MIDDLE EAST REPORT

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Spring 2002 ■ Number 222 MIDDLE EAST RESEARCH & INFORMATION PROJECT Spring 2002 No. 222 Vol. 32 No. 1

Middle East Report (ISSN 0899-2851) is published four times a year (quarterly) by the Middle East Research and Information Project, 1500 Massachusetts Avenue NW, Washington DC 20005.

POSTMASTER: Periodicals postage paid at Washington, DC and UP FRONT 2 Opening the Debate on the Right of Return additional mailing offices. Send all address corrections to MERIP, Sari Hanafi PO Box 277, Hopewell, PA 16650-0277. 8 Controllable Democracy in Uzbekistan MAILING: The magazine is mailed periodicals class in North Alisher Ilkhamov America and IMEX to the rest of the world. Send address changes to MERIP, Subscriber Services, PO Box 277, Hopewell, PA 16650- 11 “Security Assistance” Bonanza After September 11 0277. Subscriptions are $37 per year for individuals, $76 for institutions. Overseas postage additional. Other rates on inside back cover. Middle East Report is available in microform from University Microfilms, 300 North Zeeb Road, Ann Arbor, MI 48106. WAR WITHOUT BORDERS Canadian Distribution: Doormouse Distribution, 55 Metcalfe Street, #6, Toronto, M4X-1R9. ARTICLES 12 Victims of Circumstance ADVERTISING: For details, contact MERIP, Tel 202-223-3677 Anthony Shadid Fax 202-223-3604. Email [email protected] Web www.merip.org 14 The Shape of Afghanistan to Come INDEXES AND ABSTRACTS: Abstracta Iranica, The Alternative Anthony Shadid Press Index, Index Islamicus, International Development Abstracts, International Political Science Abstracts, The Left Index, The Middle 18 Afghan Women: Bombed to Be Liberated? East Journal, Mideast File, Migration and Ethnizität, PAIS Bulletin, Saba Gul Khattak Universal Reference Systems. 24 Pakistan Between Afghanistan and India ELECTRONIC ARCHIVE: Available through JSTOR, www.jstor. Hamza Alavi com for participating institutions. 32 Gray Money, Corruption and the REVIEW BOOKS and other items for review should be sent Post-September 11 Middle East to MERIP Reviews, Kevorkian Center for Near Eastern Studies, New York University, 50 Washington Square South, New York, John Sfakianakis NY 10012-1073. 34 Refugees in Their Own Country COPYRIGHT: All rights reserved. Reproduction, storage, or Maggy Zanger transmission of this work in any form or by any means beyond REVIEW ESSAY 44 Gender and Islamism in the 1990s that permitted by Sections 107 and 108 of the US Copyright Law is unlawful without prior permission in writing of the Publisher, or Mervat Hatem in accordance with the terms of licenses issued by the Copyright Editor’s Picks 48 New and Recommended Reading Clearance Center (CCC) and other organizations authorized by the publisher to administer reprographic reproduction rights. Pease note, however, that all institutions with a paid subscription to the PHOTOS/GRAPHICS Mohammed Baba/AFP, Piers Benatar/ magazine may make photocopies for teaching purposes free of charge provided they are not resold. For educational photocopying Panos Pictures, Tim Dirven/Panos Pictures, Kamran Jebreili/ requests that do not originate from an institution with a paid AP Photo, Banaras Khan/AFP, Efrem Lukatsky/AP Photo, John subscription, please contact the Copyright Clearance Center, 222 Moore/AP Photo, Tauseef Mustafa/AFP, Hiwa Osman, Philippe Rosewood Drive, Danvers, MA 01923, phone: 978-750-8400. For Rekacewicz/Le Monde Diplomatique, Jihad Seklawi/AFP. all other permissions inquiries, including requests to republish material in another work, please contact MERIP Editorial Offices, fax 202-223-3604. COVER PHOTO Afghan woman, 55, walks on her prosthetic

FOR THE BLIND: Selected articles from this publication are leg at Red Cross center in Kabul, December 2001 (Jimin Lai/ available for blind and visually handicapped persons on audiotape AFP Photo). from Freedom Ideas International, 640 Bayside, Detroit. MI 48217. COVER DESIGN Geoff Hartman WE ENCOURAGE the submission of manuscripts, photographs and artwork relevant to our focus on the political economy of the contemporary Middle East and popular struggles there. This includes general theoretical contributions relevant to these issues and connecting developments elsewhere in the world with the Middle East. Letters to the Editor are also welcome. Please send manuscripts as attached files to: [email protected]. A style sheet is available on request, as well as on our website: www.merip.org. FROM THE EDITOR

MIDDLE EAST REPORT utside the Pentagon, the smoking rubble left when one wing of the Defense Department was destroyed by a hijacked airliner last September 11 is long since cleared. A scoreboard-sized digital Oclock counts down the days and hours until this coming September 11, when the Pentagon Editor Chris Toensing expects to have fully repaired the damage. “Let’s roll”—George W. Bush’s cloying new motto—scrolls Outreach Editor Ian Urbina across the bottom, as the seconds tick off the furious pace of rebuilding. Inside the military-industrial establishment, at briefings and beery stag dinners, the generals and contractors know their hour has Consultant Barbara Neuwirth already arrived. Print/Web Design & Production James E. Bishara The hijackers’ attacks, and more so the rapid collapse of the Taliban under the weight of US bombs, Interns Rudeyna Babouder, Mariam Javanshir, have been a great boon to believers in global governance through US military power. Already ascendant Karin van der Tak hardline unilateralists in the Bush administration—the circles surrounding Vice President Dick Cheney Proofreaders Justin Hoffman, Sian MacAdam and Defense Secretary Donald Rumsfeld—have been boosted higher by the widely trumpeted successes of Operation Enduring Freedom. In the wartime deployments in Uzbekistan and Kyrgyzstan, which Reviews Shiva Balaghi, Rebecca L. Stein are taking on an air of permanence, the ultra-hawks are “pre-positioned” for containment of Russia and Printing McArdle Printing China, chief on their list of prospective challengers to US dominance. In the “axis of evil,” the hardliners find the necessary justification for throwing larger wads of taxpayer money at the continuously failing National Missile Defense program and for demanding from Congress a $48 billion jump in defense Contributing Editors Lila Abu-Lughod, spending over last year. There is lonely Congressional dissent as Special Forces contingents are dis- Mariano Aguirre, Asef Bayat, Joel Beinin, Azmi patched to the Philippines, Yemen and Georgia to help those governments quell Islamist insurgencies. Bishara, Dan Connell, Beshara Doumani, Kaveh Even the Pentagon’s missteps are rewarded. As Norman Solomon observed in his column for Fair- Ehsani, Selima Ghezali, Sarah Graham-Brown, ness and Accuracy in Reporting, the week-long flap over the Office of Strategic Influence—designed to Fred Halliday, Geoff Hartman, Rema Hammami, feed disinformation to the foreign press—has “actually reinforced the notion that the US government Deniz Kandiyoti, Isam al-Khafaji, Ann Lesch, has no rational motive for hiding truth, since its real endeavors can proudly stand the light of day.” Zachary Lockman, Tim Mitchell, Roger Owen, After Rumsfeld sheepishly disbanded the in-house spin unit, few news outlets noticed that a similar Reem Saad, Mohammed el-Sayed Said, Simona outfit called the Information Awareness Office will be headed by retired Adm. John Poindexter, that Sharoni, Mohamed Sid-Ahmed, Susan Slyomovics, Salim Tamari, Graham Usher, Oren paragon of official probity last sighted trying to explain the Iran-contra fiasco to a bewildered public. Yiftachel, Sami Zubaida. As the articles in this issue argue, the latest consolidation of the military-industrial complex has done little or nothing to enhance the security of people in the Middle East and Central Asia. Even as winter snows hinder the suddenly hotter war in Afghanistan, more US interventions appear certain. MERIP Board of Directors Bruce Dunne, David Renewed fighting in March has underscored the hollowness of the US victory in Afghanistan. At McMurray, Karen Pfeifer, Jillian Schwedler, Ted the hardliners’ urging, the US began its assault on the Taliban before a viable political alternative had Swedenburg, Sandra Tamari, Chris Toensing. been concocted. Anxious to avoid combat casualties, the administration could merely stand and watch when its proxies, the erstwhile Northern Alliance, rolled into Kabul considerably ahead of the agreed- Editorial Committee Kamran Ali, Shiva upon schedule. With Northern Alliance fighters in control of the capital and major cities, it was impos- Balaghi, Phyllis Bennis, James E. Bishara, Sheila sible not to include Abdul Rashid Dostum and other commanders accused of war crimes as ministers in Carapico, Elliott Colla, Deborah Gerner, Lisa Hamid Karzai’s interim government. The resulting return of warlord politics to Afghanistan promises Hajjar, Salah D. Hassan, Steve Hubbell, Vickie anything but stability. Already, it appears that warlords nominally friendly to the US presence and Langohr, David McMurray, Khalid Medani, Garay Karzai have at least twice misdirected US bombing and commando raids to eliminate their own rivals. Menicucci, Karen Pfeifer, Shahnaz Rouse, There are whispers that the crime wave in Kabul—supposedly the one place where Karzai’s authority Rebecca L. Stein, Ted Swedenburg, Chris holds firm—is perpetrated by armed gangs loyal to members of the government. Outside Kabul, Af- Toensing, Ian Urbina. ghan civilians are even more insecure. Karzai pleads for a bolstered International Security Assistance Force, incorporating US soldiers, to bring law and order to the provinces. It is at best uncertain how Development Committee Alfred Khoury, Jillian long the political will to police Afghanistan will last in Washington after US forces have thoroughly Schwedler, Sandra Tamari. “body-slammed” (as one general put it) the core of al-Qaeda and Taliban militants still holed up in the mountains bordering Pakistan. The blunt instrument of bombing—which killed untold hundreds of Afghan civilians—seems to have dismantled the Taliban and al-Qaeda as conventional military forces. But it was singularly un- Copyright © January–March 2002 suited to the declared war aim of killing or capturing Osama bin Laden, his top lieutenants and the Middle East Research & Information Project Taliban leadership. If one accepts the understanding of al-Qaeda as a loose network of self-contained Printed in the USA. cells which rely on bin Laden only for spiritual inspiration and occasional financing, there is no basis www.merip.org for concluding that the war has reduced the risk of more attacks. Further, as John Sfakianakis demon- strates in this issue, the assets that al-Qaeda might use to fund further acts of destruction could very well be intact. Not surprisingly, Sen. Trent Lott and his fellow Republican flacks now claim that the Continued on page 48. UP FRONT

JIHAD SEKLAWI/AFP Palestinian refugee children demonstrate outside UN headquarters in Tyre, for the right of return and against Israeli Prime Minister Ariel Sharon. Opening the Debate on the Right of Return Sari Hanafi

A decade after Oslo, Palestinian negotiators have reached an impasse in the debate concerning refugee return.

The discussion should be opened to creative ideas beyond the sacred positions. New ideas, even those that won’t work, can shake loose new possibilities.

ari Nusseibeh, the Palestinian Authority’s diplomatic al-Awda network—formed to press for the refugees’ right of representative in Jerusalem, started an enriching debate return to their pre-1948 homes—even collected signatures Swhen he declared that, in the framework of a two-state on a petition to Palestinian Authority (PA) head Yasser Arafat, solution, the Palestinians cannot demand the return of refu- demanding Nusseibeh’s dismissal from his post. This initial gees to homes now inside the state of Israel. Spirited responses debate was crucial, though it has been followed by less pro- to Nusseibeh came from scholar Salman Abu Sitta and refu- ductive ones. gee advocate Terry Rempel of Badil, among others. The The importance of the right of return should not inter- fere with the right to free expression. Just as some within Sari Hanafi, a sociologist, is director of Shaml, the Palestinian Refugee and Diaspora Islamist movements argue that some topics are not up for Center. This article does not necessarily express the position of Shaml. discussion lest “God’s will” be violated or the Qur’an con-

2 MIDDLE EAST REPORT 222 SPRING 2002 travened, a new nationalist and secular fundamentalism re- and their guys saying this. Even if they sign on to such a text fers to “national consensus” to silence the opinions of at one stage or another, a new generation will emerge in ten Nusseibeh and others.1 But what is this national consensus? or twenty years and argue that they had no right to give up Is it a consensus concerning the establishment of two states, [the right of return].”4 one Palestinian and the other Israeli, or one secular state? Is These understandings show a total ignorance of the de- it a consensus over the targeting of civilians during a na- bate on the Palestinian side. Since Nusseibeh’s statement, tional struggle? Or is it a consensus concerning the position discussions have taken place in newspapers, inside politi- of awaiting implementation of their right cal parties and in the camps, even assuming the form of an of return? More than a few massacres have been perpetrated exchange of communiqués between the Fatah youth orga- and justified in the name of “national consensus” in the Arab nization (supporting Nusseibeh) and another faction in world. New ideas, whether valid or invalid, are often con- Fatah (reiterating the traditional position of the Palestin- sidered a break from the national consensus and thus tanta- ian leadership). Since the beginning of the second intifada, mount to treason. Ironically, the discourse of national Israeli media and intellectuals have reverted to parotting consensus has historically not been consensual, but instead the opinions of representatives of the military-political sys- has been used by dominant forces to retain their positions. tem. For the first time, scholars like Morris and A.B. The Zionist movement itself had no “national consensus,” Yehoshua are writing on the question of Palestinian return but encompassed different political forces, though some in the language of phobia. groups came to dominate over time. If the PA does not em- brace those who do not agree with its global vision, domi- An Enduring Syndrome nant political forces in Palestine may establish a one-party state like others in the Arab world. The dominant Israeli discourse on Palestinian return psy- chologizes the conflict: there are a lot of writings about Is- Things Unheard Of? raeli anxieties, worries and nightmares, and about the Palestinian hater. This discourse is also ethnically structured. At the level of content, what Sari Nusseibeh has said is not Its major concern is demography: how returnees would dis- very new, nor is it surprising. Azmi Bishara has said as order the colonial legacy of expulsions. Israel’s public rela- much, though as a criticism of the two-state framework tions campaigns have indeed worked intensively since the envisioned by the Oslo “peace process.”2 Inside the Pales- Camp David talks of July 2000 to convince the world that tinian establishment, PA officials like Saeb Erekat and Yasser there actually is a possibility of massive Palestinian return, Abed Rabbo have recently reiterated their long-standing to bolster Israel’s claim that return means the erasure of Is- contention that while the right of return should be recog- rael through the destruction of its “Jewish character.” This nized, its implementation should be flexible. Arafat’s own perspective has been disseminated in many articles published op-ed published February 3, 2002 in the New York Times in Israeli and Western newspapers by well-known members clarified the PA’s position: “We seek a fair and just solu- of the Israeli “peace camp.”5 This enduring syndrome of vic- tion to the plight of Palestinian refugees who for 54 years timization makes any serious discussion of the Palestinian have not been permitted to return to their homes…We right of return, let alone other rights, impossible. Unfortu- understand Israel’s demographic concerns and understand nately, the Nusseibeh declarations reinforce the Israeli atti- that the right of return of Palestinian refugees, a right guar- tude about the importance of the demographic issue in the anteed under international law and UN Resolution 194, Palestinian-Israeli conflict. must be implemented in a way that takes into account such This Israeli discourse is also hegemonic. In an article en- concerns.” What is new about Nusseibeh’s declaration is titled “Refugees Forever,” Yossi Alpher wrote that “Israel its level of clarity relative to issues left unaddressed in other could recognize some humanitarian right of family reunifi- statements. What is surprising is not only that Palestinians cation, which Palestinians could label ‘return,’ for all first- in general have regarded Nusseibeh’s declaration as highly generation refugees, i.e., those over 54 who were actually provocative, but also that Israeli intellectuals pretend they born in present-day Israel, who wish to return and who have have never heard such things before. relatives that could assist in their absorption. Their number How has the new debate over the right of return been would not be large, nor would they affect the long-term received by Israeli and Palestinian audiences? On the Israeli demographic balance, but their ‘return’ could provide a de- side, responses have been couched in colonial stereotypes gree of satisfaction for the Palestinian narrative without se- that characterize the colonized as a mob containing very few riously challenging the Israeli narrative.”6 voices of reason. Danny Rubinstein, columnist for the lib- While Sari Nusseibeh’s declarations open up debate over eral daily Ha’aretz, summarizes the Palestinian debate by say- the right of return and its meaning in the Palestinian polity, ing that Nusseibeh’s declarations “are the extraordinary that on the Israeli side he is used by his “peace partners” as evi- prove the ordinary.”3 Historian Benny Morris considers Sari dence that Palestinians will yield their rights. At a rally of Nusseibeh “an exception. His statements are putting his life 15,000 organized in Tel Aviv on February 16, 2002 by Peace in danger. He is not one of the first-rank senior leadership. I Now and the Beilin-Sarid “Peace Coalition,” Nusseibeh de- never heard Muhammad Dahlan, Jibril Rajoub or Abu ‘Ala’ manded justice for the refugees and spoke of the need for

MIDDLE EAST REPORT 222 SPRING 2002 3 Aleppo ing positions have no Turkey Neirab

Countries in which UNRWA operates. place in this formulation. Yehudith Harel, a mem- Refugee Population in Camps ber of the Peace Now 100,000 75,000 movement, summarized 50,000 25,000 the attitude of many Israeli 10,000 5,000 intellectuals: “The atti- For the population in the camps of Talbieh, Jarash, tudes reflected in Oz’s ar- Souf, and Husn, UNRWA statistics indicate a higher Latakia Camp population than those registered as refugees. UNRWA ticle, even more than the shows the existence of two “unofficial” camps in . The first, near Latakia, holds 2,500 refugees, and the political positions ex- second, Yarmouk, on the outskirts of Damascus, has Hama Hama close to 100,000 people. pressed, are the epitome of the intellectual corruption

As of June 2000 Homs and the emotional handi-

Host Number Total Number of Homs cap of the Israeli main- Country of Camps Number of Refugees Living Refugees in Camps stream peace camp

Nahr el-Bared 10 1,570,192 280,191 Tripoli intelligentsia. This has gen- Lebanon 12 376,472 210,715 Beddawi erated within Israeli circles Syria 10 383,199 111,712 Palestine 27 1,407,631 608,862 a deep-rooted, patronizing, Lebanon 19 583,009 157,676 self-righteous discourse, a Gaza 8 824,622 451,186 Baalbek Syria lack of empathy for other Total 59 3,737,494 1,211,48

Beirut Dbayeh people’s suffering, a lack of Mar Elias Shatila understanding of their per- Burj el-Barajneh Damascus spective and needs and, Sbeineh Ein el-Hilweh Qabr Essit Saida above all, an almost Khan Danoun In Increase in the number of Palestinian refugees in the Middle East In millions Mieh-Mieh Khan chronic conviction that the 1.6 1.6 El-Buss Marj Ayoun Eshieh Litani Yarmouk ‘other’ has to act in the best Quneitra Tyre Burj 7 al-Shamali of Israeli interests.” 1.2 1.2 Until 1967, Jordan Jordan administered the West Golan Heights Suweida Bank, and the refugees in (annexed by Dera'a Palestine Israel) armouk (Emergency) Jordan and the West Bank () were counted together. Acre A Lacking 0.8 Jordan and 0.8 ('Akka) Dera'a the West Bank Palestine Nazareth Irbid Dera'a Haifa (West Bank) Strategic Irbid Husn 0.4 Lebanon 0.4

Jenin Jordan Souf Dimension Tulkarem Jarash Syria Zarq Camp Baqa'a 0 0 Tulkarem No. 1 Far'a 1950 1955 1960 1965 1970 1975 1980 1985 1990 1995 2000 Nour Shams Salt The Palestinian debate is Kalkilya Nablus Amman Mark Jalazon more dynamic than the Kalandia Tel Aviv Deir Jabal Jaff Ein el-Sultan Israeli one, though it suf- Ramallah Jericho el-Hussein Am'ari 'Aqabat Jabr Beach (Shati) Mediterranean Jerusalem fers from a lack of strate- Shu'fat Wihdat Palestine Sea Bethlehem Aida (Gaza Strip) Jabalia Beit gic political thinking. Arroub Deheisheh Nuseirat Hebronh Talbieh Palestinian politics is Fawwar Deir caught between two dis- el-Balah Palestine Palestine (West Bank) courses. The first is a (Gaza Strip) Jordan moral discourse based on Khan ounis the justice of the Pales- Israel tinian cause. With regard 0 25 50 km Israel Egypt 0 10 20 km to the refugee issue, this Source: UNRWA, 2000. means that the refugees PHILIPPE REKACEWICZ, MANIÈRE DE VOIR N° 54, LE MONDE DIPLOMATIQUE, PARIS, NOVEMBRE 2000. uprooted from their land should return home, ac- Israel to take responsibility for the creation of the refugee cording to international law and principles of human problem, even apologize. But the Peace Now report on the rights. The second discourse is externally oriented, based rally recorded only Nusseibeh’s statement that “the path to on fragments of positions usually taken under pressure peace is through the return of the refugees to the state of to answer specific crises. This discourse integrates many Palestine and the return of the settlers to the state of Israel.” tactical elements and differs from one constituency to an- As the Israeli sociologist Lev Grinberg argued, this partial other. What is lacking in the Palestinian discourse is the silencing of Nusseibeh reveals the game played by his coun- strategic dimension: a discourse based necessarily on moral terparts. It is telling that a main slogan at the rally was: “Leave premises, but which understands the international bal- the territories and be ourselves again.” Palestinian negotiat- ance of power and transmits this understanding to the

