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Notes and References

1 OCCUPATION AND REACTION

1. On the diplomatic prelude to 's invasion and defeat, see J. B. Hoptner, Yugoslavia in Crisis 1934-1941 (Columbia, 1962); M. van Creveld, Hitler's Strategy 1940-1941: The Balkan Clue (, 1973). 2. For the terms of Yugoslavia's accession to the Tripartite Pact, see M. van Creveld op. cit., pp. 128-9. 3. British relations with Prince Paul and his government, and with the coup conspirators, are dealt with by M. C. Wheeler, Britain and the War for Yugoslavia 1940-1943 (New York, 1980) pp.6-61 and D. A. T. Stafford, 'SOE and British involvement in the coup d'etat of March 1941', Slavic Review vol. 36 no.3 (September, 1977) pp.399-419. On the coup itself see D. N. Ristic, Yugoslavia's Revolution of 1941 (London 1966). 4. M. Wheeler, op. cit., pp.55-8. 5. Ibid., p.53. 6. For Axis reaction to the coup see M. van Creveld op. cit., pp. 144-9 and Trials of the German Major War Criminals [Henceforward TGMWC] (London 1946-51), vol. 2, pp.221-2; vol. 4, p.114; vol. 6, pp.223-5, 227; vol. 9, pp.128-30; vol. 10, pp.194-5; vol. 11, p.52; vol. 15, p.341 and vol. 19, p. 133. 7. H. R. Trevor-Roper (ed.), Hitler's War Directives 1930-1945 (London, 1964), pp.61-62, Directive no.25, 27 March, 1941. 8. Accounts of the April War are given by V. Terzic, Jugoslavia u aprilskom ratu (Titograd, 1963), The German Campaign in the Balkans (US Dept. of the Army pamphlet, Washington, 1953); J. Tomasevic, War and Revolution in Yugoslavia, 1941-1945: The [Henceforward The Chetniks] (Stanford, 1975) pp.54-88 and M. van Creveld op. cit., pp. 154-1. See also C. Shores, B. Cull and N. Malizia, Air War for Yugoslavia, Greece and 1940-1941 (London, 1987) pp. 168-229. An enlightening description of the chaos within the Yugoslav High Command is given in the report of the British Military Attache, Lt Col. C. S. Clarke, in WO208/2004. 9. The Yugoslav was small, but counted among its number one of the most powerful afloat, the . The failure of the navy even to attempt to escape was one of the minor tragedies of the campaign. Its vessels could have brought away several thousand military personnel, would have proven a valuable addition to the British Mediterranean Fleet (espe• cially in view of the heavy losses in shipping sustained during the eva• cuations from Greece and Crete) and would have given the Royal Yugoslav some real prestige. As it was, only the obsolete Nebojsa and the motor boats Durmitor and Kajmak succeeded in reaching British protection. Some Yugoslav troops escaped into Greece from southern Yugoslavia but were captured before they could be evacuated. A few aircraft (mainly seaplanes) also reached sanctuary. But of the million or so Yugoslav military personnel, fewer than a thousand

202 Notes and References 203

escaped to carry on fighting under the Yugoslav flag. See M. Twarclowski in Conway's All the World's Fighting Ships 1922-1946 (London 1980), pp.355-9; F0371/30287 R4702, R4713 and R4892/4475/92. 10. The commander of the Group in the southeast was General Milan Nedic, later puppet ruler of . 11. N. Ristic, op. cit., pp. 132-6. 12. There is substantial controversy over the legal validity of the Yugoslav surrender. See M. Deroc, British Special Operations Explored: Yugoslavia in Turmoil 1941-1943 and the British Response (New York, 1988), pp.26-34, 264^7n; J. Hoptner, op. cit., pp.289-92; F0371/33451 R1050/151/92 and F0371/33452 Rl 726/151/92. German casualties in the Yugoslav campaign were 151 dead, 392 wounded and 15 missing (German Campaign in the Balkans, p.64). Italian losses were substantially greater - 3334 killed, wounded and missing (S. Bosnitch, review of S. Loi's Le Operazioni Delle Unita Italiane in Yugoslavia, South Slav Journal vol. 6 no.l, spring 1983, p. 117). 13. See especially J. Tomasevic, The Chetniks, pp.75-88. 14. N. Ristic, op. cit, p. 128. 15. On the partition see N. Rich, Hitler's War Aims - the Establishment of the New Order (London, 1974), pp.264-99;J. Tomasevic, The Chetniks, pp.89-112; L. Karchmar, Draza Mihailovic and the Rise of the Chetnik Movement 1941-1942, PhD dissertation, Stanford University 1973, pp.26-54; F. P. Verna, Yugo• slavia under Italian Rule 1941-1943: Civil and Military Aspects of the Italian Occupation, PhD dissertation, University of California at Santa Barbara, 1985, pp.69-86. 16. H. R. Trevor-Roper, op. cit., pp.63-5. 17. N. Rich, op. cit., p.264, 483n; TGMWC, vol. 6, pp.229-30. 18. The Ustasha organisation was an -nationalist Croat group led by Dr. Ante Pavelic, a Croat politician and ex-member of the Yugoslav parliament. The group carried out terrorist activities both in Yugoslavia and against Yugoslav targets in other countries, and was largely responsible for the assassination of King Alexander in Marseilles in 1934. The organisation was supported by Fascist and revisionist Hungary during the 1930s, Pavelic himself living in exile in Italy for most of this period. The organ• isation was dedicated to the overthrow of the Yugoslav state and the establishment of an independent . It combined many of the features of Fascist 'ideology', including a strong racial element, with support for the Catholic Church (not always reciprocated). There is no good analysis of the movement in English, but most studies on the war in Yugoslavia contain some information about it, and an article by D. Reinhartz in the South Slav Journal, 'Aryanism in the Independent State of Croatia, 1941-1945: the historical basis and cultural questions', vol. 9 no.3-4, autumn-winter, 1986, pp. 19-25 makes some interesting points. 19. Documents on German Foreign Policy, Series D [Henceforward DGFF], vol.XII, pp.594^-8, 606-10, 630-2. 20. Even in those extensive areas not under direct German military occupation, the Nazis ensured that they had the right to exploit economic resources; for example, the Mostar bauxite mines in Hercegovina (J. Tomasevic, The Chetniks, p.91). Before the war Yugoslavia provided with 90 per cent of her tin, 40 per cent of her lead, 10 per cent of her copper, large Notes and References amounts of antimony and bauxite and, along with Greece, over 45 per cent of her aluminium (M. van Creveld, op. cit., p.4, 186n; R. Cecil, Hitler's Decision to Invade Russia, 1941 [London 1975], p.92). The final division of Yugoslavia was as follows: (i) Independent State of Croatia - 98 572 km2 - 6.3 million people (i.e. 3.3m , 1.925m , 700000 Moslems, 150000 Germans, 70 000 Hungarians, 65 000 Slovaks, 30 000 , 5000 Italians, 40 000 Jews): (ii) Portion of annexed by Germany - 9 620 km2 - 775 000 people: (iii) Portion of Slovenia annexed by Italy () - 5 242 km2 - 380 000 people: (iv) Adriatic coast and islands annexed by Italy - 5381 km2 - 380 000 people (that is 5000 Italians, 280 000 Croats, 90000 Serbs): (v) and area annexed by (- and western ) - 28 000 km2 - 1.23 million and : (vi) Areas occupied by (Macedonia and part of Serbia) - 28 250 km2 - 1.26 million people: (vii) Areas occupied by Hungary (Backa, Baranja, Medjimurje and Prekomurje) - 11 601 km2 - 1.145 million people (i.e. 300000 Hungarians, 197 000 Germans, 243 000 Serbs, 220 000 Croats, 80 000 Slovenes, 40 000 Slovaks, 15 000 Ruthenes, 15 000 Jews): (viii) Serbia (occupied by Germany) - 51 100 km - 3.81 million (of whom, 175000 Rumanians): (ix) (occupied by Germany) - 9776 km2 - 640 000 people (i.e. 295 000 Serbs, 120000 Germans, 95 000 Hungarians, 70000 Rumanians, 18 000 Slovaks, 14000 Croats, 4000 Jews). This is from a total prewar area of 247 542 km2 and a population of approx. 15.92 million at the start of 1941 (J. Marjanovic, 'The German occupation system in Serbia in 1941' in Les Systemes d'occupation en Yougoslavie [Henceforward, Les Systemes] (Belgrade, 1963), pp.272~3). M. Deroc, op. cit., p.33. Citing a German document of 1 July 1941, Deroc gives the number of soldiers uncaptured in Serbia as 325 000 (316 200 conscripts, 2000 professional officers and 6800 regular soldiers and 'unre• liable elements'). See ibid., p. 143, 302n. Ibid, p. 101, 106. There is no full-length objective biography of Mihailovic in any language. The most detailed study from the Partisan side is Jovan Marjanovic's Draza Mihailovic izmedu Britanaca i Nemaca, vol. 1, Britanski Sticenik [Draza Mihailovic between the British and the Germans - vol. 1, British Protege: Hence• forward Draza Mihailovic] (Belgrade 1979), but like so many works produced by Yugoslav authors before Tito's death it subscribes undeviatingly to the orthodox line and ignores any evidence which contradicts it. Further, it is not really a biography of Mihailovic at all, being more of an attempt to pin everybody else's sins upon him. It is also disappointing in its use of sources. There is a mass of material about Mihailovic in articles and books produced by ex-Chetniks or pro-Chetnik authors, some of which is reviewed by M. Deroc in 'Sources for Draza Mihailovic's biography (Basic data and peacetime events only)', South Slav Journal, vol.5 no.4 (18) winter 1982/83, pp.31-4. In his British Special Operations Explored Deroc gives further infor• mation and analysis. L. Karchmar, op. cit, pp.69-94 is useful on the early stages of his movement, as is the first volume of Knjiga o Drazi [The Book about Draza], a collection of articles by ex-Chetniks edited by one of Mihailovic's foremost champions, Radoje Knezevic (Windsor, , 1956). Notes and References 205

25. M. Deroc, op. cit, pp.97100; L. Karchmar, op. cit, pp.73-75. 26. Blaming the Croats for the defeat became fashionable both in areas of Yugoslavia and in the outside world. As early as 17 April General Simovic issued a statement in which he held the Croats largely responsible for the fall of Yugoslavia, and within a few weeks King Peter himself was telling a similar story to anybody who would listen (I. Jukic, The Fall of Yugoslavia (New York 1974), p.73; FO371/30282 R4844/4188/92 & R5236/4188/ 92). Apart from the fact that this caused great harm to Serb Croat relations within the exile government it was simply untrue. While many Croats did desert, mutiny, sabotage and betray the Yugoslav war effort, their actions were but one in an extensive list of reasons why the country collapsed. In military terms the war was already lost by 10 April, when the Germans launched their attack in northern Yugoslavia, by the failure of the predo• minantly Serb armies in the south to hold open the line of retreat to Greece. Croat actions possibly accelerated the debacle by a few days. See J. Tomasevic, The Chetniks, pp.78-9; C. Shores et al, op. cit, p.219; M. Deroc, op. cit, pp. 103-4, 111, 289n; and the report of the British Consul-General in Split in F0371/30219 R8750/162/92. 27. For accounts of Mihailovic's conduct in the April war, see M. M. Vukovic, 'Sa pukovnikom Drazom Mihailovicem od 6 do 14 aprila 1941' [With Mihailovic from 6 to 14 April 1941], Glasnik srpskog istorisko-kultumog drustva (Njegos' [Henceforward Glasnik SIKD 'Njegos'] no.34, June 1975, pp.32-46; M. Deroc, op. cit, pp. 101-8. 28. J. Marjanovic, Draza Mihailovic, p.64; J. Tomasevic, The Chetniks, p. 124; L. Karchmar, op. cit, pp.76-80; M. Deroc, op. cit, pp.108-110. 29. L. Karchmar, op. cit, p.77. 30. J. Marjanovic, Draza Mihailovic, p.64; M. Deroc, op. cit, p. 109; L. Karchmar, op. cit, pp. 77-9. 31. J. Tomasevic, The Chetniks, p. 122; L. Karchmar, ibid. 32. I. Avakumovic, Mihailovic prema Nemackim dokumentima [Mihailovic in the light of German documents] (London, 1969), pp.14—15; L. Karchmar, op. cit, p.80, 102n. 33. P. Meskovic, 'Od Bosne do ' [From to Ravna Gora], Knjiga o Drazi, vol.1, p.29; L. Karchmar op. cit, pp.l02-3n. B. Lazitch, Tito et la Revolution Yougoslave 1937-1956 (, 1957) p.54 dates the arrival on Ravna Gora as 8 May. 34. L. Karchmar, op. cit, p.80. Misic had been a famous Serbian commander in the First World War. His elder son, Alexander, was one of Mihailovic's closest aides; as with so many families during the war, another son joined the . 35. The Trial of Dragoljub-Draza Mihailovic: Stenographic Record and Documents from the Trial of Dragoljub-Draza Mihailovic [Henceforward TDM] (Belgrade, 1946), pp.110-113; M. Milazzo, The Chetnik Movement and the Yugoslav Resistance (London 1975) pp. 14-16: J. Tomasevic, The Chetniks, pp. 124-5; L. Karchmar op. cit, pp.81-7; F0536/23 - report by Colonel M. Zujovic, September/October 1943, Allied/F/208, p.2; also reports by British liaison officers with Mihailovic's forces, especially in WO202/162. 36. M. Deroc, op. cit, pp. 143-4. 37. L. Karchmar, op. cit, p.83. 206 Notes and References

38. On Pecanac, see L. Karchmar op. cit, pp.108 2 and J. Tomasevic, 'The Chetniks, pp.126-9. The Chetnik Association was founded after the First World War to look after Chetnik veterans and preserve the Chetnik ideal. However, it quickly took on a strongly political character and was used to propagate Serb nationalist ideas and, it must be said, to suppress certain ethnic minorities (for example, Croats in Bosnia). It became widely hated by non-Serbs as a result, although not surprisingly in Serbia it was regarded more kindly. According to Zujovic, who arrived on Ravna Gora in July 1941, Mihailovic sent a letter to Pecanac requesting close connections and asking that Pecanac carry out organisation in southern Serbia in accordance with prewar orders. J. Marjanovic, Ustanak i narodnooslobodilacki pokret u Srbiji 1941 [The Uprising and the People's liberation Movement in Serbia, 1941: henceforward, Ustanak] (Belgrade, 1963), p. 190 dates the letter 15 August and gives the text, while J. Tomasevic, The Chetniks, pp.127 -8, suggests 18 August. 39. L. Karchmar, op. cit, p.88. 40. If this was the case then it worked, at least for some time. Not until 17 December 1941 did the Germans strip Mihailovic's men of the rights granted to regular soldiers under the Geneva convention (M. Deroc op. cit, pp.212-13). 41. J. Tomasevic, The Chetniks, pp.115 20. 42. M. Deroc, op. cit, pp.96- 7; J. Tomasevic, The Chetniks, p. 121. 43. P. Meskovic, op. cit, p.32; M. Milazzo, op. cit, p. 15. 44. L. Karchmar, op. cit, p.86. 45. M. Milazzo, op. cit, p. 16; J. Marjanovic, Ustanak, p. 127. On the 'Commis• sioner Administration' or 'Provisionally Appointed Government', see B. Karapandzic, Gradjanski rat u Srbiji 1941—1945 [Civil War in Serbia 1941 — 1945] (Cleveland, Ohio 1958) pp.22-9; M. Deroc, op. cit, pp.148-53; J. Marjanovic, Ijes Systemes, pp.283 -88. 46. This committee constituted the basis of the 'Central National Committee', formed by Mihailovic at the end of 1942. See L. Karchmar, op. cit, pp.569—77, 626n. See also this work, footnotes to conclusion, notes 20 and 24. 47. Traditional ties of family and friendship (which dominated social relations throughout Serbia), combined with the natural tendency of most Serbs, whatever their political attitude, to seek to preserve Serb lives in the face of Axis repression and Ustasha atrocities, meant that there was great reluctance among the Serbs to fight one another. Even those who sym• pathised most closely with 's Fascist ideals, the members of Dimitrije Ljotic's %bor movement, only started fighting Mihailovic after he began cooperating with the Partisans during autumn 1941. See L. Karchmar, op. cit, pp.115 24; M. Deroc, op. cit, pp,146~5. 48. See M. Deroc, op. cit, pp.119-20. 49. L. Karchmar, op. cit, p. 131; S. Clissold, Yugoslavia and the 1930- 1973, a Documentary Survey [Henceforward, Documents] (Oxford, 1975) pp.4-5. 50. For the explosion of some myths concerning Tito's formative political years, see M. Deroc op. cit, pp.115-19 and S. K. Pavlowitch, Tito - Yugoslavia's Great Dictator (London, 1992) pp.l~29. For a more conventional interpre• tation, see P. Auty, Tito; a Biography (London, 1970) pp.29—39. Notes and References 207

51. On Tito's experiences during the 1920s and 1930s, c.f. M. Deroc, op. cit, pp.119 125 and P. Auty, op. cit, pp.40-73. 52. L. Karchmar, op. cit, pp. 133-4. According to Karchmar, pp.167 8n, by 1940 the CPY had some 6150 members, as well as about three times this number in its youth organisation (SKOJ). By the number had risen further, to 11879 party members and 14 873 in the Communist youth (ibid, p.l72n). See also S. Clissold, Whirlwind An Account of Marshal Tito's Rise to Power [Henceforward, Whirlwind] (London, 1949) p.31,34. 53. See P. Shoup, Communism and the Yugoslav National Question (New York and London, 1968) pp.60-100 passim. See also S. Clissold, Whirlwind, p.35. 54. On this subject, see especially I. Avakumovic, History of the Communist Party of Yugoslavia, vol.1 (Aberdeen University Press, 1964) passim; S. Clissold, Documents, pp.5-7; L. Karchmar, op. cit, pp. 131-6; J. Tomasevic, The Chetniks, pp.81-4; S. Bosnitch, 'The Yugoslav Revolution, 1941 1945: A Reappraisal of the Communist Revolutionary Strategy and Tactics' [Hen• ceforward, 'The Yugoslav Revolution'], South Slav Journal, vol.7 no.3 4 (25 6), autumn-winter, 1984, pp.4 7. 55. S. Bosnitch, 'The Yugoslav Revolution', pp.6-7; L. Karchmar, op. cit, pp.135 136; J. Tomasevic, The Chetniks, p.80, 83; S. K. Pavlowitch, 'Reserve Infantry lieutenant Rapotec: His Missions to and from Occupied Yugo• slavia' [Henceforward, 'Lieutenant Rapotec'], Unconventional Perceptions of Yugoslavia 1940-1945 (New York 1985), p.l45n. See also J. Marjanovic, Ustanak, pp.43-9 for the conventional, Communist version. 56. M. Deroc, op. cit, pp. 129-30; M. Djilas, Wartime (London, 1980 edition), p.4; M. Djilas, Memoir of a Rei'olutionary (New York, 1973) pp.388~9; S. Bosnitch, 'The Yugoslav Revolution', pp.7 8; S. Clissold, Documents, p,97n. See also Chapter 3, note 23. 57. The text of the Comintern's call to arms, issued on 22 June, can be found in S. Clissold, Documents, p. 128. Rather than call for immediate armed action against the occupier, the CPY initially emphasised the need for organisation (ibid, pp.127 -8). Only when the Comintern demanded on 1 July that the CPY start a Partisan war (ibid, p. 129) did Tito issue a proclamation in an appropriate vein. 58. S. Clissold, Documents, p. 128; W. Roberts, Tito, Mihailovic and the Allies, 1941- 1945 (New Jersey, 1973) pp.23-24. 59. M. Djilas, Wartime, p.5. 60. S. Bosnitch, 'The Yugoslav Revolution', p.8. 61. L. Karchmar, op. cit, p. 143; M. Deroc, op. cit, p. 170. 62. L. Karchmar, op. cit, pp.143 5; P. Shoup, op. cit, p.62. According to contemporary Partisan documents, the Communist leadership regarded this matter as of 'enormous significance'. See S. Bosnitch, 'The Yugoslav Revo• lution', p.9 and M. Deroc, op. cit, p. 172. 63. I. Jukic, op. cit, pp.92-4; B. Karapandzic op. cit, pp.30 6; L. Karchmar, op. cit, pp.39-40; S. K. Pavlowitch, Yugoslavia (London, 1971) pp.111 12. This policy initially involved the introduction of laws depriving all Serbs (as well as Jews and certain other groups) of their rights as citizens within the NDH. Henceforward, they were to be referred to as 'Former Serbs', their Cyrillic alphabet was to be banned and freedom of worship severely 208 Notes and References

restricted. Having reduced the Serbs almost to the status of cattle, they were to be slaughtered as such. 64. F. Tudjman, Les Systemes, pp. 188-92; M. Milazzo, op. cit, p. 10; L. Karchmar, op. cit, p.34, 435. This is not to say that the proclamation of Croat independence was unpopular with the mass of the Croat population; the Croat Peasant Party (HSS), the dominant force in Croatia's interwar politics, had supported this cause for many years. However, this also meant that while many Croats found the Ustashe repugnant, they did practically nothing to intercede in the anti-Serb policy initiated by that regime. In this regard, the failure of the HSS leadership, as well as of a good part of the Catholic church hierarchy, to take a lead in openly condemning the , was crucial. See especially S. K. Pavlowitch, 'Lieutenant Rapotec', pp.90-1, 98-9; and 'Archbishop Stepinac's Memorandum to Pavelic regarding Conversions to Roman Catholicism', South Slav Journal, vol.5 no.l, spring 1982, pp.38-46. 65. For details of these guidelines, which involved decapitating the Serb com• munities by liquidating their leaders before deporting, killing or converting the survivors, see L. Karchmar, op. cit, pp.435-9. On Ustasha policy towards the Serbs see alsoj. Steinberg, All or Nothing: the Axis and the Holocaust (London, 1990) pp.29-31; B. Petranovic, Srbija uDrugom Svetskom Ratu 1930- 1945 [Serbia in the Second World War 1939-1945] (Belgrade, 1992) pp. 118-127. 66. M. Ugrenovic, 'In the Interests of Truth and Justice', South Slav Journal, vol. 8, no. 1-2 (27-8), spring-summer 1985, pp.56-64, gives a vivid and hor• rifying description of the atrocities in northwestern Croatia (Banija), and shows how the Serb communities facing annihilation typically attempted to save themselves. For further details of the atrocities, see F. Verna, op. cit, pp.381-6; I. Jukic, op. cit, pp. 100-1. 67. For a good analysis of the Hercegovinian uprising, see L. Karchmar op. cit, pp.444-7. See also J. Tomasevic, The Chetniks, pp. 132-3; M. Milazzo, op. cit, pp.49-50; I. Jukic, op. cit, pp. 102-3; I. Avakumovic op. cit, p.36. Milazzo puts the population percentages in this area at Croats - 4 per cent; Moslems - 28 per cent; Serbs - 67 per cent. 68. L. Karchmar, op. cit, p.447; J. Tomasevic, The Chetniks, p. 133. 69. See P. N. Hehn, The German Struggle Against Yugoslav Guerillas in World War II (New York, 1979), pp.21-2, 24, 70-1; L. Karchmar, op. cit, pp.440-1, 457- 67; M. Milazzo, op. cit, pp.51-3; I. Avakumovic, op. cit, p.37. 70. P. Hehn, op. cit, p.24; F. Verna, op. cit, p.390. 71. Examples of appeals made by the population for Axis intercession, and details of negotiations between the insurgents ('Partisan' and 'Chetnik') and the Axis can be found in M. Milazzo, op. cit, pp.50~52; M. Deroc, op. cit, p. 147; P. Shoup, op. cit, p.68; F. Verna, op. cit, p.393; L. Karchmar, op. cit, pp.467- 468; J. Tomasevic, The Chetniks, p.213; A. Miletic, 'O saradnji komandanta cetnickih odreda istocne Bosne Jezdimira Dangica sa Nemcima (avgust 1941 - april 1942)' [About the Collaboration of the Commander of the Chetnik Detachments in East Bosnia, Jezdimir Dangic, with the Germans, August 1941 - April 1942], Vojnoistorijski Glasnik, 1972 (2) pp.135-145. 72. See especially two telegrams, dated 10 July and 10 August 1941, from the German Charge d'Affaires in Croatia to his foreign ministry in DGFP Notes and References 209

vol.XII, pp.113-15 and 301-2 respectively. On the German attitude to the NDH's policies, see also L. Karchmar, op. cit, pp.439-0, 468; P. Hehn, op. cit, p.24, 70; M. Deroc, op. cit, p.37; M. Milazzo, op. cit, p. 10; S. Pavlowitch, Yugoslavia, p.H2n. According to I. Jukic, op. cit, pp.94—5, in mid-1941 Hitler personally encouraged Ante Pavelic, the Ustasha leader, to pursue a nationally intolerant policy 'for 50 years'. 73. F. Verna, op. cit, pp.387-9; L. Karchmar, op. cit, p.707; S. Loi, op. cit, p. 113; I. Avakumovic, op. cit, p.37. See also S. K. Pavlowitch, 'The King Who Never Was: An Instance of Italian Involvement in Croatia, 1941-3', European Studies Review, vol.8 no.4, October 1978, p.475. The Italians also generally pursued a positive line towards the Jewish population of Croatia. SeeJ. Steinberg, op. cit, passim. 74. M. Milazzo, op. cit, pp.52~5; J. Tomasevic, The Chetniks, p. 102. Although, as has already been pointed out, the Germans supported the NDH, cordial relations with the Italians were regarded as even more important (See DGFP, vol.XII, p.343). Consequently, despite Croat appeals, the Germans resolved not to interfere with Italian plans. 75. M. Milazzo, op. cit, pp.55-7; F. Verna, op. cit, pp.390-391; L. Karchmar, op. cit, pp.449-450; P. Hehn, op. cit, p.72. 76. M. Milazzo, op. cit, pp.55-60. 77. For example, the CPY was very weak in Hercegovina (L. Karchmar, op. cit, p.448, 51 On; M. Djilas, Wartime, p. 13; J. Tomasevic, The Chetniks, p. 133), while its Croatian party organisation exhibited a good deal of independence and, according to senior Partisan figures, remained reluctant to begin a struggle against the occupiers well into August (P. Shoup, op. cit, pp.78-9). According to F. Verna, op. cit, p.367, the CPY in the 'played only a very marginal part in the insurrection' there. However, in those areas in which the Ustasha had been relatively successful in decap• itating the traditional Serb leadership (officers, officials and so on) - Srem, , Kordun and Banija - the CPY was able to seize control of the insurgent movement at an earlier stage (L. Karchmar, op. cit, pp.442-3). 78. M. Milazzo, op. cit, pp.56-7; L. Karchmar, op. cit, pp.451-2. 79. On Italian objectives in Montenegro, and their negotiations with the Zelenasi, see especially F. Verna, op. cit, pp.164—80. See also L. Karchmar, op. cit, pp.40-3; M. Djilas, Wartime, pp. 18-19; M. Milazzo, op. cit, p.43. 80. See also Chapter 6, note 38, for further details of the factors underlying the revolt. 81. Milovan Djilas, the senior CPY member despatched to organise Partisan actions in Montenegro, was specifically ordered by Tito not to incite a general uprising, since the Italians would inevitably crush it (M. Djilas, Wartime, p.8). 82. P. Shoup, op. cit, pp.64-9.. See L. Karchmar, op. cit, pp. 147-50 for further discussion of the advantages possessed by the CPY over other elements (such as Mihailovic) which sought to gain control over the uprising. 83. L. Karchmar, op. cit, pp.373-4, 378-81, 442-4, 448-9, 451, 460-1; J. Marjanovic, Ustanak, pp.405-19; M. Milazzo, op. cit, p.53. 84. L. Karchmar, op. cit, pp.438-9. The total number of Serbs fleeing from the NDH into Serbia by the end of 1941 may have been as high as 300 000 persons. Lacking food or any of the other basic necessities of life, many 210 Notes and References

joined the Partisans as the only way of maintaining themselves. See M. Deroc, op. cit, p.43; M. Milazzo, op. cit, p.l 1; M. Djilas, Wartime, pp.11- 12; DGFP, vol.XII, p.553. See M. Deroc, op. cit, pp. 136-55 for an excellent analysis of the causes of the unrest in Serbia between the end of the April war and the outbreak of the uprising. 85. L. Karchmar, op. cit, pp.90-1, 106 7n, 179, 459-60, 462, 464-5; P. Hehn, op. cit, p.27, 71. Among the more important officers were Major Bosko Todorovic, who arrived in east Bosnia on 8th August, and Major Jezdimir Dangic, who followed eight days later. The former was definitely a member of Mihailovic's organisation, but Dangic's loyalties are less clear. Partisan authors (for example A. Miletic, op. cit, p. 135) normally identify him with Mihailovic's Chetniks, as occasionally do pro-Chetnik writers, although for different reasons (for example I. Avakumovic, op. cit, p.37). However, although he appears to have pledged nominal allegiance to Mihailovic, he exhibited considerable independence in his actions; indeed, in November he completely ignored a desperate plea for assistance addressed to him by the officers on Ravna Gora. See L. Karchmar, op. cit, pp.462~4 and this work, Chapter 4, notes 91 and 93, and Chapter 5, note 112. 86. L. Karchmar, op. cit, p. 141, 145-6. 87. Most Yugoslav sources identify 7 July as the start of the uprising in Serbia, presumably to show that the CPY's call to arms met with an immediate answer (for example J. Marjanovic, Ustanak, p. 102). However, on this day only two Serbian gendarmes were killed, and the first attack on a German soldier did not occur until 18 July. 88. C. R. Browning, ' Reprisal Policy and the Mass Murder of Jews in Serbia', Militargeschichtliche Mitteilungen, vol. 1 (1983), p.32; M. Deroc, op. cit, pp. 152-3, 304n.

