to career patterns and the search for individual self fulfillment, making ―delay the name of the game.‖ As the same time, he suggests ―many men are afraid of becoming fathers, using various stratagems to justify their choice‖ (idem)157. I argue here that one of these ―stratagems‖ is to emphasize goals of self-realization and autonomy over family building, despite (or perhaps because of) the constraints of reaching such objectives. Men justify such strategies by distinguishing their own ―life projects‖ from those of their fathers, albeit at times with an admittance to fear.

157 Ginsburg (2003:72) also cites Gustavo Pietropolli Charmet (1995: 146-7) who, based on research in Milan, suggests ‗The most common [stratagem] was to repeat, until it became a self-evident truth, that it was irresponsible to bring children into the work in such a terrible moment of its history. In reality the only real danger that the man felt was with regard to himself.‖

288 You see, everything was so automatic in the past. For example, my father could say, ‗I have a job, I‘ve done military service, I have a girlfriend, I get married, period. And then the year after you already have a kid. Now, instead, you think about it… what should I do? What can I do? What do I want to do? If you‘re too afraid, you move with lead feet, and the years pass. I don‘t want to be like my father, but more importantly, I simply can‘t be like him. Times have changed (Pietro, age 31)

While the majority of ―young‖ men I spent time with felt that their life trajectories will not resemble what they described as the ―easier‖ and ―less tormented‖ sequential path of their fathers, their comparative distinctions from their fathers revealed both important similarities and differences. On the one hand, men expectations about building a family or their ―life projects‖ were explained in very much the same sequential order that they described their own fathers as following, albeit they perceived their

―chronological‖ path towards parenthood as more difficult - perhaps due in part to their expectations that they should be able to choose. Men perceived their fathers‘ ―steps‖ towards fatherhood as not only ―easier‖ but also more ―socially‖ obvious in terms of what one ―did,‖ i.e., military service, employment, union, family (see also chp. 4). Yet despite the similarity in sequential ambitions, Paduan men adamantly insisted that they did not want to be like their fathers, whom they saw as more rigid and dogmatic in their ―life projects‖ and, as I will discuss below, more ―absent‖ and authoritarian as fathers than they hoped to be. More generally, as men transition into first births, they often compared their own strategies to that of their fathers, as they negotiated the dynamics of care and work. In what follows, I discuss the meanings ―young‖ Italian fathers (age 28-45) associate with fatherhood and how these play out in the everyday habits and practices of life in Padua.

7.4 Identifying with Fatherhood

289 Many of the ―young‖ fathers I interviewed closely linked their identity as fathers to the labor market, which, as one interviewee described it, is ―full of nothing but precarious labor contracts, and dehumanizing work conditions.‖ In fact, the precarious labor market often increased many men‘s identitary investment in fatherhood, in that they tended to represent themselves above all as fathers because ―the rest‖ has disappointed them, and no longer seemed an area in which they could accomplish their goals of self-realization.

In a world of job market instability and insecurity, they found in their children a new reference point; something to base their identity upon.

You see, when the economy was better in the 1980s and 90s, people were ‗too distracted‘ to have children. Instead they preferred to have at most one child, and they enjoyed taking trips to the Red Sea, buying designer clothes, and eating out in fancy restaurants. When the economy is worse people have more children. They revert back to the essentials in life. When you can‘t afford a luxurious lifestyle, then things like family become more important… children give you a reason to get up in the morning, they make everything worthwhile. (Luca, age 38, one child)

Since having a child, I have a different motivation… In the morning you get up, but in her eyes you see the future… and so I get up. Why do I get up? If they yell at me at work, or if I do something wrong… I mean at work they can torture me… It‘s a strike against my body, but my home, my family is my shell… It‘s my own thing that continues… my world in which I grow… I structure my world like this, you know? …Outside work, and my inside ‗family‘ world. (Andrea, age 36, one child)

Despite such representations of children as fundamental reference points, one might also interpret such descriptions as a renewed effort to realize the self, similar to that suggested by Ariès (1980: 650): ―Couples – and individuals – no longer plan life in terms of the child and his personal future, as was the case during the nineteenth and early twentieth century. This does not mean that the child has disappeared from such plans but that he fits into them as one of the various components that make it possible for adults to blossom as individuals.‖ Ravn (2005:38-40), in her study on fertility in Norway, similarly

290 suggests that ―Despite many years dedicated to individual fulfillment, postponement of parenthood, the ―good life‖ must include children.‖ The author suggests that the emphasis on family life coexists and converges with a strong notion of individualism and an urge to create individually meaningful lives. ―[Creating a family] can be interpreted…as an inner quest, spurred by a wish to realize one‘s personal potential as a parent‖ (Idem).

Informants in Padua voiced similar opinions. As one man put it (age 35, one child), ―I‘m not that ambitious, but I have to do something I find satisfying… if I don‘t‘ find that, then

I cannot be a good partner, or a good father.‖ Dalla Zuanna (2006:11) has similarly pointed out that in Italy, postmaterialist and postmodern values do not come into conflict with ―the value of children as an ‗extension‘ of their parents…Instead the attention to family ties can reinforce the emphasis on self-realization.‖

This dynamic of self-fulfillment was similarly reflected in the choice to have a second child, which often seemed to depend more on the desire to offer a companion to the first, rather than a direct desire to be a parent (in that this goal has already been achieved). In her work on parenthood in Bologna, Gribaldo (2007: 7) similarly recounts that ―notwithstanding that the model of the ideal family foresees two children, there seems to emerge a model of parenting in which it is not so much the presence of children, but the parent who ‗makes‘ the family.‖ Between the constraints of a precarious labor market and strong notions of individualism, scholars such as Bimbi (1993) have suggested that the choice to have children in Italy becomes ―hyper-rationalized‖ (see also

Livi Bacci, 2006). On the other hand, Micheli (1995a, 2000) suggests that in order to have a(nother) child, it is necessary not to let economic logics of rationality prevail. ―As if in a dream, paternity is a reachable result only when the caging grip of the control of

291 rationality is loosened.‖ Ethnographic work in Padua revealed among men an odd pull between ―rationalizing‖ having children, especially as one ages, and the need to ―let go‖ of all (economic) rationality in order ―let births happen‖ in a setting where the perfect conditions for having children are difficult to achieve (Gribaldo et al. 2009). First time fathers (especially those over the age of 35) often described the choice to have a child as having slowly become, over time, what they termed a ―rational decision,‖ linked not only to self-fulfillment, but also to the decision to transmit their knowledge, and more fundamentally, a part of themselves, to the next generation, preserving a sense of continuity and even immortality.

The thing is, the more years that pass, the more having a child becomes a rational decision… you can even decide not to have them or have them because you decide to transmit something… what will become of me when I‘m dead? If you think about it… like for Foscolo, a famous Italian poet who believed his immortality to be expressed through the things that he did, his works, etc… his continuity was not his soul which went to heaven, but his writings, his work. For us, in order to prolong ‗life‘… the awareness of what we know… a child can have this thing here. Just like a last name, the child carries on the name. (Stefano, age 42, two children)

… Like in rugby, no? You carry the ball, but at a certain point you have to pass the ball backwards... and from there… from where you stand, another moves forward… it‘s as if in the moment that you have a son, you‘ve arrived up until that point, and then you pass him the ball, and he takes it from there… with the fears and strength of both, no? And you know what the strange thing is? When you pass him the ball, you know your own fears, and you know the fears that you are passing on to him… and you‘d do anything to protect him from those fears, but it‘s exactly those fears that he must carry forward, you understand? So on the one hand it‘s this rational decision to have a child because it‘s something you desire – I mean I think most men want to be fathers one day - but on the other hand it‘s not something that you just decide, it‘s something bigger than that…(Dario, age 36, expecting first child)

7.5 I Am Not My Father

Such a sense of continuity contrasts with the adamant distinctions fathers (age 28-45) made in distinguishing themselves from their own fathers, and more generally with male

292 adult models proposed by the previous generations. In fact, while studies of paternal involvement have placed much emphasis on conflict and negotiations between men and their partners as they negotiate work and childcare, a lesser body of literature highlights the often contested relationship between men and their fathers. Scholars such as McBride

(1989), Parke (1995), and Palkovitz (1997) and have noted that much of the literature on fatherhood focuses on ―the direct interaction or engagement between the father and his offspring, while other aspects have received less systematic attention.‖ Yet as Italian men take on more caring roles, they are forced to redefine older models of masculinity. Many of my informants spoke of trying to distance themselves from their own fathers‘ ―hard‖ temperaments, psychological rigidity, moral rigorousness, and physical and emotional detachment; such efforts can, in turn, impact involvement in childcare.

In the majority of cases, men‘s fathers incarnated patriarchal models of authority linked to economic maintenance and social status. Men described their fathers‘ presence in the family (as they were growing up) as limited; their role in childcare above all characterized by a general and moral character, which did not usually translate into more intimate or continuous daily rapport. Exchanges between men and their fathers typically lacked a corporeal or emotional dimension; affection, although present, was expressed more indirectly – through activities done together, or as sacrifices or goods given to children – than explicitly through verbal or physical communication. Men described their fathers as rigid, silent, authoritarian, imposing and, in some cases physically aggressive

(see also Deriù 2005; Bellassai 2005b).

Things have really changed in Italy… I mean if you think about my grandfather, and my father to some extent as well… my mother told me that my grandfather never held his children in his arms, because he would have felt embarrassed… ashamed… it was something that a man just didn‘t do. My own father wouldn‘t

293 have been caught dead pushing a stroller. So things are different and I feel fortunate because it would be a pity to miss out on all of this… I think that having a physical relationship with my daughter is incredibly important… (Igor, age 38, one child)

―Young‖ Paduan fathers insisted that they wanted to be different than their own fathers, especially in terms of expressing emotion and affection. Scholarly research has similarly proclaimed signs of a decline in patriarchy, which sees involved fathers,

―unacceptable absent fathers,‖ (Risè 2003) Pà-mà (papà-mammà) (Bimbi 1993) and

―new fathers‖ emerge frequently in empirical studies, in the pages of the newspapers, and in the common imagination (Deriù 2004, 2005). Young fathers frequently compared themselves in a reflective and self-critical fashion with past models of manhood and fatherhood, emphasizing above all the importance of their ―presence‖ (essere presenti) in their children‘s lives.

A: What does it mean to be a ‗good father‘? I: I don‘t know… I‘m… we‘re still sort of at the beginning of all of this… My father worked a lot, and he was never around, and I think spending a significant amount of time with your children is important. He never did… but because he also couldn‘t; he didn‘t have the material possibility to do so…. But as time passes, you get to know your children better, and when they need help, you know immediately what to do… knowing their personality, having spent time with them…. The possibility of watching them grow; participating in the process of it all… that‘s just not something fathers used to do. (Gianni, age 41, one child) Honestly, sometimes I think the model of parenting that I would most like to imitate is that of my wife. Maybe this seems ‗unmanly‘ but… And anyways, maybe at the chromosomal level it will simply be impossible not to transmit expectations and anxiety that seemingly get passed down every generation from fathers to sons…even if my intention is to be nothing like my father. I think the best I can do is just be present in my children‘s lives… express affection, be there when they need me… (Gianluca, age 35, one child)

Research in Italy reveals that the proportion of fathers most involved in childcare

(for children 0-5) increases proportionally to the degree of urbanization of their place of residence (Rosina and Sabbadini, 2006). Men associated with the highest levels of

294 participation are those in professions like office workers, teachers and public servants, perhaps because they often have more flexible working hours (idem). In addition, when the fathers have higher levels of education, they also participate much more in childcare; the same holds true when both partners work (Thomson 1990; Lundberg and Pollack

1996), suggesting the ―first signals of a slow, but with all probability progressive, adaptation of fathers to a dual income family model, which requires them to assume higher levels of responsibility in childcare‖ (Rosina and Sabbadini 2006:160). Indeed, from interviews with young, educated fathers in Padua, there seemed to emerge not only a negative opinion of ―traditional‖ fathers, but an identification with more ―maternal‖ models of caring,158 and more broadly, an investment in their children experienced as an effort to put forth a form of paternity that is different, if not the opposite of what they experienced as children.

While Paduan men seem to easily define themselves as ―what they are not‖

(patriarchal, authoritarian, absent, unaffectionate, etc.), they struggle to define ―what they are.‖ As Rosina (2006:148) points out, what it means to be a father is ―still very much a work in progress.‖ Although patriarchy has seemingly lost some of it teeth, new models of paternity have had difficulty emerging. Ginsborg (2003:77) suggests that men, ―if they

158 Mothers do not, however, always want to be imitated, and often lament the roles of their partners who rather than adopting an independent strategy of fathering, become ―extensions‖ of the mother figure. For a longer discussion of this aspect, see chapter 4, and chapter 8. A number of women felt that when men become too affectionate and ―friendly‖ with their children, the child loses the ―paternal‖ figure and, more generally, there ensues confusion over which parent should do what. As one woman commented, ―I am more forceful and authoritative with our child, because my husband has taken on a more caring and compassionate role… this is confusing not only for them, but also sometimes for us!‖ As Dowd (2000) has pointed out, the claim that fathers are essential (and unique) remains powerful, despite the fact that we know that fatherhood is a cultural role, rather than simply biological. She asks (2000:10) ―If we label nurturing as mothering, will we deter men from fathering? I suspect that some would argue that we would. The argument would go something like this: to use motherhood as a model puts men off and makes them feel excluded and presumptively inadequate. Therefore, if we are serious about reorienting our definition of fatherhood, let us not begin with terminology that will defeat our goal‖ (see also Lamb 2004).

295 do not choose the time-honored path of ‗exit‘, i.e. of spending little time at home, they

[have] difficulty negotiating the dynamics of modern family life. The ground rules have been rewritten, but no one is sure of the new text.‖ Indeed, while fatherhood has always been a social construct (Mead 1963), in recent decades, ―it has become an even more complicated and intriguing accomplishment that is intimately connected to demographic transitions and the micropolitics of family life‖ (Marsiglio and Cohan 2000: 78). While the norms and expectations associated with fatherhood have become broader and individuals have greater leeway in constructing their own forms of parenting (idem), a sense of confusion predominates as men struggle to create recognizable and socially acceptable alternative forms of fathering.

In fact, many Paduan men I interviewed found it difficult to be fathers, and their desire to be ―present,‖ ―caring‖ and affectionate often translated into behaving more like elder brothers with their children, or as friends and confidants. Rosci (1994: 302) suggests that fathers have become more affectionate, but also more uncertain, protective and indulgent (see also Zoja 2000; Deriù 2004, 2005). During fieldwork in Padua, this mechanism came across in observations of men‘s interactions with their children as well as in interviews with school teachers, who recounted their experiences with the parents of their pupils:

So in the 30 years I‘ve been a teacher, I can definitely tell you that there has been a slow change in that it used to be just the mothers that came to parent-teacher meeting, but now there are plenty of fathers as well… the problem is that these men… they‘re just like the mothers, except worse… What I mean is that if you talk to the father and you say, look your son isn‘t working hard enough, he always fails his tests, tomorrow he is going to have to go to work… he‘ll say, ‗ah, but my wife doesn‘t want that‘. It doesn‘t make sense, you understand? She (the mother) commands with this excess of feminine hyper-protection… and he is so ‗feminine‘ (effeminato) that he isn‘t able to be … I mean maybe he‘s more affectionate, and ‗maternal‘ but…

296

Spallacci (2004) suggests that young fathers today are unprepared – regardless of their desire – to be affective fathers as a consequence of their original socialization oriented towards a more ―cold,‖ and ―impersonal‖ communication. Paternity is thus configured as a hybrid between affectivity and normativity, but also ―as a role that is rarely accomplished and hardly visible, and of dubious credibility for the children‖ (idem). He suggests that in the framework of a paternity that is neither normative nor affective, neither educative nor loving, the role of the mother is increasingly incisive, in that the mother takes on not only a more authoritarian role, but plays an increasingly larger part in the external socialization of the children (Baraldi 2000).159

As a hierarchical and authoritarian model of parenting is perceived of as increasingly inappropriate, so too, it seems, is its opposite: egalitarian and horizontal parent-child relationships. Italian fathers are thus caught in a place where recognizable alternatives seem far and few between. In creating acceptable new forms of fatherhood, they are stymied by a lack of roles models (given refusals of older models of fatherhood) and the inability (and undesirability) of falling back on an undisputed economic role given the increasing necessity for dual-earner households. The challenge for Paduan fathers today is thus to adopt asymmetric models of parenting that are not rigid or unilateral, thus breaking the dichotomy between hierarchy and authority on the one hand, and horizontality and equality on the other. To this end, among an albeit relatively small

159 In fact, Paduan men who refuse older models of fathering often end up filling this lacuna by adopting a maternal spirit of affection towards their children. Turning upside down past expectations of parenting roles, a number of men in Padua described the authoritarian and rigid child-rearing styles of their wives compared to their own more affective approaches. Spallacci (2004) suggests that we may be witnessing, ―in the representations fathers provide of the familial ménage, a reversal in roles: tolerant fathers, authoritarian mothers.‖ He argues that although differences in gender roles have attenuated, they have by no means disappeared and perhaps (at least in young fathers‘ imaginations) are simply present in different forms.

