Other AEI publications on problems of forelln and defense polley r::AELS Strategic Sufficiency: Fact or Fiction? James L. li1w!iHall Buckley and Paul C. Warnke. 1972, 86 pages, $5.75 C/Meeting Troubled A11iance: Turkish-American Problems in Historical Perspective, 1945-1971, George S. Harris. 1972, 263 pages, paper $4.50, cloth $8.00 (published jointly with the Hoover Institution) Soviet Advances in the Middle East, George Len­ czowski. 1972, 176 pages, $4.00 Major Middle Eastern Problems in International Law, Edited by Majid Khadduri. 1972, 139 pages, r­ The e!. $4.00 ., =. Defense Implications of International Indetermin­ acy, Robert J. Pranger. 1972, 31 pages, $2.00 Nixon American Policy for Peace in the Middle East, 1969-1971, Robert J. Pranger. 1971,69 pages, $2.00 The Bear at the Gate-Chinese Policymaking Doctrine Under Soviet Pressure, Harold C. Hinton. 1971, 112 pages, $3.00 (published jointly with the Hoover Institution) A Just Peace in the Mideast: How Can It Be Achieved? I. L. Kenen, Elmer Berger, Allen Pol­ Melvin R. Laird lack, and Christopher Mayhew. 1971, 167 pages, $5.75 American Enterprise Institute for Public Policy Research 1150 Seventeenth Street, N.W., Washington, D.C. 20036 Job Name:2274819 Date:15-06-18 PDF Page:2274819pbc.p1.pdf Color: Black PANTONE 139 C The Nixon Doctrine A Town Hall Meeting on National Security Policy sponsored by the American Enterprise Institute held at American Enterprise Institute Washington, D. C. Robert Goralski Moderator The Nixon Doctrine Melvin R. Laird Gale W. McGee Robert P. Griffin Thomas C. Schelling Town Hall Meeting American Enterprise Institute for Public Policy Research Washington, D. C. Distributed to the Trade by National Book Network, 15200 NBN Way, Blue Ridge Summit, PA 17214. To order call toll free 1-800-462-6420 or 1-717-794-3800. For all other inquiries please contact the AEI Press, 1150 Seventeenth Street, N.W., Washington, D.C. 20036 or call 1-800-862-5801. ® Copyright 1972 by the American Enterprise Institute for Public Policy Research 1150 17th Street, N.W., Washington, D.C. 20036 All rights reserved under International and Pan-American Copyright Conventions Library of Congress Catalog Card Number L.C. 72-88078 Printed in United States of America Foreword In a free society, public attitudes are crucial in public policy formation. They influence the options on the many issues confronting public officials, whether elected or ap­ pointed. It is vital, therefore, that thought leaders who help form public attitudes have available the results of research, analysis and innovative thought from as wide a range of sources as possible. In recent years, no subject of national concern has in­ volved sharper conflict than national security affairs. Fore­ most in the continuous debate is the issue of what kind of defense policy the United States needs for the future. Even more fundamental, of course, is the issue of what direction American foreign policy should follow. Partisan controversy will continue to make its contribu­ tion to the battles now underway over such matters as Indochina, the defense budget, strategic arms limitation, and the more basic foreign policy questions of national interests and purposes. Dedicated to nonpartisan policy research, the American Enterprise Institute can approach these very serious issues in a different, but no less effective, manner. This approach is exemplified in AEI's Town Hall Meetings on National Security Policy. The format for this series is designed to develop dialogue, that form of human communication that emphasizes listen­ ing to others instead of haranguing them. Papers are pre­ sented by the principals of the meeting, a longer one by the person who sets the stage for the subsequent discussion" and shorter ones by discussants. After these formal presen­ tations, there is an exchange of views among the principals, followed by questions and comments from a group of experts. The proceedings of the meeting are made available in videotapes, films and books. By emphasizing conversation and listening in the debate over national security policy, the American Enterprise In­ stitute hopes to add something of value to the substance of the issues now being raised about America's future role in world affairs. In the process we believe that the following dictum by Lord Keynes will become self-evident to thought­ ful participants, viewers and readers: "I am sure that the power of vested interests is vastly exaggerated compared with the gradual encroachment of ideas." William J. Baroody President American Enterprise Institute for Public Policy Research Contents Part 1 The Nixon Doctrine: FroIn Potential Despair to New Opportunities 1 Melvin R. Laird Part 2 COInInentaries 25 Gale W. McGee Robert P. Griffin Thomas C. Schelling Part 