Other AEI publications on problems of forelln and defense polley r::AELS Strategic Sufficiency: Fact or Fiction? James L. li1w!iHall Buckley and Paul C. Warnke. 1972, 86 pages, $5.75 C/Meeting Troubled A11iance: Turkish-American Problems in Historical Perspective, 1945-1971, George S. Harris. 1972, 263 pages, paper $4.50, cloth $8.00 (published jointly with the Hoover Institution) Soviet Advances in the Middle East, George Len­ czowski. 1972, 176 pages, $4.00 Major Middle Eastern Problems in International Law, Edited by Majid Khadduri. 1972, 139 pages, r­ The e!. $4.00 ., =. Defense Implications of International Indetermin­ acy, Robert J. Pranger. 1972, 31 pages, $2.00 Nixon American Policy for Peace in the Middle East, 1969-1971, Robert J. Pranger. 1971,69 pages, $2.00 The Bear at the Gate-Chinese Policymaking Doctrine Under Soviet Pressure, Harold C. Hinton. 1971, 112 pages, $3.00 (published jointly with the Hoover Institution) A Just Peace in the Mideast: How Can It Be Achieved? I. L. Kenen, Elmer Berger, Allen Pol­ Melvin R. Laird lack, and Christopher Mayhew. 1971, 167 pages, $5.75

American Enterprise Institute for Public Policy Research 1150 Seventeenth Street, N.W., Washington, D.C. 20036

Job Name:2274819 Date:15-06-18 PDF Page:2274819pbc.p1.pdf Color: Black PANTONE 139 C The Nixon Doctrine

A Town Hall Meeting on National Security Policy sponsored by the American Enterprise Institute held at American Enterprise Institute Washington, D. C.

Robert Goralski Moderator

The Nixon Doctrine

Melvin R. Laird

Gale W. McGee Robert P. Griffin Thomas C. Schelling

Town Hall Meeting American Enterprise Institute for Public Policy Research Washington, D. C. Distributed to the Trade by National Book Network, 15200 NBN Way, Blue Ridge Summit, PA 17214. To order call toll free 1-800-462-6420 or 1-717-794-3800. For all other inquiries please contact the AEI Press, 1150 Seventeenth Street, N.W., Washington, D.C. 20036 or call 1-800-862-5801.

® Copyright 1972 by the American Enterprise Institute for Public Policy Research 1150 17th Street, N.W., Washington, D.C. 20036 All rights reserved under International and Pan-American Copyright Conventions Library of Congress Catalog Card Number L.C. 72-88078 Printed in United States of America Foreword

In a free society, public attitudes are crucial in public policy formation. They influence the options on the many issues confronting public officials, whether elected or ap­ pointed. It is vital, therefore, that thought leaders who help form public attitudes have available the results of research, analysis and innovative thought from as wide a range of sources as possible. In recent years, no subject of national concern has in­ volved sharper conflict than national security affairs. Fore­ most in the continuous debate is the issue of what kind of defense policy the United States needs for the future. Even more fundamental, of course, is the issue of what direction American foreign policy should follow. Partisan controversy will continue to make its contribu­ tion to the battles now underway over such matters as Indochina, the defense budget, strategic arms limitation, and the more basic foreign policy questions of national interests and purposes. Dedicated to nonpartisan policy research, the American Enterprise Institute can approach these very serious issues in a different, but no less effective, manner. This approach is exemplified in AEI's Town Hall Meetings on National Security Policy. The format for this series is designed to develop dialogue, that form of human communication that emphasizes listen­ ing to others instead of haranguing them. Papers are pre­ sented by the principals of the meeting, a longer one by the person who sets the stage for the subsequent discussion" and shorter ones by discussants. After these formal presen­ tations, there is an exchange of views among the principals, followed by questions and comments from a group of experts. The proceedings of the meeting are made available in videotapes, films and books. By emphasizing conversation and listening in the debate over national security policy, the American Enterprise In­ stitute hopes to add something of value to the substance of the issues now being raised about America's future role in world affairs. In the process we believe that the following dictum by Lord Keynes will become self-evident to thought­ ful participants, viewers and readers: "I am sure that the power of vested interests is vastly exaggerated compared with the gradual encroachment of ideas."

William J. Baroody President American Enterprise Institute for Public Policy Research Contents

Part 1 The Nixon Doctrine: FroIn Potential Despair to New Opportunities 1

Melvin R. Laird

Part 2 COInInentaries 25

Gale W. McGee Robert P. Griffin Thomas C. Schelling

Part 3 Discussion 51

Participants 79

Part 1

The Nixon Doctrine: FroIn Potential Despair to New Opportunities

1

Melvin R. Laird

The United States stands today on the edge of a new era in international relations, an era that future historians may say moved us from a focus on confrontation and war to the start of long-lasting peace. It is to this new beginning that I shall address myself today. The focus of my remarks will be the Nixon Doctrine, an unpretentious yet historically important restatement of America's proper place in the world by a President who is concerned as much with shaping the future as he is with present needs. The Nixon Doctrine is an approach to world affairs that combines both high principles and practical realism. And this is as it should be, for both the high hopes of the states­ man and the accomplished skills of the politician are neces­ sary for a successful policy of peace in these complicated times. In short, the times demand, and the Nixon Doctrine pro­ vides, a principled, practical peace prescription. Experienced men must-and I believe do-combine principle and prac­ tice in their basic approach to the problems that confront them. They are realists. Nations can, and must, do likewise in the management of their affairs. This approach may have its shortcomings for the utterly ruthless or the pure moralist, but these are not the people who build a real peace in a real world. With this basic idea in mind-that the Nixon Doctrine is a mix of basic principles and pragmatic approaches-I shall discuss its principles, its practical results to date, and its promise for the future. But first, let me say a word about the importance of the Nixon Doctrine to our planning. It is the basic philosophy underlying the conduct of both our foreign and national

3 The Nixon Doctrine security affairs policies. As such, it provides the essential link between the basic principles of the President's policy for peace and the practical implementing programs to which most of the attention and debate concerning defense plan­ ning and budgeting are directed. Most of the debate about defense issues today relates to specific aspects of our own forces, and to the pros and cons of the various service roles and weapons systems. This per­ spective, while important, understandable and natural, is not what the Nixon Doctrine and the strategy of realistic deterrence are all about. Many people, in my view erroneously, use the terms military strategy, defense strategy and national security strategy interchangeably. This is the source of much con­ fusion. The issues on which I shall focus here will be those of foreign policy and national security strategy, not mili­ tary strategy. The objective of our national security strat­ egy of realistic deterrence is to deter or prevent wars, to bring to bear those forces-not just military forces, but economic, diplomatic, psychological and other forces-that are essential to successful deterrence of all levels of conflict. This, in my view, is the central issue of national security planning-how we utilize the combination of resources available to us and to our friends and allies in a way best calculated to deter war, whatever its size or scope. To put my purpose in its bluntest terms, the most rele­ vant defense issues that cry out for debate and discussion are those which flow from an appreciation of what this ad­ ministration's strategy for peace is all about. We say we are no longer prepared to be the cop on every beat; that we are going to keep our treaty commitments; that we are not going to spend in peacetime more than 7 percent of the gross national product on defense; that our security will be enhanced, not retarded by the SALT agree­ ments; that we will reach zero draft calls and have al1­ volunteer armed forces. Is this nothing but rhetoric, or do we have a set of programs and concepts that will make it

4 Melvin R. Laird possible for us to accomplish these often disparate pur­ poses? These are the essential questions Americans ought to be debating, not the number of aircraft carriers, or air­ craft wings or ground divisions the various services should have. Those questions are important too, but they are sub­ sidiary to the broader national security issues that will de­ cide America's future role in, and impact on, the world in which we live. That is why in my Defense Report to Congress earlier this year, I call for a public dialogue on the national secu­ rity issues raised by the Nixon Doctrine and the strategy of realistic deterrence "such as we have not had since the days of the genesis of the Marshall Plan." 1 To engage in such dialogue, thoughtful citizens want and need to understand the foreign policy and national security framework which has been established by the Nixon admin­ istration. It is to this issue that I now turn.

I. Principles of the Nixon Doctrine

Foreign Policy. In his address to a joint session of Con­ gress on June 1, immediately following his return from the Moscow summit meetings, President Nixon noted the mem­ orable and unprecedented sight of the American and Russian flags flying together over the Kremlin. He could not help but reflect on how the symbolism of the Kremlin had been for so many years, for so many Americans, the very epitome of cold-war confrontations between the United States and the U.S.S.R. Now perceptions must change. The world has become too dangerous a place for the great nuclear powers to be constantly in confrontation with each other. Whatever the future differences between the Russians and ourselves­ and they may well be intense-they cannot be permitted to lead us to open conflict, either conventional or nuclear. lAnnual Defense Department Report, Fiscal Year 1973: Na­ tional Security Strategy of Realistic Deterrence (Washington: Government Printing Office, 1972), p. 17.

5 The Nixon Doctrine

President Nixon has repeatedly emphasized his hope of bringing about a basic change in our relations with com­ munist nations, and in particular the U.S.S.R.-a change from confrontation to negotiation. An essential ingredient to a generation of peace is a stable relationship between the United States and the Soviet Union. There are, and will continue to be, profound differences between the Soviet Union and ourselves, differences which cannot simply be ascribed to historical accident or misunderstanding. They are rooted in different conceptions of the rights and re­ sponsibilities of men and of governments. They are rooted in a conflict of world interests and differing perceptions of how those interests should be protected and forwarded. We cannot eliminate these differences overnight. We probably cannot eliminate them in your lifetime or mine. Unless we accept that fact, and make this recognition the starting point for our efforts toward peace, we will diminish the chances for peace and increase the risks to our own interests. The true question confronting us is not whether it is pos­ sible to have instant revolution in our relations with the Soviet Union. It is, rather, whether we can be peaceful ad­ versaries without becoming belligerent antagonists, whether we can resolve what can be resolved and control what can­ not. That is what the statement of Basic Principles of Mu­ tual Relations Between the United States and the U.S.S.R., agreed to in Moscow on May 29, 1972, is all about. And that is what the President's strategy for peace is all about. Our strategy for peace is based on three pillars. Willing­ ness to negotiate is one of those pillars. The other two-the pillars that can change meaningful negotiations from an elusive hope to a recognized reality-are strength and part­ nership. The Nixon Doctrine and the strategy of realistic deterrence are derived from the strength and partnership pillars of President Nixon's strategy for peace. The Nixon Doctrine and its supporting national security strategy strike a balance between what America should do and what our friends can do. This doctrine permits us to

6 Melvin R. Laird do enough, without doing, or attempting to do, too much. It pledges that we will keep our treaty commitments, that we will provide a nuclear shield, and that we will assist our friends in safeguarding world stability. But it does not call upon us to do everything ourselves. The Nixon Doctrine and its supporting strategy relate to our relationship with the Soviet Union, but they also have a much broader application. They provide the United States with a strategy that encompasses our relationships with all nations. As we move from confrontation to negotiation, from the symbols of force to the practices of persuasion, we must do so without submerging the national interests of any state save the interest of waging aggressive war on others. We cannot neglect that national strength so necessary to the process of negotiation and partnership. Without it, negotia­ tion soon becomes concession, and partnership becomes ex­ ploitation. Surely, honor involves the self respect one gains from the admiration of others, a self respect that cannot accept intimidation just as it will not intimidate others. I have heard criticism that the Nixon Doctrine and our implementing programs are too broad, too general, to be useful, that they do not define in precise detail the path ahead. This latter observation is in fact true, and it is true because we have broken with the principles of the past, which said that America, because of some all-pervading wisdom, could in fact write all plans and dictate all pro­ grams. This "benevolent paternalism," if you will, may be an easy path to follow in a world dominated by one super power, but it is certainly not a meaningful or realistic ap­ proach today-if it ever was. We seek not a Pax Americana, but a peace that will endure because, in President Nixon's words, "every nation has a greater stake in preserving than in breaking it." The Moscow summit was not the beginning of a new period of Soviet-American condominium. Quite the con­ trary, it was a recognition that what we and the Soviets

7 The Nixon Doctrine might do to each other held great danger for all. But it was, equally, a recognition that no super power, or combination of super powers, possessed the resources or the wisdom to dictate solutions to the rest of the world. Our purpose was to set our own relationships within a new framework, not to require that others adjust their own actions to that framework. Even while ideological tensions continue, the rise of other major, and lesser, centers of power enormously complicate international politics. In an increasingly complex world, uncertainty in foreign affairs rather than predictability will predominate. The emergence and development of the new realities of world politics will inevitably complicate the lives of every American. Some will despair, turning toward isolation or outrage at America's apparent loss of world mastery, a mastery that it at least once pretended to have. Others, hopefully the vast majority of Americans, will patiently absorb this new experience and learn to enjoy in larger measure the freedom a fluid state of world affairs can pro­ vide to free men. In addition, however, one must hope that this evolving freedom from the rigidities of the cold war will not lead to unreasoning mass euphoria. It behooves us to keep our heads; the mi1lenium has not yet come. But realism also dictates that we recognize and take proper advantage of the opportunities created by this changing world environ­ ment, rather than turning inward or criticizing those who try.