2 THE SPECIAL OPERATIONS EXECUTIVE (SOE), THE AND EUROPEAN RESISTANCE

1. D. A. T. Stafford, Britain and European Resistance 1940 1945 (London, 1983) p.12. 2. W. N. Medlicott, The Economic Blockade (London, 1959) p.411. 3. GS (R) originally had a staff of one and a typist (M. R. D. Foot, SOE -An Outline History of the Special Operations Executive 1940-1946 (London, 1984) p.l 1). SIS was formed in 1909, and came under the control of the Foreign Office from 1921. It was also known as MI6 or 'C. 'C was also used to refer to the head of the SIS, Sir Stewart Menzies (ibid.) 4. D. Stafford, op. cit, p.20. 5. B. Pimlott, Hugh Dalton (London, 1985) p.282; G. Jebb, The Memoirs of Lord Gladwyn (London, 1972) p.97. 6. B. Pimlott, op. cit, p.281; H. Dalton, Memoirs 1931- 1945: the Fateful Years (London, 1957) pp.325~6. On Dalton's character and attitude to economic and subversive warfare, see B. Pimlott, op. cit, pp.282, 289, 300, 308, 325; M. Foot SOE, pp.28-29; G. Jebb, op. cit, pp.101 05. 7. B. Pimlott, op. cit, p.295. Notes and References 211

8. Ibid. 9. M. Foot, SOE, pp. 19-21; B. Pimlott, op. cit, pp.295-8; H. Dalton, op. cit, pp.366-8; D. Stafford, op. cit, pp.24-6. 10. D. Stafford, op. cit, p.26; B. Pimlott, op. cit, p.298. 11. The head of Section D had been Lawrence Grand; MI (R)'s was J. F. C. Holland. On Grand, see B. Sweet-Escott, Baker Street Irregular [Hence• forward, Bohr Street (London, 1965) pp.20-21; M. Foot, SOE, p.ll. 12. M. Foot, SOE, p.22. 13. Ibid, p.30. The liaison function was dealt with through weekly meetings of a body known as the 'D' Board (later the 'SO' board), which Jebb, Nelson, various liaison officers, an SIS representative and others attended (G. Jebb, op. cit, p. 103). 14. B. Sweet-Escott, Baker Street, p.34. 15. B. Sweet-Escott, 'SOE in the Balkans' in P. Auty and R. Clogg (eds), British Policy Towards Wartime Resistance in Yugoslavia and Greece [Henceforward, British Policy] (London, 1975) p.5. 16. B. Sweet-Escott, Baker Street p.22; A. Glen, Footholds Against a Whirlwind (London, 1975), pp.43-44, 51; J. Amery, Approach March (London, 1973), pp.158, 161. The 'others' eventually included Hugh Seton-Watson, Terence Atherton and Basil Davidson. 17. M. Wheeler, Britain and the War for Yugoslavia 1940-1943, (New York, 1980) p.26; J. Amery, op. cit, p. 140. 18. J. Amery, op. cit, p. 141. 19. Ibid, pp. 146-7; M. Wheeler, op. cit, p.25; J. Marjanovic, Draza Mihailovic, p.24. 20. J. Amery, op. cit, pp. 173-4; M. Wheeler, op. cit, p.25. 21. D. Stafford, 'Belgrade coup', p.411n.;J. Amery, op. cit, p.162, 167-8, 171; M. Wheeler, ibid. 22. E. Barker, British Policy in Southeast Europe in the Second World War (London, 1976) p.85;J. Amery, op. cit, p. 175; M. Wheeler, op. cit, pp.25-7. Many of the individuals named in this paragraph were to play important roles in British relations with the Chetniks 1941-44. The same is true of practically all of the SOE members named in this chapter. 23. H. Williams, 'The Special Operations Executive and Yugoslavia', unpub• lished PhD dissertation, University of Southampton 1994, pp. 16-18 gives details. See also B. Sweet-Escott, Baker Street, p.22; A. Glen, op. cit, p.56. 24. A. Glen, op. cit, pp.51-2; M. Wheeler, op. cit, pp.27 253 n; H. Williams, op. cit, p. 14. D. Stafford, 'Belgrade coup', p.413ff. notes Lt Col. Clarke's contacts with Popovic, the Yugoslav Director of Military Intelligence between December 1939 and September 1940, but says that Clarke's role is 'obscure'. It is rendered much clearer by Clarke's 'Final report' in WO208/2004 (especially Appendix 13). In the latter document Clarke describes his contacts with the successive directors of military intelligence, of whom Popovic was a particularly rich source of information. Popovic seems to have had a profound faith in British victory, even after the defeat of France, and was a close friend to Clarke. He provided details of the Yugoslav war plan, the number of reserve divisions, system and procedure of mobilisation, orders of battle and location and strength of anti-aircraft, coastal and frontier fortifications, as well as copies of all the daily reports 212 Notes and References

coming from the Yugoslav attaches and agents in Germany and Italy. Alexander Glen, the Assistant Naval Attache, seems to have worked for Section D (M. Wheeler, op. cit. p.253n; A. Glen, op. cit, p.51), but according to Amery (op. cit, p. 161) had contacts with the Yugoslav General Staff which resulted in his obtaining the entire Italian order of battle in Albania - presumably an SIS function. The answer probably lies in the fact that relations between the service attaches, the D agents and the Minister were cordial; although as Wheeler notes, Campbell was not overly impressed by Section D's schemes (B. Sweet-Escott, Baker Street, p.62; M. Wheeler, op. cit, p.251). Even those on the ambassador's staff, such as Peter Garran (Third Secretary), who disapproved of the activities of 'spies' were nevertheless friendly and helpful (A. Glen, op. cit, p.51). That the various agents seem to have shared flats and offices no doubt reinforced the efficiency of this cooperation (A. Glen, op. cit, p.53). The service attaches were Wing Commander Hugh Macdonald (Air Attache), Captain Max Despard (Naval Attache) and Lieutenant Colonel Clarke (Military Attache). 25. J. Amery, op. cit, p. 166. M. Deroc, British Special Operations Explored: Yugo• slavia in Turmoil 1941-1943 and the British Response (New York, 1988) p.273 gives the dates of Bailey's tenure as June-August 1940. It is possible that during the period April^June he was only acting head, and that Masterson may similarly have been acting head from August to November. After visiting in August, Bailey was in Istanbul as controller of SO 2's operations in the region. His chief assistant was A. G. de Chastelain (M. Deroc, op. cit, p.273; J. Amery, op. cit, p. 185). 26. F. W. D. Deakin, The Embattled Mountain [Henceforward, Embattled Mountain] (London, 1971) p. 125; B. Sweet-Escott, Baker Street, p.30. 27. P. Howarth, Undercover - the Men and Women of the Special Operations Executive (London, 1980) p.8; H. Dalton, op. cit, p.369; B. Sweet-Escott, Baker Street, p.21. 28. B. Sweet-Escott, Baker Street, p.30, 32. 29. Previously, Yugoslavia had been more in the French sphere of influence than the British; more important, the British were wary of doing anything to upset Italy and draw her into the war on the Axis side. Neither of these considerations were any longer relevant. See A. Glen, op. cit, p.51. 30. J. Amery, op. cit, pp. 161-2; A. Glen, op. cit, p.53. 31. B. Sweet-Escott, Baker Street, p.52; A. Glen, op. cit, p.55. 32. B. Sweet-Escott, Baker Street, pp.38-41, 43. 33. J. Amery, op. cit, p. 171. Among the 'casualties' was Colonel Popovic (See note 24), who was replaced in September 1940 with a Croat, Colonel Kalecak, who proved substantially less forthcoming (WO208/2004 Appendix 13). 34. FO371/30212 R641/114/92. 35. FO371/30212 R1095/114/92; R1379/114/92; H. Williams, op. cit, pp. 16-17. 36. See Chapter 1, note 3 and sources referred to therein. On the role of SO 2's agents, see alsoj. Marjanovic, Draza Mihailovic, pp.23-6. 37. J. Lucas, Germany's Elite Panzer Force: Grossdeutschland (London, 1978) p. 122; SO 2's objectives at the end of March are identified in F0371/30213 R3466/114/92. See also FO371/30218 R3801/162/92; F0371/29777 Notes and References 213

R5423/113/67; FO371/30226 R6393/297/92. On the organisation's few successes, see H. Williams, op. cit, pp. 18-19. 38. FO371/30270 R4027/3617/92; FO371/30282 R4790/4188/92. 39. B. Sweet-Escott, Baker Street, p.64. Among those captured were Tom Mas• terson (head of SO 2 in Belgrade) and George Taylor, who had arrived in the Balkans in January with instructions from Dalton and the Foreign Secretary, , to intensify SO 2's activities in sabotage, sub• version and preparations for post-occupational work (M. Wheeler, op. cit, p.29). 40. B. Sweet-Escott, 'SOE in the Balkans', British Policy, p.6. 41. Major-General C. Gubbins, 'SOE and Regular and Irregular Warfare' in M. Elliott-Bateman (Ed.), The Fourth Dimension of Warfare (Manchester, 1970) p.85. 42. See G. Jebb, op. cit, pp. 104-5. Jebb notes that a friend, unable intellec• tually to defeat Jebb's defence of Dalton, stated 'you may well be right. But the trouble about him is his eye. All I can say is that, if he were a horse, I just wouldn't buy him' (ibid). Ben Pimlott, Dalton's biographer, has written that Dalton's 'booming and bullying... put the organisation on the map'; but it was just as likely to put it firmly on the area of the map vaguely labelled 'here be Tigers' (B. Pimlott, op. cit, p.308). On Dalton's rela• tionship with Churchill, see B. Pimlott, op. cit, pp.347-50. 43. D. Stafford, Britain and European Resistance, p.26. 44. Ibid, p.29, 40; F. Hinsley, British Intelligence in the Second World War, Vol.11 (London, 1981) p. 15. 45. Brigadier General R. H. Barry, 'Statement by U.K. representatives', European Resistance Movements 1939-1945. First International Conference on the History of the Resistance Movements held at Liege-Bruxelles-Breendonk 14-17 September 1958 (Oxford, 1960) p.351. 46. M. Muggeridge, Chronicles of Wasted Time; the Infernal Grove (London, 1972), cited inj. G. Beevor, SOE. Recollections and Reflections 1940-1945. (London, 1981) p.75. 47. Other influences on the relationship were to be found in the general snobbery and disdain shown by the old guard of SIS, and in the manner in which Section D had passed to SOE's control. Although Menzies attended the 1 July meeting at which SOE's formation was advocated, and depite his apparent approval of its proposals, it was not until 4 September that he discovered that a direct deal between Halifax and Dalton had taken D entirely out of his control. See M. Foot, SOE, p.21; N. West (pseudonym of R. Allason), MI6- British Intelligence Service Operations 1909-1045 (London, 1983 paperback edition) p. 162. 48. F. H. Hinsley, op. cit, p. 16; D. Stafford, Britain and European Resistance, p.37. 49. F. Hinsley, op. cit, p. 14. 50. Ibid, pp. 16-17; PREM3 185/1 - Churchill to Ismay 10 February 1944, cited in D. Stafford, op. cit.;, p.38. 51. SIS was so keen that its contribution should be appreciated that Menzies himself would sometimes deliver particularly juicy ULTRA decrypts to Churchill (N. West, op. cit, pp.223-4). It might be mentioned that SIS had some major operational failures of its own in the first years of the war, making mistakes which rendered its criticism of SOE pure hypocrisy, suf- 214 Notes and References

fering the penetration and collapse of some of its networks in occupied territories and failing to live up to its obligations to provide intelligence on certain important subjects. Part of the explanation for its attacks on SOE might therefore be found in a not unnatural desire to divert attention away from its own failures. See F. Hinsley, op. cit, pp.17 18; N. West, op. cit, pp. 134-8; M. R. D. Foot, Resistance (London, 1978 paperback edition) p.136. 52. B. Sweet-Escott, Baker Street, pp.104-105. See M. Foot, Resistance, pp. 102-8 for a good general analysis of the technicalities of wireless communications. 53. M. Foot, SOE, pp.109--10; See also D. Stafford, Britain and European Resistance, p.38. SIS proved very unwilling to assist SOE in establishing its own communications network, and positively stingy in handing over wireless sets (N. West, op. cit, p. 171, 175; M. Yoot, SOE, p. 108). 54. F0898/12 - note by Mr. D. Stephens, 20 September 1941, 55. B. Pimlott, op. cit, p.320; G. Jebb, op. cit, p.102. SO 2 referred to SO 1 as 'Leeper's Sleepers' because of its apparent lack of interest in propaganda to countries as yet unoccupied (B. Sweet-Escott, Baker Street, p.66). 56. B. Pimlott, op. cit, pp.320-27; B. Sweet- Escott, Baker Street, pp.67-8; H. Dalton, op. cit, p.378. Jebb was 12 years younger than Leeper, yet promoted above him; Leeper seems to have been somewhat paranoid over Jebb's intentions. 57. B. Pimlott, op. cit, pp.328-9, 335; G. Jebb, op. cit, p. 104. Dalton acknowledges that his relations with Bracken 'were often stormy' (H. Dalton, op. cit, p.378). For the text of Bracken's cabinet paper, submitted on 4 August, proposing the creation of a 'Department of Political Warfare' (headed by an executive committee which would have the right to create and lay down policy for all government organs concerned with political warfare), see F0898/12. 58. B. Pimlott, op. cit, pp.331-4; F0371/30861 C2091/248/62. 59. R. Bruce-Lockhart, Comes the Reckoning (London, 1947) p. 143. The Minis• terial Committee, which had in fact been set up in May 1941, consisted of Anthony Eden (Foreign Secretary), Brendan Bracken (Minister of Information) and Hugh Dalton (Minister of Economic Warfare). The Executive Committee consisted of Robert Bruce-Lockhart (Director- General of PWE until 1945), Reginald Leeper and Brigadier Dallas Brooks. Brooks was actually from SO 1, but was the Ministry of Informa• tion's representative. Mr David Stephens acted as Secretary to both committees. For a detailed organisational table of PWE in 1941, see F0898/12 PW(E) (41)2. 60. It might be argued that SOE based its dislike of PWE on much the same basis as SIS based its own aversion to SOE; both had lost significant parts of their own organisations, and did not like it. 61. See, for example, minutes of PWE Executive Committee meeting of 8 November 1941 in F0898/12. The dispute was particularly intense in the Middle East. 62. F0898/25 - letter R. Murray to R. Bruce-Lockhart, 10 June 1942. 63. E. Barker, 'Some Factors in British Decision-making over Yugoslavia 1941 — 4' in, British Policy, pp.27-9. 64. H. Dalton, op. cit, p.362. Notes and References 215

65. M. Foot, Resistance, pp.35-6; G. Jebb, op. cit, pp. 104-5; J. Beevor, op. cit, pp.17 18; B. Sweet-Escott, Baker Street, p.62; H. Dalton, op. cit, p.371. 66. L. Woodward, op. cit, p.283; L. Karchmar, op. cit, p.734. 67. H. Dalton, op. cit, pp.367-8; B. Pimlott, op. cit, pp.295 6, 316-18, 324; D. Stafford, Britain and European Resistance, pp.24-5, 2930. An interesting expression of this belief can be found in a paper on propaganda policy written by Dalton in December 1941. Dalton wrote: 'In the occupied countries the Left is, as a rule, more patriotic than the Right... The Communists are a special case, but they tend to be more nationalist than Communist and anyhow line up in support of our Russian allies ... Our best friends in occupied Europe are not the bourgeoisie, much less big business, or Generals, but the masses, and principally the industrial workers [a class largely missing from Yugoslav society]. Therefore, our propaganda should primarily be addressed to them.' See F0898/12 Memorandum by H. Dalton on 'Propaganda Policy', 6 December 1941. 68. In the paper referred to in note 67, Dalton commented: 'We have recognised, but it will not, I think be good propaganda to boost too hard the various exile Allied Governments... These may be found not to have much following when the storm breaks in their home lands. New men, who have stayed out and faced out the German occupation, and have bolder and more revolutionary ideas, may be preferred to those who have lived, not very dangerously abroad... We should not boost too hard the exiled Allied Governments. They may prove to be broken reeds.' (F0898/12 memorandum by H. Dalton on 'Propaganda Policy', 6 December 1941.) 69. B. Pimlott, op. cit, p.317. See also, British Policy, p.6, 14, 211, 284, and B. Davidson, Special Operations Europe: Scenes from the Anti-Nazi War (London, 1980), p.71. 70. B. Pimlott, op. cit, p.318. 71. D. Stafford, Britain and European Resistance, p.31; M. Foot, SOE, p.32; B. Sweet-Escott, Baker Street, pp.47-8; J. Beevor, op. cit, p.26.

3 PREPARATION

1. W Roberts Tito, Mihailovic and the Allies, 1941-1945 (New Jersey, 1973) p.22; P. Auty, Tito, p. 183. See also J. Marjanovic, Ustanak, p.77. 2. F. Maclean, Disputed Barricade (London, 1957) p.323. 3. WO208/2018A. Report of Colonel Mladen Zujovic, dated 8 December 1944, Paris. 4. TDM, p. 159. The officers on Ravna Gora apparently possessed wireless equipment as early as June, but were unable to get it to work J. Marjanovic, Ustanak, p. 78). 5. J. Amery, Approach March (London, 1973) p. 166; M. Deroc British Special Operations Explored: Yugoslavia in Turmoil 1941-1943 and the British Response (New York, 1988) p.56, p.273 n. 6. M. Deroc, op. cit, p.56. 7. J. Amery, op. cit, p.235. 216 Notes and References

8. J. Amery, op. cit, p.236 gives early June. Sir Reginald Hoare, Ambassador to the Yugoslav Government in exile, was instructed by the Foreign Office on 25 May to introduce Colonel Bailey to the Yugoslavs as the 'British officer in charge of subversive activities in Yugoslavia', and Hoare reported that he had done so in a telegram to the Foreign Office on 3 June. F0371 /30214 R5631 / 114/92; F0371/30214 R5849/114/92; J. Amery, op. cit, p.238. 9. M. Wheeler Britain and the War for Yugoslavia 1940-1943 (New York, 1980) p.64. Djonovic has noted that the Yugoslav Ambassador in Ankara was unable to provide any useful information about the situation inside Yugoslavia, but that the Consul in Istanbul proved to be better informed; J. Djonovic, 'Veze sa Drazom Mihailovicem sa srednjeg i bliskog istoka i severne Afrike' [The connections with Draza Mihailovic from the Middle and Near East and North ], GlasnikSIKD 'Njegos'no A July 1958)pp.42~3. 10. The translation of Simovic's order dated 4 June can be found in F0371/ 30291 R7374/4906/92. The Foreign Office was notified of his appointment in a telegram from Sir H. MacMichael, High Commissioner in Palestine on 23 June, and the Foreign Office transmitted its reply welcoming the appointment on 26 August. FO371/30291 R6943/4906/92; F0371/ 30292 R7785/4906/92. See also J. Djonovic, op. cit, p.41; J. Amery, op. cit, p.238. 11. J. Djonovic, op. cit, pp.41-2. 12. J. Djonovic, op. cit, p.42. See also J. Marjanovic, Draza Mihailovic, p.80 and M. Deroc, op. cit, p.312n. 13. J. Marjanovic, Draza Mihailovic, pp.80-1; J. Djonovic, op. cit, p.42. 14. J. Djonovic, op. cit, p.43. 15. J. Marjanovic, Ustanak, p.77, 194—6 states that information concerning sabotage actions and diversionary activities in Serbia, as well as about the uprising in Hercegovina reached at this time. See also L. Karchmar Draza Mihailovic and the Rise of the Chetnik Movement 1941-1942 PhD disser• tation, Stanford University, 1973, p.440; I. Avakumovic, Mihailovic prema Nemackim dokumentima [Mihailovic in the light of German Documents] (London, 1969) p. 14, 18, 36; M. Deroc op. cit, p. 168. 16. S. Pavlowitch, 'Lieutenant Rapotec', pp.70-1. Rapotec could not, however, have brought information about the rising in Montenegro, as Wheeler suggests, for the simple reason that the revolt had not yet broken out when Rapotec arrived in Istanbul. See M. Wheeler op. cit, p.65. 17. S. Pavlowitch, 'Lieutenant Rapotec', pp.68-71. J. Marjanovic, Draza Mihailovic, p.86 gives details of the composition and work of this committee. He claims that after initially helping refugees from the Ustasha terror, it quickly took on a political character and collaborated with the Italians. He correctly surmises that it was Rapotec who brought information about this committee to Istanbul. According to Marjanovic, Rapotec also told Trbic that there was a movement headed by Staff Colonel Dragoljub Mihailovic. This is quite possible, as Pavlowitch op. cit, p.69 points out that Rapotec learned of Mihailovic's existence en route to Istanbul in late June. There is no record of whether Rapotec gave Djonovic or the British the same infor• mation, although Djonovic must surely have known from Trbic. 18. M. Wheeler, op. cit, p.65; M. Deroc, op. cit, p.58; J. Djonovic, op. cit, p.43. Notes and References 217

19. J. Marjanovic, Draza Mihailovic, p.81. 20. J. Marjanovic, Draza Mihailovic, p.82. 21. The fact that Misic is mentioned perhaps lends some credibility to Marja- novic's claim that it was Misic who personally gave the instructions to Rakic. Alexander Misic was one of Vojvoda Misic's sons. Vasic was a Serb lawyer and author, and an 'old school friend' of Djonovic. J. Djonovic, op. cit, p.44. 22. On 23 June Djonovic warned Simovic that the start of the Soviet German war would quickly lead to action in Serbia (J. Marjanovic, Ustanak, p.91). S. Pavlowitch, 'Lieutenant Rapotec', p.71 observes that Rapotec passed on information about the Communists to the Yugoslav military authorities in Cairo in September 1941. J. Marjanovic, Draza Mihailovic, p.82 claims that Rapotec informed Trbic that the Communists were leading the revolution in Serbia. At this time (end of June/early July), however, the Communists had only just begun their activity, and it might be hypothesised that Rapotec was possibly adopting the German tendency to ascribe all resistance, whatever its origins and character, to the Communists. The clearest expression of this is in the directive issued by Keitel (Chief of the High Command of the Armed Forces - OKW) on 16 September 1941. In this order it is stated that 'Whatever the particular circumstances, every case of resistance to the German forces of occupation must be treated as due to Communism'. Documents on International Affairs 1939-1946, vol.11, Hitler's Europe (London, 1954), p. 188. Similarly, the German reprisal proclamation announcing the shooting of 2100 people on 10 October identified them all as 'Serbian Communists', when most were in fact innocent civilians (M. Deroc, op. cit, p.254 gives a photocopy of this announcement). M. Deroc, op. cit, p.59 suggests that Colonel Popovic, head of Yugoslav military intelligence in the Middle East, already knew about the Partisans from two Polish officers who had escaped through Yugoslavia; he bases this claim on Popovic's reminiscences. However, the two officers in question did not reach Istanbul until 24 November. Their account of their experiences can be found in F0536/5/3147. 23. This is quite possible. Leaflets of the regional committee of the Communist Party of Yugoslavia for Serbia published in June 1941 denounced the bands as 'Agents of London (various capitalist cliques, Chetniks and Police, some foolish officers and others)...', and called on the population not to support them; J^bornik dokumenta I podatka o JVarodnooslobodilackom ratu narodna Jugoslavije [Collection of documents and information about the Yugoslav people's national liberation struggle; henceforward, %bornik ] torn. 1, book 2 (1952) pp. 13-14, cited in I. Avakumovic, op. cit, p.25. See also L. Karchmar, op. cit, p. 138, 172n. 24. On occasion the Partisans practiced this as deliberate policy, with the intention of provoking punitive expeditions which would stir up the popu• lation against the Germans. See P. Shoup, Communism and the Yugoslav National Question (New York and London, 1968) pp.96-7. 25. J. Djonovic, op. cit, pp.43-4. 26. J. Amery, op. cit, p.239,. 27. Ibid, p.244. His claim should be regarded with caution. Although the reference to the cutting of the -Belgrade line is possibly correct, his mention of troop movements and dead German officers is suspect, at 218 Notes and References

least at this early stage. Any German troops moving into Yugoslavia were probably either those moving from Greece to their assembly areas for 'Barbarossa', or the German occupation forces replacing them. Similarly, most of the Italian units were in the country by the end of April. The first German reinforcements to be despatched as a response to the revolt did not arrive in Yugoslavia until mid to late August, and the first full division until late September (P. Hehn The German Struggle Against Yugoslav Guerillas in World War II (New York, 1979) pp.18-19, 25, 27, 46; F. Verna 'Yugoslavia under Italian Rule 1941 1943: Civil and military Aspects of the Italian Occu• pation' PhD dissertation University of California, 1985 passim). It is highly unlikely that there could have been more than two or three obituaries of German officers killed in Yugoslavia at this time; German losses in com• bating both the Chetniks and the Partisans in 1941 were extremely low, some 168 killed in Serbia by 25 December 1941 (M. Deroc, op. cit, p.256; P. Hehn, op. cit, p.69). 28. J. Djonovic, op. cit, p.44. M. Wheeler, op. cit, p.66, 266n, and F. Deakin, Embattled Mountain, p. 126 give a figure of 5 million dinars (the equivalent of £20 000). Wheeler states that Djonovic is in error in citing a figure of one million dinars, but gives no reason for his assertion (presumably he and Deakin work on the basis that this is the figure found in British documents - for example the SOE briefing paper of 28 October in F0371/30220 R9505/162/92 ~ and it was the British who provided the money). However, a telegram from SOE Cairo to 'Bullseye' on 12 October notes that Mihailovic was being sent one million dinars (£bornik, torn. 14, book 1, p.823). Additionally, at his trial Mihailovic twice stated that he only received 900000 dinars, and that 500000 of this was lost; see TDM, p. 152, 333. L. Karchmar, op. cit, p.866n. says that Rakic took a 10 per cent cut, which accounts for the other 100 000 dinars. 29. M. Wheeler, op. cit, p.66; J. Amery, op. cit, p.244. 30. The document was given originally by Bailey to Simovic, who passed it on to Djonovic, who in turn relayed it to the Foreign Office. This dates it some time before the German invasion of the Soviet Union, as Simovic arrived in England on 21 June, having clearly passed it on to Djonovic before leaving. It probably originates from early June, when Bailey's role was explained to the Yugoslavs. It was not received in the Foreign Office until late August. 31. F0371/30291 R7374/4906/92 Bailey report, June 1941. 32. J. Amery, op. cit, p.240. 33. J. Marjanovic, Ustanak, p. 195; M. Wheeler, op. cit, p.66. 34. G. H. N. Seton-Watson, 'Afterword: Thirty Years After', British Policy, p.285. 35. J. Amery, op. cit, pp. 179-80; A. Glen, op. cit, p. 137; Discussion 'Following Deakin', British Policy p.249; V. Kljakovic, 'Velika Britanija, Sovjetski Savez i ustanak ujugoslaviji 1941. godine' [Great Britain, the Soviet Union and the Uprising in Yugoslavia, 1941], Vojnoistorijski Glasnik, 21, May-August 1970, p.71; G. Seton-Watson, British Policy, p.285. 36. J. Amery, op. cit, p.244. 37. J. Marjanovic, Draza Mihailovic, p.82. 38. M. Deroc, op. cit, pp. 194-204. I have relied primarily on Deroc's excellent account for the following section. Brief mentions of the 'Russian Project' can Notes and References 219

be found inj. Djonovic, op. cit, p.45, J. Amery, op. cit, pp.259-60 and J. Marjanovic, Draza Mihailovic, p.84. 39. J. Amery, op. cit, p.240; D. Stafford, Britain and European Resistance, pp.63-4. 40. J. Djonovic, op. cit, p.45; M. Deroc, op. cit, p. 196. 41. Plans for using a French aircraft from Syria or a British aircraft from Malta were also considered (M. Deroc, op. cit, p.296). 42. Efforts were made by the British in Moscow to secure cooperation in the Balkans, however. 43. M. Deroc, op. cit, p. 199, citing Bailey's report of 7 September 1941. 44. M. Deroc, op. cit, pp.201-2. 45. J. Amery, op. cit, p.259 attributes the failure of the project simply to the Yugoslav Government's wish to exclude the Soviets until close cooperation had been established between Mihailovic and the British. In fact, it seems that most of the Yugoslavs involved in the project were anxious to have Soviet participation precisely because they felt it was the best way of reducing Soviet influence. Deroc, who uses sources unavailable to Amery is, in my opinion, more persuasive. 46. J. Amery, op. cit, p.260. 47. Ibid, p.244. 48. B. Sweet-Escott, Baker Street, p.43. 49. Ibid, p.53. 50. M. Deroc, op. cit, p.62. 51. WO 193/616 - note by General Staff Major A. Daniell, M09, 25 April 1941. 52. B. Sweet-Escott, Baker Street, p.70. 53. W0193/616 - telegram Dalton to C-in-C Middle East 64842, 3 May 1941. 54. WO 193/616 - telegram Wavell to CIGS 0/66692, 23 May 1941. 55. W0193/616 - telegram Wavell to Dalton 0/66691, 23 May 1941. 56. WO 193/616 - telegram Dalton to Wavell 69746, 31 May 1941. 57. W0193/616 - telegram Dalton to Wavell 74256, 25 June 1941; B. Sweet- Escott, Baker Street, p.71. 58. O. Lyttelton (Lord Chandos), The Memoirs of Lord Chandos (London, 1962), p.239. 59. B. Sweet-Escott, Baker Street, p.73. 60. Some were undoubtedly burned in the Cairo bonfires of July 1942, when Rommel threatened to overrun the British defences and large quantities of records were destroyed; others may have been 'lost' after the war or, where they survived, withheld from researchers. 61. FO371/30291 R7374/4906/92 - Bailey report, June 1941. 62. F0898/115 - telegram Col. Thornhill to Brig. Brooks GSI(K) 86240, 28 July 1941. 63. F0898/114 - undated minute Lt Col. Johnstone to Col. Thornhill (Contents make it clear that it originates from early August). 64. B. Sweet-Escott, Baker Street, p.75. 65. Bailey appears to have remained in Istanbul until the collapse of the Russian project. 66. B. Sweet-Escott, 'SOE in the Balkans', British Policy, p. 19. 67. G. H. Seton-Watson, op. cit, pp.289-290; B. Sweet-Escott, Baker Street, pp. 78-79. 220 Notes and References