4 MIDDLE EAST REPORT 222 SPRING 2002 public. This means that the political leadership must be turn and the right of choice, however, do not only depend able to tell the public of its inability to realize promises on Israel’s recognition, but also on the policies of Arab made by past elites. countries that host refugee populations. It is symptomatic of the lack of strategic discourse that Palestinians are less interested in knowing what decisions Volume of Eventual Return are taken in the central committee of the PLO or in en- larged PA cabinet meetings than they are in declarations Pal- Both Nusseibeh and his main critic Salman Abu Sitta as- estinian leaders make when they visit Western capitals. In sume the problematic position that the implementation of the same spirit, Sari Nusseibeh’s declarations at Hebrew the right of return will trigger the actual return of a huge University in Jerusalem and Tel Aviv University created much number of refugees. Nusseibeh believes that such an influx more debate about the right of return and the refugee issue would change the “character” of the Jewish state within the in the Oslo framework than Azmi Bishara’s commentary in framework of a two-state solution, and hence cannot be con- an Egyptian monthly. templated. Abu Sitta, who supports such a return, has not adequately explored the potential sociology of return if it Right of Return becomes possible. What would actual Palestinian return look like? Will there be a mass of refugees rushing in simulta- Even in the framework of a two-state solution, Nusseibeh neously or a trickle of fragmented groups induced by factors did not adequately evaluate the centrality of the right of more powerful than nationalism, identity and the experi- return. There are two dimensions to the right of return: ence of exile? symbolic and material. When Nusseibeh speaks of the Abu Sitta’s work has been important in opening up the illogic of four million Palestinians returning to Jewish Is- debate concerning geographic absorption in Israel. He dem- rael, he sees mainly the material onstrates, after dividing Israel into dimension. By contrast, Edward three demographic areas, that the Said sees mainly the symbolic di- majority of Israeli Jews (68 per- mension with his concept of mu- What Nusseibeh has said is cent of the population) is now tual pardon or forgiveness. Both concentrated in one area making dimensions are important. neither new nor surprising. up eight percent of Israeli territory. In order for Israel to recognize A second area (six percent of Is- the Palestinian right of return, it raeli territory) holds a mixed must not only acknowledge the population including another ten refugees’ rights but also redress the root of the Israeli-Pales- percent of Israel’s Jewish citizens. Hence, Abu Sitta says, the tinian conflict and Israel’s central role in the dispossession areas in and around former Palestinian villages remained of Palestinians for the past 54 years. Regardless of the solu- empty and unused, and could readily absorb returning refu- tion that concludes the conflict—one state or two—the refu- gees, most of whom were peasants when they fled in 1948. gee issue cannot be considered secondary. Of course, 50 years later, the majority of these refugees dwell The current intifada has uncovered the importance of the in metropolitan areas like Damascus, Amman, Cairo, Chi- refugees, as they represent the social and political actors most cago and New York. They are no longer peasants. unable to bear the impasse of the Oslo process begun in But the land’s ability to absorb the refugees should not be 1993. The al-Awda network has been the primary force in the only factor in determining return scenarios. Irish-Ameri- defining the issue of the right of return as essential to the cans did not return to Ireland following the end of British Arab-Israeli conflict in the Western and Arab public spheres. colonialism, few Armenians returned to Armenia after its This network, composed of activists and independence and only a small number of Lebanese returned supporters of the Palestinian cause, has lobbied Human to Lebanon following the civil war. In each of these cases, Rights Watch and Amnesty International to take positions there was not only ample capacity in the countries of origin, in favor of the right of return, in a rare case of a Southern but ample political will for reabsorption. In general, UN network undertaking the Herculean effort to influence the High Commissioner for Refugees data demonstrates that policies of Northern organizations. the number of refugees returning to their various countries Beyond the moral and symbolic value of realizing the of origin, once return is possible, is far less than the number right of return, this right is useful in creating the frame- choosing resettlement in the host country or repatriation to work for providing refugees with the choice between re- a third-party state. The structure of the global labor market maining in their host countries, returning to their village plays a major role. of origin or coming to the political entity in the Palestin- ian territories (or relocating to an attractive third locale). Researching Return The right of return is a necessity for those who have for half a century been forced to live as foreigners without basic Return is determined by many factors. Field work and stud- civil rights, in miserable camps and in states that have not ies conducted in 13 countries have not uncovered a homo- always embraced them with open arms. The right of re- geneous population of four million refugees who would

MIDDLE EAST REPORT 222 SPRING 2002 5 Refugees made homeless by IDF bulldozing of 60 homes in January 2002 gather outside UN tents in Rafah, the Gaza Strip. MOHAMMED BABA/AFP exercise their right of return, but a far smaller number. The conceptual terms, interviewees might get a 100 percent posi- exact number is impossible to give: the uncertainties of a tive response as to whether the refugees will return. If the negotiated settlement and the possible reactions of the Arab question is narrowed, however, to include such factors as states would cause estimates to vary tremendously. the prospect of returning to a village under Israeli sover- In his letter criticizing Nusseibeh, Abu Sitta refers to polls eignty and holding Israeli nationality, or one without guar- conducted in some areas, particularly within the Palestinian anteed adequate employment or housing, the percentage territories, that demonstrate a refugee “consensus” on the might drop significantly. A Palestinian residing in Lebanon intention to return. Any such poll, whether conducted by may not be able to determine his or her intention to return amateurs or highly professional research centers, and cer- if the Lebanese position remains unclear. Will the Palestin- tainly any research based on questionnaires in Arab dicta- ians be literally thrown onto the border, as occurred in Libya, torships, is vulnerable to critique. No matter how the or will they be given the right of choice? Such factors often question is presented, responses will obviously tend toward invalidate the methodology of polls and surveys. a political position that is influenced more by protracted The person asking the questions can determine the re- conflict, disillusionment and the prospect of defeat than the sults. Four years ago, I visited my family living in a Pales- subject’s actual intent. tinian refugee camp in an Arab host country. My father Factors influencing the subject’s decisions range from the refused to see photos I had taken in Haifa because, in his experience and memories of exile to his or her economic words, it was not “his Haifa.” Haifa was now an Israeli situation. If the question of desire to return is posed only in city, he declared. He was adamant that he could not return

6 MIDDLE EAST REPORT 222 SPRING 2002 as long it remained under Israeli sovereignty. The very next a proposal vehemently opposed by Palestinians inside Israel day a Swiss journalist interviewed my father and asked him (and worth opposing for that very reason). At the same time, if he would return to Haifa if it became possible. Suddenly, the spirit of this idea was included in the Taba talks, where he waxed ideological and eloquent, announcing that “as a Israel proposed giving up five percent of the land within its Palestinian, like any other, I long to return no matter what pre-1967 borders to a Palestinian state, in exchange for land the conditions.” expropriated for illegal settlements. New ideas, even those It is not sufficient to prove that the Palestinian right of that won’t work, can shake loose new possibilities. return is enshrined in international human rights law and humanitarian law. Research must also demonstrate that rec- Author’s Note: The author thanks Omar Yassin for his help edit- ognition of return is a necessity for regional security and, in ing this article. some cases, a humanitarian necessity as well. Endnotes 1 For instance, Husam Khader, the Palestinian legislator from the Balata refugee camp, said: Beyond the Sacred “Sari Nusseibeh has taken himself away from the national camp.” 2 “It is impossible to apply the right of return in the two-state framework! There is a structural contradiction between the two-state solution and the right of return for Palestinian refugees, A decade after Oslo, Palestinian negotiators have reached an which would change the demographic nature of the Jewish state, with the permission of the Jewish state itself. The Palestinian national liberation movement should decide whether the impasse in the debate concerning refugee return. Refugee establishment of the Palestinian state without the right of return constitutes an acceptable historical compromise (as long as the state has sovereignty over the Haram al-Sharif and as rights discussions should be opened to creative ideas outside long as the agreement allows refugees to return to inside the state’s borders). If such a historical the sacred discourse. In a special bulletin published by the compromise is impossible from both Palestinian and Israeli points of view, we have before us a long struggle against apartheid, a struggle based on full citizenship for two peoples in one Palestinian Academic Society for the Study of International country. Israel will prefer a total war over this last option.” Azmi Bishara, “Liberating the Homeland, Liberating Human Beings,” Wijhat Nazar 23 (Cairo: al-Ahram, December 2001) Affairs (PASSIA) in early 2001, Muhi ‘Abd al-Hadi and Jan [in Arabic]. de Jong proposed an extension of the Palestinian territories 3 Ha’aretz, November 12, 2001. to include the Galilee and some areas of the Negev in order 4 Interview with Benny Morris, “‘The Arabs Are Responsible’: Post-Zionist Historian Benny to absorb portions of refugee populations, without denying Morris Clarifies His Thesis,” Yediot Aharonot, December 9, 2001. 5 In addition to Morris, Amos Oz, novelist and founder of Israel’s Peace Now movement, the remainder’s right of return. This solution resolves the reiterated the view that Palestinians had rejected “the most far-reaching offer Israel can make” by insisting “on the right of return for millions of refugees to their homeland.” The Guardian, Israeli fear of altering the character of the Jewish state. ‘Abd January 5, 2002. Novelist A.B. Yehoshua wrote a similar article in Liberation, July 23, 2001. al-Hadi and de Jong went so far as to say that the Galilee 6 Featured at http://www.bitterlemons.org, December 31, 2001. communities should be annexed to a future Palestinian state, 7 Yehudith Harel, “Peace Now and Its ‘Other’,” Al-Ahram Weekly, January 11-17, 2001.

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MIDDLE EAST REPORT 222 SPRING 2002 7 UP FRONT Controllable Democracy in Uzbekistan Alisher Ilkhamov

Few doubt that the prolongation of the presidential term in Uzbekistan’s January referendum paves the way for presidency for life for Islam Karimov. The Uzbek regime is building a controllable democracy, combining the expansion of democratic-looking institutions with restricted civil liberties and human rights. All this is unlikely to affect Washington’s ever-strengthening ties with its newest ally.

ashington’s newest ally Islam Karimov comes to the one family member to vote on behalf of all the rest. Nor- White House on March 12 fresh from a stage-man- mally, the persons actually voting are heads of households Waged electoral victory in Uzbekistan. A referendum belonging to the older generation. Probably two out of ev- on January 27 asked the Uzbek electorate two questions: ery five eligible voters delegate the right to vote to some- whether a two-chamber parliament should be introduced and body else. These are usually young people, whose opinions whether the presidential term should be extended from five are thus under-represented in elections and referendums. to seven years. According to Central Electoral Commission Electoral commission officials could manipulate the num- data, 91.58 percent of eligible voters participated. Of those, bers because only 130 independent international observers from 93.65 percent said yes to the first question and 6.35 percent 30 countries arrived to watch the balloting. The independent said no. On the second question, 91.78 percent voted in fa- Uzbek NGOs that are registered with the government are usu- vor and 8.22 percent against. The overwhelming passage of ally not allowed to monitor the process. An unregistered NGO, the referendum did not surprise international election moni- the Human Rights Society of Uzbekistan, which managed to tors, most of whom refused to send observers to watch the visit two polling places in Jizzak province, found the same pro- process of voting. State Department spokesman Richard cedural violation: voting on behalf of others. Boucher said US officials “did not observe prior presidential The very procedure of voting allows the authorities to juggle elections because preconditions for a free and fair election did referendum results in their favor. To say “no” a voter needs to not exist and do not see a need to observe this referendum.” black out the question on the ballot, while to say “yes” a voter But two higher-ranking representatives of the Bush ad- need only toss the unmarked ballot into a slot. Not many ministration—Gen. Tommy Franks, commander of people can be found in Uzbekistan who will make the black CENTCOM, and Assistant Secretary of State Beth Jones— marks under the authorities’ watchful eyes. Moreover, the did pay important visits to Tashkent in late January. Two ballots of those who did not come to vote can simply be thrown days before the referendum, Franks thanked the Uzbek gov- into the ballot box, and counted as “yes” votes. ernment for the use of air bases in bombing Afghanistan, saying that “we look forward to being recipients of this con- A Well-Acted Play tinued support.” Two days after January 27, Jones promised the Uzbek foreign minister a tripling of US aid to Uzbekistan Few doubt that the prolongation of the presidential term this year, to $160 million. Though Jones also proffered the paves the way for presidency for life for Karimov. The only obligatory rebuke for the referendum, the money surely spoke question is how the regime will achieve this by legal means, louder than her words. without directly contradicting the formalities of democ- racy. Such a stratagem may finally have been invented. Procedural Juggling Karimov’s presidency dates to March 1990, when the Su- preme Council of the Uzbek SSR elected him. (He was The artificially massive turnout and skewed results in the then First Secretary of the Central Committee of the Com- January referendum were constructed in a number of ways. munist Party of Uzbekistan.) In 1991, two months after Uzbek families have an average of six members, but cases Uzbekistan’s declaration of independence, the law of presi- where each eligible family member actually votes are rare. dential election was adopted, and the first nationwide elec- For many years, local electoral commissions have allowed tion for president was held on December 29 of the same year. Two candidates participated in that election— Alisher Ilkhamov is acting director of the Open Society Institute in Tashkent. Karimov and Muhammad Solikh, representing Erk (the

8 MIDDLE EAST REPORT 222 SPRING 2002 Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld with Uzbek President Islam Karimov in Tashkent, October 2001. EFREM LUKATSKY/AP PHOTO

Democratic Party). Karimov was elected with 86 percent No less notable was the well-acted play performed at of the vote. Solikh has lived abroad since 1993. Parliament’s second session in May of that year. Karimov gen- Karimov’s presidency was considered to have started when erously offered to consider the prolonged period as the sec- Uzbekistan adopted a new constitution in December 1992. ond official term of his presidency. In response to this request, The law of elections stipulated a term of five years for the parliamentarians formed a special committee to study the president. By the constitution, Karimov’s term should have opinions of the electorate. The committee came to the expired in 1997. However, in February 1995 members of unsurprising conclusion that the majority of the republic did the newly elected Parliament voted to conduct a referen- not support the president’s proposal. Under these circum- dum on prolongation of Karimov’s presidency from 1997 stances Parliament issued another resolution declaring the to 2000. On March 26, 1995, 99.6 percent of the electorate prolonged period to be the first term of Karimov’s presidency. voted to keep him in office. Thereby he kept the right to run for president one more time.

MIDDLE EAST REPORT 222 SPRING 2002 9 Meanwhile, in December 1997 the law of presidential the regional bosses. On one hand, the regional administra- elections was “corrected.” In the initial version of the law tions were given the right to nominate their own candidates the president could not serve more than two terms in a row. for the parliamentary deputies’ seats. On the other hand, But almost nobody noticed that in the new edition of the Karimov tried to promote his loyalists into Parliament. But law this stipulation was not mentioned. From a formally he has only partially succeeded: the last parliamentary elec- legal point of view, Karimov is not prohibited from running tions in 1999 revealed his inability to impose his creature, for a third term. Most likely, the regime regards this option the Fidokorlar party, as a major faction. The leader of as a last resort. Another way to secure the same aim legally is Fidokorlar was accompanied on his campaign tours of the to establish a new type of parlia- country by two of Karimov’s ad- ment which would adopt a new visers. Surprisingly, this did not constitution, setting yet another help. Fidokorlar won only 14 per- fresh starting point for the exist- The Bush administration’s tri- cent of the seats, while an infor- ing presidency. mal union of another party and pling of aid to Uzbekistan representatives of provincial ad- An Advance? ministrations jointly garnered 63 surely speaks louder than the percent of seats, maintaining a Transformation of the current State Department’s words of majority of sorts. not quite professional parliament The results of the 1999 elec- to a bicameral one where one protest over electoral engi- tions certainly did not satisfy chamber will work on a perma- Karimov and his circle. The fail- nent basis, as in Russia, can be neering. ure of Fidokorlar necessitated the considered an advance toward invention of a tool to gain con- controllable democracy. The trol over the potentially rebel- model of the Russian parliament has probably impressed lious parliament—by politically legitimate means. A Karimov—there, one-man governance proceeds without bicameral parliament appeared to satisfy at least two needs: being accused of a lack of democracy. On the exterior, ev- restructuring the parliament and presenting a new step to- erything looks like some Western democracies: the lower ward democratization to the outside world. The chamber is in the hands of professional politicians and po- professionalization of the parliament may be a move in a litical parties elected in competitive contests, while the desirable direction. But one should not underestimate the upper chamber gathers just several times a year. If the presi- hidden political context of the bicameral initiative. dent can control the majority of seats in the lower cham- ber, then his political superiority over all other bases of Tale of Two Portfolios power is guaranteed. It seems that a similar model is being introduced in In recent years countries in the former Soviet Union have Uzbekistan. Since all legally registered political parties in moved to a sort of controllable democracy. This type of Uzbekistan answer to the president, no one questions the regime combines the expansion of democratic-looking in- loyalty of future lower houses. The question is the loyalty stitutions with restricted civil liberties and human rights. of the upper chamber, which will certainly represent clan, Each country has taken a particular course, but in all coun- corporate and regional elites. So far the latter have con- tries the state bureaucracy is regaining control over the trolled the seats in Parliament. society and economy. From this point of view, Uzbekistan Although politically loyal, these elites were not always stands as an example of total dominance of the state and satisfied with Karimov’s policy. Despite coming to power central government over society. as a compromise political figure between regional bosses All this is unlikely to affect the ever-strengthening ties and the central government, later on Karimov distanced between the US and Uzbekistan. Too many benefits are himself from the provinces and successfully redistributed promised by the sudden opportunity for the US military power and national economic resources toward the center. to penetrate Central Asia at a time when Russia, tradition- He has managed to impose a strict hierarchy of executive ally the main opponent of US policy in Central Eurasia, is power, to gain full control over the key export sectors of obliged to contain its anti-Western rhetoric. At least until the economy and to subordinate all law enforcement agen- the end of the Bush presidency, US officials will probably cies to himself directly. This centralizing shift has forced travel to Uzbekistan with two portfolios: a thick one filled the discontented provincial elites to find indirect and hid- with gifts from business and the military and a slender den ways to resist the regime. One way was to challenge folder of complaints from critics of Karimov and his cro- the president in Parliament. In 1991 the parliament even nies. Such a policy will certainly satisfy the Uzbek regime, tried to throw Karimov out of office when he was openly which will endeavor where possible not to anger the inter- criticized by some deputies loyal to Vice President national community with too harsh crackdowns on dissi- Shukrullo Mirsaidov, who was later on sacked. dents, and even to demonstrate good will, while remaining Since that time, Karimov has played a double game with careful not to relax its iron grip on power.

10 MIDDLE EAST REPORT 222 SPRING 2002 “Security Assistance” Bonanza After September 11

Regional support for George W. Bush’s “war on terrorism” has not come cheap. Drowned out in the fanfare surrounding the US aid packages for reconstruction of Afghanistan has been news of massive outflows of military aid to neighboring countries. The bulk of the “security assistance” came in two chunks: the emergency supplemental appropriations bill of October 2001, which gave the administration and Con- gress $20 billion each to allocate, and the foreign appropriations bill passed last December 19. Much of this aid has gone to regimes with highly dubious human rights records. The chart below does not include several new arms sales currently in the pipeline, mostly to Egypt and Israel, but also to Oman, Turkey and the United Arab Emirates. Rewards for regional allies in the war are likely to continue. Bush’s 2003 budget request opens the floodgates even further, promising significant increases in aid to Jordan, India, Oman, Pakistan, Yemen and others. Some of this aid seems destined to exacerbate rather than calm regional tensions. In the White House proposal, for instance, military aid to Paki- stan—until September under US sanctions because of its nuclear testing and the military coup in 1998—rockets from nothing this year to $50 million. India would receive the same amount, again up from nothing.

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MIDDLE EAST REPORT 222 SPRING 2002 11 WAR WITHOUT BORDERS

Hajji Sattar describes how his son Ameen was injured in a US airstrike, Kandahar hospital, January 2002. JOHN MOORE/AP PHOTO Victims of Circumstance Anthony Shadid

A definitive toll of Afghan civilians killed by US bombs will probably prove impossible. But it is becoming clear that US claims that fewer civilians have died in Operation Enduring Freedom than in any previous campaign are likely untrue.

t was 3 am in Qala Niazi when the drone of US bombers an occasion that had drawn guests and relatives from rumbling through the night sky awoke villagers sleeping Jalalabad in the east, Khost in the south and the nearby Ioff a night of festivities last December 29. Within half an city of Gardez. Because they had traveled long distances, hour, a storm of sound and fury unleashed by the warplanes on roads particularly treacherous after the Taliban’s hasty had ended, and the hamlet was no longer. December 29 retreat, many chose to spend the night in the cluster of was the morning after 15-year old Inzar’s wedding party, walled compounds built of dried mud and hay. The bombs entombed many of them, including the bride and groom. Anthony Shadid, staff writer for the Boston Globe, visited Afghanistan in January 2002. Strewn across the sun-baked plain in southern Afghani-

12 MIDDLE EAST REPORT 222 SPRING 2002 stan was the detritus of their lives—a pillow adorned with attacks that saw US forces expend 18,000 bombs, mis- red roses, a purple mattress, a suitcase and a dusty blue siles and other ordnance since October 7, 2001. water pitcher. A report from the Project on Defense Alternatives, a The Pentagon said the B-52 bomber and two B1-B private think tank, estimated conservatively that 1,000 bombers were targeting senior Taliban and al-Qaeda lead- to 1,300 had died by the end of December. This report ers and speculated that the destruction was made worse projects that Afghan civilians were killed at a higher rate by an ammunition depot at the site. Defense Secretary than in the Kosovo bombing campaign. Donald Rumsfeld said “multiple intelligence sources” had Whatever the count, the toll has raised questions confirmed the target. Villagers, hospital officials and the among those supporting the war about the effective- UN say the victims were civilians. The UN put the num- ness of bombing—still a blunt instrument despite talk ber of dead at 52, nearly half of them children. Villagers of precision weapons—in targeting a relatively small said at least 80 people were killed. The director of the group of combatants. Civilians were rarely warned of hospital in nearby Gardez said 100 had died. attacks and apparently never in areas populated by More certain than the numbers was the anger that lin- Pashtuns, the largest Afghan ethnic group that formed gered weeks later. “Try to understand. Nobody is here. the backbone of the defeated Taliban. More and more, Why are you sending planes and bombing us? Nobody is Afghans claim intelligence provided to US forces by here,” said Bai Jan, a 45 year-old man from neighboring local factions was motivated as much by settling scores Spin Kalay who said he helped bury what was left of the as eliminating cadres of al-Qaeda. bodies to hide them from Afghans who bore the wandering dogs. brunt of bombing are an- gry and confused—sen- Who’s Counting Afghans who bore the brunt of bomb- timents that contrast with the popularity the In the history of the US ing are angry and confused—senti- US government enjoys military campaign in Af- ments that contrast with the popularity elsewhere in the country. ghanistan that began in From Qala Niazi to October, Qala Niazi, the US government enjoys elsewhere Zhawar Kili along the about 100 miles south Pakistani border, from of Kabul, will likely in the country. Herat in the west to stand out. Zadran in the Pashtun It remains one of the heartland, scenes of grief, highest civilian tolls from bombing at a single site. It loss and flight have been repeated across a landscape de- marked the first time the UN went public with specific fined like no other by war. concerns about the unintended consequences of US strikes. And the Pentagon’s defense foreshadowed the On the Winning Side? growing questions the US military would face in defend- ing bombing and attacks that killed innocents in the pur- Ishaq Suleiman was a village that always saw the Taliban suit of an elusive clique of Taliban and al-Qaeda leaders as invaders. But the warren of mud huts congregated out- who—in remarkable numbers—have managed to escape side the city of Herat had the misfortune of calling a the American dragnet. Taliban base its neighbor. After the US campaign began While the Pentagon has insisted since the start of the in October, the Taliban sent tanks, artillery and their once conflict that it will not keep track of the numbers killed ubiquitous pickups to the village for cover. Villagers knew in US attacks, a fuller picture has begun to emerge of the consequences. civilian casualties through visits to bombing sites by jour- In this Dari-speaking region that hoped to be on the nalists and others. winning side in the war, people heard warnings in Dari The accounting remains incomplete: Afghanistan is and Pashtun to leave the area, apparently aired by Ameri- home to some of the world’s most rugged terrain, with cans in aircraft overhead. They saw the bombing of the entire regions cut off in winter. Impassable roads and base less than a mile away. They even banded together to growing lawlessness make travel risky. The dead are bur- put stones in the street to stop the Taliban vehicles from ied quickly—by tradition, before sundown on the day of entering. “But we didn’t leave our houses,” said Ghaus-u deaths—making a tally difficult even days after bombs Din, 45, his black turban askew in the winter wind. “If land. But it is becoming clear that claims by Rumsfeld we left, thieves would come and steal all our belongings.” and other US military officials that fewer civilians have On November 1, the war arrived in Ishaq Suleiman, died in Operation Enduring Freedom than in any previ- flashes of light matched by sounds of shattered glass. Resi- ous campaign are likely untrue. A definitive toll will prob- dents say dozens of bombs landed in the village on five ably prove impossible, but there is little question that at days over a nearly two-week period. In all, according to least 1,000 civilians died, and likely many more, in AREA, an Afghan non-governmental organization funded