Defense Policy. Just as our own strength is maintained for the purpose of deterring war, so must our partnership with friends and allies be structured to the same end. Our own strength remains our first priority. But, if there is a single characteristic that most distinguishes the Nixon Doc­ trine from other national security principles espoused since 1945, it is the emphasis we now place on the role our part-

8 Melvin R. Laird

ners must play in the common defense. No more than we should seek to dominate our adversaries by force, should our friends be dominated by our unnecessary unilateral generosity. President Nixon has said that while a major American role remains indispensable, other nations can and should assume greater responsibilities. He has recognized that a changing strategic relationship requires new doctrines, and that emerging polycentrism in the communist world pre­ sents different challenges and new opportunities. Implementation of the President's strategy for peace and the Nixon Doctrine called for a new approach to our de­ fense thinking and our security planning. We began that process in 1969, and it is continuing today. First, we had to establish the plans we would follow in shaping our defense programs. They are contained and discussed in detail in my defense reports to Congress of the past two years. The basic purpose of our implementing national security strategy is to provide, through strength and partnership, for the security of the United States and its free world friends and allies. Meaningful planning guidelines for effective partnership had to be established. The guidelines we de­ veloped were as follows: 1. In deterring strategic nuclear warfare, primary reli­ ance will continue to be placed on U.S. strategic deterrent forces. 2. In deterring theater nuclear warfare, the U.S. also has primary responsibility, but certain of our allies are able to share this responsibility by virtue of their own nuclear capabilities. 3. In deterring theater conventional warfare (i.e., a major non-nuclear war involving the U.S.S.R. or the People's Republic of China, such as a major war in Europe), U.S. and allied forces share responsibility. 4. In deterring subtheater or localized warfare (i.e., con­ flict which does not involve the U.S. directly with either the U.S.S.R. or the People's Republic of China), the

9 The Nixon Doctrine

country or ally which is threatened bears the primary burden, particularly for providing manpower, bu~ when U.S. interests or obligations are at stake we must be prepared to provide help as appropriate. I believe many critics who argue that the path we have chosen is nothing more than the previous road with less capabilities miss the main point. That main point is that, over time, we should no longer need the past level of capa­ bilities, provided that we can move forward with programs such as security assistance and burden-sharing that put teeth into an effective partnership-a partnership that fos­ ters, rather than inhibits negotiations. Treaties and commitments are a two-way street. We can replace some of the unilateral guarantees-which we have supported in the past primarily with our own forces-by effective multilateral capabilities. Hopefully, conditions will develop that permit a greater sense of regional respon­ sibility toward the resolution of local problems, with resort to a call upon the United States for assistance reserved to a time when it is evident that a regional response alone is inadequate. There is another point which is frequently overlooked, a point much more relevant to the basic principles of the President's strategy for peace. That is the basic change in our approach to principal potential adversaries, the change to a path of meaningful negotiations, not just rhetoric. As I have said many times, we seek such negotiations, negotia­ tions made possible by effective strength and partnership. This is also a difficult and time consuming path to follow, hut one that offers the greatest hope for reducing the de­ fense burden on all nations. Successful pursuit of these objectives cannot be accom­ plished overnight, nor is negotiation a one-sided, all-give­ and-no-take proposition. I will discuss these points further later on. Our first priority in national preparedness must continue to be strategic nuclear arms. While we have reached a

10 Melvin R. Laird significant and historic milestone with the agreements stem­ ming from SALT I, we have just begun the long and dif­ ficult path of nuclear arms negotiation. These agreements permit us to maintain the viability of current deterrent forces, and put effective quantitative limits on strategic nuclear forces. But to continue down this path, and to main­ tain our security, we must pursue those programs that will maintain an effective deterrent. We should not forget that the present accord on offensive weapons is a temporary limitation only. Actual reductions in weapons can come later, after more patient negotiation conducted from a position of adequate strength. Within the realm of nuclear arms are theater-based sys­ tems that also require our attention. While such systems are not yet covered by SALT, the United States and the Soviet Union have exercised caution in deployments and doctrines that might unduly frighten any nation into countermeasures. Nevertheless, these weapons have a powerful deterrent ef­ fect against potential adversaries who might prey on the relative weakness of our allies. For two major areas of concern, Europe and East Asia, we also maintain effective conventional forces in partner­ ship with our allies, with special emphasis on our NATO commitments. Unilateral, precipitate withdrawal of sizeable American forces would be disastrous in the midst of prom­ ising developments on mutual and balanced force reduc­ tions, to say nothing of the havoc such unwise and hasty action would play with current NATO strategies and with various moves now being taken by European states-most notably West Germany-toward normalization of relations with Eastern Europe. But the potentialities for a more meaningful partnership with our allies do exist, and will enable over time a restructuring of our defense burdens. Especially in the case of dealing with local and regional conflicts, where major treaty partners may not be involved -this applies in particular to areas outside Western Eu­ rope-are there prospects for improved regional cooperation

11 The Nixon Doctrine and for better programs of military assistance. If supported by the nations involved and properly encouraged by the United States, these prospects will tend toward moving American military presence in these areas from a direct to an indirect one. In some regions this process of shifting from direct to indirect means for defending American and allied interests (quite a different process, incidentally, from complete withdrawal) will take more time than in other regions. But over time the shift can be made. The strategy of realistic deterrence is specifically designed toward this end. Time is a major factor for success in this area. No better example of that fact confronts us than in Vietnam and the rest of Indochina, where we have been, in a very real sense, buying time. There was a need to afford the South Viet­ namese a realistic amount of time to develop their own capable self-defense force. Vietnamization provides three phases of timed development for the South Vietnamese forces. This program has enabled them, or soon will enable them, to replace our support effort. This has already taken place on the ground; the next steps will be in the air and in logistics. They do need time to complete their work. Our present air and naval assistance is designed for this pur­ pose. Then, with their own ground and air capabilities de­ veloped-and they are now well on their way to this shared goal-the South Vietnamese can defend themselves against their relentless enemy. Of course, the success of Vietnamization cannot be mea­ sured fully or fairly until its process has bee'l completed. Meanwhile, its partial completion already has yielded sub­ stantial dividends. Of first importance is that 90 percent of our troops have returned home, and our support costs have been cut to one-third of past levels. Although the South Vietnamese forces at An Loc, Hue and Kontum are to some degree supported by our air and naval power, the South Vietnamese ground forces are holding in and around these besieged cities. And, their own air force is performing ad-

12 Melvin R. Laird mirably. One should remember that three years ago there was virtually no significant South Vietnamese capability to resist Hanoi's best troops. Today they are effectively re­ sisting. There is no question but that improvement in South Vietnam's combat proficiency has been striking. From the standpoint of American defense policy, a real tragedy of Vietnam is that Vietnamization was not started much earlier than 1969, through a policy of deliberately training and equipping the South Vietnamese forces to fight effectively against North Vietnam as well as to cope with internal security problems caused by Vietcong activity. Such opportunities existed throughout the 1960s (and not just in Vietnam). Apparently the opportunities were set aside in favor of decisions to introduce substantial Ameri­ can involvements in all phases of the war. The consequences of such earlier decisions have caused a twofold problem for us in 1972, both aspects of which require the drastic mea­ sures we have recently taken north of the DMZ. On the one hand, we must still buy time for the South Vietnamese forces to develop. On the other, we must continue to protect our own withdrawal. Of course, the war in Vietnam could end tomorrow if the other side chose to negotiate seriously and to accept Presi­ dent Nixon's generous peace offer. Lacking success in our negotiations on Vietnam, our emphasis is on bringing that conflict to an end, through making the South Vietnamese and other nations who support them strong enough to cope with aggression from the North. The Vietnamese are willing to bear this burden. We must not tum away in frustration from those dedicated and wounded people. Neither can we ignore the flagrant aggression, supported with modern and sophisticated weapons by the Soviet Union, in our pursuit of meaningful peace. In the fullest sense, the decisions relative to Vietnam reflect what we are now trying to do in implementing the Nixon Doctrine under our national security strategy of real­ istic deterrence. While seeking to preserve our own defense

13 The Nixon Doctrine capabilities, including those necessary to our primary nu­ clear responsibility and our shared major conventional re­ sponsibility for coping with conflict involving the major powers, we also seek the development of individual or re­ gional capabilities to deter or cope with other conflict. Vietnam is but one lesson in patience regarding national defense policy. Perhaps another such lesson may have greater importance over the long run. That is the serious danger of making drastic, unilateral reductions in defense budgets below levels that provide effective security for both ourselves and our friends and allies. No one believes more strongly than I that we must examine scrupulously the trade-offs between domestic and national security pro­ grams. No one has worked harder for this, and we have made cuts. And no one recognizes better than I that we have not yet learned how to do all our homework. But part of this homework will have to extend beyond a study of how we are going to spend all the defense cuts some are proposing. First, "defense cuts" will not be automatically converted into "domestic appropriations" if the President but gives the signal. As a long-time participant in the congressional appropriations process, I am convinced there is no such thing as an automatic authorization or appropriation in the Congress. Each program has to pass muster before 535 skeptical men and women. Second, there is the question of whether the success of any federal program, domestic or national security, hinges simply on the amount of money appropriated for it. I would be willing to answer this negatively for the Department of Defense budget, providing it was not taken as blanket endorsement of the opposite and incorrect position that there is absolutely no correspondence between quantity and quality. Hopefully, those who see large dividends accruing to domestic programs from cuts in the defense sector will also look at what else besides money is necessary for effec­ tive policies.

14 Melvin R. Laird

Last but not least, patience is required in negotiations with opposites like the Russians. They are always hard bargainers; we should be too. This does not mean that we should reinforce each other's suspicions by bellicose behav­ ior. Nevertheless, as we move from confrontation to nego­ tiation, we must maintain a high level of military strength, commensurate with our security objectives, reducing this strength through negotiations, not euphoric unilateral ac­ tions. And I would emphasize that our strength must be related to objectives, and not just to numerical comparisons of forces. Reciprocity, rather than the desire to please others with no compensation in return, makes for sound international policy. Americans tend to personalize everything from pres­ idential candidates to relations with the Soviet Union. In personal private relations, unilateral gestures of affection are healthy. But in public relations between great nations, the unilateral gesture of friendship must be used with great care. The more normal spirit of international affairs is set by bargaining, where advantages are reciprocal, and where every nation's interests are protected. To summarize, patience and prudence are virtues not to be ignored in our understandable desire to end the war in Vietnam and move forward on our many problems at home. Vietnamization is a prudent policy and so is a gradual tapering off of the proportion of defense spending within the total federal budget. On the last point, since 1969 the defense budget has decreased relative to the total federal budget at what I consider to be an acceptable rate. A sharper decline-or even a precipitous plunge-in defense spending may be attractive to some Americans, but the results would be at once dangerous and disillusioning; dan­ gerous because coming to grips with our defense priorities after Vietnam and SALT I should take time-we must not repeat the mistakes of past boom-or-bust defense policies; disillusioning because the transfer of appropriations from de­ fense to domestic programs is never automatic in any sense.

15 The Nixon Doctrine

There is another lesson to learn from our experience in Vietnam, a lesson that we have sought to reflect in imple­ menting the Nixon Doctrine. That is the concept of useful power as it applies to our defense planning. We all can remember the arguments prevalent just a short while ago regarding the carefully calculated strength of U.S. military forces. But lacking from this equation was a paramount consideration: the purpose these forces served as instru­ ments of national policy, in terms of our objectives on the international scene. I submit that the Nixon Doctrine and the structure that we have derived from it provides those answers where they were not available before.

II. Practical Results of the Nixon Doctrine

As I noted earlier, President Nixon has said of his new doctrine that it seeks to reflect certain realities: a major American role remains indispensable, other nations can and should assume greater responsibilities, a changing strategic relationship requires new doctrines, and emerging poly­ centrism in the communist world presents different chal­ lenges and new opportunities. In light of these four realities, let us examine the results to date of a national security policy that attempts to guide American interests within the requirements implicit in.these realities.

