Peace, Power, and Security: Contending Concepts in the Study of International Relations Author(s): Barry Buzan Source: Journal of Peace Research, Vol. 21, No. 2, Special Issue on Alternative Defense (Jun., 1984), pp. 109-125 Published by: Sage Publications, Ltd. Stable URL: http://www.jstor.org/stable/423935 Accessed: 12/08/2009 18:14

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http://www.jstor.org ISSN 0022-3433 Journal of Peace Research,Vol. 21, No. 2, 1984

Peace, Power,and Security:Contending Concepts in the Study of InternationalRelations*

BARRY BUZAN Department of InternationalStudies, Universityof Warwick

This article compares the merits of three concepts - peace, power and security - as approaches to the study of International Relations. It argues that peace and power offer only partial, and significantly flawed, views, and yet that thinking within the field has become locked into an excessively polarised framework which is dominated by the opposition between them. The necessity for a new frameworkarises from the intellectual exhaustion and restrictivenessof this prevailingorthodoxy. Security is put forward as an alternative frame- work which is capable of encompassing most of what is useful from the other two, plus much of the middle ground that is obscured by them. The argument proceeds by comparing the quality of insight which each of the three concepts offers into two of the most fundamental elements in internationalrelations: 'the anarchy'and 'the arms race'.The case is made that each of these elements consitutes a highly durable feature of international relations, but not that is either immutable within its form, or necessarily malign in its effect. Power and peace are seen to give only narrow and incomplete views of the anarchy and the arms race. Both result in excessively rigid and negative interpretations,with power leading to an over-emphasison the inflexibilityof both elements, and peace leading to over-optimismabout their removability.Security is seen to offer a more balanced perspective.It takes into account the durability of the anarchy and the arms race, but does not lead to necessarily negative views of them. It opens up the considerable scope for positive change which exists within the two elements, and so provides the basis for a synthesis of realist-idealism.

1. Introduction The theme of this special issue of the Journal proved as conceptually inadequate as power in of Peace Research indicates the existence of providing an underlying orientation for em- broad dissatisfaction with the basic concepts pirical studies. Although peace has served well which havedominated most thinkingin the field as a perspectivefrom which to mount a critique of InternationalRelations. Peace Researchitself of Realism, it has failed to generate a com- began as a revolt against the power-oriented prehensive alternative approach to the study conceptions of the Realist orthodoxy in Inter- of internationalrelations. national Relations. The present call for 'a The argumentin this paperis that the division new paradigm in thinking about defence and between the power and peace views has itself security' marks a recognition that peace has become a barrier to progressive thinking. In

* This article extends an argument suggested, but not conceptual sense of security, explore the relation- developed, in the Introduction to People, States, ship among the three in more depth than was possible and Fear: The National Security Problem in Inter- earlier. The objective of this piece is the same as national Relations (Buzan 1983). In the book, I that of the earlier work: to promote security as the establish peace and power as the orthodox con- basis for an alternative conceptual framework. tending concepts, and attempt to introduce security But here the treatment is more balanced, involving as an alternative to them. The argument there is a comparison of how the three concepts relate to predominantly concerned with developing the two of the most basic elements of international conceptual framework of security by exploring relations: the anarchy and the arms race. I would its domain, its referent objects, its contradictions, like to thank John Vincent of Keele University for and its potential for generating related concepts the remark that got me thinking along these lines, which might usefully be applied to both theoretical and Peter Byrd of WarwickUniversity for comments and empirical work. Here, I wish to return to the on the first draft. same starting point and, now armed with a developed 110 Barry Buzan part, this barrier arises from the antagonism It does, however, identify a factor which is generated between those Realists and Idealists universal both as a motive for behaviour and who take strong stands on either side of the as a description of the relative status of the divide. More subtly,it arises by locking patterns actors. The concept of peace emphasises both of thought into the unhelpful structure of an the international system as a whole, and indi- apparently unresolvable dilemma. The power viduals as its ultimate building bloc, at the and peace views do not mix easily, even within expense of states, and emphasises the dynamic a single individual struggling to find a more of harmony at the expense of that of conflict. balanced analytical framework. Consequently, Its principal focus is on a possible universal to the extent that international relations is condition. thought about primarily in terms of these two The concept of securityhas traditionallybeen concepts, the middle ground will always be dif- treated as a side effect, arising from the pos- ficult to occupy. Up to a point, opposition session of either power or peace.' In this between basic concepts is fruitful. Each serves subordinaterole, it has not been seen as a major to stimulate the other by providing a contrast, concept capable of encompassing the field of and criticism creates incentives to sharpen and International Relations as a whole. The only deepen thinking. Beyond that point, however, previous attempt to develop security as a core this process declines into diminishing, and concept was made by John Herz during the eventually negative, returns. Opposition early 1950s (Herz 1950, pp. 157-80; 1951 and becomes institutionalised and politicised, and 1959, pp. 231-43). Herz's idea of the 'security creative thinking is either overridden by the dilemma' focused on the self-defeating aspects rituals of intellectual entrenchment, or stifled of the competitive pursuit of power. But un- by the lack of creative room within the tight fortunately,though it became an accepted con- contradictory confines of the peace/power cept within the literature, it failed to tran- dilemma. It is my view that this is the situation scend the Realist paradigm.This failure can in in which we now find ourselves. part be attributed to the unlucky timing of To break the habits of a long-familiar con- Herz's idea, which surfacedin the midst of deep ceptual orientation is never easy, but the quest Cold War conditions highly supportive of the for a new approach requiresit. That quest also Realists' power-struggleview of international requiresa willingness to re-examinethe funda- relations. mental characterof the problemwhich concepts But Herz's failure to achieve a larger con- like peace and power are designed to address. ceptual role for security also resulted from the Only by going back to basics can we clarify the emphasis which characterisedhis work. Firstly, insights and the shortcomings of existing con- he was concernd primarily with national cepts. Once these insights and shortcomingsare security, and therefore like the Realists he made explicit,we can use them to chart new, and concentrated much more on the character of hopefully more fruitful, conceptual directions. states than on the characterof the international In what follows, my purpose will be first, to system. His focus on the state meant that the identify the basic characterof the problem, and concept of security was seen principally as an second, to identify the strengthsand weaknesses idea that led immediately to an intractable of alternative concepts in dealing with it. In dilemma. Although it was useful to have this pursuingthis second purpose, my objective will problem identified and labelled, the existence be to compare the merits and flaws of power of the dilemma cut off interest in any further and peace as core concepts, while at the same development of the concept. Arnold Wolfers' time developing the idea of security as a subsequent, and well-known, essay on the synthesis between them. The concept of power ambiguity of security as a concept was also emphasisesthe parts of the internationalsystem based on the national security perspective,and at the expense of the whole, and the dynamic of so reinforced the conclusion that security was conflict at the expense of that of harmony. unlikely to prove fruitful as a broad concept Peace, Power, and Security 111 for interpretingthe field (Wolfers 1962, ch. 10). of security providesa synthesis which not only As a consequence of these state-centricuses of preserves and reconciles the valuable insights security,those who were attractedto its critique of both the power and peace schools, but also of Realismfound themselvesnonetheless forced addresses critical areas which both narrower back into the Realist mould because of the concepts neglect. irresolvablecharacter of the security dilemma at the state level. 