297 group educated Paduan men there seems to emerge a shift from fathers as helpers to their wives (and mothers of their children), to a model of parenting which sees co-parenting, and an increasing equality in the carrying out of parenting duties (see also Pleck 1997,

Rosina and Sabbadini 2006). Among this group of men, there emerged a consistent link between level of education, the timing of first birth, and his involvement in childcare.

Men who delayed having a child (or were over the age of 34 at first birth), not only tended to have higher levels of education, but participated in the more ―custodial‖ activities of childcare such as cooking meals, bathing, changing diapers, etc. rather than simply helping with homework or playing (see also next chapter, as well as Goldscheider and Kaufmann 1996; Halle and Le Menestrel 2000, Menniti and Palomba 2002).

7.6 Mammos and Patriarchs: Different but the Same?

Although a number of scholars have written explicitly of maternal fathers, new mammos

(Argentieri, 1999), and affective fathers (Pietropolli Charmet 2000), other authors express perplexity over the actual consistency of transformations in the father role and of the differentiation compared to past models (Ventimiglia 1994, 1996). While fathers with higher levels of education, living in urban areas like Padua may be participating more in childcare and expressing more affectionate attitudes towards their children, Italy still remains well behind other countries in terms of gender symmetry in care activities. Smith

(2004), in a recent comparative study points out that in Italy, only 11% of fathers take

―substantial‖ care of very young children compared to 57% of Danish, 31% Finish, 24%

British, 20% German and 16% French fathers. The activities they do participate in are overwhelmingly ―interactive‖ (such as play) rather than preparing meals, changing diapers, giving the child a bath or putting her to bed (idem:152, Di Giulio and Carrozza

298 2003).160 Numerous fathers never participate in childcare; Rosina and Sabbadini (2006) report that 30% of men with very young children (under age three) never change diapers.

The proportion of fathers who don‘t partake in childcare is higher in the South and

Islands, and among fathers with lower levels of education.

Fathering in Padua similarly mirrored these statistics, with fathers of lower social class and education participating less in activities such as changing diapers and feeding their children, often simply due to inflexible schedules and long hours spent working.

Certainly institutional barriers (not only personality or motivation) slow the pace of change, and may reduce levels of paternal involvement (Lamb and Tamis-Lemonda

2004). On the other hand, these men were also more likely to clearly distinguish between parenting roles, attributing duties of guidance (and economic maintenance when possible) and ―problem solving‖ to the father and tasks of daily care to the mother. Despite being less confused over gender roles and expectations, these men still professed a disliking of absent, unaffectionate fathers, and like men with higher levels of education, proclaimed that they wanted to be different than their fathers, above all by being more ―present‖ and

―affectionate‖ with their children.

160 Indeed, Italian women typically do more total work (housework + paid labor) than their partners (Rizzi et al. 2009) and are more likely take time off of work to care for a sick child or make other comprises in which children, rather than work, come first (Belloni 1996; Bimbi 1996). In fact, mothers who privilege professional duties over familial ones are critiqued much more severely than fathers (Spallacci 2004). Although young, educated Italian fathers show an increasing interest in actively participating in tasks such as changing diapers, playing, and attending school meetings (Rosina and Sabbadini 2006) this is not the same as assuming responsibilities for children‘s upbringing on a day-to-day basis. In the tug-of-war between balancing a career and dedicating time and energy to the ins-and-outs of everyday family life, women, rather than men, often first throw in the towel, either by delaying first births and/or refusing to have a second child.

299 So while the rhetoric of a ―new‖ fatherhood is quite strong, the practice of fathering seems to have changed very little (Messner 1992)161. Lamb (1987, 2000, 2004), for example, has studied US fathers‘ involvement with children through observing factors such as motivation, skills, self-confidence, social support, and institutional practices, concluding that little change has occurred in the actual work of fathering, especially as this is measured in engagement or interaction, accessibility, and responsibility (see also

Lamb, Pleck, and Levine 1985; Barnett and Baruch 1987; Radin 1993). Pleck (1995) similarly suggests that although contemporary fathering is characterized by greater involvement, in absolute terms the amount of care has changed very little. Such continuity in the paternal role suggests that we should rethink not only the emergence of

―new forms of fatherhood‖ but also men‘s insistence in distinguishing themselves from their fathers and more ―traditional‖ and ―patriarchal‖ forms of fathering.

In fact, men‘s refusals to imitate their own fathers and older models of parenting may reflect more continuity than change. For example, men of fathering age in the 1960s and 1970s, in a manner suspiciously similar to that of the younger men I talked to in

Padua, believed as youth that they could ―come to terms‖ with their own fathers and older models of masculinities. As one informant (age 65, two adult children) commented:

161 This is not to say that cultural and historical images of fatherhood and research on fatherhood have remained static. Rather, I emphasize here that actual paternal involvement in childcare has changed very little over the last century in the Western World. A thorough review of the history of father involvement is beyond the scope of this chapter, but certainly the work of scholars such as Michael Lamb, Ross Parke, Barry Hewlett, William Marsiglio, Mark Cohan, Anna Dienhart and others provides an in-depth look at changing social and cross-cultural constructions of fatherhood and father involvement over time. Lamb (2000), in particular, identifies four types of father roles that have been emphasized in different time periods: (a) the moral overseer, most important before the Industrial Revolution; (b) the breadwinner, which was dominant from the Industrial Revolution to the Great Depression and saw the ―dedomestication‖ of fathers and the gendered division of labor as they men left the family to perform paid work (c) the sex- role model which attained prominence during the 1930s and 1940s and (d) the new nurturant father which became popular beginning in the 1970s, caused in large part by women‘s massive entry into paid labor.

300 As a generation, I think we know we‘ve made mistakes as parents… probably above all by being too permissive… So our children, I can‘t say with much certainty that they – or I for that matter – have had a good model of fatherhood… If I think back, I feel as if I made a lot of mistakes as a father… due also to the fact that the idea of my generation was to overcome that of our own fathers…we wanted to do things differently. My parents were authoritarian, which is something we refused… although maybe to an extreme degree... in that we lacked in giving a sense of rules, and a sense of responsibility to the next generation…

Deriù (2005) points out that culturally we are used to thinking that sons (historically, psychologically, politically) assert themselves by symbolically killing their fathers. Men whose sons are today around the age of 35 believed they too could ―come to terms‖ with their own fathers, by disowning older models of patriarchy, but in reality they often simply took their fathers‘ places. It thus follows that although new forms of fathering are emergent among educated men in urban settings, at a more profound level, there seems to be a perpetuation of a historical male need to separate from the father figure. The risk, in other words, is that men affirm a categorical rupture with their own fathers, believing that they have distanced themselves from this figure. In reality, they are unconsciously confirming a ―traditional‖ male claim to self-determination (Deriù 2005). One might even question if processes of individualization – so often used to describe the contemporary

Western social world - are simply a different form of a typically masculine culture. The point being that a rupture with older father figures may hide substantial continuity in terms of mental schemas and representations of the self and of the world, as witnessed by the continued low proportion of fathers who actually participate in childcare.

One might similarly identify continuity in the sense of self-realization and identity that fathering provided men in the contemporary context of a disappointing and precarious labor market (described in the beginning of previous section), and comparable

301 feelings of self-fulfillment that fathering gave to these men‘s fathers. As one man

(Alessio, age 68) commented:

It used to be that not everyone could go to university, or for that matter, even high school…over time the economic possibilities have risen… and there has been a shift from making the family a priority to one of personal self-realization in other areas… What I mean is, realizing one‘s own goals (realizzarsi) was impossible, in the sense that you had to make do… so you might as well have a family (laughs). No, what I mean is… having a family was a way of fulfilling oneself (realizzarsi). Through work there was no hope… you had to be a factory worker, or a farmer, or some kind of laborer… but on the other hand, you had a family, and you were a part of that… The next generation, they started to attend university… and they started to place all their bets on that and not on having a family.

Such remarks from older men seemed to resemble quite closely younger men‘s self- identification with fatherhood, given the latter‘s disenchantment with finding a satisfactory career, or even a stable contract in today‘s precarious labor market. Younger men – especially those who have not achieved higher levels of education and those of lower social class - seemed to reach much the same conclusion, albeit somewhat later in the life course, due to a prolongation of various life events and the pursuit (not in all cases achieved) of higher levels of education and goals of self-realization which do not

(initially) prioritize family-building. On the other hand, there seemed to be much more a sense of choice among the younger generations; or at least a sense that they should be able to choose the paths that they desired – and perhaps consequently, a stronger insistence in their identities as affectionate and caring fathers. In addition, for men who do attain higher levels of education, their self-realization and sense of identity tends to be much more centered on their careers, which only later has significant effects on fathering, a topic to which I now turn.

7.7 Delay and an Age-Gap in Unions: a Fruitful Combination?

302 While on the one hand it seems that a differentiation with one‘s own father is neither novel nor necessarily results in new forms of fathering, on the other hand, among educated men living in urban settings – who also clearly differentiate themselves from their fathers – the desire to participate in the care of young children, be more open and affectionate, and ―present‖ seems more likely to become a reality. Why among these men and not others? In this concluding section, I suggest that we might do well to revisit

Rosina‘s (2007) hypothesis of an age gap in marriage (older men and younger women) leading not only to greater participation on the part of men, but also higher outcomes in terms of fertility. Is an age-gap in union formation coupled with a delay in first fatherhood a casual element in the emergence of mammos? In what follows, I briefly review Rosina‘s ―age-gap/delay theory,‖ reflecting on its implications for male identity, fertility rates, and gender equality.

As outlined in the introduction, Rosina (2007) suggests that the ―strategy‖ that best enables men to reconcile work and having a family is to pursue their objectives

―sequentially‖: finish their education, build a career, and, once they have achieved a minimum of professional stability, start a family. Due to their ―attractiveness‖ on the marriage market, these men may end up marrying women who have similar levels of education, but are significantly younger and thus still fully within their reproductive phase of life. Obviously, such a strategy is not entirely possible for women. As Rosina points out, a 35 year-old woman who invests in the same formative and professional path is certainly more penalized in terms of the marriage market and with respect to having children compared to a woman who is 25-29 years of age. He suggests that the ―best choice‖ for women who desire to strongly invest in their education and careers is not to

303 postpone marrying, but rather to wed before the age of 30 with a man who is 35 or older and who has already begun to establish a career. Such a situation, according to Rosina, would, for the woman, facilitate reaching ―in tandem‖ both personal and familial objectives (as opposed to the man, who, as mentioned above, reaches these objectives sequentially). The stable position of the male member of the couple would theoretically, according to Rosina, allow the woman to take advantage of more flexible work opportunities (both in terms of professional investment and with regard to a more elastic adaptation to family commitments). Rosina (2007:170) suggests that ―we might hypothesize a convergence between a sequential masculine reconciliation and, in parallel, a feminine reconciliation of family and work.‖

Among the 9 men in couples (with at least one child) I interviewed during fieldwork that seemed to have enacted this strategy (marrying at over the age of 35 to women under the age of 30), most came from lower-middle class backgrounds, but aspired to social positions higher than those of their fathers‘. All had achieved relatively high levels of education and had postponed (an in one case even forgone) marriage. Their partners also had high levels of education but were at least 5 years younger than themselves. Most women in these relationships had had their first child by the age of 30-

36 years of age, higher than the national average at 28.7 (FSS 2003). Of the men who had only one child (3), all had intentions to have at least one more, while among those with two children (5), several had the intention to have another child (one couple had three children). This descriptive look mirrors a larger trend in Italy which hints at fertility

―recovery‖ among women with university levels of education who have their first child after the age of 30 (Caltabiano et al. 2007, 2009). Such ―recovery‖ is also, perhaps, made

304 more possible in an urban, northern context such as Padua, which offers relatively more available (albeit still limited) childcare services and where gender asymmetries may be less evident, economic conditions somewhat better, and modern and postmodern values more diffused (Saraceno 1994; Pinnelli 1995; Van de Kaa 2001; Del Boca 2002; Rosina and Sabbadini 2006; Caltabiano et al. 2007).

While Rosina (2007) hypothesizes that an age gap at first union might increase fertility outcomes among these couples, certainly a related aspect to this is the achievement of higher education and the ―recovery‖ of births on the part of women.

Gustafsson (2001) has shown, for example, that in Germany, Great Britain, and Sweden, women with a university level education were among the first to postpone entry into motherhood (see also Toulemon 2005, with regard to France). It is thus difficult to tell if men who marry women younger than themselves enact a ―strategy‖ which allows them to attain higher fertility outcomes, or if women who prefer to delay marriage and first births

(and in doing so attain higher levels of education) are more likely to marry men who are over the age of 35. In fact, when women delay first births, they increase their possibility of obtaining well-paid employment - a result of their education, accumulation of on-the- job skills, and experience (McDonald 2000a, 2000b, cfr. Caltabiano et al. 2007). ―Given the consistency of the various findings in the literature, trends in female education can be seen as a major force shaping the postponement of childbearing in Europe‖ (Billari et al.

2006: 5). Perhaps more importantly, Caltabiano et al. (2007) point to recent empirical data which has demonstrated that the negative impact of education level on fertility has progressively lessened over time, to the point that it disappears, or even reverses direction

(see also Kravdal 2001; Dalla Zuanna and Impicciatore 2007).

305 In Italy, a recent trend has been observed in which couples with greater cultural and economic resources have a higher propensity to have children (Dalla Zuanna and

Tanturri 2007; Rosina and Testa 2007). Caltabiano et al. (2007: 16), in a study of age at birth and education of women in Italy, reveal that the quota of fertility achieved between the ages of 30 and 40 is much higher among more educated women. They suggest that

―we may thus be observing the timid beginnings of a reversal in fertility decline due in large part to fertility recovery by women over 30 years of age, especially those among the youngest generations, living in the North, who hold a university degree.‖ Rosina‘s (2007) theory of an age gap/delay leading to higher final parities thus makes sense, although perhaps not so dramatically as he supposes. If men endeavor to do things sequentially, women similarly hope to do the same, by delaying marriage and first births. While men have the advantage of being able to delay family formation well over the age of 35, women, if they hope to have children, are more constrained by biological factors, and must necessarily start earlier. Yet it seems that an increasing number of women who delay fertility later ―make up for lost time‖ after the age 30, ―recovering‖ fertility and meeting the often expressed goal of having two (or more) children.

One question that arises from these dynamics is whether gender asymmetry created by an age-gap is mitigated by higher levels of education. Among the group of nine Paduan couples interviewed and observed during fieldwork, the greater delay among men, their achievements of higher levels of education and career stability put them in a better position to be caring, participative fathers for several reasons. Not only were they better able to negotiate time off and flexible work schedules due to their more stable career paths, but men in this group generally seemed more comfortable and at ease with

306 being mammos and participating in the daily responsibilities of childcare. In other words, by delaying marriage (to younger women) and first births these men were able to feel more secure in their gender identities as men, and this security carried over into other spheres such as fathering, expressed as participative and caring.

You see, men and women have different ‗biological clocks‘…men are the ‗hunters‘ and need to first assure that they can support their family, protect the members, not just the child but also the mother… a young father can‘t have this perspective… and I don‘t think he realizes that you first need to accomplish certain things and then you can help educate a child with certain values and principles, stay beside your wife, as her companion in all things… even washing the dishes and changing diapers! I‘m not in the least embarrassed to put my kid in a stroller and take her to the park… I go to teachers meetings and doctor‘s appointments… I‘m what you‘d call a real mammo – and I don‘t give a damn what other people think about me… I do whatever I feel is ‗right‘ to do! (Silvio, age 45, two children)

Undoubtedly, a father has to be more than a man who brings home a paycheck, at least in today‘s society… and it‘s also true that a child needs a point of reference which is serious and constant… Maybe a more mature man, who has had the possibility to experiment, and try different experiences, and is just more prepared… has a different manner of confronting this commitment to family life…. (Federico, age 37, one child)

Between men and women there exists a gap of about 10 years: if a woman the age of 30 feels she has begun to fulfill her professional ambitions and is ready to form a family, a man is ready to satisfy her desire – and be equally participative in all things - starting from the age of about 40 on… (Davide, age 44, two children)

For the Paduan men in this ―age-gap/delay group,‖ it seems that establishing a stronger and more secure sense of male identity (through higher levels of education and career pursuits) before having children, allows them to overcome problems stemming from their own, more father-absent childhoods.162 Moreover, participation in infant and early child care seemed to reinforce a sense of security in their masculinity. Fathers in this group not

162 Scholars such as Elder et al. 1984; La Rossa and Reitzes, 1993; Halle and Le Menestrel 2000 have similarly pointed out that the quality of a fathers‘ interaction with his children may be tied to his own success, real or perceived, as a breadwinner.

307 only played with their children, but also prepared meals for them, and cared for them when they were ill.163 Perhaps even more importantly, the majority of these men had two children and all who had only one had intentions to have at least one more child. In fact, a similar dynamic concerned the women as well, in that participation on the part of men functioned best among couples in which women were able to think of themselves as mothers and workers (and hence see employment as a source of independence and self– realization as much as an economic necessity), and consequently care was no longer their exclusive competency nor automatically marked as the primary element characterizing female identity (see also chapter 8).

