The 2015 General Election and Singapore's Political Forecast : White Clouds, Blue Skies
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This document is downloaded from DR‑NTU (https://dr.ntu.edu.sg) Nanyang Technological University, Singapore. The 2015 general election and Singapore's political forecast : white clouds, blue skies Weiss, Meredith L.; Loke, Hoe‑Yeong; Choa, Luenne Angela 2015 Weiss, M. L., Loke, H.‑Y., & Choa, L. A. (2016). The 2015 general election and Singapore's political forecast : white clouds, blue skies. Asian Survey, 56(5), 859‑878. doi:10.1525/as.2016.56.5.859 https://hdl.handle.net/10356/88157 https://doi.org/10.1525/as.2016.56.5.859 © 2016 The Regents of the University of California. This paper was published in Asian Survey and is made available as an electronic reprint (preprint) with permission of The Regents of the University of California. The published version is available at: [http://dx.doi.org/10.1525/as.2016.56.5.859]. One print or electronic copy may be made for personal use only. Systematic or multiple reproduction, distribution to multiple locations via electronic or other means, duplication of any material in this paper for a fee or for commercial purposes, or modification of the content of the paper is prohibited and is subject to penalties under law. Downloaded on 24 Sep 2021 01:00:28 SGT MEREDITH L. WEISS, HOE-YEONG LOKE, AND LUENNE ANGELA CHOA The 2015 General Election and Singapore’s Political Forecast White Clouds, Blue Skies ABSTRACT The People’s Action Party’s unexpectedly strong win in Singapore’s September 2015 general election illuminates the dynamics of opposition under electoral authoritar- ianism. The conduct and outcome of the election raise questions not just of why the much-hyped opposition efforts fizzled, but also of the implications for Singapore politics, moving forward. KEYWORDS: Singapore, electoral authoritarianism, elections, People’s Action Party, opposition politics THAT THE PERENNIALLY RULING PEOPLE’S ACTION PARTY (PAP) would win Singapore’s September 2015 general election, the country’s twelfth since independence in 1965, was a foregone conclusion. Even the most ambitious and promising opposition parties aspired not to form the government but to be a larger, more effective, yet ‘‘responsible’’ parliamentary opposition. Regardless, that the PAP not only won back one of the mere seven seats held by the opposition but also boosted its share of the popular vote by nearly 10 percentage points, to around 70%, surprised even the ruling party. Until MEREDITH L. WEISS is Professor of Political Science at the University at Albany, State University of New York. She has most recently edited the Routledge Handbook of Contemporary Malaysia (Rout- ledge, 2015) and Electoral Dynamics in Malaysia: Findings from the Grassroots (Institute of Southeast Asian Studies, 2014). She wishes to thank the University at Albany for funding this research, helpful informants from across Singapore’s political parties for their insights, and Eileena Lee for her enthusiastic companionship at rallies. HOE-YEONG LOKE is Associate Fellow at the European Union Centre in Singapore, a partnership of the National University of Singapore and Nanyang Tech- nological University. He is the author of Let the People Have Him—Chiam See Tong: The Early Years (Epigram Books, 2014). LUENNE ANGELA CHOA is the co-founder of Hornbills Concepts and Communications, a public affairs consultancy based in Singapore. Emails: <[email protected]>, <[email protected]>, <[email protected]>. Asian Survey,Vol.56,Number5,pp.859–878.ISSN0004-4687,electronicISSN1533-838X. © 2016 by The Regents of the University of California. All rights reserved. Please direct all requests for permission to photocopy or reproduce article content through the University of California Press’s Reprints and Permissionswebpage,http://www.ucpress.edu/journals.php?p¼reprints.DOI:10.1525/AS.2016.56.5.859. 859 860 ASIAN SURVEY 56:5 polling day, parties on both sides, observers, and even supposedly astute bookmakers had assumed that the PAP would lose a few more seats. Indeed, opposition gains in 2011 had left many observers predicting a near-inexorable shift toward a more liberal, two-party system to supplant Singapore’s long- standing dominant-party, hybrid system. The conduct and outcome of the election raise questions not just of why the much-hyped challenge fizzled, but also of the implications for Singapore’s political trajectory. While the opposition performed worse this time than in 2011, its salience cannot be read only from polling results. The different approaches and results across opposition parties offer insight into what works for would-be challengers, however hamstrung by internal disorganization, limited resources, and structural hurdles. More important, these polls illu- minate the roles political opposition plays in a stable hybrid system: the extent to which a vocal opposition may push the dominant party to reform (or at least to justify its policy choices better) despite structural constraints; whether voters prioritize ‘‘voice’’ beyond effective policy outcomes; how much personality matters amid a substantially partisan vote; what tools and niches challengers can exploit in pressing their case; and how both sides extend their reach beyond core supporters to a growing mass of swing voters or those of unknown sympathies. As an opposition Workers’ Party (WP) campaign metaphor suggested, referring to the WP’s signature blue and the PAP’s white, voters choose between ‘‘blue sky’’ and shape-shifting ‘‘white clouds.’’ Even should the clouds block out the blue, both share space in Singapore’s electoral firmament.1 CONDUCT AND RESULTS OF THE ELECTION The defining features of hybrid, or electoral authoritarian, regimes are curbs on civil liberties and skewed elections—in Schedler’s terms, kinks or discon- tinuities in the ‘‘chain of democratic choice.’’2 The conjunction of these dimensions is readily apparent in Singaporean elections. The voting process itself is above reproach, although opposition parties and the human rights 1. Sylvia Lim, WP rally speech, September 4, 2015, <http://www.wp.sg/sylvia-lims-rally-speech- yishun-stadium-rally-4-sep/>, accessed October 25, 2015. 2. Andreas Schedler, ‘‘The Menu of Manipulation,’’ Journal of Democracy 13:2 (April 2002), pp. 36–50; see also Larry Diamond, ‘‘Thinking about Hybrid Regimes,’’ Journal of Democracy 13:2 (April 2002), pp. 21–35. WEISS, LOKE, AND CHOA / SINGAPORE’S 2015 ELECTION 861 group Maruah (Dignity)3 have found it necessary to persuade skeptical voters that their vote is secret, thanks to the use of serial numbers on ballot papers. Campaigns are tightly regulated, too, to be rigorously ‘‘fair’’: for instance, each party is allotted time proportionate to its number of candidates for televised ‘‘party political broadcasts,’’ and strict rules govern how many pos- ters and banners each candidate or party may display.4 Regardless, the opposition faces hurdles. Most obviously, it is only during the official campaign period, constitutionally mandated to be between nine and 56 days, that rallies and open campaigning are allowed. The 2015 campaign lasted only 10 days, including an eerily silent ‘‘cooling-off day’’ introduced in 2011, when campaigning is prohibited. Even then, precise parameters surround the methods of canvassing that are permissible as well as the hours and venues of rallies (7–10 PM, except for two downtown noon rallies; for these, parties chose venues by lot, one day in advance). Rules on online campaign efforts have been progressively loosened, yet curbs persist on political videos, and the PAP’s control of mainstream media magnifies its advantage. A mixture of multimember group representation constituencies (GRCs) and single member constituencies (SMCs), whose composition and bound- aries shift with each election, ensures minority representation; each GRC must include at least one member from among the minority groups that comprise about one-quarter of Singapore’s population. GRCs, however, complicate competition for opposition parties. Not only must the party come up with a full slate of plausible candidates but also each candidate pays a steep deposit, SG$ 14,500 (US$ 10,422) this year, which is forfeited should the candidate poll below 12.5% of votes. (Only the two independents who ran in 2015 lost their deposits, and the Reform Party squeaked through with 12.7% in one SMC.) Nevertheless, for the first time since independence, all parliamentary seats were contested: 13 SMCs and 16 GRCs, each with between four and six members, for a total of 89 seats. Complementing these elected MPs are appointed non-constituency members of parliament (‘‘best losers’’ from the opposition; the Elections Department invites those candidates who secured 3. Maruah, ‘‘Vote Wisely. Vote without Fear. The Vote Is Secret,’’ September 6, 2015, <http:// maruah.org/2015/09/06/vote-wisely-vote-without-fear-the-vote-is-secret/>, accessed October 26, 2015. 4. The Singapore Elections Department website enumerates these guidelines in a downloadable handbook: <http://www.eld.gov.sg/pdf/GE2015/Candidate%20Handbook%20for%20Parliament ary%20Election%202015_1.pdf>, accessed October 25, 2015. 862 ASIAN SURVEY 56:5 the highest shares of popular votes, but not enough to win, to join the parliament), an innovation introduced in 1984 to ensure a minimum num- ber of non-PAP MPs (currently nine). (Up to nine nominated members of parliament, drawn from key societal sectors rather than political parties, complete the mix.) More parties than usual contested in 2015, including two parties formed since the last election. Part of the reason for the PAP’s greater vote share was simply that some seats that had been walkovers previously (and hence not included in the party’s vote tally), or that were not claimed by more estab- lished opposition parties, were now contested by weaker parties seeking an available niche. The PAP’s especially strong results in such seats—as high as 79% in five-member Jurong and six-member Ang Mo Kio, and 78% in previously uncontested five-member Tanjong Pagar (Lee Kuan Yew’s former constituency)—increased the PAP’s overall average.