2. The nature of the problem Secondly, and perhaps even more important, The basic problem which underlies almost all Herz treatedsecurity much more as an outcome interest in international relations is insecurity. of power relations, than as a direct motive for The influenceand status which powerand peace behaviour. By not developing the significance have acquired as core concepts stem from the of security as a motive, he sacrificed any pos- insight, and the guide to action, which they sibility of using it as the basis of an approach have offered on this problem. strong enough to challenge the Realist ortho- Insecurityis a problem of immense scale and doxy. If security is recognised as an important complexity. It stretches across all the levels of motive for behaviour in the international sys- analysis from individual to global, and across a tem, then it provides-a view of international spectrum of sectors ranging from cultural and relationswhich is quite distinct from that which social, through economic and political, to sees security merely as a possible outcome of military. Individuals can experience insecurity power relations. through all the levelsand sectors. The emphasis The argument that follows is based on the may be on a very personal level, like fear of belief that security is an important motive for violence from neighbours, or from govern- behaviour, and that it can be usefully applied ment, for cultural,social, political or economic to much more than just the state. If freed from reasons. It may come via the state level, in the the confines of 'national security' which tie it form of tensions or violence between the indi- closely to the power view, securityoffers a com- vidual's state and other states. Or it may come prehensive perspective on international rela- in a more diffuse sense from the international tions. As a concept in its own right, it operates system as a whole, in forms such as threats to on all threelevels of analysis - individual,state, economic activity,or fearsof nuclearholocaust. and system - and it identifies both a universal Although individuals are the ultimate depo- motive for behaviour and a possible universal sitory of insecurity,they do not, becauseof their condition. Once expanded into this broader limited powers, provide its most potent expres- framework,the ambiguitywhich plagued its use sion. That role falls to a great variety of organ- on the national level becomes an asset rather isations whose principalpurpose is to aggregate than a liability. The idea of security encom- individual insecurities up to a level at which passes the dynamics of both conflict and sufficient resources become available to take harmony, and it is precisely this breadth of remedialaction. These include banks, insurance coveragewhich makes it so useful when applied companies, cooperatives,many ethnic organisa- to the internationalsystem as a whole. tions, many political groupings, and states. Concepts like power, peace and security play These organisationsbecome actors in their own a subtle and vital role in research. By em- right, and because of their power and structural phasising a particular view of reality, they momentum, they create a level of behaviour highlight some issues and discount others, so which is above, and to a considerable extent providing both agendas and priorities for distinct from, that of individuals. When the empiricalwork. My argumentwill be that while interactions among these organisations are power and peace have both generatedvaluable competitive, then the problem of insecurity is partial insights, they are too restrictedin their compounded. basic view of internationalrelations to generate The modern state is the highest form of such full understanding.I will arguethat the concept organisation so far achieved. Because of the 112 Barry Buzan extent and totality of its command over the species suicide for the first time in its history. individuals within it, and also because of its That transformationin the condition of human primacy in the control of force, the state serves existence explains why the concept of peace as the basis of a distinguishable system of arose as a challenge to the more traditional relations on a global scale. But since relations concept of power. It also explains why the betweenstates are often competitive,that system emphasisof this paper is on the insecuritywhich is dominated by the problem of insecurity.In- arises from the fear of war. security underlies not only relations between If war is the heart of the problem, then in states, but also relations between the governing order to investigate the utility of our three powers in one country and a varietyof substate concepts, we need to go back to the basic factors organisations in another. It is to the form of which give rise to it. War is a phenomenon of insecurity generated at the levels of state and organised groups, and therefore occurs above internationalsystem, that the concepts of peace, the level of individual insecurity. Its most power and security are primarilyaimed. feared form is that waged between states, fear Peace directs attention towards the need to stemming from the scale on which states can removeviolence in relationsbetween and within mobilise the instrumentsof violence.At the level states. The peace perspectiveis oriented towards of states, the most fundamental factors as- solving the insecurity problem by removing its sociated with war are the anarchic system of causes. Power directs attention towards the relations among states, and their competitive means by which individual states can both be pursuit of military capability. We will label controlled internally, and pursue their com- these factors 'the anarchy' and 'the arms race. petitive interests within the state system. It The anarchy provides the political conditions approaches the insecurity problem on the unit for war by setting sovereign entities into a level, seeking to solve it by guiding states to patternof relationsin which each is responsible play the game of international relations in for its own welfare, security, and internal such a way as to maximise their own advantage. political structure.The arms race provides the Security directs attention towards the need to military conditions for war by equipping states find methods that can satisfy the legitimate to use force in their relations with each other. concerns of states without at the same time The purposeof our enquirywill be to investigate amplifying the dynamics of insecurity among how effectively our three basic concepts take them. The securityperspective rejects the notion account of these two factors.3 that the problem of insecurity can be solved. Before we do that, however, we must first It tries instead to develop a management ap- establish our assumptions about the anarchy proach which is equally sensitive to both the and the arms race, particularlywhether or not national and the internationaldynamics of the these factors are seen to be fixed or removable insecurity problem.2 elements within the problem.Consensus on this Although insecurityhas many facets, one, the point is vital if there is to be any new con- fear of war, has risen to extraordinaryprom- ceptual frameworkfor thinking about defence inence in recent decades. The principal cause and security. I will argue here that the anarchy of this rise is found in the surplus capacity and the arms race are both highly durable,and for destruction which the mechanical and that they should therefore be treated as essen- nuclear revolutions introduced into warfare tially fixed factors in any practical approach during the present century. These revolutions to the problem of insecurity. enormously increased the costs and risks of Anarchyin the internationalsystem is defined war without producingany fundamentalchange by the absence of any overarching political in the structureof relations which traditionally authority. For more than three centuries, made war a normal and expectedinstrument of anarchy has taken the form of sovereign terri- state policy (Mandelbaum 1981, ch. 1.). As a torial states each claiming to be the ultimate result, humankind holds the