MIDDLE EAST REPORT 222 SPRING 2002 13 The Shape of Afghanistan to Come Anthony Shadid

n a cold January morning, Uzbekistan opened its ing their claims to fiefdoms that pay tribute to Karzai Ofirst mission in its battered neighbor to the south but increasingly go their own way: Ismail Khan in with as much ceremony as weary Afghanistan could Herat, Gul Agha Shirzai in Kandahar, Hajji Abdul- muster: generals were in uniforms, bureaucrats in Qadir in Jalalabad, warlords and loosely affiliated Western suits and delegates from the rugged hinter- commanders in nine provinces, and Dostum, who land wore their traditional pakul. has stated that the future government “must an- Officials doled out praise for the depth of ties be- swer the needs and wishes of people in the regions.” tween the Central Asian nations, and gracious thanks Courting these statelets in the making are the coun- went to Afghanistan’s interim leader, Hamid Karzai. tries that have long vied for influence in Afghanistan: But the mission was not inaugurated the Afghan capi- Iran to the west, Uzbekistan and Turkmenistan to the tal of Kabul, but in Mazar-e Sharif, a commercial city north, Russia and India, always eager to frustrate the in the north. The real celebrity was not Karzai, but ambitions of neighboring Pakistan. Abdul Rashid Dostum, a burly Soviet-trained general- When it comes to nascent state-building, Dostum— turned-warlord who speaks Uzbek and, most impor- known to his soldiers as “the wrestler”—has perhaps tantly, brings guns and money to the region he rules. the most to show. Television in Mazar comes from the Four months after the fall of the Taliban, the new Uzbek capital of Tashkent, and the city’s currency is Afghanistan is beginning to look more and more like known as junbushi, an Afghan note that Dostum the Afghanistan of old. printed before the Taliban took over and that operates Outside Kabul, from which the US-backed interim by an exchange rate different from the government- government extends its shaky writ over five prov- minted currency. It takes its name from Junbush Milli, inces at best, familiar faces are back. They are stak- the armed movement that Dostum has led.

by the German government that tracked civilian casual- was a man with a gray beard. I saw there was another ties, 12 people were killed and 14 wounded. The bomb- body in front of me. He was still alive, and he was ing affected 42 families, AREA said, and caused $17,350 screaming,” said Nabi, wearing a turban and khaki in damage. jacket. “I was running like a madman, here and there. Among the dead was 60-year old Hajji Mohammed, Then I saw my wife running toward me. When I got whose house was wrecked by a bomb that landed about to her, she told me our son and daughter were wounded 15 feet away in the dirt street outside. Its target was a in another village.” Taliban truck that villagers say had driven off half an The Pentagon, when asked about Ishaq Suleiman, said hour before. On a cold winter morning, Ghulam Nabi the village was occupied by forces of the Taliban’s 17th picked through the mud, hay and brick that was his Mechanized Infantry Division and 4th Armored Brigade. brother’s house—a solitary mud arch perched over the Even in villages, it said, trucks and equipment “were still rubble piled in his former bedroom. He remembered authorized military targets.” the night that he lost his brother, and his desperation to find his 12-year old son Ghaus-u Din and 7-year Convoy of Death old daughter Adila. “I heard an explosion and every- where was full of dust and smoke. I was desperately The US attack on a convoy December 20 in the restive looking for my daughter. I saw a body in front of me. southeastern region of Paktia has emerged as a case study I went up to it but there was smoke, dust and it was in the dangers of intelligence delivered by warlords and dark. I went closer and I touched the face and I saw it faction leaders to settle their own scores. The Pentagon

14 MIDDLE EAST REPORT 222 SPRING 2002 The city itself is better off than Kabul: the phones see his return as a way toward reconciliation. People work from Mazar to the four northern provinces have complained of nepotism within Khan’s ranks, Dostum controls. In his de facto capital, where he particularly in his appointments to military commands rides around in a convoy of a dozen pickup trucks and authority over trade across the Iranian border, a carrying soldiers with guns and rocket-propelled lucrative source of bribes and smuggling. grenades, Uzbekistan and Turkmenistan have So far both Dostum and Khan have sought to avoid opened their only missions in Afghanistan. public disagreements with Kabul. That’s proving less Dostum serves in the interim government as deputy the case in other more lawless regions, where US defense minister and says he is in contact every other bombing has continued and commanders and war- day with Defense Minister Mohammed Qasim Fahim. lords are aggressively vying for power. But Dostum, with the soldier’s lack of diplomacy, Hajji Abdul-Qadir holds tenuous sway in three prov- makes clear his intention. Seated at a table after the inces in the east that have come to define the banditry ceremony to open the Uzbek mission, he predicted and looting many fear will spread elsewhere. UN offi- that the only viable government in Afghanistan would cials openly acknowledge the warlords are stealing be the one that “will be in accordance with realities.” tons of donated food that pour into the eastern city of In just months, Herat, a city once home to some Jalalabad every month. Most residents don’t wait for of the Muslim world’s most esteemed poets, paint- the 9 pm curfew—they secure themselves in their ers and architects, has come to rival Mazar in the homes as soon as darkness falls. autonomy it enjoys. The city and surrounding region To the south, Gul Agha, a former governor in the is run by Ismail Khan, who like Dostum has reclaimed 1990s, has proven to be a wildcard in relations with his authority of old. A famed guerrilla commander, Kabul, despite the support provided by US Special Khan had taken over after the Soviet withdrawal in Forces. Like Karzai, he is a Pashtun. Unlike Karzai, he 1989 and ruled, with a degree of popular support, has a force of thousands of fighters who answer di- until the arrival of the Taliban. They swept him from rectly to him, and he has set out to disarm his oppo- power and later put him in jail, but his escape in 2000 nents in the four provinces he controls in the south, added to his mystique. He sought refuge in Iran, home to key smuggling routes from Pakistan. Agha, a which has supported his return with the dispatch of man who shot his father’s killer and hung his trophy aid, military advisers and thousands of weapons. from a tree, will speak only to Karzai, and not to the Since his return, Khan has moved against potential Tajiks in the interim government. Agha, like the other opponents. He has arrested supporters of exiled King warlords, is keeping the fledgling institutions of gov- Zahir Shah, a nostalgic figure for some Afghans who ernment at arm’s length. says the convoy was carrying Taliban leaders; survivors ing to help. “Everybody was climbing up the mountains, claim the convoy was bringing tribal leaders to the inau- trying to hide,” remembered Musa, standing in front of guration of Hamid Karzai, Afghanistan’s interim leader, the gutted remains of his home. Charred trees were and that it was targeted by a warlord seeking to eliminate snapped like toothpicks, and a burned car sat idly in his rivals. front. Four craters 20 feet deep marked a path about 30 The debate over the convoy’s identity paid less atten- feet long that tore through the house and down the hill tion to the attacks’ other targets: a cluster of nearby homes in front. and a village about six miles away that was bombed hours Musa Khan insists his family were victims of circum- later. The results were no less devastating. The aerial as- stance and had no connections to the Taliban, despite the sault there spanned miles, persisted into the next morn- presence of a nearby Taliban base. “Why did Americans ing and—according to villagers—left dozens dead. do this to us? We are not Arabs, we are not Taliban. We are Musa Khan’s family was among the first victims. Ten ordinary people,’’ said Khan, who buried his family in a minutes after hitting the convoy, warplanes struck his cemetery three hours away at the clan’s ancestral village. house on a hill where relatives from two other houses By 3 am the US attack was broadened to the village of had gathered. Twelve were killed—Musa’s four brothers Bekhere, a half-hour drive away along a riverbed in a shel- and three sisters, plus two cousins and three aunts. The tered valley that the Pentagon has described as “an active 22-year old villager, his face weathered by the sun, was staging and coordinating base for al-Qaeda activities.” The tending his sheep and goats when the attack started and bombing lasted until noon. Villagers say 63 people were watched the scene from a distance. He could do noth- killed, perhaps more; an Afghan non-governmental group

MIDDLE EAST REPORT 222 SPRING 2002 15 that tracked casualties in the region put the number at 44. military target. Were civilians killed? Possibly. If they were The village was targeted, residents say, because the con- killed, they were killed because they were in the vicinity voy stopped in front of it, trying to leave the valley by of a military target.” another road. The route, they say, was snowed in, forcing Khanzad Gul, director of the hospital in Gardez, about the convoy to turn around and go back out. The flicker three miles from the village, called the attack “a misun- of their car lights proved fatal. “They stopped over there,” derstanding.” “They think anyone who grew beards is an said 26-year old Bala Khan, pointing at the road that ran al-Qaeda member,” said bearded Gul. If that’s the case, along the village. “They turned off their lights but the he commented, “they should take me. But I’m a doctor airplane had already seen them.” and I did my study in [Soviet] Russia.” His two brothers were killed in the attack, and his home, Villagers said the houses in Qala Niazi belonged to along with 15 other buildings, was destroyed. The ruins the Niazi clan, a far-flung Pashtun family of former cut a swatch of destruction along nomads. The houses were built the side of the hill. about five years ago on a wide As with others in Bekhere, plain bordered on one side by Bala still wears the face of dis- “This bombing was not a a snow-capped range, and on belief, his eyes blinking in rapid the other by formidable moun- fire. His words pour out: “I have mistake. This was a military tains painted in reds, purples, nothing left. Even the cloak on browns and grays. Other ham- my shoulder is borrowed from target,” said a Pentagon lets were clustered along the someone else.” spokesman. plain. The surrounding prov- ince of Paktia was long a “In the Vicinity” Taliban stronghold, and a com- pound said to house its soliders Weeks after the bombing of Qala Niazi, the landscape a mile or so away bore the signs of a recent bombing. was still littered with tattered sandals, a baby’s shoe and Gul and another hospital official, Nur Mohammed, said shredded women’s clothes, some of them embroidered in the Taliban in the region were from Kandahar and had greens, purples and oranges. A mattress lay near a can of fled back to that province after the fall of Kabul in No- vegetable oil and a metal canister spilling flour. Nearby vember. “Everybody escaped the area. Nobody is here,” was an empty sack of wheat emblazoned with USA and Mohammed said. two clasped hands, the symbol of the US Agency for In- ternational Development. Too Close to Tora Bora “Is this Taliban?” asked Jan, holding a baby’s green san- dal in his hands made dirty by rummaging in the rubble. The bombing over nearly two weeks in January of a vast “Is this al-Qaeda or Taliban? No.” complex of caves tucked in a dusty ravine near the Paki- Jan and another villager, 55-year old Niaz Mohammed, stani border was the last sustained, but possibly most in- said at least ten villagers ran from the village after the conclusive, attack in the American air war. The Pentagon bombing began. The UN, citing a reliable source, put claims the strikes destroyed dozens of buildings and sealed the number at 10 to 20. They were all killed by other more than 50 caves that hid Taliban and al-Qaeda opera- bombs about 100 yards away. At that site, three deep tun- tives. Villagers and local commanders say the base was nels, possibly dug by bombs designed to destroy bunkers, effectively abandoned—by Arab fighters before the air lay open. Into one cascaded a canal that once carried water war even began, by Afghans within days of the first bombs to a nearby village. Dried blood was still spattered on the falling in the country. “Nobody was here. It was empty,” dirt, and a fragment of bone lay nearby. said Khali Gul, a villager standing amid charred willow There was no doubt that ammunition was stored at trees, red brick and a junkyard of destroyed weaponry— the site—though villagers differed on how it got there. artillery, tanks and a century-old cannon with wooden At one of the five compounds, piles were still stacked like wheels. More numerous in the Zhawar area were civil- a bountiful harvest, the metallic green of the cases re- ians, dangerously exposed in villages perched atop the flecting the sun. cliffs that sheltered US-backed mujahideen at the base in US military spokesmen said the presence of the am- the 1980s, then the Taliban, Arabs and other foreign fight- munition made Qala Niazi a “valid military target.” They ers in the 1990s. did not rule out civilian deaths in the village, but placed Local commanders and villagers say that in Zhawar Kili, the blame on al-Qaeda and the Taliban. Lt. Col. Dave less than a mile away, US bombing killed seven people and Lapan at the Pentagon cited the discrepancies in the ca- destroyed at least ten homes. In Zanshura Kili, about a mile sualty estimates. “Even people on the ground can’t agree away, eight people were killed and three homes destroyed. In on what the numbers are,” Lapan told the Boston Globe. other villages—Lali Kili and Shudyac Kili—at least 40 homes “It goes to the nature of what is a civilian and what is a were damaged or destroyed, they said. The strikes forced 3,000 combatant. This bombing was not a mistake. This was a people to flee their homes. Many headed for Pakistan.

16 MIDDLE EAST REPORT 222 SPRING 2002 For 25 years In These Times has provided readers with an NEW! in-depth look at issues that the mainstream media gloss over. Subscribe to and Purchase In These Times covers the labor movement, environmental issues, feminism, grassroots politics, Back Issues of minority communities and the media itself like no other magazine. In These Times’ investigative Middle East Report online. reporting provides news you can’t get anywhere else. Check out www.merip.org

At one point during the attacks, the bombing was so fierce and the villagers so isolated that a group of them decided to embark on a 20-mile trek through ravines and over hilltops to Khost. They went to the city’s mar- ket, where by loudspeaker, they pleaded for help in dig- ging out the bodies and burying the dead. “Only innocent people died in those bombings,” said Zawar Khan, a 38-year old commander who lived in Zhawar Kili. “None of those people are dying,” he said, point- ing to the remnants of the base that once housed Taliban and al-Qaeda. The Pentagon averred even in January that the base remained “a staging point for escaping al-Qaeda mem- bers.” But the scenes there told a different story. In Zhawar Kili, a red, blue and green pillow sat in one of four 30- foot craters. The carcass of a cow rotted in the sun, its A 1-YEAR, 24-ISSUE $ 95 head still tied to a post laying on the ground. A cot jut- SUBSCRIPTION IS ONLY 19 ted from the side of a hill, like a fractured bone. Along another crater was a broken tea set. Next to it was a child’s VISIT US ON THE WEB AT red sandal. The other sandal was a few feet away in a box inthesetimes.com with a yellow comb, beads and a small plate. Mawla Jan, whose house was destroyed, was digging CALL: 1(800) 827-0270 through the rubble, his black shirt soiled with dirt and sweat. He said he lost 60 sheep and goats and the equiva- OR WRITE TO: IN THESE TIMES, P.O. Box 1912 lent of $6,000 in Pakistani rupees that he had safeguarded Mt Morris, IL 61054-9885 in the house. “Everything has been destroyed,” he said, MENTION CODE AFR02 TO GET THIS GREAT DEAL waving his dirty hands. “Nothing is left for us. All we have are the clothes we wear. What should I say to the government, what should I say to the United States? They destroyed us. What should I say to them?” “It’s cruel,” he continued, shaking his head. “The base is there and they hit our house here. It’s cruel. How can I convince the Americans that none of al-Qaeda and Taliban are here?” Echoing others, he added softly, “You have to be sure.”

MIDDLE EAST REPORT 222 SPRING 2002 17 Afghan refugee women fleeing the province of Kandahar cross the Pakistani border at Chaman, October 2001. BANARAS KHAN/AFP Afghan Women Bombed to Be Liberated? Saba Gul Khattak When we are hungry, nobody listens, but when we are fighting, they send us loads of firearms and artillery. Why? — Zubaida (April 1998).

he US bombing of Afghanistan, indiscriminate by its and repressive, even small displays of joy are outlawed. very nature, was partly justified as an attempt to free Children aren’t allowed to fly kites, their mothers face TAfghan women from the shackles of the Taliban. As beatings for laughing out loud.” She concluded that “the First Lady Laura Bush, delivering the weekly radio presi- brutal oppression of women is a central goal of the ter- dential address, said: “Life under the Taliban is so hard rorists” and that the Taliban’s treatment of women and Saba Gul Khattak is deputy director and research fellow at the Sustainable Development children is a clear picture of “the world the terrorists would Policy Institute in Islamabad, Pakistan. like to impose on the rest of us.” Shortly thereafter, the

18 MIDDLE EAST REPORT 222 SPRING 2002 State Department issued a nine-page report on what it the early 1990s, under the communist-backed govern- called “The Taliban’s War Against Women.” George W. ments, women held 70 percent of teachers’ jobs as well as Bush reinforced the same theme almost a month later: 50 percent of government jobs and 40 percent of medical “For several years the people of Afghanistan have suffered posts in Afghanistan. under one of the most brutal regimes in modern history— a regime allied with terrorists and a regime at war with High Cost of War women. Thanks to our military and our allies, and the brave fighters of Afghanistan, the Taliban regime is com- Although progress on women’s rights in Afghanistan was ing to an end.” undeniably slow, it was reversed when the US-backed Omitted from this lofty discourse was the fact that mujahideen took over in April 1992. This government Northern Alliance soldiers, those “brave fighters of Af- had no national policy on women’s rights—indeed, it was ghanistan,” have a reputation for looting and rape that itself hardly a viable government, as infighting among dif- makes Afghan women distinctly uncomfortable. Ignored ferent factions led to a complete breakdown of order. in Bush’s celebrations of victory was the fact that over the Under these circumstances of open looting and murder, course of just one month, the US dropped over half a many refugees who had returned from Pakistan and Iran million tons of bombs—approximately 20 kilograms of went back to the host countries, along with new refugees high explosive for every man, woman and child in the who had previously cooperated with the different com- country. Forgotten in the US media is the fact that Af- munist-backed governments. The internecine fighting was ghan women experienced various patriarchal controls brought to an end in 1996 when the Taliban took over emanating from the government before the Taliban took more than 80 percent of the country with assistance from over. Such controls began to tighten in the refugee camps Pakistan’s Inter-Services Intelligence Directorate (ISI). in Pakistan more than 20 years ago. In Afghanistan this The Taliban achieved overnight popularity, initially, be- process commenced when Kabul was conquered by the cause they promised to bring peace and security to a coun- US-backed mujahideen. try torn by war. However, the Taliban’s promises came with a high cost for women. Slow Progress The decrees of the Taliban government regarding the status and rights of women won them no favor with any- Almost 100 years ago, Afghanistan’s monarch Amir Abdur one—not even the conservative Islamic governments. Rehman Khan decreed that women should receive the rights In Pakistan, the conservative Jamiat-e Islami chief Qazi granted to them in Islam. His decrees included attempts to Hussain Ahmed criticized the Taliban’s policy of deny- outlaw child marriage and forced marriage and to protect ing women the right to education and employment.2 women’s and especially widows’ right to inheritance and sec- But inspiration for the Taliban’s attitudes and policies ond marriage, a woman’s right to divorce, and the right to toward women came from the 343 refugee camps that claim her mehr (dowry). However, the monarch “denied had been established across the Northwest Frontier Prov- women full freedom of expression and mobility by decree- ince and Balchistan province of Pakistan, with the sup- ing that men were entitled to full control over women be- port of various Western countries. In these camps, cause ‘the honor of the people of Afghanistan consists in the Afghan refugee men received training and indoctrina- honor of their women.’”1 When Queen Surraya removed tion from different secret agencies, the most important the veil and came out in public in 1929, the issue of purdah of which were the CIA and its smaller partner, the ISI.3 (segregation) for many urban elite Afghan women appeared Refugees could only register for entitlement to food and to have been settled. shelter after declaring allegiance to one of the seven Afghanistan’s constitutions have granted women equal political parties crafted by the ISI. In turn, these politi- rights with men since 1923. Women got the right to vote cal parties channeled military hardware, men and finan- with the 1964 constitution. The 1977 constitution, pro- cial aid to warlords in Afghanistan. The men who mulgated by a pro-communist government, said that “the registered were required to go back and fight in Afghani- entire people of Afghanistan, women and men, without stan after receiving training in a border camp. Extremely discrimination have equal rights and obligations before the strict codes of behavior, enforced through the frequent law.” The same government issued a decree that stated that circulation of fatwas (religious edicts) and ultra-conser- it wanted to remove the “unjust patriarchal feudalistic re- vative interpretations of Afghan culture and traditions, lations between husband and wife.” These decrees had lim- were imposed upon the women in camps. One fatwa ited impact, largely because the social relations within read (in part): “We declare that women, without neces- which the hold of the family is embedded did not undergo sity, do not have the right to go out in the public and in significant change. While women were encouraged to en- the schools. We ask the leaders to forbid Muslim women, roll in universities and to take jobs in government as well according to the sharia texts, to go to the schools. If as business and the service sector, this phenomenon was this action is not taken, the success of jihad will turn to restricted to the elite in urban areas where women had be- failure and we will face harsh problems.”4 The connec- come visible over the course of two to three decades. By tion between this environment for women and the suc-

MIDDLE EAST REPORT 222 SPRING 2002 19 Northern Alliance soldier mans a checkpoint near Pol-e-Khumri, northern Afghanistan, December 2001. TIM DIRVEN/PANOS PICTURES cess of the jihad is clear. The checks on women’s mobil- cal foot soldiers for the struggle with India in Kashmir. ity and literacy gave Afghan men psychological assur- Both Pakistani and Afghan women were surprised at ance that their women would not be interacting with the curbs that were placed on them during the rule of Zia other men in person or in writing in their absence. Given and successor governments. The former faced discrimi- this background, it comes as no surprise that the Taliban, natory legislation introduced by the military government after taking over in Afghanistan, pursued the gender and the latter faced multiple restrictions ranging from politics they had imbibed in the camps in Pakistan. denial of access to equal rights, mobility and education to marriage and divorce. Afghan patriarchal culture was Patriarchal Policies the convenient scapegoat, while the massive donor sup- port that buttressed this “culture” received a free pass. The conservative ideologies espoused in these camps with For example, the ten-year $87 million income genera- regard to women fit into socio-political trends in Paki- tion project for refugee areas known as IGPRA did not stan as a whole during the 1970s and 1980s. During this provide a job for a single Afghan refugee woman (who period, religion was used effectively to prop up the 11- constitute the majority of the refugee population). The year military dictatorship of Zia ul Haq, whose self-pro- donors—in this case the UN High Commissioner for claimed mandate was to Islamize the country, from its Refugees and the World Bank—explained this policy by economy to its schools. Afghan refugee camps in Paki- saying that Afghan men frowned upon such ventures.5 stan, with an estimated population of over 3.5 million by 1992, were excellent breeding grounds for radical con- Ruptures in Repression servative ideas. Not only did they produce mujahideen for the fight against the Soviets in Afghanistan, but they It is important to note several ruptures in the Taliban’s also provided the Pakistani military with highly ideologi- repression of women, not to let the Taliban off the hook,