I‘m open to having another child, and I think it‘s something we both want. With Stefano being able to take so much responsibility for the children – I mean his work schedule [as a professor] is more flexible than mine… Stefano even encouraged me to take a higher level position, even if this means I now have to commute to Venice… at first I was torn, but now… things seem to be working out, and I find my work really satisfying. We plan on having more children… but I don‘t know… it‘s still a struggle, because I feel guilty sometimes that I‘m not more available for my child… but then again I‘d love to have another one… (Laura, age 34, 2 children).

Despite, however, the somewhat counterintuitive signs that the combination of delay and an age-gap at first marriage might translate into higher fertility, the general trend in the gender age-gap in marriage seems to be narrowing (slightly) rather than widening

(Fraboni, 2006, see also Figure 9, chp. 6). While this pattern may reflect increasing gender equality, once couples have children, this dynamic may change. Again, perhaps

163 As mentioned in the first section ―Europe‘s Oldest Fathers‖ a large age-gap at first birth may also shape father-child interactions in particular ways. MacDonald and Park (1986), for example, report from a survey of 300 fathers, that age is negatively related to the frequency of father‘s physical play with their children. In an observational study, Volling and Belsky (1991) found that older fathers were more responsible, stimulating and affectionate with infants at three and nine months than younger fathers. Neville and Parke (1997), through their observation work, have shown that delayed and early fathers‘ play styles differed in that the former tend to rely more on cognitive mechanisms than on physical arousal to engage their children (cfr. Lamb and Tamis-Lemondo 2004).

308 counter-intuitively, gender equality may ultimately be greater in couples where the age- gap is wider. This does not, however, account for the fact that women simply cannot delay births as long as men, and as such are forced to balance career and family responsibilities to a great extent than men, who given their greater delay may hold positions of greater power within the relationship. In order to further investigate the relationship between fertility and the gendered division of work in Padua, in the next chapter I turn to an exploration of attitudes and practices of egalitarianism in the domestic sphere and, relatedly, fertility outcomes.

CHAPTER 8. THE REAL AND THE IDEAL. EGALITARIAN ATTITUDES, THE GENDERED DIVISION OF LABOR AND MEN‟S FERTILITY INTENTIONS

Despite the marked desire of men to distinguish themselves from their own fathers and their acceptance of a modern feminine subjectivity, a number of studies have suggested that Italian men seem less reflective with regard to lingering asymmetries at the domestic level. Gallo (2007:270) suggests that the exclusive identification of men with the breadwinner role has be-come ever more anachronistic in Italy, yet this transformation

―generates profound tensions when men and women do not simultaneously reprocess the gendered symbols and practices which articulate relationships within the family and with regard to domestic work and paid labor‖ (idem; see also Ruspini 2003: 98-100). In this chapter, I examine men‘s attitudes towards gender equality, the division of paid and domestic labor, and the impact of the latter on fertility intentions among dual-earner couples. More broadly, I ask: Is there a fertility response to the division of domestic tasks and paid labor among Paduan men?

Demographers have suggested that although new models of fatherhood stress more involvement in the care of children and domestic chores, an equitable division of family tasks remains far from the norm in Italy (Rosina and Sabbadini 2006). Differences in the distribution of labor increase when there are children, as fathers tend to work longer hours in paid employment and mothers spend more time in household tasks and care activities, regardless of their involvement in the labor market (Pinnelli and Fiori

309

310

2008). Yet many scholars consider paternal collaboration essential to ―alleviating the costs of social reproduction for women and avoiding excessive limits on the number of children born‖ (Pinnelli and Fiori 2008: 172, see also Folbre 1994, 1997; McDonald,

1997; Seward and Richter 2008).164 More specifically, a number of studies suggest that fathers‘ involvement in household tasks and in the care of children positively affects women‘s propensity to have a second child (Mathews 1999; Torr and Short 2004; Mills et al. 2008). Researchers suggest that improving gender equity within the family may favor the realization of fertility intentions and help push birth rates towards replacement level (McDonald 2000a, 2002).

While increasing attention has been paid to the gendered division of domestic practices, it remains unclear just how much men‘s egalitarian gender attitudes (or the lack thereof) affect fertility desires and outcomes (Bernhard and Goldschieder 2008; Puur,

Olah, Tazi-Preve, and Dorbritz 2008; Westoff and Higgins 2009). In their review of the literature and cross-country analysis, Westhoff and Higgins (2009: 72) suggest that

―while some measures of gender egalitarianism among men in some countries appear to be positively associated with higher fertility, other measures are negatively associated‖

(Westoff and Higgins 2009: 72, see also Kaufmann 2000, Tazi-Preve, Bichlbauer and

Gougon 2004; Philipov 2008). Yet such survey results lack the in-depth information necessary to understand gender dynamics, the mechanisms behind declared attitudes of egalitarianism, and the resultant division of labor. In fact, while the large majority of men and women I spent time with in Padua agree that ―in today‘s society, men and women are

164 Seward and Richter (2008:89) point out that, ―Especially in Europe, the issue of caring fathers has been connected with discussion of concerns about low fertility. As more women have been employed, the challenges of combining family and paid work increasingly influence fertility decisions.‖

311 to all purposes equal,‖ their actual behavior in terms of ―domestic practices‖165 (Chapman

2004) do not always mirror this ideal. Most couples use a combination of common sense, power, and ideology in dividing paid and unpaid work (Coltrane 1996; Di Giulio and

Carrozza 2003), and this in turn seems to influence fertility outcomes. As we shall see in this chapter, cultural ideas about gender practices are often so deeply embedded that women and men hang on to them with some tenacity (even if, ultimately, rigid adherence may not always be in their best interests) (Chapman 2004: 2; Hochschild 1989). Others, on the other hand, go to great lengths to match their gender ―ideals‖ with the actual division of work and domestic labor. Such patterns of behavior are closely linked not only to socio-economic status and age, but also to the circumstances of paid labor, and more broadly, the cultural, economic, and political context of Padua. It is at the intersection of gender ideals and the balancing work and family life that we may learn more about men‘s fertility intentions and outcomes.

An ethnographic exploration of the relationship between men‘s gender ideals, the division of paid and unpaid labor, and fertility intentions, allows for an examination of a prominent theory in demography: McDonald‘s (2000a, 2000b) hypothesis regarding inconsistencies between levels of equity in family-oriented institutions and individual-

165 Following the lead of Morgan (1996) and Chapman (2004), I use the term ―domestic practices‖ to emphasize that wider cultural, economic, and political circumstances shape patterns of domestic life. Simultaneously, each family defines and executes such practices according to the unique circumstances which characterize their household. As Segalen (2002:81) so elegantly puts it: ―… there is no such entity as the Italian family. Each family has its own history and destiny, its own secrets, aspirations and delusions, its own conflicts and passions. Each is built on mobile sands, for time is constantly changing its shape and the status of individuals who compose it.‖ Domestic practices not only change over time as people move through the life course, but are fluid and require constant renegotiation. In this chapter I define domestic practices in a broad sense so as to embrace a wide range of activities that may occur both within and outside the home (e.g. housework, managing and providing childcare, leisure, managing and spending money, etc.). I am also attentive to the fact that caring and housework are qualitatively different in that the former involves ―negotiations with others and responsiveness to others‘ needs; it is both a form of labor and of love‖ (Smart and Neale 1999:20).

312 oriented institutions. McDonald proposes that fertility is particularly low in societies where women have equal opportunities in education and work, but where they carry an unequal proportion of family work. I use a gender perspective, focusing specifically on men and their fertility intentions, to further explore the mechanisms behind McDonald‘s theoretical model. More specifically, I propose that we pay more attention to the interplay between men‘s attitudes towards gender equality (the ―ideal‖) and the bidirectional relationship between domestic practices and work (the ―real‖). An examination of men‘s attitudes and actions highlights not only their agency in defining and framing the distribution of paid and unpaid labor, but reveals the important role that relationships between men and women play in fertility outcomes. I argue that unless the real and the ideal coincide more closely, fertility rates will continue to remain low.

After a brief review of several prominent gender and fertility studies, I critically evaluate McDonald‘s theory. I then use ethnographic examples to demonstrate the different ways that the ideal and the real play out in Paduan men‘s lives, and the consequences for fertility intentions. Given the increasingly common occurrence of families in which both parents work and the greater likelihood of men participating in domestic practices in such households (Saraceno 2005; Rosina and Sabbadini 2006), I focus particularly on the lives and experiences of 14 Paduan men in dual earner couples with (at least) one child under the age of 5. I conclude by discussing the policy implications of my findings.

8.1 Gender and Fertility Studies

While social scientists have long studied gender issues and the roles socially ascribed to males and females, the study of gender as it relates to demographic questions is a more

313 recent field of investigation. Becker (1981), in his theory of New Home Economics, pointed to the relationship between the transformation of family configurations and the socio-economic status of women. He argued that social scientists should consider greater female independence as one of the principal factors influencing a decreasing desire to marry and have children. While scientists have since critiqued his theory, one can recognize the beginnings of a new awareness with regard to gender roles and their impact on fertility outcomes. Since Becker‘s study, the breadth of material on this topic has increased substantially. In what follows I thus highlight several studies of interest to this chapter.

Chesnais‘s (1996, 1998) work, for example, presents an argument of particular significance. The author points out that although researchers often link low fertility in

Western European countries to gender equity, a closer look reveals that in fact there exists a connection between gender equity and higher fertility.166 In observing industrialized countries such as Sweden, the author argues that egalitarian countries have higher fertility because policies that allow for more equitable leave and family support decrease the incompatibility between work and childcare. In other countries (e.g. Italy), where more inequity between gender roles subsists and work flexibility and government support for childcare of infants 0-3 tend is limited (Mason, 1997), fertility outcomes result much lower. Chesnais labeled this situation the ―essence of a future feminist paradox.‖

166 Stark and Kohler (2002) similarly point out that ―high fertility in cross-sectional analyses with developed countries tends to be associated with high female labor force participation during the 1990s, quite contrary to the reverse pattern during earlier decades‖ (see Ahn and Mira 1998, Hoem 2000, Rindfuss et al. 2003).

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Torr and Short (2004) test these theories in an empirical study of US working couples. Employing time-use data167 from the National Survey of Families and

Households, they investigate the impact of gender equality (indicated by the division of household labor) among working couples with one child on the transition to a second birth. Their results reflect quite closely the conclusions of Chesnais, in that they observe a u-shaped pattern based upon gender equality/inequality within the home and equality outside the home in non-family institutions. They report (2004: 113): ―Couples are more likely to proceed to a second birth when the wife‘s share of housework is relatively low

(54% or less of such work). They are also more likely to have a second birth when wives do most of the housework (84% or more).‖ Couples in the middle 50% of their study, who struggled to find a balance between family and work, had the lowest probability of proceeding to a second birth. Torr and Short‘s study demonstrates that both ―modern‖ couples168 who share domestic chores and ―traditional‖ couples in which the women take on a greater share of the household labor have similar fertility outcome, while families which find themselves somewhere between modern and traditional (middle 50%), tend to have fewer children.

167 Time use studies, like that conducted by Torr and Short (2004), have been carried out by a number of scholars. Researchers have shown, for example, that in the U.S. the total time women and men spend doing paid and unpaid work (taken together) is broadly equal. On the other hand, in-depth analyses also reveal the persistence of significant social problems, from income to gender inequality (Robinson and Godbey, 1997; Greenstein, 2000; Bianchi et al., 2006). A comparison of time-use across 10 OECD countries conducted by Bittman and Wajcman (2004) found similar results. Rosina and Sabbadini (2006) using Italian survey data (FFS 2003) reveal that Italian women work more than Italian men (an average of 54 total hours per week compared to 48 hours per week; or an extra 24-hour day per month).

168 In addition to Torr and Short‘s study, a number of other projects have similarly suggested that more ―egalitarian men‖ transition more rapidly to a second (or even a third) birth (Berinde 1999, Kaufman 2000, Oláh 2003, Duvander and Andersson 2006, Bernhard and Goldscheider 2008).

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In the Italian context, relatively few scholars have studied gender issues as they relate to fertility. Survey results from a project carried out in five large Italian cities revealed that among couples in which both parents worked the likelihood of having a second child rose when the father increased his involvement in housework after a first birth, and if the mother did not reduce her working hours (Mencarini and Tanturri, 2004).

Another study, based on the European Community Household Panel, found that Italian fathers‘ involvement in care activities slightly increased the probability of having the second child, although only for the younger cohorts of working women (Cooke, 2003).

An analysis of data from another longitudinal survey–ILFI (Longitudinal Survey on

Italian Households) resulted in similar findings (Fiori, 2006). Although these findings suggest that a father‘s participation in childcare and domestic tasks may affect fertility, the validity of this relationship has been tested only under particular circumstances, focusing on limited types of help and woman‘s occupational status and education.

Pinnelli and Fiori (2008) in part remedy this lacuna. Their study of Italian women interviewed 18 to 21 months after childbirth confirms that help from partners, especially for working woman, encouraged the latter to plan for a second child, although not a third one. Mills et al. (2008), in their comparative study of Italy and the Netherlands, find that

Italian couples with higher levels of education had higher fertility intentions, which they relate to women‘s stronger bargaining power, and a more equal division of housework and childcare.

Despite a growing interest in men, most studies on gender and fertility, whether conducted in Italy or abroad, have focused on women, or at best, couple relationships.

Studies that focus solely on men are rare, and tend to center their analyses on either

316 men‘s gender attitudes and fertility desires and outcomes (as described above), or men‘s participation in domestic chores and childcare (e.g. the types of activities they are involved in169). In this chapter, I am interested in looking at an issue which has predominantly seen women as the focus of analysis, or the ability to balance work and family life, and fertility intentions and outcomes.170 McDonald‘s theory (2000a, 2000b,

2001, 2002), to which I now turn, delves carefully into this subject, although the focus is not on men specifically. In what follows, I review McDonald‘s theory with a critical lens;

I then apply it to ethnographic data collected in Padua.

8.2 Gender Equity in Family-Oriented and Individual-Oriented Institutions: A Critical Review

McDonald argues that Chesnais‘s u-shaped relationship described above, or the relationship between gender equity and fertility, is not a paradox, but rather must be conceptualized in terms of equity with regards to two institutions: family-oriented and individual-oriented. He builds upon Mason‘s (1997:158) concept of the ―gender system,‖ defined as, ―the socially constructed expectations for male and female behavior that are found (in variable form) in every known human society. A gender system‘s expectations prescribe a division of labor and responsibilities between women and men and grant

169 I return to the literature – most thoroughly developed in the fields of psychology and sociology - on men‘s involvement as parents in the section dedicated specifically to Paduan men, their gender ideologies, work-family balance, and fertility intentions. For an excellent review of the literature on whether and how much time fathers spend with their children see Lamb and Tamis-Lemonda‘s (2004) edited volume: The Role of the Father. Pleck and Masciadrelli (2004), in particular, discuss not only what fathers do when they are available but why they do what they do. In contrast to earlier conceptualizations of fathers‘ roles which focused primarily on the breadwinner model, current studies also recognize that fathers play a number of significant roles (companions, care providers, spouses, models, etc.) whose ―relative importance varies across historical epochs and cultural groups‖ (Lamb and Tamis-Lemond 2004: 3).

170 One exception to this is the large EU project: Critical Research on Men in Europe (CROME, 2000- 2003). Project findings from CROME revealed that men, gender equality, and work and family life is seldom a topic addressed by professional organizations or labor market officials, confirming a reluctance to ―name men as men‖ (Hearn and Pringle 2006), as well as ―an ingrown habit of thinking about gender and family reconciliation measures with women in mind‖ (Holter 2007:431).

317 different rights and obligation to them.‖ McDonald hypothesizes that, initially, increased gender equality within the home stimulated a transition from high fertility to replacement fertility (or a total fertility rate of 2.1 children per woman). He suggests, however, that although changes within the family were sufficient enough to allow women extensive control over their fertility, they did not provide other forms of equity within the family: women continued to be the predominant providers of care and domestic labor.

Over time, the slow changing nature of family-oriented institutions ultimately came into conflict with individual-oriented institutions -such as education and market employment- which, on the other hand, change more quickly and are characterized by higher levels of gender equity. McDonald (2000a: 437) explains:

Starting from a point where women had a subordinate status in individual institutions such as formal education and market employment, the [20th] century ended with very high levels of gender equity prevailing in these institutions. High levels of equity enjoyed by women as individuals in combination with continuing low levels of equity for women in their roles as wives or mothers mean that many women will end up bearing fewer children than they aspired to when they were younger.

More broadly, McDonald suggests that the conflict between higher levels of gender equity in individual-oriented institutions, and lower levels of gender in family-oriented institutions, caused the decline from replacement-level fertility to the very low fertility rates characteristic of countries like Italy since the late 1900s.

While McDonald takes an important step in centering his theory of fertility transition around gender stratification and gender roles in different social institutions (and their potential inconsistency with one another), his approach seems remarkably to equate

―gender‖ with ―women.‖ In fact, in the first of a series of papers on gender equity and fertility transition, McDonald (2000a:427) laments a lacuna in fertility studies that do not

318 take gender into account, commenting ―it is almost inconceivable that fertility transition can be studied without considering socially constructed expectations for female behavior‖

(emphasis added). When men are mentioned, they tend to be described statically as patriarchal decisions makers, hence missing their subjective desires or agentic qualities.