capability for source of political authority within its own Peace, Power, and Security 113 domain. Sovereigntyand anarchyrepresent the ful mechanism of self-preservation.The system opposite ends of the same political phen- imposes self-help conditions on its constituent omenon: the claim of sovereigntyby the actors members which require them to struggle to in the system automatically defines relations preserve their own existence. Their success in among them as anarchic.The formal definition that strugglesustains the anarchy.This 'invisible of anarchy used here derives from the work of hand' mechanism means that the uncoor- Kenneth Waltz (Waltz 1979, chs. 5 and 6). It dinated and unconscious behaviourof the units describes the basic organising principle of the continuously regeneratesthe character of the international system which, so long as states system in which they are all embedded. The continue to define themselves as sovereign, is units and the system are thus linked in a not affected by the level of interactionor inter- mutually reinforcing relationship which is dependence among the units concerned. The extraordinarilydiflficult to break. idea of anarchyas a type decentralisedpolitical On the empirical side, the evidence is over- order is all too often submerged by the prom- whelming that both the system, and its inent usage of the term as a synonym for chaos. mechanism of self-preservation,are extremely Even so formidablea politician as Denis Healey robust. The system has endured without falter has been lured by this double meaning into for more than three centuries, and within the making the nonsensical statement that: 'the last three decades has tripled its membership world would be facing anarchy if governments and expandedto encompass virtuallythe whole arrogated to themselves the right to change of humankind within the framework of sov- governments in other sovereign states' (Repor- ereign states. The new members have embraced ted in Guardian Weekly, 6 November 1983, the system with exceptional passion, with the p. 4). result that humanity is probably more con- For the actors within it, anarchyis a self-help sciously and more extensively fragmented system which providesno authoritativeform of politically than at any time in history. constraint on conflict among the actors. Such A host of revolutionsin human affairs have constraints as do exist arise from actions taken been promoted as heralding the doom of the by states in relationto each other. These actions anarchic political system, but none has so far may producea balanceof powerin which the in- made a significant impression upon it. The centives to use force are low. War, whether by growth of an international economy has not accident or by design, is a natural, though not dissolved political boundaries as some hoped an inevitable, feature of anarchic systems. Its it would. The rising terror of war resulting frequency and its intensity may vary greatly from successive revolutions in the destruc- according to the historical conditions affecting tiveness and cost of the resort to military both the grounds for conflict and the incentives force, has failed to overwhelm the anarchy. governingthe use of force. Warcan result from And direct attempts to build universalpolitical conscious competition among states, and from organisations have resulted in institutions misunderstanding among them as to each which serve,rather than undermine,the existing other's intentions. Anarchy does not in a strict structure of fragmentation. No compelling sense cause war, but it does provide the frag- evidence suggests that any of the new revolu- mented political conditions which make war a tions now beginning to impinge on human prominent featureof relations among states. It affairs will have any better fortune in breaking is this facilitativerole which makes the question the grip of anarchy.Neither global communica- of whether anarchy is a fixed or a removable tions nor environmental interdependence,for condition so important. example, look at all likely to provide greater The available evidence, both theoretical and leveragethan the economic and military devel- empirical, points to anarchy as immensely opments that have already failed to shift the durable. On the theoretical side, anarchy is deeply institutionalised structure of human durable because its structurecontains a power- political relations at the internationallevel. 114 Barry Buzan

The arms race, like the anarchy,is also an ex- additional dimension to the process. Weapons ceptionally durable feature of international technology inevitablyrides along the wavecrest affairs. Aside from the question of policing of the broad advance in human knowledge. within states, it can be argued that the arms That advance has a self-sustainingdynamic of race is merely an aspect of the anarchy. The its own which, excepting the case of a large- need for weapons on a large scale only arises scale collapse of political order,is substantially because of the fragmented political structure independent from the particularitiesof human of the species which obliges states to treat each political affairs. As a consequence, military other with suspicion. While this is true, it does technology is subject to a relentless improve- not encompass the whole substanceof the arms ment which is strikinglyillustrated by the rapid race. The arms race also has a dynamic of its and amazing transformationsin military hard- own which bears strongly on the problem of ware which have dominated internationalrela- insecurity. tions for the last one and one-half centuries. Within the context of anarchy,the principal The same knowledge that produced the indu- dynamic of the arms race results from com- strial revolution also produced the mechanical petition among states in the accumulation of revolution in warfare.And advance in theoret- weapons. Even states with no aggressiveinten- ical physics made it impossible to ignore the tions are compelled by the possibility of war fact that nuclear weapons had become techni- to participate in this competition. The con- cally feasible. dition of anarchy thus promotes the arms race The potential for new and more powerful through the mechanism of the power-security weapons which is inherent in the advance of dilemma, by which the efforts of each state to knowledge seriously exacerbates the effect of preserve its security lead to a self-reinforcing the anarchy on the arms race. The possibility cycle of competition among all of them. For an of new weapons developments heightens the extensive discussion, see Buzan 1983, ch. 7. uncertainty in military relations among states, When the system contains, or is thought to and so subjects them to constant pressure to contain, aggressive expansionist states, the keep their own military equipment at the pressure to arms race becomes even more forefront of what the current state of knowl- intense.From this point of view,it can be argued edge makes possible. By responding to the that the durability of the anarchy sustains the general advance of science and technology durability of the arms race. The uncertainty in this way, states begin to distort the natural createdby the dividednessof the global political pattern of advance by directing large resources system, and the consequent possibility of states specifically to areas likely to produce militarily using force against each other, compels each useful offshoots. In this sense, the dynamics of state to behave in such a way as to sustain the anarchy accelerate the military consequences role of weapons in the system overall. Only the of knowledge, and a closed cycle of incentives replacementof the anarchy by a world govern- is created which makes military competition ment of some sort - in other wordsthe elimina- an intensely self-reinforcingprocess. tion of states as sovereignactors - could free Although the particularexacerbation of the peoples of the requirementto arm themselves arms race by the anarchy is an important as an insuranceagainst war. feature, the main point here is that the arms In addition to the drive impartedby anarchy, race is independently driven by the general the arms race is also sustained by the indepen- advance in science and technology. This means dent pressureof general developmentin science that even without the push given by the military and technology. That part of the arms race pressures of the power-securitydilemma, the which is generatedby the condition of anarchy known potential for new weapons would in- would occur even if weapons technology crease rapidly and remorselessly in line with remained static. But the steady expansion of developments in the civil sector. This fact has knowledge in science and technology gives an profound implications for disarmament, and, Peace, Power, and Security 115 along with