20 MIDDLE EAST REPORT 222 SPRING 2002 but to assert that the agency of Afghan women, if greatly such missions in the future.9 Despite appearing unwill- limited, was present even under their rule. Some women ing to spend time with actual Afghan women, and de- doctors were able to negotiate with the more moderate spite the AWN’s adverse reactions to her, King has mullahs to continue their work in hospitals. The best- continued to speak for Afghan women after September known example is Suhaila Sidiq, a surgeon, who contin- 11 in her capacity as special adviser to the UN on gender ued to work in a military hospital where she attended to issues and the advancement of women. Before a UN Se- both male and female patients and organized medical curity Council meeting in December 2001 on reconstruc- courses for women.6 Similarly, there were thousands of tion aid, King was quoted as saying: “Between myself, ghost schools for girls in people’s homes, and the govern- [Lakhdar] Brahimi, the UNIFEM leaders, as well as the ment chose to look the other way. During the latter part other ambassadors, international NGOs and prominent of their rule, the Taliban agreed to open formal schools women leaders who have written in support of these for girls in Kabul and Kandahar, Mullah Omar’s native women’s issues, there is a very good chance that [Afghan city. The Taliban were also persuaded by the World Food women’s] voices will be heard.”10 Program (WFP) to allow Afghan women to run bakeries from White Man’s Burden which the WFP supplied subsi- dized bread to Afghans. Afghan Slow progress on Afghan Women have frequently been women frequently challenged the women’s rights was re- used as pawns in colonial and Taliban’s Wahhabi interpretation neocolonial discourse, and the of Islam, implying that it ema- versed when the US-backed recent example of Afghanistan is nated from the funding they re- no exception. The British pointed ceived from Saudi Arabia. Women mujahideen took over. to practices of child marriage, sati chose to wear the traditional and purdah, to indicate the un- “shuttlecock” burqa rather than civilized treatment of Indian the Arab hijab that some Taliban attempted to enforce. women by Indian men and to justify their colonization Instead, many women told the Taliban to don Arab-style of India. British colonial decrees introducing these sub- dress themselves.7 ject populations to “civilized” norms—the White Man’s Throughout the Taliban’s grip on the country, some Afghan women continued to be employed, some contin- ued to attend school and some negotiated with the rul- ing clergy to continue their professional work. After the Taliban, the veil has not been abandoned by many Af- Unveiling Traditions ghan women who feel more secure with it than without Postcolonial Islam in a Polycentric World it. “Give me security and then I will remove my burqa,” ANOUAR MAJID said Nasreen.8 Some women assert that Afghan women’s problem was not so much the veil but the rule that they “This excellent book is full of passionate, polemi- needed to be accompanied by a male relative when they cal scholarship. Majid covers a wide-ranging stepped out of the house. This rule, now officially lifted, territory—the persistence of ‘orientalist’ created many practical problems for them—in public discourse, ‘Arab’ nationalism, ‘Islamic fundamen- transport, for instance—and sowed a fear of beatings from talism,’ postcolonial criticism, a critique of the police. Despite the clear linkage of the veil in real capitalism, contemporary Muslim feminist scholar- Afghan women’s lives to wider social mores and issues of ship, and (black) African novels from Islamic personal safety, the veil continues to be simplistically as- cultural backgrounds. [A] timely book....”—Abdul sociated in US discourse with the Taliban. JanMohamed, University of California, Berkeley The agency of Afghan women, under the Taliban and after their fall, has not always been appreciated by their “There are few academics writing today who draw self-proclaimed international champions. In their report on the cultural and literary range that Majid does following the visit to Pakistan of the UN Gender Mis- here.”—Leila N. Ahmed, author of Women and sion headed by Angela King, the Afghan Women Net- Gender in Islam work (AWN)—made up of professional Afghan refugee women in Pakistan—stated that they were left “confused, 240 pages, paper $18.95 insulted, hurt, angry and substantially ignored… [A]part from the Taliban, no one else has humiliated Afghan women as Ms. King has.” The AWN noted that “this is Duke University Press not an unusual situation—neither within our society, nor toll-free 1-888-651-0122 www.dukeupress.edu within the UN agencies where we work,” and goes on to state that they would not be prepared to accommodate

MIDDLE EAST REPORT 222 SPRING 2002 21 Afghan refugee woman sweeps up sheep droppings for fuel in a camp outside Mazar-i Sharif. TIM DIRVEN/PANOS PICTURES

Burden—purported to be rescuing brown women from around the world, whether waged by homegrown nation- brown men. In a throwback to this thinking, US discourse alists or assisted by outsiders, for using women as a re- on Afghan women, with its implicit claim to know all source to be mobilized against the colonizer; as soon as Afghan women and children, advocated bombing them national liberation is achieved, women are put back un- in order to liberate them. The US representation of Af- der stronger patriarchal controls.11 Can one say that the ghan women as a hapless illiterate lot who were not even case of Afghan women is somewhat similar, if more dis- allowed to laugh out loud, stripped of rights and by ex- appointing, as Afghan women did not even experience tension of consciousness, is as colonial as the British idea the shared moment of triumph? In fact, their oppression of the White Man’s Burden. Furthermore, the betterment intensified with the bombing due to their fear of death of Afghan women’s lives is no longer a central theme of and destruction of their neighborhoods and communi- Bush administration pronouncements, as the Taliban and ties. It matters little to Afghan women made refugees by the strengthened patriarchal culture in conjunction with the bombing whether the bombs were manufactured in the war were perceived to be the problems. While no one the US or in the former Soviet Union; what matters to contests that Taliban edicts denied women their rights them is that bombs forced them to flee their homes. As across the board, the root causes of Afghan women’s op- one recent arrival in Pakistan explained, “Fighting erupted pression, personified for a few years by the Taliban, re- and it reached Kabul.” Said another woman, with under- side elsewhere. Women’s needs and priorities are hardly statement: “The circumstances became unbearable.” ever fulfilled by the kind of politics and policies that are These refugee women underscore the need for peace. One entrenched within the current system of unequal social respondent, when asked if her son would wage jihad, relations, a system that every so often requires masculinist immediately emphasized that he would only work to es- violence disproportionately borne by women to right it- tablish peace. This response contrasts with those of moth- self. ers 20 years ago who were willing to sacrifice their sons’ Nothing can justify the bombing of Afghanistan, least lives for the war.12 of all the so-called liberation of Afghan women. Femi- The removal of the Taliban has not achieved the libera- nists have long criticized national liberation struggles tion of Afghan women; indeed, in many places Afghan

22 MIDDLE EAST REPORT 222 SPRING 2002 Instruments,” Proceedings of the Seminar on Women’s Human Rights in Afghanistan, Mazar- women could be more insecure at present than before Sep- e Sharif, 1994. tember 11. Warlords associated with Gen. Abdul Rashid 2 Interview with Qazi Hussain Ahmed, 1999. 3 This indoctrination was possible for a number of reasons. On the one hand, Afghan refugees Dostum, deputy defense minister in the Afghan interim in Pakistan from rural areas believed that they had left their homeland due to the takeover of government, as well as soldiers of the erstwhile Northern the godless Russians whom it was their religious duty to fight. Anti-Soviet governments took advantage of this belief in jihad to create a fighting force of mujahideen where none had Alliance, are reported to have attacked and raped Pashtun existed before. In the 1970s Islam was a handy driving ideology, having appeared to reassert women living in northern Af- itself in very powerful ways in the Iranian revolution, 13 the success of the PNA campaign in Pakistan on the ghanistan with impunity. basis of Nizam-e Mustapha, the emergence of resistance in the Central Asian republics and defiance of the Saudi Dostum protects the attack- monarchy in Mecca when a group of disaffected ers from feeble attempts at The war on the Taliban, like nationals took over the Kaaba. 4 The full text of the fatwa is quoted in Khattak, law enforcement. As the “Militarization, Masculinity and Identity in Pakistan: Northern Alliance entered British colonialism, purported Effects on Women,” in Nighat Saeed Khan and Afiya Shehrbano Zia, eds., Unveiling the Issues (Lahore: ASR different cities in the wake of to be rescuing brown women Publications, 1995). the bombing, there were con- 5 Khattak, “Refugee Policy Politics: Afghans in Pakistan,” paper presented at the Conference on sistent reports of looting and from brown men. Refugees and Displaced Persons in South Asia, murder wherein Pashtuns Rajendrapur, Bangladesh, 1998. 6 Catherine Hours, “Afghan Women Return to Power were targeted in ugly scenes Corridors,” Dawn, December 23, 2001. of violence in reprisal for their 7 Nafisa Shah, “The War Against Women,” Newsline, April 1998. 14 alleged support of the mostly Pashtun Taliban. As war- 8 News International, January 31, 2002. lords and deep insecurity reemerge in Afghanistan, many 9 Cassandra Balchin, “United Against the UN,” Newsline, April 1998. refugee women in Pakistan still refuse to repatriate—but 10 Janelle Brown, “Putting the World on Notice,” Salon.com, December 6, 2001. 11 See, for example, Kumari Jayawardena, Feminism and Nationalism in the Third World their voices are absent from the news now that US inter- (London: Zed Books, 1986) and Valentine Moghadam, Gender and National Identity: Women ests have been served. and Politics in Muslim Societies (London: Zed Books, 1984). 12 For a more detailed account, see Saba Gul Khattak, “Violence and Home: Afghan Women’s Experience of Displacement” in Craig Calhoun and Paul Price, eds., Understanding September Author’s Note: Thanks to Lubna Chaudry for her comments on 11 (New York: New Press, forthcoming). this article. 13 Anna Badkhen, “Reports of Rape, Looting by Afghan Militiamen,” San Francisco Chronicle, February 15, 2002. Endotes 14 For example, Rory McCarthy and Nicholas Watt, “Alliance Accused of Brutality in Capture of Kunduz,” The Guardian, November 27, 2001; Suzanne Goldenberg, “Gun Terror of Kabul’s 1 Nancy Hatch Dupree, “Afghan Women in the Context of International Women’s Rights Liberators,” The Observer, January 13, 2002.

The Center for Contemporary Arab Studies Announces its 2002 Annual Spring Symposium The Arab Novel: Visions of Social Reality

With a focus on the Arab novel, this Symposium seeks to promote awareness of the Arab world’s rich and vibrant literary tradition; to examine the cultural relationships between East and West; and to explore the humanistic aspects of Arab society and culture. A number of prominent Arab novelists, literary critics, and scholars from the Arab world, Europe, and the United States will present papers and engage in discussion on topics including: Theorizing about the Novel: Modernity and Post-Modernity, Masked Identity: The Novel as Autobiography, Arabian Nights, The Novel of War and Politics, The Arab Novel Between Cultures, and The Arab Novel as History. In addition to the panels, a round-table discussion among the attending Arab novelists will be conducted in Arabic.

April 12–14, 2002 ICC Auditorium, Georgetown University For more information, please contact Leah Harris, Symposium Coordinator, at (202) 687-6215 or at [email protected]. Check out www.ccasonline.org.

MIDDLE EAST REPORT 222 SPRING 2002 23 Funeral for 16 Christians killed by Muslim extremists, Bahawalpur, Pakistan, October 2001. PIERS BENATAR/PANOS PICTURES Pakistan Between Afghanistan and India Hamza Alavi

Radical Islam and the activities of jihadi groups have been central to Pakistan’s relationship with Afghanistan as well as India. But the Pakistani military was already turning against such groups for internal reasons, before the

US assault on al-Qaeda and the Taliban and this winter’s confrontation with India.

akistan has been passing through extremely difficult damentalism and is, apparently, pursuing secular val- times. First, the government was drawn into support- ues. By contrast, the once proudly secular India has been Ping America’s Afghan war, which was costly for it. taken over by extreme Hindu fundamentalists who came Then, the winter saw a dangerous military confronta- to power through the ballot box. They have threatened tion with India, threatening a war that neither side war against Pakistan. Secularism and democracy are at wants. South Asians who are committed to values of odds with each other. secular democracy are faced with a paradox. A military Islamic fundamentalism and the activities of jihadi ruler in Pakistan has declared a war against Islamic fun- groups have been central to Pakistan’s relationship with Hamza Alavi, a Pakistani, is a retired academic who taught sociology at the University Afghanistan as well as India. But that can be mislead- of Manchester, England. ing. Pakistani policies were already being reoriented by

24 MIDDLE EAST REPORT 222 SPRING 2002 its military regime against such groups for internal rea- Islamabad, various Afghan cities and Central Asian capi- sons, long before George W. Bush’s declaration of war tals.1 As Ahmed Rashid points out, by April 1996, “The against al-Qaeda and the Taliban, and the warlike con- Clinton administration was clearly sympathetic to the frontation with India that began in December. In both Taliban, as they were in line with Washington’s anti- cases, moreover, material interests are concealed behind Iran policy and were important for the success of any the ideological cloak of religious fundamentalism. southern pipeline from Central Asia.”2 Early in 1997 Unocal brought a Taliban delegation to Washington, Oil and the Taliban lobbying for US recognition, while at the same time another Taliban delegation was in Buenos Aires on the Islamic fundamentalism was propagated in Pakistan in invitation of Bridas, Unocal’s rival.3 the 1980s by its military dictator Gen. Zia ul Haq, By late 1997, however, world opinion was outraged recruited by Reagan and assisted by the CIA to mobi- by news of the extremely oppressive policies of the lize Afghan warlords to fight the Soviets in the name Taliban, especially with regard to women. US feminist of Islamic jihad. A jihadi culture was actively promoted groups mounted pressure against both Unocal and the in Pakistan (not least within the army) as well as in Clinton administration, demanding a change in policy Afghanistan, with the help of US and Saudi money. toward the Taliban. The women’s vote was crucial for CIA-trained jihadi groups in both counties were armed Bill Clinton in the 1996 elections and he could not with sophisticated weapons such as Stinger missiles. ignore women’s groups. The Taliban invited reprisals After driving the Soviets out of Afghanistan, rival war- from the US by providing a base for bin Laden, who lords, all invoking Islam, and armed by the US and had declared war against the US and the Saudis and Pakistan, began to tear their country apart. Against that was held responsible for the bombing of US embassies background of complete anarchy, the radical Islamist in Kenya and Tanzania in August 1998. Ironically, it Taliban rose to power. took the petty Monica Lewinsky affair, when Clinton The interests of Unocal, an American oil company, needed a dramatic alternative focus for public atten- lurked behind US Afghanistan policy during the 1990s. tion, to precipitate an ill-planned and ineffective cruise Unocal aimed to build oil and gas pipelines from Central missile attack on Afghan territory in August 1998. At Asia, across Afghanistan and Pakistan to the Arabian Sea, that point Unocal pulled out of Afghanistan, at least bypassing Iran. But the destructive civil war being fought for the time being. by warlords forestalled the establishment of an effective The economic rationale for a pipeline via Afghanistan state that could guarantee the security of the proposed and Pakistan remains. Westward pipeline routes now pipelines. Attempts to bring the warring Afghan factions pushed by the US government are also insecure and more together were unsuccessful. By the end of 1994, with help expensive than the southern route. Further, the burgeon- from the government of Benazir Bhutto and financial aid ing Southeast and East Asian markets for oil and gas could from Saudi Arabia, the Taliban emerged as a powerful be more directly and cheaply accessed from the and united force in that deeply divided country. They Baluchistan coast. secured control over most of the country, driving then- After the fall of the Taliban, Unocal may be hoping President Burhanuddin Rabbani’s forces into a small en- that its pipeline through Afghanistan is once again po- clave in the northeast. litically feasible. But Hamid Karzai’s transitional govern- Fazlur Rehman, head of the Pakistani Jamiat-e Ulama- ment cobbled together at Bonn, made up as it is of a e Islam (JUI), had close links with the Taliban leader- makeshift collection of rival warlords, lacking any politi- ship and played a major part in securing the Bhutto cal unity, is unlikely to be the basis of the stable Afghani- government’s support for the Taliban. In the 1993 elec- stan that the US and Unocal are looking for. Warlords tions Fazlur Rehman was an ally of Bhutto’s Pakistan are already back in action in the countryside, defiant of People’s Party. He was made Chairman of the Parlia- the central authority, which itself is internally divided. mentary Standing Committee for Foreign Affairs, a po- sition that he used to build connections with the army Secularism vs. Islamic Fundamentalism leadership and the powerful Inter-Services Intelligence Directorate (ISI), who were already deeply involved in Islamic fundamentalist parties had little influence in Pa- Afghan affairs. He had close personal contact with most kistan until Z.A. Bhutto, with his misguided and op- Taliban leaders who had been students of deeni madaris portunistic populism, flirted with them in the 1970s. It (religious schools) run by the JUI in Pakistan. was Zia, however, who promoted fundamentalist Islam The US government soon tacitly supported the actively in the 1980s. With generous Saudi financing Taliban, who had effectively subordinated the sparring he encouraged the establishment of a chain of deeni warlords and had also publicized their dislike of Iran as madaris that recruited sons of pauperized peasants and well as their determination to cut Afghanistan’s flour- Afghan refugees, offering them free room and board and ishing opium production. In April 1996 Robin Raphel, “religious education.” The “education,” such as it was, Assistant Secretary of State for South Asia visited was designed to turn the pupils into zealots. Some

MIDDLE EAST REPORT 222 SPRING 2002 25 madaris also gave military training to their pupils who Musharraf into power, took place. Thanks to Zia’s poli- became militant cadres of jihadi groups and were later cies, Islamic ideology had permeated some sections of to provide foot soldiers for the Afghan Taliban. The the army as well. But the dominant ideology in the army minds of the pupils were filled with utopian dreams remained that of “professionalism,” inculcated in Indian about the “Islamic” society which they would create, in officers of the army by the British colonial rulers to in- which no one would be left in want. Most leaders of the sulate them from the appeal of nationalist movements. Afghan Taliban were products of Pakistani deeni madaris. That ideology entailed “military honor” and loyalty to They maintained close ties with their Pakistani men- one’s regiment as well as a belief in the moral superior- tors, notably the leaders ity of the “professional” of the two factions of the army officer over “self- Pakistani JUI. seeking politicians” who More than 70 percent Soon after taking power, Musharraf exploited the illiterate of the larger madaris (with masses. The dominance more than 40 pupils) be- declared that Kemal Atatürk, the of this ideology among longed to the puritanical the Pakistani officers’ Deobandi-Wahhabi tradi- great “Muslim” secular soldier, was corps was only partly tion. The Saudis funded his personal hero. lessened when Zia made the madaris to foster anti- his efforts to promote Is- Shi‘a and anti-Iranian lamic ideology instead. ideas. The Iranians re- In 1995 Islamist ideo- sponded in kind, but the number of Shi‘a madaris was logues led by a Major General Abbasi attempted an in- less than four percent of the total. The deeni madaris pro- ternal coup to dislodge the professionals. Their aim was vided recruits for extremist sectarian groups most of which to Islamize the army and Pakistan. The coup attempt were heavily armed, and sectarian violence reached a scale failed, but it was a major shock to the professionals and that Pakistan had never known before. “reinforce[d] the senior commanders’ concern with pro- Islamist leaders acquired new ambitions. They began fessional development.”4 In the aftermath many Islam- to assert that Pakistan was created to establish an Islamic ist officers were weeded out. But many, especially in state and it was they, therefore, who had the right to run senior positions, remained. Musharraf and the “profes- the government. Post-Zia civilian governments (alter- sionals” were faced with difficulties in contending with nately under the Pakistan People’s Party and the Muslim powerful generals committed to Islamic ideology. League) continued to promote Islamic fundamentalist ide- In opposing religious fundamentalist tendencies in the ology through school textbooks, universities and the me- army and society, Musharraf has invoked the secular val- dia. Most Pakistanis soon came to believe that Pakistan ues of Jinnah. But Musharraf himself does not appear was indeed created to establish an Islamic state. to be driven by any ideology. He is a “professional,” a The fact, however, is that the Pakistan movement had pragmatic and flexible man who believes in the armed secular foundations. The All India Muslim League was forces as the sole repository of legitimate force in soci- not a religious movement at all. It was a party of West- ety and, indeed, the custodian of the nation. He has ern-educated professionals and the “salariat”—those who had no difficulty in abandoning one policy and sup- aspired to get government jobs. These people successfully porting another if that promises to be more profitable. resisted attempts by mullahs to gain influence in their It was easy for Musharraf to drop his earlier support for party. Muhammad Ali Jinnah, founding father of Paki- the Taliban and jump on the bandwagon of Bush’s war stan, spelled out the movement’s secular creed in his in- against terrorism, since he had not supported the Taliban augural address to Pakistan’s Constituent Assembly. on grounds of Islamic ideology. The Taliban’s capture Speaking against the background of the long history of of Kabul was in effect a victory for the Pakistani forces Hindu-Muslim conflict in India before independence, he behind them—the first ever victory of Pakistan’s army said that in Pakistan “Hindus will cease to be Hindus in the field. As a professional, Musharraf took pride in and Muslims will cease to be Muslims, not in the reli- that victory. But soon it was clear to him that he was gious sense, for that is the personal faith of each indi- backing the wrong horse. vidual, but in the political sense, as citizens of the state.” Soon after taking power, Musharraf indicated his pre- It was not until the 1980s, under Zia’s regime, that “secu- dilections by declaring that Kemal Atatürk, the great larism” was equated with apostasy. “Muslim” secular soldier, was his personal hero. He un- successfully tried to modify Pakistan’s notorious blas- Musharraf’s “Secularism” phemy law, one of Zia’s legacies, which was being used to persecute innocent people, especially Christians. This Armed jihadi groups patronized by the “democratic” re- move was resisted loudly and angrily by Islamists still in gime of Nawaz Sharif dominated Pakistan’s civil society the army. Musharraf might not have cared about mere when the 1998 army coup, that brought General Pervez public outcry, but resistance from within the army was

26 MIDDLE EAST REPORT 222 SPRING 2002 Kashmiri shopkeeper on strike, Srinagar, February 2002. TAUSEEF MUSTAFA/AFP another matter. The professionals had not yet consoli- were killed. The head of a relatively moderate Sunni dated their influence in the army, and Musharraf had to movement in Karachi was killed by rival Deobandis. retreat. Musharraf’s recent declaration that he will not Shi‘a groups retaliated, killing Sunnis. Iranian diplomats make any attempt to repeal or modify any of the unjust were assassinated by the Deobandis. Government offi- and oppressive laws promulgated by Zia in the name of cials, including some senior police officers, were also Islam bespeaks the strength of Islamists still in the army. among those killed. Judges were afraid to try cases of It will take a long time to exorcise Zia’s ghost from the sectarian killings (as well as blasphemy cases). One se- minds of the Pakistani public and the army. nior judge was assassinated in his office by gunmen be- cause he had found a sectarian killer guilty of murder. Sectarian Killings Pakistani press reports alleged that intelligence agen- cies were involved in the sectarian murders. Support The heavily armed jihadi groups were a matter of great for sectarian killers from within the state machinery concern to the professionals in the military establish- was a challenge to the army professionals, placing ment for reasons other than Islamic ideology. These Musharraf and his team in contention with those who groups were rival nodes of power vis-à-vis the army, a sympathized with the religious extremists. This con- situation that was anathema to Musharraf’s cohort. With tradiction at the heart of state power had another di- their sophisticated weaponry, jihadi groups were a threat mension: although the professionals held central power, to the army’s monopoly of legitimate force in society religious ideologues were able to manipulate the cor- In the summer of 2001, armed Islamist groups went rupt and inefficient state apparatus at the local level. on a sectarian killing spree throughout the country, leav- The Pakistani press also reported that many activists ing hundreds of victims. Some groups targeted Shi‘a pro- in extremist groups were common criminals who had fessionals, killing doctors (68 in Karachi alone), close ties with local police and military officers. The engineers, civil servants and teachers. But not only Shi‘a writ of the state ran very thin.