A Major American Role. In January 1969 the United States appeared bogged down in the war in Vietnam to such an extent that our government appeared able to han­ dle little else. Public opinion was likewise obsessed with the issue. The fact that over 500,000 American troops were in Vietnam, with no plans in the offing to withdraw them, made this pre-occupation quite understandable. In addi­ tion, the war had led to President Johnson's decision not to seek a second full term as chief executive. The conse­ quences of Vietnam were preventing the United States from

16 Melvin R. Laird assuming a major role in world affairs elsewhere so as to protect its overall national interests. Our efforts over the past several years have led us away from this obsession, and toward a more responsible and carefully considered policy. While the change may not have been as dramatic as some would like, Vietnam has been to a considerable extent de-emphasized as American ground forces have been withdrawn. Not even the events in Indo­ china of the last few months, momentous as they are, can detract now from a more comprehensive American search for peace, a search very much broadened since early 1969. After a careful reassessment of American policy in major areas of foreign affairs, new efforts were launched during 1969 and 1970 to bring peace to the Middle East, to move the Berlin question toward a satisfactory settlement, to formulate American positions for SALT, and to move other unfinished negotiations towards completion. In 1971 these efforts continued, but with a renewed emphasis on improv­ ing relations between the United States and the U.S.S.R. as well as between the United States and the People's Republic of China. In the areas of Berlin, SALT, bilateral relations with China and Russia, as well as in various other negotiations, 1972 has proved a vintage year for American world leadership toward peace. Of the major American initiatives inaugurated early in President Nixon's administration, the Middle East remains an outstanding issue. But one should not neglect to note that warfare was escalating in the Middle East when an American-sponsored cease-fire was accepted by the com­ batants in August 1970, and this cease-fire has been main­ tained ever since. In fact, the change in the situation in the Middle East during mid-1970 was so dramatic a shift from vicious war to uneasy truce that I consider that the policies pursued by the American government in this region at that time may prove a model for our world leadership in the coming years. This effort combined principle and practice brilliantly and may well be seen by future historians as

17 The Nixon Doctrine among the most important contributions toward world peace in President Nixon's first term. (May I say here that those whose defense budgets would slash the U.S. Navy and cause reduction or removal of the Sixth Fleet from the Mediterranean would serve poorly the cause of stability in the Middle East.)

Other Nations Should Assume Greater Respon­ sibilities. From my extensive personal experience with Vietnam, Korea and NATO since January 1969, I can at­ test to a dramatic shift in our defense policy regarding these major areas of concern. As I noted earlier, our new strategy of realistic deterrence has for its most unique emphasis, I believe, the accent we have placed on mutual defense responsibilities between the United States and its allies. We seek not wards but allies, nations which are able and enthusiastic practitioners of their own self-defense, so that what aid we do give them will be supplementary, not primary. In Vietnam we have moved far under our Vietnamization program. Earlier I pointed out that we still have some distance to go so that we can truly say that in the air, on the ground, and in the area of supply, the South Viet­ namese forces are fully capable of their own self-defense without much outside support. But I also noted that we started very late on this enterprise, only in January 1969, and we have come a long way since then. With the South Koreans we have negotiated long and hard to make sure that in withdrawing some of our forces we shall continue to provide the necessary military assis­ tance to supplement their own strong defense establishment. In NATO councils I have been arguing strenuously for more effective methods for burden-sharing, with very posi­ tive results. For NATO, of course, the military threat from the Soviet Union and its East European allies remains strong, so that we must have a well-integrated strategy in response~ Withdrawing forces from NATO, therefore,

18 Melvin R. Laird

should not be unilateral, but through mutual and balanced force reductions.

New Strategic Doctrines. In the field of strategic nuclear arms we have worked since January 1969 to main­ tain a potent and sufficient deterrent capability in relation to the U.S.S.R. in the face of astonishing Soviet advances in nuclear arms. At the same time, we have worked to stabi­ lize strategic forces on both sides. Perhaps there is no area of national security interest that has more carefully com­ bined the negotiations and strength aspects of the Nixon Doctrine than has SALT. A good deal of talk has developed about the supposed threat of new Russian nuclear arms to the strategic balance, a threat that could put the United States in an inferior position thereby imperiling both military and political suf­ ficiency. Of course, we must always work to prevent this from happening. The policy of "strategic sufficiency" de­ veloped by this administration does just this. We should not be misled by simple numerical comparisons between this or that area of strategic weaponry. Without discount­ ing the importance of these comparisons, one should note that nuclear forces are "sized" by the United States in terms of our overall plans and capabilities regarding other nuclear powers. We do not build formidable strategic wea­ pons simply for the purpose of making the balance sheet look favorable; effective deterrence is not gained by this type of numbers game. Instead we carefully proceed with strategic weapons development for the military tasks at hand, tasks which are geared to deterrence. The ABM treaty and interim agreement to limit offensive weapons that have been produced in SALT I and are now before the Congress should be viewed as politically and militarily important for both limiting strength and main­ taining strength. The SALT I agreements can pay a hand­ some security dividend to the United States. Given the pace of Russian missile and submarine development, an

19 The Nixon Doctrine uncontrolled situation might well have led, as I have made clear in my last two annual defense reports to Congress, to a situation where the United States would be poorly protected indeed. The critics of these agreements who argue that by so entering into them the United States has put itself in a position of inferiority (actual or potential) miss the important point that by not having reached this nego­ tiated limitation, the United States would have surely faced major defense problems in the near future. The hazards of not proceeding with defensive and offensive limitations on strategic arms would be much worse than proceeding with these limitations, limitations carefully arrived at with the mutual defense interests of both powers taken into account. At the same time, it should be observed in all candor that the results of SALT I do not justify the kind of euphoria we are already encountering. It is true that the SALT agreements represent a "small step" that could lead forward to a "giant leap" for mankind. But these agree­ ments are a beginning, not a culmination. Consequently, when I read of the large cost savings some defense ana­ lysts are already counting-in ABM, Trident, defense against bombers, and so forth-I am concerned. SALT is a central element in our common exploration for peace, but until the results of this exploration become a bit clearer we must continue, prudently and unprovocatively, the effective programs necessary to preserve our deterrent. What pro­ grams we do reduce in the wake of SALT I, if any, will be handled in the same careful way we have conducted and will continue to conduct the SALT negotiations.

Polycentrism. The Sino-Soviet rift, our greatest evi­ dence of emerging polycentrism, has been under our noses for some years now. But the time for recognizing this and moving to improved relations with both of these nations was not ripe until the last year or two. Both China and Russia probably feel more self-confident, more willing to go their own ways as full participants within the avenues

20 Melvin R. Laird of correct international behavior. China has signalled a new independence in world affairs, particularly in modifying its militant animosity toward the United States. We do not feel, however, that the world has changed so drastically that we can dispense with a defense policy regarding these two nations. On the other hand, our relations with these two nations will continue to change in such a way that we can talk more frankly with them about our mutual prob­ lems and interests. The President has made this clear in his idea that the United States must talk more with others, in a genuine spirit of dialogue. He brought this dialogue to public atten­ tion as early as his inaugural address, and it has been made central to the Nixon Doctrine. Nowhere is there better evi­ dence of our desire to move from force to mutuality than in the summit meetings we have held with the Chinese and Russians on their own soil. The President has seen this dialogue as the acme of a peaceful world. Genuine peace is more than the mere absence of war, it is the cultivation of mutual persuasion. Growing polycentrism in the com­ munist world has provided enough loosening of ideological rigidities-though not an abandonment of them-to allow for real issues to be discussed seriously in an environment relatively free of ideological obstructionism. As President Nixon observed in his June 1 report to Congress on the Moscow summit meetings, his experience of working with the Russians in business-like sessions covering our many differences was a totally new one for American leaders in the postwar world. Previously, summits occurred within the context of both euphoria and conflict, with high hopes quickly dashed by the seemingly intractable problems of the cold war. While ideology remains a central difference between ourselves and the communist powers, a realism has now been introduced into our discussions. This realism stems, in part, from reexamination of rigid ideology in the communist world, a reexamination that has been partly responsible for the emerging polycentrism we now see.

21 The Nixon Doctrine

But perhaps the most important change with regard to America's role in the world is increased awareness that this role has many facets, each interrelated, and that in the past perspective of defense planning, we had tended to forget these other vital elements of national security. We had become obsessed with America's military capabilities, however used, as an entity unto themselves, rather than as an essential but not sufficient element in a broader ap­ proach to world problems. This is one reason that I believe implementing the strat­ egy of realistic deterrence may be the most complex task this nation has ever faced. The calculus of military plan­ ning is difficult at best, but when combined with the many other factors and realities that enter into our overall na­ tional security, the problems presented are almost un­ bounded. In the Department of Defense, we have sought to come to grips with some of these problems through new processes and procedures. The concept of net assessment, that is, comparing the capabilities (all of them) for what we want to do with the obstacles (B:gain, all of them) that prevent us from achieving these objectives, is one new approach. Similarly, total force planning, by which we seek to consider all available military and nonmilitary resources, not just those of one service or one nation, is another. Many of the problems that arise in these areas do not lend themselves to precise calculation, but they are just as much a part of the decision-making process as the analysis of military forces which receives so much attention. In the Department of Defense, we have carefully and methodically moved forward to implement the planning guidelines that we have established, developing and using the processes that I have just mentioned. As you know, the process of developing and shaping a defense budget is complex, and implementing new processes and developing new perspectives takes time internally just as time is re­ quired to bring about effective changes in our external relationships with other nations.

22 Melvin R. Laird

III. Conclusion

I believe the great promise of the Nixon Doctrine lies in the future. It provides us with a practical framework for the pursuit of high principles. It does not provide us all the answers, answers which must be sought patiently and realistically in our interaction with other members of the complex international world that exists today. We must use the opportunities we have to seek these answers, not by turning away from the problems because they are difficult, but by understanding the principles and adapting to the realities to move forward on the path toward peace. For me, the Nixon Doctrine truly represents a turning away from past discouragement and toward future hope. We have taken the first steps toward setting a new path, both domestically and in our international relationships. That path is a long one, one that cannot be completed by anyone now in office. But the way has been set. Only the will of the American people and the wisdom and for­ titude of their leaders in the years to come can realize the promise of our new course.

23

Part 2

Commentaries

25

Gale W. McGee

The Nixon Doctrine is a significant development in United States foreign policy. To understand its role amid the perspectives of the nuclear age, it is necessary for one to understand what the Second World War did to the position of the U.S. in the world community. The United States is a country which prospered for 150 years by either avoiding a European system founded on power equilibrium or by exploiting the strife of the con­ tinent. As a result, in the closing years of the 19th century, America remained only a minor participant on the stage of European affairs. However, World War II was the obvious turning point in the direction of American foreign policy. As a conse­ quence of the outcome of this devastating conflict, the United States found itself strangely on the front lines of the world, no longer able to hide behind the protective balance of Europe or the facade of isolationism. Through­ out our history we had enjoyed the luxury of choosing one of the two sides whenever conflict threatened the balance of power structure in Europe. But that option disappeared in 1945. For the first time in our national life we emerged as one of the two sides. It was a foregone conclusion that the balance of power would have to be reestablished as soon as possible in the wake of World War II. What was far less certain, however, was whether the United States as the new leader of the Western world would be able to rise to those requirements. The war had destroyed three great powers, each of which in turn left a vast political vacuum in its wake. In addition, two of the victorious nations, England and France,' were left so weakened by the conflict that they could no longer continue their historic role as significant factors in the

27 Commentaries balance of power. Perhaps never in history had so much violence been done to the infrastructure of world stability. In the East as well as the West, very few vestiges of the past were left intact. It was into this chaotic setting that history thrust the United States. Never in modern times had one nation emerged from a world war with such great power and such frightening responsibility for the wise use of that power as did the United States. And as history long since should have taught, unless and until the world is brought back into balance following war, few, if any, meaningful strides could be taken toward an improved world community. In a period when Soivet military capabilities remained comparatively modest, its stridently aggressive rhetoric created little fear. But when the Soviet Union emerged from World War II with the largest armed forces in Europe, its aggressive pronouncements seemed ominous in­ deed. Russia's historic pressures toward expansion and the recent history of the spread of the Soviet Union into terri­ tories of Finland, Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania, Prussia, Poland, Czechoslovakia and Romania did not suggest that expansion would be limited to words alone. It was within this context that the Berlin blockade be­ came the first threat to the postwar stability of Europe. In an effort to restore equilibrium to a Western Europe con­ fronted by a powerful Soviet Union, the United States broke with its historic isolation from Europe's balance of power in peace-time to join in a common defense alliance. The Berlin blockade is often referred to by historians of the period as the ultimate test of American intentions, the test that met with great success. It is important that we continue to view Russia in the context of her historical experience. Whether ruled by the czars or commissars, she has been an expansionist nation. Her expansionist policies have been blunted only where she has been challenged. As a result of her ominous military capabilities after

28 Gale W. McGee

World War II, Russia's expansionist tendencies became more aggressive in nature. Yet, the United States stepped into the breach as a major component of the balance of power system which evolved after the Second World War. Western Europe stands today as the prime example of how the balance of power has contributed to stability in this area of the world. NATO and the American nuclear um­ brella have served to check Soviet pressures from the east. As a result, Europe has enjoyed unparalleled stability, eco­ nomic growth and prosperity. The NATO alliance's deter­ mination, coupled with the military capabilities to back up that determination, has resulted in a successful deterrence. As a consequence, we have witnessed an easing of tensions between East and West in Europe. But the world is round. In the Far East, events have been slower in shaping the lines of power or of defining the boundaries of balance. Large uncertainties still prevail. Both the Korean and Vietnam wars were waged amid these uncertainties. It is essential, therefore, that we keep upper­ most in our minds that a balance of forces and capabilities in Asia must someday be achieved. Such a balance may in fact be closer now than at any time since the surrender of Japan in 1945. A balance of power in Asia is now as critical to the chances for world stability as that in Europe. In fact, these political and power equilibriums are inextricably interwoven. Therefore, we in the United States must not harbor the delusion that the recent summit diplomacy with China and the Soviet Union suddenly relegates the balance of power concept to the dim, dark past. The direct opposite is true. While the recent SALT agreements have put a limitation on the nuclear capabilities of the U.S. and the U.S.S.R., and may be evidence that both super powers are committed to preventing a nuclear confrontation, we are still faced with the real world in which policies thought by some critics to be outmoded are not only still pursued, but are also still effective. Witness the new presence of the Soviet Union in

29 Commentaries the eastern Mediterranean, the Red Sea, the Indian Ocean and the China Seas-all ushered in with old-fashioned naval power!