My goal in this chapter is not only to give men agency, but also to emphasize the intertwined nature of family-oriented and individual-oriented institutions. McDonald does discuss their reciprocal relationship (see below), but he emphasizes above all their inconsistencies. Although an attractive explanation for explaining the shift to very low fertility levels in Italy, such a model treats institutions as analytically distinct; as if they travel on parallel and independent paths which butt up against each other rather than influencing one another. Take for example, McDonald‘s conceptual representation

(2000a: 436, his figure 1; here figure 11) of changes in gender equity over time in these

―separate‖ institutions:

Figure 11. Changes in Gender Equity over Time

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The impression here is that family-oriented institutions and individual-oriented institutions change mostly independently of one another, such that once they become too disparate, fertility is influenced negatively. Not only is little suggested about the ways such spheres are intertwined, but in the ten years since McDonald proposed this theory, one wonders what has contributed to the persistence of below replacement fertility levels in Italy and in other countries? In other words, if one were to extend the lines of this figure, what would we see? McDonald (2000a:438) suggests that very low fertility rates will persist unless gender equity within family-oriented institutions rises to much higher levels. Ethnographic evidence from Padua, to which I will shortly turn, reveals a surprising finding: attitudes expressed among all fathers with (at least) one child under the age of 5 - regardless of age or class – reflected a belief in the importance of gender equality, and among a significant proportion of these men, I observed efforts to put this ideal into practice through sharing domestic duties, participating in child care, and seeking more flexible work schedules. Beliefs in gender equality did not, however, always mirror actual behavior, and the proximity between ideal and real was shaped by the interaction between ―institutions that deal with people as individuals, such as education and market employment […] and institutions that deal with people as members of families, such as industrial relations (the terms and conditions of employment), family services, the tax system, social security, and the family itself‖ (McDonald 2002: 428).

That said, McDonald (2001, 2002) does make some attempt to weave the institutions of gender, family, the market and the state, especially as this concerns his discussion of market production as opposed to social reproduction. More specifically, he suggests that in a liberal economic agenda, individuals must maximize their utility to the

320 market in order to protect themselves against risk. As such, they must acquire saleable skills, work experience and a marketable reputation in addition to accumulating wealth as a safety net (2001:10). Accordingly, ―The canny player in a game that rewards market production is unwise to devote time or money to social reproduction. Social reproduction involves altruism, that is, time and money devoted to others or to the society at large. For the risk averse in a free market economy, altruism is equivalent to foolhardiness‖ (idem).

The flip side of the coin is that the family is the heart of social reproduction, which involves not only altruism, but self sacrifice and risk acceptance. McDonald‘s conclusion, again focused on women, is that ―the market continues to produce risk-averse workers for whom children are a considerable risk…. Sustainable fertility rates will only be restored if the state and the market recognize a new family model, one based on a greater degree of gender equity‖ (2001:11). He suggests that although gender equity in individual- oriented institutions has progressed, the male breadwinner model still underpins family- oriented social institutions (idem), such that if fertility rates are to rise above replacement rates, a reform of that state and market recognizant of new family models based on a greater degree of gender equity must take place. McDonald emphasizes, above all, the need to eradicate the entrenched male breadwinner or family wage model which punishes social reproduction, especially for women.

8.3 Paduan Men: Gender Ideologies, Work, Family, and Fertility Intentions

Ethnographic research from Padua revealed, regardless of age or social class, among all fathers with (at least) one young child under the age of 5, a distinct decline in the male breadwinner ideal, but also significant difficulty in the transition to more egalitarian models of work and domestic labor. This in turn had consequences for men‘s fertility

321 intentions. Surprisingly, family life was often more dynamic than employment, such that work conditions (especially those more deeply ingrained in a traditional view of masculinity) weighed heavily on efforts to participate in childcare and domestic routines.

In other words, gaining recognition as caregivers in the workplace was difficult for men.

This suggests that in some cases processes of change may originate at home, rather than vice versa. On the other hand, several cases revealed that employment situations friendly to family life had an impact on men‘s lives at home in terms of their participation in childcare and domestic chores.171 More broadly, insufficient opportunities to balance production and reproduction, and to match gender ideals to the division of paid and unpaid labor, negatively influence men‘s fertility intentions.

In other words, ideals of gender equality were tested in the ―real‖ of balancing work and family. In fact, we might represent this dynamic with the following figure:

Figure 12. Gender Equity and Fertility Intentions between the Real and the Ideal

Ideal: Gender equity

Fertility intentions Real: Work Real: Family

It is from within this reciprocal relationship and the specific stories of men in Padua that I explore men‘s gender ideologies, work-family balance, and fertility intentions. This

171 Although not directly related to fertility intentions nor specifically Italian men, Holter‘s (2007) article ―Men's work and family reconciliation in Europe‖ reveals a finding of considerable weight for the issues examined in this chapter. His (2007: 453) ―main finding was that changes in the men‘s household and private life relations preceded other changes […] Instead of work changing gender, we often found women‘s new work roles as part of changing homes and homes changing men, with a beginning dynamic effect back into working life.‖

322 perspective allows not only for a deeper analysis of the mechanisms behind McDonald‘s theory, but reveals the importance of gender-neutral workplace policies, and, as pointed out by McDonald (in a rare look to men), a ―more general recognition and support of fathers as parents… [and] a society that is accepting of ―involved fathers‖ (McDonald

2002: 441; see also Mathews 1999: 27).

Although not directly related to fertility outcomes, much relevant work has been conducted – especially in developmental psychology and sociology – on the contribution of the workplace (as both a barrier and an enabler) to men‘s involvement as parents

(Russell and Hwang 2004: 476). Unfortunately, this literature is rarely incorporated into demographic investigations of men and fertility, despite growing evidence of the link between paternal involvement in childcare and domestic practices and higher fertility outcomes. While early analyses of paternal involvement in childcare focused on employment and the impact of social assumptions of men as breadwinners, more recent research has focused on the contribution of workplace culture and initiatives (i.e. whether men take paternity leave), on men‘s interaction with children (Repetti, 1994; Hass and

Hwang 1995; Haas, Allard, and Hwang 2002), and the workplace as a context for providing education, information and support for fathers (Levine and Pittinsky 1997).172

Of particular interest to this chapter is that many of these studies surprisingly suggest that the relationship between workplace demands and father involvement is relatively weak

172 Generally, there seems to be a consensus in the developmental psychology literature that father involvement is affected by ―multiple interacting systems operating at different levels over the life course, including: psychological factors (e.g. motivation, skills, self confidence), the children‘s individual characteristics (e.g. temperament, gender), social support (e.g. relationships with partners and extended family members), community and cultural influences (e.g. socio-economic opportunity, cultural ideologies) and institutional practices and public policies (e.g. welfare support, child support enforcement, work conditions). These reciprocally interacting levels can be viewed as a hierarchy of factors influencing paternal behavior‖ (Lamb and Tamis-Lemonda 2004:11).

323 and that ―men have much more control over both work hours and their level of involvement as a father than many of the theoretical models implied‖ (Russell and

Hwang 2004: 476, cf. Gerson 1993; Pleck 1997; Hass, Allard and Hwang, 2002).

Recognizing the agentic qualities of men as they balance work and family life is fundamental to understanding fertility intentions and outcomes.

Although change occurs unevenly given the unique situation of each family,

Paduan men‘s gender ideologies, distribution of domestic and paid labor, and resultant fertility intentions can be categorized loosely into three groups ranging from less than gender equal situations to marked signs of equality between partners. These three groups similarly reflect an increasing proximity between ―ideals‖ of gender equality and ―real‖ or actual behavior. I‘m particularly interested here in examining the ways family- and individual-oriented institutions intertwine and interact in specific ways, identifying men‘s agency as they navigate between beliefs and practices, and understanding the impact of their relationship with their partners on the division of labor and childcare. I chose to examine couples with (at least) one child under the age of 5 in which both partners are employed as research has shown that the division of tasks between partners is more equitable when the woman is employed (Oppeneimer, 1994; Chafetz, 1995; Grillo &

Pinnelli, 1999; Maffioli & Sabbadini, 1999). This is also the group in which men‘s endeavors to balance work and family are most salient for understanding fertility intentions and the likelihood of choosing to continue family building. Within each category, I first address men‘s gender ideals and the ―real‖ they experience in trying to balance work and family life, and then discuss the consequences of the latter for fertility intentions.

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8.3.1 Surface Gender Equity

The first group (5 couples) concerns men with lower levels of education, in their mid-30s to early 40s, employed in factories or various sorts of manual labor. Upon being asked, these men quickly agreed that ―men and women are to all purposes equal in Italian society‖ and more specifically, expressed a desire to fulfill the role of a caring, affectionate father who shared household duties with his spouse. Despite, however, a discourse of more ―equitable‖ masculinity, men had difficulty obtaining flexible work schedules and increasing their involvement in family life.

At home, the abstract beliefs about what women and men ―ought‖ to do did not seem connected to the actual division of household labor. The wives of many men in this group appeared unprepared to deal with the desire on the part of their spouse to share in domestic practices. They found it difficult to give up total authority over household management, and generally preferred to do most of the domestic labor themselves. They would, however, recount their husbands‘ modest contributions in a positive, appreciative way. Although they seemed grateful for their husband‘s ―help,‖ most women in this group also viewed their husbands as incapable of performing domestic chores up to the standard they desired, and many ultimately felt that they would rather do it themselves. In other words, women often recounted men‘s ―help‖ with mixed emotions, while men quickly learned they fared better if they let their wives do the domestic tasks to the perfection they desired. These women also rarely asked for collaboration and infrequently delegated domestic practices to their spouses, and both partners tended to easily fall back on gender stereotypes about who was ―naturally‖ better at doing certain activities.

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I would say that I certainly help around the house, although my wife does more than me… and always does it better! She is constantly correcting me, and showing me the right ways to do things – you know, for example, how to best hang the laundry - and it always takes her a quarter of the time to do anything around the house than it takes me. She just does it better and faster… women I guess have some kind of DNA that just makes them better at doing these things… well, that and the fact that from the time they‘re 8 years old women have do things around the house… I try to do things, but it always seems like a losing battle (Mirko, age 35)

While in the field observing such behavior, I happened upon an article in the local newspaper, entitled ―Veneto: laziest men in all of Italy?‖ which similarly addressed the issue of men‘s participation in domestic chores. The journalist, Alessandro Valdin (Nov.

30, 2007) reported results from a study by Klaus Davi and Co. who, using a sample of

250 Veneto men between the ages of 30 and 70, concluded that the group who participates most in domestic chores consists of those under the age of 35 while those over the age of 60 leave most of the cleaning and cooking to their wives. A third of the sample declared that they do not help out at home because they don‘t have time, while

27% reported that they are not ―good at domestic chores‖ (di non essere portato per le attivitá domestiche). Others (17%) admitted laziness, while about 11% of the men declared that such activities are a ―women‘s things‖ (―cose da donne‖). Finally, 9% of the sample declared that they leave the domestic chores to their wives because ―they are simply better at these activities.‖ While such results are perhaps discouraging for proponents of gender equality, they do reflect an important trend in ―naming men as men,‖ or the increasing desire to reflect on what men do (or don‘t) and why.

A number of men in this group, while (ideally) motivated to participate in domestic practices and childcare, often complained that a lack of skills - exemplified by ignorance or clumsiness - prevented them from increasing their involvement and

326 closeness with their young child. While this perhaps sounds like an excuse, it may also reflect a very real fear of incompetence and failure made still more genuine by mothers who I witnessed grimacing when fathers failed to console a crying infant, who said nothing when he handed over a baby who needed diapering, or said things like ―he‘s clumsy and he makes me waste time.‖ Recent research in developmental psychology has similarly focused on the extent to which mothers are gatekeepers for father‘s involvement. Allen and Hawkins (1999), for example, distinguish three components of gatekeeping on the part of US mothers: a reluctance to give up responsibility by setting rigid standards, external validation of maternal identity, and differentiated conception of family roles. Other findings indicate that fathers are more involved when their wives‘ own fathers were more participative or if their wives have positive relationships with their fathers (Feldman et al. 1983; Haas, 1988; Radin 1993; Beitel and Parke, 1998). Lind

(1974) found that Swedish fathers who were taught and encouraged to care for their newborns were more involved with their infants three months later. Despite the gradual emergence of mammos in Padua and elsewhere in Italy, men in this group may feel apprehension that active parenting and masculinity are incompatible. This would help to explain why men‘s motivation to take a major role in childcare has increased relatively slowly, despite dramatic changes in female employment patterns (Haas 1992; Russell and

Hwang 2004; Lamb and Tamis-Lemonda 2004).

Mothers in this group may also feel that increased paternal involvement threatens fundamental power dynamics within the family (Lamb and Tamis-Lemonda, 2004). In fact, although all of the women in this group worked outside the home, most occupied low-paying, low-prestige positions with little prospect of advancement. It may be that

327 they prefer to maintain authority in domestic practices even if this means physical and mental exhaustion (idem: 14). Economic conditions seem unlikely to reduce the need for both parents to obtain employment, and if women feel reticent to share power and authority in the household, men may consequently be less inclined to seek strategies at work that would allow them more flexibility and opportunities to contribute to domestic practices.

More specifically, when speaking about paid employment, these men often conveyed the idea that a man was not (or could not be) the principal caretaker at home.

As Vittorio (age 37) commented ―Where I work, there really isn‘t an investment in the personal life or family life of the workers… the point is to get the work done, and that‘s it.‖ Jacopo (age 38) similarly explained, ―When my son was born, my co-workers and manager got together and gave me a present, but after that, no one really asked me how things were going. It was a difficult time, the baby cried all night, and I would show up to work exhausted. My wife stayed at home with the baby, and that was that.‖ Generally, these men lamented that their employers did not recognize them as caretakers. Others observed that they felt marginalized by their co-workers, especially those without children. As Gianluca (age 40) put it,

―I thought about asking to leave work a bit early on occasion in order to be with our newborn daughter, but I felt afraid of being laughed at. Last year, a fellow co- worker wanted to take parental leave to help with breast feeding, but I remember people making fun of him… maybe they didn‘t even realize that a man can bottle feed…so anyways, I ended up not asking for any special permission… besides my wife seems to want to do all the feeding anyway.‖

The mentality that permeated many of these men‘s work settings was that family programs were women‘s programs. Men, already made more hesitant by dynamics at

328 home, often felt doubtful about rubbing against the grain of gender expectations at work which assumed that the presence and care on the part of the father were less necessary than that of the mother. This in turn influenced the arrangement of domestic practices at the home. If new fathers felt too intimidated to insist on parental leave upon the birth of their child, they also felt reluctant to then ask for leave to stay at home with a sick child or to take time off to take the child to the doctor.

Asymmetries in the different relevance given to the division of household labor, childcare, and paid labor constantly contradicted an ideal vision of a strongly symmetric contract, and this had consequences for fertility intentions. As Belloni aptly notes (1996:

20), ―the conflict, more or less explicit, between ideal representations and real asymmetries, tends to increase the probability of postponement sine die of fertility decisions.‖ Mothers in this group tended to feel overwhelmed with their duties inside and outside the home while fathers, despite their explicit desire to partake in domestic practices, felt frustrated that they could not spend more time with their young child, and

(perhaps too) quickly gave up trying to meet their wives‘ high expectations with regard to domestic chores. The majority of the couples in this group desired a second child, but felt hesitant to proceed due to both economic concerns and worries about their ability to care for another child. Of the five couples under consideration, only one had two children, and this couple stood out for the fact that the wife worked part time, as opposed to full time like the rest. One might conclude that for these men, the real and the ideal were exceedingly disparate, and in fact, there existed a general sense of disempowerment; an inability to change the ―real‖ and move closer to ―ideal‖ conditions for family building.

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More broadly, attitudes within the family and the terms and conditions of employment - which according to McDonald both fall with the realm of ―family-oriented institutions‖ tended to conflict with one another. In other words, while men expressed gender equal ideologies, such sentiments where immediately stymied both by their own partners attitudes and by work conditions which continue to be modeled after a male- breadwinner ideal. This suggests that there may be elements within family-oriented or individual-oriented institutions which contrast one another. We might also further reflect on the ways that these women‘s participation in relatively low paying jobs influenced the family-oriented sphere. Although their jobs reflect McDonald‘s view of increased equality in individual-oriented spheres – by the mere fact that they work - the fact that they received little gratification from their employment seemed to reinforce an imbalanced distribution of domestic chores and childcare within the family. More generally, from an analysis of the interaction between institutions that deal with people as individuals and institutions that deal with people as members of a family, we may learn more about the mechanisms which facilitate or hinder men and women‘s efforts to match their gender ―ideals‖ to actual behavior.

8.3.2 Reconciling the Real and the Ideal

A second group of men (6 couples) concerns those of approximately the same age as the last group (mid-30s to mid 40s), but who had higher levels of education and worked in

―white collar‖ jobs in fields such as psychology, medicine, the public sector, or in managerial positions. When asked their opinion about gender equity, men and their spouses in this group often gave a more complicated answer than the previous group.