MIDDLE EAST REPORT 222 SPRING 2002 27 Muhammad. After Bush de- clared his global “war on ter- rorism,” Musharraf knew he could depend upon the for- merly hostile US to support him. Many in Pakistan believe that Musharraf began to act against religious extremist groups only at the behest of the Americans. That is mani- festly not the case. Musharraf’s crackdown on armed religious extremist groups began not after Sep- tember 11 but well before that. However, we must also recognize that he was able to remove or sideline Islamists in the army only after he could count on US backing. Among the senior generals given compulsory retirement after September 11 was the very ambitious and powerful Lt. Gen. Mahmud Ahmad, direc- tor general of the notorious ISI. In 2000, Ahmad was able to prevent a presidential visit to Afghanistan during which Musharraf had intended to persuade Mullah Omar to yield Osama bin Laden to the US. Instead, Ahmad went to Kandahar himself and gave the green light to the Taliban’s continued refusals. In opposition to the funda- mentalists’ slogan of Islamic jihad, Musharraf has raised the counter-slogan of “Pakistan Indian solider on patrol in Srinagar. First.” To justify disarming or TAUSEEF MUSTAFA/AFP banning armed fundamental- ist groups, he has declared that the “writ of the state must be restored,” by which he clearly The Army’s Writ Restored means the writ of the army. For the time being the profes- Universal horror at the killings gave Musharraf an open- sionals have the upper hand in the army. But the effects of ing to regain the initiative. In June 2001, he convened a ideological conditioning spanning over two decades, both national conference of ulama at which he roundly con- within the army and in society, cannot be erased overnight. demned them for their narrow and dogmatic conception Retired general Talat Masood reflected concerns among the of Islam. His hard-hitting speech asked if Islam was about professionals in the military when he pointed out that ideo- sectarian killings, and warned the ulama that they were logical “reforming and recasting will not be easy…and is not above the law. Musharraf could not have said as much likely to be met with resistance from disaffected groups, a year earlier, but he was now more confident. That warn- even from some elements within the establishment [mean- ing to religious leaders was followed by the August 14 ing the army] itself.”5 banning of two notorious sectarian terrorist groups, the A cultural revolution is called for. Musharraf has said Sunni Lashkar-e Jhanghvi and the Shi‘a Sipah-e that he wants to transform Pakistan into a “modern,

28 MIDDLE EAST REPORT 222 SPRING 2002 moderate Muslim state.” If Musharraf and the military Jaish-e Muhammad and Lashkar-e Taiba, for the attack. believe that a progressive and vibrant society can be cre- Not long thereafter, leaders and activists of these two ated purely by orders from above, they will be sadly mis- groups were arrested in Pakistan. It was claimed, taken. What is needed is freedom of speech and unconvincingly, that the arrests were unconnected with expression that might allow creative and courageous the New Delhi attack. That was the last thing the thought to flourish. For over half a century, since inde- Musharraf government could have wanted. Pakistan had pendence, a culture of conformity and censorship has nothing to gain and much to lose by staging such a drama. been enforced. Old habits die hard. There is an ingrained The scale of Indian troop mobilization at the Pakistani fear of new ideas, not least among those who rule over border has been unprecedented. On January 14, the Wash- the academic world, the media and the police, particu- ington Times quoted US officials saying that “90 percent larly vis-à-vis public meetings. There are already some of India’s military forces are now deployed outside of peace- signs of a new intellectual environment, but this will time garrisons.” India has a far bigger and better-equipped not flourish in a political vacuum, nor will it be pain- army and a much larger nuclear capacity, than Pakistan, less, achieved without a struggle. and its economy is much larger and stronger. A war be- tween the two nuclear South Asian countries would be a Kashmir terrible disaster all around. Pakistan has few illusions about the ultimate outcome of such a conflict. Musharraf has The Kashmir issue has been the main obstacle in the way been appealing for talks and for the return of troops on of better relations between Pakistan and India. It is time both side of the border to peacetime positions. Analysts that both countries recognized that the future of Kashmir have stressed that a war would not be easy for India either, is for Kashmiris to decide. Since whatever the final outcome may the beginning of the Kashmiri be. The Pakistani army has the intifada in 1989 there has been capacity to inflict unacceptably growing consciousness of this in A new factor is shaping India’s heavy damage in return. As Pakistan. Pakistanis support the someone who has spent the best self-determination for the global policies: its ambition to part of his life promoting Kashmiris very passionately, and friendship between India and no Pakistani government can be recognized as a world Pakistan, I find the way in abandon that cause. Musharraf power. which the present government has affirmed this commitment. of India has dismissed every ap- He has made a distinction be- proach made by the Musharraf tween “terrorism” and national government (and by an anxious liberation struggles against an occupying power, thus jus- US) for a peaceful settlement to be extremely sad and very tifying and supporting the struggle of the Kashmiri people. worrying. At the same time, he has categorically rejected any role for Immediately after the jihadi attack on the Indian parlia- Pakistan-based jihadi groups in Kashmir. In 1989, Gen- ment, Musharraf condemned it unreservedly. He offered eral Aslam Beg, then head of the army, set up the ISI’s joint Pakistani-Indian investigations to identify the culprits Kashmir Cell to control and coordinate the activities of and bring them to justice. That offer was turned down by jihadi groups. Musharraf has closed the cell down, saying India. Pakistan then asked India to provide evidence that that Pakistan-based jihadi groups were alienating Kashmiris might enable a full Pakistani investigation. That request too by trying to impose the Taliban’s version of Islam on them. was dismissed. Instead, the Indian government demanded Secondly, he has accepted that there is no military solu- that about 20 persons named in a list consisting largely of tion for the Kashmir issue. Pakistan, Musharraf says, must Indian nationals should be deported to India. Musharraf give all political and diplomatic support to the struggle for said that Pakistan had not given asylum to any Indian sub- self-determination of the Kashmiri people and try to se- jects, and that no Pakistani national would be handed over cure international mediation, including enforcement of UN to another country. If action against anyone was called for, resolutions on Kashmir. A.G. Bhatt, chairman of the 23- that would be done in Pakistan, under Pakistani laws. member All Parties Hurriyat Conference of Kashmir, has India might have felt reassured by the measures taken by welcomed that declaration, saying that the time had come the Musharraf government against Pakistan-based jihadi for the political process to take over. groups, as detailed in Musharraf’s major speech on January 12. Five Islamist and jihadi groups were banned. There were India’s Threat of War large-scale arrests of jihadi leaders and activists, perhaps more than 2,000, and the arms of jihadi groups were ordered con- By mid-December 2001, Pakistan was faced with India’s fiscated. Leaders of India’s main opposition party, the Con- threat of war in response to a jihadi attack on the Indian gress Party, and two communist parties generously acclaimed parliament on December 13. The Indians instantly these measures. But the ruling Bhartiya Janata Party (BJP) blamed the ISI and two Pakistani jihadi groups, namely responded coolly, repeating the overworked mantra that they

MIDDLE EAST REPORT 222 SPRING 2002 29 wanted “action, not words.” It took a three-day visit from anti-Christian as well as anti-Muslim, has overtaken India’s Secretary of State Colin Powell to persuade the Indian gov- once proud secularism. Atrocities have been committed ernment to soften its line. At a joint press conference with against India’s Muslim and Christian minorities with impu- Powell, Indian Foreign Minister Jaswant Singh expressed his nity. Many in Pakistan feel that Indian Prime Minister Atal appreciation for the January 12 speech and said that India Bihari Vajpayee is not himself a warmonger. But he is under was ready to cooperate with Pakistan in the fight against great pressure from his senior colleagues, especially, the terrorism. But the very next day Interior Minister L.K. Hindu fundamentalist Advani and George Fernandes, the Advani, while acknowledging the importance of Musharraf’s chauvinistic minister of defense. Advani may be adopting speech, reverted to saying that “mere speech is not enough.” an extreme hard-line position as part of a bid to succeed the Indian troops would not withdraw until Pakistan handed aging and ailing Vajpayee. If that is Advani’s ambition, his over to India those whom he had named. extreme fundamentalist views make it unlikely that he can Musharraf, referring to his own far-reaching actions hold together a fractious alliance of 20 parties. against jihadi groups, declared: “We will not allow any- The hard line of the BJP in the dangerous military stand- one to sit on judgment [on us]. Whatever measures we off with Pakistan was attributed to posturing before the Feb- are taking for eliminating terrorism and religious extrem- ruary elections in four Indian states. The BJP badly lost the ism are aimed at reforming our own society and not to election in all four states (losing half of its seats in the key appease anyone.” He was also conciliatory. “We need pa- state of Uttar Pradesh with its 99 million voters). Jingoism tience,” he said. “You have to realize that they are a 20- did not work, for the winning opposition parties stressed party alliance and often speak with different voices. It bread-and-butter issues. Nevertheless, the initial signs are takes them time to arrive at an agreed position.” He added, that the BJP has moved even further to the right. The situ- “There will be no war.” ation is quite unstable. Only four of India’s 28 states now have a BJP government. BJP leaders have declared that this Explaining the Hard Line does not alter their position at the center. Hopes of a post- election détente have been dashed. The speech of the presi- The present confrontation between India and Pakistan has dent of India, when inaugurating the budget session of the occurred in very different conditions from the past. In parliament on February 25, was hostile and aggressive. He recent years, fundamentalist Hindutva ideology, reiterated that “dialogue with Pakistan…and terrorism can- not go together” in demanding that Pakistan should first end terrorism in Kashmir and hand over the 20 persons I N S T I T U T E F O R P A L E S T I N E S T U D I E S whom India has named. Meanwhile the warlike confronta- tion stays. The results of the election are such that there will Hamas: Political Thought be a great deal of wheeling and dealing between parties be- fore a clear pattern emerges. and Practice Over and above electoral sloganeering there is one new Khaled Hroub, 2000, 300 pp., $29.95, cloth long-term factor that is shaping India’s global policies: its ambition to be recognized as a world power. As the largest Updated and translated into English economic and military power in South Asia, India now de- Shipping: USA: $6.00 for the first book, $1.00 for each sires to extend its influence elsewhere in Asia, especially in additional book; International: $7.00 for each book the Middle East and Southeast Asia. Bush and Britain’s Tony Blair have announced their support for India’s bid to be- “Must reading—the most comprehensive and critic- come a permanent member of the UN Security Council. ally documented study of HAMAS published to date.” —John L. Esposito, University Professor & Director, Center The US wants India to play a key role in its strategy for the for Christian-Muslim Understanding, Georgetown University Middle East and Southeast Asia, not least in its policy to “... this in-depth and dispassionate presentation of contain China. Hamas doctrine as it has developed since the 1980s In pursuit of its global ambitions, India has been devel- is masterful.” oping close ties with Israel, especially in the field of military —Foreign Affairs cooperation. In November 2001 alone, three official Israeli “Hroub’s book is excellent... [it] goes well beyond and delegations—representing the Knesset, the Foreign Minis- far beneath the sensationalist and often distorted try and, crucially, the Ministry of Defense—visited India. reporting of Hamas ... required reading for These were followed in January by a three-day visit by policymakers, scholars, politicians and students.” Shimon Peres, the Israeli foreign minister, to New Delhi. —Sara Roy, Center for Middle Eastern Studies, Harvard University Israel is scheduled to provide state-of-the-art weapon sys- tems and military technology to India, including the Phalcon 3501 M Street, NW · Washington, DC 20007 airborne early warning system, which in the past the US Tel: 800/874-3614 · 202/342-3990, ext. 11 · Fax: 202/342-3927 had refused to allow Israel to supply to third parties. India Order this book on-line at: www.ipsjps.org already has massive military superiority over its neighbors, raising the question of the purpose of such huge investment

30 MIDDLE EAST REPORT 222 SPRING 2002 in military technology. The declaration by Fernandes at the time of India’s nuclear test in May 1998 may be a clue. India’s If an independent nuclear bombs and delivery systems, he said, are intended Palestinian state were for deployment against China. created alongside Military Rule and Democracy in Pakistan Israel, what would its In Pakistan the military has exercised power, de facto, even when civilian governments have been in office. Successive economy be like? “democratic” leaders have depended on the army’s support and approval to stay in office. The military has wielded a Dollars & Sense readers found the answer in: pervasive influence on the shaping of state policies. Retired general Talat Masood acknowledged as much when he spoke The Mercurial Economics of the of a “monumental failure of our past domestic and foreign Phantom Palestinian State policies in which, ironically, the military has had a crucial by Karen Pfeifer (January/February 2002) role to play.”6 The army’s unshakable grip was revealed when the right-wing Prime Minister Nawaz Sharif tried to dis- miss Musharraf and put his own nominee in his place. Sharif &sensesense was promptly removed by the 1998 coup, which was the THE MAGAZINE OF ECONOMIC JUSTICE army’s way of preserving its institutional autonomy. The ex- prime minister’s coziness with the US did not save him from offers a comprehensive economic analysis being ousted. The US angrily led international pressures on of current events worldwide. Subscribe Pakistan to restore democracy. now and find out how labor activists and The Supreme Court of Pakistan, which initially legiti- immigrant-rights organizers have adjusted mated Musharraf’s coup, has now mandated that the army in the wake of the September 11 attacks: should restore parliamentary government by October 2002. Organizing After September 11 Musharraf has agreed to do so. It is too early to see pre- by Autumn Leonard, Tomás Aguilar, Mike Prokosch, cisely how that will be done. The fact that Musharraf has and Dara Silverman (March/April 2002) appointed himself President of Pakistan for “at least five years” is not a good beginning. The constitution must also In the face of economic collapse, the people of Argentina brought down their own govern- be reinstated, but no one knows how that will happen. ment. But will they be able to keep the IMF at The army has promised elections, despite its unconcealed bay? Find out in our upcoming issue: contempt for politicians. Religious parties will not be a threat; in the past they have been unable to take more than two per- Economic Debacle in Argentina: cent of the vote and they are unlikely to do better. Neither The IMF Strikes AgainAgaines will the two main political parties present much of a chal- by Arthur MacEwan (March/April 2002) lenge. The Muslim League has been successfully fragmented You’ll also get in-depth features explaining how and its rival, the Pakistan People’s Party, is demoralized, its the economy works, plus our “Regulars”—Ask Dr. leader in exile. There are few signs that this political vacuum Dollar, Economy in Numbers, and much more. will be filled soon. One of Musharraf’s ministers has given up his post to set up a new party. Indications are that the new system will have two components, one of them rather lame. “There are few things as important as the The first part is likely to be based on local bodies along the kind of work Dollars & Sense is doing.” lines of General Ayub Khan’s discredited “basic democracies,” —Noam Chomsky which were ideally suited to control and manipulation by the central bureaucracy. Elections for these bodies were held in 2001. The second component would be a moth-eaten na- To order by Visa or Mastercard, call toll-free: 1-877-869-5762. tional assembly, without significant powers, which would be Or clip and return this ad to receive a free trial copy of Dollars & held up for international acclaim as an exemplar of army de- Sense. If you choose to subscribe, you’ll pay only $18.95 for mocracy. All of this bears watching. one year (6 issues)—30% off the cover price. Name ______Endnotes 1 Ahmed Rashid, Taliban: Islam, Oil and the New Great Game in Central Asia (London: I.B. Address ______Tauris, 2000), p 45. 2 Ibid., p. 46. City/State/Zip ______3 Ibid., p. 170. Return to: Dollars & Sense, PO Box 3000, Denville, NJ 07834-9810 4 Stephen Cohen, The Pakistan Army (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1998), p. 171. 5 Dawn, January 26, 2002. 2CSPME 6 Dawn, January 26, 2002.

MIDDLE EAST REPORT 222 SPRING 2002 31 Man passes through Dubai gold market. KAMRAN JEBREILI/AP PHOTO Gray Money, Corruption and the Post-September 11 Middle East John Sfakianakis

Graft, smuggling and kickbacks in the Middle East create huge sums of money requiring concealment in a secretive banking system. Al-Qaeda has simply used existing mechanisms for hiding cash. Regime and elite corruption, not pervasive regional sympathy with Osama bin Laden, are the main factors inhibiting the cooperation of banks in the Middle East with Bush’s “war on terrorist finances.”

32 MIDDLE EAST REPORT 222 SPRING 2002 hen, on September 24, 2001, George W. Bush pub- Laden’s ideology, are the main factors inhibiting the coop- lished his executive order freezing accounts of al- eration of banks in the Middle East with the “war on terror- WQaeda and other radical Islamist groups in US-based ist finances.” banks, he called on financial institutions around the world to join the US in its “strike on the financial foundation of Follow the Money the global terror network.” Countries or companies that did not also freeze the assets of the 27 individuals and organiza- Priority in the post-September 11 investigation was given tions on his “most wanted list” would face severe US finan- to combating money laundering around the world, includ- cial sanctions, Bush threatened. Many financial institutions ing the Middle East. Money laundering is the processing of in the Middle East were keen to comply. By early Novem- criminal proceeds to disguise their illegal origin, allowing ber, Kuwait had closed down several “kiosks” outside beneficiaries to enjoy their profits without jeopardizing the mosques that allegedly collected money for al-Qaeda. In source. The amount laundered globally is estimated at $500 Bahrain and the United Arab Emir- billion to $1 trillion per year.1 The ates (UAE), bankers quickly an- lower estimate is roughly equiva- nounced their commitment to lent to the total annual economic tracing “terrorist” money and em- Legal arms sales make for- output of Spain. Illegal arms sales, barking on a campaign to fight smuggling, drug trafficking and money laundering. Sudan assisted tunes for middlemen—mostly prostitution rings generate huge the US in tracking the financial ac- from the buyer’s side. sums of “gray money” that require tivities of Osama bin Laden and in laundering. Embezzlement, in- tracing money transfers between sider trading, bribery and com- Sudanese banks and their branches puter fraud schemes also produce abroad. Lebanon’s prime minister assured the international ill-gotten gains that need to be legitimized. community that his country “is not involved in any money A number of developments in the international financial laundering” (though he refused to freeze the assets of system during recent decades have rendered finding, freez- Hizballah). Egypt and Iran are drafting money laundering ing and confiscating criminally derived income and assets laws. The storm of US media criticism notwithstanding, all the more difficult. These are the “dollarization” (use of Saudi Arabia showed signs of willingness to trace the few the US dollar in transactions) of black markets, the general million dollars transferred out of Saudi Arabia to bin Laden trend toward financial deregulation, the progress of the Eu- since the mid-1990s. ropean common market and the proliferation of financial US ambitions to thwart financing of al-Qaeda operations secrecy havens. seem so reasonable as to be unexceptionable, but attempts The Middle East is not the money laundering center of to monitor financial transactions in the Middle East are the world. New York, Miami, London, Zurich, Singapore, fraught with unintended consequences and practical diffi- the Caribbean and the South Pacific figure more promi- culties. The evidence is that al-Qaeda and other groups have nently. But according to the 2001 report of the Financial exploited gaps in supervision in the international financial Action Task Force (FATF) of the Organization of European system, moving funds through the global banking system Cooperation and Development, Lebanon, Egypt and Israel and using less conventional channels such as charities and all fall into the select category of money laundering havens. the hawwala system of money transfer. Bush’s executive or- A major factor in the success of Lebanon’s banks has always ders now list more than 150 individuals and organizations been their secrecy. Thanks to its banking secrecy, Beirut be- whose assets should be frozen. While banks in the West have came a haven for funds spirited away from neighboring coun- struggled to comply with this apparently straightforward re- tries during the “Arab socialist” era, as well as for not-so-clean quest, banks in the Middle East find it even harder to com- profits repatriated by Lebanese merchants involved in the ply. Their difficulty is rooted in the institutionalized diamond and gold business in West Africa. Lebanon was corruption in many states of the region, which mandates among the many places where the late Nigerian dictator Gen. that many financial transactions be secret and undocu- Sani Abacha and his associates invested their embezzled bil- mented. In the Middle East the line dividing legal and ille- lions during the mid-1990s. The Lebanese banking system gal money-making activity is quite fuzzy, as is the distinction appears lucrative to prospective clients because the average between public and private funds. At the core of the region’s yield on dollar deposits ranges between four to five percent political economy is an extensive and unchanging patron- (compared with less than three percent in the US and Eu- age system which is intended to be clandestine and lacking rope). The drug trade, in which Lebanon acts as a hub, has in accountability. As a result, the transparency investigators also helped banks in Beirut achieve their money-laundering would need to thoroughly track the financial dealings of notoriety. The BBC reported recent estimates that opium bin Laden and his associates is non-existent. Regime and and cannabis from the Bekaa valley generated more than elite corruption, not pervasive regional sympathy with bin $500 million annually during the Lebanese civil war. It is John Sfakianakis is a research fellow at Harvard University, Center for Middle believed that Lebanese Prime Minister Rafiq Hariri, a bil- Eastern Studies. lionaire, used the banking system in Lebanon to launder