The Nixon Doctrine-New Demands, Old Problems

In assessing the Nixon Doctrine, it is important that we keep in mind the realities of the world today. It still remains that lawless community of nations in which the only ac­ ceptable alternative to war yet devised by civilized man is the balance of power. Today, the communist world no longer marches in ca­ dence with a unity of awesome proportions. At the same time, the Western world is no longer riveted together by a fear of a common enemy, monolithic communism. As the unity of the communist world has become fragmented, so has western unity become eroded by the easing of East­ West relations. The new power-political forces at loose in the world to­ day demand an updated assessment of the responsibilities of the powerful nations toward each other and in relation to the fragmented numbers of the other 130 or so independ­ ent governments of the world, some old, many new. As a step toward making this essential adjustment, the Nixon Doctrine was conceived. Even as the Nixon Doctrine emphasizes negotiation, however, it relies on both power and partnership in the conduct of our foreign policy. NATO, the SALT talks and the recent summitry in Peking and Moscow may not have been possible (not to mention successful) without our pos­ ture of strength. Yet the doctrine only represents a transition into a mod­ ernized assessment of the balance of power system. It serves as a bridge between the old balance of power and a new equilibrium among the powers. The doctrine at best may

30 Gale W. McGee win a little more time in an attempt to adjust ourselves to the new requirements of a new balance system. In effect, it holds the line only temporarily, and is confronted with nu­ merous limitations, many of a potentially hazardous nature. At this moment, the Nixon Doctrine hangs precariously by a thin thread of summitry and of the skillful, tactical brilliance of one-man diplomacy. But this alone cannot offer insurance as a formula for the future. The challenges to the doctrine (and herein lie its limitations) are for the most part reflected in the new face of America and the new body of public opinion in this country. This factor alone could more than strain that single thread which supports our current posture. At this point, it is necessary to explore six challenges confronting the doctrine: 1. The American mood is no longer one of accepting this doctrine or any other doctrine as a solution to all problems in foreign affairs. The explanation for our success in foreign affairs for nearly 25 years was the remarkable consensus which united the citizens of our country in support of our foreign policy endeavors, a consensus of public opinion that was motivated by a fear of world communism. This consen­ sus began to come apart-unraveled as it were-amid the shocks and disillusionments of Vietnam. Now there appears to be nothing in sight to put the pieces back together. 2. The domestic condition is further weakened, and the problem compounded, by the steady decline of the tradi­ tional elite as the foreign policy formulators of the United States. Long an historic factor in the operations of a balance of power system, a leadership elite among the major powers made it much simpler for nations to adjust to the shifting power-political forces of the world. 3. Another domestic threat to the doctrine is the rapidly rising hostility toward the executive power of the President. Again, this is a result of the backwash of Vietnam. Yet, at this very moment, with the kind of diplomacy being exer­ cised by the President in the context of the requirements of

31 Commentaries balance, more and more executive authority may be re­ quired rather than less. At the moment, however, the anti­ thesis of this seems to be popular with the man in the street. 4. The electronic media, and all of its ramifications, has presented a unique challenge to the successful implementa­ tion of foreign policy. The electronic media have made it impossible to isolate foreign policy in international events. What was once confined to the province of the elite and the policy makers has now suddenly become everybody's busi­ ness. It may well be impossible to get foreign policy making back into some kind of manageable proportion. S. To further compound the problem, we must now have serious misgivings as to whether the American people, with their concept of "freedoms" and their right to know-free­ dom of information-can rise again to the responsibilities of world power. 6. And finally, the Nixon Doctrine is also vulnerable in that it so far has capitalized on the resurgent spirit of iso­ lationism with its appeal for requiring other nations to share the burdens of their security. Many Americans are supporting the doctrine because they see in it an American withdrawal from the world. It means a lowering of the American profile in many areas and even a complete with­ drawal from others. While isolationism is not the goal of the President's policies by any means, the consequence could be that it will accentuate demands of many of the old isola­ tionists for a new "Fortress America" as our only remaining bastion of security. It satisfies a resurgent isolationism which may be impossible to hold in check. The United States is confronted with the current power­ political demands of a world which exists in a still danger­ ous bipolar nuclear age. The current status of this bipolar relationship is the mutually acknowledged balance of terror. This was recog­ nized in the SALT agreements when the limitation was placed on the nuclear capabilities of the U.S.S.R. and the U.S.A. All the SALT agreement means is that the key fac-

32 Gale W. McGee tor in this bipolar balance of power structure, i.e., nuclear capability, has been frozen. But in freezing this factor, there remain the obvious capabilities of outflanking the old con­ frontations of power with innovative recourse to the tactics of the "old politics" of the pre-World War I era, naval power. That this "relic of the past" might still be relevant in the nuclear age is attested to by the new Soviet presence in key parts of the globe referred to above. The international situation is further complicated by the economic and political resurgence of nations left in the wreckage of World War II, in particular, the new Germany and the new Japan. (A meaningful role for the new China would seem to be further down the road.) What does all of this say, then, about the thesis of those critics who argue that the balance of power concept is dead? It says that we must distinguish between the relevance of a balance of forces thesis in a world of sovereign nations on the one hand, and a set of changing conditions within the United States which would seem to make its pursuit diffi­ cult, if not impossible, on the other hand. Therefore, the problem for the United States is less Soviet policy than it is the disarray of affairs within our own country. It is less changes in the balance of power system which threaten us than it is the changed capabilities of the great powers. We have already noted that inside the United States sub­ stantive, even shattering, domestic changes have already occurred, including a decline of consensus, the demise of our foreign policy elite, challenges to the executive power of the President, and the impact of electronic media on the citizens' impressions of foreign affairs. On the other hand, in the Soviet Union, change has been less substantive. For the most part, the Kremlin remains about as capable in pursuing the politics of power in the world as it was 2S years ago. And because the gap of capa­ bilities in this respect has actually widened between Wash­ ington and Moscow, the Russians can be said to be in a steadily strengthening posture.

33 Commentaries

The Soviet Union remains a monolithic state which can successfully pursue the balance of power system in less fear of a hostile public opinion. The Soviet government controls its media, it has a monopoly on opinion, and it can proceed in the decision-making processes by an elite; and its prob­ lems of fragmented and doubting public opinion remain much less acute than those facing the Americans. It is a tragedy that the dirtiest phrase in the vernacular of the world politics today is "balance of power." We have relegated that phrase into limbo in this country instead of recognizing it for what it is: perhaps the only real alterna­ tive that this imperfect world still has for heading off future wars. Short of a world under law, political and military equilibrium among the powers would seem to offer us our best starting point for resolving the tensions of international politics. Therefore, it is imperative that the balance of power be viewed in its larger setting, as a response to the broadest set of changing conditions in the real world. If it is to have meaning, it must be addressed to the real world around us. The dimensions and requirements of the balance today are not the same as in 1945, or even 1965. There must be a recognition of change and an understanding of the conse­ quences of this change if our policies are to remain relevant. I reject the thesis that the balance of power concept is dead. The concept is still operable, and will continue to be until the nations of the world work out a higher system in its place. To ignore this reality is in effect to say that we would willingly forfeit our role in the world and take the chances of somebody else assuming this role for us. Therefore, unless we follow the Nixon Doctrine with a new approach to these realities as they have intruded into our national psyche, we are going to wind up playing sec­ ond fiddle in the future course of international affairs. This prospect could well leave our basic international interests to the tender mercies of others.

34 Gale W. McGee

Beyond the Nixon Doctrine

The United States must formulate a long-range policy which addresses itself to the new requirements of responsibility as a world power. We have to face up to the current power­ political demands of a world which exists in a still danger­ ous bipolar nuclear age. Vast changes in the world and even greater changes on the domestic scene require that our nation meet the de­ mands of change with at least a modernizing of the foreign policy mechanism of our representative democracy. Before it is too late we owe it to ourselves to undertake a searching appraisal of our foreign policy system and its mechanisms in light of the needs of the last quarter of the 20th century. The Nixon Doctrine does not do that. At best it only wins us a little more time for coming to grips with our foreign policy plight. Therefore, I would propose a three-point program to facilitate this process: 1. A top-priority citizens' commission to be appointed by the President and to be composed of the best minds and the most experienced technicians in the realm. Such a commission should reexamine our entire consti­ tutional processes as they relate to foreign policy formula­ tion and implementation. This means calling into question our own cliches about the founding fathers and directly challenging our own comfortable and customary generali­ zations that have become a part of our traditions. Let the commission dare to propose what, in its judgment, the secu­ rity of our national interest demands of us institutionally as well as personally. It could well be that this commission would determine that the present decision-making mechanisms in our Con­ stitution are most satisfactory in meeting the needs of our times. But again, it might throw out a great deal. At most it could restructure or modernize the policy mechanism.

35 Commentaries

At the very least, it could affirm the adequacy of what we now have. This proposal should not be unpalatable to any of us. We have continually, through amendments and through court decisions interpreting the Constitution, updated this docu­ ment to meet our domestic needs and problems. Yet, very little has been done to update the Constitution as it relates to the problems of making and implementing foreign policy. 2. As a stopgap measure, we should create a national security committee made up of the most prestigious per­ sonnel from each chamber of the United States Congress. It would be the responsibility of this committee to remain in residence in the nation's capital as a small group avail­ able at all times to consult with the chief executive on secu­ rity matters. This would help to bridge the gap which pres­ ently exists between the executive and legislative branches of government, a gap in an age when international events sometimes move too fast to await assembling of quorums or the convening of committees. 3. In addition to the national citizens' commission and the congressional national security committee, I would rec­ ommend the mobilizing of a mass informational and edu­ cational program to stimulate dialogue, public debate, and so forth, at all levels. There is a definite need for a concentrated educational campaign to familiarize and alert public opinion to the requirements of our national responsibility in the exercise of world power, and to enable them better to know what must be expected of their elected representatives. The people ought to demand less in the way of flamboyance and what­ ever we call the political things we do because we think the constituency likes it. Hopefully, it could lead to a rising public demand for statesmanship in the performance of their elected representatives. While these limited suggestions are not put forward as the solution to the problems of foreign policy, they are sug­ gestive of the urgent need to begin the processes of a sub-

36 Gale W. McGee stantive reexamination. To do less than these three things would be to risk our own national destiny to the decisions of others. Indeed, the times ahead of us may demand that we do much more.

37

Robert P. Griffin

I'm pleased to participate in this review of the Nixon Doc­ trine with Secretary Laird which provides us with a timely opportunity to put into perspective recent developments of significance for the entire world. The breaking of the seige of An Loc, the apparent sapping of the strength of North Vietnam's new aggression, Pod­ gorny's visit to Hanoi, Kissinger's return to Peking, the SALT I agreement, the signing of the Berlin accords and the West German treaties with the Soviet Union and Poland, the preservation of the cease-fire in the Middle East, Secre­ tary Connally's renewal of the dialogue with the world's bankers and money changers, all these fit conveniently into something of a grand design. As Secretary Laird has indicated, there is an orderly plan for harnessing our economic strength in partnership with the strength of our allies-for harmonizing our foreign policies and our defense strategies and-in the service of realistic peace building. This effort is producing significant progress. This is an occasion for renewing our confidence in the course we have taken. But, as Secretary Laird has warned, it is no occasion for complacency. We must guard against not only our own euphoria but that of our allies. For it is a funda­ mental of the Nixon Doctrine that each nation must do its share. Our friends must understand, as our own people must understand, that the ball game is far from over. One piece in that grand design-about which we will be hearing more in the year ahead-may be the theater-based defense systems which Secretary Laird mentioned tonight. Western Europe is still subject to the possible threat of Soviet nuclear attack, without adequate means for its own defense or deterrence. Western Europe still relies heavily on the American strategic deterrent. SALT I has not eased

39 Commentaries that threat and, in one sense, has intensified it to the extent that it stops development of missile defense. The shape of future West European defenses will depend to a great ex­ tent on the next round of East-West negotiations on Euro­ pean security and on attempts at mutual and balanced force reduction. These negotiations will be influenced, no doubt, by the United States' application of the President's prin­ ciples for peace, two of which, partnership and strength, are embodied in the Nixon Doctrine. The Nixon Doctrine stresses developing more self-reliance among our allies, in Western Europe as elsewhere. And the mix of United States and West European participation in those defenses at all levels of conflict now becomes a topic of concern. Secretary Laird has been careful to avoid claiming too much for the Vietnamization program, the centerpiece of the Nixon Doctrine. The dimensions of the success of Viet­ namization are only now becoming apparent. New commu­ nist threats against Hue, Kontum and An Loc are being rebuffed. Vietnamization is meeting its most severe test. South Vietnamese armies have absorbed the communists' strongest thrusts and preserved enough strength to counter­ attack, a new mark of South Vietnamese maturity in battle which is very encouraging. Some say that these South Vietnamese successes are com­ pletely attributable to American air power. It is interesting that in some cases the same people who contend that our bombing in the North will have no decisive effect, concede that at the same time our bombing in the South is very effective. I believe American air support in the South should be viewed in another way. North Vietnamese forces get much of their punch from the Soviet tanks and other arms aid provided by the U.S.S.R. American air power, in par­ ticular, has been offsetting that Soviet supported advantage. Recent Moscow and Peking tolerance of United States measures to cut off outside military aid to North Vietnam may be the prelude of further reductions in our own in­ volvement in the Vietnam war.