Rather than immediately reply ―Yes, men and women are to all purposes equal in today‘s

330 society‖ they would typically answer that although they believed in the fundamental importance of gender equality, they did not believe that such equality had been achieved in contemporary Italian society. Despite, or perhaps because of, their skepticism towards the achievement of gender equality, men in this group seemed particularly motivated to match their attitudes of egalitarianism to the ―real‖ in which they lived. Differently from the group described above, much more dialogue and discussion took place in the private sphere and at work as to the appropriate division of paid labor and domestic practice.

While discourse and actual behavior seemed more closely attuned to the reality of balancing work and family life, these couples still struggled with gendered expectations, and there often ensued confusion over who should do what.

Men in this group made a conscious effort to contribute to domestic chores such as sweeping the floor, washing dishes, doing laundry, shopping, and cooking. Although their spouses recognized their participation in household labor, there still existed a tendency to recount the division of work in terms of ―he helps me quite a bit‖ rather than to discuss housework in gender neutral terms. Observations conducted in these men‘s homes also suggested that although men contributed a great deal to cleaning, cooking, etc., they tended do these tasks upon request, rather than spontaneously carrying out a chore. Their spouses found this frustrating, although disagreement over the division of domestic chores tended to be less about who usually did a certain activity, and more about who took initiative, who planned, and who managed domestic practices. Take, for example, Sara‘s (age 36) description of the division of household chores:

I would say that I think much more ―long-term‖ so, for example, if I see that some grocery shopping needs to be done, and I know today is a free day for me, I think to myself ‗I should go today because in the next few days I‘ll be really busy and

331

won‘t be able to go, and besides the store is closed on Wednesdays‘… Francesco isn‘t like that at all! So when I know that he isn‘t going to think about these kinds of things I say, Francesco can you go? And he goes shopping… or I ask him to clean the bathroom, and he does… but I‘m the one who says we should clean… or that we should wash the dishes after dinner…. I mean, he‘ll get to it… but maybe the next day, or the day after that… This irritates me, but I can‘t complain, he helps around the house and I‘d say we more or less share chores.

Although they were apt to ―manage‖ household chores, these women also tended to be more ―tolerant‖ of the outcomes when men performed domestic tasks. For example,

Federico (age 37) commented, as one day I watched him iron clothes freshly taken from the washing machine: ―You see, I iron… some days it feels like I‘ve completely forgotten how to do it and nothing seems to come out right! But anyways, I do it… and my wife simply laughs, and puts on a wrinkled blouse. Sometimes, though, it‘s just too much, and she ends up doing it over again... Anyways, I make an effort and we pretty much agree on who does what around the house...‖ Women in this group recognized that there existed more than one way to perform domestic chores, although this was not always as easily put into practice as recognized in words

Many women have the perception of knowing the truth (avere la veritá in tasca)… I mean, of knowing that when they say something is clean, it really is clean… while if a man says the same thing… if he says ‗there it‘s clean‘ it probably means it‘s still dirty… Which is not true… the important thing is that we find a way not to be too rigid… and we respect the other person‘s rhythm and way of doing things (rispettare i tempi del altro) (Marialaura, age 33)

More broadly, differently from the group described above, these couples negotiated173 the division of tasks much more explicitly, with men often making a more noticeable effort –

173 Chapman (2004) correctly points out that it should not, however, be presumed that men and women enter into relationships on equal footing. ―Women and men also bring different resources into relationships including ‗economic power,‘ ‗socialized skills,‘ ‗physical capabilities‘ and, most importantly, ‗sets of ideas.‘ Consequently, most couples have arguments about the day to day practices of domestic life because they have greater say on some issues compared with others, and do not always share understanding on competing time pressures and priorities‖ (idem: 99).

332 even if under instruction - to share in the household burden. While such negotiation often reflected a desire on the part of both partners to share domestic practices more equitably, it also suggested an underlying confusion as to who ―should‖ do what, and required constant energy and a willingness to discuss.

When it came to childcare, men in this group also seemed more aware and informed of the benefits of spending time with their young children, both for themselves and for the child (Marsiglio 1991; Coltrane 1996). Mothers, differently from those in the group described above, encouraged interaction and involvement and fathers seemed more at ease and confident in their ability to change a diaper or feed the child. In fact, the arrival of a first child actually made some men more active in domestic practices: ―now that I have a family, I vacuum, cook, clean, change diapers and go grocery shopping… it‘s not that I didn‘t ever do these things before, but now I participate a lot more…Now it‘s normal for men to do these things around the house, just look around at all the mammi you see...‖ On the other hand, the majority of men in this group commented on the challenges of maintaining an equal division of labor once their child was born. Stefano

(age 42) for example, commented:

Gender equality? Let just say that in Italy, equality between the sexes has not been achieved, but in my little camp of a family, we try to live things in a way that… For example, I iron, because I‘m good at it… although we started to have more arguments about these things when Giacomo was born. In the sense that sometimes I delegate activities to my wife… I say ―you should do it, you‘re the mother‖… and she says, ―what is that supposed to mean?!‖ She says that I just use that as an excuse, to delegate things I don‘t want to do…‖

Despite men‘s egalitarian attitudes and efforts to participate in domestic practices, there still remained a sense of frustration on the part of most of these women who felt that,

333 notwithstanding a significant ―effort‖ on the part of the spouse to partake in domestic practices, they ultimately did more around the house and performed more childcare.

As Italian women‘s expectations of equality increase, they similarly encounter divergences with a family model which does not adhere to their ideals and hopes. The women in this group refused, at some level, to take on a full ―dual burden,‖ and countered this dynamic by delegating activities and encouraging their husbands to change diapers or carry out similar childcare tasks.174 Despite these efforts, on the part of both men and women, most of these couples still did not equally share the housework and childcare, even if both worked outside the home in similarly sophisticated careers. Men seemed to have greater difficulty adapting to the renegotiation of the division of household labor once a child was born, and seemed dependent on their wives managerial directions. Indeed, the birth of a child increased the necessity of dedicating time to domestic activities and women seemed to feel more stressed in this regard than men.

When tensions rose, women tended to lose patience with their partner‘s clumsiness, and fall back on gender stereotypes dictating who is ―naturally‖ better at performing certain domestic practices175. Despite such difficulties, these men stood out in their efforts to reflect on their behavior, on their relationships, and on paternity.

Such reflection often carried over to the work place, where many men made a dedicated effort to balance work and family life. Differently from the last group, they

174 Scholars have suggested that fathers who provide more childcare and participate more in domestic labor may be out of necessity; a working mother ―produces‖ a more care-giving father (Rosina and Sabbadini 2006).

175 Chapman (2004: 139) similarly suggests that ―counter-cultural domestic practices require the establishment of more strictly rule governed behavior than in conventional households. By definition, it is easier to fall into line with conventional domestic practices because the principles that underlie them are deeply embedded and are therefore constantly reinforced through cultural, personal, economic and political life.‖

334 often had jobs where designing flexible schedules was more of an option. For example, one man, a computer technician, recounted that his boss was more ―tolerant‖ towards his decision to work more flexible hours because they relied on him as an ―expert.‖ As long as he achieved the goals set out by the managers, they allowed him to distribute his eight hour work commitment over the course of the day, which in turn permitted him to take on family tasks at odd hours. More generally, employees seen as important to an organization seemed more able to plan their time such that they could attain an acceptable work-family balance.

Interestingly, although these men expressed gender equality as an ideological issue, they also often presented the latter in practical and emotional terms. More specifically, these men described the breadwinner model as ―in crisis‖ because it no longer fitted expectations of the division of labor. Such statements were stimulated by a constant (re)negotiation of domestic practices as well as work environments friendly to family life. For example, Alberto‘s employer encouraged him to take parental leave upon the birth of his daughter. Alberto (age 33) somewhat hesitantly accepted and recounted feeling surprised that passing time with his infant at home made him take more initiative in sharing housework: ―the time at home made me realize all the things my wife did around the house, and I began to do things that I previously didn‘t do… like straightening up, or sweeping the floor after a meal.‖ Above all, he recounted exploring a more affective and emotional side to himself. A number of psychologists and sociologists have similarly pointed out that fatherhood can further a man‘s personal development by increasing his awareness of himself, his values, and his familial relationships (Erikson

1959; Cowan 1988; Hawkins et al. 1993; Coltrane 1996).

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Yet men‘s endeavors to request certain parental benefits at work did not always meet with success. For example, Andrea (age 36) asked for breast-feeding leave, a benefit that existed at his company, but had never been requested by a man. The managers granted a wage and hour reduction, but Andrea later lost his job when the company downsized. While not given as an explicit reason for his being let off, Andrea linked his request to having lost his job. More broadly, new attitudes on the part of caregiving men seemed to create tensions in the workplace and still appear to be in a developmental phase. As Holter (2007: 452) discerns in his work on men‘s work and family reconciliation in Europe, ―It was not as if management was anticare. It simply did not care, according to many men.‖ A number of men in this group similarly felt that they sacrificed a great deal for their children, but that their employers, and sometimes even their spouses, neither recognized nor valued their actions.

These men seemed to be slowly adjusting to a new ―gender system.‖ Despite ideals of gender equality, in actual practice an entirely equal division of labor with their partners had not (yet) been achieved and the distribution of labor was constantly renegotiated (a tiring process). Notwithstanding these tensions, increased participation in childcare and domestic chores combined with better (if still limited) access to family benefits and flexible hours in paid labor seemed to augment these men‘s desires to have another child. For some of these men, their higher levels of education also translated into higher incomes than that of the previous group, making financial concerns less of an issue and increasing the possibility of taking advantage of alternative services in terms of

336 domestic chores and childcare.176 Generally, a greater ―match‖ between the ―ideal‖ of gender equality and the ―real‖ of balancing work and family seemed to encourage men‘s intentions to have another child. On the other hand, the persistent, unbalanced division of domestic practices (and constant need to negotiate who does what) contributed to a delay in moving on to a second child. In fact, 3 of these couples had only one child the age of 4 or 5 and, although men expressed their intention to have another child, the couple had not yet transitioned to a second birth. Two couples each had two children, although one of these was wealthy enough to pay for (and willing to use) private childcare, as opposed to the others in this group who were not poor enough to be realistically eligible for public childcare (for children 0-3 years of age) but not wealthy enough to afford the expense of private childcare, or were, more broadly, against the idea of leaving a child of that age in an environment outside the immediate family or a trusted babysitter. The last couple had three children, although the second two children were twins and there was a four-year difference between the first birth and the second births. When I left Padua, this last couple was struggling to decide how to best manage childcare, without necessarily having to change their full time work commitments. More broadly, although the gap between the ―real‖ and the ―ideal‖ among these couples seems narrower - and hence

176 If public childcare for children aged 3-5 is well developed in Italy and used by 95 percent of children, the opposite is true of the availability of childcare services for children under age 3, used by only 6 percent of the population (Del Boca and Vuri, 2007). Public childcare for children aged 0-3 is also characterized by high levels of heterogeneity across regions and access to the latter strongly depends on family size, income and composition. In fact, due to the considerable imbalance between supply and demand, it is in practice available only for low income families. Private childcare, on the other hand, is less widespread, costs much more, and represents a significant economic burden for families (idem). Moreover, together with availability, childcare use depends on the hours of care offered, which of course, affect the opportunity- costs for mothers and fathers. As a result, taking care of young children is still largely delegated to families (including grandparents or other relatives, babysitters, other forms of self-organized childcare).

337 encourages higher fertility intentions - it is still wide enough to delay or even perhaps prohibit the transition to a second birth.

McDonald‘s suggestion that gender-equity in individual-oriented institutions has progressed, but that a male breadwinner model still underpins family-oriented institutions is in some ways contradicted by findings from this group. In fact, gender-equity seems to have progressed within some aspects of family-oriented institutions – such as within the family itself – testified to by marked efforts to negotiate domestic duties and childcare. In other ways, McDonald‘s hypothesis rings true, in that when the terms and conditions of employment do not recognize that the male breadwinner model increasingly makes less sense, a conflict emerges between family-oriented institutions and individual-oriented institutions, and negatively impacts fertility intentions. Yet rather than simply coming into conflict with one another, it may helpful to think about the ways that greater equality in individual-oriented institutions positively influences family-oriented institutions. In other words, greater participation on equal terms of men and women in education and market employment renders increasingly evident the need to reform market policies recognizant of different kinds of family models.

8.3.3 The Realizable Ideal?

The last group of fathers (3 couples) concerns those of a relatively young age (in their late 20s and early 30s) who, although a small group in terms of representativeness (first births tend to occur later in Italy, especially for men, see chapters 6 and 7), are interesting to consider in terms of what the future may hold. Like the group described above, these men agreed that ―men and women are to all purposes equal,‖ although they saw the

―subject of equality‖ as a problem. They believed that questions of gender equality

338 should be talked about more in the mass media, in the family, and in the workplace, given the persistent differential treatment of men and women across a broad range of social institutions. Despite such skepticism, however, their actual behavior surprisingly matched their attitudes towards gender egalitarianism. Kaufman and Uhlengerg (2000) similarly suggest that young fathers are more likely to translate egalitarian attitudes into behavior that is consistent with their ideals. Notwithstanding, however, the relatively close concurrence of ―real‖ and ―ideal,‖ constraints in transitioning to a second birth loomed large, especially as this concerned the labor market and public services.

Interestingly, this group of men exhibited a notably different mentality in terms of the meaning of domestic practices and paid labor. ―Work‖ to these men signified not only employment outside the home, but domestic chores as well; as Gabrielle (age 29, two children) suggested to me one day:

―See, things have changed in Italy. While once men ―worked‖ outside and women stayed at home, running the household, taking care of children… what I mean, what I want to say is that this arrangement was understood as the husband does ―work‖ and the woman stays at home… now men understand that what women do when they stay home is just as much ―work‖ as that outside the home… So, my wife and I, we are both employed, inside and outside the home!‖

Also noticeable was a clear difference in the ―standard‖ of orderliness; more disorder in these homes than in those of the previous two groups. Chapman (2004: 119) suggests that

―many younger women may resist pressure to maintain high standards of housework as it limits their opportunities in other fields; and because if they adopt such an attitude, they may not feel so threatened if their partner or husband steps in and takes charge of some tasks.‖ It may also be that younger cohorts of Italian women, like their male counterparts, simply don‘t know how to do things around the house, or that their standards are much

339 lower. While once female children were expected to help their mothers cook and clean

(while their brothers stood by and watched), this gendered division of labor is ever less a reality. ―Doing gender‖ (West and Zimmerman 1987, see also chp. 4) or acting such that others will perceive the latter as expressions of an underlying masculine or feminine

―nature‖ seems increasingly irrelevant when it comes to domestic practices.

Similarly, cooking played a much less central role in distinguishing between men and women‘s roles and responsibilities in these homes. Not only did both men and women cook (either separately or together) but meals were not even always eaten together. This pattern of behavior contrasts dramatically with Goddard‘s (1996: 188) ethnographic work in Naples, in which she observes that ―the division of labor and space, the importance of women‘s networks, the centrality of children in the family and of food in defining membership within the household, contributed to making women and especially mothers central to household organization and family life.‖ Donald Pitkin, in his work in Lazio similarly observes ―the amount of time spent in the daily rituals related to the preparation and consumption of food, as well as the cleaning up afterwards is impressive, and the priestess of this cult of food is the mother‖ (1985:213). In the homes of these three Paduan men, as well as to some extent among the two groups described above, the preparation of food and the manner in which the family consumed it seemed to carry less importance in terms of gendered associations.

The men in this group were also quite involved in childcare, not only in play activities but also in tasks such as changing diapers, feedings, and bathing. Such collaboration shows notable change compared to the statistics described above in the first section. In fact, Micheli (2007: 19) points out that more weight should be given to ―the

340 remarkable fact that in just 14 years (1988-2002) there has been a 25% decline (from 60 to 44%) of men who are not involved at all in childcare… the continuously critical view of the limited involvement of Italian males in parental duties does not take into account evident signs that the gender role system, once stable, is rapidly changing….‖ Most notable among this group was that men often initiated care or domestic tasks without being ―directed‖ to do so by their partners. The women similarly had a more open and innovative attitude towards male collaboration in domestic practices.

A: How would you describe your relationship with your husband? That is, with respect to the dynamics that you have, to the division of household chores, etcetera. Susanna (age 26): Well... the first word that comes to mind is equal. Equal. That is, there are no things that he or I don‘t do. That is, there are no things, you know, with regard to the daily chores, you know? That is, both of us take care of the children and manage the house… the work is completely interchangeable; totally, from A to Z. That is, there is absolutely nothing that I do or that he doesn‘t do, that is, excluding breastfeeding… but everything else is completely equal. Interchangeable I would say.