68. B. Sweet-Escott, 'SOE in the Balkans', p. 18. 69. B. Sweet-Escott, Discussion, 'Following Barker, Bailey, Maclean and Taylor', British Policy, pp.240-1. 70. FO371/30215 R8289/114/92 letter D. Simovic to A. Eden PVK 233, 4 September (received 9 September 1941); FO371/30215 R8616/114/92 - Letter G. Jebb to A. Eden, 20 September (received 24 September 1941) and letter A. Eden to D. Simovic, 30 September 1941; M. Deroc op. cit. pp.60- 1. 71. J. Amery, op. cit, p.244; F0898/114 - letter Lt Col. J. de Salis to Air Commodore P. R. C. Groves, 26 December 1941. 72. J. Amery, op. cit, p.245. 73. Ibid. 74. Ibid, p.244. 75. Ibid, p.245. 76. One might suggest that the letter's outspoken tone resulted from Amery's exasperation at the delays being caused in Cairo, his enthusiasm for immediate action (based on what he had been told by Djonovic about Mihailovic's '100 000 armed men'), and a natural desire to put over to his father the importance of his own mission. 77. From Amery's account of 'Bullseye' it can be seen that he is consistently three days out with his dates, from at least early September onwards. If his error is traced back into August, it is possible (although unproveable) that the letter was dated 18 not 15 August. See below, note 96. Nevertheless, at least two historians accept Amery's version of the importance of his letter in securing Churchill's personal intervention. See M. Deroc, op. cit, pp.63—5; M. A. Kay, 'The British Attitude towards the Yugoslav Government in Exile 1941-1945', PhD dissertation, University of Southampton 1986, pp.38-9. 78. M. Wheeler, op. cit, p. 121, 283n. On the Yugoslav government at this time see also S. K. Pavlowitch, 'Out of context - the Yugoslav Government in London 1941-1945', Journal of Contemporary History, vol.16 no.1, January 1981, p.89; S. K. Pavlowitch, 'Momcilo Nincic and the European Policy of the Yugoslav Government in Exile, 1941-1943: F, Slavonic and East European Review, vol.62 no.3, July 1984, p.404; FO371/30291 R7078/4906/92. 79. M. Kay, op. cit, p.39; FO371/30214 R6771/114/92 - tel. Foreign Office to New York no.666 PILOT, 2 July 1941. This directive also noted a call to arms against the 'Cetniks' issued by the Croat authorities. 80. S. Pavlowitch, 'Lieutenant Rapotec', p.71. 81. Cited in J. Marjanovic, Draza Mihailovic, p.85. 82. At his trial in 1946 Mihailovic confirmed that Zarko Todorovic, his com• mander in Belgrade from May 1941, had 'succeeded in establishing links through the American legation' (TDMp. 159). L. Karchmar denounced this as a falsehood propagated for political reasons (L. Karchmar op. cit, pp.866-7n). His argument is based upon the erroneous claim that all US Legation staff left Belgrade on 20 May. That it was Rankin who carried this information from Yugoslavia is confirmed by L. Modisett, The Four Cornered Triangle: British and American Policy toward Yugoslavia 1939- 1945, PhD dissertation, Georgetown University 1981, p.299. 83. FO371/30214 R7294/114/92 telegram Sir R. Campbell to Foreign Office no.867, 25th July 1941. Notes and References 221

84. FO371/30215 R7332/114/92 - note J. Addis [SIS], 26 July 1941; see also Tel. Foreign Office to New York no.811 PILOT, 1 August and no.827 PILOT, 6 August 1941 for further information; FO371/30219 R7641/ 162/92 - various Reuters reports, 13 August 1941. 85. FO371/30215 R7791/114/92 - Transocean report, 7 August 1941. 86. F0371/30219 R7968/162/92 - letter D. Simovic to W Churchill, enclosing reports, 14th August 1941 (forwarded to Foreign Office, 20 August). 87. PREM3/510/2 - Prime Minister's personal minute M837/1, 28 August 1941. 88. M. Deroc, op. cit, p.275n. acknowledges this, but continues to accept Amery's claim in the absence of an alternative explanation. 89. FO371/30219 R7968/162/92 - undated Prime Minister's minute. 90. F0371/30219 R8086/162/92 - letter Col. Lamplough (Naval Intelligence) to Minister of Economic Warfare and P. Dixon (Foreign Office), 30 August 1941. 91. PREM3/510/2 - H. Dalton to W. Churchill, 30 August 1941. Another copy of the text is in F0371/30219 R8086/162/92. 92. D. Stafford, Britain and European Resistance, p.32 gives the text. Minor but insignificant changes include the substitution of the word 'oppression' for 'repression', and 'paramilitary' for 'military' operations. 93. WO 193/768 - memo, Maj. Gen. J. N. Kennedy (Director of Operations and Plans, WO) to DMI and CIGS, 23 August 1941. 94. W0193/768 - letter J. Rigby, MOl, WO to Col. G. F. Taylor, SO 2, 25 August 1941. 95. PREM3/510/2 - H. Dalton to W. Churchill, 30th August 1941. 96. Julian Amery's account of the formation and despatch of Mission 'Bullseye' is the most detailed available, but although it is internally consistent regarding its dates he is three days in error throughout. For example, he claims that 'Bullseye' landed in Montenegro on the night of 17-18 Sep• tember, when in fact it was the evening of the 20, and he alleges that John Bennett came to Cairo on 5 September, when Bennett was certainly in Istanbul on the 6 September. Cf. J. Amery, op. cit, p.247, pp.253-4 and M. Deroc, op. cit, pp.69-74, p. 198. 97. J. Amery, op. cit, pp.246-7. The reason for the misunderstanding is simple: in transmitting his request for the Yugoslavs to be sent from Istanbul, Amery had not been allowed to reveal that the mode of transport would be by submarine. The British and Yugoslavs in Turkey assumed that an aeroplane would be used, presumably either for a direct trip to Suvobor or to drop the team in Macedonia, whence they would continue on foot. 98. On Popovic, see Chapter 2, note 24. 99. M. Deroc, op. cit, pp.79-80. 100. J. Amery, op. cit, p.248. 101. F. Deakin, Embattled Mountain, p. 129. 102. Ibid, pp. 128-130. It is possible that Deakin is confusing this description of the briefing with instructions despatched to the mission as a whole on 12 October (see note 129). 103. M. Deroc, op. cit, p. 196. Hudson spoke fluent Serbo-Croat and physically was extremely powerful. F. Deakin, Embattled Mountain, p. 129 describes him 222 Notes and References

as 'a young man of outstanding physical courage and a rough independence of spirit'. 104. J. Amery, op. cit, p.247. 105. M. Deroc, op. cit, p.312n, drawing on information in a letter from Amery in 1982, notes that Popovic insisted that a British officer accompany the mission. 106. See S. W. Bailey, 'British Policy towards General Draza Mihailovic', British Policy, p.61; P. Auty, 'Some factors...' in British Policy, p.91; F. Deakin, Embattled Mountain, p. 129; H. Williams 'The Special Operations Executive and Yugoslavia' unpublished PhD dissertation, University of Southampton, 1994, p.35. M. Deroc, op. cit, p.243 offers a summary of secondary sources. 107. FO371/59410 R8966/58/92 - Statement by Hudson, June 1946. See also S. K. Pavlowitch, 'D. T. Hudson (1910-1995); a Depressed Witness of the First Civil War in Yugoslavia', Tokovi Istorije, no. 1-2/1995, p.264, 270. 108. Bailey goes on to add the words 'regardless of nationality, religion or political belief. These are very similar to Deakin's words used on two occasions. Deakin in turn originally seems to have taken them from the Yugoslav Historical Report in CAB 101/126, p.4, where the 'official his• torian' of SOE, W. J. M. MacKenzie used them, while admitting that no copy of the directive could be found. Deakin made a number of notes on this account in July 1952, and probably used them on the two occasions referred to. The first was at the St Antony's College (Oxford) conference, December 1962. There he stated the following: 'I think - and I stand to correction here — that in general terms his [Hudson's] instructions were to contact, investigate and report on all groups offering resistance to the enemy, regardless of race, creed or political persuasion' (Yugoslav discussion p.5). He used precisely the same wording in The Embattled Mountain nine years later. It seems quite apparent that he was not quoting the directive verbatim, or he would not have put in the qualifying clause in his speech in 1962. Further, Deakin did not arrive in Cairo until after the July 1942 'bonfires' and almost certainly never saw the directive himself. The same is true of Bailey. I suspect that Bailey in 1973 merely slightly reworded Deakin's statement, two years after The Embattled Mountain was published. This makes sense, because if Deakin's was directly quoted from the briefing notes, why should Bailey bother to change the words? Unfortunately, the impression gained by two prominent SOE personalities both saying virtually the same thing is that these words were used in the briefing. My contention is that they were not, that 'Bullseye' was landed with the specific intention of proceeding to Mihailovic, but had the additional task of reporting on other groups which they might come across en route. This does not mean that such groups would not be helped - quite clearly attempts were made to send supplies to the Montenegrins at Radovce, as will be seen - but the original purpose of the mission was to contact Mihailovic and attempt to coordinate his actions with any other resistance groups discovered, and with the British. Deroc's contention that the words quoted by Deakin were used, but that they applied to Albanian groups is, I think, a minor slip in an otherwise excellent analysis (M. Deroc, op. cit, p.76). 109. P. Auty, 'Note on Colonel D. T. Hudson's account of his mission to Yugoslavia 1941-4', British Policy, p.91. Notes and References 223

110. M. Deroc, op. cit, pp.76 7; H. Williams, op. cit, p.35. 111. J. Amery, op. cit, p.244; B. Sweet-Escott, Baker Street, p.96; M. Djilas, Wartime, p.71. See also M. Deroc, op. cit, pp.68-9 for discussion of this question and Amery's personal confirmation that this analysis is correct. It seems inconceivable that in the ten days he spent with Hudson, Amery should not have mentioned the information concerning Mihailovic which had been received up to this time. It might be noted that H. Williams, op. cit, p.35 disagrees with this analysis, and there is some plausibility in the source which she cites (p.204n) as evidence, but given the explicitness of the sources mentioned above, I am reluctant to alter my position. One suspects, however, that this is a subject which will never be completely clarified, not least because both Hudson and Amery are now dead. 112. The second of the reports passed on by Simovic to Churchill on 14 August stated that 'In Montenegro a Communist government sat for seven days in , and there were terrible uprisings... Most of the people have taken to the woods'. See F0371/30219 R7968/162/92. 113. M. Deroc, op. cit, pp.80-1. Popovic cannot, however, have given them information about the Partisans collected from the 'Polish officers', as he claims, since the latter did not reach Istanbul until 24 November (F0536/ 5/3147). He may, however, have passed on such intelligence about the Communists as had been relayed to the Yugoslav command by Rapotec, Rakic and other escapees. 114. M. Deroc, Wartime, p.81, 203-4. See also V Kljakovic, op. cit, p.72; F. Deakin, Embattled Mountain, p. 129. 115. M. Wheeler, op. cit, p.267n; M. Deroc, op. cit, p.80. Djilas also points out that Ostojic and Lalatovic 'did not defend their government very strongly', although they were anxious to rally 'national forces' around the banner of the coup government (M. Djilas, Wartime, pp.70 — 1). 116. J. Amery, op. cit, p.251. 117. Mihailovic later claimed that the messages brought by Ostojic and Lalatovic 'were rather obscure. In fact, they made fun of General Ilic himself, who scarcely gave them any messages' (TDM, p. 123). 118. M. Djilas, Wartime, p.68; F. Deakin, Embattled Mountain, p. 126; M. Deroc, op. cit, pp.69-74. 119. P. Howarth, Undercover the Men and Women of the Special Operations Executive (London, 1980) p.78; S. K. Pavlowitch, 'D. T. Hudson', p.37 (where the Franciscan friar becomes a shepherd boy). 120. This is consistent with the date of the first telegrams (26 September) and Djilas' claim that the 'mission was in Radovce only five or six days after landing' (M. Djilas, Wartime, p.69). 121. D. Hudson, St Antony's discussion p. 12. 122. WO202/128 telegram no.2 Folio 502, dated 26 September, received Malta, London 955, 3 October 1941. 123. M. Djilas, Wartime, pp.69-71. 124. Ibid, p.71. 125. WO202/128 - tel. no.6 F.522, undated, r. Malta, London 984, 9 October 1941; tel. no.7 F.523, undated, r. Malta, London 985, 9 October 1941; J. Marjanovic, Draza Mihailovic, p.l 17. 224 Notes and References

126. This also corresponds with Djilas' information that 'while the royal mission was still with us we were planning a major operation against the Italians. Though we didn't involve the mission in this operation we didn't hide it from them either' (M. Djilas, Wartime, p.72); WO202/128 - tel. no.8 F.524, undated, r. Malta, London 524, 9 October 1941; tel. no.9 F.529, undated, r. Malta, London 992, 10 October 1941; tel. no. 10 F.530, undated, r. Malta [London?], 11 October 1941. 127. WO202/128 - tel. no.10 F.530, undated, r. Malta [London?], 11 October 1941. 128. ZbomiK torn. 14, book 1, p.822 tel. SOE Cairo to 'Bullseye', no.2 undated and no.4, 10 October 1941. See also J. Marjanovic, Draza Mihailovic, p. 109. F. Deakin, Embattled Mountain,, p. 130 dates the instructions 9 October. Given that tel. no.2 is undated, and no. 3 is missing from the relevant file, he may be correct. 129. The original telegrams can be found in ZDOm^ torn. 14, book 1, p.823, tels. no.6 and no.8, SOE Cairo to 'Bullseye', both 12th October 1941. The publication of these messages fortunately resolves a debate concerning who sent them, and to whom, in F. Deakin, Embattled Mountain, pp. 131-2, L. Karchmar op. cit, p.870n and M. Deroc op. cit, pp.82-4. See also V. Kljakovic, op. cit, pp.72-3, 76 and D. Sijacki, Nas Put - Istorijski Razmatranja o Ravnogorskom Pokreta i njegovim Neprijateljima [Our Way - a Historical Con• sideration of the Ravna Gora Movement and its Enemies] ( 1969) p.38. 130. M. Deroc, op. cit, pp.66-7, 84. 131. WO202/128 - tel. no.23 F.562, undated, r. Malta, London 35, 16 October 1941. J. Marjanovic, Draza Mihailovic, p.l 17 dates this telegram 16 October, which means that Lalatovic sent it. 132. F. Deakin, Embattled Mountain, p. 13 3. 133. See ZhomiK torn. 14, book 1, p.821 (for original text); WO202/128 - tel. no.25 F.573, 16th October, r. Malta, London 58, 19 October 1941. See also F. Deakin, Embattled Mountain, p. 131 and J. Marjanovic, Draza Mihailovic, p. 117. This telegram appears to have been sent in response to a request from SOE Cairo to the mission on 12 October for information on who was leading the Montenegrin revolt. See Zoorn^K torn. 14, book 1 , p.823 - tel. no.8, SOE Cairo to 'Bullseye', 12 October 1941. Deakin claims that Hudson was the author, but this contradicts his own account, which states (correctly) that Hudson left Radovce on 13 October, leaving both wireless sets behind. Deakin goes on to say that Hudson sent his last message before leaving Montenegro on 19 October, which is equally impossible. Between 13 and 19 October all telegrams were sent by Lalatovic using the J' set from Radovce. The other radio, a 'Mark III', required mains electricity, which was not available in Radovce (J. Marjanovic, ibid, p.l 18). Contrary to Deakin's account the J' set had not already 'burnt out' (an error repeated by W Roberts, op. cit, p.28); it was still functioning on 19 October, when Lalatovic expressed his intention to leave Radovce. Hudson himself merely said that the 'J' set 'eventually' burnt out (St Antony's discussion, p. 12). 134. WO202/128 - tel. no. 12 F.595, undated, r. Malta, London, 22 October 1941; tel. no.31 F.595, undated, r. Malta, London 73, 22 October 1941. See also Zpornik, tom. 14, book 1, p.821 - tel. no.28 of 17 October (this message Notes and References 225

is missing from the WO202/128 file - it may be a repeat of no. 12; see below). J. Marjanovic, Draza Mihailovic, p.l 18 dates no.31 19 October, which possibly means that no. 12, which has the same folio number, is also 19th October (and wrongly numbered). Alternatively, no. 12 was received in Malta on 11 October (its position in the numerical series), but for some reason not transmitted to London until 22 October. The answer probably lies in a telegram sent by SOE Cairo to 'Bullseye' on 17 October, which stated that tel. no. 12 was impossible to read, and should therefore be repeated (Zbornik, tom. 14, book 1, p.823). 135. L. Karchmar, op. cit, p.386. 136. F0536/31 - Hudson's 'Series A' telegrams, April 1943, p.4. 137. M. Djilas, Wartime, p.71. 138. F0371/30220 R9280/162/92 - G. Jebb [SOE] to O. Sargent, 14 October 1941, enclosing copy of note for COS. 139. F0371/30220 R9520/162/92 - tel. C-in-C Middle East to Chiefs of Staff, GR/20605, 31 October 1941. 140. F0371/30220 R9687/162/92 - tel. C-in-C Middle East to War Office, O/ 23001, 6 November 1941. 141. For discussion of the date upon which Mihailovic first made contact with the British, see S. C. Trew, No Pity Distilled; Britain and the Chetniks, 1941- 1942, PhD dissertation, University of Keele, 1991, p.310n. 142. On the authentication of Mihailovic's signals, cf. W. Petro, Triple Commission (London 1968), p.223, J. Marjanovic, Draza Mihailovic, p.93" and B. Todorovic, Last Words - a Memoir of World War II and the Yugoslav Tragedy (New York, 1989) pp.286-7. 143. F0371/30220 R9174/162/92 - letter H. Ismay to A. Cadogan, 14 October (received in Foreign Office 17th October) 1941, enclosing tele• grams and Royal Yugoslav Government aide memoire. 144. Ibid. WO202/128 - telegrams from Pavlovic dated 8 and 9 October. 145. The 'J' set only had a 300 mile range, which meant that it couldn't reach Malta from Serbia. Therefore there was no point in taking it. It was also required by Lalatovic for maintaining the link with the British which, it was hoped, would result in a supply drop at Radovce. The 'Mark III' set was left behind because of its weight and bulk (D. Hudson, St Antony's discussion, pp. 12-13). The 'senior Partisans' were Arso Jovanovic and Mitar Bakic. Despite Deakin's claim, repeated by Marjanovic (and on one occasion by Hudson himself), that Djilas accompanied the group, he did not. He only heard of his dismissal from command in Montenegro on 5 November, and did not set off for Uzice until 11 November. D. Hudson, St Antony's discussion, pp. 12-13; F0536/31 - Hudson's 'Series A' telegrams, April 1943, p.5; WO208/2002 Hudson's 'Report on the Serbs', 22 April 1944; F. Deakin, Embattled Mountain, p. 132; J. Marjanovic, Draza Mihailovic, p.l 18; M. Djilas, Wartime, p.79, 86. 146. F0536/31 - Hudson's 'Series A' telegrams, April 1943, p.5. 147. D. Hudson, St Antony's discussion, p. 13. 148. WO202/128 - telegram Ravna Gora unnumbered, dated 27 October, r. Malta 640, 29 October 1941. 149. F. Deakin, .Embattled Mountain, pp. 134-5. 226 Notes and References

150. F. Deakin, Embattled Mountain, p. 136; FO.536/31 - Hudson's 'Series A' telegrams, April 1943, p.8; M. Deroc, op. cit, pp.283 4 n. 151. F. Deakin, Embattled Mountain, p. 136. 152. J. Marjanovic, Draza Mihailovic, p-118; Zoom^ torn. 14, book 1, pp.821-2. The main problem for historians using the WO202/128 file in determining who was where, and when, is an inaccurately translated telegram, no.30, sent by Lalatovic on 19 October: 'On October 20th two parties are going with main radio to Serbia. Listen in to us from October 25th, in accordance with plan for main radio. Accumulator radio for internal communications remains in Radovce with us. Malta should listen in each day at 1900 GMT hours for 15 minutes to ensure continuity until we are sure our messages are reaching Cairo.' My translation of the original text quoted by Marjanovic, ibid, is as follows: 'On 20th two persons are leaving for Serbia with the main radio. Listen in to us from 25th according to the plan for the main radio repeat main radio repeat main radio. At Radovce we are leaving the accumulator radio repeat accumulator radio, for internal communications with us - Malta should be sure to listen in every day from 19 to 19.35 hours GMT to restore sure [secure] connections with Cairo.' The 'Accumulator set' was the J' set. The 'Main radio' was the Mark III. From Marjanovic's text it is clear that the J' set remained in Radovce when Lalatovic and Dragicevic (the 'two persons') left for Uzice. 153. Dragicevic had apparently found his wife in Montenegro (M. Djilas, Wartime, p.71) and may have 'fallen out' with the Yugoslav officers (F. Deakin, Embattled Mountain, p. 136. Over what?) Whatever the reason, the ease with which he was apparently able to desert the mission hardly speaks volumes for its military discipline, although information given by S. K. Pavlowitch, 'D. T. Hudson', p.270 implies that Dragicevic may in fact have been a victim of some coercion on the part of the Partisans. There is one alternative but unsubstantiated explanation. Giving evidence at Mihailovic's trial, General Simovic claimed that Dragicevic remained in Montenegro (which is wrong) with Arso Jovanovic, and that Simovic approved this link with Jovanovic, 'in whom he had complete confidence' (F0371/59413 R9814/58/92). See also S. W Bailey, British Policy, p.61 for a similar explanation.