40 Robert P. Griffin

As we move further along a course set by the Nixon Doctrine-as our allies provide more and more of the man­ power for their own defense-we can realistically expect that there will be requests from those allies for security assistance in the form of military hardware. This is part of the price-but a reasonable price-that we should be will­ ing to pay to build and maintain a structure of peace. The sustained success of the Nixon Doctrine depends on occasions like this, which help to explain to the American people the objectives and the means available for achieving that most important objective: a generation of peace throughout the world.

41

Thomas C. Schelling

There are two remarks in Secretary Laird's informative paper to which I'd like to add emphasis. The first is that in certain areas-Berlin, SALT, and bilateral relations with China and Russia-"1972 has proved a vintage year for American world leadership toward peace." The month of June may be a little early for closing the books, but I shall not begrudge the secretary a slight tone of exultancy. As­ suming that the SALT agreements are responsibly examined and overwhelmingly accepted by the Congress, this will have been, in the important areas mentioned, a spectacular six months. The other is his observation that "Americans tend to personalize everything from presidential candidates to re­ lations with the Soviet Union." I wonder whether we can detect here a slight tone of suppressed rebellion on the part of the secretary against the title of his own paper, "The Nixon Doctrine," a phrase that he did not coin. There are historic changes taking place; and some conditions, long in coming to fruition, are being consummated in this vintage year of President Nixon's administration. But to name them for an American President is at best a harmless indulgence of egocentrism in a polycentric world. More likely it ob­ structs our perception of what is going on in the world, and invites a self-deluding attempt to recapture that sense of "world mastery" that the secretary tells us America "at least once pretended to have." What do they call these his­ toric changes in other countries? The Brezhnev Doctrine? The Brandt Doctrine? The Chou En-Iai Doctrine? The secretary has properly emphasized "growing poly­ centrism in the communist world," and even a reexamina­ tion of communist ideology in the communist world, "a reexamination that has been partly responsible for the

43 Commentaries emerging polycentrism we now see." If what he sees is really there-and I tend to see what he sees-and if the vintage year that we spoke of reflects these trends, it may be im­ portant not to deceive ourselves that an American doctrine, especially a doctrine that is in its infancy on the time scale of these historic trends, has done more than participate in the final nurturing of this year's fruits on vines that have been cultivated and sometimes fought over by American Presidents and communist party chairmen, vines that had the resiliency to withstand the compounded rigidities of communist leaders and arrogancies of American leaders. Some of us-and I venture to guess that Secretary Laird is among us-had SALT in our vocabulary before the elec­ tion that gave us the President whose name is on the doc­ trine. The team that negotiated the SALT agreements was rich in experienced people who had worked, not merely on arms control but on SALT itself, under an earlier President. I congratulate President Nixon for the skill and steadfast­ ness that brought this work to a genuine milestone-SALT I, as Secretary Laird so aptly characterizes it-but I doubt whether we should rewrite history (or forget history) to make it "one of the major American initiatives inaugurated early in President Nixon's administration." The truth is that, Vietnam aside-and I can't leave Viet­ nam aside much longer-President Nixon may well deserve congratulation for participating constructively in events and institutions that he neither inaugurated nor defined for us in his "doctrine." Indeed it would be a tribute to his modesty that he didn't pretend to discover these events, and a tribute to his wisdom that he didn't think they could be brought about by a single President within the horizon of a single administration. The Truman Doctrine is dead, or at least useless. Its vision of the world, a vision that the revisionists have not made altogether implausible even at this distance, was that the world was divided into two parts, one part united under communism and the other fragmented in its freedom and

44 Thomas C. Schelling dependent on American leadership and American resources. On the ratchet principle, free-world gains, if any, were pre­ carious but losses to communism were unrecoverable. The communists were ruthless, indefatigable and, worst of all, competent, especially in appealing to the poor and the underprivileged. Most of these beliefs and expectations embedded in the Truman Doctrine have proved either wrong, exaggerated, or impermanent. The schism between China and Russia that became unmistakably visible by the summer of 1963, brought an end to the period in which the Truman Doctrine had even temporary validity. Maybe we'd be wise to eschew doctrines. Maybe we can take a lesson here even from the communists, who, according to Secretary Laird, are begin­ ning to struggle free from orthodoxy and rigid ideology, perhaps from timeless and universal principles. Let us en­ courage them to aspire to the pragmatism on which Ameri­ cans used to pride themselves, and not disillusion them too soon with the sight of an American President giving his own name to a doctrine. So much for doctrine. Let me turn now to some of the policies that appear to be contained within this new port­ folio that President Nixon has given us. The three pillars are negotiation, strength and partnership. We move from "confrontation" to "negotiation." Even as President Ken­ nedy said, we must never negotiate from fear and never fear to negotiate. The "basic change in our approach to principal potential adversaries," we are told by the secretary, is "the change to a path of meaningful negotiations, not just rhetoric." Presi­ dent Nixon was closer than I to what went on at the time, but I felt sure then, and still believe, that President Eisen­ hower sought a basic change from force to persuasion, a change to a path of meaningful negotiations. First among the "principles of the Nixon Doctrine" that Secretary Laird has given us is that the world has become too dangerous a place for the great nuclear powers to be

45 Commentaries constantly in confrontation with each other. Whatever the future differences between the Russians and ourselves-and they may well be intense, he tells us-they cannot be per­ mitted to lead us to open conflict. If Brezhnev took credit for this "new perception," I'd have to defend poor dead Khrushchev against this infringement of copyright. Eisen­ hower said all this. Are we asked to believe that the differ­ ence, now, is that President Nixon actually means it? If there is a single characteristic that most distinguishes the Nixon Doctrine from other national security principles espoused since 1945, the secretary tells us, it is the empha­ sis we now place on the role our partners must play in the common defense. May I add that, if there was a single characteristic that most distinguished the Kennedy and Johnson administrations from "other national security prin­ ciples espoused since 1945," it was the emphasis they placed on the role our partners should play in the common de­ fense. If you don't believe it, ask the Germans. The main point, we are told, is that over time we should no longer need the past level of capabilities "provided we can move forward with programs such as security assistance and burden-sharing to put teeth into an effective partner­ ship." Burden-sharing was the theme song in NATO the year the former Supreme Allied Commander, Europe, be­ came President of the United States. And we can replace, we are told, some of the unilateral guarantees by effective multilateral capabilities. Maybe, but considering how hard we have tried in the past, don't bet too much on it. Finally, in areas outside Western Europe, the secretary tells us there are "prospects for improved regional coopera­ tion and for better programs of military assistance." I wish I knew just what he had in mind. Latin America? Yes, I suppose it is possible, but the prospects may be better if we layoff the military assistance. Central Africa? I don't see it. The Mediterranean? It is possible only at the expense of NATO, but there is little danger that Greece, Libya and

46 Thomas C. Schelling the rest of them will discover a common geographical bond. The Middle East? The Indian subcontinent? Or perhaps Asia? If you stand on high ground at Vandenburg Air Force Base, where we launch our rockets out over the Pacific, and look westward, it looks like a "region" out there, stretching from Japan to the Philippines, possibly around to Burma and India. (It is a little hard to exclude China from the "region" but our eyes have had a lot of practice in exclud­ ing it.) All of those countries, excepting Australia and New Zealand of course, are united by being non-Western, non­ white, for the most part non-Christian, and all comprised within a narrow angle of vision as we strain our eyes over the Pacific. But the distances among them are enormous. For practical purposes, India is about as close to London as to Tokyo. They do not look alike to each other. Disparities in technology and income levels are about as great among the countries of Asia as between them and the rest of the world. They weren't all on the same side in World War II and some of them have been on opposite sides in more re­ cent wars. I'm afraid I just don't see a "region" that is ripe for "better programs of military assistance." So, taken all together-negotiation rather than confron­ tation, putting teeth in the alliances, sharing the burdens, forging regional associations-I find little new in the in­ sights, policies or principles that have been gathered to­ gether, or even in the language that is typically used to describe them. I wonder whether what really is new is buried under a lot of doctrinal verbiage. The world is indeed changing. With some delay our perceptions are changing. (Whether they are changing to correspond with the real world is something we cannot be sure of.) But our strategic and national security vocabulary sounds much as it used to sound, making it hard to tell whether or not policy and practice have changed. The fact that I saw President Nixon in Peking on my television set does more to persuade me that things have changed, even that President Nixon has

47 Commentaries changed things, than anything the President and his ad­ visers have managed to formulate in words. Maybe what's most interesting, and most important, is "out there," and not in our own doctrines and policies and plans. Secretary Laird tells us that the Sino-Soviet rift, our greatest evidence of emerging polycentrism, "has been under our noses for some years now." Then, curiously, he says that the time for recognizing this and moving to improved relations with both of these nations "was not ripe until the last year or two." May I juxtapose that observation with the secretary's judgment that "the real tragedy of Vietnam is that Vietnamization was not started much earlier than 1969." I believe the real tragedy of Vietnam was that the Sino-Soviet rift was not recognized before it was "under our noses," or even after the smell of acrimony between Khrushchev and Mao became unmistakable. Had it been understood that the monolith was split, had it been per­ ceived that "polycentrism" could occur even within the communist world, the United States government might never have felt obliged to contain a monolithic communist nuclear enemy at the DMZ. The Nixon Doctrine doesn't tell us-I guess it doesn't have to tell us-whether it was wise for America to raise the stakes in Vietnam in the middle 1960s to the point where all of that killing, as well as all of that dying, would appear necessary to national security and national honor. The blame is not President Nixon's, but the lesson may be for him. A great value of Secretary Laird's paper is that it re­ minds us that Vietnam is not everything. Yet he finds it necessary to warn us against euphoria. He tells us the mil­ lennium has not arrived. I wonder where the euphoria is, if there is any. Who is it that may be so thrilled with a succession of triumphs as to believe that his audience is getting giddy with success? The dying has been reduced, as far as American families are concerned, but the killing goes on in Vietnam. The prisoners aren't home, the refugees

48 Thomas C. Schelling aren't settled, much of the country looks like a hell, and even the North Vietnamese who die and suffer are people. We don't need to be told that the millennium has not ar­ rived, either abroad or at home. Something, furthermore, has gone wrong in Vietnam even, I believe, from the point of view of the administration that Secretary Laird represents. Something splendid may hap­ pen at any moment, but in the middle of June the Presi­ dent has had three-and-a-half years to make his strategy of negotiation work, and it hasn't worked yet. It is no solace to anybody that the fault is Hanoi's. The failure is Presi­ dent Nixon's. Nor were we forewarned of "the drastic mea­ sures we have recently taken north of the DMZ." These measures, and the military events that prompted them, could hardly have been scheduled in the Vietnamization program. Something wasn't working. Secretary Laird tells us that what we are doing in Viet­ nam is "buying time." I suggest he may have the transac­ tion backwards: time is what we are spending. And unless negotiation works, or we finally quit hoping it will work, we are committed to go on spending time. At its most success­ ful, "Vietnamization" may lead to a state of perpetual war. Let me propose what will be the real test of the Nixon Doctrine. The President has a good running start. He's had some practice. Those who were dragging their feet have seen that it can be done. Let him find the Southeast Asian equivalent of his new relation with Communist China. Twenty years of silent bitterness and hostility followed the Korean War. The mood was reciprocal. What will be our relation with our former enemies after this one, and what can we do now, or stop doing, that may shorten the period in which we shall be despised by the people we have been fighting against?