Observations of equal collaboration in domestic practices between spouses also revealed the complexity of identify ―who does what.‖ Take, for example, an evening I spent at Nicola and Susanna‘s home. After dinner, Nicola (age 31) was in the process of giving his daughter a bath, when he called out to Susanna who couldn‘t find one of the bath toys. Susanna and I were in the kitchen cleaning up after dinner; she knew the location of the toy and so went to bring it to him. A few moments later, Nicola appeared in the kitchen and starting giving me a hand with the rest of the cleaning up, while

Susanna continued with the child‘s bath. Domestic practices may involve more than once person doing the same activity (i.e. cooking, bathing the children). Surveys which ask who ―mostly‖ carries out a certain activity can be quite useful, but can also hide diverse

341 types of domestic organization. While chatting with Susanna in the kitchen, she explained that the domestic tasks were usually carried out by ―whoever is around to do them‖ and it was not necessarily the same person who started an activity to be the one to finish it.

Studies conducted on a national scale in Italy suggest that father involvement in childcare is greater in the northern regions, and increases proportionally to the degree of urbanization (Rosina and Sabbadini 2006). The authors comment that this may be ―a first signal of a slow, but with all probability progressive, adaptation of fathers to a dual income family model, which requires them to assume higher levels of responsibility in childcare. It is also possible that this is due to an increase in the power of the working woman to negotiate with her partner the management of household labor, as suggested by a part of the literature‖ (2006:160; see also Thomson 1990; Lundberg and Pollack 1996).

Addis (2000), however, points to the difficulties faced by more egalitarian couples and suggests that those who share ever more equally domestic tasks and paid work bravely defy state welfare policies which penalize working couples and fail to support couples

―engaged in raising families, sharing domestic work and providing the financial resources needed for the task.‖ Indeed, the choice to equally share domestic and paid labor, and invest in caring models of fathering was often recounted by these men as a ―courageous‖ decision, both in terms of an embedded cultural and political resistance to mammos, as well as a labor market which – through its increased ―flexibility‖ – was both an enabler and barrier to domestic practices and family building.

The increasingly precarious nature of employment has, in fact, primarily affected new labor market entrants (Esping-Andersen, 2007) and all three of the men in this group were employed in precarious ―project‖ contracts (for a full discussion of the

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―precariousness‖ of the Italian job market, its effects on youth-adult transitions and fertility see chap.2).177 They described having considerable flexibility in terms of hours, which was left in many cases to their own regulation. Two of the men commented that such contracts gave them considerable freedom to organize family and paid labor in equitable ways. One of the men, on the other hand, found ―precariousness‖ to have the opposite effect – rather than grant greater elasticity in terms of schedule, he found himself working more than he might otherwise have done, had he been employed with a fixed-term or a more specifically defined contract. The downside to such contracts, agreed upon by all three men, was that they were unstable (and sometimes illegal), had very few benefits (no sick days, no paid vacation, etc.), and could easily be ended by the employer; all of which created significant financial stress. More broadly, men and women in this group felt constrained by an economic and political context characterized not only by the precarious labor market, but also by the high cost of housing, and a lack of available public childcare (see above footnote 13). Cooke (2008: 127) suggests that in countries like Italy and Spain where macro-economic factors have made employment extremely precarious, the trade-off between female employment and fertility intensifies

177 A law (legislative decree 276/2003) reforming the Italian labor market enacted in 2003 introduced important changes relating to ―semi-subordinate‖ work (midway between dependent employment and self- employment). The law provided for the conversion of ―employer-coordinated freelance contracts,‖ a common form of semi-subordinate work, into ―project contracts.‖ Project contracts (Collaborazioni coordinate a progetto, Co.co.pro.) replaced the (also very recent) previous type of employer-coordinated freelance contracts (collaborazioni coordinate e continuative, Co.co.co) and aim to prevent the relatively frequent fraudulent use of the latter. New regulations however, reflect widespread uncertainty as to how to precisely define what constitutes a ―work project.‖ Moreover, the lack of collectively-agreed upon pay scales of reference and the absence of any form of social protection in case of involuntary interruption of the collaboration have not, to any great extent, improved conditions for these workers. Since the inception of Co.co. pro and Co.co.co contracts, the number of Italians employed in such ―flexible‖ work has increased rapidly: between 1999 and 2003 at an average rate of 14% per year (equivalent to 250,000 more workers per year). In December 2003, the number of semi-subordinate workers exceeded 2,800,000, or 12.5% of total employment, and many of these employees were young (under 35) (National Institute of Social Insurance).

343 because ―traditional male breadwinner families are institutionally supported but no longer economically feasible, while dual earner families are the most economically viable yet are not institutionally supported.‖

Because of the labor market situation, other family-flexibility options were not taken, despite the fact that parental leave policies in Italy are fairly generous178. In fact, self-employed parents and those with non-standard employment contracts have less access to parental leave. Self-employed mothers may take only three months of parental leave with benefits, and must take it in the child's first year. Indeed, although the take up of maternity leave in the public sector is nearly universal, among women working in the private sector or with temporary contracts the use of the latter is much lower (European

Commission, 1998; Escobedo, 2001; Cooke 2008).179 Self-employed fathers have no right to parental leave or benefits. More broadly, taking extended leave in a market with high unemployment puts the quality of future full-time employment at risk (Cooke 2008).

To add to this, there are no unemployment benefits for those who are not yet in the labor

178 Child-based leave consists of maternity and parental leave; no separate paternity leave exists. Maternity leave lasts for five months, paid at 80 percent of a mother's usual salary. Parental leave lasts for six months per parent (with a maximum of 10 months per child; 11 months if the father takes at least 3 months). During six of those 11 months, parents receive benefits amounting to 30 percent of their usual salary. Thus, if a family uses all of their allotted leave, they will have 11 months of paid leave and five months of unpaid leave. Low income families, defined by annual incomes of less than €14,401.40 (in 2008), can continue to receive the 30 percent stipend after the sixth month (Fagan and Hebson 2006).

179 Naldini and Sarceno (2008: 740-741) report that, ―according to a recent survey (ISTAT-CNEL 2003), based on a sample of working mothers with small children (aged 18– 24 months), the take-up rate for fathers was only 7 percent, while a mere 4 percent of the remaining fathers expressed the intention to take parental leave in the future. More importantly, this policy did not really gain momentum in the public discourse for three main reasons: (1) the change in government in 2001 (the new centre-right government and its minister of labor did not particularly support the new law, although they did not oppose it); (2) the resistance from employers, coupled with the low compensation rate for the leave;7 (3) changes in the labor market due to the increase in non-standard employment contracts, which do not give entitlement to the new parental leave (Eurostat 2008). This last phenomenon not only increased the number of workers not covered by the new policy, but also generally increased the feeling of insecurity, thus further reducing the uptake of parental leave by eligible fathers.‖

344 market, are self-employed, or employed under a non standard contract (Naldini and

Saraceno 2008).

While the labor market is increasingly ―flexible,‖ the management of ―time‖ dedicated to domestic practices and care activities seems, on the contrary, increasingly

―rigid.‖ Perhaps in reaction to the unpredictable, risky, and precarious nature of the market (Giddens 1991, McDonald 2001), within the families under consideration here, childcare seemed to be highly ―organized,‖ with institutions (including education) playing a large role, especially as children began to attend nursery school, and then, increasingly, afterschool activities. Fathers and mothers, in all three of the groups, spoke of ―never having enough time,‖ and always having to take their children to this or that pastime or hobby; these activities were mostly external to the family itself, speaking to an increasing ―institutionalization‖ of time and normativeness to care.180

More broadly, the changing behavior of albeit a small group of men and women will potentially have an impact on gendered behavior in the future, as well as fertility intentions. Among this group of men, all three had intentions to have more children. We also clearly see the interaction between individual-oriented institutions (the market, especially) and family-oriented institutions. The flexible nature of employment contracts made, in some ways, fertility intentions more feasible, as it allowed men more freedom to choose their schedules and to balance family and work commitments. On the other hand, the precariousness of the labor market and relatively low incomes increased the stress felt

180 Although beyond the scope of this chapter, authors such as Alessandra Gribaldo (2007) have pointed out that the ―institutionalization‖ of time dedicated to childcare becomes increasingly evident as children age, from the involvement of parents at school, to the need to respond to an increasingly diverse sociality of children. ―It means one must conform to the idea that it is necessary to saturate one‘s child(ren)‘s time with organized activities: soccer, music, gymnastics, dance, and birthday parties that are ever more commonly entrusted to professional entertainers.‖

345 by these couples in economic terms, and consequently, their decisions to have children.

Hence, although they were – to a great extent - able to realize their ideals, the conditions under which these became a reality were not entirely positive. Despite such setbacks, one of these couples had already transitioned to a second child. More broadly, it seems that the precarious labor market (or what McDonald might call an individual-oriented institution) both positively and negatively influenced family-oriented institutions; vice- versa, evident change in gender equity within these families may ultimately shaped individual-oriented institutions, as men and women become increasingly vocal in terms of the social changes that must be made for equality between men and women to become a reality.

8.4 Conclusion: Closing the Gap between the Real and the Ideal

In this chapter I have endeavored to explore an issue that has rarely been addressed in the literature on gender issues and fertility, or that of men‘s gender ideologies, their efforts to balance family and work, and their resultant fertility intentions. In doing so, I hope to have shed light on some of the ways Italian men negotiate, contest, and defend the often contradictory forces that shape their lives. The persistent gap which remains between men‘s egalitarian attitudes towards gender roles and their lived experiences is influenced not only by men‘s work conditions and their relationships with their partners/spouses, but also by the larger socio-economic, cultural and political setting in which their actions are embedded. I have argued that a narrowing of this gap increases men‘s fertility intentions and outcomes.

More broadly, McDonald‘s argument that very low birth rates reflect the degree of institutional conflict between gender equity achieved in education and the labor market

346 and gender equity as related to the family (including the degree of flexibility in employment, extent of supportive services such as public day care and paternal leave) rings true not only for women, but for men as well. It has been my aim here to widen

McDonald‘s theory to include the desires and behaviors of men, as well as to deepen it by considering not only the conflict between gender equity in individual oriented institutions and gender equity in family-oriented institutions, but the complex ways in which they interact and shape men‘s fertility intentions. An ethnographic examination of 14 men with (at least) one child under the age of 5 revealed a distinct decline in the male breadwinner ideal. The transition, however, to achieving and balancing more egalitarian models of work and family (and potentially reaching desired fertility outcomes) depended to a great extent on the relationships between men and women, employment conditions, education levels, the (un)availability of public family support services, and the irregular impact of legislation governing the labor market.

Ethnographic evidence from Padua hints at signs of change. Some men are challenging the cultural association between masculinity and paid work, and assumptions that the breadwinner role is intrinsically desirable. There is a growing expression of dissatisfaction with the degree to which this has deprived men of significant access to their children. Despite discontent and a broad consensus that ―men and women are (or should be) to all purposes equal‖ there are still relatively few jobs that allow men the flexibility for childcare under optimal circumstances (i.e. as opposed to ―forced‖ flexibility through precarious, ―project‖ contracts). Many employers simply do not formally recognize in their personnel policies the importance of men‘s participation in family life (Lewis and Lewis 1996, Chapman 2004, Holter 2007).

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Holter (2007: 481), building on the work of Russell and Edgar (2000), argues that full integration of men into mainstream business strategies would involve a number of initiatives such as:

Fatherhood being included as part of a companywide strategic planning process involving managers and supervisors; fatherhood being included with targets and measure (e.g. number of men who take parental leave and family leave to care for children; demographic profile of senior management group in terms of fatherhood status), senior managers being seen accountable for the level of active fatherhood, involved fatherhood being included in recruitment and retention strategies, and competencies being developed for managers to enable them to manage fatherhood issues raised by their employees. It would also involve organizations conducting fatherhood impact audits to determine the extent to which current or planned workplace demands impact the opportunities for fathers to be actively involved.

Family-oriented institutions within market employment which recognize a desire on the part of fathers to participate more in childcare and, more broadly, domestic practices may play a significant role in shifting the balance of power within households.

If husbands share a larger share of the housework, both men and women benefit. Women enjoy better mental health while fathers develop sensitivities that in Western settings have often been assumed to be ―naturally‖ maternal (Coltrane 1996: 200-201). Coltrane also points out that when fathers share equally in parenting, ―children thrive intellectually and emotionally, and they grow up with less rigid gender stereotypes‖ (idem). Sharing household and paid labor thus carries the potential for transforming the meaning of gender in this and in future generations.181 More broadly, gender egalitarian households contribute to allowing men and women to match their fertility desires and outcomes.

Little, however, in terms of public policy in Italy has encouraged change in family-oriented institutions, either directly for families or in terms of employment

181 Studies in the field of developmental psychology have shown that children with highly involved fathers were characterized by cognitive competence, increased empathy, less sex-stereotyped beliefs, and a more internal locus of control (for a review see Lamb and Tamis-Lemonda 2004).

348 conditions and benefits for families. It was not until 1996 that the role of men as parents and caregivers moved forward on the EEC Equal Opportunities unit‘s agenda and they issued the following statement:

It is recommended that Member states should promote and encourage, with due respect for freedom of the individual, increased participation by men, in order to achieve a more equal sharing of parental responsibilities between men and women and to enable women to have a more effective role in the labor market (Article 6, Council of Ministers Recommendation on Child Care, 1992, in EC Network Childcare, 1996:37)

Although most countries have some provision of economic compensation for parental leave, this varies considerably from flat rates, often at a lower-than-average salary compensation level, to earnings-related entitlements, generally compensating at a higher level than the flat-rate approach (O‘Brien 2004). Northern Europe has been most active in pushing father-sensitive family polices. Countries such as Norway, Sweden and Denmark stand out for their decision to mark a proportion of paid parental leave to be devoted exclusively to fathers, in order to strengthen fathers‘ caring role with their infants, as well as to encourage more fathers to take such leave (Bjornberg 1994). Relatively few studies, however, have been conducted on the impact of men‘s taking parental leave on family life (Deven and Moss 2002; O‘Brien 2004).

Parental leave, while certainly an important aspect to increasing gender equality in the home and allowing individuals to meet their desired fertility goals, is perhaps overemphasized as a single enabler of father involvement. The promotion of gender equity in all social institutions is fundamental, as is facilitating the ability of individuals to match their ―ideal‖ to the ―real‖ or achieve what George Saunders (1976) once called

―the realizable ideal.‖ Strategies to attain more gender equality must include not only

349 specific workplace policies, but also, as suggested by McDonald (2002: 481) ―gender neutral tax-transfer policies including social insurance, support of workers with family responsibilities irrespective of gender, removal of institutional remnants of the male breadwinner model of the family, acceptance of fathers as parents by service providers, and more gender recognition and support to fathers as parents.‖

The work of development psychologists should also be incorporated to a much greater extent in policies which address the persistence of below replacement fertility and gender issues. Work by prominent psychologists such as Lamb, Pleck, and Levine

(1985), Pleck (1997), and Russell and Hwang (2004) remind us that analyses of workplace factors should include an understanding of the variation in father involvement, which they suggest is linked to a hierarchy of factors: a) the extent to which a father wants to, or is motivated to be involved (b) how self-confident and skillful the man is as a parent; (c) the level of support a father receives, especially from his partners or spouse

(the mother of the child); and (d) institutional policies and practices, especially work place policies and practices. In turn, an anthropological understanding of the ways these factors are molded by cultural norms and values would help favor not only increased paternal involvement, but greater gender equality.

CONCLUSIONS

The changes in the lives of Italian men as they pass through important life events highlight the importance of exploring how social, economic and political context may affect notions of male identity, partnerships, and fatherhood. This study brings to the fore a number of questions concerning the history of Italian men‘s experience, the ways gender and sexuality organize and define contemporary male identity, and the societal benefits and prohibitions associated with maleness. Fieldwork in Padua suggests that men are riven with contesting pressures and variables, particularly with respect to class, education, and sexuality; all of which shape their experiences and perceptions of gender and masculinity. Indeed, although men (as a broad category) continue to control much of

Italy‘s resources, capital, media, political parties and corporations, there emerges a general discontent with what it means to be a man and a questioning of older models of masculinities, spurred on in part by women‘s increased participation in the labor market.

The particular setting of Italy, still characterized by gender inequality, thus opens up a paradox: how to be men, but to be different men? As Whitehead (2002:48) suggests,

―men are increasingly caught in the pincers of a culture that still expects them to ‗be at the helm‘ yet also requires them to engage in reflexive analysis of their masculinity.‖

Italy is not the only place where men grapple with the challenges posited by women‘s increased independence, widespread refusals of an older patriarchal gender order, and a progressively evident shift in terms of ―traditional‖ gender roles. Scholars such as Zinberg (2000) and Makino (2001) have show how Japan – a country considered 350

351 by many to be a bastion of misogynistic practices and beliefs - is experiencing similar change, and concern for the ―Japanese male psyche‖ is now apparent. Increasingly, commentators on Japanese contemporary society highlight worries not only over the psychological well-being of Japanese males, but also the detrimental inflexibility of a male-oriented political culture in a context of rapid gender change. A recent study in the

UK similarly suggests that due to women‘s increased ―opportunities and choices,‖ more women are choosing (happily) to live alone ―unfettered by the demands of a husband and children.‖ This has been accompanied by a general refusal – on the part of both men and women - of ―macho stereotypes‖ (The Guardian, 1999). It is suggested that while a

―brave new world dawns for (single) women, (single) men face an increasingly ―sad, lonely, and unhealthy‖ existence, being unable to cope physically, emotionally or psychologically with their isolation, and unable to identify acceptable gender models

(idem.).