4 APPROBATION

1. M. Deroc, British Special Operations Explored: Yugoslavia in Turmoil 1941- 1943 and the British Response (New York, 1988), p.207. 2. A. Seitz, Mihailovic - Hoax or Hero? (Columbus, 1953), p. 12; F. Deakin, Embattled Mountain, p. 136. 3. M. Wheeler, Britain and the War for Yugoslavia 1940-1943 (New York, 1980), p.87; F. Deakin, Embattled Mountain, p. 137; M. Deroc, op. cit, p.207. 4. F0536/31 - Hudson's 'Series B' telegrams, April 1943. 5. F. Deakin, Embattled Mountain, p. 137 states that when Hudson explained his intention to maintain liaison with the Partisans, Mihailovic threatened to sever all relations with him. This story is repeated by M. Wheeler, op. cit, p.87. The effect (if not the aim) is obviously to back up the thesis that Notes and References 227

Mihailovic was already irreconcilably opposed to the Partisans. However, it would in fact appear that the threat was not made until after the Brajici meeting, and possibly not until after the actual outbreak of the civil war (see telegram from Hudson of 3 November, cited in this chapter, note 101). Nor would it make sense in view of Mihailovic's desperate need of British aid, which would best be facilitated by maintaining good relations with Hudson. Another source claims that when Hudson announced his intention to maintain links with the Partisans, the officers held a meeting to decide whether he should be killed in view of the danger of his falling into German hands. Hudson was informed of the purpose of this meeting and its decision by Mihailovic himself, (P. Howarth, Undercover - the Men and Women of the Special Operations Executive (London, 1980), p.81). Again, this only makes sense in the context of the chaotic situation prevailing after the outbreak of civil war on 2 November, when the Chetniks could no longer guarantee Hudson's safety and when it was no doubt feared that (a) the Partisans could use Hudson for their own purposes, and (b) that he knew too much about Chetnik strength and dispositions. If the story is true, it was not the first time that the murder of a member of the mission had been contem• plated by the guerrillas in Yugoslavia. M. Djilas, Wartime, p.72 notes that the Partisans made tentative proposals that the officers should be killed when they were in Montenegro. Similarly, at his own trial in 1946 Mihailovic stated that Hudson brought a message stating that 'a rebellion would not be tolerated' (TDM, p. 124). F0371/59408 R8688/58/92 - minute by J. R. Colville reporting conver• sation with D. Hudson, 13 June 1946. J. V Djelevic, 'Iz prvih meseca' [From the first months], Knjiga o Drazi, vol.1, p.185. It should be acknowledged that sources are unclear on this point. On the one hand, Hudson's account, Djelevic's article and even TDM, p. 124 appear to indicate that instructions that the Yugoslavs fight for Yugoslavia alone were given at the first meeting. On the other hand, TDM, p. 124 also suggests that it was an official statement of policy, transmitted via SOE Cairo - and Hudson only resumed contact with Cairo after arriving at Ravna Gora. Additionally, it was only after the outbreak of the civil war that the British authorities decided to attempt to put the Partisans directly under Mihai• lovic's command. Given that both Hudson's and Djelevic's accounts bear a remarkable similarity to a telegram despatched by SOE Cairo on behalf of the British government on 16 November (see this chapter, note 128), it seems probable that both men's memories are at fault. M. Milazzo, The Chetnik Movement and the Yugoslavia Resistance (London, 1975), p.20. According to P. Hehn, The German Struggle Against Yugoslav Guerillas in World War II (New York., 1979), p.28, German casualties in August 1941 were 22 killed and 17 wounded. C. Browning, 'Wehrmacht Reprisal Policy and the Mass Murder of Jews in Serbia', Militargeschichttiche Mittelungen, vol. 1 (1983), p.35 gives a total of 30 dead, 23 wounded and 1 missing. The difference may be accounted for by the losses incurred during the Chetnik attack on , which occurred on 31 August, and which may not have been reported until several days later, in September. In either case, these casualties were very low, and make nonsense of Partisan claims; for 228 Notes and References

example, R. Colakovic, Winning Freedom (London, 1962), pp.54, 60 gives a total of 26 Germans killed in just two engagements in a very limited geographical area. If the events are not entirely fictitious, they probably involved Serbian gendarmes, not Germans; or if Germans were involved, their losses were nothing like those claimed by the Communists. For a German view of the developing unrest and increasing sabotage in Serbia during July and August, see P. Hehn, op. cit, pp.22-7. Anti-Axis actions were variously attributed to 'Communists', 'Serbian Nationalists', 'terrorist bands', 'bandits' and so on. Between 11 and 31 August in Serbia there were 14 attacks on German military vehicles or personnel, 52 on railways, 16 on communications, 9 on mines or industrial establishments, 24 on gen• darmerie stations and 96 on communal offices. 11. M. Milazzo, op. cit, p. 16; L. Karchmar, Draza Mihaibvic and the Rise of the Chetnik Movement 1914-1942 PhD Dissertation, Stanford University, 1973, pp. 143-4. 12. Mladen Zujovic, who was in the -Cacak- area in the summer of 1941 claimed later that there were only some 20 dedicated Communists there, 'but they all came into line at once; difficulties were small, thanks to their existing organisation and, above all, the ardent desire of the people to get to grips with the invader'. Although the older peasants were suspicious of their claims of Russian triumphs, 'young men under 20 joined immediately. No one took them seriously, however, little dreaming that they would one day form the elite of the Partisan Army' (F0536/23 - report by Col. M. Zujovic, September/October 1943, Allied/F/208, p.3). 13. L. Karchmar, op. cit, p.89, 177-80. J. Marjanovic, Ustanak, p. 184 gives the strength of Mihailovic's forces in western Serbia in summer 1941 as 3000 men. 14. WO208/2018A - 'Report on Mission to General Mihailovic and Con• ditions in Yugoslavia' by Col. W. S. Bailey (Henceforward, 'Bailey Report'), April 1944, Part I - 'Serb Chetnik Tradition'. On the uprising, and its influence on Mihailovic's strategy, seej. Tomasevic, The Chetniks, p.l 18; M. Deroc, op. cit, p.185; J. Marjanovic, Ustanak, p.128. The first meeting between Partisan representatives and the officers on Ravna Gora took place in July, when Dr Jovanovic (a member of the Partisan detachment) held talks with Mihailovic at the latter's headquarters. In mid-August a higher level Partisan delegation travelled to Ravna Gora, where they were received by Mihailovic's assistant, Lt Col. Pavlovic. During the same month, meetings between Partisan and Chetnik officials occurred in various other parts of western and . See J. Marjanovic, Ustanak, pp. 128-9, 200-1; L. Karchmar, op. cit, p. 185; R. Colakovic, op. cit, p.34, 48-9; Zbornik, tom. 14, book 1, p.23n. 15. TDM, p.l 10. 16. L. Karchmar, op. cit, p. 186, 308n. One of the most important Chetnik commanders in Serbia, Major Radoslav Djuric, later claimed (even after joining the Partisans himself) that when the Partisans first appeared Mihailovic was willing to fight alongside them (WO202/196 - Declaration of General Staff Major R. Djuric, 2 June 1944). D. Sotirovich, a Chetnik author, notes that in summer 1941 Mihailovic considered that there were two groups among the Communists. The first, he said, were professional revolutionaries taking their orders from Stalin; the others, however, 'hate the Notes and References 229

occupier as we do'. See D. M. Sotirovich, Trahison au Sommet (Paris, 1972) p.64, and M. Deroc, op. cit, p. 186. 17. TDM, pp.115-16. 18. L. Karchmar, op. cit, p. 190 gives a total of 1007 persons killed on six occasions in reprisal for the deaths of about nine Germans. As the number of the latter killed in August was between 22 and 30 (see note 10), it is conceivable that more may have died. See also J. Marjanovic, Ustanak, p. 169; C. Browning, op. cit, p.33. 19. L. Karchmar, op. cit, pp. 191-3. 20. On Pecanac's policy, see D. Petrovic, 'Cetnicka organizacija Koste Pecanca u okupiranqj Srbiji do pocetka oktobra 1941. godine' [The Chetnik Organ• isation of Kosta Pecanac in Occupied Serbia to the start of October 1941], Vojnoistorijski Glasnik, 1968 (2), pp.l73~201;J. Marjanovic, Ustanak, pp.174-5. On the formation of the Nedic, government, see J. Marjanovic, Ustanak, pp. 176-83 and B. Karapandzic Gradjanski rat u Srbiji (1914—1945) [Civil War in Serbia 1914-1945] Cleveland, Ohio, 1958, pp.82-6. 21. TDM, pp.116-7; L. Karchmar, op. cit, pp.92-3, 179-80, 197-9; J. Mar• janovic, Ustanak, p.l92~3; M. Deroc, op. cit, p. 160. 22. I. Avakumovic, Mihailovic prema Nemackim dokumentima [Mihailovic in the light of German documents] (London, 1969), p.21. J. Marjanovic, Ustanak, p. 141 claims that the Macva Partisans took Loznica on 4 September, but on p.206 admits that it was Misita's Chetniks who were responsible. See also the account of Pop Zecevic, a Partisan commander who had earlier served with the Chetniks, who admits that this was a Chetnik operation (WO208/ 2002). 23. TDM, p.l 13. 24. For example, the Radjevina Chetnik detachment cooperated with the Par• tisans in destroying two German companies in the town of on 5 September; while even before this, on 25 August, an agreement for joint action had been concluded between the the Partisan Podrinjska odred and the Cer Chetniks (J. Marjanovic, Ustanak, p. 140, 142; L. Karchmar, op. cit, p.204; Zbornik, tom. 14, book 1, p.23n). The town of Sabac was unsuc• cessfully attacked by a joint Chetnik-Partisan force on 23 September, and Gornji Milanovac was captured (along with its German garrison) by the Chetnik and Partisan detachments six days later (J. Marjanovic, Ustanak, pp.202~3, 207, 244, 248; B. Karapandzic, op. cit, pp.98-9; M. Deroc, op. cit, pp. 174-8). 25. L. Karchmar, op. cit, pp.206-8; J. Marjanovic, Ustanak, pp.226-7; S. Clissold, Whirlwind (London, 1949) p.59. Mihailovic's reluctance to accept Tito's terms may have had something to do with the fact that the Chetnik leader believed Tito to be a Russian, whose interest in the Serbian uprising was therefore purely selfish. Even the Partisan leadership considered Tito's Serbo-Croat to be poor: M. Djilas has written that Tito 'expressed himself worst in Serbo-Croatian', frequently resorting to Russian phrases and idioms. He adds that Tito's 'public addresses only gave credence to rumours that he was not "our man", but a Russian'. See M. Djilas, Tito - The Story from Inside (London, 1981) p. 10, 97. 26. DGFP Series D, Vol. XHI, p.507 - Order of 14 September 1941. This was the 342nd Infantry Division. 230 Notes and References

27. Documents on International Affairs 1939 1946, vol.11 Hitler's Europe, pp. 1889; R. C. Fattig, 'Reprisal: the German Army and the Execution of Hostages during the Second World War', unpublished PhD dissertation, University of California at San Diego, 1980, pp.139-40; P. Hehn, op. cit, p.48; J. Marjanovic, Ustanak, pp.216-18. 28. For details see P. Visnjic, 'Djestva Nemacke ojacane 342 divizije i 125 puka u severnozapadnoj Srbiji ujesen 1941. godine' [The Efforts of the Rein• forced German 342nd Division and 125th Regiment in Northwest Serbia during Autumn 1941], Vojnoistorijski Glasnik, 1972, 23 (1) pp. 120-7. See also J. Marjanovic, Ustanak, pp.249-57; R. Fattig, op. cit, p. 156. 29. R. Fattig, op. cit, pp.147-53; C. Browning, op. cit, p.40. The Germans also wiped out the Jewish population and a large number of gypsies held in camps in Serbia, although they were largely not involved in the rising. Several thousand were executed in October in reprisal for acts committed by the Partisans and Chetniks. In addition the German punitive expeditions took their toll of the local population in their areas of operation, the 342nd Division alone killing probably 2000 people in the first half of October. See C. Browning passim and L. Karchmar, op. cit, pp.226-7, 332-4n. There is quite possibly a bitter irony in the Kraljevo and massacres, for both were responses to losses suffered in areas of joint PartisanChetnik operations, and it is likely that at least some of the Germans died at the hands of Mihailovic's troops. See L. Karchmar, op. cit, p.226 and M. Deroc, op. cit, pp. 175-8. Quoting Hudson, H. Williams, 'The Special Operations Executive and Yugoslavia', 1941- 1945, unpublished Phd dis• sertation University of Southampton 1994, p.207n notes the effect of these massacres upon Mihailovic's attitudes. 30. M. Milazzo, op. cit, p.27; J. Marjanovic, Ustanak, pp.246 8, 265-6, 308-9; B. Karapandzic, op. cit, pp.99-101; ZoomiK torn. 14, book 1, pp.42 3; J. Tomasevic, The Chetniks, pp.138—9. L. Karchmar, op. cit, pp.220 —1 attributes this to British instructions, for which there is litde evidence. The wireless links with Mihailovic were insecure until Hudson provided codes, and it is inconceivable that the British would have sent such important orders en clair. They would also have been unlikely given the completely inadequate information regarding the revolt available to the British at this time. Additionally, from what is known of the instructions sent to Hudson for relaying to Mihailovic in early October, it appears that SOE still wanted him to damp down the revolt. However, this policy did undergo substantial revision in London later in October, as will be seen. 31. This was the stance taken by Mihailovic at his trial (TDM, pp.112—4, 117- 8). Hudson also suggested later that there was an element of truth in this analysis (F0536/31 - Hudson's 'Series B' telegrams, April 1943). With reference to note 30 above, Mihailovic said nothing at his trial to indicate that the British were responsible for his anti-Axis orders. 32. L. Karchmar, op. cit, pp.215-8, 221, 228-31, 234 (J. Marjanovic, Ustanak, pp.205 6 and 310 13 not surprisingly blames the Chetniks for these incidents). 33. See especially J. Marjanovic, Ustanak, pp.268-94; L. Karchmar, op. cit, pp.222-3, 232-3. 34. I. Avakumovic, op. cit, p.25; L. Karchmar, op. cit, pp.233, 336n. Notes and References 231

35. S. Clissold, Whirlwind, pp.62-4 gives the full text of the proposals. 36. The problem with this was that the Partisans were likely to interpret this category broadly; the Chetniks, less so. In particular, many of Pecanac's commanders were deserting to Mihailovic or acting independently. For example, Dragutin Keserovic, a former Pecanac commander, joined Mihailovic and in late September attacked Krusevac, killing 23 Germans - nearly a seventh of the entire fatal casualties inflicted on the German Army in Serbia to the end of 1941. The problem was even more difficult in the case of the gendarmes, who were a favourite target of the Partisans even after they joined Mihailovic, and who reciprocated the feeling. See J. Tomasevic, The Chetniks, p. 145; D. Petrovic, op. cit, p. 196; I. Avakumovic, op. cit, p.58; J. Marjanovic, Ustanak, p.327; L. Karchmar, op. cit, p.324n. 37. Point 6 of the list; see note 35. 38. The best analysis in English of the Brajici talks and their conclusions is given by L. Karchmar, op. cit, pp.238-40 & 339-43n. See also J. Tomasevic, The Chetniks, pp. 147-8, S. Clissold, Whirlwind, pp.64-5; and M. Milazzo, op. cit, p.32. 39. L. Karchmar, op. cit, pp.238-40. 40. J. Tomasevic, The Chetniks, p. 148. 41. M. Milazzo, op. cit, p.32. 42. S. Clissold, op. cit, pp.65-7. 43. D. Hudson, St Antony's discussion, p. 12. It might be mentioned that if Mihailovic had already decided to wipe out the Communists, he failed to take his best opportunity to do so. He could have attacked the leaders at the meeting itself, or if that was too dangerous, might have arranged their disposal while they were returning to Uzice. In fact, the Pozega Chetniks, who had proved themselves strongly opposed to the Partisans ever since cooperation between the two forces began, appear to have planned just such an attack. According to Karchmar, 'Mihailovic was informed of the plot in time, and furiously telephoned Ignjatovic [commander of the Pozega Chetniks] to let Tito proceed unharmed' (L. Karchmar, op. cit, p.242; See also B. Lazic, Tito et la Revolution Yougoslave, (Paris 1957), p.75). 44. FO371/30214 R7294/114/92 - P. Dixon minutes, 26 July and 1 August 1941. 45. A Moscow broadcast of 10 August monitored by the British called on the 'Serbian nation' to 'Disobey orders. Fall on German garrisons and kill soldiers and officers. Destroy railway lines for German transports. Blow up bridges, German munitions and oil. Cut telephone lines. Don't give a single grain of wheat to the Germans. Kill Hitler's agents in Serbia, Artimovich and his helpers. Deal in the same measure that which has been dealt to you: for every fallen Serbian head, let 100 Fascist heads fall. Be true to Serbian traditions and the warlike traditions of your ancestors.' (F0371/30215 R7332/114/92) 46. J. Marjanovic, Ustanak, p. 195. 47. F0898/56 - Report on Serb Research Unit 'Sumadija', 14 August 1941; M. M. Stenton, 'British Propaganda and Political Warfare 1940-44: a Study of British Views on how to Address Occupied Europe', unpublished PhD dissertation, Peterhouse, Cambridge, 1977, p. 175. 'Sumadija' (also known as 'Y2') commenced broadcasting on 7 August 1941. There were two other 232 Notes and References

Yugoslav 'research units', one for the Croats ('Zrinski' or 'Yl') and one for the Slovenes ('Triglav' or 'Y3'). The Croat station began operations on 31 May 1941, and the Slovene station on 23 August 1941. See F0898/56 - Report by R. A. Leeper, 'Evidence of R. U. Reception', 1 January 1943. Towards the end of August Simovic also requested that the BBC broadcast instructions to Yugoslavia to 'wait until the nightingale sings on the pyramids', a cryptic message which probably referred to orders for an uprising which would be broadcast by the Yugoslav High Command in Cairo (F0371/30215 R7882/114/92; J. Marjanovic, Draza Mihailovic, p.89; E. Barker, British Policy in South-East Europe, p. 157). 48. FO371/30215 R7887/114/92 - P. Dixon minute, 22 August 1941 and Foreign Office propaganda directive, 4 September 1941. 49. Cited in J. Marjanovic, Draza Mihailovic, p. 102. 50. FO371/30220 R9010/162/92 - Yugoslav government aide memoire, undated. 51. Ibid. This information was based on the reports of two industrialists who came to Turkey in September to negotiate cotton and hemp contracts (J. Djonovic, op. cit, p.45). 52. M. Wheeler, op. cit, p.91. 53. J. Marjanovic, Ustanak, p.248. The compliments directed at the Partisans lend weight to the idea that at the start of October Mihailovic still regarded them as genuinely anti-Axis, although severely or even fatally misguided over strategy. Unless Ilic sent his instructions via a courier (which would at best take some time, and at worst never arrive; which therefore makes it very unlikely), the message must have gone via Malta, using the British wireless link with Mihailovic. This means that the instructions must have had SOE's approval. 54. FO371/30220 R9174/162/92 - H. Ismay to A. Cadogan, 14 October 1941 (received 17 October), enclosing Yugoslav government aide memoire P.V.K. 255 dated 11 October and telegrams dated 6/7, 7, 9 and 10 October 1941. 55. On the sources of this information see J. Marjanovic, Draza Mihailovic, p. 107 and J. Djonovic, op. cit, p.46. 56. FO371/30220 R9010/162/92 - O. Sargent minute, 6 October, Letter O. Sargent to G. Jebb, 10 October; R9244/162/92 - O. Sargent minute, 14 October; R9280/162/92 - A. Cadogan minute, 15 October 1941. 57. CAB79/15 - GOS(41) 353. 58. CAB79/15 - COS(41) 354, 'The Rebellion in Yugoslavia'. Jebb's paper was forwarded to the Foreign Office and can be found in F0371/30220 R9280/162/92. 59. CAB79/15 - COS(41) 354. 60. Ibid. 61. WO 165/53 - telegram Chiefs of Staff to Commanders in Chief Middle East, WO 95880, COS 182, 15 October 1941. 62. PREM3/510/4 - letter Simovic to Churchill PVK 260, 20 October 1941. Simovic asked for the delivery to Yugoslavia of 120 light machine guns, 300 Bren guns, 72 trench mortars, up to 100000 hand grenades and medical supplies. He ennumerated the guerrilla forces at between 80000 and 100000 men. Notes and References 233

63. WO 165/53; F0371/30220 R9436/162/92 - telegram Chiefs of Staff to Commanders-in-Chief Middle East, WO 97189, COS 186, 22 October 1941. 64. WO 165/53; F0371/30220 R9436/162/92 - telegram Commanders-in- Chief Middle East to Chiefs of Staff, O/17614, 23 October 1941. 65. F0371/30220 R9436/162/92 - P. Dixon minute, 24 . Both Sargent and Eden expressed their agreement (ibid, O. Sargent and A. Eden minutes, 26 and 27 October 1942 respectively). Among the reports received by the Foreign Office at this time was a telegram from the British Embassy in Berne stating that there were now '50 000 fully armed Yugoslav guerillas with motor transport and two tanks' and that in Montenegro the Italians held only the coast and the capital. See F0371/30220 R9317/162/92 - tel. Mr Kelly, Berne to Foreign Office, no.2345, 21 October 1941. Another message, this time from the Military Attache in Ankara, noted that the Italians had evacuated Montenegro and that the Germans were carrying out bombing missions in Bosnia. See F0371/30220 R9317/162/92 - tel. Military Attache, Ankara to War Office, 15 October 1941 (received in FO 20 October). P. Dixon minuted (23 October): 'It is becoming increasingly apparent that it is worth our while to make unusual efforts to support this revolt, even though it may be premature and may not fit in with our other strategical plans.' 66. W Churchill, The Grand Alliance, pp.339-45, 405-6, 409, 41113. 67. J. Erickson, The Road to Stalingrad (London, 1977) pp.219-22. 68. F0371/30220 R9381/162/92 - despatch no.292, A. Eden to S. Cripps (British Ambassador to the Soviet Union), 22 October 1941. 69. F0371/30220 R9505/162/92 - SOE briefing paper, 28 October 1941. SOE's objections were apparently based on a dubious claim to be liaising already on the matter with its Soviet counterpart, the OGPU (actually, NKVD). As noted, the 'Russian Project' was dead by the end of September. 70. FO371/30220 R9381/162/92 - SOE memoranda, 27 October 1941. 71. FO371/30220 R9505/162/92 - despatch, no.304, A. Eden to S. Cripps, 29 October 1941. Maisky specifically requested that 1000 raincoats, 30000 tins of food, 300 heavy machine guns, 6700 Bren guns, 25 000 hand grenades, 5- 10 000 grenades with timing devices, 100 mountain guns and 10 tons of dynamite be delivered to the guerrillas (P. Dixon minute, 29 October 1941). 72. CAB65/19 - WM(41) 107. 73. FO371/30220 R9489/162/92 - Foreign Office Memorandum, DO(41) 24, 31 October 1941. The idea that British officers be sent to join the insurgents appears to have originated in a minute by P. Dixon on 24 October (F0371/ 30220 R9436/162/92). Quite rightly, Stenton observes (op. cit, p. 176) that Eden was being more than a little unrealistic in terms of the practicalities of maintaining the revolt; as he suggests, Eden 'probably had in mind the Arabian Revolt of the First World War and forgot that the Adriatic was not dominated by the as the Red Sea had been.' 74. FO371/30220 R9584/162/92 - P. Dixon minute, 29 October 1941. Dixon was referring to a message broadcast by Simovic over the BBC on 28 October which called on Mihailovic to avoid 'hasty action' and await orders before launching a revolt. An English version of the text is quoted by J. Tomasevic, The Chetniks, p. 163. V Kljakovic, 'Velika Britaniya, Sovyetski Notes and References

Savez i ustanak u Jugoslaviji 1941 godine' [Great Britain, the Soviet Union and the Yugoslav uprising of 1941], Vojnoistorijski Glasnik, vol xxi, May- August 1970, p.74 states that Mihailovic was first advised to avoid 'useless sacrifices' in a telegram from Simovic on 18 October. See also J. Marjanovic, Ustanak, p.305 and R. L. Knezevic, Jugoslovenska vlada i Draza Mihailovic' [The Yugoslav Government and Draza Mihailovic], Poruka no.10, 1 February 1953, p.l 1; M. Wheeler, op. cit, p.276n. On 1 November, at Dixon's suggestion, Eden sent a letter to Simovic in which he expressed his concern that the two men should 'maintain close touch... in order to ensure the completest possible coordination of policy between our two governments' (F0371/30220 R9584/162/92). FO371/30215 R8741/114/92 - PWE Directive for all propaganda media on Yugoslavia for the week 5-12 October 1941. The directive for the week 12-19 October stated that propaganda should 'ALWAYS end with or include a sentence indicating that the effective value of Yugoslav resistance lies in the future not the present' (Capitals in the original), and warned that all news should be phrased 'to avoid suggesting that we are inciting them to fight.' The directive for the week 26 October to 2 November noted that it was essential that all bulletins should include news of the resistance of the 'Cetnici', and that although admiration was permissible, it was still necessary to 'avoid any element of incitement'. It might be pointed out that the Yugoslav government had a tendency to make large scale requests for equipment completely disproportionate to the strength of its forces, something which the Foreign Office would have done well to bear in mind when assessing the Yugoslav demands for assistance to the guerrillas. For example, on 2 August General Simovic presented to Churchill a list of material to be purchased for Yugoslav forces by March 1942. This included 400 tanks, 36 anti-tank guns, 200 bombers, 100 fighters, 50 other aircraft, 30 armoured cars, over 1000 trucks, 270 motor• cycles, 194 other vehicles, 1 , 3 and 3 motor torpedo boats. This was at a time when the total strength of Yugoslav forces was well under 1000 men. PREM3/510/2 - letter Gen. D. Simovic to W. Churchill, 2 August 1941. For example, in a conversation between Dr. Nincic and the British Minister to the Yugoslav Government, George Rendel, the Yugoslav Foreign Minister stated that 'the whole movement was premature and that, admirable as it no doubt was, it was not likely to serve any useful purpose.' FO536/4/3006 - letter G. Rendel to A. Eden no.12, 17 October 1941. In 1943 George Rendel noted that the Foreign Office, worried by the apparently 'lukewarm' support shown by the Yugoslav government towards Mihailovic, had instructed him on 3 November 1941 'to seek an immediate interview with General Simovic to explain the attitude of H.M.G. [sic]'. Rendel was told to 'make sure that Simovic gave all the possible support to Mihailovic by broadcasts etc. [sic] My instructions were to play up General Mihailovic's movement and to encourage the Yugoslavs to do the same'. See F0536/7/3614 - letter G. Rendel to O. Sargent F0183, 9 March 1943. Specifically, the military intended dropping 30 light machine guns, 20 sub machine guns, 90 automatic pistols, ammunitions, 1000 field dressings and £10,000 in gold. See FO371/30220 R9520/162/92 - telegram Com- Notes and References 235

manders-in-Chief Middle East to Chiefs of Staff GR/20605, 31 October 1941. 80. Ibid. P. Dixon minute, 1 November 1941. 81. F0371/30220 R9547/162/92 - unnumbered telegram, received 29 October and forwarded to Foreign Office by Simovic, 31 October 1941. See also WO202/128 for a slightly different translation. Tel. unnumbered, undated, received London 29 October 1941. 82. F0371/30220 R9506/162/92 P. Dixon minute, 3 November 1941. See also Chapter 3 for Kennedy's attitude in August. 83. Ibid. - O. Sargent and A. Cadogan minutes, both 3 November 1941. 84. CAB69/3 - DO(41) 24 and DO(41) 26. 85. CAB79/55 - COS(41) 35(0); FO371/30220 R9652/162/92. 86. F0371/30220 R9584/162/92 P. Dixon minute, 7 November 1941, A. Eden minute, 8 November 1941; R9652/162/92 P. Dixon minute, 7 November 1941. 87. F0371/30220 R9715/162/92 - telegram Chiefs of Staff to Commanders- in-Chief Middle East WO 55580, COS 197, dated 7 November 1941. 88. On the outbreak of civil war see L. Karchmar, op. cit, pp.243 51, 344—48n; J. Marjanovic, Ustanak, pp.333-9; J. Tomasevic, The Chetniks, p. 149; TDM, pp.119-29,409-10,423-8;F0371/33465R1144/178/92&R1375/178/92. 89. L. Karchmar, op. cit, p.243 implies that the decision to attack the Partisans was made by Vasic (the political head and, at that time, Mihailovic's second in command) in collaboration with a number of the most anti-Communist Chetnik leaders. Further evidence for this claim appears to exist in the form of the original operational orders for the attack found in ZDorn^ torn. 14, book 1, pp.44-57. All of these are signed by Vucko Ignjatovic, commander of the rabidly anti-Partisan Pozega Chetnik detachment (see n.43), rather than by Mihailovic himself. See also S. Clissold, Whirlwind, pp.70-2. J. Tomasevic, The Chetniks, p. 149 claims that Mihailovic issued the order for the operation on 31 October. M. Milazzo,op. cit, p.37 merely states that 'the officers' decided to attack the Partisans. On 31 October Mihailovic was not at his headquarters, which makes Tomasevic's allegation doubtful. For their part the Chetniks have habitually pointed to a Partisan attack on a mine at Zajaca after the Brajici conference as the outbreak of civil war. See L. Karchmar, op. cit, p..242; F0371/59468 R4824/170/92 (letter from 'C.P.' to Manchester Guardian, 3 March 1946); WO204/8109 - The Cetniks. A Survey of Cetnik activity in Yugoslavia April 1941 ~ July 1944 (published Sep• tember 1944) p. 10. In view of the fundamental differences in strategy between the Partisans and Chetniks, the inability of both commanders to control their extremist supporters, and the consequently steady escalation in numbers and seriousness of the incidents which occurred, the two movements would undoubtedly have come to serious blows eventually. The fact that the civil war broke out at the start of November, rather than a few weeks or months later, was as much the fault of the Germans, who by their successful counteroffensive and atrocities created pressures which the alliance could not withstand. Grand conspiracy theories (from either side) unfortunately have a tendency to reflect nothing but the prejudices of those proposing them. Karchmar's observation that 'almost casually, disaster came to Jugoslavia' is persuasive. Notes and References