the impact of the anarchy,is the basis The real engine of the arms race is the for the argumentthat the arms race is a highly advancein human knowledge,and that advance durable feature of internatinalrelations. cannot be touched more than superficially by The existence of knowledge is more funda- measures like disarmament. Because it is the mental to the dynamics of the arms race than potency of knowledge which underliesmilitary is the existenceof the militaryhardware deriving insecurity, disarmament, even if it could be from it. Because the hardwarecan be created accomplished at the hardware level, would quickly once the knowledge for it exists, even make little basic difference to the dynamic the removal of the hardware does not much of the arms race within the anarchy.The world dampen the intensity of military insecurity governmentsolution to the arms race is blocked between states. This link between knowledge by the durabilityof the anarchy.Any attempt and military insecurity is illustrated by the to suppress existing knowledge, or to stop early years of the nuclear competition between furtherdevelopments, would requirean ideology the United States and the Soviet Union. The of arcadianism so draconian as to be beyond Soviets would not agree to American proposals the possibility of political realisation. The for nuclear disarmament and international durability of the arms race thus rests on the control of the nuclear industry.They reasoned durability of the whole system of human that because the Americans had tested a bomb, knowledge. whereas the Soviets had not yet reached that Acceptance of the argument that both the stage, disarmamentwould leave the Americans anarchy and the arms race are fixed rather with an edge in knowledge. That edge would than removable factors in the problem of give the Americans a lead in recreatingnuclear insecurity provides the foundation for asses- weapons should they decide to violate the dis- sing the utility of peace, power, and security armament agreements. as basic organising concepts. Any concept The importance of knowledge as a factor in which rests on the assumption that either is the arms race must not be underestimated.Not removable, exposes itself as fundamentally only does the existenceof knowledgemean that impractical as a basis for policy. Equally mis- military hardwarederiving from it can be con- leading, but more subtle, are concepts which structed in short order, but it also means that allow 'fixed' to be read in its narrowestsense a vast range of civil goods will also exist which as 'invariable. Such concepts lead to the ex- could, in the absence of hardwarespecifically cessive realism of social Darwinism, which is designed as weapons, be used for military just as inappropriateas the excessive idealism purposes. Consequently even a disarmed world of assumptions that the anarchyand the arms would not escape the fear of war. Military race can be removed. If a new frameworkfor securitywould rest,as it did early in this century, thinking about defence and security is to have on mobilisation timetables, and fear would any relevancefor policy, it must avoid both of reside in the prospect of one country gaining these extremes.The presentdanger is that power a mobilisation edge which would enable it to inclines towards excessive Realism, and peace transform its knowledge into military hardware towards excessive Idealism. Because the mass earlier than its opponents. A current example emotional currentswhich surroundthese issues of this situation is the fear centred on those are very strong, there exists a constant risk that states which are using the acquisition of civil an essentially false polarisation between the nuclear technology as a means of providing power and peace views will obscure the vital themselves with a short option on building middle ground. Fear of war, fear of defeat, nuclear weapons. In a disarmedworld, even the and fear for individual interests, provide a fear of immediate attack would still exist. It is potent political fuel which can easily be flared easy to conjureup scenariosin which civil goods into highly divided views, and the consequent like jumbo jets and chemical poisons could be replacementof thought by dogma. quickly converted into potent instruments of In the searchfor middle ground, it is essential mass destruction. 116 BarryBuzan to recognisethat while the anarchyand the arms government, as it was cured earlier at the race are fixed factors in any time-scale relevant individual level by the creation of states. to contemporary policy, they are neither im- The benign view, by contrast, focuses on the mutable nor wholly negative in character.The anarchy not as a negative condition but as a excessiveIdealism of peace is a logical response positive form of political structure. The to the perceptionthat the anarchyand the arms rationale of anarchy is the political primacy race are wholly, or preponderantly, negative of the parts over the whole. Anarchy is not in character.The excessive Realism of power is chaos, but a decentralised form of political a logical response to the perception that they order. Because states are not at all like indi- are immutable. Both perceptions are incorrect, vidual human beings, an anarchic order at the and it is in the recognition that the anarchy international level has quite different implica- and the arms race, though fixed, are neither tions from the application of the same political immutable nor inevitably negative that the principal at the level of individuals. An inter- concept of security finds its grounds for devel- nationalanarchy expresses not only the historical opment. and political variety of humanity, but also the The key to assessing peace, power, and profound absence of even a basis for universal security as organising concepts thus does agreement on an organising ideology for the not lie only in how they relate to the fixity planet as a whole. Anarchy emphasises the of the anarchy and the arms race. It lies also values of independence,self-determination, and in how they relateto the broad options available cultural identity, and the stability of the system within the anarchy and the arms race, and the lies in the resilienceof the units which compose positive and negative features which define the it. range of those options. Our final task in this From the benign perspective, anarchy is a section must thereforebe to outline the malign system structurewhich offers an immense range and benign aspects of the anarchyand the arms and variety of internal political arrangements. race. Although the basic structureof anarchy - no The malign view of anarchyequates the term central government - is so durable as to be with chaos, and emphasises disorder as a fixed for the foreseeablefuture, in no sense does necessary consequence of the absence of over- this imply that the relationshipbetween anarchy arching political authority. Anarchy is seen as and insecurity is also fixed. Within anarchy, a primitive, or failed, condition in which a political arrangements are highly mutable in somehow natural human unity is denied polit- ways that make a big differenceto the problem ical expression. The persistence of political of insecurity.The division of the global sover- fragmentationreflects old parochialismswhich eignty into separate parts can, for example, be are increasingly out of tune with the scale of accomplished in an infinite variety of ways. human ecological, cultural, and economic Numbersof memberscan rangefrom very small activities,a disharmonycompellingly illustrated to very large: the anarchycan be highly aggre- by the extent to which the power of weapons gated into a handful of large units, or highly has outgrown the frameworkof war. Anarchy disaggregated into hundreds or thousands of breeds war as it has always done, and per- small ones. These units can be fairly similar in petuates the outdated, inward-looking views size, power, degree of internal coherence, and that continue to send millions of people to an character of organising ideology, or they can early death. Like illness and poverty, anarchy be very different. The degree of recognition is seen to represent the absence of a desired and respect that the units accord each other good - in this case political order - and can range from nearly zero, in which case therefore needs to be eliminated by the provi- anarchy does approximate chaos, to very con- sion of that good as soon as possible. Hobbes' siderable, in which case the problem of in- war of all against all needs to be cured at the security would be substantially mitigated. internationallevel by the creation of a universal The character of an anarchic system can, in Peace, Power, and Security 117 other words, vary from being crude and con- great powers, like Britain during the nineteenth