Notes and References
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Notes and References 1 OCCUPATION AND REACTION 1. On the diplomatic prelude to Yugoslavia's invasion and defeat, see J. B. Hoptner, Yugoslavia in Crisis 1934-1941 (Columbia, 1962); M. van Creveld, Hitler's Strategy 1940-1941: The Balkan Clue (London, 1973). 2. For the terms of Yugoslavia's accession to the Tripartite Pact, see M. van Creveld op. cit., pp. 128-9. 3. British relations with Prince Paul and his government, and with the coup conspirators, are dealt with by M. C. Wheeler, Britain and the War for Yugoslavia 1940-1943 (New York, 1980) pp.6-61 and D. A. T. Stafford, 'SOE and British involvement in the Belgrade coup d'etat of March 1941', Slavic Review vol. 36 no.3 (September, 1977) pp.399-419. On the coup itself see D. N. Ristic, Yugoslavia's Revolution of 1941 (London 1966). 4. M. Wheeler, op. cit., pp.55-8. 5. Ibid., p.53. 6. For Axis reaction to the coup see M. van Creveld op. cit., pp. 144-9 and Trials of the German Major War Criminals [Henceforward TGMWC] (London 1946-51), vol. 2, pp.221-2; vol. 4, p.114; vol. 6, pp.223-5, 227; vol. 9, pp.128-30; vol. 10, pp.194-5; vol. 11, p.52; vol. 15, p.341 and vol. 19, p. 133. 7. H. R. Trevor-Roper (ed.), Hitler's War Directives 1930-1945 (London, 1964), pp.61-62, Directive no.25, 27 March, 1941. 8. Accounts of the April War are given by V. Terzic, Jugoslavia u aprilskom ratu (Titograd, 1963), The German Campaign in the Balkans (US Dept. of the Army pamphlet, Washington, 1953); J. Tomasevic, War and Revolution in Yugoslavia, 1941-1945: The Chetniks [Henceforward The Chetniks] (Stanford, 1975) pp.54-88 and M. van Creveld op. cit., pp. 154-1. See also C. Shores, B. Cull and N. Malizia, Air War for Yugoslavia, Greece and Crete 1940-1941 (London, 1987) pp. 168-229. An enlightening description of the chaos within the Yugoslav High Command is given in the report of the British Military Attache, Lt Col. C. S. Clarke, in WO208/2004. 9. The Yugoslav navy was small, but counted among its number one of the most powerful destroyers afloat, the Dubrovnik. The failure of the navy even to attempt to escape was one of the minor tragedies of the campaign. Its vessels could have brought away several thousand military personnel, would have proven a valuable addition to the British Mediterranean Fleet (espe cially in view of the heavy losses in shipping sustained during the eva cuations from Greece and Crete) and would have given the Royal Yugoslav Government in exile some real prestige. As it was, only the obsolete submarine Nebojsa and the motor torpedo boats Durmitor and Kajmak succeeded in reaching British protection. Some Yugoslav troops escaped into Greece from southern Yugoslavia but were captured before they could be evacuated. A few aircraft (mainly seaplanes) also reached sanctuary. But of the million or so Yugoslav military personnel, fewer than a thousand 202 Notes and References 203 escaped to carry on fighting under the Yugoslav flag. See M. Twarclowski in Conway's All the World's Fighting Ships 1922-1946 (London 1980), pp.355-9; F0371/30287 R4702, R4713 and R4892/4475/92. 10. The commander of the Third Army Group in the southeast was General Milan Nedic, later puppet ruler of Serbia. 11. N. Ristic, op. cit., pp. 132-6. 12. There is substantial controversy over the legal validity of the Yugoslav surrender. See M. Deroc, British Special Operations Explored: Yugoslavia in Turmoil 1941-1943 and the British Response (New York, 1988), pp.26-34, 264^7n; J. Hoptner, op. cit., pp.289-92; F0371/33451 R1050/151/92 and F0371/33452 Rl 726/151/92. German casualties in the Yugoslav campaign were 151 dead, 392 wounded and 15 missing (German Campaign in the Balkans, p.64). Italian losses were substantially greater - 3334 killed, wounded and missing (S. Bosnitch, review of S. Loi's Le Operazioni Delle Unita Italiane in Yugoslavia, South Slav Journal vol. 6 no.l, spring 1983, p. 117). 13. See especially J. Tomasevic, The Chetniks, pp.75-88. 14. N. Ristic, op. cit, p. 128. 15. On the partition see N. Rich, Hitler's War Aims - the Establishment of the New Order (London, 1974), pp.264-99;J. Tomasevic, The Chetniks, pp.89-112; L. Karchmar, Draza Mihailovic and the Rise of the Chetnik Movement 1941-1942, PhD dissertation, Stanford University 1973, pp.26-54; F. P. Verna, Yugo slavia under Italian Rule 1941-1943: Civil and Military Aspects of the Italian Occupation, PhD dissertation, University of California at Santa Barbara, 1985, pp.69-86. 16. H. R. Trevor-Roper, op. cit., pp.63-5. 17. N. Rich, op. cit., p.264, 483n; TGMWC, vol. 6, pp.229-30. 