Hudson later recounted that at Valjevo 'I saw the engagement of Cetnik tanks, I saw the wounded coming up - all Cetniks... Now there was no doubt that Mihailovic was fighting. I think it seriously compromises the work of a serious historian who comes out with a statement that Mihailovic did not, on any occasion, fight the enemy'. D. Hudson, St Antony's discussion, p.l 1; L. Karchmar, op. cit, pp.240-1, 245; S. K. Pavlowitch, 'D. T. Hudson', p.264, 270, 272. Meanwhile, the Chetniks launched their last major assault on the Germans at Kraljevo on 28 October, suffering heavy losses in the process. Even so, as late as 1 November two Hotchkiss tanks, escorted by 50 Chetniks, succeeded in breaking into the centre of the town before being forced to withdraw (J. Marjanovic, Ustanak, p.266). See also I. Avakumovic, Mihailovic prema Nemackim dokumentima [Mihailovic in the Light of German documents] (London, 1969) p.22; B. Karapandzic, op. cit, p. 100. L. Karchmar, op. cit, p.250, 347n, 350n. On 9 November, Mihailovic informed Jezdimir Dangic, Chetnik commander in east Bosnia, that the Partisan attack 'has the aim of preventing the arrival of aid from the English, which has to come via Pozega' (Zbornik, tom. 14, book 1, p.72). Pozega had been mentioned several times in the early telegrams sent by the Chetniks over their insecure wireless link as suitable for British aircraft to land on. See, for example, F0371/30220 R9174/162/92. On 27 October Hudson himself signalled that Pozega was safe for aircraft to use (WO202/128 - tel. no.118, 27 October 1941). D. Hudson, St Antony's discussion, p. 18. L. Karchmar, op. cit, pp.255-6, 477-8; V Kljakovic, op. cit, p.82; M. Milazzo, op. cit, p.37, 64-5. ZDorn^K torn. 14, book 1, pp.72~5 gives the text of Mihailovic's appeal to Dangic, 9 November 1941. L. Karchmar, op. cit, pp.256-8 suggests that the principal architect of the approach to the Germans was one of Mihailovic's officers, Colonel Branislav Pantic, who had close links with German intelligence circles in Belgrade. He implies that the final decision to seek ammunition from the enemy was taken about 6 November. M. Deroc, op. cit, p. 187 claims that Mihailovic made his decision only at the almost unanimous request of his subordinates, and that Pantic's own account of the incident is 'totally unreliable'. Published documents state that Mihailovic authorised the approach to the Germans by 28 October, and guaranteed at this time to eliminate the Communists in Serbia. However, it is difficult to be certain how much these initial contacts represented Mihailovic's own thoughts and how much they represented Pantic's desire to 'sell' Mihailovic to the Germans (J. Marjanovic (Ed.), The Collaboration ofD. Mihailovic's Chetniks with the Enemy Forces of Occupation 1941— 1944 [henceforward, The Collaboration] (Belgrade, 1976), p. 14). On the prologue to the Divci meeting see the documents given in Z^orn^ tom- 14, book 1, pp.857-70 and J. Marjanovic, The Collaboration, pp. 13-20. See also L. Karchmar op. cit, pp.256-8, 351-2n; M. Deroc, op. cit, pp. 189-90; M. Milazzo, op. cit, p.37; J. Tomasevic, The Chetniks, pp. 148-9; J. Mar• janovic, Draza Mihailovic, pp. 136-4. The Partisan historian Kljakovic quotes Mihailovic as saying before the meeting; 'I have decided to sacrifice myself for the common good and to try to secure the means for the struggle against the Communists and in this way end the [German] punitive expeditions'. See V Kljakovic, op. cit, p.83. Notes and References 237

95. The aeroplane dropped 20 machine guns, 10 000 rounds of ammunition, 600 hand grenades, $4556 and £181 (F0371/33455 R3139/151/92). This was material originally intended for despatch to Radovce on 3-4 November, but when wireless contact with Montenegro was lost the loads were trans• ferred for dropping in western Serbia. See F0371/30220 R9687/162/92. 96. German documents show that Mihailovic was meant to meet the Germans on 9 November. On 10 November the BBC broadcast news that Mihailovic had refused to capitulate to the Germans in negotiations 'yesterday'. On the same day the London Times carried a similar story. This means that Mihailovic had sent a signal in order to pre-empt any revelations which might later emerge to the effect that he had met the enemy. That the arrival of British arms on the night of 9 November did not change his mind is shown by the fact that he kept his appointment with the Germans on 11th November. See M. Deroc, op. cit, p. 192; L. Karchmar, op. cit, p.259; J. Marjanovic, Draza Mihailovic, p. 164. 97. The Germans gave the example of a Chetnik tank attack on Kraljevo on 1 November (see note 90). On 3 November Harold Turner (German state councillor in Serbia) reported that Mihailovic's detachments had been 'responsible for a series of severe clashes in western Serbia and for the heavy losses of the German armed forces' in that area (Zbornik, tom. 14, book 1, p.866). 98. The minutes of the Divci meeting are quoted by J. Marjanovic, The Colla• boration, pp.20-7 and Zbornik, tom. 14, book 1, pp.871-8. See also M. Deroc, op. cit, pp.187-93; L. Karchmar, op. cit, pp.258-9, & 352-4n; J. Mar• janovic, Draza Mihailovic, pp. 153-62; J. Marjanovic, Ustanak, pp.353-5; F0371/59403 R5264/58/92 - Interrogation report of Obit. Par, CSDIC/CMF/SDI03, 28 February 1946. 99. Although the documentary evidence is fragmentary, reflecting the sub• stantial destruction of SOE's Cairo archives in mid-1942, that a number of telegrams passed between Captain Hudson and SOE's Middle East headquarters at this time is made clear by material contained in the Yugoslav Historical Report (CAB101/126). Deakin's account in The Embattled Mountain, pp. 139-41 is evidently based largely on this source. The unacknowledged author of the Historical Report appears to have been one Miss D. J. Dawson of the Historical Branch of the Cabinet Office. 100. WO202/128 - tel. no.118, 27 October 1941; J. Marjanovic, Draza Mihailovic, p. 172. 101. CAB101/126, p.5 A. This telegram arrived in London on 9 November (ibid.). 102. M. Wheeler, op. cit, pp. 108-9; V Kljakovic, op. cit, p.82; F0371/33469 R5798/178/92 - Royal Yugoslav Government aide memoire, 19 August 1942; J. Marjanovic, Draza Mihailovic, pp. 173-4. The reference to the Partisans' failure to give arms from the Uzice factory to the Chetniks relates to an agreement made at the Brajici conference, whereby the Partisans apparently promised to share the rifles produced there with Mihailovic's troops. See L. Karchmar, op. cit, p.343n for details. 103. WO202/128 - tel. unnumbered, undated, r. London 758, 7 November 1941. According to Kljakovic, in another telegram on 7 November, 238 Notes and References

Mihailovic stated that aid must arrive 'now or never'; there is no trace of this telegram in the WO202/128 file. See V Kljakovic, op. cit, p.82. 104. This is the explanation given by an escaped Australian prisoner of war, Ronald Houghton Jones, who was on Ravna Gora at this time. See C. Lawrence, Irregular Adventure (London 1947) p.228. 105. F0536/31 Hudson's 'Series B' telegrams, April 1943. Hudson's own version therefore seems to suggest that stopping the supply sorties was more of an attempt to restore his own freedom of communication than a method of rendering the Chetniks incapable of suppressing the Partisans. The effect from Mihailovic's point of view, however, was likely to be the same in both cases. 106. Ibid. 107. A telegram of 13 November from the Commanders-in-Chief Middle East, while noting the outbreak of civil war, specifically stated that 'Operations will be continued as arranged subject to weather conditions' (WO 165/53 - tel. Commanders-in-Chief Middle East to War Office, GR/25600, 12/13 November 1941). 108. C. Lawrence, op. cit, p.228. Again, this is Jones' account. According to the latter, Mihailovic's anger was exacerbated by Hudson only informing him of his action after the Chetniks had spent an entire night at the drop zone in freezing conditions waiting for arms to arrive. 109. Slightly different wordings of this telegram can be found in WO202/128 no.23, dated 10 November, r. London 1161, 11 November 1941; F. Deakin, Embattled Mountain, pp. 139-40; F0371/30220 R9873/162/92. 110. FO371/30220 R9872/162/92; W0165/53 - tel. Commanders-in-Chief Middle East to War Office, GR/25660, 13 November 1941. The Middle East's comment that lack of resources and weather conditions rendered large-scale support to the insurgents impracticable also bore out the fears expressed by the Foreign Office over the Chiefs of Staff telegram despatched a week beforehand. 111. F0371/30220 R9873/162/92 Gen. D. Simovic to A. Eden, 13 November 1941. See also J. Marjanovic, Ustanak, pp.358-9. F. Deakin, Embattled Mountain, pp.139 40 gives a different text, which states that '... Cetnik leaders are talking openly that they would rather come to terms with the Germans than the Communists'. 'Come to terms' is a rather ambiguous phrase, although in the context of this sentence Simovic's use of the term 'collaborate' in his message to Eden is probably accurate. The fragmentary records appertaining to this period make it difficult to discover the source of Simovic's additional information. One possibility is that it was included in a telegram received from Mihailovic on 9 November, in which the latter begged the Yugoslav Prime Minister to ensure that broadcasts from London and Moscow stressed the need for a united command to direct the resistance, and in which Mihailovic stated that he would do all he could to remove misunderstandings with the Communists (although this telegram is absent from the WO202/128 file, reference is made to it in a Yugoslav government aide memoire dated 19 August 1942 and received in the Foreign Office 2 September 1942 - see F0371/33469 R5798/178/92. J. Mar• janovic, Ustanak, p.356 also seems to accept its existence as legitimate). M. Wheeler, op. cit, p. 107, 278-9n suggests that the paragraph which I refer to as SOE's or Simovic's comments was also part of Mihailovic's telegram of 10 Notes and References 239

November. This seems unlikely, in that the version given by Deakin clearly has a quotation mark after '... Cacak, Pozega and Uzice', which indicates that the rest of the message did not form part of the original telegram. Second, as Wheeler admits, only the first paragraph exists in the WO202/ 128 file. Third, the wording of the second part is in a different part of speech to that used in the actual telegram. Fourth, at least a part of the contents (that relating to Hudson's opinion and the leaders of the revolt in Mon• tenegro) are not what one might expect from Mihailovic at this time, and even contradict his own telegram. The most likely explanation is that 'Simovic's comments' are in fact SOE's, This seems probable, given that the British controlled the wireless link with Mihailovic, and were responsible for relaying his telegrams to the Yugoslav government. It would be natural for SOE to add their view of the situation when passing on these messages. See also J. Tomasevic, The Chetniks, p.283, and, in particular, a letter from Lord Glenconner to Brig. D. Brooks of 13 November (in F0898/157) which confirm this view. Simovic's request was no doubt also influenced by Mihailovic's telegram of 9 November (See note 111). Throughout October and early November the Yugoslavs had been pressing their case with the Soviet government; for example, at a meeting with Maisky on 28 October. See J. Marjanovic, Ustanak, p.305, 355-7 for details. F0371/30220 R9874/162/92 Lord Glenconner (SOE) to P. Dixon (Foreign Office), 15 November 1941. Glenconner used a very similar argument in a letter to Brigadier Brooks, Deputy Director-General of the Political Warfare Executive two days beforehand (F0898/157 Glenconner to D. Brooks, 13 November 1941). FO371/30220 R9797/162/92 - despatch from R. Campbell, Lisbon, to Foreign Office, no.425 Saving, dated 1 November, received 12 November 1941. Both this message and an almost identical one from P. Garran (former Third Secretary in the British legation in Belgrade) were received in London at about the same time as Simovic made his approach to Eden, that is 13 November. See also F0371/30294 R9811/4906/92; FO536/4/3028; M. Wheeler, op. cit, pp. 102-3. Letter P. Garran, British Embassy, Lisbon to P. Dixon, 3 November 1941 (received in Foreign Office 13 November 1941). The Bajloni family left Belgrade on 10 October. Their information (which J. Marjanovic, Ustanak, p. 185 claims covered the period up to 1 October) was therefore a month out of date when it reached London. Given that the report supposedly originated with Mihailovic, it was not particularly accurate. It might be conjectured that as the information was for external consumption and the Royal Yugoslav Government in particular, it deliberately understated the Chetnik action in Serbia in order to avoid conflicting with the Yugoslav government's instructions relayed by Rakic and over the BBC. Gordana Bajloni apparentiy brought ciphers from Mihailovic which were identical to those brought by Rankin in July; unsuccessful attempts were made to use these to establish connections with Mihailovic (F0371/59415 Rl 1221/58/ 92 - Simovic's evidence at Mihailovic's trial; see also Chapter 3, note 82). See note 55. Both the Serb Orthodox Church report (24 pages) and the report on conditions in Yugoslavia between April and September 1941 (45 pages) can be found in their original Serbo-Croat text in F0371/30221 240 Notes and References

R10232/162/92. They were handed to Eden by Simovic on 28 November 1941. 116. FO371/30221 R10232/162/92 - Sekulic report, pp.43-4. See also J. Tomasevic, The Chetniks, pp. 136-7; M. Wheeler, op. cit, pp. 103-5; M. Milazzo, op. cit, p. 17. 117. Ibid. It might be mentioned that apart from the information on the aims and activities of the Chetniks and Partisans, much of the report dealt with matters of peripheral interest to the British policy-makers, such as the role of the Russian minority and the currency system imposed by the Germans. 118. FO371/30220 R9797/162/92 - P. Dixon minute, 13 November 1941. 119. There is no copy of this telegram in the WO202/128 file. A reference to it was made in a letter from Cadogan to Simovic of 18 November 1941, although Cadogan dated it 9 November (F0371/30220 R9874/162/92). Such a message would obviously be substantially at odds with the telegram referred to in note 111. It seems reasonable to suggest that it was dated 12, not 9 November. This would tally with a reference made by M. Wheeler, op. cit, p. 109 to a signal of 12 November in which Mihailovic stated that he would 'be able to liquidate the communists immediately' on receiving the arms requested. It would also make sense in light of his failure to get ammunition from the Germans at Divci. In either case there is unfortu• nately no evidence whether SOE knew of such a telegram before 15 November, although in his letter to Brooks on 13 November Glenconner did say that 'We... believe that the only practical course is to continue to support that side which is most likely to achieve undisputed leadership, with our help'. (F0898/157 - Letter Glenconner to D. Brooks, 13 November 1941). 120. See WO208/2006. The first summary provided for SOE by MI3b was dated 6 November, NO/INT/181/41. Further summaries were dated 7, 9, 10, 11 and 13 November. The information contained in them was usually several days old. The circulation of these summaries varied from day to day, and SOE appear to have ceased to receive them after 17 November (although it was shown a situation map based on this source on 21 November). The information was also relayed to Sir John Shearer, Deputy Director of Intelligence in the Middle East in a series of telegrams from 7 November onwards. According to a telegram from Shearer to the Director of Military Intelligence in Britain, the former passed on the gist of this intelligence to SOE's Cairo office without revealing the source. See WO208/2006 - telegram Shearer to DMI, 1/28833, 20 November 1941. 121. WO208/2006 - MI3b Summary no.8, 17 November 1941. A summary of 18 November referred to 'Government irregulars... cooperating with the Serb (Nedic) gendarmerie in fighting the communists'. M. Wheeler, op. cit, p. 109 assumes this refers to Mihailovic's Chetniks. It is much more likely to be a reference to Pecanac's Chetniks, as Mihailovic's forces were still being called 'insurgents'. The first unit to desert Mihailovic for Nedic did not apparently do so until 12 November; it should hardly be surprising that it was Vucko Ignjatovic's Pozega Chetnik detachment, the vehemently anti- Partisan group who had been deeply involved in the attack on Uzice and who Mihailovic had to prevent from murdering Tito on the latter's return from the Brajici conference. See L. Karchmar, op. cit, p.260. See also E. Notes and References 241

Barker's review of M. Wheeler's book in South Slav Journal vol. 3 no.4, December 1980, pp.44-5. 122. F0371/30220 R9874/162/92 - P. Dixon minute, 15 November 1941. 123. M. Wheeler, op. cit, p.l 11. A. Cadogan, Diaries, p.413, entry for Saturday 15 November. 124. F0371/30220 R9874/162/92 - letter D. Howard to Col. L. C. Hollis, 16 November 1941. 125. Ibid. - telegram Foreign Office to S. Cripps, Kuibyshev, no. 155, 16 November 1941. 126. WO 165/53 - telegram War Office to Commanders-in- Chief Middle East, no.52477, 18 November 1941. The War Office recognised that 'so long as virtual civil war between Communists and Mihailovists [sic] continues the difficulties of sending supplies are enormously increased'; another cheery note likely to deter the military from sending aid to the Yugoslavs. 127. F. Deakin, Embattled Mountain, p. 139. 128. CAB101/126, p.6 citing SOE archives file (A.D./S.I.) SC/34/9. 129. WO202/128 - tel. unnumbered, undated, r. London OPUS 2173, 19 November 1941. This was also confirmed by Mihailovic at his trial. See TDM, p. 124. 130. F0371/30220 R9874/162/92 - letter A. Cadogan to Gen. D. Simovic, 18 November 1941. 131. FO371/30221 R10016/162/92; FO536/4/3006 - letter D. Howard (Foreign Office) to G. Rendel, 22 November 1941. According to Kljakovic, this telegram was despatched to Mihailovic on 19 November (V. Kljakovic, op. cit, p.91). 132. F0371/30220 R9874/162/92 - text of Simovic's speech of 15 November. See also R. Knezevic, Jugoslovenska vlada i Draza Mihailovic', Poruka no. 10 (1 February 1953) p. 11 andj. Marjanovic, Ustanak, p.360. It ought to be recognised that Simovic's speech was by no means counselling complete inaction. As he stated, 'We have repeatedly said that the moment for the decisive blow has not yet come. We want to preserve this precious blood, but no advice can help men that are fighting in self-defence... We can no longer therefore give only advice, but do our utmost that these defenders of our fatherland and our name, do not remain alone without assistance in an unequal struggle which they were forced into by the enemy... Wherever the occupation authorities, either directly or through their , attempt to annihilate the people, they cannot help defending themselves, regardless as to whether the circumstances for a final settlement of accounts with the enemy are favourable or not. The government consider it their duty, and will continue to do so, to render all possible assistance to its people.' (My italics) On 19 November Mihailovic reported that Simovic's speech (which was apparently repeated on 16 and 17 November) had made a 'deep impression on the nation' (WO202/128 - tel. OPUS 2173, 19 November 1941). See also J. Marjanovic, Ustanak, p.362. 133. FO536/4/3006 - letter G. Rendel to O. Sargent, 3 November 1941; M. Stenton, op. cit, p. 177. 134. F0898/158 - letter A. Eden to M. Nincic, 13 November 1941. See F0898/12 for identical texts sent to Polish, Norwegian, Dutch and other governments. Not one of the exile governments considered it suitable to 242 Notes and References

encourage active resistance (see D. Stafford, Britain and European Resistance, (London, 1983) p.35). 135. E. Barker, 'British Decision-Making over Yugoslavia', British Policy, p.30. 136. FO371/30221 R10092/162/92 - Brig. G. Mallaby (Director of Operations, M05, War Office) to D. Howard, 22 November 1941. 137. FO371/30221 R10096/162/92; FO536/4/3006 - letter G. Rendel to D. Howard, 25 November 1941. 138. F0371/30221 Rl0336/162/92 letter G.Jebb to D. Howard, 2 December 1941. See also remarks on Jebb's letter in the Times Literary Supplement by M. Wheeler (28 April 1972) and R. West (5 May 1972). 139. F0371/30221 R10009/162/92 - telegram S. Cripps to Foreign Office, no. 132, 19 November 1941 (received 21 November); S. Clissold, Documents, pp. 133-4. 140. L. Karchmar, op. cit, p.261, 264 attributes this to (a) the arrival of ammu• nition from a pro-Chetnik officer in Nedic's forces; (b) the desertion of the more mercenary Chetnik elements and those with the lowest morale, leaving only a hard core who were determined to resist to the end. 141. F0371/30215 R9152/114/92 - Propaganda directives for November. Although the directive for the week 14-21 November stated that Mihailovic should be mentioned as 'the leader of the Yugoslav Patriot Forces', instructions that he should not yet be constantly mentioned as the 'big personality' demonstrated that a degree of caution was still being observed. In the directive for the week 21-28 November, however, all such 'details' were cast aside, and the primary aim became to rally the 'four or five different groups [Sic] resisting in Serbia' under Mihailovic's command. See also J. Marjanovic, Ustanak, pp.362-3. 142. As M. Wheeler, op. cit, p.l 14 and L. Karchmar, op. cit, pp.262 71, 356- 9n. point out, the conventional Partisan version, that Tito responded mag• nanimously to Chetnik pleas for mercy and a need to avoid causing 'diffi• culties in the foreign relations of the Soviet Union', is unconvincing (V. Kljakovic, op. cit, p.92; J. Marjanovic, Ustanak, pp.368-9, 371). Soviet propaganda only began appealing for unity between the resistance elements on 23/24 November, not 16/17 November, which is logical given that Bogie and Cripps did not approach the Russians until 17/18 November. Tito's protest on 25 November against Moscow's lauding of Mihailovic claimed that 'It was only on account of London that we refrained from completely liquidating Draza Mihailovic'. In view of his difficulties in destroying the Chetniks this is a somewhat disingenuous statement; however, it contained a strong element of truth in that British propaganda by this time was (as noted above) strongly promoting Mihailovic as leader of all Yugoslav resistance. For Tito's protest, see S. Clissold, Documents, p. 132. 143. J. Marjanovic, Ustanak, pp.370 1. 144. The terms are given in L. Karchmar, op. cit, p.358n. See also WO204/ 8109 - 77a? Cetniks, p. 10. 145. WO202/128 - tel. unnumbered, dated 22 November, Villa Resta 1598, 22 November 1941. 146. FO371/30221 R10199/162/92 letter Gen. D. Simovic to A. Eden, 26 November 1941. 147. Ibid, letter H. Dalton to A. Eden, 26 November 1941. Notes and References 243

148. Ibid, P. Dixon minute, 26 November 1941. Dixon considered that the one message received from Mihailovic claiming that the civil war had been ended might not be enough to convince the service departments and Commanders-in-Chief Middle East to despatch material aid to him. He minuted: 'What seems essential is that the Partisans should be made to realise that Mihailovic is the man who is receiving support from H. M. Government [sic], the Yugoslav Government and the Soviet Government; and that is, I think, the real argument in favour of sending supplies during the present moon period. We must in fact do everything possible to increase Mihailovic's prestige as the best means of encouraging other elements to rally to him.' 149. Ibid. - telegram Foreign Office to S. Cripps no.233, 26 November 1941. 150. CAB65/20 - WM(41) 120. 151. CAB80/32 - COS(41) 705. 152. FO371/30221 R10199/162/92 letter A. Eden to D. Simovic, 28 November 1941. 153. CAB80/32 COS(41) 390. The British offensive in North Africa (Operation Crusader) began on 18 November. By the end of the month, when Eden made his requests for assistance to Mihailovic, a fierce struggle was being waged around . As M. Wheeler, op. cit, p.28In. points out, the 'Ultra' intelligence available to the Chiefs (but, apparentiy, no longer to SOE) may also have influenced their position. A summary prepared on 18 November had reported that although some resistance, 'chiefly in the form of "Communist" disorders and sabotage', continued in Serbia, the focus of the revolt had shifted to Bosnia. The summaries of 21, 25 and 27 November tended to support this conclusion. See WO208/2006, MI3b summaries 9 14. 154. PREM3/510/12 note A. Eden to W. Churchill, 28 November 1941. 155. Ibid, Prime Minister's Minute D303/1 to Gen. H. Ismay, for COS Com- / mittee, 28 November 1941. 156. CAB79/16; FO371/30221 R10219/162/92 COS(41) 402. 157. PREM3/510/1; CAB 120/734 memorandum, A. Eden to W. Churchill, unnumbered, 7 December 1941; FO371/30221 R10404/162/92 Minute by P. Dixon, 1 December 1941. 158. F0536/31 - Hudson's 'Series B' telegrams, April 1943; F. Deakin, Embattled Mountain, pp.141, 145. According to S. K. Pavlowitch, 'D. T. Hudson', p.265, Hudson was anxious not only to try to mediate between the parties, but also to gain access to the power supply in Uzice, which he needed to operate his radio (which Dragicevic, out of 'pro-Partisan sympathies', was apparently sabotaging). Perhaps not surprisingly, the attitude of the Par• tisans towards Hudson by this stage was one of little trust. His congratu• lations to the Partisans for the ending of the civil war must have rung hollow after the chronological coincidence of his arrival on Ravna Gora, the outbreak of civil war and British propaganda and material support to Mihailovic. See M. Wheeler, op. cit, p.l 17, F. Deakin, Embattled Mountain, pp. 140-1; M. Djilas, Wartime, p.97, 112; V. Kljakovic, op. cit, pp.81 2. 159. F0536/31 - Hudson's 'Series B' telegrams, April 1943; F. Deakin, Embattled Mountain, pp. 141-3. On 21 November Hudson reported: 'My attitude to Mihailovic has been that he has all qualifications except strength. At present 244 Notes and References

the Partisans are stronger and he must first liquidate them with British arms before turning seriously to the Germans. He told me today that lack of ammunition will force him to retire from Ravna Gora if Partisans continue to fight him. I attended a Cetnik-Partisan conference, and conveyed your attitude [presumably, that expressed in the telegram sent to Hudson on 16 November]. The Partisans insist they keep their identity under any joint arrangement with the Cetniks... They suspect Mihailovic of helping Nedic and other pro-Axis elements in fighting the Communists. The Partisans will continue to fight Mihailovic unless he combines on their terms.' F. Deakin, Embattled Mountain, p.141; CAB101/126, p.7 citing SOE file (A.D./S.I.) SC/ 34/9. 160. On Operation 'Western Morava', see P. Hehn, op. cit, pp.64—5; J. Mar• janovic, Ustanak, pp.382-5; L. Karchmar, op. cit, p.272. The German 113th Infantry Division participated in this operation. Its diversion from the Russian front represents the sole achievement of the 1941 rising in relieving pressure on the Soviet Union (one of the fundamental aims of the Communist Party of Yugoslavia). However, the division was substantially understrength and appears to have been withdrawn either from an inactive sector of the front or from rear area duties. See M. Deroc, op. cit, p. 179; L. Karchmar, op. cit, pp.253, 349n. 161. TDM, p.68; S. Clissold, op. cit, p.73; F. Deakin, Embattled Mountain, p.145; V. Kljakovic, op. cit, p.98. 162. M. Djilas, Wartime, p.l 12; M. Deroc, op. cit, pp.89-90. The experience of the German attack was a thoroughly unpleasant but salutary one for the Partisans, showing that regular forces could not be engaged on anything approaching equal terms by lightly armed insurgents. According to German records, the Partisans lost 1415 dead (of whom 389 were shot in reprisal). Even allowing for the fact that a proportion of these were undoubtedly civilians caught up in the retreat and others were wounded rebels executed by the Germans (see M. Djilas, Wartime, p.l 13), Partisan losses were inordi• nately high. By contrast, the Germans lost 11 dead and 35 wounded. The totality of the defeat is further indicated by the large quantity of war booty (several thousand rifles, a number of ammunition dumps, vehicles, equipment depots and so on). See P. Hehn, op. cit, pp.64—5. 163. J. Marjanovic, Draza Mihailovic, p.l 19; M. Wheeler, op. cit, p.l 18. 164. F0536/31 - Hudson's 'Series B' telegrams, April 1943; M. Djilas, Wartime, pp.105, 108. See also M. Deroc, op. cit, p.89 for the account of a Chetnik officer, Major Perhinek, who supposedly got his information from Hudson himself. 165. M. Djilas, Wartime, pp.112-3; F0536/31 - Hudson's 'Series A' telegrams, April 1943, p.24, Hudson's 'Series B' telegrams, April 1943; M. Deroc, op. cit, pp.88-9; W. Roberts, op. cit, p.37. J. Marjanovic, Draza Mihailovic, p.l 19 attributes Hudson's decision to his orders from SOE Cairo to act as Mihailovic's liaison officer. Djilas recounts that he himself ordered Hudson's radio set to be hidden, but that Tito told him to return it as Hudson was 'an ally' (M. Djilas, Wartime, p. 113). 166. L. Karchmar, op. cit, p.260; M. Milazzo, op. cit, p.40n. J. Tomasevic, The Chetniks, p. 198 appears to be alone in ascribing the cooperation of these forces with Nedic to a decision taken by Mihailovic in mid-November, but Notes and References 245

given his tendency to blame Mihailovic personally for many of the worst aspects of Chetnik actions this ought not to be surprising. 167. L. Karchmar, op. cit, pp.273-8, 362-3n; B. Karapandzic, op. cit, pp. 158- 62; M. Milazzo, op cit, p.40, 87; M. Wheeler, op. cit, p.l 18; TDM, pp. 131- 2, 429-30. The precise date and conclusions of the conference are unknown (V. Kljakovic, op. cit, p.98 and J. Marjanovic, Ustanak, p.388 both give 30 November). As Karchmar points out, there is no evidence other than a vague and unreliable account of a Chetnik commander, Milos Glisic {TDM, pp.68-9), that Mihailovic ordered legalisation of his forces on this occasion. Even Glisic's account states that Mihailovic 'said that the detachments still remained under his command, and that this was only a temporary solution'. See also H. Williams, op. cit, p.207n. 168. J. Tomasevic, The Chetniks, p. 127; L. Karchmar, op. cit, pp.277, 363n; M. Deroc, op. cit, p.209. 169. S. Bailey, 'British Policy Towards Mihailovic', British Policy, p.64; WO208/ 2018A - Bailey report, April 1944, Part 1 - 'Serb Chetnik Tradition'. See also S. Clissold, op. cit, p.56. 170. On Operation 'Mihailovic', see P. Hehn, op. cit, pp.65-6; I. Avakumovic, op. cit, pp.29-31; M. Deroc, op. cit, pp.210-11; L. Karchmar, op. cit, pp.273-5. 171. M. Deroc, op. cit, p.211; I. Avakumovic, op. cit, p.30. Along with other Chetnik officers, Misic was taken to Valjevo, where he was interrogated and shot. See also F0371/59414 R10362/58/92 (Account of Mihailovic's closing speech at TDM). 172. F0536/31 - Hudson's 'Series A' telegrams, April 1943, p.24. 173. J. Marjanovic, Draza Mihailovic, p.l 19 (citing an interview transcript of 1970 with Hudson). Sources differ on this question, Hudson implying that he kept his wireless, at least for a short time, after Cosic's attack (F0536/31 - Hudson's 'Series A' telegrams, April 1943, p.24). Citing the account of a Chetnik officer, Major Perhinek, M. Deroc, op. cit, pp.89—91 suggests that Hudson buried the set some time after leaving the Partisans. See also F. Deakin, Embattled Mountain, p. 146. 174. F0536/31 - Hudson's 'Series A' telegrams, April 1943, p.24 and 'Series B' telegrams, April 1943; M. Deroc, op. cit, p.213; F. Deakin, Embattled Mountain, p. 146. See D. Sotirovich, op. cit, p.l 13 for a slightly different version. The 'Ljoticevci' is a colloquial term for the Serbian Volunteer Corps, the Serbian militia raised among the followers of the right wing nationalist movement 'Zbor' (Rally) led by Dimitrije Ljotic. Generally speaking, the Ljoticevci were among Mihailovic's bitterest enemies. See M. Martic, 'Dimitrije Ljotic and the Yugoslav National Movement Zbor, 1935- 1945', East European Quarterly, Vol.XTV, no.2, pp.219-239; B. Karapandzic, op. cit, pp.90-4, 218-36, 253-8. 175. F0536/31 - Hudson's 'Series B' telegrams, April 1943; WO204/8109 - The Cetniks, p. 17. 176. WO202/128 - tel. no.39, undated, r. London, Malta 663, 2 December 1941. Mihailovic appears to have issued orders to liquidate the Partisans at the conference of 1 December. See L. Karchmar, op. cit, pp.278, 363n; J. Marjanovic, Ustanak, p.394; V. Kljakovic, op. cit, p.99. 177. WO202/128 - tel. no.43, F.18, r. London, Malta 667, 2 December 1941. 246 Notes and References