MIDDLE EAST REPORT 222 SPRING 2002 33 money from his foreign-based companies and to facilitate son of former Prime Minister Abdellatif Filali and former deposits from his close Saudi friends. Lebanese banks are CEO of Omnium Nord Africain (ONA), the largest Mo- also rumored to have laundered public funds on behalf of roccan private group, believed to be majority-controlled by highly positioned Syrian military personnel and business- the royal family.7 A year after the Filali incident, a close ad- men looking to invest in real estate. viser to the royal family—according to Moroccan sources, Although there are never precise figures, the amount of he signed the late king’s checks—was charged by France with money that is believed by the government to be laundered trying to circulate more than $360 million in counterfeit every year in Egypt is about $4.3 billion—approximately Bahraini dinars.8 five per cent of the country’s gross domestic product.2 Drug trafficking is presumably the source of 70 per cent of the Hands in the Till laundered money. Although Egypt is drafting a money laun- dering bill, it is predicted that by 2004 the amount of dirty Besides drug traffickers and mafiosos, regime officials ben- money flowing through Egypt will total $6 billion. How- efit greatly from the loose and secretive habits of finan- ever, according to banking sources interviewed for this ar- cial institutions in the Middle East. Bribes for state ticle, drug money is not the sole source of laundered funds. contracts and licenses supply a continuous revenue stream Smuggled Iraqi oil, as well as Italian mafia money predomi- to most rulers and their supporters among big landhold- nantly invested in the coastal resort of Sharm al-Sheikh, also ers and businessmen. Mobile telephone network licenses brings dollars into Egyptian bank vaults. In its attempts to issued in Lebanon and Egypt since 1996-1997—and more regulate money laundering, the Central Bank of Egypt (CBE) recently the one in Algeria—provide some examples: the has begun instructing the banking community in the art of three state licenses combined netted regime figures more “knowing its clients.” In October 2001 a CBE statement than $2.3 billion in payments. In Lebanon and Egypt, indicated that banks were instructed to inform the Interior members of the ruling elite, businessmen and bankers Ministry (not the Ministry of Finance) of any bank deposits benefited. According to well-placed sources, one of the or transfers exceeding $120,000.3 US banks become suspi- two Lebanese licenses was awarded to the son of the min- cious when a cash deposit exceeds $10,000. ister of defense, Muhsin Dalloul, who is married to It was only a year ago that money laundering became a Hariri’s stepdaughter. In Algeria it was military circles criminal offense in Israel. Money laundering in Israel in the close to the Bouteflika regime. Construction contracts 1990s was very much related to Russia. Up to February 2002, are another area where money is accumulated by various new immigrants have been able to bring an unlimited intermediaries and regime clients. During the 1990s, amount of money and assets into Israel without declaring Lebanon under Hariri’s premiership exemplified the in- them. In 1997 sources estimated that Israel was attracting terconnection between private business and public office. some $4-5 billion annually in laundered money—presum- Not only was Hariri’s business team allowed to hold of- ably this number has only increased since then. Reportedly, fice in various key civil service posts,9 but the fabled re- the Russian mafia has taken advantage of Israel’s banking construction of Beirut was, and still is, carried out by secrecy laws to introduce the laundered money, using im- Solidère, a privately owned joint stock company in which migrants as couriers and local businessmen as fronts. One Hariri maintains a majority interest. of the highest-profile cases is that of Gregory Lerner, ar- Although illegal arms sales are not the rule in the Middle rested in 1997 for defrauding four Russian banks of $106 East, government-to-government arms sales make fortunes for million, who was reportedly sent to Israel to head up one of middlemen—mostly from the buyer’s side. In the case of Saudi the money laundering operations. He is currently serving arms purchases, many princes get a “cut” of monies spent; the six years in an Israeli prison. Recent headlines include the size of the cut depends on the prince’s proximity to the inner ongoing investigation of well-known businessman Gad circle of the royal family. Tracing these kickbacks is a daunting Ze’evi, who has been questioned for allegedly involving task, since they very easily enter the local banking system and Russian businessmen suspected of money laundering in his are promptly reinvested within the country or outside. A Saudi 1999 acquisition of 20 percent of the state-controlled tele- banker interviewed for this article conservatively estimated that communications company Bezeq.4 More recently, arms deals alone have generated more than $5 billion in kick- Switzerland’s Federal Banking Commission has ordered Bank backs in the past 25 years in Saudi Arabia. The al-Yamama Leumi, Israel’s second biggest bank, to replace the head of arms deal sending British weapons to the Saudis topped $30 its Swiss banking subsidiary after it failed to exercise due billion, with at least two dozen middlemen taking hefty com- care in opening a bank account for Vladimiro Montesinos, missions, including the Syrian Wafiq Sa‘id and ‘Adnan the former Peruvian spy chief.5 Khashoggi of Saudi Arabia.10 Over the decade 1973-1983, US Money laundering opportunities can always be established arms exports to Saudi Arabia amounted to $35 billion. Be- for people in very close proximity to a regime, even in coun- tween 1991-1997 there were $23 billion more in arms agree- tries in the good books of the FATF. Fouad Filali, the former ments between the US and the Saudis.11 If one includes the rest husband of Princess Lalla Meriem of Morocco, the sister of of the region and other suppliers, such as France, Russia, Italy King Hassan VI, was involved in a large-scale money laun- and Germany, one can imagine the amounts of illicit cash be- dering operation, according to press reports.6 Filali was the ing pocketed by arms trade middlemen.

34 MIDDLE EAST REPORT 222 SPRING 2002 Bribes and kickbacks are extremely difficult to quantify and the Middle East, to “clean” and reinvest the Ba‘thist and to trace, since they never enter the coffers of the central government’s sanctions-busting proceeds. Some of that banks but rather are silently stowed in accounts throughout money, which is under the control of Saddam Hussein per- Europe and North America. A report by the London-based sonally, is invested in various countries in the Middle East Swissmoney Research revealed that, excluding offshore tax through recognized local investment houses and a few trusted havens, residents of Jordan were the heaviest users of Swiss middlemen acting as fronts for Hussein. Perhaps more than banks last year, with fiduciary deposits equal to 16.4 percent $50 million has entered the Jordanian stock market, accord- ($1.317 billion) of the kingdom’s gross domestic product ing to Jordanian banking sources, more than double that ($8.03 billion). Two other Arab amount has entered the Egyp- countries followed close be- tian bourse and even more has hind: Lebanon (with deposits gone through the London worth $2.468 billion, equal to Even a target under comprehen- Stock Exchange. It is also 14.4 percent of the country’s thought—by various Gulf GDP) and the United Arab sive international sanctions—the bankers and investment Emirates (with deposits worth houses—that an undetermined $6.387 billion, or 13.6 percent Iraqi regime—has eluded a amount has entered the bank- of the UAE’s GDP).12 On an crackdown on smuggling. ing system, particularly off- absolute basis, the largest Arab shore branches, of Bahrain. holder of Swiss bank deposits The Iraqi regime’s exploitation last year was Saudi Arabia, salt- of the global, and more impor- ing away $9.091 billion, or 6.6 percent of the kingdom’s tantly, the regional systems of finance is not novel. Others GDP.13 The size of the deposits does not in itself indicate use the international system in similar ways. wrongdoing, but it is suggestive that the recent international investigation into Abacha’s embezzlement of over $4 billion Destination Dubai reveals the complicity of at least 19 well-established interna- tional banks in “cleaning” that former dictator’s stolen money.14 A major haven for money laundering, smuggling and un- surveyed business activities is the UAE, especially Dubai. Smuggling The Financial Times reported that more than half of Iraq’s smuggled oil finds its way to the UAE, often through Ira- Still more large sums of money requiring concealment come nian ports. “The sanctions-busting vessels are registered in from smuggling. Smuggling in the Middle East can involve Panama, Belize, Liberia and other flag-of-convenience coun- anything from unlicensed software in Lebanon to banned tries,” making it extremely difficult to track their financial alcohol in Saudi Arabia via Dubai to Iraqi oil making its activities.17 Ship-owners frequently operate through dummy way through various middlemen in Russia, Syria, Turkey companies and UAE-based agents under the benignly neu- and the UAE. But even a target under comprehensive inter- tral eye of the authorities. If oil is confiscated by the au- national sanctions—the Iraqi regime—has eluded efforts at thorities, the agents frequently buy it back. Apart from oil, a crackdown. The US and Great Britain have had little luck smuggling flourishes between Iran and Dubai in consumer in persuading Russia to cooperate in reducing the number goods, TVs and electronics equipment. During the 1990s, of middlemen involved in purchasing Iraqi oil. (Some 700 Dubai turned into a center of prostitution controlled mainly companies are registered in Russia to purchase oil from by the Russian mafia, catering mostly to visitors from the Iraq.)15 Russia is reluctant to clamp down because many of neighboring Gulf countries. Also, the UAE is being used as the kickbacks go to Russian middlemen, certainly includ- a major staging point for a more than $25 million per year ing Russian officials. Complicating the matter even further, caviar smuggling operation.18 about a third of smuggled Iraqi oil products travel overland The almost completely unregulated gold brokerages of into central and northern Iran. Traders call this oil Iranian Dubai are an exit point for bullion smuggled to the Indian “displacement” oil because it replaces products from Iran’s subcontinent. Until 1998, when it was replaced by Singapore, own refineries in the south of the country, where products Dubai was the top re-export center of gold bullion in the are often blended with Iraqi contraband.16 Lastly, smuggled world. Gold and the informal and anonymous hawwala sys- Iraqi oil winds up at a discount price in Jordan, Turkey and tem of money transfer—made famous by Bush’s closure of Syria—whose pipeline to Iraq is now believed to be the most the Somalian al-Barakat companies—are directly linked. At active route for the sanctions-busting oil trade. least billions of dollars flow through the hawwala system; one For many years US intelligence has been trying to trace estimate even placed the annual total at $1 trillion.19 In 1996 the Iraqi regime’s oil smuggling revenues outside of Iraq, it was estimated that the equivalent of $4 billion entered In- but this has proven a difficult task. According to business dia through the hawwala system that year, counting only the sources interviewed for this article, it is believed that middle- money that moved through banks. No estimate of how much men involved in brokering Iraq’s oil use offshore compa- goes through in illegal trades is available.20 Accusations about nies, as well as legal companies and banks in Switzerland the use of hawwalas to share bribes and kickbacks among the

MIDDLE EAST REPORT 222 SPRING 2002 35 South Asian political elite abound. Ex-Indian Prime Minister entirely clean money—become the revenue from smuggled P.V. Rarasimha Rao, for example, has been indicted for mak- gold. The smugglers even make a small profit on the fees ing many hawwala payments for kickbacks.21 An estimated they charge the South Asian workers for their services. $5-6 billion is sent to Pakistan from Gulf states annually; only Much of the $500,000 used to fund the September 11 $1 billion goes through formal banking channels, while the attacks is believed to have come through US banks in rest is transferred through hawwalas.22 Dubai, among others Citibank of Dubai. The Washington While the hawwala system has ancient roots, much of Post revealed that, just as the US began bombing Afghani- the contemporary network grew out of gold smuggling stan, Taliban and al-Qaeda operatives, using Karachi as a operations in South Asia during the 1960s and 1970s, transit route, sent millions of dollars through couriers and using Dubai as one of the most important transit routes. the hawwala system to Dubai, where the assets were con- To get around import restrictions, smugglers shipped gold verted to gold bullion. Pakistani and US officials estimate aboard boats from Dubai and Abu Dhabi to South Asia. that about $10 million was taken out of Afghanistan by After selling the gold, they needed to get the cash back courier in late November and early December of 2001. home. The smugglers discovered a solution in the grow- US investigators are now examining records from Dubai’s ing population of Indians and Pakistanis working in the top gold brokerages for any transactions showing links to Gulf states. These workers often send money home to the movement of al-Qaeda or Taliban money, and have their families, but banks charged prohibitive commissions found unusual gold shipments into the US after Septem- and fees. By contrast, the hawwala system set up in part ber 11. As well as using gold to hide assets, al-Qaeda may by gold smugglers, whose enormous profits and low over- have smuggled gold into Pakistan and India for profit. An head allow them to offer very cheap rates, was attractive. al-Qaeda manual found in Afghanistan included chapters South Asians give portions of their earnings to hawwala on smuggling gold.23 Al-Qaeda also used diamonds and offices in the Gulf. Usually by phone, the Gulf office con- honey to make money and hide assets, but gold is believed tacts its counterpart in South Asia, which pays out an to have been the most important commodity. Gold is eas- equal sum to the workers’ relatives from its stash of gold ily divided into smaller chunks and it is much easier to sell profits. In this way, the gold profits are repatriated to the than diamonds, especially in South Asia and Southeast Asia. Gulf without being physically moved or leaving a paper Diamonds are beginning to be universally recognized by trail. Dirty money sent via hawwalas cannot be taxed or serial number, but gold is impossible to trace, since even traced. The system works as if the workers’ remittances— stamped bars can simply be smelted.

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36 MIDDLE EAST REPORT 222 SPRING 2002 Without the tacit encouragement of the UAE govern- Islamic Bank as directly involved in running accounts for ment, gold brokerages and hawwalas would not have de- bin Laden and his associates.28 veloped into such a powerful transaction system. The UAE In 1995, Forbes named Khalid bin Mahfouz as the 125th has fashioned itself as a free-market zone to differentiate wealthiest man in the world. Long-time chairman of the itself from its often rigid and undiversified Gulf neigh- National Commercial Bank (NCB), the kingdom’s most bors. Oil revenue is falling; in 2001 it contributed just venerable financial institution, bin Mahfouz was at one 28 percent of the country’s point closer to the royal fam- GDP. Tourism contributed ily than Kamil, according to 20 percent.24 The UAE will some. Apart from being the be quite reluctant to abolish One acquires business promi- owners of one of the biggest activities like the hawwala family-run banks in the world, system for fear of sabotaging nence in Saudi Arabia as the di- in 1976 the bin Mahfouzes its attempts to become a glo- founded the Saudi Economic bal shopping center. rect result of proximity to the Development Company to royal family. invest in other sectors, like The Saudi Image contracting, global real estate, financial services and Islamic Problem investing. The family business Most prominent among the countries being pressured by was founded by Salim bin Mahfouz, possibly the most the US to trace and cut off funds associated with bin Laden prominent among a handful of immigrants from the and al-Qaeda is Saudi Arabia.25 At the request of the US, Hadramawt valley in southern Yemen who have made their the Saudi Arabian Monetary Authority (SAMA), the mark on Saudi Arabia’s commercial scene. NCB grew out kingdom’s central bank, is trying to monitor accounts asso- of the money-changing operation Salim set up in 1938. In ciated with some of the country’s most prominent business- 1951, having earned the trust and respect of King ‘Abd al- men to prevent them from being used wittingly or ‘Aziz Al Saud, Salim was granted a banking license and unwittingly to funnel money to al-Qaeda. However, busi- NCB became a joint liability partnership between his im- ness and the state in Saudi Arabia are so intertwined that mediate family and his in-laws the Kakis, a prominent Jidda finding out who is clean and who is not will be extremely trading family. After the 1987 oil price crash and the 1990- difficult. One acquires business prominence in Saudi Arabia 91 Gulf war seriously depleted the kingdom’s cash reserves, as the direct result of proximity to the royal family. the higher echelons of the royal family turned to NCB for Among the 150 accounts being monitored by SAMA are money. For years NCB published no financial statements. those belonging to Salih Kamil and the bin Mahfouz fam- The pressure on NCB was intensified by Khalid bin ily, both very close to the House of Saud. Although it is Mahfouz’s association with BCCI, whose operations were difficult, at this point, to prove that either of them directly closed down by the Bank of England in 1991. Khalid re- or knowingly padded al-Qaeda’s bank deposits, their im- signed from NCB’s management in 1992. In 1995 he paid mense business networks are suggestive. Salih Kamil is con- a $225 million fine for his role in the BCCI scandal and sidered one of the wealthiest and most diversified Saudi reappeared as chairman and sole owner of NCB in 1996, Arabian businessmen. Along with the Rome-based ART sat- having bought all of the bank’s shares in the two preceding ellite TV channel, Kamil owns the Dallah al-Baraka Group, years. In 1997 he sold some 20 percent to other members of with around $7 billion in assets.26 He also owns the Jidda al- the bin Mahfouz and Kaki families, but remained chairman Baraka Bank and is a majority stakeholder in al-Baraka Is- until 1999, when the government bought his shares and his lamic Investment Bank of Bahrain. Russian intelligence has links with the bank were cut. charged that the Jidda al-Baraka Bank was used by a Saudi During the same year Khalid was placed under house religious charity, al-Haramayn, to funnel funds to Islamist arrest when Saudi officials, at the urging of the US, au- fighters tied to al-Qaeda in Chechnya. Kamil also holds dited his bank and found that millions of dollars were shares in the Sudanese Islamic Bank, a branch of the Faisal being funneled to charities controlled by bin Laden. Other Islamic Bank of Egypt, and is listed as an original investor members of the bin Mahfouz family, including two sons and top shareholder in the al-Shamal Islamic Bank of of Khalid who sit on the board, still own more than 20 Khartoum—founded by National Islamic Front leader percent of the shares. Much of the suspicion about bin Hasan al-Turabi—which US prosecutors say was used to Mahfouz’s involvement with al-Qaeda revolves around a channel large amounts of money to al-Qaeda operatives.27 1999 audit conducted by the Saudi government that re- The other non-Sudanese shareholder of the al-Shamal Bank portedly discovered that NCB had transferred at least $3 is the Faisal Islamic Bank. The Faisal Islamic Bank of Saudi million to charitable organizations believed to be fronts Arabia, chaired by former Saudi intelligence chief Prince for bin Laden’s network. Khalid’s sister is one of bin Turki al-Faisal, is the head bank of a number of affiliates Laden’s wives.29 It is also believed that ‘Abd al-Rahman under the same name from Egypt to Pakistan to Malaysia. bin Mahfouz, Khalid’s brother, is a board member of Banking authorities in Luxembourg have named the Faisal Blessed Relief, a Sudan-based charity, which US officials

MIDDLE EAST REPORT 222 SPRING 2002 37 say served as a front for bin Laden. ‘Abd al-Rahman also The first time Beit Jala was shattered, served as a board member of Muwafaq, a defunct charity people were surprised and wondered formerly registered in Jersey and headed by Yasin al-Qadi what happened... from Jidda, also accused by the US of being associated Now Israel is threatening to blockade with al-Qaeda networks.30 the Palestinian areas and prevent us Perhaps fearing that US scrutiny of charities that may from getting water, electricity or fuel... have sent money to al-Qaeda will interfere with the reli- Children are the first victims of all this. gious duty of alms-giving and damage their Islamic le- gitimacy, the Saudis have taken some steps to rectify the No wonder they don't laugh from their image problem of charities based in the kingdom. In Janu- hearts anymore. They've lost their ary 2002, the Jidda Chamber of Commerce set up a task childhoods, and their only crime is force to develop a financial and administrative system for that they are Palestinian. charities that would enhance their credibility.31 It is diffi- --Patricia Al-Teet, school student cult to imagine a system that allows outsiders to track Beit Jala, West Bank who gives to Islamic charities and how the charities use their money, and at the same time can be deemed Islamic, since it is considered impious to publicize large dona- tions. Further, bankers who work in Saudi Arabia say that monitoring charitable donations is difficult because the kingdom has no tax system or internal revenue service that audits accounts. Companies pay zakat, a religious tax, but in many cases keep two sets of books to mini- mize the payments. Ambitious Task The anti-terrorist bill signed into law by Bush on October 27, 2001 would open a can of worms if such measures were passed and adopted in the Middle East. Section 315 of the bill classifies foreign corruption offenses as money launder- THE NEW INTIFADA ing crimes: if US companies are involved in the “bribery of Resisting Israel's Apartheid a public official, or the misappropriation, theft or embezzle- ment of public funds by or for the benefit of a public offi- Paper 1 85984 377 8 $20 cial” they can be charged with facilitation of money Edited by ROANE CAREY laundering under the new legislation. A similar law was re- cently passed in the UK. Although it might be feasible to Introduction by NOAM CHOMSKY enforce this law domestically, to remain competitive in bids for Middle East contracts, US and British companies will Now more pertinent than ever, the case likely find new ways of hiding graft money in offshore ac- counts and dummy subsidiaries. for an international grassroots movement Any effort to control flows of money into and within the in support of Palestinian rights is made Middle East is an ambitious task at best. Investigations trac- with urgency and persuasive clarity. ing financial transactions are predicated upon the existence of careful record-keeping of banks and wire transfer houses. Featuring essays by Edward Said, Neither the hawwala system nor many business activities in Robert Fisk, Ahdaf Soueif, Hussein Ibish, the Middle East leave a paper trail. The economies of most Ali Abunimah, Jennifer Lowenstein, Middle Eastern countries are still cash-dependent, and trans- Sara Roy, Muna Hamzeh and others. actions occur much more often in cash. But even if Middle Eastern economies were credit-oriented, it is still the banker who approves or denies large deposits. Banks worldwide have a fundamental interest in increasing their assets. According to one Gulf banker, the lesson absorbed from the success of American banks in the 1990s was “you find out how much 180 Varick Street New York NY 10014 the customer is willing to deposit in your bank,” and treat tel. 212 807 9680 the customer accordingly. As long as regime corruption gen- www.versobooks.com erates cash to be hidden, there will be bankers who can be bought to hide it. Without thorough reform of business-

38 MIDDLE EAST REPORT 222 SPRING 2002 NEW S WAY UBSC S TO RIBE N ATTENTION OW! “[Middle East Report] has been a steady source of penetrating SUBSCRIBERS! studies, timely and informed, full of For more than three decades, Middle East Report has been a source of clear-headed coverage insights.” and analysis of Middle East politics, culture and society. From renowned scholars to award- —Noam Chomsky winning journalists, Middle East Report brings you the writers who put the news in perspective. For essential background on controversial topics, for the critical analyses you won’t read in your “. . . invaluable for daily newspaper, subscribe now to Middle East Report! teaching Middle East history and politics— Now four convenient ways to subscribe or renew your subsciption to the voice of reason Middle East Report — and good sense.” —Roger Owen, Harvard • Call MERIP’s editorial office at (202) 223-3677; University • Use the form located on the inside back cover; • Subscribe online at www.merip.org. • By mail to MERIP Customer Service, PO Box 277,Hopewell, PA 16650-0277