49

Part 3

Discussion

51

Discussion

ROBERT GORALSKI, moderator of the meeting: Secre­ tary Laird, have you any comments on the views expressed by other members of the panel? SECRETARY LAIRD: Overall, I think there is a good consensus among the panelists that the Nixon Doctrine is an important adjunct to our move towards peace in the world in this year 1972. And I believe that there is a gen­ eral understanding that partnership, strength, and the will­ ingness to negotiate, are the three important pillars of that doctrine. Professor Schelling, I think, was somewhat critical of the fact that the doctrine was not implemented earlier. In my paper I was simply trying to be kinder to past administra­ tions and to past American leadership than Professor Schelling seems to want to be this evening. There is no question that in the early part of the 1960s the principles of the Nixon Doctrine could have been applied. But they were not applied. When President Nixon took over as Presi­ dent in 1969, there were over 550,000 Americans involved in Vietnam. We were in a situation in which we had an ongoing war and casualties were running at a very high rate. The Soviet Union and China started their Vietnamization program as far as North Vietnam was concerned in 1953, and that Vietnamization program in the North has been going forward for these 20 years. The application of the Nixon Doctrine and Vietnamization to South Vietnam started in 1969 and in a period of three years this tremen­ dous progress, this tremendous change, has been made. Now, I am not critical of those past administrations. I don't care to debate the question of "why Vietnam." I have tried to change the dialogue in America to, "why Vietnami­ zation?" Vietnamization is a substitute for negotiations,

53 Discussion should negotiations fail, and it also complements the ave­ nue of negotiations and improves the prospects for a nego­ tiated settlement. But I think the doctrine established at the beginning of the 1960s was a much different doctrine than partnership, strength, and negotiation. As President Kennedy said in his inaugural address of January 20, 1961, as he moved away from the policies of the Eisenhower administration-partic­ ularly as far as Southeast Asia was concerned-"Let every nation know, whether it wishes us well or ill, that we shall pay any price, bear any burden, meet any hardship, support any friend, oppose any foe to assure the survival and the success of liberty. This much we pledge and more.') The Nixon Doctrine, starting in 1969, is an entirely dif­ ferent approach to the problems which we face with our allies, friends and adversaries throughout the world. SENATOR GRIFFIN: May I say a word or two, in re­ sponse to Professor Schelling's charge that President Nixon has been a failure in terms of negotiating a settlement of the Vietnam War? It seems to me, as a member of the legislative branch of the government, that to the extent that there has been fail­ ure perhaps some of the blame should be borne by some of the members of the body in which I serve. I say this with some reluctance, but I believe it ought to be noted. At the present time, for example, we are in a very deli­ cate situation. The military pressures, it seems to me, are bearing down on the North Vietnamese and may make them come to the negotiating table with serious intentions of reaching a settlement. President Podgorny has just re­ turned from Hanoi where it is believed that he made an effort to put a certain amount of pressure on the North Vietnamese to negotiate seriously. Dr. Kissinger is in Peking, and there are reasons to believe that perhaps the leaders of the People's Republic of China may be interested in help­ ing to bring about some kind of a settlement. But, on the other side, there are contrary pressures within

54 Discussion our own country and, unfortunately, within the legislative branch of the government. We are faced with the Mansfield amendment in the Senate, which would, if passed, unilat­ erally declare that without any negotiation we would with­ draw all of our troops from Vietnam by August 31, 1972, without regard to whether we got our prisoners of war back or without regard to whether there was a cease-fire or any­ thing else. We have a candidate for the presidency, Senator McGovern, who is going around saying, "If you elect me, we will unilaterally withdraw 90 days after I am inaugu­ rated." And so the pressures are strong on North Vietnam not to negotiate. Those pressures come unfortunately from within our own country. And it is, I think, a great tribute to Presi­ dent Nixon that he has, in spite of this, been able to bring the negotiations as far as he has at this point. I believe that with a little cooperation, a little support-from within the Senate particularly-President Nixon would have a good chance of bringing about a settlement of the war. MR. GORALSKI: Senator McGee, as a Democrat in the Senate, how do you view the critical statements that have just been made about previous administrations? SENATOR McGEE: Well, with our advantage of hind­ sight, I think it is easy for us to criticize each of those administrations. And I think we get a little reckless with history. I think we ought to remind ourselves that many of the advantages that we have around the world now stem in no small measure from the steps that were taken immediately in the wake of the Second World War, in Greece, Turkey, Iran and during the Berlin blockade. As Winston Churchill was quoted as saying at that time, "If you Americans had acted as you did in the First World War at the time of Berlin, Russia would be on the Atlantic Coast of Europe today." But as a consequence of the Marshall Plan and the part­ nership of NATO, a balance of Europe was indeed struck,

55 Discussion and it was that balance of Europe that was a basic part of other things that have happened and happened with some success. Things happened under President Eisenhower the same way. And I think Richard Nixon in 1962 was eloquently sup­ porting the President of the United States in the analysis of the problem in Southeast Asia. We are all smarter in 1972 than we were in '62. In my opinion, this kind of question doesn't lend itself to partisanship. Nor should it blot out the realities of t~e changing times. It depends upon so many other circum­ stances beyond one's personality, one's party and even one's policy. And I would submit that a President Hubert Humphrey, to hypothecate for the moment from 1968, probably would have been threatened with impeachment if he had gone to Moscow. Only a President Nixon could make such a jour­ ney because of his background in another segment of our country's philosophy. I think it makes a difference. I think it is realistic that we face up to that. I think that it is lucky that he did it. It was long overdue, as many of our panel members have said here. But I would finally inject, with Secretary Laird-I think my credentials are pretty solid with the secretary and with President Nixon-that I believe this is a desperately im­ portant moment for our country to speak with one voice. So much hangs from that delicate thread of the decisions and the successes of one-man diplomacy, be that man Henry Kissinger as the agent of the President, or President Nixon himself. And I don't think that any Democrat, any American of any stripe, should take any delight from a stumble, a misjudgment, an explosion of any sort that would mark the end of the efforts of this very skillful inter­ val in our history. And I would hope that this were kept above the level of personalities. I think our real problem is to update our system so that we can capitalize on the times and timing. I think that is

56 Discussion of the utmost importance. And if we get bogged down in our disintegration here at home, I think we will have for­ feited our best chance to influence the shape of the world to come. PROFESSOR SCHELLING: I agree with Secretary Laird that there is a great deal of consensus, and consensus means that there really isn't a Nixon Doctrine. There is an "Amer­ ican Doctrine," as Senator McGee has explained, that start­ ed with the Marshall Plan. It has progressed through several Presidents. What is new, I think, with President Nixon-Senator McGee said it-is that he can do things that Hubert Hum­ phrey could not have done. A good example is that Presi­ dent Nixon, after 20 years of supporting that regime, could abandon the national government of the Republic of China on Taiwan without the credibility of U.S. commitments in the Middle East, in Europe and elsewhere being the least bit undermined. It was a misfortune for us and the world that when the communists conquered all of Mainland China, Chiang Kai­ shek got away and kept, in effect, a hostage to which we became committed. After 20 years President Nixon finally was able to do what no earlier President, I believe, could have done, and certainly what no earlier President did, which was to say, "Despite formal and informal commit­ ments to you, we will do what you cannot abide. We will virtually recognize the communist regime in China as China and we will not carry out the threats that we have made in the past about the admission of Communist China to the United Nations." I think this is a splendid accomplishment, and it suggests that you do not always lose credibility around the world when, after a protracted period of doing everything and more that could have been expected of you, you say, "Enough is enough, we're going to turn around." I suspect that the motivation that led President Nixon to abandon Chiang Kai-shek might earlier possibly have

57 Discussion led to the abandonment of South Vietnam which, with luck, might have been part of the Nixon Doctrine now, and which would have meant rapprochement with an even larger part of Asia than the rapprochement initiated a few months ago. But I think it is very important to notice that President Nixon was able to leave Taiwan in the lurch and emerge with American honor and American credibility unsullied because of a larger appreciation that more was at stake than seven million people, half of whom were refugees from the mainland of China. I think this truly reflects a Nixon Doctrine that doesn't come out of the verbiage about part­ nership, burden-sharing and persuasion versus confronta­ tion. Nixon has done some extraordinary things. Maybe he doesn't want them highlighted as the Nixon Doctrine. But what he has done to Taiwan is what earlier Presidents never could admit they would do. And he did it. And I don't think it cost him anything. There is an extraordinary lesson in this. It suggests that the Nixon Doctrine is not hollow, and to compare the with­ drawing troops from Vietnam to burden-sharing in NATO is to draw attention away from what this President has managed to do, for which I give him real credit. MR. GORALSKI: I somehow sense you have something to say, Secretary Laird. [Laughter.] SECRETARY LAIRD: I would only say that any inter­ pretation that the application of the partnership principle of the Nixon Doctrine somehow or other set aside the four major bilateral and the four major multilateral treaty com­ mitments which have been approved under our constitu­ tional process, and which involve Taiwan, the Republic of China, is a complete misrepresentation of the application of the Nixon Doctrine and its partnership philosophy. We will go forward with the application of our partner­ ship principle in building the strength of the Republic of China and I do not look for any difficulty in getting these programs that I have presented to the Congress this year approved. I am confident that the United States Senate and

58 Discussion the House of Representatives will go forward with our aid request for the Republic of China on Taiwan. We are strengthening our partnerships, we are not moving in a direction to weaken them and, if we are going to be successful in the negotiating area, whether it be with the People's Republic of China or the Soviet Union, the strength and partnership principles take precedence over negotia­ tions until negotiations are successful. So your interpretation of our position regarding the Re­ public of China on Taiwan is a misreading of the facts, and I am sure that the Congress will support the position that we are taking. SENATOR McGEE: So far as I'm concerned, the Congress will support that position. I'm not the living, exhilarating majority of the Congress these days-[Laughter]-so I think I'm entitled to say that. But I would like to inject a note of caution about part­ nership. It wasn't invented very recently. I recall the long, long efforts at the time of the Marshall Plan, at the time of the beginning of NATO, and at the time of other eco­ nomic development programs in other countries of the world. Particularly fresh in my mind are some of those in Africa where we tried to help in areas that the French and the British had recently occupied by sharing the burden of military costs. I well remember the constant petitions, the constant pressures to get a greater participation so that it would be a genuine partnership. I even recall a phrase under Jack Kennedy concerning the partners of the alliance-I think that may be his-but the point is it was partnership. Partnership has always been our goal. The very last thing we ever wanted was somehow to have to go it alone. But the misleading thing about part­ nership is that without partners it suggests that we'll with­ draw from everything and go it alone, and that just isn't true-that is, if we're going to survive. It means that even without partners you've got to see it through. That's what comes from getting stuck at the top

59 Discussion of the heap where history has thrust us. You don't have the luxury of choice in deciding what you're going to do with partners. And I think that's one of the reasons why some of the people have rallied behind President Nixon's doctrine for wrong reasons, because it suggested to them that some­ body else was going to bear the burden and we were going to get off cheaper, we were even going to withdraw from a lot of the hot action around the world. That's only true if it all works and if the world cools off. But we're here in the world with no alternatives, no place else to go. For that reason, when the chips are down, we're stuck, unilaterally, if necessary, multilaterally, if everything works and we can persuade our friends that we need help. But we don't have the luxury of telling them, "Well, if you guys aren't going to stick by us, we're going to take our marbles and hide behind 'Fortress America.'" That's no longer a meaningful option for us. SENATOR GRIFFIN: I think generally Senator McGee and I see the situation in much the same way. I'd like to refer to some things that Professor Schelling has said about President Nixon and how much of what he has accomplished has been due to the efforts of previous Presidents. I don't think that anyone claims, least of all President Nixon, all of the credit for what he has been able to achieve in the vintage year of 1972. But I don't think we should underestimate what kind of wisdom and courage he has exhibited. A story has been making the rounds in Washington that goes like this. Brezhnev said to Nixon when they were hav­ ing their conference, "I had a dream. I dreamed that I saw the United States Capitol building and a red flag was flying over it." Nixon said to Brezhnev, "I had a dream too, and I dreamed that I saw the Kremlin and a red flag was flying over it." Brezhnev said, "And what's so unusual about that?" To which Nixon responded, "But the inscription on the flag was in Chinese." [Laughter.]

60 Discussion

President Nixon, when he was candidate Nixon, tele­ graphed very clearly his understanding of the possibilities for opening up new vistas in our relationship with China. And the fact that he could see and understand the rela­ tionship and the possibilities that it held, and that he had the courage to make the necessary steps to take advantage of the circumstances, seem to me speak very eloquently. If this were going to be a campaign speech, I would indicate how tragic it would be to change horses now. SENATOR McGEE: Could I inject a moderating note there, Bob? You know, we could go back through the pages of history and find some very stark and shocking state­ ments from almost any man in public life that you'd care to mention, and they wouldn't make him look very good in the real world today. But what it ought to tell us is that there's a great difference between running for President and being President. I think President Nixon has been through that kind of an ordeal within the ranks of many who thought they voted for him for different reasons than he's now talking about, particularly in the foreign policy field. They certainly did with Lyndon Johnson and with Jack Kennedy. I'm not sure about President Eisenhower because he came on with a different kind of symbolism at the time. But the point is that you can make any case you wish, if you select the right quotations, and you can incarcerate most anybody in any kind of an imprisoned public image you wish by selecting others. The really important thing is what a man rises to. That's why we can't judge the man only by what he says before November. It's what he's ca­ pable of rising to when that awesome burden rests on his shoulders alone that matters. And most of our recent Presi­ dents have had the great capability of rising to the demands of the office of President of the United States. PROFESSOR SCHELLING: Could I answer one point that arose earlier about Taiwan, which I think is not merely a debating point because what we're really discussing is 61 Discussion how American foreign policy affects the rest of the world. It seems to me that to discern what American policy is toward the Republic of China it isn't enough to ask mem­ bers of Congress, it isn't enough to ask members of the administration. The important thing is to ask high officials in the government of the Republic of China. They have expressed themselves publicly as having been betrayed. The fact that they can express that, and Ameri­ can credibility has not deteriorated because of it, is an extraordinary event. I understand that the Secretary of Defense cannot say that we have abandoned the Republic of China. But the government officials of the Republic of China can say it and have said it. SECRETARY LAIRD: Would you tell me who that offi­ cial is that has said that? Name his name. PROFESSOR SCHELLING: I won't name individuals. There were expressions from the United Nations with re­ spect to what their position was - SECRETARY LAIRD: I don't think you can quote any official of the Republic of China along the lines that you expressed here tonight. With all apologies to the reporting services that are represented here tonight, I just don't be­ lieve you'll find that governmental official. I like all these stories that relate to informed sources and I read them. I don't believe in informed sources. I'd like to know the name of that government official. PROFESSOR SCHELLING: No, I won't tell you the names of government officials. The fact is that all of the newspapers represented the Republic of China as being dis­ appointed, disillusioned, dismayed at what had happened to them, and at the lack of American support for their perpetuation in the United Nations. And it's clear that the United States has changed the position that it held for so many years, and that this is a withdrawal of support from the position that was held before President Nixon.