178. F. Deakin, Embattled Alountain, p. 146. There is no trace of this message in the WO202/128 file. 179. Ibid., p. 140; M. Deroc, op. cit, p.209. 180. Mihailovic's lack of interest in Hudson may have been accentuated by the possibility of replacing him with Lieutenant Christie Lawrence, one of several escaped British POWs at that time at large in Serbia. See WO208/2018A Bailey Report, April 1944, Appendix 3 British liaison with Mihailovic. 181. I. Avakumovic, op. cit, p.52; F. Deakin, Embattled Mountain, p. 146; L. Karchmar, op. cit, p.279; M. Deroc, op. cit, p.214. On 8 December the Germans put a price of 200 000 dinars on Mihailovic's head (M. Deroc, op. cit, pp.212- 3). 182. FO371/30221 R10257/162/92 - telegram Commanders-in- Chief Middle East to Chiefs of Staff, GR/33066, 1 December (received 2 December) 1941. The plan to land a team at Split, who would then go on to investigate the situation in Slovenia (Operation 'Henna'), was clearly a resurrection of the idea originally proposed by Rapotec in July and by Simovic in his note to Churchill in mid-August. Rapotec himself headed this mission. The Montenegrin party (Operation 'Hydra'), commanded by Colonel Luka Baletic, was no doubt intended as an attempt to restore the links broken after Lalatovic's departure from Radovce. According to Baletic, the sub• marine had actually reached the Montenegrin coast before orders to return were received. See S. Pavlowitch, 'Lieutenant Rapotec', pp.73-4; B. Todorovich, op. cit, p.225; F0371/33454 R2701/151/92. 183. FO371/30221 R10404/162/92 minute by P. Dixon, 1 December 1941. A report by SOE Cairo originating from this time (it is undated, but is clearly from the end of November or start of December) advocated 'Maximum support of existing rebellion' and noted that there was some 30 000 lb of equipment on Malta and a further 324000 lb [!] in awaiting shipment to the country. This shows just how crucial the lack of transport proved. See WO 193/616 undated SOE Middle East report, November/December 1941. 184. F0371/30221 R10408/162/92 letter Gen. D. Simovic to A. Eden, 3 December 1941. 185. PREM3/510/1; CAB120/734 memorandum A. Eden to W. Churchill, 7 December 1941. 186. PREM3/510/1 letter H. Dalton to W. Churchill, 11 December 1941. Dalton claimed that if supplied with gold the insurgents would be able to purchase arms from the Italians. This point went unremarked. 187. Ibid, DO(41) 72. 188. Ibid, Memorandum by \N. R. Freeman (for CAS) to W. Churchill, 15 December 1941. On 4 December Eden had once again written to Maisky requesting that the USSR send a message to the Partisans expressing approval of the understanding reached with Mihailovic and urging them to maintain the united front under his command. Maisky acknowledged this communication two days later, without promising that his government would act in the sense required. This seems to have been the last British- Soviet contact on the subject in 1941. See FO371/30221 R10199/162/92. 189. M. Milazzo, op. cit, p.41; L. Karchmar, op. cit, p.279. Notes and References 247

190. Opinion amongst the Germans regarding their own success against the rebellion was divided. Some senior officers considered Mihailovic 'beaten', while others were less sanguine. However, both groups believed that the revolt would flare up when the weather improved in 1942. The Germans were also well aware of the legalisation of Mihailovic's forces, and attempted to hinder it. However, they were faced with a major problem in that Nedic sanctioned the legalisation, probably in an attempt to assert his own control over the bands. See P. Hehn, op. cit, pp.67-9; L. Karchmar, op. cit, p.276, M. Milazzo, op. cit, p.40n; I. Avakumovic, op. cit, p.31. 191. News of Mihailovic's resistance, fictitious or not, had the desired effect. On 3 December the Yugoslav High Command in Cairo issued the first com• munique on the revolt, claiming that bitter fighting was going on between the forces of Mihailovic and the Germans (W. Roberts, Tito, Mihailovic and the Allies, 1941-45 (NewJersey, 1973) p.38; FO371/30215 Rl0452/114/92). A well-known diarist wrote: 'Like a whisper of a man one had thought dead comes a communique - from the Yugoslav front!... I am really moved by this report. I don't know what it all amounts to, but imagine the gallantry of those harassed guerrillas in an occupied country proudly sending out their communique just like any other fighting army... And all the time the Yugoslavs have been fighting with us! Why, bless the Greeks and Yugoslavs - the 80000 Yugoslavs of General Mihailovic' (S. G. Millin, The Pit of the Abyss (London 1946), p.79). 192. M. Wheeler, op. cit, p.67.

5 FRUSTRATION

1. D. Stafford, Britain and European Resistance, p.76; Cadogan, Diaries, pp.435-36. 2. FO371/33440 R210/12/92 - letter, G. Rendel to A. Eden, 9 January 1942. 3. On the Royal Yugoslav Government, and its relations with the British, see especially M. Kay 'The British Attitude Towards the Yugoslav Government in Exile 1941-1945' unpublished PhD dissertation University of Southampton, 1986 passim; M. Wheeler, Britain and the War for Yugoslavia 1940-1943 (New York, 1980) pp.121-62; S. K. Pavlowitch, 'Out of Context - The Yugoslav Government in London 1941-1945', Journal of Contemporary History vol.16, 1, January 1981, pp.89-118; G. Rendel, The Sword and the Olive (London, 1957) pp.210-31; and several articles by Kosta St Pavlowitch in Glasnik SIKD 'Njegos3, especially 'Pad Simoviceve vlade' [The fall of the Simovic government] (vol.2, December 1958, pp.67-81); 'Padjovanoviceve vlade' (vol.4, December 1959, pp. 1-16). 4. On Jovanovic, see D. Djordjevic, 'Historians in Politics: Slobodan Jovanovic', Journal of Contemporary History, vol.8 no. 1, January 1973, pp.21- 40; G. Rendel, op. cit, p.218. 5. J. Tomasevic, The Chetniks, pp.269-71; M. Wheeler, op. cit, p. 144; I. Jukic, op. cit, p.l 16, 119; F0536/7/3614 - letter G. Rendel to O. Sargent, F0183, 9 March 1943. That it was a manoeuvre calculated to gain British recognition of the new government was also the explanation given by Major 248 Notes and References

Nedeljkovic to the Partisans in March (see F. Deakin, Embattled Mountain, p. 163). 6. J. Tomasevic, The Chetniks, p.178; I. Jukic, op. cit, p.l 19; F0371/33451 R603/151/92. [Yugoslav Army in the Homeland = Jugoslovenska vojska u otadzbini or JVO]. 7. TDM, p.312; J. Tomasevic, The Chetniks, p.271; I. Jukic, op. cit, p.120; Zbornik, tom. 14, book 1, p.837 - Tel. V. K. Br.35, 11 June 1942, Jovanovic to Mihailovic. 8. Mihailovic considered that he was appointed Minister 'merely for purposes of propaganda' (see TDM, p. 160, 167). See also Z. Vuckovic, Secanja iz rata [War Memoirs] (London, 1980) p. 183. 9. W. Roberts op. cit, p.38; I. Avakumovic, Mihaibvic prema Nemackom doku- mentima [Mihailovic in the Light of German documents] (London, 1969) p.52; TDM, p. 136; L. Karchmar, Draza Mihailovic and the Rise of the Chetnik Movement 1941-1942, PhD dissertation, Stanford University, 1973 p.283. 10. P. Hehn, The German Struggle Against Yugoslav Guerillas in World War II (New York, 1979) p.77; I. Avakumovic, op. cit, p.51; M. Deroc, op. cit, p.215; K. Hnilicka, Das Ende auf dem Balkan 1944/45 - Die Militarische Raumung Jugo• slavians durch die Deutsche Wehrmacht (Gottingen, 1970) p.200 - Report on a conference between German command and Serbian government, 7 February 1942. Both the Partisans and the British also thought that Mihailovic had gone to Bosnia after the suppression of the revolt in Serbia, an error repeated since by some authors (S. Clissold, Documents, p. 133; F0371/33465 R731/178/92 - P. Dixon minute, 26 January 1942; PREM3/510/1 - letter H. Ismay to J. Martin [Churchill's P.P.S.], 27 January 1942; F. Deakin, Embattled Mountain, p. 146). In the case of the British, the error probably arose from their decyphering of (inaccurate) German signals (see WO208/2006 - MI3b summary no.22, 4 February 1942). This may also have accounted for British suspicion regarding the authenticity of Mihailovic's telegrams (see n.45). 11. As a result of the reverses on the Eastern front, in mid-December 1941 the German High Command ordered the transfer of troops from Serbia and Croatia and their replacement with other Axis forces. Others had to be transfered to Greece in March 1942. As a result, in January and February 1942 the Bulgarians extended their responsibilities to occupation duties throughout much of Serbia. The Germans did, however, retain the 704th Infantry division, elements of the 714th and 717th Infantry divisions and several security battalions in Serbia (P. Hehn, op. cit, pp.78-80, 83, 96-97; J. Marjanovic, Ustanak, p.391. M. Milazzo, The Chetnik Movement and the Yugoslav Resistance (London, 1975), p.86 attributes the Axis inaction to the lack of troops and a preoccupation with events in east Bosnia. The winter weather may also have been an important factor. 12. WO202/128 - tels. no.52, r. London 025, 6/1 /42; no.53, r. London 023, 6/ 1/42; no.54, r. London 02, 6/1/42; all erroneously dated 2 December 1941. 13. J. Marjanovic, Draza Mihailovic, pp.223-224; H. Williams 'The Special Operations Executive and Yugoslavia, 1941-1945', unpublished PhD dis• sertation, University of Southampton 1994 p.43. 14. N. Plecas, 'S Mora i iz Vazduha u Porobljenu Otadzbinu' [By sea and air into the occupied homeland], Glasnik SIKD 'Njegos3, vol.5, June 1960, pp.39- Notes and References 249

40; F. Deakin, Embattled Mountain, pp. 155-77; S. Pavlowitch, 'Lieutenant Rapotec', pp.74-105; J. Marjanovic, Draza Mihailovic, pp.223-32. 15. F. Deakin, Embattled Mountain, p. 155; N. Plecas, op. cit, p.39; S. Pavlowitch, 'Lieutenant Rapotec', p.74. Atherton was formerly editor of the South Slav Herald in Belgrade, where he also worked for Section D. 16. S. Pavlowitch, 'Lieutenant Rapotec', pp.74-5. 17. Ibid, p.l46n; F. Deakin, Embattled Mountain, pp. 155-6. 18. S. Pavlowitch, 'Lieutenant Rapotec', pp.75-101; F. Deakin, Embattled Mountain, pp. 156-77. See alsoj. Marjanovic, Draza Mihailovic, pp.226-8 and M. Lekovic, 'Boravak britanske vojne misisje na oslobodjenoj teritoriji i Crne Gora i jugoistocne Bosne (februar— april 1942)' [The Sojourn of the British Military Mission on the Liberated Territories of Montenegro and Southeast Bosnia, February - April 1942], Istorijs/d zapisi, no.1-2 (1971), pp.301-28. 19. Sinko, who had become ill, remained on Mljet. He later travelled to Split, whence he was sent to join the Chetniks in the Dinara mountains. In 1943 he was transferred to the Supreme Headquarters (S. Pavlowitch, 'Lieutenant Rapotec', pp.78-9, 147n; N. Plecas, op. cit, p.39). 20. J. Amery, Approach March (London, 1973) p. 175, 227-228; M. Wheeler, op. cit, pp.25-26, 61. 21. See 'Resistance Movement in Slovenia'; extract of report by Lt Col. , South Slav Journal, vol.5 no.4 (18) winter 1982/83, pp.40-7. 22. The question of who killed Atherton and O'Donovan, and why, has never been satisfactorily resolved. If Djakic was entirely responsible, and the balance of probability suggests that he was, the motive was probably simple banditry; they were carrying substantial quantities of gold and cash (infor• mation from S. K. Pavlowitch). On the debate over who killed Atherton and O'Donovan, see V. Dedijer, Dnevnik, vol.1, pp. 141-2, 161-2, 264; S. Pav• lowitch, 'Lieutenant Rapotec', p.88; F. Deakin, Embattled Mountain, pp. 169- 74; H. Williams, op. cit, p.45, 47, 210n and TDM, pp.385-7. 23. For example, see F0371/33465 R937/178/92 - P. Dixon minute, 12 February 1942, which refers to SOE's plans 'for establishing contact with patriots in Croatia'. 24. F0371/33466 R2852/178/92 - letter Glenconner to P. Dixon, 27 April 1942. Glenconner stated that 'we [SOE] are doing all we can to send personnel into Yugoslavia to learn more of the situation, and to report on the differences between Mihailovic and the Partisans'. 25. S. Pavlowitch, 'lieutenant Rapotec', p.74. 26. F. Deakin, Embattled Mountain, p. 157, 159, 162-63, citing messages from Milutinovic to Tito (13/2/42), Tito to Pijade (25/2/42) and Pijade to Tito (15/3/42). In a letter from Nedeljkovic to Mihailovic of 26 May 1942, the former stated that Atherton had orders to collaborate with the Partisans (ibid, p. 173). 27. Ibid, p. 165, citing messages from Tito to the Comintern (24/3/42) and Tito to Pijade ('early April'). See also H. Williams, op. cit, pp.45-7, who notes that the documentary evidence concerned Mihailovic's relations with Nedic's forces in Serbia. 28. Telegram Ostojic to Mihailovic, 15 May 1942, cited in M. Wheeler, op. cit, p. 166. Using the version given in TDM, p.387, I have changed one word, substituting 'stimulate' for 'undermine' in the first paragraph; in the overall 250 Notes and References

context of the telegram the latter seems somewhat contradictory. See also F. Deakin, Embattled Mountain, p. 172 for a third translation of the telegram. The 'mission in south Serbia' was a reference to an attempt made in January 1942 to infiltrate a wireless set to Skoplje. It proved abortive, but Atherton, who left Egypt in January, could not have known this. See WO202/355 - tel. G/2786, SOE Middle East to London, 3 November 1942. 29. Telegram Mihailovic to Jovanovic, 15 May 1942, cited in F. Deakin, Embattled Mountain, p. 172. This message is not given in WO202/128, but there is evidence that this file is incomplete, and telegrams 1846, which would have been dated between 14 and 17 May, are listed in that file as missing. 30. Telegram Mihailovic to Jovanovic, 24 May 1942, cited in ibid, (an extremely mutilated version is found in WO202/128, tel. 197, F.l 134A, r. London 4619); Telegram Jovanovic to Mihailovic no. 121, 30 May 1942, cited in M. Wheeler, op. cit, p. 167. 31. M. Wheeler, op. cit, p. 167. 32. N. Plecas, op. cit, p.40; F. Deakin, Embattled Mountain, p. 155. 33. J. Marjanovic, Draza Mihailovic, p.225; F. Deakin, Embattled Mountain, p. 158. Mihailovic confirmed their capture in a telegram of 18 March (WO202/128 - tel. no. 103 F.576A, r. Malta 18 March 1942). 34. J. Marjanovic, Draza Mihailovic, p.226; L. Karchmar, op. cit, p.873n. 35. The 15 page paper produced by SOE Middle East in November/December 1941 stated that 'Fomenting of active rebellion in occupied territories is not desirable as we cannot give them military support at this stage', but pointed out that exceptions were possible and that in the case of Yugoslavia there should be 'Maximum support of existing rebellion'. The paper was discussed in January 1942. Therefore, when Atherton was briefed there was still a tendency to support the revolt unconditionally. As it became clearer during January that the insurgents had been dealt a heavy blow, and as propaganda directives were received counselling the need for organisation rather than outright resistance, this attitude may well have changed. Thus, although 'Hydra' and 'Disclaim' landed almost simultaneously, their instructions could have been very different. See WO 193/616 - undated SOE policy paper, November/December 1941. 36. WO202/163 - note D/H70 [unidentified SOE officer] to DSO (Bl) [Director of Special Operations, SOE], DH70/JU/1930, 28 December 1942; S. Pavlowitch, 'lieutenant Rapotec', p.l48n. 37. F0371/33467 R1951/178/92 - P. Dixon minute, 20 March 1942, reporting conversation with G. Jebb the same day. 38. W. Roberts, op. cit, p.56. L. Karchmar, op. cit, p.366n and M. Deroc, op. cit, p.215 (& p.249 map) both point out Deakin's error {Embattled Mountain, p. 148) in stating that this was the mountain of the same name in Herce• govina. On 18 March Mihailovic signalled that he was near Takovo (southeast of Suvobor), and on 5 April that he was on Cemerno with his staff, but that it was unsafe to remain there (WO202/128 - tels. no. 102, r. Malta, 18 March; no. 133, 5 April 1942). 39. L. Karchmar, op. cit, p.284, 525; W. Roberts, op. cit, p.57. On 9 April Mihailovic signalled that he had arrived on Golija (WO202/128 - tel. no.136F.836A, 9 April 1942). Notes and References 251

40. J. Tomasevic, The Chetniks, p. 199 states that the meeting in March between Mihailovic and Acimovic (Nedic's Minister of the Interior) occurred with German permission and at Mihailovic's instance. M. Wheeler, op. cit., p. 120 accepts this claim and M. Milazzo, op. cit, p.88 also attributes responsibility to Mihailovic, who, he claims, 'instructed that a temporary armistice be offered to Nedic'. L. Karchmar, op. cit, p.l07n alleges that Acimovic was an 'opportunist' and suggests (p.369n) that the initiative was his. German documents, which would obviously be based on Acimovic's statements, might therefore be unreliable. 41. I. Avakumovic, op. cit, p.52. The officers are named in F0371/33492 R2687/2268/92. 42. L. Karchmar, op. cit, p.284; WO202/128 - tel. no. 196 F.l 138A, r. London 4626, 24 May 1942; I. Avakumovic, ibid. 43. The Brandenburg unit used in Operation 'Forstrat' appears to have been the 7th Company under a Captain Muller. See J. Lucas, Germany's elite Panzer Force: Grossdeutschland (London 1979) pp.H6~26; P. Leverkuehn, German Military Intelligence (London, 1954), pp.46 50; I. Avakumovic, op. cit, p.53; P. Hehn, op. cit, p. 140. 44. W. Roberts, op. cit, p.57; J. Tomasevic, op. cit, p.200; L. Karchmar, op. cit, pp.284 5; IDM, pp. 136-40; C. Lawrence, Irregular Adventure (London, 1947) p.233. 45. M. Wheeler, op. cit, p.308; F. Deakin, Embattled Mountain, p. 149. See also n. 10. Mihailovic sent about 30 telegrams in January and 20 in February, but not all are cited in the WO202/128 file; some of these may never have been received. Of those which did reach the British only a dozen were of operational importance or contained useful intelligence. The rest contained information concerning decorations, promotions and other secondary matters. 46. WO202/128 - tel. no.89 F.598A, 17 February 1942 ('butcher's dog' message); tel. no. 136 F.836A, 9 April 1942 (reporting arrival on Golija). Mihailovic sent 31 messages in March and 21 in April. Again, some are missing from the WO202/128 file, but a letter from Jovanovic to Eden dated 8 April 1942, as well as the messages cited by Deakin showr that at least some of these were received by the British (see F0371/33466 R2316/ 178/92). 47. K. A. Merrick, Flights of the Forgotten; Special Duties Operations in World War Two (London, 1989) p. 156; W Roberts, op. cit, pp.56-7; L. Karchmar, op. cit, p.284. The material dropped in April included two wireless sets with batteries and accessories, 15 machine guns, 31 sub-machine guns, 40 000 rounds of ammunition, 288 grenades, 13 000 gold sovereigns (another 8000 were lost en route), 12 500 dollars (in gold and paper), clothing for about 150 men, and medical stores (F0371/33455 R3139/ 151/92). Mihailovic's appeals for wireless sets, arms and other stores can be found in WO202/128, tels no.78, r. London 663 6/2, 29 January 1942; no.90, r. Malta, 19 February; no.128, 30 March; no.132, 1 April; no. 136 F.836A, 9 April; no. 138 F.858A, r. Malta, 11 April; and increasingly often thereafter. On the loss of airdropped material see tel. no. 140 F.941A and 962A, r. London 20 April 1942 and L. Karchmar, op. cit, pp.366-7. 252 Notes and References

48. K. Merrick, op. cit, pp. 155-6; WO202/128 - tel. no.93 F.624A, r. Malta 22 February 1942 (request for leaflet drops) and tel. no. 151 F.l031 A, r. London 4280, Malta 2058, 29 April 1942 (praise for such sorties). 49. There are substantial discrepancies over the composition and precise fate of this team, which consisted of sergeants Milisav Bakic and Milisav Semiz. See N. Plecas, op. cit, p.40; WO202/128 - tels. no.153 F.1014A, r. London 4281, Malta 2059, 5 May 1942 and no. 193 F.l097A, r. London 4437, Malta 2086, 18 May 1942; L. Karchmar, op. cit, p.284; C. Lawrence, op. cit. p.228; K. Merrick, op. cit, p. 156; H. Williams, op. cit, p.44; S. Trew, No Pity Distilled p.342n. 50. F. Deakin, Embattled Mountain, p. 149. The relevant telegrams, no. 123, 124 and 125 (despatched between 28 and 30 March) are missing from the WO202/128 file, but were clearly handed over to the Royal Yugoslav Government (F0371/33466 R2316/178/92). 51. Ibid., p.147; F0536/31 - Hudson's 'Series A telegrams, April 1943; C. Lawrence, op. cit, p.229; W. Roberts, op. cit, pp.56-7. 52. The Germans conducted several 'cleaning-up' operations in the area during December (M. Deroc, British Special Operations Explored: Yugoslavia in Turmoil 1941-1943 and the British Response (New York 1988) p.212). As Hudson had apparently lost his uniform (F. Deakin, Embattled Mountain, p. 148) he stood a good chance of being shot as a spy if captured. 53. In February 1942 Mojsilovic was described by Nedic as 'unreliable'; apparently he was later imprisoned (K. Hnilicka, op. cit, p.200; F0536/ 31 - Hudson's 'Series A' telegrams, April 1943, p.24). 54. F0536/31 - Hudson's 'Series A telegrams, April 1943, pp.24-5. 55. F0371/59410 R8966/58/92 - Statement by D. T. Hudson, June 1946. 56. C. Lawrence, op. cit, p.229; L. Karchmar, op. cit, p.872n; F. Deakin, Embattled Mountain, p. 147n. 57. J. Tomasevic, op. cit, p.285. 'Radovan' was Ronald Houghton Jones' nom de guerre with the Chetniks. Jones travelled to Montenegro with the Chetnik headquarters staff and was captured by pro-Italian militia in Hercegovina on 25 July 1942 (ibid. J. Marjanovic, Documents, p.51). 58. M. Deroc, op. cit, p.91, 215; F. Deakin, Embattled Mountain, p. 146. 59. W Roberts, op. cit, p.57; WO202/2018A - Bailey report, April 1944, Appendix 3 - British Liaison with Mihailovic. 60. TDM, p. 140. 61. F0536/31 - Hudson's 'Series A telegrams, April 1943, p.23; TDM, p. 139; J. Tomasevic, The Chetniks, p.200. 62. For example, F0371/33466 R2269/178/92 - Press Reading Bureau, Stockholm to Foreign Office, 31 March 1942; F0371/ 30893 C723/10/18 - tel. 025697 Military Attache, Ankara to C-in-C Middle East and War Office, 12 January 1942; C931/10/18 -tel. no.261 Mr. Kelly, Berne to Foreign Office, 26 January 1942; F0371/33134 Rl992/43/67 - letter, Washington Chancery to Foreign Office, 9 March 1942. 63. Krek's sources were largely, but not always, Slovene; for example, the National Committee in Ljubljana (See F0898/158 - letter M. Krek to R. Bruce Lockhart, 23 July 1942; F0898/159 - letter G. Rendel to R. Bruce- Lockhart, 21 July 1942). The Croat Vice-Premier, Dr Juraj Krnjevic, also Notes and References 253

had connections with Yugoslavia through the Catholic Church in and elsewhere (I. Jukic, The Fall of Yugoslavia (New York, 1974) p. 125). 64. See especially material held in F0536/5/3147 and F0536/5/3149. 65. For example, a highly informative letter on the situation in Bosnia/ Croatia from N. Bartulovic (a member of the Yugoslav National Party in ) to R. Knezevic (Minister of Court in the Royal Yugoslav Government), dated 26 January, received in London 20 March, forwarded by R. Murray (Political Warfare Executive) to G. Rendel and P. Dixon on 13 June. Bartulovic was a prominent figure in the underground organi• sation in Split (L. Karchmar, op. cit, p.596; J. Marjanovic, Draza Mihailovic, p.86). C. L. Rose attempted to justify such actions later in the year. He wrote 'Maybe it is all wrong in principle: but the Yugoslavs are really such a shocking collection that they justify a breach of every rule' (F0371/33502 - C. L. Rose minute, 29 September 1942). See also H. Williams, op. cit, p.55. 66. E. Barker, 'Fresh Sidelights on British policy in Yugoslavia, 1942- 3', Slavonic and East European Review, vol.LIV no.4, October 1976, p.572; M. Wheeler, op. cit, p. 164. 67. To the material provided by Krek, Krnjevic, the press reading bureaux and diplomatic sources, which are in the open F0371 files, one must add the information contained in the RJ (Red Jacket) files, which are withheld from public inspection. M. Wheeler, op. cit, p. 164 speculates that they contained 'super-secret intelligence of particularly striking importance', especially 'Ultra' decrypts. However, with the exception of a few individuals the Foreign Office staff was unaware of such intelligence, nor did they receive it until late 1943 (F. Hinsley, British Intelligence vol.11, p.5 and vol.III pt.l, p. 139). From cross-referencing information in other sub-files, it is much more likely that the RJ files contained SIS intelligence other than 'Ultra' (but possibly sometimes based on this source), information provided by SOE (including telegrams passing between SOE and Mihailovic, and intelligence received from escapees from Yugoslavia), other intelligence from Krek, Krnjevic and other Yugoslav ministers, and minutes on sensitive questions of policy, especially after indications of the arrangements existing between the Chetniks and the Italians were received. 68. Zivan Knezevic was head of the military 'cabinet' established in January 1942 within the Prime Minister's Office. M. Wheeler, op. cit, p. 130 notes that this 'became the effective controller of military policy and relations with Mihailovic'. The other principal members of the group were two of King Peter's aides, Majors Rozdjalovski and Vohoska. They were collectively known as the 'Three Majors' or the 'Three Musketeers', and had substantial support in Serb circles, especially the two other Knezevic brothers, Radoje (Minister of Court) and Nikola (who dealt primarily with intelligence and contacts with Mihailovic). See M. Wheeler ibid, and pp.28990n. The British considered Vohoska a particularly bad influence on the young king (F0371/33479 R3899/626/92; F0371/33480 R5764/626/92). 69. For a good analysis of the 'Cairo Affair' see M. Wheeler, op. cit, pp. 131-44. See also G. Rendel, op. cit, pp.214-16 and H. Williams, op. cit, pp.51 4. 70. F0371/33451 R972/151/92 - C L. Rose minute, 12 February 1942; R1008/151/92 - letter G. Rendel to D. Howard, 12 February 1942. 254 Notes and References