flictual, to being developed and stable. It century,and the United States after the Second is this range of possibilities, and their implica- World War,can use their command of military tions for the problem of insecurity, which power to create broad spheres within which are ignored as a sphere for action by those stable and peaceful relations can flourish. who move too quickly either to embrace world Military power even offers one of the solu- government as the only solution, or to assume tions to anarchy, though the self-sustaining that anarchymust always be malign. mechanisms of the anarchy would doubtless The malign view of the arms race is too well make extremelybloody any attempt at universal known to need detailed elaboration. Arma- empire. ments are seen as dangerous, wasteful, and Armaments underlie both the positive and self-defeating. Because of the competitive the negative aspects of the anarchy.The right dynamic of military power between states in of self-defence is essential to units even within the anarchy, armaments are seen as a self- the benign image of anarchy.Armaments not defeating method of achieving security, and only sustain the claim to independence and as a general stimulus towards war. Within the sovereignty,but also provide a crucial element state they lead to extravagantwaste of material in regulating relations among the units within resources, and, via the necessity for military the anarchy.The ideal image here is a situation organisations, to the corruption, or even to the in which the configuration of military power subordination,of domestic political life. Arma- is such that no country has reason to doubt that ment's are also subjectto the moral case against the probablecosts of the aggressiveuse of force the use of force in human relations, and to will greatlyoutweigh the probablegains. Such a the functional critique that they perpetuate situation can be achieved either by the dom- rather than resolve the problems they are used inance of defensive weapons over offensive to address. As with the anarchy,the continued ones, or else by the mutual dominance of addiction of our species to weapons is seen offensive weapons which allows costs to be by many as being outdated, outrageous,and out inflicted by retaliation. For elaboration of of tune with the level of civilisation we have this way of thinking, see Jervis 1978, pp. 167- now achieved. 214. As with anarchy,we can again imagine a But here too, there is a strong case that huge range of situations which vary according this factor is neither immutable nor wholly to the military and political conditions created negative.Armaments have long been recognised by weapons. In the worst of these scenarios, to play a paradoxical dual role within the military relations will be very unstable, with affairs of the anarchy.On the one hand, their incentives to strike first high all around, and use in war provided the principal demonstra- probable rewards exceeding probable losses. tion of the elements of chaos and disorder In the best of them, states are still independently within the anarchy.But on the other hand, their armed, and the arms race is still subject to the use in enabling states to create spheres of pressures of both anarchy and technology, political order and balances of power have but military configurations are stable, and played a vital role in underpinninglong periods incentives to resort to force are kept very low of peace. Through the balance of power, arma- regardless of the level of political hostility ments can serve to stabilise relations even when present. the anarchy contains units which are highly Some of the contemporary work on deter- competitive and hostile. Because the stability rence is aimed at producing this situation of the anarchy rests on the resilienceof states, (see for example Waltz 1981) is is work ex- and because the resilienceof states depends to ploring territorialdefence policies which maxi- a significant extent on their armaments, there- mise defensive capability without posing fore the stability of the anarchy derives in part military threats across borders (Roberts 1976; from the existence of armaments. Singularly and Report of the Alternative Defence Com- 118 Barry Buzan mission 1983). From this perspective,both the 3. The anarchyand the arms race national political developments which make Concepts like peace, power and security lack the use of territorialdefence strategiesfeasible, precise, agreed definitions, they identify broad and the nuclear revolution in military affairs, issues or conditions clearly enough to serve hold out great promise as well as great threat. as important frameworksfor discussion, but at Nationalism can serve as a stabilising force the empirical level they cannot be, or have not both by increasing the internal coherence of yet been, reduced to standard formulas. At- states, and by enabling them to define clearly tempts to make sense of them in any particular their relationship to each other.4 In addition, case are still dominated by the circumstances for the first time in history, military power unique to that case. exists in such excess that effective deterrence In this section, it is the role of these concepts becomes a real possibility. If deterrencecan be as approachesto the study of internationalrela- made stable, then a massive constraint is im- tions that provides the focus for our enquiry. posed on war, and a long step is taken towards Each concept serves as an instrument through conditions in which more developed, stable which the user hopes to obtain a significant and benign forms of anarchybecome possible. insight into the object of his or her enquiry. Seen from this perspective,the fact that the As in the physicalsciences, the choice of instru- anarchy and the arms race are fixed factors no ment emphasisessome aspects of the object and longer defines the basic issues of insecurity. obscuresothers. The human body looks verydif- In terms of assessing our three concepts, the ferent according to whether the instrument of critical choice does not lie between succumbing observation is the naked eye, a microscope, to the anarchyand the arms race in a fit of excess an X-ray machine, or a heat scanner. In what Realism on the one hand, or rejectingthem in follows, I hope to identify the strengths and a fit of excess Idealism, on the other. Because weaknesses in the view that each of these both contain very broadpossibilities for internal three concepts provides of the anarchyand the variation, and because both encompass strong arms race. The absence of agreed definitions positive as well as negative features, a massive for the concepts makes this a hazardous task. area of middle ground becomes evident. Within In trying to spell out the way in which an this ground there exists enormous scope for ambiguous concept orients perceptions of addressingthe problem of insecurity. basic factors like the anarchy and the arms The positive features of the anarchy and race, one relies on broad impressions of large the arms race provide plenty of room for the and diverse literatures. The attempts to gen- strong idealist drive which justifiably finds eralise is in permanent risk of tipping into the present situation unacceptable. The pos- caricature. The task must nonetheless be sibility of a 'realist-idealism' avoids the attempted, because it is the only way of asses- futility and frustrationof the pendulum swings sing the relative utility of peace, power, and between the two pointed out by E.H. Carr.5A security as organising concepts within the realist-idealism would escape the danger of field.6 political irrelevancewhich stems from advocacy of policies which are unattainable. It would 3.1 The anarchy also avoid the error of excessively negative 3.1.1Power views about the anarchy and the arms race, The great strength of power as a concept is which lead to advocacy of policies which, if also its great weakness, namely that it draws implemented, reproduce and emphasise the attention to the reality of anarchy by focusing features which gave rise to them in the first observation onto the capability of the con- place. In what follows, I hope to make the case stituent units. Power identifies not only a that the concept of security provides a vehicle central descriptive feature of anarchy, but for a realist-idealism. also a principal motive of the units. As a con- sequence, it enables us to make both empirical Peace, Power, and Security 119 and theoreticalobservations about the structure of relations.Because poweremphasises interests of anarchy(the distributionof power), and the at the unit level it offers only a distorted view dynamics of relations within it (the balance of relational patterns. The survival of units of power) (Waltz 1979, esp. chs. 5, 6 and 8). throughthe pursuitof powerbecomes the