Such cross cultural examples suggest that if men are not literally facing a ―crisis of masculinity‖ (given persistent gender inequality) then certainly a discourse of masculinity in crisis has emerged. Popular writings on the crisis of masculinity often assume, however, that men and their masculinity are homogenous and biologically indivisible, sustained by a natural order that has been severely threatened by women‘s

―misguided‖ attempts to transform the gender ―balance‖ (Whitehead 2002: 56).

Whitehead (idem.) suggests that feminism is often seen to be the guilty party in all of this; ―Thus, the crisis of masculinity thesis can also be read as a form of backlash against women in general and feminism in particular‖ (see also Lingard and Douglas 1999).

While a discourse of a ―crisis of masculinity‖ may well divert attention from the power

352 effects of men‘s still largely dominant position across many Italian social institutions, it may also reflect very real attempts on the part of some men to develop different masculinities which challenge, directly or inadvertently, stereotypes and ―traditional‖ gender differences and inequalities (Maile 1999). In addition, we should not be dismissive of the profound changes that have occurred in the Italian economic and social structure and the impact that women‘s increased presence in employment, education, and politics has wrought. Italian men are increasingly finding that the adoption of any

―traditional‖ masculine postures tends to be dismissed by women, and in a time of gender, social, and economic change, many men, particularly those lacking the necessary social or cultural capital, may be ―denied the self-validation elicited by fraternalistic male breadwinner work patterns and traditional relationships‖ (Whitehead 2002: 57; see also

Connell 1995; Segal 1997; Robinson 2000). In turn, the fragility of contemporary Italian masculinity – caused largely by the ―marking‖ of men as a gender and a struggle to identify appropriate masculinities - plays a significant role in influencing demographic outcomes, such as union formation and fertility.

Indeed, the first half of this dissertation has endeavored to show – through the lens of historical processes and contemporary ethnographic work in Padua - the ways that masculinity, the male body, and male heterosexuality have become increasingly scrutinized, gazed upon, reflected on, and dissected by academics and Italians alike.

Documenting the gradual emergence of men as a gender, rather than a reified, universal category, allows for consideration of the consequences of the latter for the construction of male identities and an understanding of the dialogical relationship between gender and demographic processes. Of particular interest in understanding the ways that men have

353 slowly and increasingly come to be recognized as a gender is the above-mentioned discourse of a ―crisis of masculinity.‖ A historical perspective (chp. 3) allows us to recognize that such discourse is not only not new, but that particular groups of men (i.e. the less-educated and low-skilled laborers as opposed to higher educated, high-skilled workers) will have different tools at their disposal in their efforts to reconcile feminism with varying levels of power and opportunity (Segal 1999). An examination of the current crisis of Italian masculinity in Padua (chp. 4) thus reminds us that neither men nor masculinity are fixed entities, but constantly shift across time and space. It also reveals the importance of understanding men as discursive, or of considering the dominant, subordinated and political ways of talking and thinking about men in multiple cultural settings. Men are no longer the invisible, unmarked gender, the Archimedean point from which all norms, laws, and rights flow; men are themselves the objects of the gaze of women, of other men, and of a new critical scholarship (Nye 2005: 1938). Like gender, the male body and sexuality (chp. 5) have also slowly become ―visible,‖ through both a mediatic ―gaze‖ which objectifies men‘s bodies and sexuality and men‘s own endeavors to seek identitary legitimacy though the latter. An increasingly homogenizing consumeristic gaze and similarity between the sexes can, however, be quite destabilizing for men, and in fact in some cases there may be a direct link between the perceptions of the body and men‘s sexual behavior and experiences. More broadly, understanding the resultant fragility of men as they are increasingly ―gendered‖ may help us to better understand demographic phenomena such as Italian low fertility; vice versa, looking at men‘s lives through the lens of population processes aids in illuminating the particular facets of contemporary Italian masculinity.

354

In fact, while the first half of the dissertation documents the ways that Italian men have gradually emerged as a gender and relatedly, the various ―crises‖ of masculinity over time and in present day Padua, the second half of the dissertation (as well as chp. 2) critically examines important demographic events such as departure from the parental home, union formation, first births, and the transition to second births. In doing so, it has been my aim to explicitly ―gender‖ men as they pass through these important demographic transitions; indeed, if men have become increasingly ―visible‖ as a gender, in demographic analyses they still too often remain a universal category which is often ignored or taken for granted. In other words, the very effort to examine the desires, experiences, and behavior of men as they move through important life events is in itself a

―gendering‖ of men. In turn, this ―gendering‖ of men may contribute to a better understanding of broad demographic trends such as low fertility in Italy.

For example, the case studies of Claudio and Danilo (chp. 6) highlight the importance of understanding the interplay between larger social processes and individual agency. A theory of demographic conjunctures allows for a description of specific contexts of actions, and the ways men engage and interpret the former. It also reveals the importance of understanding the power dimensions at play and, more broadly, the ways rates of cohabitation and marriage are the outcome of constantly shifting sets of conjunctions and construals embedded in the larger social structure. More specifically, a

―gendering‖ of Paduan men as they form unions suggests that Italian men may increasingly seek to cohabit before marriage, but that the importance of marriage will continue to remain strong; thanks in large part to strong family ties and parental influence on adult children‘s behavior and beliefs (see also chp. 2). This may mean that marriage

355 will continue to be delayed as will, consequently, first births (given the importance placed on births within wedlock), making cohabitation yet another element in the prolongation of the life course (see also chp. 2).

Similarly, a ―gendering‖ of men in Padua provides valuable information as to the ways men identify with fatherhood, and the ways that perceptions of their own fathers affect their expectations and attitudes towards first births (chp. 7). While Paduan men ideologically refuse an older model of authoritarian and strict fatherhood, preferring instead a more nurturing model of parenthood, efforts made towards family building are often stymied but the lack of an obvious ―path‖ to follow and, more generally, an absence of acceptable role models of ―new‖ kinds of fathers (see also chp. 4). On the other hand,

Paduan men‘s efforts to distance themselves from their fathers‘ hard temperaments and physical and emotional detachment may in some ways mirror their own fathers‘ similar rejection of their fathers, revealing a potentially cyclical pattern of a need to reject the father figure in order to create –sometimes ironically similar – paths towards family building and the construction of identities as fathers. Ethnographic work reveals that men in Padua struggle to create socially acceptable forms of fathering that neither overlap too closely with the parenting styles of their mothers or wives, nor are overly friendly in a brotherly fashion, or – at the other extreme - excessively authoritarian; suggesting that their identity as fathers remains fragile at best, despite an increasing awareness and reflection on the ―kinds‖ of fathers they would like to be.

One evening that I spent in a group meeting on ―parenthood‖ sponsored by a local church in Padua testifies particularly well to the increasing amount of reflection Italian men and women (and academics) now dedicate to ideals forms of fathering and – in

356 doing so - their direct participation in the ―gendering‖ of men. The session, held in the airy chapel of the church in which the numerous attendees (about 50-60 people) occasionally shifted uncomfortably on the hard wooden pews, was led by a family psychologist from the University of Padua. The psychologist spoke at length of the need for fathers to distinguish between two similar, but crucially distinct manners of being a father: autorevole (authoritative) and autoritario (authoritarian). The first, she suggested, is the father who, rather than acting as an older brother or a friend, provides a loving role model, capable of establishing rules and boundaries without, however, losing the capacity to listen to the child and to provide love and affection. The second kind of father acts in an autocratic fashion, laying down the rules in an overbearing manner, distancing himself emotionally and physically from the child. ―We must,‖ she exclaimed ―encourage an authoritative kind of fatherhood, rather than its extremes: either the authoritarian father, or the father who acts as a friend or an older brother.‖ Many a parent in the room nodded sagely in agreement with the psychologist‘s assessment; and while a large number in attendance were women, there were also quite a few men, either in the company of their wives or partners or alone. Such events reveal the willingness of men and women alike to reflect on what it means to be a man and the various facets of male identity, including fatherhood.

While ethnographic work in Padua suggests that men with higher levels of education and greater career stability feel more comfortable experimenting new forms of gender identity (such as caring, affection ―mammos‖) and enacting new, ―authoritative‖ forms of fatherhood, the gendered division of domestic labor and participation in childcare remains far from equal in Padua, and more generally, in Italy. We have,

357 however, little understanding of the ways men think about and experience the division of paid and domestic labor and the ways the latter impacts their fertility intentions. A

―gendering‖ of men in Padua suggests that the dual earner couples who are more likely to transition to a second birth are those families in which men (and women) are able to match a (widespread) ideology of gender equality with their actual work conditions and relational dynamics between partners (chp. 8). Certainly there emerge signs of change in the challenges some men pose to the cultural association between masculinity and paid work, or to assumptions that the male breadwinner model is intrinsically desirable. More and more men in Italy may express dissatisfaction with the ways the latter has deprived them of access to their children, and demand changes in market employment conditions, ultimately shifting gender expectations and roles within the household, and, perhaps, easing the transition to second births. At the same time, new forms are masculinity are embedded within the particular socio-cultural context of Italy, where we find the peculiar combination of rejection of a patriarchal gender order and the continued and even enhanced commitment to the ―strong Italian family.‖ In fact, strong intergenerational ties are perhaps one of the foremost elements driving a delay in departure from the parental home, union formation, and first births (chp.2). This unusual combination is in part a result of the fact that although both the family and gender have become highly ideologically charged public issues, policies at the practical level have remained largely stagnant, marginal and fragmentary (Naldini and Saraceno 2008). That the Italian State continues to rhetorically invoke the social and moral importance of the family while doing little to augment relatively weak welfare provisions reinforces a more traditional

358 family model, with undertones of gender inequality.182 In other words, despite an expansion of educational and employment opportunities for women, Italian family laws and provisions remain rather ―traditional.‖183 Not only are monetary provisions to struggling families with children, unemployment benefits, and parental leave options for those employed in non-traditional contracts extremely limited, but on a broader, political scale, Italy‘s government continues to consist of primarily of older men who occupy the majority of parliamentary positions; hardly representative of the emergent resistance to a male breadwinner model and increased gender equality in ―individual-oriented institutions‖ (McDonald 2000a, see also chp. 8). More broadly, a critical interrogation of

Italian masculinity, or, more specifically, a ―gendering‖ of Paduan men, reveals dynamics of power and privilege, but also hints at ways in which we might promote gender equality and to deepen our understandings of demographic processes.

9.1 Implications for Demographic Research

9.1.1 Gender: A Social Institution

Over the last several decades, demographers have dramatically changed the ways they think about gender. There has been a shift from a seeming lack of awareness that population processes are intimately connected to gender, to a nearly required nod to the relevance of social constructions of what it means to be a man or a woman (Riley 2005:

109; Georgiadis 2007). Yet despite the attenuation of barriers to gender and demographic

182 As Naldini and Saraceno (2008: 734) point out, ―the family, through its gender division of labor and its intergenerational solidarity is expected to provide all the protection and support that is not given by a welfare state heavily biased towards pensioners and core workers.‖

183 As one New York Times (2008) journalist recently suggested, ―The lesson from southern Europe is perhaps operative: embrace the modern only partway and you put your society – women in particular – in a vise. Something has to give, and that turns out to be the future.‖

359 work, weaknesses persist. For example, ―gender‖ is still too often equated with ―women‘s issues‖184 despite the fact that male identity, perceptions of masculinity, and the desires, expectations, and actions of men are equally pertinent to understanding demographic phenomena. The issue at hand here is not simply to include ―the other half of the equation‖ in gender studies of population processes, but to recognize that there in fact exists an equation, and to treat men as a gender, rather than a universal hegemonic category. More broadly, the concept of gender in demography needs to be redefined as a social institution; a structuring principle of social life and power distribution. ―As such it affects reproduction and other life domains, and entails the study of both men and women and the consideration of both socio-economic and the ideological dimensions of gender‖

(Bernardi and Hutter 2007: 549). Gender is a socio-cultural construction, a fiction, one that therefore is open to change and contestation - it is through gender change that we may potentially better understand population processes.

One reason that demographers have been slow to incorporate gender in population analyses lies in the methodological challenges of ―measuring‖ the latter. The fluid nature of gender is difficult to ―verify‖ using findings derived from surveys or questionnaires.

Quantitative results frequently fail to reveal the differences between what people say they do and what they actually do, and asking individuals directly about a particular issue may lead to rationalizations rather than explanations. As Georgiadis (2007) has pointed out, no interviewer should expect to collect unbiased or ―pure data,‖ for all accounts are

184 Bernardi and Hutter (2007: 549), building on Susan Greenhalgh (1995), point out that ―the way demographers account for gender in reproductive processes is at best suggesting the emergence of a demography of women, that considers a narrow range of women‘s characteristics as demographically important and ignores the rethinking of analytical categories related to gender achieved in anthropology, sociology, and social history.‖

360 subjective. Moreover, an essential component of understanding interviewees‘ viewpoints in to learn about the ―context‖ in which they are expressed (idem.). Given the difficulties of capturing gender and its role in demographic outcomes using conventional, quantitative demographic methodologies, qualitative approaches provide useful alternative or complementary information. Despite this possibility, there has been little discussion of the different value of qualitative and quantitative methods for assessing gender‘s effects in demography, especially compared to fields such as women‘s studies

(Lather 1991; Jayaratne and Stewart 1991; Barrett and Phillips 1992; Maynard and Purvis

1994; Riley 1997, 1999, 2005). This may, in all likelihood, be due to the predominance of quantitative work and the general preference for quantitative methods in demography

(Riley and McCarthy, 2003, White et al.). Nevertheless, as Riley (2005: 116; see also

Greenhalgh 1990; Scheper-Hughes 1997) has argued, ―qualitative methods might deepen our understandings of gender and other complex social processes; they are more likely to capture the messiness of social life than are the more parsimonious quantitative models.‖

Demography might expand its tools and outlook by developing new epistemologies and methodologies or by borrowing the findings and insights of others who approach these topics from different perspectives (Riley 1998).

9.1.2 A Renewed Look at Institutional and ―Whole‖ Demographies

Despite weaknesses in epistemological approaches to incorporating gender into research on population, demographers have expressed a growing openness toward the discipline of anthropology, and more broadly, have made efforts to understand the influence of local forms of social organization and culture on population dynamics. Reconsideration of gender as a social structuring principle would allow demographers to better incorporate

361 gender into population analyses, and potentially, to reformulate McNicoll‘s (1980, 1992)

―institutional demography.‖ Bernardi and Hutter (2007) similarly advocate moving (or returning) towards an institutional demography, stressing the importance of local institutions in explaining demographic behavior. ―Thus, institutions are the background context for demographic behavior… for instance… an institutional approach would be to examine the way gender concepts structure the relationships between men and women in the market, legal arena, and privacy of the family‖ (ibid.: 550).

McNicoll‘s institutional demography, which recognizes both historical contingency and societal specificity, as well as ―embraces narrative modes of explanation that can accommodate forces such as gender and power that are difficult to incorporate into standard empirical models of demographic behavior‖ has also been drawn upon by anthropologist Greenhalgh (1995:12), in her efforts to ―situate fertility.‖ Greenhalgh

(idem.) develops the concept of ―whole demographies‖ which, broadly speaking, involve consideration not only social and cultural factors, but also of political and economic frames in order to properly ground demographic outcomes in reality. While differing slightly in their foci,185 the overall approach of Greenhalgh‘s ―whole demographies‖ and

McNicoll‘s ―institutional demography‖ are very similar. Both are attempts to incorporate factors that are not necessarily amenable to ―standard‖ quantitative demographic analysis.

Investigations of gender and population phenomena might therefore consider both institutions (much like McDonald‘s macro-level investigation of gender equality, see chp.

8) and culture such that individual behavior and local contexts would be the point of

185 If anything, Greenhalgh emphasizes anthropologists‘ interest in individual agency while McNicoll gives greater weight to structures. In this dissertation, I‘ve advocated an approach which draws together both individual and structural factors in a way that incorporates a historical element.

362 departure. Culture, in this case, should not be considered as a static variable, a simple indication of values and norms, but rather should be understood as ―offering a stock of symbols that are invested with moral weight, but which people are able to manipulate for their own ends; through this continuous process of manipulation, culture itself changes‖

(Hammel 1990: 462). In other words, rather than look at the effects of specific institutional configurations on individual behavior, a renewed institutional demography and endeavors to achieve ―whole demographies‖ must incorporate the interaction between individual agency, culture, and political, socio-economic and gender institutions.

In this dissertation, I‘ve shown how men‘s assumptions about gender shape decisions such as whether and when to leave the parental home, to marry, or to have a child, as well as influence the allocation of paid and domestic labor. The particular cultural, political, and socio-economic context in which their actions are embedded shape their gendered expectations and the possibilities of action they can envision. For example, the timing of important demographic events is shaped by Paduan men‘s expectations and attitudes about the ―right time‖ to leave the home, get married and become a father. The

―right time‖ is, in turn, deeply intertwined with perceptions of age and male adulthood, which dictate the chronology and timing of important life events and the cultural appropriateness of certain actions (chp. 2).