62 Discussion

SECRETARY LAIRD: I don't want to give anyone in the world today the idea that we have moved away in any way from the defense arrangements and the defense treaty which we have with the Republic of China on Taiwan. The President has made this clear, and I have made it clear in the testimony requesting military assistance and military credit for the Republic of China, and I do not be­ lieve that any responsible official in the Republic of China will make the statement that you have made today. PROFESSOR SCHELLING: With respect to defense commitments, I'm sure that no American official has sug­ gested that our defense commitments are in any way less than they ever were. The test will be in years to come­ whether the behavior of people on Taiwan suggests that there has been any withdrawal of American support from the position which we supported for 20 years. What I am trying to do is give President Nixon credit-and I see that it's embarrassing credit-[Laughter]-for having turned around, for having disappointed a regime with which we still have formally-and I agree with you absolutely dead­ ly seriously-a defense commitment that I think is not undermined by these new arrangements. But it is now a defense commitment to Taiwan rather than the recognition that this is the government of China to which we are com­ mitted. 'We have withdrawn the political, the moral, support that we gave them for 20 years. And I think it is an extraordi­ nary achievement of your administration, sir, that this has been accomplished, that the Republic of China has had to swallow it, and that nobody is voicing doubt about the credibility of American defense commitments on account of it. And it seems to me that this is, if not a heroic, at least a significant achievement of President Nixon under the Nixon Doctrine and - SECRETARY LAIRD: I agree with you completely, but I don't believe that we should allow anyone listening to this program to get the idea that there has been a lessening

63 Discussion of America's commitment to the obligation that we have assumed under our defense treaty arrangements. And I was afraid that such an impression might be gained by listening to your comments. MR. GORALSKI: We will now have questions and com­ ments from our guests. WILLIAM BEECHER, The New York Times: Secretary Laird, I would like to ask you a question about the impli­ cations of the Nixon Doctrine as it relates to our Indochina policy in the years ahead. You have pronounced Vietnamization, if not a roaring success, at least a success. My impression is that the Viet­ namization process was not designed to contend with the kind of massive tank and artillery-supported attack from the North as we have witnessed over the last several months. My question, then, is this, sir. If negotiations fail to end the war, would you assume that a massive American air-sea armada must be kept for some years in Indochina (1) to deter a repetition of the kind of invasion from the North we have recently seen, and (2) if that deterrence fails, to help throw it back? SECRETARY LAIRD: No, I do not. MR. BEECHER: Would you amplify that. SECRETARY LAIRD: Phase two of the Vietnamization program is going forward, as outlined in the Defense Re­ port, turning over to the South Vietnamese the capability in the air, artillery and logistics fields to maintain their own in-country security against the threat of the North Vietna­ mese as they maraud throughout South Vietnam, Laos and Cambodia. 'We are effectively planning a force structure which will give them the capability of meeting this threat. MR. BEECHER: As of when, sir? SECRETARY LAIRD: The program as far as the ground responsibility goes has moved much more rapidly than the air, artillery and logistics. But, even today, the South Viet-

64 Discussion namese flew over 230 sorties, air sorties. They were flying a very few sorties when the program started. As a matter of fact, there were only 200 aircraft in the South Vietnamese Air Force when Vietnamization began. Today there are well over 1,100. That program is moving along very well, and the pro­ gram of Vietnamization does give the South Vietnamese the capability of providing their own in-country security. And that is what the program is all about, to completely terminate American involvement in Indochina. Now, that does not mean that the United States will not, in the foreseeable future, have a presence in Asia as far as naval and air power are concerned. 'We will have such air and sea power present in Asia as we apply the Nixon Doc­ trine and make the best use of the resources that are avail­ able with all of the countries with whom we have defense alliances and defense arrangements. MORTON KAPLAN, University of Chicago: I would like to return to the question Professor Schelling raised and ask Secretary Laird a question. But first, as an academic, I would like to get the analogy straight. Professor Schelling spoke about abandoning Vietnam as we abandoned Taiwan. Now, the case of abandoning Viet­ nam means pulling out all military support or defense commitment. There has in fact been a major change of policy in Viet­ nam, as there was with respect to Taiwan. Vietnamization is a major change from the policies of the Kennedy-Johnson administrations. Now, Professor Schelling is recommending that we do in Vietnam what we did not do with respect to Taiwan, namely, remove our defense commitment. Immediately after the visit to China there were some in Asia and elsewhere who felt that the policy was in fact a policy of abandonment of the defense commitment, and Marshall Green was sent to Asia to respond to that. Was there not a loss of credibility until the policy was adequately explained?

65 Discussion

SECRETARY LAIRD: Well, I think that the trip of Mar­ shall Green-Assistant Secretary of State Marshall Green -was an important trip. It is always well to have the opportunity to brief one's allies and friends regarding the discussions that take place, whether they be in Moscow, whether they be in NATO, or whether they be in the Peo­ ple's Republic of China. But I do feel that there is a good comprehension of the Nixon Doctrine on the part of our Asian allies. They see Vietnamization as the first application of that doctrine. They see Cambodia-where we made a conscious decision in this administration not to commit American ground forces-a country in which we are going forward with a military assistance program. There were some that said we couldn't go to the Congress and get that approved. I was one that felt the Congress would approve an adequate mili­ tary assistance program in keeping with the application of the Nixon Doctrine. We had a better than two-thirds vote in the United States Senate for the application of that mili­ tary assistance program in Cambodia, and we had a better than 80 percent vote in the House of Representatives. No. I believe that this doctrine is being understood by our friends in Asia, and I know it is understood by our friends in Europe, having just returned from the NATO Defense Ministers Meeting. CLEMENT J. ZABLOCKI, U. S. House of Representa­ tives: Secretary Laird, I am somewhat concerned with your optimism about the success of the Nixon Doctrine. After all, regardless of the label, any doctrine will have to stand the test of time. And the key to whether the Nixon Doctrine will be a success is, if I may quote you, "What the United States can do, friends will do." Secretary Laird, you know that in the past a bipartisan spirit in the Congress, in the Senate and the House, laid the foundation on which the Nixon Doctrine was built. And I recall that some of the members of the opposite party to mine, your own party, rejected -

66 Discussion

SECRETARY LAIRD: I'm nonpolitical now though. [Laughter.] REPRESENTATIVE ZABLOCKI: At that time, Mr. Sec­ retary, you were a member of the House and you were political. [Laughter.] But the military and economic assis­ tance programs were opposed by the members of your party. I'm not so sure whether they were consistently opposed, but to a great degree they were, to the very programs that made the Nixon Doctrine possible. My question is: What can the United States really do in the future to the extent it has in the past with the growing neo-isolationism in this country, the concern about our own economic ability to continue the economic and military assistance and, furthermore, the sentiment, particularly in the Senate, in opposition to the military? Just recently you have very articulately convinced the House members how important it is to have military assis­ tance. Is it not true we will have to have a bipartisan spirit and we must also have a very viable economy in order to continue the Nixon Doctrine toward future success? SECRETARY LAIRD: There is no question about it. And the Nixon Doctrine will require that all of our friends and allies who are part of our partnership arrangements must make an increased contribution of their own assets and of their own resources to the military strength of their countries. 'We have these defense arrangements with Japan and with European nations through NATO. Some nations are not adequately contributing of their resources to the secu­ rity of their particular area. These mutual defense agree­ ments which we have require mutuality on both sides, and there are nations that are contributing less than 1 percent of their gross national product to defense and security re­ quirements in their areas of the world and getting a free ride. We should discuss that openly and frankly with them, with our people and with their people. The Nixon Doctrine, in order to succeed, must recognize this mutuality with our

67 Discussion partners with whom we have these defense agreements and arrangements. Some of them can help in the security and military assistance area and some in the economic develop­ ment area. Many of them are not sharing the burden ade­ quately or effectively at the present time. REPRESENTATIVE ZABLOCKI: You miss the point, Mr. Secretary. I think you will have to-in order to have the Nixon Doctrine succeed-get continued and broader support on the part of the Republicans in Congress. SECRETARY LAIRD: There is no question about the kind of suport we need for our defense arrangements. It must be a bipartisan support. That is why we are working, both in the State Department and the Defense Department, to build up and to develop bipartisan support for these programs. SENATOR McGEE: And what happens, Mr. Secretary­ SECRETARY LAIRD: I do not believe the defense issue should be the major issue in this campaign. I can assure you that President Nixon will continue to speak for a strong country. There are some in this year 1972 that don't believe strength is important. And I, as Secretary of De­ fense, cannot go along with that kind of philosophy. And I do not criticize those people for running up the white flag because they are Democrats or Republicans, I criticize them as Secretary of Defense, and because I think that that is bad for America. SENATOR McGEE: Just a question that follows in the wake of Clem's line of questioning: What happens if these partners don't produce, don't come through? Where does this leave us with the doctrine? SECRETARY LAIRD: I believe that they will come through - SENATOR McGEE: That's not the question. SECRETARY LAIRD: - if we are willing to talk frankly and openly with them.

68 Discussion

The problem in the past has been that we hesitate to talk in this frank and open fashion about the responsibilities all of us have in these partnerships. We have looked at these treaty commitments as one-way streets and forgot to consider the mutuality of responsibility of all partners to these defense arrangements. And I have found since I have been talking with the defense ministers in NATO, and with the NATO Council, that we have been able to move them in a different direc­ tion by talking frankly and openly with them. For the first time, we have the Defense Improvement Account, and there are no U. S. contributions to this new program. We have been able to make some progress as far as Japan is concerned in some increases in defense expenditures, not enough, but they are moving in the direction of increasing their defense program. But this defense arrangement we have with Japan is a mutual defense arrangement and it's about time we talked about the mutuality of these defense agreements that we have. SENATOR McGEE: And if they don't? SECRETARY LAIRD: I believe we can be successful ­ SENATOR McGEE: And if they don't- SECRETARY LAIRD: - at talking - SENATOR McGE'E: - Mr. Secretary? SECRETARY LAIRD: - frankly and openly. If we are not, then I believe that the kind of bipartisan support which is needed and necessary from our Congress will not be maintained in the decade of the 1980s and the latter part of the 1970s. BRUCE RUSSETT, Yale University: I would like to put a little different twist on this discussion. Professor Schelling and other people have noted that the idea of burden-sharing, of persuading our allies to do more, has been around for a long time. We have been only mod­ estly successful in persuading our allies to do more, per-

69 Discussion haps a little bit more successful recently than in the past. One of the reasons, I think, that our success has been so modest has been that it has been very clear both to Ameri­ cans, to the American government, and to foreign govern­ ments that there was a great deal of deep, broad bipartisan support in the American populace for American military commitment abroad. Now we have heard Senator McGee and others worrying about the growth of the new isolationism, the growth of "fortress-America" foreign policy ideas. To put that a little bit less pejoratively, we now see at least a rather broad lessening of enthusIasm in the populace for these military commitments. The evidence both in the past commitments, the level of these, and the really major change in American public opinion against these commitments is very clear. Now, of course, this decline in support can be very dan­ gerous. On the other hand, I wonder if this doesn't perhaps provide an opportunity-that the fact that some of this support is much less than it used to be may make it pos­ sible for the Nixon administration to succeed in persuading our allies to do burden-sharing, to succeed in a way that previous administrations could not because the popular political opinion in our country was quite different. So I wonder if perhaps, within limits, of course, the pres­ ent administration might not even welcome that change in public opinion? SECRETARY LAIRD: Well, I would not want to think that the change is a welcome change. I can only state that as I meet with my colleagues, the defense ministers of these other alliances, and with the defense ministers in NATO and Korea and Japan, I think it is important that we point out the realities of the 1970s. And one of them is the politi­ cal reality, and another is the fiscal reality, which we face during this particular period. And I do not hesitate to point those realities out. WILLIAM KINTNER, Foreign Policy Research Institute: The SALT agreement codifies a type of parity in the stra-

70 Discussion tegic field between ourselves and the Soviet Union and also suggests a decoupling of our strategic guarantees to our allies, particularly in 'Western Europe. Such opinions are held by many analysts both in the United States and in Western Europe. And yet the necessity for regional equi­ librium becomes all the more important. The European allies have been dragging their feet. I know some defense ministers would like to do more. But is not the problem also that under the flexible-response doc­ trine, which relies initially almost totally on conventional forces, that they see no use in expanding their forces. Is there a possibility that the administration will consider giving greater weight to the nuclear defenses of Western Europe and perhaps assistance to the development of a European consortium based on the British and French nu­ clear deterrent to compensate for the reduction of our com­ mitment which will take place over time as a result of the SALT talks? SECRETARY LAIRD: No, I would not think so. I think that we will be going in the opposite direction and, as we make progress in the strategic arms limitation field, and as we go forward with the follow-on negotiations as far as forward-based systems are concerned, that the conventional deterrent in Europe will take on an increased importance rather than a decreased importance. So I would think that quite the opposite line of reasoning would be used as far as our European allies are concerned. And I believe that we will be able to work out these arrangements and reductions over the next few years. The situation is such that we are only moving now in the strategic arms limitation area as far as strategic weapons. We will move into the forward-based systems and to mutual and balanced force reduction and force limitation. Then we will be moving forward in the negotiation area on the whole broad question of military assistance and the levels of mili­ tary assistance in the Far East, the Middle East, and other areas of the world.