centre The firm roots of power in the anarchyare the of attention, and the collective consequences source of its advantage as a concept, an ad- of that approach to policy are discounted. The vantage which is complemented by its utility powerview contains no moral constrainton war, for expressing the form of problems as they relyingsolely on the balance of material factors occur for decision-makers within units. One to preserve the peace. Both the self-defeating reason for the widespread influence of power aspect of the pursuit of power by competing as a concept has been the good fit between units, and the risk of war, are simply accepted the kind of insight it provides into the as part of the realitywhich anarchyimposes on anarchy, and the kinds of problems faced by its constituent units. decision-makers.In this context, the ambiguity In sum, the powerview correctlyidentifies the of power - whether it is primarilya means or anarchyas central to the problem of insecurity, primarily an end - has been an advantage. but misses the full significance of anarchy by Orienting their perceptions through the con- illuminating only its most negative aspects. cept of power has enabled decision-makersto Because it focuses on the units more than on avoid dealing with awkwardquestions about the the system as a whole, the concept of power is means and ends of their policies. vulnerable to cooption by the forces of emo- These considerable advantages are offset by tional ethnocentrismwithin units. In this sense, some potent disadvantages. Although power the power view is peculiarly self-reinforcing: scores well for taking into account the im- the more it influences the views of those who portance and durability of the anarchy, it make policy, the more the system will conform achieves this only at the cost of a narrow to the negative image of anarchy inherent in and negative view of the characterof anarchy. the view,and the more policy will be pushed into The view of anarchythrough power is clear,but the conflictual mould. one-dimensional. Because power concentrates attention on the units, and in particular on 3.1.2 Peace their capabilities, it leads to an excessively The view of anarchy through peace is as dis- competitive and conflictive view of relations torted as that through power, although the within the anarchy.By focusing on the power of distortion is in the opposite direction. The the units, and on the power relations between peace view suffers from a tendency to discount them, the concept of power filters out the non- the durability of the anarchy, and to overrate conflictual features and motives on which the the prospects for harmonious relations. benign view of anarchy rests. One of the main strengthsof the peace view is The power view of anarchy is one in which that it focuses attention directly onto the relations are dominated by fear. The political problem of war. In so doing, peace encourages dividedness of the system is read as meaning both a useful, holistic perspective, and a that the interests of the units are largely op- normative stance opposed to the aggressive posed, instead of just being separated, and use of force in international relations. This thereforethat relations among them must tend combination of holism and anti-warsentiments to be hostile. The power view of anarchy can usually means that anarchy is seen primarily offer no idea of progress, because the balance as part of the problem. Because anarchyis such of power game is endlessly self-perpetuating. an important facilitative condition for war, its The achievement of universal empire by one continuation is naturally seen as antithetical actor might end the game, but this outcome to the highest priority of the peace view. The would reflect the victory of one actor over the peace view is thus fundamentally at odds with others rather than a politically desired pattern our argumentthat the anarchyis a fixed factor. 120 Barry Buzan

Because anarchyis seen as part of the problem, control of them will transform relations within rather than as a condition of the problem, the the anarchy. Similarly, those engaged in con- view through peace leads to policy prescriptions flict resolution frequently assume that most which discount or ignore the enduring realities conflicts rest on misunderstandings, and of the anarchy. therefore that better forms of communication The most typical forms of these prescriptions will allow an underlying harmony to come to depend on the anarchybeing so weakly rooted the surface.9 Enthusiasts for interdepen- that it can either be replaced outright, or else dence are also susceptibleto the view that either if not replaced, then its malign effects easily the anarchy,or its malign effects, can be over- overridden.Enthusiasm for world government ridden by an increasing network of economic, defined the mainstream of the peace view for environmentaland culturalties. a long time, though it has not been in the Because the peace view requiresan emphasis forefront of peace thinking since at least the on the elimination of war, those who hold it early 1970s.7 Such proposals are a perfectly are required to discount the importance of logical response to the problem of insecurity, anarchy at the level of the state. The peace but their assumption about the removability view emphasises individuals, and the inter- of the anarchy makes them extravagantly national system as a whole, and consequently idealistic. The intellectual logic underlying fails to confront the problemof durableanarchy idealistic internationalism displays a curious at the level of the state. Like the power view, link to the logic of the power view. Although the peace view is vulnerable to emotional the perspectivesthrough power and peace differ idealism, though its focus is quite different. absolutely about the durabilityof the anarchy, The emotionalism of power expresses itself they agree strongly on the negative, conflict- through the state in the form of nationalism. oriented, view of relations within the anarchy The emotionalism of peace is usually focused which derives from the power analysis. It is on the extremeof reductionism,the individual, because they accept this negative view that and the extreme of holism, the international advocatesof peace are tempted into the excesses system as a whole. This differencein emotional of idealistic internationalism. focus explains the ease with which the more The failure of internationalismto have any public proponentsof the powerand peace views practical effect on policy, has, over the years, fall into opposed camps. eroded interest in it. But the peace view has nonetheless remained popular, even though it 3.1.3 Security has lacked much influence on policy. Its more The securityview of anarchyincorporates much modern versions display a greater realism in from both the power and the peace views. terms of acceptingthe durabilityof the anarchy. Virtually the whole of the power view finds But in order to achieve this, and at the same a place, but with the essential qualification time retain the commitment against war, its that it representsonly a part of what needs to advocates have had to assume that the malign be taken into account. Thus the security view effects of the anarchy can be overcome in a accepts the realityand durabilityof the anarchy, relatively straightforwardmanner. Its clearest the importance of the units within it, and the expression has been in advocacy for arms role of the powerdynamic amongst those units. control and disarmament, discussion of which Most of the peace view also finds a place, but belongs in subsection 3.2 below. It is typical within, rather than outside, the context of the of the peace view to assume that harmonious anarchy. Thus the security view accepts the relations are within relatively close reach. moral imperativeagainst war, the need to con- Much of the enthusiasm for arms control and centrate on harmonious relationships,and the disarmament rests on the narrow assumption need to concentrate on both individuals and that weaponsare a principalobstruction to more the system as a whole. These normally opposed harmonious relations, and that removal or views can be reconciled because security Peace, Power, and Security 121 represents a broader behavioural motive than be fixed according to some set of common either power or peace, and because the security principles derived from factors such as race view of anarchy is both more comprehensive or nationality or geography. Ideological dif- and more positive than the view through either ferences in the domestic organisation of units power or peace. In the power view, anarchy is might be quite profound, but there would be an unpleasant realitywhich has to be accepted. agreement on political non-interference in In the peace view it is an artificial and detri- each