71. It is a measure of the time and effort which the Foreign Office was forced to devote to the crisis that there are 15 F0371 files on this subject (33451-64; 33485) but only 10 on resistance in Yugoslavia during 1942. The imbalance is even more pronounced for the first half of 1942, 7 files dealing with the Army Crisis up to the end of June, but only 3 on resistance matters during the same period. 72. Opinion differs on the precise effect of the crisis on British Yugoslav relations. L. E. Modisett, op. cit, p.278 considers that it 'had a poisoning effect on British -Yugoslav relations that would be hard to exaggerate'. The British Minister (later ambassador) to the Yugoslav government, George Rendel saw in it the foundations for Britain's abandonment of the gov• ernment two years later (op. cit, p.215). M. Wheeler, op. cit, pp. 143-4 believes this to be 'simplistic' and offers a more sober analysis. 73. F0371/33465 Rl78/178/92 telegram no.30, S. Cripps to Foreign Office, 7 January 1942. 74. F0371/33465 R731/178/92 - P. Dixon minutes, 26 January and 5 February 1942. 75. F0371/33465 R890/178/92 - minutes by C. L. Rose, 8 February and O. Sargent, 10 February 1942. Jebb's letter is apparently in RJ (Red Jacket) 42. 76. WO202/128 - tel. no.64 and continuations, undated, r. London 03 28/1, 042 28/1 and 040 28/1; F0371/33469 R5798/178/92 RYG aide memoire submitted to Soviet Government, 19 August 1942, dates this telegram 23 January. 77. F0371/33465 R890/178/92 - letter S. Jovanovic to A. Eden, 5 February 1942, enclosing aides memoire. The Yugoslav proposal was simultaneously put to SOE (Ibid, D. Howard minute, 10 February 1942). 78. F0371/33465 R1023/178/92 - letter G.Jebb to O. Sargent, 11 February 1942; R1024/178/92 - C. L. Rose minute, 12 February 1942. 79. Glenconner's opinion was expressed at a meeting attended by Foreign Office, War Office, Air Ministry and SOE representatives on 12 February. See F0371/33465 R1024/178/92 - C. L. Rose minute, 12 February 1942. 80. F0371/33482 R1243/691/92 letter G. Rendel to D. Howard, 20 February 1942. 81. Nevertheless, according to Rendel, Nincic 'went through the roof when told that direct communications between the Yugoslav government and Mihailovic had been prohibited (F0371/33465 Rl512/178/92 letter G. Rendel to D. Howard, 5 March 1942). 82. PREM 3/510/1; F0371/33465 R1351/178/92 memorandum for Defence Committee, 28 February 1942. 83. Of the five Whitleys and one Halifax which SOE and the Foreign Office had squeezed out of the Air Ministry at different times in 1941, one had been lost en route to Malta, two had been destroyed on the ground, and the remainder had returned to England for overhauling (ibid.). 84. AIR8/920 COS(42) 67. At the FO-WO-SOE-AM meeting of 12 February the Air Ministry's representative had promised to examine the possibilities of providing long range aircraft for SOE's contacts with Mihailovic (see n.59 above). Six days later the Vice Chief of the Air Staff cabled to Air Chief Marshal Sir Arthur Tedder, Air Officer Commanding in the Middle East, that it was considered 'most important to do everything Notes and References 255

possible' to support the rebellion and that two Liberator bombers were available (AIR8/920 telegram AM to HQRAF ME, AX4, 18 February 1942). This offer was submitted to the COS on 28 February (COS(42) 139 'Yugoslav Revolt'). The Liberator was a substantial improvement on the Whitleys and Halifax so far provided, and was capable of carrying some 6000 lbs of supplies on each sortie. 85. F0371/33465 Rl392/178/92 letter Glenconner to P. Dixon, 28 February 1942. 86. M. Wheeler, op. cit, p.308n. states that Mihailovic was transferring his headquarters from Suvobor to Takovo at this time: but Takovo is barely five miles from Suvobor, which does not account for a three week break in transmissions. Mihailovic's meeting with Acimovic (see note 40) possibly occurred at this time. 87. F0371/3466 R1951/178/92 - P. Dixon minute, 20 March 1942. On possible links between Mihailovic and the Russians, see V. Dedijer, 'Who killed General Mihailovich?', The Listener, 28 February 1980, p.266. 88. F0371/33466 Rl951/178/92 - letter A. Eden to I. Maisky, 24 March 1942. The request was apparently repeated when Eden met Maisky on 27 March (F0371/33466 R2079/178/92 Despatch no.81, D. Howard to A. Clark-Kerr, 27 March 1942). 89. W7O202/128 - tel. no. 102, r. Malta 18 March 1942; F0371/33466 R2132/ 178/92 - R Dixon minute, 1st April 1942. 90. F0371/33466 R2132/178/92 - SOE memorandum, 28 February 1942; CAB80/62 - COS(42) 80(O). Mihailovic's telegrams are withheld in RJ142, but accessible in WO202/128. 91. CAB79/20; AIR8/920 - COS(42) 102, 1 April 1942. 92. See S. Trew, No Pity Distilled, p.346n. On 17 March Rendel offered his opinion that no Englishman who had spent over ten years in the Balkans could remain impartial, and that this was certainly true of some of SOE's personnel (F0371/33453 Rl883/151/92 - Letter G. Rendel to D. Howard, 17 March 1942). As would become clear by the end of 1942, it was probably true of Rendel himself. 93. M. Wheeler, op. cit, p.310n. 94. Singapore fell in mid-February (A. Cadogan, Diaries, p.433 described 12 February as the 'blackest day... of the war'), and by the end of March the situation for the British and Americans in the Far East was desperate. Atlantic convoy losses were appalling and the British had just suffered a major setback to their attempts to supply Malta, which appeared to be in imminent danger of invasion. The major bright spot was in the Soviet Union, where the had successfully counterattacked during January, February and March. By the end of April the Joint Intelligence Staff considered a complete Russian defeat highly unlikely (See CAB119/56 - JP(42) 460(S), 29 April 1942). 95. WO202/128 - tels no.78, dated 29 January 1942, r. London 663 6/2; no.102, r. Malta 18 March 1942; no.132, 1 April 1942. 96. Ibid, tel. no. 136 F.836A, 9 April 1942. 97. F0371/33466 R2316/178/92 - letter S. Jovanovic to A. Eden, 8 April 1942. 256 Notes and References

98. PREM3/510/12 - S. Jovanovic to W. Churchill, 9 April 1942. The aides memoire were identical to those submitted to the Foreign Office at the start of February (See F0371/33465 R890/178/92). As a result, different proposals regarding the matter of independent communications were made to Eden and Churchill at the same time. 99. CAB79/20; AIR8/920 - COS(42) 117. 100. WO208/2014 - end. 12A: Tel. Air Ministry to C-in-C Middle East, OZ35, 17 April 1942. As H. Williams, op. cit, p.56 points out, the general deterioration in the strategic situation (both as a result of events in the Far East and because of a renewed German threat in the USSR) meant that in the absence of any possibility of launching a 'Second Front', the British felt obliged to focus their air assets in a bombing campaign against Germany, thus leaving few (if any) aircraft for SOE's purposes. Although the Yugoslavs themselves might have been able to solve the supply problem by negotiating the transfer of American aircraft to their own forces in the Middle East, this plan was effectively stymied by the British, who were highly reluctant to see their own influence over the resistance movements threatened in any way (ibid, pp.57-8). 101. F0371/33466 R2515/178/92 - despatch A. Eden to A. Clark Kerr, no.12, 15 April 1942. 102. F0371/33466 R2484/178/92 - P. Dixon minute, 17 April 1942. If Mihai• lovic's message of 23 January (see note 76) had been received, it had clearly made no impression. The Russians had been in contact with the Partisans since before the start of the revolt, in particular through a Comintern radio station run by Josip Kopinic from Zagreb. Other wireless links also existed, and as remarked, there is some evidence that the Soviet Union had links with Yugoslavia through their contacts (via the USSR's Sofia legation) with the Chetniks (See V Cencic, Enigma Kopinic (Belgrade 1983), 2 volumes, passim; V. Dedijer, Nova Prilozi za Biogrqfiju Josipa Broza Tita (Rijeka 1981), pp.470-5; S. Clissold, Documents, pp.6-7, 14, 16. 103. For example, a letter from the Press Department of the British Legation, Berne on the subject of Slovene Partisan activities, written in mid-December 1941 but only received on 13 February 1942 (F0371/33465 R1014/178/ 92). 104. F0371/33465 Rl375/178/92 - letter G. Rendel to D. Howard, 25 February; letter D. Howard to G. Rendel, 4 March; F0536/5/3147 - letter D. Howard to G. Rendel, 20 March; letter G. Rendel to D. Howard, SO 17, 30 March 1942. 105. F0371/33134 R1992/43/67 - letter Washington Chancery to Foreign Office, 9 March 1942, r. 26 March; F0371/33466 Rl 754/178/92 tel. no.875 Mr. Kelly, Berne to Foreign Office, 14 March 1942. 106. FO371/33490 R1990/1990/92 - C. L. Rose minute, 26 March 1942. See, for example, undated letter from Dr. B. Andjelinovic to his brother in London, forwarded by R. Murray to G. Rendel, 23rd March 1942 (F0536/5/3147). 107. F0371/33134 R2211/43/67 - C. L. Rose minute, 5 April 1942. Five days later, George Rendel noted that recent information 'confirms the impression which I have been forming that the communist partisans are gradually becoming the main centre of resistance to the , atanyrate [sic] Notes and References 257 in Croatia and Slovenia, and will expect eventually to get their reward in a form that may not be very popular or satisfactory.' See F0536/5/3149 - Letter G. Rendel to R. Murray, 10 April 1942. Rendel's comments were apparently prompted by information contained in a letter from a member of the Croat Peasant Party in Rome to Juraj Krnjevic in London. This stated that as a result of repression in Serbia most Chetniks had moved to Bosnia. Even here, however, the Partisans were the 'dominant factor', attacking both Mihailovic's forces and the Ustashe. WO208/2014 - MI6 political report CX/35400, 13 April 1942, no author identified. FO copy to Mr P. Loxley (Cadogan's Personal Secretary). Copies of the report were also sent to the War Office, SOE, PWE and the Minister of State in the Middle East. Not surprisingly, there is no record of such a paper in Cadogan's diary. The latter did see Selborne on 11 April, and it is conceivable that the matter was discussed (A. Cadogan, Diaries, p.446). A report on British-Chetnik relations prepared by Hugh Grey in 1944 implies that the SIS paper was circulated within the Foreign Office (See F0371/44276 R12712/8/92 - H. Grey report 27 July 1944, p.2). A minute by P. Dixon on 17 April reinforces this view, as it suggests that Mihailovic might have come to terms with the Partisans as a result of a shortage of ammunition, which was one of the points made by the SIS paper (see F0371/33466 R2484/178/92). F0371/33134 R2211/43/67 - letter D. Howard to A. Toynbee, 13 April 1942. F0371/33490 R3034/1990/92 - Foreign Research and Press Service, Royal Institute of International Affairs, 'Communists in Yugoslavia', to D. Howard, 7 May 1942. WO202/128 - tel. no. 107 F.576A, r. Malta 22nd March 1942. The accu• sation of Partisan-Ustasha cooperation related to 'parallel actions' carried out against the Chetnik forces commanded by Major Jezdimir Dangic in east Bosnia. Dangic had travelled to east Bosnia in August 1941 in order to organise the Serb population against the Ustashe. He initially cooperated with the Partisans but on his own initiative maintained contacts with Nedic, the Italians and later the Germans with a view to coming to some sort of arrangement whereby the Serb population would be protected from the Ustashe. Chetnik-Partisan relations gradually broke down from the end of November and in the spring the Partisans decided to destroy Dangic and his forces in order to use east Bosnia as a springboard for re-entering Serbia. In March both they and the Ustashe launched an attack on the Chetniks. Although the operations were independent, it appears that the Partisans and Ustashe did not fight one another, and the Germans came to believe that a non-aggression agreement existed between them. Whether or not this was the case, henceforth allegations of Partisan-Ustasha cooperation were to become a major feature of Chetnik propaganda. The ease with which entire Croat Wehrmacht and Ustasha formations deserted to the Partisans during the period 1942-45 (of which there is ample evidence) only confirmed the Chetniks in their suspicions. See M. Milazzo, op. cit, pp.62-73; L. Karchmar, op. cit, pp.457-502; A. Miletic, 'O Saradnji Komandanta cetnickih odreda istocne Bosne Jezdimira Dangica sa Nemcima (august 1941-april 1942' [About the Collaboration of the Commander of the 258 Notes and References

Chetnik Detachments in East Bosnia, Jezdimir Dangic, with the Germans, August 1941-April 1942] Vojnoistorijski Glasnik, 1972 (2) pp.135-45; J. Tomasevic, The Chetniks, pp.159-161, 206-209; I. Avakumovic, op. cit, pp.40-45; P. Hehn, op. cit, p.l47n. 113. F0371 /33466 R2316/178/92 Yugoslav government aide memoire, 8 April 1942. 114. F0371/33469 R5978/178/92 Yugoslav government aide memoire, 19 August 1942, r. in Foreign Office 2 September 1942. 115. F0371/33466 R2515/178/92 letter A. Eden to I. Maisky, 27 April 1942. Writing to Dixon on 27 April, Glenconner stated that information received from couriers and others coming out of Yugoslavia suggested that the Partisans were fighting Mihailovic and might even be winning. This, he suggested, made it all the more important to create a united front with the assistance of the Russians. His letter did not arrive in the Foreign Office until 1 May, but it seems reasonable to assume that the sentiment was already known to the latter (F0371/33466 R2852/178/92 - letter Glen• conner to P. Dixon, 27 April 1942). 116. F0371/33466 R2484/178/92 tel. A. Clark Kerr to Foreign Office, no.8, 30 March 1942. 117. F0371/33466 R2855/178/92 letter G. Rendel to D. Howard, 28 April 1942. 118. S. Clissold, Documents, pp. 134-5; F0371 /33469 R5978/178/92 - Yugoslav government aide memoire, 19 August, r. in Foreign Office 2 September 1942. 119. S. Clissold, ibid, pp. 135-6. 120. F0371/33466 R2855/178/92 P. Dixon minute, 6 May 1942. 121. F0371/33455 R2794/151/92 memorandum, S. Jovanovic to G. S. Harvie-Watt (Prime Minister's Office), dated 23 April. The paper was diverted to the Foreign Office without Churchill seeing it. Jovanovic com• plained that 54 messages from Mihailovic had not been relayed to his government and alleged that the British were issuing orders to Mihailovic without Yugoslav consent or knowledge. He suggested that the wireless facilities be entrusted to the Yugoslavs, but that they would remain tech• nically under British control, half the personnel would be British and that British codes would be used. On 27 April an interdepartmental meeting concluded that for reasons of security, certain telegrams had been delayed in transmission to the Yugoslav government, but that of the messages which Jovanovic claimed had not been relayed to him, many had not even arrived in London, others had been given to Simovic and still others were either indecipherable or of no conceivable interest to the Yugoslavs. The British took this opportunity to reaffirm their right to control the communications link. See F0371/33493 R2976/2354/92. 122. F0371/33467 R2972/178/92 letter M. Nincic to A. Eden, 2 May 1942. 123. CAB79/20; F0371/33467 R2973/178/92 COS(42) 141. Mihailovic was at this time moving into the Sandzak. F. Deakin, Embattled Mountain, p. 150 suggests that Mihailovic's silence was the result of a British request for information about the Partisans sent to him on 12 April. He evidently ignores a telegram sent by the general on 11 April in which it was explained that lack of wireless batteries necessitated a suspension of communications (WO202/128 - tel. no. 138, 11 April 1942). Notes and References 259

124. F0371 /33467 R2973/178/92 - letter A. Eden to M. Nincic, 15 May 1942. 125. F0371/33467 R3795/178/92 - letter Glenconner to P. Dixon, 6 June 1942. 126. WO202/128 - tel. no.162 F.1051A, r. London 4326, 9 May 1942. It was this telegram which prompted Jovanovic's (abortive) conversation with Bogomolov on 16 May. Todorovic was Mihailovic's chief delegate for Bosnia and Hercegovina, and also acted as Dangic's Chief of Staff. An ideological anti-Communist, he nevertheless cooperated with the Partisans until the breakdown of relations between the two groups. He was involved in negotiations with the Italians aimed at the removal of the Ustashe and the Croat authorities from areas of Bosnia and Hercegovina. On 19 February 1942 he was ambushed by the Partisans near and either killed in the subsequent shootout or executed soon afterwards. See L. Karchmar, op. cit, pp.452-4, 465, 471, 478-91, 518 n; M. Milazzo, op. cit, pp.65-73; J. Tomasevic, rThe Chetniks, pp.157 8; J. Marjanovic, Draza Mihailovic, pp. 194- 8; 'N. M.', 'A Serbian Approach' [review of J. Tomasevic's 'The Chetniks'], South Slav Journal vol.1 no. 1, January 1978, p. 19; M. Djilas, Wartime, p. 145; and note 112 above. 127. F0371/33467 R3008/178/92 - C. L. Rose minute, 10 May 1942. Mihai• lovic's message of 9 May may be in one of three closed files from this period (R3124, R31~34, R3468/178/92). 128. WO202/128 - tel. no.209 F.l 143A, r. London 4638, 26 May 1942; F0371/ 33467 R3636/178/92 - letter Glenconner to P. Dixon, 28 May 1942. 129. M. Wheeler, op. cit, p. 171 gives a much clearer translation, but it would be misleading to cite it as the version upon which the British based their decisions in 1942. The most important difference between the two versions is that in Wheeler's version Hudson is accused of interfering with the receipt of arms, not 'announcing' it, and that it was feared that he would do so again. 130. F0371/33467 R3008/178/92 - Foreign Office aide memoire, 5 June 1942; R3636/178/92 - P. Dixon minute, 5 June 1942. 131. On 16 June Michael Rose [FO] noted that there was no question of asking the Russians for assistance in providing airfields for SOE to use in supplying Mihailovic during the summer, as the Soviet Union was 'deliberately encouraging the Communists' (F0371/33467 R3795/178/92 letter M. Rose to Glenconner, 16 June 1942). 132. The Russians adopted a stony silence regarding Mihailovic. Nincic attempted to get Molotov, the Soviet Foreign Minister, to discuss the question when the latter was in Britain for discussions which culminated in the signing of the Anglo-Soviet Treaty at the end of May, but with no success (See F0371/33467 R3008/178/92 - P. Dixon minute, 22 May 1942; R4117/178/92 - O. Sargent minute, 30 June 1942. 133. Tel. no.211 F. 1162A, r. London 4673, 26 May 1942. Mihailovic had already sent one very brief telegram criticising British propaganda regarding the Partisans (see tel. no. 113, 26 March 1942). 134. F0371/33467 R3868/178/92 - letter S. Jovanovic to G. Rendel, 5 June 1942. 135. F0371/33491 R2096/2096/92 - press cuttings. 136. F0371/33491 R2479/2096/92. The genesis of such reports was the Middle East, where the Yugoslav government maintained three information centres, 260 Notes and References

in Istanbul, Cairo and Jerusalem. The Jerusalem bureau was suspected to be particularly active. The Britanova press agency, an Anglo-Yugoslav organi• sation in Istanbul (set up by Section D/SOE in Belgrade in 1940) was also identified as a principal source, although H. Williams (op. cit, p.25), using information given to her by Mark Wheeler, questions this assertion. In fairness, the British and American journalists who unreservedly used and embellished such reports, and the British government, which exploited them for their own domestic ends should take a share of the blame for the difficulties which followed. See F0371/33491 R2096/2096/92 - P. Dixon minute, 28 March 1941; R2479/2096/92 - letter G. Rendel to D. Howard, 14 April; R3128/2096/92 - note, 13 May 1942; R3217/2096/92 - despatch from Palestine, 2nd May 1942; R3618/2096/92 - letter G. Rendel to D. Howard, 30 May 1942; J. Amery, op. cit, p.141; M. Stenton, op. cit, p. 187. 137. F0371/33466 R2461/178/92 - O. Sargent minute, 30 March 1942. 138. F0371/33491 R2869/2096/92; F0371/33471 R7028/178/92 - private and confidential memorandum to editors, signed by F. Williams; Controller, Press and Censorship, 27 April 1942. 139. The Political Warfare Executive directives for the period January to June 1942 are to be found in F0371/33135A Rl 17/75/67 and R2472/75/67. 140. Ibid, directives for weeks beginning 2 January, 10 January and 7 February 1942. 141. FO371/30861 C248/248/62 - Central Plan of Political Warfare for Europe, 2 January 1942; F0898/159 - letter R. Murray to D. Brooks, 6 March 1942; FO898/306 - 'Plan of Political Warfare for the Spring and Summer of 1942', dated 23 March 1942. 142. F0371/33135A Rl 17/75/67 - directives for weeks beginning 7 February, 6 March, 14 March (rally to Mihailovic); 17 January, 24 January, 31 January, 6 March, 14 March (Croat resistance). 143. F0371/33465 R1394/178/92 - letter R. Murray to P. Dixon, 26 February 1942. This was a reflection of the 'United Front' approach which the Soviets had been following ever since 22 June 1941. Needless to say, the Partisans were not in the least satisfied with Moscow's propaganda. See S. Clissold, Documents, p. 128, 132, 145-7. 144. F0371/33466 R2509/178/92 - letter O. Sargent to R. Bruce Lockhart, 17 April 1942. 145. Ibid, letter R. Bruce Lockhart to O. Sargent, 24 April 1942. King Peter's speech was actually made on 27 March, the anniversary of the 1941 coup. In it he called on the Yugoslav people to 'recover after [the] enemy attacks and... get together and organize under the supreme leadership of General Mihailovic. Beware of too early actions which could cause great sacrifices completely out of proportion with possible results. In the struggle against the enemy, everyone - Serbs, Croats and Slovenes - will join when the right time comes and when the signal is given' (cited in J. Tomasevic, The Chetniks, p. 164). There is no doubt that PWE made great efforts to ensure that Yugoslav spokesmen put forward a united front. In the face of the dif• ferences between the exile politicians, it often found itself fighting a losing battle. See correspondence in F0898/158. 146. F0371 /33135A R2472/75/67 Directive for week beginning 24 April 1942. Notes and References 261

147. Ibid, Directive for week beginning 6 June 1942. 148. Cited in M. Wheeler, op. cit, pp. 165-6. 149. F0371/33467 R4157/178/92 - letter R. Murray [PWE] to P. Dixon, 21 June 1942. It is likely that Mihailovic was annoyed by the references to Croat and Slovene resistance, and to 'patriot' activities, which (as will be seen) he equated with praise for the Partisans. 150. E. Barker, 'Fresh Sidelights', p.572. 151. See WO208/2006 passim and Chapter 4, n.l 11, 112. 152. The last summary specifically identified as having been given to S02 [sic] was dated 17 November 1941 (ibid.). 153. SOE nevertheless received some intelligence from the Military Intelligence section responsible for the Balkans, MI3b. This did not include MSS (Most Secret Sources that is 'Ultra') or ISOS (Abwehr decrypts). See WO208/ 2014 - Maj. D. Talbot-Rice minute, 17 February 1942. 154. See WO208/2014 passim; F. Hinsley, op. cit, vol.11, p.663; vol.III pt.l, p.501. On the Government Code and Cipher School, see N. West, op. cit, p.55, 62-3, 125, 176. 155. This operation was described by the Partisans as the 'Second Offensive'. It lasted from 15 January into February and except in early February, when the Partisans had some severe clashes with Croat units, involved very little serious fighting. One result was that Tito, who had gone to east Bosnia in December 1941, moved southwards to Foca, where he set up his supreme headquarters. It was in Foca that the Atherton mission met Tito in March. See P. Hehn, op. cit, pp.84—95; L. Karchmar, op. cit, pp.488-94. See also WO208/2006 - summary no.22, 4 February 1942 for what little the British did know of this operation. 156. PREM3/510/1 - note J. Martin (Churchill's PPS) to Gen. H. Ismay, 24 January 1942; Memorandum H. Ismay to J. Martin, 27 January 1942; WO208/2006 - note from unidentified Lt. Col, Military Intelligence, 26 January 1942. 157. WO208/2014 - D. Talbot-Rice minutes, 7 and 15 March 1942. See also maps illustrating developments between 28 February and 13 March, p.7A and 9A. These showed extensive actions against the Ustashe throughout Bosnia, carried out both by Chetniks and Partisans (although usually iden• tified as 'insurgents"), but little concerning actions in Serbia. 158. Ibid, D. Talbot-Rice minute 15 March 1942; Brig. J. M. Kirkman (DDMI(I)) minute, 17 March 1942. 159. Ibid, Capt. B. L. Deed minute, 18 April 1942. See also maps illustrating developments during April on p.l IB, 19A and 19B. 160. F. Hinsley, op. cit, vol.III pt.l, p. 138; WO208/2014 - Col. Thornton minute for DMI, 28 April 1942. 161. The complexities of the situation in Bosnia at this time almost defy description. Many writers (for example J. Marjanovic, Draza Mihailovic, pp.243-51; J. Marjanovic, Documents, pp.71-4) imply that during the spring and summer the Chetnik bands entered wide-ranging collaborationist agreements with the Ustasha regime and the Germans as part of a coherent and unified plan to destroy the national liberation struggle. While few deny that agreements were reached between the various parties, explanations as to motives vary extensively. At the risk of gross over-simplification, it might 262 Notes and References

be suggested that the following is a supportable analysis: During the period January-April the Chetniks suffered heavy losses in fighting against the Ustashe and the Partisans. They avoided confrontations with the Germans and Italians in the hope that they might be encouraged to protect the Serb population from the atrocities implemented by the Ustasha regime. This objective was only partially attained, primarily in Italian zones of influence or occupation. Individual bands changed sides with alarming frequency, either as a result of coups and counter-coups among their leadership or through negotiation with their opponents. Dangic's arrest by the Germans on 12 April decapitated the Chetnik command structure and left it in crisis. By May the unavailability of German troops for further large- scale operations left the Croat government with an urgent need to pacify their 'state'. The Chetnik bands, over whom Mihailovic had little influence (let alone control) were willing to negotiate in view of their extremely vulnerable position and their desire to revenge themselves on the Partisans. Agreements were concluded between the Croats and the nationalists which reflected little but their mutual hatred of the Communists, the desire of the Serb nationalist leaders to protect the population from further slaughter at the hands of the Ustashe and a need for both sides to recover after many months of almost uninterrupted fighting. The fundamental antipathies between the two parties were in no way altered, and they continued to clash with increasing frequency during the summer. Despite clauses in the agreements dealing with armed collaboration against the Partisans, such actions were infrequent and generally ad hoc. For detailed analyses of the situation, see L. Karchmar, op. cit, pp.498 508; M. Milazzo, op. cit, rjp.78-81, 109; A. Miletic, op. cit, pp.138 44; P. Kacavenda, 'Saradnja Cetnika i Ustasa u Bosni 1942. godine' [Chetnik Ustasha Cooperation in Bosnia in 1942], Vqjnoistorijski Glasnik, 1966 (5) pp.38-50; I. Avakumovic, op. cit, pp.45-8; J. Tomasevic, The Chetniks, pp.226-9. See also P. Hehn, op. cit, pp.99 126 for an excellent indication of the contradictions which existed within Axis policy during this period. 162. WO208/2014 D. Talbot-Rice minute, 13 May 1942. 163. PREM3/510/12 PM's personal minute M220/2, 2 June 1942; Report, 'The Situation in Yugoslavia', 2 June 1942. 164. Ibid. 165. Ibid, letter A. Brooke to W. Churchill, 16 June 1942.