18. The Ustasha organisation was an ultra-nationalist Croat group led by Dr. Ante Pavelic, a Croat politician and ex-member of the Yugoslav parliament. The group carried out terrorist activities both in Yugoslavia and against Yugoslav targets in other countries, and was largely responsible for the assassination of King Alexander in Marseilles in 1934. The organisation was supported by Fascist Italy and revisionist Hungary during the 1930s, Pavelic himself living in exile in Italy for most of this period. The organ isation was dedicated to the overthrow of the Yugoslav state and the establishment of an independent Croatia. It combined many of the features of Fascist 'ideology', including a strong racial element, with support for the Catholic Church (not always reciprocated). There is no good analysis of the movement in English, but most studies on the war in Yugoslavia contain some information about it, and an article by D. Reinhartz in the South Slav Journal, 'Aryanism in the Independent State of Croatia, 1941-1945: the historical basis and cultural questions', vol. 9 no.3-4, autumn-winter, 1986, pp. 19-25 makes some interesting points. 19. Documents on German Foreign Policy, Series D [Henceforward DGFF], vol.XII, pp.594^-8, 606-10, 630-2. 20. Even in those extensive areas not under direct German military occupation, the Nazis ensured that they had the right to exploit economic resources; for example, the Mostar bauxite mines in Hercegovina (J. Tomasevic, The Chetniks, p.91). Before the war Yugoslavia provided Germany with 90 per cent of her tin, 40 per cent of her lead, 10 per cent of her copper, large Notes and References amounts of antimony and bauxite and, along with Greece, over 45 per cent of her aluminium (M. van Creveld, op. cit., p.4, 186n; R. Cecil, Hitler's Decision to Invade Russia, 1941 [London 1975], p.92). The final division of Yugoslavia was as follows: (i) Independent State of Croatia - 98 572 km2 - 6.3 million people (i.e. 3.3m Croats, 1.925m Serbs, 700000 Moslems, 150000 Germans, 70 000 Hungarians, 65 000 Slovaks, 30 000 Slovenes, 5000 Italians, 40 000 Jews): (ii) Portion of Slovenia annexed by Germany - 9 620 km2 - 775 000 people: (iii) Portion of Slovenia annexed by Italy (Province of Ljubljana) - 5 242 km2 - 380 000 people: (iv) Adriatic coast and islands annexed by Italy - 5381 km2 - 380 000 people (that is 5000 Italians, 280 000 Croats, 90000 Serbs): (v) Montenegro and area annexed by Albania (Kosovo-Metohija and western Macedonia) - 28 000 km2 - 1.23 million Montenegrins and Albanians: (vi) Areas occupied by Bulgaria (Macedonia and part of Serbia) - 28 250 km2 - 1.26 million people: (vii) Areas occupied by Hungary (Backa, Baranja, Medjimurje and Prekomurje) - 11 601 km2 - 1.145 million people (i.e. 300000 Hungarians, 197 000 Germans, 243 000 Serbs, 220 000 Croats, 80 000 Slovenes, 40 000 Slovaks, 15 000 Ruthenes, 15 000 Jews): (viii) Serbia (occupied by Germany) - 51 100 km - 3.81 million (of whom, 175000 Rumanians): (ix) Banat (occupied by Germany) - 9776 km2 - 640 000 people (i.e. 295 000 Serbs, 120000 Germans, 95 000 Hungarians, 70000 Rumanians, 18 000 Slovaks, 14000 Croats, 4000 Jews). This is from a total prewar area of 247 542 km2 and a population of approx. 15.92 million at the start of 1941 (J. Marjanovic, 'The German occupation system in Serbia in 1941' in Les Systemes d'occupation en Yougoslavie [Henceforward, Les Systemes] (Belgrade, 1963), pp.272~3). M. Deroc, op. cit., p.33. Citing a German document of 1 July 1941, Deroc gives the number of soldiers uncaptured in Serbia as 325 000 (316 200 conscripts, 2000 professional officers and 6800 regular soldiers and 'unre liable elements'). See ibid., p. 143, 302n. Ibid, p. 101, 106. There is no full-length objective biography of Mihailovic in any language. The most detailed study from the Partisan side is Jovan Marjanovic's Draza Mihailovic izmedu Britanaca i Nemaca, vol. 1, Britanski Sticenik [Draza Mihailovic between the British and the Germans - vol. 1, British Protege: Hence forward Draza Mihailovic] (Belgrade 1979), but like so many works produced by Yugoslav authors before Tito's death it subscribes undeviatingly to the orthodox line and ignores any evidence which contradicts it. Further, it is not really a biography of Mihailovic at all, being more of an attempt to pin everybody else's sins upon him. It is also disappointing in its use of sources. There is a mass of material about Mihailovic in articles and books produced by ex-Chetniks or pro-Chetnik authors, some of which is reviewed by M. Deroc in 'Sources for Draza Mihailovic's biography (Basic data and peacetime events only)', South Slav Journal, vol.5 no.4 (18) winter 1982/83, pp.31-4.