other's affairs. Such a system might be mental condition which needs to be removed. organised around a number of very large units, In the security view, anarchy is a preferred each relatively self-reliant in economic terms, form of political relationswithin which options and each capable of mounting a credible exist for both conflictual and harmonious military deterrent.The units themselves would relations. also have to be internally cohesive and stable In the security view, the power dynamic in order for the system as a whole to be stable. represents the malign side of anarchy, but Unstable units, as illustrated by the situation not the whole, or even the main, pattern of in much of the Third World today, invite both relations within anarchy.The response to it is local conflict and competitive external inter- not to seek a solution outside the anarchy, vention from units which are more strongly but to apply the peace perspective to the constituted, and more powerfully equipped. A anarchy itself. The basic rule of anarchy can stable anarchy cannot exist until most of the manifest itself in a great variety of forms, units within it have themselves achieved and it is within that variety that the idealist political maturity. International institutions impulse against war can find scope for opera- might well exist to facilitate cooperation on tion. The particularitiesof a policy based on issues of planetary scope. But like the United security can only be determined in relation Nations today, these would support, rather to a specific case, a task beyond the scope of than undermine,the principle of anarchy. this paper. We can, however, easily illustrate It should be obvious that our currentanarchy the general scope for idealism within anarchy. falls somewhere in the middle range between The single rule of anarchyrequires us only to these two extremes. The danger of anarchy is avoid overarching political authority. Within contained in the scope for regression. The that rule,we can imaginea spectrumof anarchies potential for a realist-idealism is indicated ranging from very primitive at one end to by the gulf separating our present condition highly developed at the other. In the most from that of a highly developed anarchy.The primitive possible anarchy, units would be objective of policy based on security would internally unstable, and would accord each be to encouragemovement towards a more devel- other no political recognition.Capability would oped anarchy.Such policy requiresattention to be the only constraint on the use of force all three main levels: individual, state, and amongst them. Units would recognise no system. Politically strong states cannot be bounds to their own domain other than those built without consideration for the individuals set by the limits of their own power, and the within them. And states cannot make them- system would have no rules other than force selves secure without pursuing both nationalist by which the units conducted their relations policies, which reduce their vulnerabilities to with each other. In such a system war would threat, and internationalist policies, which be frequent, insecurity would be very high, reduce the levels of threat they receivefrom the and anarchywould approximateto chaos. international system at large. Security requires In a highly developed anarchy,by contrast, action at both the national and the international mutual recognition and respect among the levels, and can only be sought in the complex units would be a major feature. Units would balance between the two. Excessiveattention to accord each other recognition as political national security leads to the self-reinforcing equals, and boundaries amongst them would dynamic of the struggle for power, while exces- 122 Barry Buzan sive attention to international security leads The power view assumes that fear of defeat to the unrealistic idealism associated with the outweighs fear of war,and thereforeencourages peace view. A true security policy requires destabilising competitive accumulations of states to attend both to their own stability weapons. At worst, the power view results in and vulnerability,and to the patternof relations obsession with weapons, and vulnerability to in the system as a whole, with particular em- the lure of national expansionism through the phasis on their impact upon it. successful pursuit of superior military power. Because the securityview of anarchyrequires Because of the prominence of military a focus on all three levels of analysis, it is much capability in the power perspective, policy less subject to the narrow emotionalism which based on it is persistently vulnerable to the affects both the power and peace views. This tendency to translate political problems into wider perspectivehas the advantageof avoiding military ones. As a consequence, a reasonable conflict-prone sectional dogmatism, but at the military policy like deterrence can come to cost of losing the politically easy appeal which replace almost all attempts to deal with rela- enables proponents of the power and peace tional problems on the political level, making views to obtain mass support. Security requires the inflammatoryidiom of the arms racealmost a broad and rational approach to policy which the sole vehicle for political dialogue. Under is hard to reconcile with the crudely informed these circumstances,military deployments can and narrowly based dynamic of contemporary replace political negotiations to such an extent mass politics. Pursuit of security policy would that the self-reinforcing dynamic of arms thus requirethe elaboration of striking idealist accumulations comes to dominate the whole images within the confines of anarchy. Only pattern of internationalrelations. by promoting such images could the security Thus, although the power view has some perspective hope to complete politically with basic strengths in relation to the arms race, the parochial appeal of pure nationalism, its inherently narrow perspective leads to and the grand ideal of global peace. policies which defeat themselvesby emphasising the negativeover the positive role of arms in the 3.2 The arms race system. Although the power view can accom- 3.2.1 Power modate measuresof arms control and disarma- In relation to the arms race, as with anarchy, ment (ACD), its emphasis on state interests the great strength of the power view is that it results in a perspectivewhich makes it unlikely accepts the factor as a fixed feature of inter- that substantialACD measureswill be achieved. national relations. In addition, the power view The effective pursuit of ACD requires a per- also encompasses the positive view of weapons spective in which state and system interestsare as a source or order, as well as of disorder, given equal weight. within the internationalanarchy. These strengths,however, are offset by an ex- 3.2.2 Peace cessive emphasis on the role of weapons which The principal strength of the peace view of resultsfrom the perceptionthat militarystrength the arms race is its high sensitivity to the self- is the ultimate definition of power. Because defeatingpotential of the competitiveaccumula- of its narrow focus on the state, the power view tion of armaments by states each seeking to of the arms race leads to self-reinforcingand enhance its own security.From this sound start, self-defeating policies in which the competitive however,the proponents of peace typically leap and conflictual role of weapons dominates to extremeviews about the negativerole of arms their role as a foundation of international in the internationalsystem, and thereforeto un- order. Because the power view emphasises the realisticpolicies requiringtheir removal. state, it tends to discount the negative inter- Because it places such strong emphasis on active effect which results from each state weapons as a cause of conflict, the peace accumulating arms in pursuit of its own view is inherently prone to discount, or even security. Peace, Power, and Security 123 ignore completely, the constructive role which Soviet Union, power policies overindulge military power plays as a foundation of order particularistic state interests, and concede within the internationalanarchy. This tendency too little to collective interests at the system is reinforced by the hostile attitude towards level. And as illustrated by proposals like the the anarchy which is also characteristicof the one for the Indian Ocean as a Zone of Peace, peace view. Indeed, within the peace perspective, peace policies overestimatecollective interests, it is hard to disentanglethe consequences of the and take too little account of state interests view of anarchy from those of the arms race. (Buzan 1981). As a result of their bias, peace Because the peace view discounts state interests, policies condemn themselves