If Mauro (age 33) still feels ―young,‖ and is constantly spoken of and treated as a

―youth‖ by his parents, politicians, employers, and the media, it is not surprising that he delays departure from the parental home (despite working successfully as a medical doctor) and makes comments such as ―I have plenty of time‖ to achieve his goals of (in this order) ―solid employment, buying a house, and marrying Federica.‖ This behavior is

363 more than simply risk aversion to a precarious labor market and a fear of taking on responsibility, but also reflects changing gender expectations of what a man should do and when. A delay in departure from the parental home will necessarily mean that a first birth will come later for Mauro. On the other hand, ethnographic evidence from Padua suggests that if Mauro eventually marries his younger fidanzata, Federica (age 27), he may end up having the two children he desires, regardless (or perhaps precisely because of) the prolongation of various life events. Such behavior is not only significant for policies which promote fertility and gender equality, but also hints at different kinds of gender expectations, by which possibilities and imagined futures are shaped by Italian men‘s efforts to achieve goals of ―chronological‖ self-realization combined with strong inter-generational ties and particular notions of age and the ―right‖ timing of events.

9.1.3 Sexuality, the Body, and Population Processes

The study of sexuality and the body also has much to offer in furthering our understandings of demographic processes although it has been largely left unconsidered in much population research.186 Adams and Pigg (2005), for example, argue that sexuality is something to which people attribute multiple moral meanings, it is a means of achieving moral goals; and that its objectification – its framing as something separate from other parts of social life – is a moral act. Roth (2004: 155) similarly suggests that demographers have slighted the importance of human sexuality, or the human ―biological drive mediated by cultural symbols, values, and socially approved norms.‖ He suggests that sexual behavior not only changes over time but ―may even be considered a driving

186 Demographers, rather than look at sexuality or the body in terms of culture, norms, moral codes, or larger institutions, have made a significant contribution in terms statistical terms (i.e. frequency, age at sexual debut for males and females, etc.).

364 factor of cultural change‖ (ibid: 16). The ways Italian men in Padua affirm and change

―moral codes‖ relative to the body and sexuality speaks directly and indirectly to gender institutions and demographic outcomes. At the same time, individual codes and behaviors relative to the body and sexuality are externally influenced by larger factors such as consumerism, family planning, and cultural change.

More broadly, the socially constructed nature of Paduan men‘s sexuality provides a window onto male identity, and furthers our understandings of the consequences and implications of considering men as a gender, rather than a hyper-normative ideal. The literature on male heterosexuality has done little more than bring men out of their

―unmarked closets,‖ showing them to have particular and not universal kinds of sexualities. An understanding, however, of what it means to be ―marked‖ as a gender - through the study of male heterosexuality and the body – can further our comprehension of demographic dynamics.

In particular, I have argued that attention to the ways men are ―gendered,‖ reveals not only the ways that consumerism and the media have increasingly commodified and objectified Italian men and women‘s bodies and sexuality in similar ways, but also reveals generational and class differences in the roles and expectations of men and women. Ethnographic research also suggests that some men, like Sandro, Giuseppe, and

Lorenzo, are having less sex due to ―distractions‖ such as leisure activities, new technologies, and ―self-improvement‖ pursuits (e.g. English classes), while other men are similarly seeking goals of self-realization by having as much sex as possible; or as

Leonardo put it: ―I just want to see what‘s out there, I need to make sure I find the ―right one,‖ you know, so I can achieve all the steps in life, but I don‘t want to be the guy that

365 marries the first girl he sleeps with… or the 50th girl, for all that matter (laughs)! I‘m sure

I‘ll settle down one day, but right now it‘s more about me, making sure I take that step in the right direction.‖ Both attitudes reflect larger theories of a general increase in individualism, or a disengagement from civic and community associations in order to pursue goals of self-actualization (whether this be sex or other) and ―pure relationships,‖ in which sex is increasingly freed from reproduction (Lesthaeghe and Surkyn 2004;

Giddens 1992). The shifting meanings of the body and sexuality in Padua hint at gradual change in the social construction of gender, a finding which has implications for the persistence of low fertility in Italy, but also for the complicated ways the morals of a still ubiquitous Catholic Church are expressed. More broadly, ethnographic research suggests that aspects of the Second Demographic Transition such as growing individualism, the espousal of autonomy and self-fulfillment, and their encouragement of both the economic independence of women and ensuing family changes have played an important role in the

―gendering‖ of men, testing previously unquestioned male and female gender roles and unbalancing equilibriums.

Further research on the notions and attitudes towards sexuality could be incorporated into demographic work and cross-cultural comparison. For example, in the context of Russia, Rivkin-Fish (2005), describes the differences between western healthcare authorities, who promote informed choice and individual empowerment, and

Russian doctors and health educators who, on the other hand, placed priority on notions of moral selfhood, and its connection with collective concerns of preserving traditional

Russian culture and ensuring Russia‘s biological continuity. Doctors felt that they could, and indeed should, intervene in their patients‘ sexual lives for both physical as well as

366 moral reasons. Understanding of the various and distinct meanings that sexuality and the body hold in different cultures, and the consequent different treatment of individuals from a variety of perspectives – moral codes, health care, public policy, cultural, economic and historical change – can significantly deepen description of both individual behavior and the cultural contexts of demographic dynamics.

9.2 Implications for Research on Gender

9.2.1 Gender and Demographic Trends

While demographers have become increasingly open to anthropological insights into population processes, the majority of anthropologists hesitate to learn and use demographic techniques and theory. Certainly demographic rates and trends ignore the rich texture of people‘s everyday lives, but they do tell us about the changing contexts in which people make family-related decisions, and more broadly, the gendered nature of symbols, actions, and institutions. In other words, through the lens of important demographic trends and events, we can observe gender. Important demographic trends

(e.g. the timing and rates of marriage and fertility, participation of women in the labor force, etc.) are not, however, simply a window onto gender, but also influence the construction of gender and sexuality and the contexts in which people make decisions.

By critically examining male identity and masculinity through the lens of important demographic trends – for example that of decreasing and delayed marriages, coupled with rising rates of cohabitation – we gain insight into the ways men negotiate important life events, broadening our understandings of the social causes of statistical patterns in contemporary Italy. The demographic experiences of men like Danilo and

Claudio provide a window onto the ways that the publicly recognized status of husband

367 goes beyond simply getting married, but includes changing gender expectations and specific actions and decisions which reinforce as well as partially transform the broader social structure. The trajectory a man chooses to follow is the result of a constant negotiation between possible and imaginable futures, the resources at his disposal, and the larger socio-cultural, political and economic structure (Johnson-Hanks 2007).

In the context of Padua, where the ―strong family‖ is in constant tension with processes of individualization, the ways union formation plays out are directly related to relational dimensions between partners, the rapport between adult children and their parents, and the gendered expectations of men and women. More or less bargaining power – often dependent on the resources available and schema enacted – shapes the horizons and resolutions of ―conjunctures‖ or the ―particular configurations of the conditions in which action takes place, as well as the juxtapositions of different life domains‖ (Johnson-Hanks 2007:14).

More broadly, the examination of demographic (life) events offers an important window onto men and women‘s behavior and the particular ways gender is socially constructed in specific political, economic and cultural contexts. Observations of gender through a demographic lens also test our understandings of the ways ―demographic rates‖ occur, challenging us to critically evaluate the roles that individual action, power, relational dimensions, and resistance to older gender systems play in the unfolding of population processes.

9.2.2 Demography, Biological Constraints, and Gender

Demographic investigations of gender also remind us of the importance of considering biology in our understandings of the social constructions of gender and sexuality,

368 contributing to debate over the ways biological and cultural factors combine in the

(re)production of gendered individuals and institutions. Such a focus also brings to the fore a long history of interest in anthropology of the links between women and men‘s status/roles and biologically determined factors. Certainly anthropologists have played a crucial role in challenging the notion that anatomy is destiny, arguing that cultural forces work on the behavioral plasticity of both males and females, shaping their behavior and the roles they assume in society. More broadly, from Margaret Mead on, anthropologists have argued for the social construction of sexuality and the politicization of sex differences; in fact, the very term ―gender‖ was introduced in order to emphasize the difference between biologically and socially determined sex (Rubin 1975; Etienne and

Leacock 1980; Sayers 1982; Fausto-Sterling1993; Brettel and Sargent 1996).187

Yet demographic trends also remind us that, in some ways, anatomy is destiny, especially when it comes to the timing of childbearing and the consequences for fertility outcomes. Biological ―constraints‖ such as the window of time a woman is fertile, shape perceptions of gender and individual decisions. More specifically, the argument that

―there are no facts about human sexual biology that, in and of themselves, have immediate social meanings or institutional consequences‖ (Collier and Rosaldo 1981:

315) is challenged by the increasingly common delay of first births on the part of both

Italian men and women.188 This trend may have significant consequences not only for the

187 Anthropologists have also attempted to critique ―biology as destiny‖ arguments through explorations of biosocial evolution. Leibowitz (1975), for example, suggested that sexual dimorphism is actually compatible with a wide variety of sex and social role patterns (for other studies by biological and psychological anthropologists which strive to eradicate gender bias, see Fedigan 1986; Sperling 1991).

188 In a latter, theoretical piece, Collier and Yanagisako (1987) call for a ―dissolution of conventional analytical boundaries‖ in which they argue that studies of gender are flawed by assumptions that ―biological facts of sexual reproduction‖ underlie gender or kinship systems in any society (1987:15).

369 future of reproduction, but more broadly the social construction of gender and gender equality. For example, I argued in chapter 7 (and 8) that men who (are able to) delay fertility to relatively late ages (i.e. mid-30s to mid-40s), are often also those who have achieved higher levels of education and who more willing to share domestic practices and childcare. In fact, the biological ability to delay having a first child may contribute to establishing a more secure sense of male identity. In other words, achieving satisfaction in outside employment, combined with higher levels of education, seems to translate into greater confidence in challenging older, more ―traditional‖ gender models and the same time that, in some ways, it reaffirms them.

Women, given a narrower reproductive window, may enter less than desirable relationships, or cut short personal pursuits in education or career ambitions. Or they may instead choose to postpone first births indefinitely, underestimating the risk of infertility which increases with age, preferring instead to achieve goals of self-realization in the prescribed social order: finish their education, establish their careers, marry and then have children.189 A future area of study that will be increasingly interesting to investigate - in terms of the implications for gender constructs and politics - will be medical advances which will allow women of older reproductive ages to achieve their fertility goals. If

Differently from feminists in the past (and perhaps in a foreshadowing of Judith Butler‘s work) they suggest that both studies of kinship and of gender assume differences that they are ultimately trying to explain. ―These differences (male and female for gender, and the genealogical grid for kinship), although socially constructed, are taken for granted and seen as existing outside of and beyond culture‖ (1987:29). They suggest trying to understand how particular societies define difference, how they recognize claims and allocate responsibility, and the symbolic and social processes make these domains appear self-evident (idem: 35).

189 Pinelli et al. (2003: 73) suggest that ―the importance of the biological role of Italian women has been considered with diffidence, in that it has traditionally justified discrimination against women, but now one has the impression that this role is in great danger and that emancipated women are not able to defend their unique feminine capability of given and sustaining life.‖

370 women are increasingly able, thanks to bio-medical technologies, to get pregnant and deliver at older and older ages, what will this mean for gender equality, constructs of male and female identity, and more broadly, the medicalization of women‘s (and men‘s) bodies and sexuality?190 What does it mean for understandings of gender and inequality when biological constraints become more flexible? Will the gendered dimensions of the life course, and the significant differences in male and female biographies given biological characteristics, represent less of a challenge to the achievement of gender equality, and the potential for individuals (and women in particular) to achieve their education and/or career aspirations?

I pose such questions not to support claims that biological differences are directly causal to (Western) notions of gender identity, but rather as a reminder that the role of biological reproduction as it relates to gender identity and the roles of men and women continues to be debated. As early as the 1970s, for example, neurophysiologists and psychological anthropologists highlighted the links between biological sex and psychological functions, and the way biological ―predispositions‖ interact with social experience to shape the psychological makeup of a person (Maccoby and Jacklin 1974:2).

A current controversy over gender distinctions regards the brain, its organization, and to what extent brain lateralization is related to sex differences. One position argues that women tend to be left-brained, resulting in superior verbal skills, while men are mostly right-brained, giving them superior visual-spatial skills (Brettell and Sargent 1996; Lippa

190 For example, a number of authors have pointed to the dramatically high number of caesarean sections in Italy (approximately 22.4 percent of all deliveries as of 2001, the highest in Europe), indicative not only of the increasingly older ages of women at first birth, but cultural attitudes towards childbirth, the design of the prenatal system, and genetic and social aspects. Anthropologists such as Whitaker (2000) have written about the ways the medicalization of reproduction that has permeated pregnancy, births, and lactation in Italy.

371

2002). One the other hand, other scholars, such as Renzettti and Curran (1989:33) contend that to date ―there is little evidence indicating that the sexual differentiation of the brain, if it occurs in humans, consequently predisposes males and female to behave in gender-specific ways.‖ While feminists certainly have pushed to eradicate male bias from biological explanations, uncertainty remains as to the ways that biological and cultural factors combine to produce a variety of gendered individuals and characteristics.

In fact, if anything, the emergence of caring, affective fathers supports Margaret

Mead‘s (1963: 280) well-known conclusion that ―many, if not all, of the personality traits which we have called masculine or feminine are as lightly linked to sex as are clothing, the manners, and the form of head-dress that a society at a given period assigns to either sex.‖ The dramatic difference between, for example, Fernando and his grandfather,

Michele, is a case in point as to the socio-cultural constructions of appropriate and

―natural‖ mothering and fathering. While Michele never picked up his children, showed physical affection or shared his emotions – and in fact ―would never have been caught dead holding a child in his arms‖ – Fernando happily pushed the stroller of his one-year- old on our many walks through the streets of Padua. It was not uncommon for Fernando to bathe, diaper, and feed the child, and he certainly never expected, as did his grandfather, that his wife would ―bring me my slippers when I come home, cook for me and clean for me.‖ Fieldwork in Padua suggests that the ―taken for granted‖ expectations of what women or men ―should‖ do have radically changed in little more than a generation. More broadly, such change speaks to the fact that culturally dictated ―natural‖ personality traits characterizing the masculine and feminine are continuously in flux, as

372 men and women challenge, manipulate, and adhere to cultural symbols and moral expectations.

9.3 “Gendered” Demography and a “Demographic” look at Gender

In analyses of Italian low fertility, both anthropologists and demographers have grappled with the ways that cultural, socio-economic and political factors influence demographic outcomes, but all too often studies of population processes skip over the gendering of life conditions and the socio-cultural constructions of gender. If we are to truly understand demographic outcomes, we must pay attention to the ways institutions and specific contexts shape perceptions of what it means to be a man or a woman and, vice versa, how individuals manipulate socio-cultural constructions of gender to achieve reproductive goals. One the other hand, demographic trends and patterns offer anthropologists an enlightening window onto the (re)production of gender.

A ―gendered‖ demography must necessarily move away from using women as the

―default sex‖ in population studies (i.e. the calculation of fertility rates, or mean age at marriage is often calculated for women alone). As Johnson-Hanks (2009) points out, the only nationally representative demographic surveys available throughout much of the developing world - the Demographic and Health Surveys (DHS) - are surveys of women.

Although numerous renowned scholars have brought to the fore the distinction between sex and gender, research that thoroughly investigates the ways ―social and economic systems structured by gender enable or constrain particular forms of demographically- relevant action‖ remains a minority‖ (ibid: 1). Similarly to the ―marking‖ of the

―unmarked‖ category of heterosexual men, anthropologists and demographers now need to do more than simply point out the need for coherent analyses of gender and population

373 processes. We need to ask what is happening to assumptions about gender, and how do these drive demographic change? What are the underlying factors shaping gendered modes of interaction and how do these influence demographic patterns such as fertility rates? As Johnson-Hanks (2009: 2) points out ―thinking through gender lets us distinguish things that are truly different but might appear at first to be the same, or that are in fact more the same than they appear on the surface.‖

I have chosen, in this study, to think about Italian heterosexual masculinity through the lens of demographic trends, despite the fact that analyses of changing male identity can be approached in any number of different ways. This approach, however, provides an attractive door through which to consider masculinity. To understand what

Luigi, a thirty-two year old mechanic who still lives at home with his parents, values, desires, and envisions for his future, is also to contribute to an understanding of how common or rare late departure from the home is today as opposed to the past, and what implications this has for his reproductive future. Knowing something about important demographic patterns and trends helps us to ask questions about how families are organized, how men think, what they think about, and what they actually do.

This dissertation also opens up wider questions about why gender and the family are such charged ideological public issues, despite (or because of) the relatively marginal role of polices aimed directly at supporting the family and improving gender equality. By carefully observing the ways demographic trends and discourse about demographic issues differ from actual practice on the ground, we can gain insight into the continuously changing nature of gender systems and family organization. Lastly, we need to remember the importance of values, ideals, and assumptions to the working of gender systems.

374

Simultaneously, institutions and practices are themselves closely related to the values, ideals, and futures men and women image. It is in understanding of this bidirectional relationship that we may gain our most fruitful insights into gender and demographic processes.

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