BBC, October 3, 2001. regime relations in the Middle East—the system of regime 15 Financial Times, August 24, 2001. survival through graft and cronyism—the task of achieving 16 Financial Times, October 4, 2000. transparency in financial transactions will outlast many 17 Financial Times, October 4, 2000. US presidents. 18 BBC, November 17, 2001. 19 Chicago Tribune, September 26, 2001. Endnotes 20 Associated Press, January 19, 1996. 21 American Banker, October 12, 2001. 1 Organization of European Cooperation and Development, Financial Action Task Force 22 The Guardian, November 8, 2001. Report (Paris, June 2001). 23 Washington Post, February 17, 2002. 2 Al-Ahram Weekly, January 10-16, 2002. 24 Oxford Analytica, October 1, 2001. 3 Central Bank of Egypt internal memorandum, October 2001. 25 Wall Street Journal, February 6, 2002. 4 Jerusalem Post, October 8, 2001. 26 Kamil’s company DBG is considered among the top three corporate entities of Saudi 5 Financial Times, November 15, 2001. Arabia, outmatched only by the Kingdom Holding Company of Prince Walid bin Talal and 6 Arabic News.com, December 21, 1999. SABIC. Among the diversified interests of DBG is FLAG Telecom, which owns and operates 7 “Qui Possede le Maroc?,” Le Monde Diplomatique, August 1991. the FLAG (Fiber Link Around the Globe) cable running 27,300 kilometers from the United Kingdom to Japan. The shareholders in FLAG Telecom are Bell Atlantic, the Asian 8 Reuters, March 1, 2000. Infrastructure Fund of Hong Kong, DBG, Gulf Associates of the US, the Telecom Holding 9 Riyad Salama was appointed to the Central Bank after handling Hariri’s account at Merrill Company of Thailand, General Electric Capital-US, the Marubeni Corporation of Japan Lynch. Fuad Siniora at the Finance Ministry was chief financial officer for Hariri’s business and AT&T Capital. Al-Baraka Banking Group, part of DBG, relocated itself as an offshore operations. Suhail Yamout jumped from directorship of Hariri’s business interests in Brazil to bank in Bahrain at the end of 2000, making a lot of its financial transactions less taxable and the governorship of Mount Lebanon. See Guilain Denoeux and Robert Springborg, “Hariri’s traceable. According to Syrian business sources, DBG is also part of a holding company, Lebanon: Singapore of the Middle East or Sanaa of the Levant,” Middle East Policy 6/2 (October formed in the summer of 2000, to invest in Syria’s mobile telephone network, Internet network 1998), p. 162. and hotels. It is joined in the consortium by Saudi Oger, a contracting concern headed by Lebanese premier Rafiq Hariri and run by his son Saad, the Bin Laden Group and the First 10 Allegations that Mark Thatcher, son of then-British Prime Minister Margaret Thatcher, received a £12 million commission for his mediating efforts in the al-Yamama deal still abound. Saudi Investment Company, owned by Syrian businessman Wafiq Sa‘id. See John Pilger, “Flying the Flag: Arming the World,” in Hidden Agendas (London: Vintage, 27 Wall Street Journal, November 6, 2001. 1998), pp. 131-132. 28 As a result of US probing into Kamil’s activities, former President Bill Clinton insisted 11 International Institute for Strategic Studies, Annual Military Balance Reports (London, that neither he nor representatives of the bin Laden family be invited to a dinner speech he 1991-1997). gave to the Jidda Marketing Board on his recent trip to Jidda. Neil Bush, brother of George 12 Swissmoney Research-Middle East Division, Review (London, 2001). W. Bush and head of the software company Ignite!, also addressed the forum. Kamil is a founding member of the Jidda Marketing Board. It is believed that Clinton was paid an 13 Fiduciary deposits are large cash deposits placed with banks in Switzerland and then honorarium of $500,000 for his appearance at the gala dinner. Al-Hayat, January 21, 2002. transferred to banks abroad in order to avoid the 35 percent Swiss withholding tax on interest. They are placed abroad anonymously, in the name of a Swiss bank, but at the risk of the 29 Former CIA Director James Woolsey revealed the familial connection between Khalid bin client. Swiss banks charge a small fee for providing this service. Swiss banks currently have Mahfouz and bin Laden in 1998 Senate testimony. See Wayne Madsen, “Questionable Ties,” over $335 billion in anonymous deposits, mostly from foreign customers. In These Times, October 19, 2001. 14 Among those involved are: Citibank, Merrill Lynch, Goldman Sachs, NatWest, Barclays, 30 Wall Street Journal, February 6, 2002. HSBC, UBS, Credit Suisse, Credit Agricole, BNP Paribas, Commerzbank, Deutsche Bank. 31 Financial Times, January 29, 2002

MIDDLE EAST REPORT 222 SPRING 2002 39 HIWA OSMAN Refugees from Kirkuk in the Bardaqaram camp in the PUK-controlled area of Iraqi Kurdistan. Kirkukis in this camp recently demonstrated outside the UN headquarters. Refugees in Their Own Country Maggy Zanger

Successive Iraqi governments have tried to forestall Kurdish control of the Kirkuk oil fields through a policy they refer to as “Arabization.” For Kurds displaced by this policy, it matters little how international law describes it.

ix bodies uncovered in February during construction lies are forcibly expelled from Iraqi government-held areas on an old Iraqi army base in Iraqi Kurdistan were grim and show up destitute in the Kurdish self-rule region. They Sreminders of the Ba‘th regime’s past genocidal poli- are the latest victims of nearly 40 years of ethnic cleansing cies towards the Kurds. “The past is ever present in that continues unabated today. Kurdish sources say that in Kurdistan,” as one Kurdish journalist says. But little re- the past ten years alone nearly 200,000 people have been minder is needed of past atrocities when the present pro- forced out of the predominantly Kurdish districts of Kirkuk, vides an ongoing illustration. Khanaqin and Sinjar, which run along the line between Every week, week after week, year after year, dozens of Kurdish- and central government-held areas. More conser- Kurdish, Turkoman or Assyrian or Chaldean Christian fami- vative estimates, like that of the US Committee for Refu- gees, say nearly 100,000. At any rate, by summer 2001, the Maggy Zanger, former assistant editor of Middle East Report, teaches journalism at the American University in Cairo. She conducted research in Iraqi Kurdistan in the forced deportation of non-Arabs was happening on “a large summer of 2001. scale,” according to the UN special rapporteur on Iraq.1

40 MIDDLE EAST REPORT 222 SPRING 2002 These numbers represent but a few of an unknown num- their Arabization efforts to date “did not raise the percent- ber of non-Arabs whose ethnic cleansing from a strategi- age [of Arabs and Turkomans in Kirkuk] to 60 percent.”2 cally significant and oil-rich area of Iraq began long before Huge oil fields stretching from south of Kirkuk up to the term “ethnic cleansing” entered the vocabulary of inter- Erbil were discovered in the early part of the twentieth cen- national law and human rights. tury. They offered the Kurds enormous economic promise but brought political catastrophe. Kirkukis The Kurds claim that the Kirkuk area is Kurdish and there- fore must be part of any Kurdish autonomous area. They Jalah Jawhar, minister of industry in Sulaimaniyya, where further claim they should receive a percentage of oil rev- the Patriotic Union of Kurdistan (PUK) controls one of two enues from the area. But since Kirkuk oil accounted for 70 Kurdish enclaves, is documenting the slow demographic shift percent of Iraq’s total oil output by the 1970s, successive in northwestern Iraq from predominantly Kurdish to pre- post-monarchy regimes have not been amenable to Kurdish dominantly Arab. He publishes Kirkuk magazine and is writ- views that Kirkuk should be a part of their autonomous re- ing a book on the “whole history” of Arabization. gion. Various autonomy negotiations between the Kurds and Jawhar is one of hundreds of thousands of Kirkukis Iraqi regimes, from the 1960s to 1991, have fallen on the who staff the offices, classrooms sword of Kirkuk. The past four de- and businesses of Kurdish urban cades have been an endless cycle of centers like Sulaimaniyya and government oppression, Kurdish re- Erbil in today’s self-governing “Kirkuk is to the Kurds bellion, war, negotiations and break- area. Families like Jawhar’s, ex- down of negotiations. pelled in the 1970s and 1980s, what Jerusalem is to the Kirkuk oil is the primary but not are now fairly well-established in the only reason for the cyclic war- their new lives. But they never Palestinians,” says Salah fare. The various Iraqi governments forget where they came from, and Rashid. from 1958 onward were steeped in never give up hope of returning. the pan-Arabism of the day, which Kirkukis write reports, submit by definition rejected Kurdish claims commentary to local and inter- of self-determination in an Arab national newspapers, organize Kirkuk cultural centers state. The Ba‘th Party saw Kurdish nationalists as a possible and start organizations like the Higher Committee for Trojan horse because of their early collaboration with Iran, Confronting Arabization. the United States and even Israel. There is some speculation More recently deported Kirkukis jam in to dismal collec- that Saddam Hussein and other Ba‘thists have racist atti- tive towns to which the Iraqi government forcefully moved tudes towards the Kurds who are more closely related, eth- Kurds in the 1970s and 1980s to strip the countryside of a nically, to Persians than to Arabs.3 population to support Kurdish guerrillas. Others make do with informal camps on the outskirts of urban centers where Creating Facts on the Ground they do their best to erect homes with scraps of canvas, old jerry cans and, if they are lucky, handmade mud bricks. Most Iraqi governments could only claim that Kirkuk is outside are suddenly dispossessed middle-class business and prop- the Kurdish area by altering the demographic reality. This erty owners. They survive by their wits and a faulty patch- they have done with some success through an ethnic cleans- work of aid from the UN, NGOs and family who may have ing policy they themselves refer to as Arabization.4 preceded them in flight. When the Ba‘th Party first came to power in 1963, it While those forced out by the Iraqi government’s immediately began to force Kurds, Turkomans and Chris- Arabization policies since the 1960s hail from hundreds of tians from the villages surrounding the oil fields. Their vil- cities, towns and villages along the dividing line between lages were destroyed and rebuilt for Arab settlers. The second the Kurdish self-ruled area and government-held territory, Ba‘thist regime of 1968, in need of time to consolidate power, they are often all referred to as Kirkukis. In some ways, decided to appease the Kurds by stating in the 1970 consti- Kirkuk lies at the heart of Kurdish nationalism, and cer- tution that Iraq consists of both Arab and Kurdish nation- tainly at the heart of Kurdish-Ba‘th Party fighting over the alities, and recognizing the national rights of the Kurdish shape of Kurdish autonomy within Iraq. “Kirkuk is to the people. Negotiations over autonomy began in 1970, but Kurds what Jerusalem is to the Palestinians,” says Salah broke down when Mullah Mustafa Barzani, leader of the Rashid, the minister of humanitarian affairs, displaced per- Kurdish Democratic Party (KDP), laid formal claim to the sons and Anfal victims in Sulaimaniyya. Kirkuk oilfields. Kirkuk has been a majority-Kurdish city for hundreds of The government saw Barzani’s claim as an act of war and years. It lies along an important trade and administrative unilaterally decreed an autonomy statute in 1974. The Kurds route linking what is now central Iraq with Turkey, Syria rejected it and renewed fighting. Under the 1974 autonomy, and Iran. Commerce and governance brought Arabs and the boundaries of the Kirkuk governorate were split in two to Turks to the area, but even the Ba‘th admitted in 1989 that allow for an Arab majority around the city proper. Heavily

MIDDLE EAST REPORT 222 SPRING 2002 41 Human Rights Watch) have pointed out that Arabization was no haphazard operation. In the 1970s, the Ba‘th gov- ernment set up the Revolutionary Command Council’s Committee for Northern Affairs, headed by Saddam Hussein, to orchestrate the mass relocation of the Kurdish population. Arabization abated with the beginning of the Iran-Iraq war in 1980, when government troops redeployed to the front. As the war drew to a close, the Ba‘th instituted the final solution to the “Kurdish problem” with the 1988 Anfal campaign of genocide, run from Kirkuk by Saddam Hussein’s cousin Ali Hassan al-Majid. During the Anfal campaign, 100,000 Kurds, the vast majority of them non-combatants, were killed outright. Another 182,000 disappeared and are presumed dead, though the government refuses to confirm their deaths. As many as 4,000 more villages were destroyed and another 500,000 people were forced to collective towns. Chemical weapons were used in at least 40 separate attacks. KDP leader Masoud Barzani said simply, “We cannot fight chemical weapons with bare hands. We just cannot fight on.”5 “Nationality Correction” Following the Kurdish uprising after the 1990-1991 Gulf war—in which Kirkuk was the ultimate Kurdish goal—and the establishment of the safe haven, the Iraqi Kurdistan Front, Kurdish cities like Chamchamal, Kifri and Kalar were reallo- consisting of all major political parties, once again negoti- cated to other Kurdish governorates. ated with Baghdad, skeptical of the longevity of interna- With the defeat of the Kurdish rebellion in 1975, the tional protection. They talked of federation and Baghdad Ba‘thist government seized the opportunity to bring the seemed willing—for a short time—to cede administration Kurds to heel once and for all. This required moving Kurds of Kirkuk, but not the oilfields, to the Kurds. But the re- off their ancestral homelands and into areas where they could gime refused to allow international guarantees and in the be controlled. The government created a security belt up to end refused to delineate the exact borders of the Kurdish 18 miles deep along the northern Iranian and Turkish bor- region, leaving the status of Kirkuk and other cities along ders, razed as many as 1,400 rural villages, and herded as the oil belt unresolved. The Front finally pulled out of ne- many as 600,000 people into collective resettlement towns gotiations in July 1991. in the plains, under the watchful eye of the Iraqi military. In October 1991 the central government withdrew all Tens of thousands were shipped off to die in the southern government services from three Kurdish governorates in the deserts. Anyone caught trying to return to their home was north—roughly along the lines of the 1974 autonomy law— summarily executed. and imposed an internal embargo. Baghdad apparently felt The Ba‘th regime also took this opportunity to settle the that if left to their own devices, and without fuel, food, elec- demographic balance in the disputed areas near the oilfields. tricity or any other government service, the Kurds would be Arabization that had begun in the 1960s was reinvigorated. more pliant negotiating partners. But ten years on the Kurds More than one million Kurdish, Turkoman and Assyrian have not resumed autonomy talks with the regime, though residents were forced out of the disputed districts of there has been some communication with the government. Khanaqin, Kirkuk, Mandali, Zakuh and Sinjar. They were After an internal war in the mid-1990s, there are two Kurdish replaced with Egyptian and Iraqi Arab settlers enticed north- governments, headed by the PUK and KDP respectively, ward with housing and property incentives. operating quite efficiently in three Kurdish districts. Laws were altered to make it difficult for Kurds to hold Meanwhile, Arabization policies seem to have increased property or gain employment. Arabs were rewarded finan- in intensity. When the government retook Kirkuk after the cially for marrying Kurdish women. Kurdish civil servants 1991 uprising, they brutally forced out thousands of Kurds. were moved out of Kurdistan to work in Arab districts. Kamaran is one of them. He was originally “Arabized,” as Kurdish faculty at the new university in Sulaimaniyya were he says, in 1989. But he snuck back into Kirkuk to look dismissed. Kurdish names were changed to Arab names. The after his family and thriving appliance shop. “It was a clan- city of Kirkuk, for example, was changed to al-Ta’mim, “na- destine way of living,” he says. He was forced to flee again tionalization.” Investigators from Middle East Watch (now in 1991 after the uprising. His family has lived in Kirkuk

42 MIDDLE EAST REPORT 222 SPRING 2002 for as long as they can remember. His father started work- qis over 18 the “right” to change their ethnic identity to ing in the oil fields in 1958, but was expelled and his house Arab. The Kirkuk Trust for Research and Studies, headed destroyed in 1963. Iraqi policy has since changed and by Lord Avebury of the British Parliamentary Human Kurdish, Turkoman and Assyrian homes and businesses are Rights Group and Kevin Boyle of the University of Essex, no longer destroyed. Rather, homes and businesses are points out that this law is in direct violation of Iraq’s 1970 handed over as “gifts” from President Saddam Hussein to constitution which states that all Iraqis are equal, regard- new Arab settlers, often along with a lump sum of money less of ethnic language, religion or social class. The consti- and arms for “protection,” according to al-Ta’mim, the gov- tution further states, as cited above, that Iraq consists of ernment newspaper in Kirkuk. two main ethnic groups, Arabs and Kurds. “This law,” the Kamaran and his wife and five children now live in a com- Kirkuk Trust points out in a recent press release, “legalizes munity built by the UN’s Habitat and a local NGO, the regime’s policy of ethnic cleansing directed against all Kurdistan Save the Children, on the edge of Chamchamal, Kurds, Turkomans and Assyro-Chaldeans.” between Sulaimaniyya and Kirkuk. “We are among Kurds The term “ethnic cleansing” came of age in the past now,” Kamaran says. “We have freedom.” Would he like to decade in reference to the former Yugoslavia. While there go back? “Of course,” he says quietly. “Kirkuk is my home.” is no single agreed-upon legal definition, Tadeusz According to Nizam Din Gili, the Kurdish governor Mazowiecki, special rapporteur of the UN Commission of Erbil, which lies inside the KDP area a few miles from for Human Rights, has written, in reference to Yugosla- Kirkuk, a typical scenario for expulsion from government- via: “The term ethnic cleansing refers to the elimination held areas goes like this: when a non-Arab has to register by the ethnic group exerting control over a given terri- children for school or renew a driver’s license, he is asked tory of members of other ethnic groups.” He later wrote, if he would like to “correct” his nationality card. All Ira- “[E]thnic cleansing may be equated with the systematic qis have an identification card that identifies them by purge of the civilian population based on ethnic criteria, ethnic origin. Non-Arabs are “allowed” to fill in a form with the view to forcing it to abandon the territories where saying they would like to “correct” their ethnicity to Arab. it lives.”6 Iraq’s policies toward its ethnic minorities fit If they refuse, they and their families are forced into the this definition. Kurdish-controlled area, leaving behind all possessions. Some have argued that ethnic cleansing is tantamount They are not allowed to sell any property they may own. to genocide, particularly when mass expulsions are ac- If they “correct” the ethnic identity to Arab, they are of- companied by large-scale killings intended to frighten ten told: well, if you are an Arab, you might as well live even more members of the targeted ethnic group into flee- in the south. They are then shipped off to the predomi- ing. In denouncing Serbian policies in Bosnia, UN Gen- nantly Shi‘i south, and are sometimes allowed to bring eral Assembly Resolution 47/121 of December 18, 1992 household goods. refers to “the abhorrent policy of ‘ethnic cleansing,’ which Hamid, who lives in Bisaslawa camp near Erbil, experi- is a form of genocide” in paragraph 9 of the preamble. enced a more proactive but also typical mechanism for expul- One judge who heard Bosnia’s 1993 suit against Yugosla- sion. In 1997, a security official paid Hamid a visit and said via in the International Court of Justice wrote an opin- he needed to report to a police station. There he was forced to ion stating that genocide had occurred, though the hand over his identification and food ration cards and other majority did not concur. There is no doubt, however, that papers. He was told it was time to leave Kirkuk. A male fam- acts of ethnic cleansing can be prosecuted as war crimes ily member was arrested at the same time and held at the and crimes against humanity.7 police station. Hamid returned home, loaded up his wife and For displaced people like Kamaran, who have little knowl- children and the few belongings the security official said he edge of debates in international jurisprudence, it is a simple could take and drove to the police station. The relative was matter of what is right. “A stone is heavier when it’s in its released when the police saw that Hamid’s family was ready place,” he says, echoing other Kirkukis who now live as refu- to leave. An officer accompanied the truck to the border with gees in their own country. the Kurdish-governed area a few dozen miles away. Endotes “In a matter of minutes, they can wrap you up and ship you off to another city,” Hamid says four years later from 1 US Committee for Refugees, World Refugee Survey 2001 (Washington, DC, 2001). the floor of his new cement-block house. His brother and 2 Middle East Watch [now Human Rights Watch], Genocide in Iraq: The Anfal Campaign Against the Kurds (New York, 1993), p. 353. From a transcript of audiotape of Ali Hassan al- father and their families had been forced out this way, and Majid speaking to his successor as Secretary of the Northern Bureau. It is unclear if Majid is recent arrivals at the various camps inside the Kurdish self- speaking of Kirkuk city or the governorate. 3 Ibid., p. 35. rule enclaves tell similar stories. 4 Ibid., p. 353. 5 This history is taken from Middle East Watch, op cit.; David McDowall, A Modern History of the Kurds (London, I.B. Tauris & Co. Ltd, 2000); Jonathan Randall, After Such Knowledge Ethnic Cleansing What Forgiveness? My Encounters with Kurdistan (New York: Farrar, Strauss and Giroux, 1997); and interviews with officials in Iraqi Kurdistan in the summer of 2001. A new Iraqi law makes the first form of deportation legal. 6 Drazen Petrovic, “Ethnic Cleansing: An Attempt at Methodology,” European Journal of In September 2001, the Iraqi Revolutionary Command International Law 5/3 (1994). 7 For a complete discussion, see William Schabas, Genocide in International Law (Cambridge: Council passed Resolution 119, which gives non-Arab Ira- Cambridge University Press, 2000), pp. 189-201.

MIDDLE EAST REPORT 222 SPRING 2002 43 REVIEW ESSAY

Gender and Islamism in the 1990s Mervat Hatem

In response to the patriarchal tendencies of the Islamist cultural revolution, a small group of Islamist and other

Muslim women have reclaimed Qur’anic and other textual interpretation for their own purposes. The result is a new space for women within the Islamic tradition.

cholars of Islamism and gender have used the Islamist examples invite us to reject the presumed passivity of emphasis on women’s familial roles to strengthen the women under the weight of Islamic tradition and the Sdominant discursive view that the modernizing state is cultural hegemony of Islamism and to examine how the single most important progressive agent in the struggle women are redefining their relationship to both. to equalize gender roles and relations in Islamic societies.1 Islamists and the state certainly continue to compete in the Cultural Change and Gendered Identities cultural and political arenas. However, state-centric repre- sentations of Islamism as a conjunctural episode in the secular Because Middle East women’s studies have tended to history of the Middle East ignore the extent to which Islam- view gender as the essential property of women rather ist practices and ideas have become normalized in the new than a relational category that explains social and his- gender identities of men and women. The study of changes torical changes in both male and female identities, men that Islamism has introduced in the identities of men and have been absent from the scholarly discussion. Inter- women—as signified in dress, group solidarity and male- estingly enough, Zaynab al-Ghazali, the Egyptian Islam- female relations—provides a broader interpretation of the ist, reports that men engaged in an extensive debate relationship between Islamism and gender. regarding their own return to an Islamic mode of dress. Equally important is analysis of the contradictory dy- Islamist men debated whether their return to traditional namics that Islamism has brought to the cultural arena. male dress should be accompanied by changes like short- While patriarchal Islamist groups have sought to impose ening their galabiyyas and growing beards in accordance conservative gender rules on women, Islamist and other with the prophetic tradition.2 They wanted to distin- Muslim women have not passively accepted them. The guish their dress from peasant and urban working-class streets of most cities and villages in the region show that dress, giving an old form a new meaning as a marker of veiled women have not heeded the call to stay at home; religious community. Male dress was also part of a new instead they have used their Islamic mode of dress to cre- identity that sought to contest the national authority of ate their own public space where they are treated with the Westernized political elite and to legitimate Islam- respect. Meanwhile, Muslim women activist-scholars cre- ist local authority.3 atively engage the Qur’anic text and the prophetic tradi- Tariq al-Bishri, the Egyptian leftist jurist turned Is- tion in ways that advance gender justice. All of these lamist, elaborates on the changing forms of fraternal soli- darity and its relationship to community. He suggests Mervat Hatem teaches political science at Howard University in Washington, DC. that the rise of Islamism contributed to the fracturing