3 Discussion 51 Participants 79 Part 1 The Nixon Doctrine: FroIn Potential Despair to New Opportunities 1 Melvin R. Laird The United States stands today on the edge of a new era in international relations, an era that future historians may say moved us from a focus on confrontation and war to the start of long-lasting peace. It is to this new beginning that I shall address myself today. The focus of my remarks will be the Nixon Doctrine, an unpretentious yet historically important restatement of America's proper place in the world by a President who is concerned as much with shaping the future as he is with present needs. The Nixon Doctrine is an approach to world affairs that combines both high principles and practical realism. And this is as it should be, for both the high hopes of the states­ man and the accomplished skills of the politician are neces­ sary for a successful policy of peace in these complicated times. In short, the times demand, and the Nixon Doctrine pro­ vides, a principled, practical peace prescription. Experienced men must-and I believe do-combine principle and prac­ tice in their basic approach to the problems that confront them. They are realists. Nations can, and must, do likewise in the management of their affairs. This approach may have its shortcomings for the utterly ruthless or the pure moralist, but these are not the people who build a real peace in a real world. With this basic idea in mind-that the Nixon Doctrine is a mix of basic principles and pragmatic approaches-I shall discuss its principles, its practical results to date, and its promise for the future. But first, let me say a word about the importance of the Nixon Doctrine to our planning. It is the basic philosophy underlying the conduct of both our foreign and national 3 The Nixon Doctrine security affairs policies. As such, it provides the essential link between the basic principles of the President's policy for peace and the practical implementing programs to which most of the attention and debate concerning defense plan­ ning and budgeting are directed. Most of the debate about defense issues today relates to specific aspects of our own forces, and to the pros and cons of the various service roles and weapons systems. This per­ spective, while important, understandable and natural, is not what the Nixon Doctrine and the strategy of realistic deterrence are all about. Many people, in my view erroneously, use the terms military strategy, defense strategy and national security strategy interchangeably. This is the source of much con­ fusion. The issues on which I shall focus here will be those of foreign policy and national security strategy, not mili­ tary strategy. The objective of our national security strat­ egy of realistic deterrence is to deter or prevent wars, to bring to bear those forces-not just military forces, but economic, diplomatic, psychological and other forces-that are essential to successful deterrence of all levels of conflict. This, in my view, is the central issue of national security planning-how we utilize the combination of resources available to us and to our friends and allies in a way best calculated to deter war, whatever its size or scope. To put my purpose in its bluntest terms, the most rele­ vant defense issues that cry out for debate and discussion are those which flow from an appreciation of what this ad­ ministration's strategy for peace is all about. We say we are no longer prepared to be the cop on every beat; that we are going to keep our treaty commitments; that we are not going to spend in peacetime more than 7 percent of the gross national product on defense; that our security will be enhanced, not retarded by the SALT agree­ ments; that we will reach zero draft calls and have al1­ volunteer armed forces. Is this nothing but rhetoric, or do we have a set of programs and concepts that will make it 4 Melvin R. Laird possible for us to accomplish these often disparate pur­ poses? These are the essential questions Americans ought to be debating, not the number of aircraft carriers, or air­ craft wings or ground divisions the various services should have. Those questions are important too, but they are sub­ sidiary to the broader national security issues that will de­ cide America's future role in, and impact on, the world in which we live. That is why in my Defense Report to Congress earlier this year, I call for a public dialogue on the national secu­ rity issues raised by the Nixon Doctrine and the strategy of realistic deterrence "such as we have not had since the days of the genesis of the Marshall Plan." 1 To engage in such dialogue, thoughtful citizens want and need to understand the foreign policy and national security framework which has been established by the Nixon admin­ istration.