to impracticality, it is prone to exaggerate the extent to which disillusionment, and eventually cynicism, and armamentsthemselves cause conflict within the so ironically often end up by reinforcing the internationalsystem, and to underestimatethe assumptions of the power view. depth and impact of political disagreementas a source of conflict. This view leads to the 3.2.3 Security assumption that the fear of war outweighs the The security view of the arms race avoids the fear of defeat, and thereforeto policy proposals opposed simplicities of the power and peace which underratethe need for national security, views, but as a consequence, loses the easy while overrating the ease with which interna- political appeal which is availableto the other tional security measures like ACD can be perspectives.The securityview accepts both the achieved. permanence of the arms race and the per- Because, in the peace view, arms are seen to manence of the contradiction between the play a leading role in war, and because the order-and disorder-producingeffect of military removal of war lies at the heart of peace objec- power. It rejects as self-defeating the tempta- tives, disarmament and arms control naturally tion of the power view to see armaments as a featureas principalpeace policies. Such policies tool for national aggrandizement.It also rejects frequentlyassume that weapons can be substan- as unrealistic the peace view that armaments tially eliminated from international relations, can and should be removed from international and that assumption clashes directly with the relations.The rathercomplex view which results arguments made above about the durabilityof loses both the moral clarity of the peace view the arms race. To the extent that the arms race and the purposive clarity of the power view. is a fixed feature, then policies requiring ex- But it gains a realism which acknowledges the tensive disarmamentare misguided and naive. positive as well as the negative potential of Even on the more limited objective of arms military power, and confronts, rather than control, the peace view causes difficulties. evades, the permanent contradiction of the Although it is a strengthof the peace view that role of arms within the internationalanarchy. it emphasisesarms control, it does so in a mirror The principal objective of security policy on image of the extreme assumptions that make the arms race is to preserve and enhance the the power view of ACD ineffective. Just as the order-producing effects of military power power view undercutsthe possibilities for arms within the anarchy, while at the same time control by overemphasising narrow state in- trying to minimise the disorder-producing terests, so the peace view diminishes the prac- effects. Such policy is neither simple, nor ticability of arms control by underemphasising easy to achieve. It requires actors to generate state interests. While the followers of power a sensitivity to the impact of their own be- embrace arms with too much enthusiasm, the haviour on the system which is at least equal followers of peace reject them with too much to their sensitivity to the impact of the fervour.As a consequence, both views result in behaviour of other actors on them. It also unrealisticarms control policies. As illustrated requires a willingness to deal with political by the small result from the many arms control problems in political rather than military negotiations between the United States and the terms, and a commitment to pursue arms 124 Barry Buzan

control on the basis of mutual security. In national relations. The extent to which the pursuing military security, states must give power and peace views highlight opposite equal weight to the military task of reducing extremesof the anarchyand the arms race only their own vulnerabilitieson the one hand, and emphasises the degree to which these concepts the political task of reducing the threats they offer a partial view of the insecurity problem. perceive from the rest of the system on the I have also shown how the concept of security other. These objectives are subject to constant combines many of the strengthsof the other two pressure from innovations in military tech- concepts, and how it opens up previously nology, from misperceptionsamong actors, and neglected areas for researchby pointing to the from the possibility of deception and cheating. large potential for idealistic thinking which The particularitiesof security policy on the exists within the fixed, but not immutable, arms race can only be worked out in relation factors of the anarchyand the arms race. to a specific case. But the underlying principle To the extentthat these argumentshave force, is to enhance the ability of states to make the task at hand is to develop security as an themselvesmilitarily secure, without at the same explicit conceptual orientation for research. time increasingthe threat which others perceive Security-oriented thinking is already evident from them. It is in seeking ways to make this in much work, but it appears mostly in the principleoperational that the scope for idealism form of hedged options on the liberal wing of within the security view lies. As noted above, power thinking and on the conservative wing two areas within which some work along these of peace thinking. A proper security-based lines has already been done are deterrenceand approach would require a conscious rejection territorial defence. In territorial defence, the of the current polarisation between peace objective is to make a country difficult to and power, and the assertion of security as a occupy without acquiringmilitary forces which fully-articulatedframework in its own right. could threaten invasion of neighbouringstates. The two old concepts have been developedto In deterrence, the objective is to exploit the their fullest potential, and their inherent limi- surplus capacity for destruction, and the tations mean that they have little further consequent high fear of war, which nuclear insight to offer. The pressing need is to move weapons have introduced into international away from the sterile argument between them, relations for the first time. The transforma- and to begin developing a new synthesis. The tion of military values by nuclear weapons intellectual space for that synthesis lies in the opens the possibility of finding mutual con- large middle ground between peace and power figurations of strike forces which are self- which has been obscured from view by the paralysing. A pattern of relations among the intensity with which the older concepts have major powers in which nuclear deterrence divided opinion. It is in the nature of a syn- reduces the incentives for major war to zero, thesis that much of the materialfor it is already would representone form of perfect outcome familiarand readyto hand, so the shift to a new for security policy on the arms race. conceptual orientation is not so difficult as might at first appear. Neither Realism nor 4. Conclusions Idealism in their extreme forms have served In this paper I have argued that security is a us well. The concept of securityoffers a realism more comprehensiveconcept than either power which is more realisticthan that of power, and or peace for understandingthe basic problems an idealism which is more practical than that of international relations. I have shown that of peace. The realist-idealism of security power and peace lead to narrow and distorted perhaps offers us a chance to recover the views of both the anarchy and the arms race, energies that we now so frequently lose either and that this narrownessleads to an artificial in opposing each other, or in confining our own and unhelpful polarisation in the main con- thinking to a narrow and contradictory ceptual frameworkused in thinking about inter- framework. Peace, Power, and Security 125

NOTES of natural harmony, they embraced the model of an 1. On reasons for the underdevelopment of security anarchy composed of liberal nation-states as the as a concept, see Buzan, 1983, pp. 3-9. ideal structure for international peace, and opposed 2. The use of the terms 'insecurity' and 'security' in traditional notions of peace through international this context appears to run the risk of circular government. Ibid., chs. 5 and 6. argument. This risk, however, is more apparent than 9. See the works of John Burton on conflict resulution, real. It arises simply from an unfortunate parallelism for example, Burton 1972. in the common usage of the terms, and does not in- volve a predeterminedor closed logical linkage. The three concepts of peace, power and security each representa distinct response to the common problem REFERENCES of insecurity. They are what Gallie (1962) (see also Burton, John 1972. World Society. 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