44 MIDDLE EAST REPORT 222 SPRING 2002 of the larger national and Arab fraternal communities. the same purpose.8 In the 1990s, there were other ex- A new “factionalism” (ta’ifiyya) emerged that challenged amples of middle-class Islamist sisterhoods activated in these older bases of solidarity. The result is an urgent the cultural arena. Islamist women consistently showed need to build bridges between secular and Islamist na- up in large numbers at state-sponsored conferences or tional currents. The secularists need to critically reex- feminist gatherings that discuss “women’s rights” to reg- amine their views of the Islamist “other” and their claim ister their opposition to secularist approaches and to to have greater legitimacy in the existing community. present their alternative. The most recent example of this The Islamists should enrich their fiqh (jurisprudence) exercise was the state-sponsored conference celebrating by absorbing successful models for addressing contem- the centennial of Qasim Amin’s Tahrir al-mara’a (Libera- porary imperatives, even those from other intellectual- tion of the Woman) held in Cairo in 1999. These con- religious traditions. Al-Bishri believes that the new frontations among Islamist and other women were Islamist hegemony provides better grounds than secu- manifestations of the fracturing of the national identities larism for securing the rights of Christian minorities and of women.9 national unity. The goal was not just for secular and Islamist currents to coexist, but to find ground on which Islamist and Muslim Women Engage both could meet to achieve the independence, unity and development of the community. This task required the Religious Discourses energy of strong and qualified men.4 The active segments of the different generations of Islamist The recent fatwa (religious opinion) issued by a panel women feel pride and interest in everything “Islamic,” and of prominent Muslim scholars, including al-Bishri, re- a commitment to advocating alternative Islamist discourses garding the enlistment of American Muslims in the US on women’s relationship to culture and politics. Outside Is- armed forces to fight other Muslims in the war against lamist circles, veiled and unveiled Muslim women at uni- terrorism showed that his commitment to the preserva- versities are also engaging the Islamic discourse in an attempt tion of fraternal national solidarity extended to situations to expand and deepen that debate. where Muslims were a religious minority. The fatwa stated: Zaynab al-Ghazali, a self-educated woman and the “A Muslim is a citizen of a state and a member of its regular only prominent woman in the Muslim Brotherhood in army. He has no choice but to follow orders; otherwise Egypt, was initially preoccupied with the challenge of his allegiance and loyalty to his country would be in Western and secular feminist writings on Islam. Her doubt. This would subject him to much harm since he recent writings are more focused on debates within the would not enjoy the privileges [of citizenship] without Islamist community and how they reproduced the secu- performing its obligations.”5 larist argument regarding the subordinate status of Salwa Ismail’s study of Algerian Islamism shows the emer- women, which she considered to be a false issue. She gence of local forms of “fraternal” identity that filled the deployed the prophetic tradition to deny the privileg- void left by the fractured national solidarities discussed by ing of men over women in Islam. If “women are the al-Bishri. She points out that, among the many supporters sisters of men” as one hadith suggests, then both the of the Front for Islamic Salvation (FIS), identity became Islamist preoccupation with the question of difference focused on peripheral suburban neighborhoods where the and the (secular) feminist claim that Muslim women mosque and sports teams contributed to the “reactivation of have gender-specific concerns miss the point. When Is- the spirit of oulad al-houma.” The mosque became a center lamist men suggest that they are better than women be- of sociability, communication and territorialization and, cause only men were prophets, they ignore the fact that along with the all-male character and fraternal values of team God gave women the equally honorable position of be- sports, valorized the male community.6 ing mothers of all these prophets. This useless debate The issue of dress for second- and third-generation serves the interests of the enemies of Islam, said al- Islamist women has been only a small part of a conscious Ghazali, especially the Jews. They also distract atten- effort to make “faith” an organizing framework for their tion from the primary concern of Muslims—the lives. This included observance of important religious ritu- backwardness of the umma. In the struggle to restore als and the definition of their relations, not only with the glory of Islamic society, a woman’s primary role is men, but also with other women, in their pursuit of edu- to build a healthy family. If she is able to juggle that cation, work and a greater presence in the cultural arena. responsibility along with others, then she should serve Much has been said on the hierarchical relations between societal needs as well.10 men and women within the family and the reserved in- In contrast, Heba Raouf Ezzat, an Egyptian political teraction between the sexes outside it.7 But studies of scientist who recently emerged as a key public voice of Egyptian veiled women in the late 1980s also showed the Islamist women of the now defunct Labor Party, offers development of new forms of sisterhood among female a reading of the history of Western secularism and its university students who met on campus in the girls’ enlightenment project that was inspired by the desire to lounges as part of religious study groups. Older middle- “construct our own [Islamic] modernity having seen class women met in mosques or in each other’s houses for where things went wrong.” She blames Western secu-

MIDDLE EAST REPORT 222 SPRING 2002 45 larism and the modern state for the crisis in social val- her headscarf back on, attending party meetings at the ues and in important institutions like the family and parliament and a presidential reception and visiting religion.11 Her emphasis on the importance of family Atatürk’s tomb as a veiled woman.16 and religion led her to strongly condemn homosexual- Konca Kuris, a member of the radical Turkish Hizbollah, ity, which she considered to be a measure of the moral who did not reject being called an Islamist feminist, offered degradation of the West and the crisis of its families. creative reinterpretations of Islamic practices and beliefs that She fears that the widespread desire to imitate the West eventually brought her into violent conflict with the party. and its mores made homosexuality a threat to Islamic A self-educated woman from Mersin in Southern Anatolia, society.12 Feminism undermined the family in yet an- her views on many Islamic issues were not published, but other way. It put emphasis on the individual rights of were articulated in televised and published interviews. While women and the critique of patriarchy, overlooking the she grounded her arguments in Qur’anic verses, Kuris criti- fact that patriarchal cul- cized literal readings of the tures also bind men into text. She has expressed a families with important concern that the Qur’an obligations. For many Muslim women, their de- was interpreted by misogy- Ezzat rejects the at- nist men who determined tempt to classify her as an fense of women’s rights is part of the the status of women, and Islamic feminist. Like al- challenged the views of re- Ghazali, she considers defense of Islam against the corrup- ligious authorities on a feminism to be a Western tion of its own ideals. number of important issues. secular construct that is While she wore a headscarf, alien to the Islamic tradi- she believed that Islam does tion that guides her.13 not require women to cover While she claims to be using orthodox Islamic method- their hair or to be sexually segregated from men in mosques, ology to interpret the Qur’an and the prophetic tradi- at funerals or in schools. Most importantly, Kuris has chal- tion, she offered unorthodox views that applied the lenged the notion of menstrual blood as “dirty,” asking how political principles of shura (consultation) to relations it can be dirty if it feeds the fetus in the womb. She sug- in the family, rejecting both the Islamic and the mod- gested that this notion was the creation of a patriarchal reli- ern splits between the public and the private. She ar- gious elite who wanted to keep women from worship and gued that women had the right to choose and reject their God.17 mates just as they had the right, as members of the Is- lamic community, to give and to withhold support to Critical Interpretations the caliph.14 The discussion of women’s interpretation of Qur’anic Eclectic Views in Turkey verses was joined by Muslim women like Farida Banani of Morocco and Zaynab Radwan of Egypt, who are un- In the 1990s, Islamist women in Turkey held more eclec- veiled, and Omaima Abou Bakr of Egypt, who is veiled. tic views about the relationship between religion and poli- As academics with training in law, Islamic philosophy and tics. In a provocative paper discussing the election of two English and comparative literature respectively, they veiled women, Merve Kavakci and Nesrin Unal, in 1999 brought new readings and discourses to the discussion. to the National Assembly, Fatma Muge Göçek stressed Banani critically reinterpreted most of the popular the hybridity of the Islamist experience and its political Qur’anic verses used by the Islamists to support the veil- practice. Kavakci, a deputy of the Islamist Virtue Party, ing of women and their seclusion at home. For instance, appeared with a headscarf at the swearing ceremony and she suggested that the practices of veiling and seclusion was noisily escorted out. Unal, a deputy of the National- were only designed for the wives of the Prophet. Jurists ist Action Party, uncovered her hair for the session and who consider veiling and seclusion applicable to all was sworn in with the other deputies. Both women were women ignore a Qur’anic verse which states that the asked to explain their roles in this event. Kavakci, a US- “wives of the Prophet were unlike other women.” Other trained engineer, described herself “as a daughter of the Qur’anic verses ask women believers to avert their gaze republic representing a persecuted populace” who was when they meet men who are not related to them. If the denied access to public education, government employ- intent was to encourage women to stay at home, then ment and a presence in the political arena because of the why was there a need for women to avert their gaze? Fi- veil. Unal indicated that “the state was sacred in the tra- nally, since Islam gave women a separate legal and finan- dition of the Turks and one has to respect that which is cial standing, it must have been expected that women sacred.”15 By making the state sacred, Unal could recon- would oversee their financial affairs outside of the home.18 cile two sacred sets of rules: one political and the other Zaynab Radwan contextualized the important Qur’anic religious. Importantly, following the ceremony, Unal put verse that explicitly stipulates that the testimony of one

46 MIDDLE EAST REPORT 222 SPRING 2002 man equals that of two women. She suggested that a fuller sions for revelation.” This leads Abou Bakr to argue that reading of the verse shows that this stipulation was spe- “if God Himself and the Prophet (PBUH) gave ear to cific to financial/commercial transactions, with which Muslim women’s queries, then why not reproduce the women of the time had limited familiarity. The verse ex- same situation if there is need for it at another point of plicitly states that the purpose of having two women tes- our history?”21 tify in such transactions is to ensure that if one strays the The Islamist cultural revolution has contributed to other will correct her. It was clearly focused on the oral women’s interest in religion and religious interpretation. It testimonies of women because very few women at that has also contributed to patriarchal religious discourses and time knew how to read and write. Once women became views. In response, a small group of Islamist and other Mus- literate and more active in the financial arena, the need lim women have reclaimed the Islamic tradition for their for the testimony of two women to equal that of one man own purposes. While Islamist women have sought to de- ended. In supporting her argument for legal equality, velop interpretations that serve the political agendas of their Radwan marshaled other verses from the Qur’an that dis- parties, other Muslim women have sought to use their intel- cussed a woman’s testimony in the civil and criminal are- lectual skills to reinterpret the Islamic texts from a gender- nas as equal to that of a man.19 sensitive perspective. The result is a new space for women within the Islamic tradition. What Is Islamic Feminism? Endnotes Omaima Abou Bakr has made a significant contribu- tion to discussions of the category of Islamic feminism 1 For the dominant view, see Deniz Kandiyoti’s introduction to her edited volume, Women, then finding currency in the West and in the Middle Islam and the State (Philadelphia: Temple University Press, 1991), pp. 1-21. For a review of narratives of the Middle Eastern state’s relationship to the modernization of gender roles, see East. She differentiated between an Islamic feminism Mervat Hatem, “Modernization, the State and the Family in Middle East Women’s Studies” which was part of Muslim self-definition and a new he- in Margaret Meriwether and Judith Tucker, eds., A Social History of Women and Gender in the gemonic Western concept designed to contain the Modern Middle East (Boulder, CO: Westview Press, 1999), pp. 63-88. 2 Zaynab al-Ghazali, “Al-Mara’a al-muslima ila ayna?” in Ibn al-Hashimi, ed., Humum al- “other.” She also identified several different uses of the mara’a al-muslima wa al-da‘iya Zaynab al-Ghazali (Cairo: Dar al-I‘tisam, 1990). notion. “Islamic feminism” has referred to work done 3 Mamoun Fandy, “Political Science Without Clothes: The Politics of Dress or Contesting by Muslim women of different generations and orienta- the Spatiality of the State in Egypt,” Arab Studies Quarterly (Spring 1999). 4 Tariq al-Bishri, Fi al-mas’ala al-islamiyya bayn al-islam wa al-‘uruba (Cairo: Dar al-Shuruq, tions, to a textual category/approach, to veiled women, 1998), pp. 5-6, 12. to oppositional counterweights to secular feminism and 5 Washington Post, October 11, 2001. to tactical constructs used by Arab feminist critics. Abou 6 Salwa Ismail, Rethinking Islamist Politics: Culture, the State and Islamism (London: I.B. Tauris, forthcoming). Bakr suggested that for the concept to be meaningful, it 7 Arlene Elowe Macleod, Accommodating Protest: Working Women, the New Veiling and Change needed to be applied in a discriminating way to those (New York: Columbia University Press, 1991); Mervat Hatem, “Secularist and Islamist Discourses on Modernity in Egypt and the Evolution of the Postcolonial Nation-State,” in who simultaneously critique the Islamic tradition and Yvonne Haddad and John Esposito, eds., Islam, Gender and Social Change (New York: Oxford develop alternatives and solutions inspired by Islamic University Press, 1998), pp. 85-99. values. For Muslim feminists, this project is designed to 8 Nemat Guenena, The “Jihad”: An “Islamic Alternative” in Egypt (Cairo: American University in Cairo Press, 1986), pp. 76-82. produce an Islamic discourse that problematizes gender 9 See Omaima Abou Bakr, Sahar Subhi, Sumayya Ramadan, ‘Abir ‘Abbas, Hala Fu’ad and injustice in the context of an Islamic worldview that they Huda al-Sadda, “Harb ahliyya sahatiha qadaya al-mara’a,” Wijhat Nazar (February 2000), believe provides “divine justice, compassion, egalitari- pp. 58-61. 10 Al-Ghazali, pp. 57-58, 60, 62. anism and liberation from slavery or submission to any 11 Heba Raouf Ezzat, “Secularism, the State and the Social Bond: The Withering Away of being other than God.” Their defense of women’s rights the Family,” in John Esposito and Azzam Tamimi, eds., Islam and Secularism in the Middle is part of the defense of Islam against the corruption of East (New York: New York University Press, 2000), p. 134-136. 12 Azza Karam, Women, Islamism and the State (New York: St. Martin’s Press, 1998), p. 222. its own ideals. Another characteristic of this new enter- 13 Ibid., p. 224. prise is what Abou Bakr calls “turning the tables” on 14 Interview with Ezzat, “It Is Time to Launch a New Women’s Liberation Movement—An Muslim men, taking them to task for their failure to Islamic One,” Middle East Report 191 (November-December 1994), pp. 26-27. 20 15 Fatma Muge Göçek, “To Veil or Not to Veil: The Contested Location of Gender in adhere to Islamic principles and injunctions. Contemporary Turkey,” Interventions 1/4 (2000), pp. 521-535. Abou Bakr’s definition of Islamic feminism places the 16 Burcak Koskin, “Merve Kavakci: A Mnemonic Symbol of the (Islamic) Past or An Icon of works of Nawal El-Saadawi and Fatima Mernissi, which Distinction,” paper presented to the Middle East Studies Association, November 17-20, 2000. stop at the critique of Islam, outside the faith-based 17 This summary is based on Burcak Koskin, “A Veiled Woman with Claims to Feminist Knowledge: The Case of Konca Kuris,” paper presented to the workshop on New Directions project. In another article, Abou Bakr asks the intrigu- in Feminist Scholarship in the Middle East and North Africa, Florence, March 21-25, 2001. Konca Kuris was kidnapped after one of her interviews. Her body was found two years later ing question: “How valid or appropriate is it for Mus- as part of police operations against Hizbollah. lims—women and men—to adopt a so-called 18 Farida Banani, “al-Nisawiya: sawt masmu‘ fi al-niqash al-dini,” in Huda al-Sadda, Sumayya gender-sensitive perspective or approach to the study of Ramadan and Omaima Abou Bakr, eds., Zaman al-nisa’ wa al-dhakira al-badila (Cairo: Multaqa al-Mara’a wa al-Dhakira, 1998), pp. 175-176. religious, cultural and historical texts?” She answers by 19 Zaynab Radwan, al-Islam wa qadaya al-mara’a (Cairo: al-Hay’a al-Misriyya al-‘Amma lil- referring to three incidents documented in the prophetic Kitab, 1993), pp. 100-111. tradition in which women questioned the Prophet on 20 Omaima Abou Bakr, “Islamic Feminism: What’s in a Name?” Middle East Women’s Studies Review (Winter/Spring 2001), pp. 1-2, 3, 7. their roles in the community. In two of these incidents, 21 Abou Bakr, “A Muslim Woman’s Reflection on Gender,” electronic document accessed at the issues raised were significant enough to be “occa- http://www.islam21.net/pages/keyissues/key2-8.htm on February 24, 2002.

MIDDLE EAST REPORT 222 SPRING 2002 47 EDITOR’S PICKS

Ahmida, Ali Abdullatif. Beyond Colonialism and Conetta, Carl. “Strange Victory: A Critical Ap- Kimmerling, Baruch. The Invention and Decline Nationalism in the Maghrib: History, Culture praisal of Operation Enduring Freedom and of Israeliness: State, Society and the Military. and Politics. New York: Palgrave, 2000. the Afghanistan War,” Project on Defense Al- Berkeley, CA: University of California Press, Antoun, Richard T. Understanding Fundamental- ternatives Research Monograph 6 (Cambridge, 2001. ism: Christian, Islamic and Jewish Movements. January 2002). Kramer, Martin. Ivory Towers on Sand: The Fail- Walnut Creek, CA: Altamira Press, 2001. Dagher, Carole. Bring Down the Walls: Lebanon’s ure of Middle Eastern Studies in America. Beinin, Joel. Workers and Peasants in the Modern Post-War Challenge. New York: Palgrave, 2000. Washington, DC: Washington Institute for Middle East. Cambridge: Cambridge Univer- Dumper, Michael. The Politics of Sacred Space: Near East Policy, 2001. sity Press, 2001. The Old City of Jerusalem in the Middle East Masters, Bruce. Christians and Jews in the Otto- Bill, James A. and John Alden Williams. Roman Conflict. Boulder, CO: Lynne Rienner, man Arab World: The Roots of Sectarianism. Catholics and Shi‘i Muslims: Prayer, Passion and 2002. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, Politics. Chapel Hill, NC: University of North Halliday, Fred. Two Hours that Shook the World: 2001. Carolina Press, 2002. September 11, 2001, Causes and Consequences. Potter, Lawrence and Gary Sick, eds. Security in Bloom, Jonathan and Sheila Blair. Islam: A Thou- London: Saqi Books, 2002. the Persian Gulf: Origins, Obstacles and the sand Years of Faith and Power. New Haven, Henry, Clement and Robert Springborg. Global- Search for Consensus. New York: Palgrave, CT: Yale University Press, 2002. ization and the Politics of Development in the 2002. Boling, Gail J. “Palestinian Refugees and the Middle East. Cambridge: Cambridge Univer- Slyomovics, Susan, ed. The Walled Arab City in Right of Return: An International Law Analy- sity Press, 2001. Literature, Architecture and History. London: sis,” Badil Information and Discussion Brief 8 Hroub, Khaled. Hamas: Political Thought and Frank Cass, 2001. (Bethlehem, January 2001). Practice. Washington, DC: Institute for Pal- St. Germain, Mary and Charlene Constable, tr. Bornstein, Avram S. Crossing the Green Line: estine Studies, 2000. The Committee. Syracuse, NY: Syracuse Uni- Between the West Bank and Israel. Philadel- Human Rights Watch, Second Class: Discrimi- versity Press, 2001. phia, PA: University of Pennsylvania Press, nation Against Palestinian Arab Children in Vogelsang, Willem. The Afghans. Oxford: 2002. Israel’s Schools (New York, September 2001). Blackwell, 2002. Brown, Nathan. Democracy, History and the Con- Khalaf, Samir. Cultural Resistance: Global and Yaghamian, Behzad. Social Change in Iran: An test Over the Palestinian Curriculum Local Encounters in the Middle East. London: Eyewitness Account of Dissent, Defiance and (Washington, DC: Adam Institute, Novem- Saqi Books, 2001. New Movements for Rights. Albany, NY: State ber 2001). University of New York Press, 2002.

Continued from page 1. are like most people,” Pentagon adviser Richard terests in the Gulf. By their logic, this ideologi- Perle told Hersh. “They like winners, and will go cal bent now assumes a practical imperative: if “war on terrorism” will be a success even if the with winners all the time.” Hussein responds to US intervention with war- primary quarries elude US forces. These cold iro- The regional players that figure in the heads aimed at Tel Aviv, even the hardliners know nies ought to give pause to those on the left who hardliners’ plans are those hosting US bases in that an Israeli counterattack would portend re- thought the US could prosecute a “just war” in proximity to Iraq: Turkey, Saudi Arabia, Kuwait gional conflagration. Ariel Sharon may not show Afghanistan. and other Gulf countries. Cheney is likely assess- Yitzhak Shamir’s restraint at Iraqi missiles, but The fall of Kabul and Kandahar inaugurated ing the extent of the payoff that will be required the shameless US invocations of Israel’s right to a season of speculation about where the war will for these regimes to allow use of their territory for self-defense throughout most of the current wave go next. Minor deployments aside, the target is a US assault. Turkey’s severe financial crisis begs of IDF assaults indicate that the Bush team hopes almost certainly Iraq. According to Seymour for a US bailout. For their part, the Saudis are he will. Hersh in the March 11 New Yorker, Bush has given putting their emissaries on al-Jazeera talk shows An analysis in the liberal Israeli daily Ha’aretz his team a deadline of April 15 to present a “co- to implore the Iraqi regime not to “give the US suggests that it was Sharon’s promises to hit the agulated plan” for completing his father’s unfin- an excuse” to attack, a signal that they will de- Palestinians harder—rather than the escalation it- ished business. Though bitter White House clare themselves powerless to resist US ambitions self—which jolted the White House into bring- squabbles over the precise timing and shape of a if Saddam Hussein refuses to allow new UN weap- ing Gen. Anthony Zinni and US ceasefire plans “regime change” operation continue to rage, the ons inspections. But the concerns of both Turkey out of semi-retirement. Removal of the Palestin- upturn in the fortunes of the hardline unilateralists and Saudi Arabia about the territorial integrity of ian Authority, by scotching the chances for a re- is ominous. When the Arab and Muslim world a post-war Iraq—a chief factor in the elder Bush’s vived “peace process,” is the sole Israeli measure did not rise up in protest at the bombing of Af- decision not to overthrow Hussein in 1991—have which the hardliners fear would jeopardize their ghanistan (aside from hastily quashed demonstra- only one credible answer: US occupation. Such grand strategy in the region. Actual peace remains tions in Palestine and Pakistan), the ultra-hawks an endeavor could be far costlier, in Iraqi and a secondary concern at best. silenced State Department complaints about the American lives, than the administration imagines. The supreme self-confidence of the ultra- potential destabilization of client regimes. The Bush administration’s obsession with Iraq hawks showed most scarily in a March 9 Los An- Cheney’s pending tour of the region is intended provides an explanation for its failure to brake geles Times story revealing classified military reports to assure regional allies that this administration’s the frightening escalation of Israel Defense Forces on scenarios for use of tactical nuclear weapons. intervention in Iraq, unlike the interrupted drive (IDF) operations against the Palestinians, includ- One scenario is an Iraqi attack on Israel. The con- on Baghdad in 1991 and the “enhanced contain- ing a series of aerial assassinations and bloody juncture of the hardliners’ belligerence and the ment” schemes of the Clintonites, will complete incursions into refugee camps across the Occu- misplaced public trust in the war effort is worri- the job. The hardliners fully expect Iraq’s neigh- pied Territories in March. The ultra-hawks have some. As John Isaacs of the Council for a Livable bors to fall into line—at least privately—once they long argued for “decoupling” resolution of the World remarked, “Dr. Strangelove is clearly still understand that the US means business. “Arabs Israeli-Palestinian conflict from material US in- alive in the Pentagon.”

48 MIDDLE EAST REPORT 222 SPRING 2002 NEW SUBSCRIPTION INFORMATION Subscription telephone and address have changed! Please write: Subscriber Services, MERIP/Middle East Report PO Box 277, Hopewell, PA, 16650-0277. Or call: (202) 223-3677 (MERIP Editorial office.) Now you can get your back issues, subscription or renewal online at www. merip.org.

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