71 Discussion

ALTON FRYE, Woodrow Wilson International Center for Scholars: Mr. Secretary, the President has asked the Con­ gress to act upon the SALT agreements before September first in order to facilitate a resumption in October of those follow-on negotiations. Some of your comments suggest that you might prefer a delay in action on those agreements unless the Congress has considered the specific defense pro­ grams in the annual defense authorization. Someone commenting in the White House discussions of these agreements said the real question is not whether we can trust the Russians but whether we can trust ourselves to act prudently on these follow-on defense programs in ways which both protect our national interests and spur the negotiations. Are you in fact of the view that action by the Congress on the agreements should be delayed until after the defense programs have been approved, or would you be happy to see prompt action on SALT followed by prudent later de­ cisions by the Congress on the individual defense programs? SECRETARY LAIRD: I believe that all three of the pro­ grams to which you refer, the 1973 budget request of the President, the agreement limiting offensive weapons as to numbers of ICBMs and submarines, and the treaty on the ABM limitations, all must be approved. I support all three. I do not believe that they are a triple-play for peace, and in order to be safe you've got to touch all three bases. The Congress in its wisdom is moving first on the authorization legislation and the House committee has reported out the authorization bill which will be acted on by the House of Representatives next week. So the authorization bill is moving first and I believe that your question is a rather "iffy" question because the Congress in its wisdom has de­ cided to move on the authorization bill first. SENATOR McGEE: May I now add my point of view from the Senate? Mr. Secretary, I think that it may be contributing to a psychological complication by stressing

72 Discussion too strongly that if we don't get the one you're not sure we can go along with, let's say, the SALT agreements. I think you're going to get both. That's my judgment. I think you ought to have both, and I agree with you completely that if we don't follow up with the requirements of what is legal under the treaty for keeping our force updated and mod­ ernized that we prejudice the chances for the second stage of negotiations. The point is that by tying the two together so inseparably I think you're almost automatically setting up a wall of opposition that we need not have to climb over. I think it's important that we ratify SALT and then that we meet head-on the defense requirements to protect our posture. I think your track record, the track record of this admin­ istration in leading from real capabilities, is so strong that that's a risk we have to take. I just don't think we need to complicate our problems in the Senate with the suggestion that they're inseparable. I agree that they are. I just don't think you ought to be saying so quite so articulately as you are. [Laughter.] SECRETARY LAIRD: I do not control all of the ques­ tions that are asked of me, but my support of the ABM treaty and the support which I have indicated for the follow-on agreement on offensive weapons is based on the approval of the 1973 program in which we go forward dur­ ing this period, this next 5 years, with these strategic sys­ tems. And when I'm asked a question I will answer it. And if members of the Senate or others do not want me to answer questions frankly and openly then they'd better find somebody else to serve as Secretary of Defense, because that's the way I will handle those questions when asked by any member of the press or a member of the House or the United States Senate. SENATOR McGEE: All you need to say, Mr. Secretary, is, "Let's cross one bridge at a time. Let's get the SALT treaty ratified, then we must address ourselves to what the

73 Discussion

SALT treaty requires of us, and let's get to it." That's all it is, just a matter of semantics. SECRETARY LAIRD: The authorization bill on the '73 defense budget is moving first and I'm happy that it is. [Laughter.] RICHARD LEVINE, The Wall Street Journal: Mr. Sec­ retary, it's been said by many administration officials since the successful SALT I round, that the second round that the President would like to see start in October is going to be vastly more complicated. It will attempt to deal with qualitative aspects of the weapons systems, with the for­ ward base systems that you mentioned. My question is this: What does the immediate budget future for the Pentagon look like over the next two or three years during which you'll be negotiating in the second round of SALT? Does it mean that we are faced with increasing defense budget expenditures while we are in the midst of the second round of SALT negotiations? SECRETARY LAIRD: Yes, we will have increased re­ quirements as far as the defense budget is concerned be­ cause of the change in philosophy that governs the defense budget during this particular period. We are now putting manpower and labor costs into the defense budget. Prior to the 1971 budget, our manpower costs were covered to a great degree by the use of conscript labor. By moving toward zero draft and an all-volunteer force, we are now putting labor costs in the defense budget. Our labor rates, or our manpower pay, have increased by 325 percent. We are now carrying the full manpower cost in the defense budget. In 1964, we were spending $21 billion on manpower costs in defense. In 1973, with 100,000 less men, we will be spend­ ing $42 billion. Those manpower costs will go up. The Soviet Union's manpower costs as a percent of their budget will be going down. As we increase these manpower costs, and we no longer require the use of conscript labor, we will

74 Discussion carry our labor costs in the defense budget. These defense costs will continue to increase. MR. LEVINE: Will our weapons modernization costs in­ crease also, Mr. Secretary, during this two or three-year period that we're negotiating the second round of SALT? SECRETARY LAIRD: Yes, they will, as the costs of labor increase. This is a very significant part of the procurement bill too. Not only will those costs increase but the largest costs will be in the manpower area of the defense budget. Almost the entire so-called peace dividend of Vietnam has been used in the last twenty-four months to pay these labor costs. I believe labor costs should be reflected in the defense budget. MR. LEVINE: It is simply labor costs, though, sir? Isn't it true that in the absence of a very quick SALT accord in the second round, that your requests in fiscal '74 for the Trident and the B-1 will probably be substantially greater than they are in fiscal '73? SECRETARY LAIRD: The cost of the increases that you refer to will be reflected in the '75 budget. WILLIAM ANDERSON, Chicago Tribune: I'd like to continue, Mr. Secretary, on Mr. Beecher's point about the military situation in South Vietnam. Could you give us an assessment of the potential military offense capabilities of North Vietnam today as compared with some recent other period of time before the invasion of South Vietnam? Is their capability as strong today, or is it much weaker, and how does this tie with your own buildup of South Vietna­ mese forces? SECRETARY LAIRD: As far as my assessment of the capabilities of the North Vietnamese is concerned, it hasn't changed since the assessment I made in November. I said then that the North Vietnamese had the capability to stage three or four major spectaculars in South Vietnam. Thus far they have staged one successful spectacular. They have taken over Quang Tri Province, one of the 44 provinces of

75 Discussion

South Vietnam. They have the capability, I think, to stage another spectacular. They were not successful in the spec­ tacular they attempted at An Loc or at Kontum, but I do believe they have the capability to go forward with one more spectacular within the next 30 days. I believe that they will then fall back and will not hit again until sometime in September or October. Their ca­ pabilities in September and October will not be as strong as the capabilities which they possessed during the last two months. Now this is assuming that we do not have a negotiated settlement. They will have that military capability during this period. MAX SINGER, Hudson Institute: I have long been an admiring student of Professor Schelling, but he seemed to be applying tonight a lesson of history that I have not yet learned when he blamed President Nixon for not having achieved a satisfactory peace in Vietnam. It is my impression that we may face a war in the Middle East which may go on for another generation, or even an­ other century, and the reason is that we have some people in one territory who want to throw out the government of another territory and the people in that territory don't want to have their government thrown out, and as long as that pair of conditions last, war in the Middle East may last. It seems to me that a similar pair of conditions may last a while in Vietnam, and that it is not in President Nixon's control to stop it and so it is not in his power to bring peace. Professor Schelling made an analogy between, or sug­ gested an analogy between, what he called our betrayal of Taiwan and the Vietnam situation. He said that we didn't lose credibility as the result of this "betrayal." I would sug­ gest that the reason we have not lost credibility about what has happened in Taiwan is that Chiang Kai-shek is alive and healthy and his people are prospering, partly because of 200 miles of water and partly because of effective defense forces.

76 Discussion

I think that the analogy to Vietnam is partly correct. So long as you do not have people hanging from communist lamp poles for the crime of being American allies we will not lose credibility. But if either Taiwan suffers a tremen­ dous loss in its position, not just its diplomatic unhappiness but something substantial, or if there is a similar loss in Vietnam, then there will be different problems. The costs of Vietnam have been immense. The benefits have been substantial. But let me suggest that the final score is not yet written, and that there's a lot of potential variation depending on what happens in the next few years and, •therefore, our policy has a great deal yet to play for. PROFESSOR SCHELLING: Chiang Kai-shek has pros­ pered because of a lot of water, a lot of money and no political opposition. I don't know what the analogy is with Vietnam. My question is simply, for how long do we go on pretending that we care about the South Vietnamese and not about the North Vietnamese, on whom it is our official position that a regime was imposed by force and for whom, as people, we have no particular antipathy? There must be some length of time, Mr. Singer, over which this will not have been worthwhile, even for the South Vietnamese, especially if we can take heart from the Nixon Doctrine that things can even get better on the com­ munist side of the world, and we can learn not only to live in peace with them but to trade with them and to expect less obnoxious forms of life, which for 20 years we insisted were inevitable. It's hard to say at the moment whether the South Vietnamese would be better off or worse off if we abandoned them. What bothers me is that I thought when President Nixon came in he promised something shorter, more progress than we've seen. If the best we can hope for is that the South Vietnamese will be able to fight their own war in perpetuity when we get out, then I'm not sure that the people on either side of the DMZ will thank us 10 years hence. They may

77 Discussion

wish that they were in the position of the Chinese who, after years of bitterness in the past, are coming back into decent relations with the rest of world. I just wonder how long we can claim that we are bene­ fiting the South Vietnamese by supporting them in a bitter, bloody war, and whether what they're going to end up with is all that much better than in the areas that the secretary has referred to as developing polycentric, less ideological, less rigid forms of government. SECRETARY LAIRD: It is the North Vietnamese that are marauding outside of their borders. It is not the ~outh Vietnamese, it is not the Cambodians, it is not the Laotians. I think that that is the important difference that we must recognize tonight.

78 Participants

WILLIAM F. ANDERSON WILLIAM KINTNER National Correspondent, Director, Foreign Policy Chicaso Tribune Research Institute WILLIAM H. ANTHONY DAVID KRASLOW Information Center Service Washington Bureau Chief, United States Information Los Anseles Times Agency RICHARD J. LEVINE WILLIAM J. BAROODY, JR. Pentagon Correspondent, Special Assistant to the Secretary Wall Street Journal of Defense PAUL W. McCRACKEN Department of Defense Edmund Ezra Day University WILLIAM BEECHER Professor of Business Military Affairs Correspondent, Administration New York Times University of Michigan CHARLES CORDDRY, JR. G. WARREN NUTTER Pentagon Correspondent, Assistant Secretary of Defense Baltimore Sun (International Security Affairs) ALVIN COTTRELL Department of Defense Director of Research, The HENRY OWEN Center for Strategic and Director, Foreign Policy Studies International Studies The Brookings Institution Georgetown University BRUCE RUSSETT JAMES FRANGGOS Professor of Political Science, Military Support Plans Officer Yale University New Hampshire Army National MAX SINGER Guard President, Hudson Institute ALTON FRYE LEON SLOSS Fellow, Woodrow Wilson Director, Politico-Military Affairs International Center for Scholars Department of State The Smithsonian Institution MATTHEW SURRELL DANIEL Z. HENKIN Press Secretary to Assistant Secretary of Defense Senator Robert P. Griffin (Public Affairs) Department of Defense JOHN SWEARINGEN Chairman of the Board, Standard MORTON KAPLAN Oil Company of Indiana Professor of Political Science, University of Chicago CLEMENT J. ZABLOCKI ORR KELLY U.S. House of Representatives Pentagon Correspondent, RICHARD A. WARE Washinston Evenins Star President, Earhart Foundation

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Cover and design: Pat Taylor