6 ALIENATION

1. Lieutenant Rapotec, the senior member of the 'Henna' mission, finally succeeded in reaching Turkey on 7 July, seeing the Yugoslav Consul-General in Istanbul three days later. Travelling via Jerusalem, he arrived in Cairo on 14 July (S. Pavlowitch, 'Lieutenant Rapotec', pp.80-1). SOE's Middle East organisation was able to get fairly detailed information about his trip from Rapotec himself and from those Yugoslavs in Istanbul and Cairo to whom Rapotec talked, but H. Williams 'The Special Operations Executive and Yugoslavia, 1941- 1945'. unpublished PhD dissertation, University of South- Notes and References 263

amption 1994, pp.48 51 suggests that relatively little use was made of it at higher levels. SIS may also have been receiving some intelligence from a transmitter being operated by the nationalists near Split, although SOE implied that it itself was receiving nothing from this source in early November (ibid, p.l48n; F0371/33472 R7571/178/92 - SOE appreciation, for• warded by P. Boughey to Foreign Office, 5 November 1942). 2. On Robertson/Radojevic, see WO202/509 - Mihailovic tel. no.967 of 14 November 1942; F0371/59469 R10672/170/92 'Note on Despatch of Captain Charles Robertson to Yugoslavia' by S. W. Bailey, 16 July 1946; CAB101/126 - Yugoslav Historical Report, pp.9 10; TDM, pp.387 8; J. Amery, Approach March (London, 1973) pp.261 -2; M. Lees, The Rape of Serbia (New York, 1990) pp. 190-193. 3. TDM, p.387; J. Amery, op. cit, p.261. In WO202/509 tel. no.967 of 14 November 1942, Mihailovic referred to him as 'our former expelled citizen'. 4. M. Lees, op. cit, p.36, 41, 190. Lees, drawing his information from V Ivanovic, IX -Memoirs of a Yugoslav (London, 1977) pp.255—6, states that Radojevic was recruited by F. W. D. Deakin. Amery, op. cit, p.261, however suggests that it was Bailey who was responsible. If this is true, then it must have been at the very end of 1941, for Bailey only arrived in New York after the USA had entered the war (S. W. Bailey, Discussion 'Following Sweet- Escott', British Policy, p.212). That in his 1946 report Bailey merely notes that Radojevic was recruited by SOE New York, rather than by himself, suggests that Lees' information is more accurate. 5. J. Amery, op. cit, p.261. In 1946 Bailey wrote that 'if not an actual member of the Jugoslav Communist Party, [Radojevic] had been an active fellow- traveller and organiser for some 15 years'. In 1944 he unambiguously stated that Robertson was a Communist (WO208/2018A Bailey Report, April 1944, Appendix 3). WO208/2Q14 - minute by the Director of Military Intelligence, 25 June 1942, notes that Terence Maxwell, head of SOE Cairo, had mentioned that his organisation was attempting at that time to insert 'selected personnel as mediators' between Mihailovic and the Partisans. In the absence of other missions at this time, this must be a reference to Radojevic. 6. F0371/59469 R10672/170/92 Bailey Report, July 1946; K. Merrick, Flights of the Forgotten: Special Duties Operations in World War Two (London, 1989) p. 156. According to J. Amery, op. cit, p.261, Radojevic's previous employment had been as a ship's wireless operator. This appears to be confirmed by the memoirs of the shipping magnate who put forward Radojevic's name as a potential recruit for SOE (V. Ivanovic, op. cit, p.255). However, Michael Lees, op. cit, p. 190, says that he had to be taught wireless telegraphy from scratch while in Cairo. While there Radojevic was beaten up by other Yugoslav personnel, believed by SOE officers to be . Radojevic himself claimed that they were Communists J. Amery, op. cit, p.261). M. Lees, op. cit, pp. 192-3 suggests that Radojevic had himself deliberately beaten up in order to deceive SOE as to his true political affiliations. 7. F0371/59469 Rl0672/170/92 - Bailey Report, July 1946; WO202/128 - tel. no.319 F.1391A, r. London 128, 23 July 1942. 8. F0371/59469 Rl0672/170/92 Bailey Report, July 1946. Notes and References

F0371/59469 R10672/170/92 - Bailey Report, July 1946. Radojevic was apparently unable ever to develop this ink. See B. Davidson, Special Operations Europe (London, 1980) p.81 for one possible explanation as to why not. K. Merrick op. cit, p. 157. Mihailovic acknowledged the safe arrival of 'Captain Rots' (clearly, 'Robertson') the next day (WO202/128 - tel. no.327 F.1412A, r. London 208, 30 July 1942). M. Lees, op. cit, p. 191; CAB101/126, p.9. According to Mihailovic, the Yugoslav Government had not given their consent to Radojevic's despatch {TDM, p.388). This appears to be confirmed by %bornik, tom. 14, book 1, p.631 (extract of report concerning information received from Captain A. Slijepcevic, 20 September 1942). In a telegram to Cairo of 9 November 1942, Radojevic himself stated that 'Colonel Rakic [commander of Yugoslav forces in the Middle East] was not pleased with my departure for Yugoslavia before I left.' (WO202/356 - tel. COLLABORATE ARDE unnumbered, 9 November, repeated London B1/3007, 10 November 1942). In a message of 12 November, Radojevic noted: 'For the last time I repeat to you that MVIC [sic] cannot be at all the man of the ALLIES in the BALKANS' [My italics] (WO202/356 - tel. COLLABORATE ARDE unnumbered, 12 November, repeated London Bl/3103). See also WO202/355 - tel. ARCHDUKE ARDE no. 11 of 18 October, repeated London Bl/2136, 19 October 1942. WO208/2018A - Bailey Report, April 1944, Appendix 3; CAB 101/126, p.9. WO202/356 - tel. COLLABORATE ARDE unnumbered, 9 November 1942, repeated London Bl/3006, Bl/3013 and Bl/3014, 10 November 1942. Mihailovic alleged that 'Robertson' had 'stated in my presence that he is a Communist publicly and openly. He has censured me and the Yugoslav Army calling us gangsters. He has... put himself in touch with the Com• munist chiefs who must answer for the crimes already committed against our people.' Radojevic protested that Mihailovic's accusations were 'based on banalities ... the truth is either that he fears the truth or fears me' (ibid.). On 14 November Mihailovic signalled to his Prime Minister: 'The BRITISH Captain Charles ROBERTSON alias our former expelled citizen Branislav RADOJEVIC on the very first day after his arrival at my head• quarters began to be engaged in activity of an illicit nature. In my presence he personally declared himself a Communist. He is making public and open propaganda in the ranks of the JUGOSLAV Army and even in my head• quarters. He has many times insulted the JUGOSLAV Army, myself and my assistants, calling us gangsters and other impolite expressions. He is trying to contact the COMMUNISTS and himself asserts that he has a connection with some COMMUNISTS although he is at my headquarters. This is very suspicious in view of the intentions of the COMMUNISTS. For this reason, I have informed the BRITISH liaison officer Major HUDSON of this. Please intervene with the BRITISH government to have him removed as soon as possible from JUGOSLAV territory and immediately relieved of all official duties.' See WO202/509 - tel. no.967, 14 November 1942. See also TDM, pp.387-8. Notes and References 265

15. WO202/356 - tel. GESH 151 of 8 November (rptd London Bl/3008, 10 November 1942) and GESH 192 of 16 November (rptd London B1/3266, 17 November 1942). 16. F0371/59469 Rl0672/170/92 - Bailey Report, July 1946; WO208/ 2018A - Bailey Report, April 1944, Appendix 3; M. Lees, op. cit, pp.192-193. 17. S. Vlahovic, letter to South Slav Journal, vol.3 no.2, June 1980, p.54; S. Vlahovic, 'Audiatur et altera pars - British wartime policy towards Yugo• slavia', South Slav Journal, vol.2 no.3, July 1979, p.7. 18. CAB101/126, p.9. 19. Ibid, citing MacKenzie, pp. 186-7. 20. M. Wheeler, Britain and the War for Yugoslavia 1940-1943 (New York, 1980) p. 183, 186; S. Bailey, Discussion 'Following Barker, Bailey, Maclean and Taylor', British Policy, p.235. 21. For example, SOE's highly critical appreciation of Mihailovic's activities, forwarded by Peter Boughey to the Foreign Office, 5 November 1942. This paper is explicitly stated in the covering letter to have been based on 'information culled from telegrams received from General Mihailovic, Major Hudson, and his assistant, Captain Robertson, during the months of September and October'. See F0371/33472 R7571/178/92. Radojevic was not by any means Hudson's 'assistant', being able to send his own signals in his own code whenever he liked. If SOE London actually believed that Hudson had a degree of control over Radojevic, this may explain why it did not treat the latter's messages with more reserve. 22. Of course, this does not apply to those messages specifically identified as having been sent by Major Hudson (for example, F0371/33470 R5958/ 178/92 and R5973/178/92). But even in these cases, as will be seen, SOE could sometimes be accused of misrepresenting Hudson's words (for example, F0371/33473 R8181/178/92). 23. WO202/355 - tel. ARCHDUKE ARDE no.ll, 18 October, repeated London B1/2136, 19 October 1942: 'Partisans very strong in EAST SERBIA near NISH and PIROT. Near VALJEVO Doctor DOSAN PANTIC commands a strong Partisan unit.' This was at a time when Partisan strength in the whole of Serbia probably did not exceed 600 men (see L. Karchmar, Draza Mihailovic and the Rise of the Chetnik Movement 1941— 1942, PhD dissertation, Stanford University, 1973 p.371 n). 24. The three members of this mission were Captain Dimitrije Naumovic, Lieutenant Velimir Vemic (both Serbs) and a wireless operator, Corporal Parol (a Slovene). They had been recruited by MI6's Cairo office from among the dissident supporters of the ousted Yugoslav premier, General Simovic, in May 1942. As various correspondence shows, SIS considered their despatch a matter of some importance. Whether the British knew at this time that one of the team, Captain Naumovic, was carrying a letter addressed to Nedic's Minister of the Interior, Milan Acimovic, is unknown, but in any case such a letter was found on Naumovic in June. It had been written by General Bora Mirkovic, one of Simovic's supporters and ex commander-in-chief of Yugoslav forces in the Middle East, and it apparently called on Nedic to render assistance to Mihailovic. The Yugoslav Prime Minister, Slobodan Jovanovic, found out about the letter from his 266 Notes and References

own appointee as Yugoslav C-in-C in the Middle East, Colonel Rakic, and attempted to use it in his campaign against the mutinous personnel in Cairo. Ultimately, however, Rakic appears to have been convinced of Naumovic's loyalty, and the mission was despatched - it is not known whether or not the letter was carried with them. Unfortunately, due either to a navigational error of fairly colossal proportions or deliberate British sabotage, the team was dropped in Hercegovina rather than over Jagodina in central Serbia. No contact seems to have been made with Acimovic or Nedic. This is just the bare bones of the story, but for those who wish to trace it in detail, the following files are of relevance; F0536/7/3627/G passim; F0921/24, various documents; F0371/33456 R3518/151/92; F0371/33458 R4830/151/92; F0371/33459 R5183/151/92 and R5511/151/92; F0371/33485 R5842/972/92. See also N. Plecas, 'S mora i iz vazduha u porobljenu otadzbinu' [By sea and from the Air into the Occupied Homeland'], Glasnik SIKD Njegos, vol.5, June 1960, p.40; %bornik, tom. 14, book 1, p.618, 628, 839; WO202/357 - tel. EMB 136 of 25 January and EMB 137 of 26 January 1943. Interestingly, according to M. Kay, op. cit, p.73, SIS' Major Long - a strong supporter of this mission - was a member of the 'Cambridge Comintern'. Is it possible that he deliberately supported the despatch of this team in order to discredit Mihailovic? It is certainly true that the Soviet government's first attacks on Mihailovic were based on his supposed links with Nedic, not the Italians. 25. N. Plecas, op. cit, p.42; WO202/128 - tel. no.471, r. London 26 August 1942. See also tel. no.525, r. London 1 September 1942). 26. Captain Slijepcevic and Sergeant Lazarevic were dropped into the mountains, the stronghold of Major Dragutin Keserovic's Chetniks. See N. Plecas, op. cit, p.43; Zbornik, tom. 14, book 1, pp.623- 33; WO208/2018A transcript excerpts from Slijepcevic's trial, 1 August 1945; WO202/128 tel. no.585 of 4 September 1942. The two officers and two NCOs parachuted to Mihailovic's headquarters on 5 September were Lieutenant Nedeljko Plecas, Sub-Lieutenant Jova Trbojevic and sergeants Tripkjo and Vojislav Pavlovic. The parachutes of the Pavlovic brothers appear to have become entangled, causing them both to be killed when jumping. A minor incident was created when news of their deaths was broadcast over the BBC on 17 September, leading to a 'disastrous' fall in morale among the other Yugoslavs who were waiting to be dropped into the country. See N. Plecas, op. cit, p.43; K. Merrick, op. cit, p. 158; WO202/ 128 - tel. no.628 of 14 September 1942; F0536/6/G3611 passim. 21'. Miladinovic and Kacarevic were dropped on 22/23 September, apparently to help Mihailovic in his sabotage campaign against lines of communication in Serbia. See N. Plecas, op. cit, p.44. 28. F0371/33471 R6695/178/92 - memorandum forwarded by Major P. Boughey (SOE) to P. Dixon, 5 October 1942; A. Eden minute, 14 October 1942. 29. WrO208/2018A Bailey Report, April 1944, Appendix 23, p.24. 30. Slijepcevic became Mihailovic's chief of the adjutant section, while Kankaras took on the role of chief cryptographer. Plecas left for Dalmatia in late November, taking with him a radio set with which it was hoped to establish a link between SOE Cairo and Ilija Trifunovic-Bircanin. See L. Notes and References 267

Karchmar, op. cit, p.527; WO202/356 - tel. COLLABORATE 43, 19 November, rptd London B1/3335, 20 November 1942. An escaped British prisoner of war, who had been with Keserovic on Kopaonik for some months, later noted that while Slijepcevic may have contacted Cairo when he first landed, he felt sure that after one or two days he no longer did so (WO202/157 - Interrogation Report of Sgt. W. F. Sayers, CSDIC/E/2/13/ 0444, 21 April 1944). In any case, Slijepcevic appears to have had an extremely jaundiced view of British intentions in the Balkans, which would hardly have made him the most reliable of agents (See N. Plecas op. cit, p.43). 31. The wireless operators dropped to Majevica appear to have lost contact with Mihailovic's headquarters in Montenegro by mid-September (F0371/ 33473 R8181/178/92; WO202/356 - tel. GESH 177 of 17 November, repeated London B1/3242, 17 November 1942). Captain Dimitrije Naumovic was primarily interested in Axis troop and munitions transport movements (F0536/7/3627/G - letter J. A. F. Ennals [SIS] to G. Rendel, 16 March 1943), while Vemic was more concerned with sabotage and intelligence-gathering carried out by the Chetniks (WO202/357 - tel. EMB unnumbered, repeated London B1/300, 15 February 1943). It might be added that the Yugoslav sappers dropped to Suvobor apparently lacked useful employment until mid-1943 (L. Karchmar, op. cit, p.617n). 32. Full text of letter is quoted in TDM, p. 122, 466-7. 33. Zbornik, tom. 14, book 1, p.836 - tel. V. K. no.31, Jovanovic to Mihailovic, 4 June 1942. See also M. Wheeler, op. cit, pp. 171-172 and F. Deakin, Embattled Mountain, p. 149. In August, presumably at SOE's request, Jovanovic despatched a telegram to his Minister of War noting that it was 'indispensable' that the latter cooperate with Hudson if any progress was to be achieved (Zbornik, tom. 14, book 1, p.841 - tel. D. V. K. no.86, Jovanovic to Mihailovic, 20 August 1942). Thoroughly disillusioned and embittered by SOE's perceived failure to back him up with Mihailovic during the pre• ceding months, Hudson later suggested that 'The D.S.O. was to keep my mouth shut' (S. K. Pavlowitch, 'D. T Hudson', p.266). 34. Lt. Lofts, two British NCO wireless operators (Sergeants Hainsworth and Emly) and a Yugoslav sergeant (Slamnik) were dropped on 26 September. This mission was also used to assist Mihailovic with his internal commu• nications. See K. Merrick op. cit, p. 159; N. Plecas, op. cit, p.44; W. Roberts, Tito3 Mihaibvic and the Allies, 1941-1945 (New Jersey, 1973) p.70; WO208/2018A - Bailey report, April 1944, Appendix 3. Both F. Deakin, Embattled Mountain, p. 150 and M. Wheeler, op. cit, p. 183 erroneously date the despatch of this mission at the end of August. 35. See F. Verna, 'Yugoslavia Under Italian Rule 1941-1943: Civil and Military Aspects of the Italian Occupation', PhD dissertation University of Cali- fornea, pp.87-105 (Slovenia), 133-52 (Kosovo-Metohija), 164-79 (Mon• tenegro), 275-366 (Dalmatia and Croatia). 36. M. Djilas, Wartime, pp.21-58; F. Verna, op. cit, pp. 180-217; L. Karchmar, op. cit, pp.373-85. 37. F. Verna, op. cit, p. 199, 214. S. Clissold, Whirlwind, p.80 estimates guerrilla losses at 5000 killed and 7000 wounded. This appears excessive. 38. On the occupation system, see F. Verna, op. cit, p. 176, 194, 209; M. Djilas, op. cit, pp.21-2; M. Deroc, British Special Operations Explored: Yugoslavia in 268 Notes and References

Turmoil 1941-1943 and the British Response (New York, 1988) p.46; L. Karchmar, op. cit, p.373. On the reprisals, see F. Verna, op. cit, p.211, 216; M. Djilas, op. cit, p.35; L. Karchmar, op. cit, pp.384-85, 422 n; I. Jukic, The Fall of Yugoslavia (New York, 1974) p. 100. The catalyst for the rising was the proclamation of Montenegrin independence on 12 July, but it was the result of a number of factors - border readjustments, growing unrest arising from the Moslem, Albanian and Ustasha atrocities (exacerbated by a large influx of Serb refugees); Communist agitation and a feeling of Slav brotherhood towards the USSR; contempt for the Italian performance in the April war and a feeling that Montenegrin honour had not been satisfied at that time; traditional Montenegrin bellicosity; the availability of leaders resulting from the release of Montenegrin officers from Italian and German captivity; and the widespread availability of arms among the population. 39. F. Verna, op. cit, pp.146-50; 207; M. Djilas, Wartime, p.35, 40-41, 48; M. Milazzo, The Chetnik movement and the Yugoslav Resistance (London, 1975) pp.46- 47; L. Karchmar, op. cit, p.383, 386; M. Deroc, op. cit, pp.48-9. 40. Even Partisan commanders acknowledged Djurisic's contribution to the anti-Italian operations (M. Djilas, Wartime, pp.29, 150). 41. For examples, see M. Djilas, Wartime, pp.41, 45-48; I. Jukic, op. cit, p. 121. 42. L. Karchmar, op. cit, p.374, 378-82, 386-7. 43. L. Karchmar, op. cit, pp.387-8; M. Djilas, Wartime, pp.28-9, 56-7, 60-2, 84; S. Clissold op. cit, p.81. Even Communist Party members did not prove immune to harsh treatment (M. Djilas, Wartime, p.87). 44. In The Chetniks, p.209, Jozo Tomasevic takes the line that immediately after the rising the 'pro-Serbian nationalists admitted defeat and wanted to quit: the Partisans were determined to continue the fight'. He goes on to allege that as a result: 'Sometime [sic] in the autumn the nationalists established contact with the Italians, offering their assistance against the Partisans.' This 'trend toward collaboration was greatly strengthened after the Montenegrins heard about the split between Mihailovic's Chetniks and the Partisans in Serbia'. He acknowledges (p.210) that not all of those killed by the Partisans were collaborators, but the firm implication behind these statements is that the nationalists were compromised from an early stage. While nobody would question the fact that the Montenegrin separatists (the ^elenasi, or '') collaborated with the Italians from the start of the latter's occu• pation, there is very little evidence of agreements between the Italians and the large majority of the nationalists until 1942. Nor could the Partisans be said to have indulged in any significant anti-Italian operations between August and the start of December 1941. Even then, when they unsuc• cessfully attacked the Italians at Plevlje (in cooperation with some nation• alists) they were not so much interested in causing the Italians losses as ensuring the transfer of a large number of troops to Serbia, where their presence was demanded by the Partisan command. Had they been able to accomplish this without the necessity of first attacking Plevlje, they would very probably have done so. See M. Milazzo, op. cit, pp.44—7; F. Verna, op. cit, pp.238-40; L. Karchmar, op. cit, pp.389-90; M. Djilas, Wartime, pp.66-7, 116-17. 45. F0536/23 - Report by Col. M. Zujovic, Sept/Oct 1943, Allied/F/208, p. 17; L. Karchmar, op. cit, pp.389-94, 425-6 n; I. Avakumovic, op. cit. Notes and References 269 p.27; F. Maclean, Disputed Barricade, p. 175, P. Auty, Tito, p. 173; M. Djilas, Wartime, pp.83-5. See £bornik, tom. 14, book 1, pp.93-100 for the original text of this order (Str. Pov. Dj. Br. 370, 20 December 1942). Virtually all authors, Yugoslav or otherwise, accept that the text is genuine and that Mihailovic issued the order himself. See V Djuretic, Saveznici i Jugoslovenska ratna drama [The Allies and the Yugoslav War Drama] (Belgrade, 1985), p. 123; J. Marjanovic, Draza Mihailovic, p.213; J. Marjanovic, Ustanak, pp.189, 395; M. Milazzo, op. cit, pp.46-7, 91-2; J. Tomasevic, The Chetniks, p.170, 210. However, L. Karchmar, op. cit, pp.396-8 & 427-30 n makes a convincing case for it having been forged. His argument is apparently reinforced by the orders issued by Mihailovic on 15 October, which appointed Djurisic and Lasic as Mihailovic's representatives in Montenegro and the Sandzak. On this document, in typewritten Cyrillic script, is added the note: 'Received and put into action, Commander, Infantry Captain 1st class [ie. Djurisic], Pov. Br. 1, 7-1-42 [7 January 1942].' Presumably, if Djurisic had actually met Mihailovic on 20 December 1941, as is often claimed, the note would be dated around that time, rather than almost three weeks later. See %bornik, tom. 14, book 1, p.39. In any case, if Karchmar is right, then this was not the only time that Djurisic faked orders. Bill Bailey, senior British liaison officer to Mihailovic during much of 1943, concluded in 1944 that Djurisic had done the same thing in the second half of February 1943 (F0371/ 44282 R20526/11/92). L. Karchmar, op. cit, pp.398-403; M. Milazzo, op. cit, pp.47-8, 81-2; M. Djilas, Wartime, pp.150, 155-9. In February 1942 (and again in March) the Partisan headquarters issued orders to their troops in Montenegro to suspend operations against the Italians and concentrate on destroying the Chetniks (S. Pavlowitch, Yugoslavia (London 1971), p. 127; S. K. Pavlowitch, 'London-Moscow through the Fog of Yugoslavia's Wartime Drama: Djur- etic's Controversial History', Storia delle Relazioni Internazionali, III - 1987/2, p.380.). F0536/23 - Report by Col. M. Zujovic, Sept/Oct 1943, Allied/F/208, pp. 17-18. As in Hercegovina, the Italian guarantee to supply food to the population of what was a food-deficiency region, as well as to the Serb refugees who had fled there from Croat and Moslem persecution, was a strong influence on the nationalists' policies. Italian-Chetnik agreements were signed on behalf of Stanisic on 17 February and 6 March (texts and comment inj. Marjanovic, The Collaboration, pp.41-3; J. Marjanovic, Draza Mihailovic, pp.235-6; F Verna, op. cit, pp.250-2; WO204/8109 - The Cetniks, pp.45-53). Djurisic signed a similar agreement in March (L. Karchmar, op. cit, p.402). A proclamation issued by the Italian military governor of Montenegro, Pirzio Biroli, on 4 December 1941 stated that: 'It is now up to the population to counter the rebels by every means, even with arms, if they do not wish to become involved in the reprisals which the rebels can provoke on the part of the Italian troops.' (F Verna, op. cit, p.233). Such threats would have made the nationalists even more determined to eject or destroy the Partisans before the Italians repeated their actions of August 1941. It ought to be acknowledged that while on the whole the Italians behaved well towards the Yugoslav population, such 270 Notes and References

threats were not idle ones, and they were sometimes capable of brutality when provoked (see, for example, P. Urbane, 'Slovene Losses 19411945', South Slav Journal vol.11 no.2-3 (40-41), summer-autumn 1988, p.35). 49. L. Karchmar, op. cit, pp.401 -2; J. Marjanovic, Draza Mihailovic, p.236. 50. M. Djilas, op. cit, pp. 170-84; L. Karchmar, op. cit, pp.404-06; D. Sotirovich, Trahison au Sommet (Paris, 1972) p. 128; J. Tomasevic, The Chetniks, p.161. 51. L. Karchmar, op. cit, pp.413-14; TDM, p.136, 142. In September 1942 Major Hudson confirmed that Djurisic had issued propaganda leaflets condemning Mihailovic for his collaboration with the Partisans, and that it was only through the activities of Mihailovic's delegates and by 'arriving [in Montenegro] in time to breathe hell and fire at the departing Communists' that the Yugoslav Minister of War was able to gain acceptance by the local nationalists (F0371/33470 R5958/178/92). The same stance was taken by the Hercegovinan and Dalmatian Chetnik leaders when Mihailovic estab• lished more regular contact with them in the summer (L. Karchmar, op. cit, p.715). 52. TDM, p. 144. See also ibid, p. 146, 164, 303. 53. M. Milazzo, op. cit, pp.90-5; TDM, pp.161 2; S. Pavlowitch, Yugoslavia, pp. 130-2. 54. For a detailed analysis of Italian-Chetnik relations, and the forces motiv• ating their 'collaboration', see L. Karchmar, op. cit, pp.702-18. 55. The complex developments in these areas during 1941 are traced in detail by M. Milazzo, op. cit, pp.48-60 and L. Karchmar, op. cit, pp.445~52. See also F. Verna, op. cit, pp.367-407; J. Tomasevic, The Chetniks, p.213; S. Pavlowitch, 'Lieutenant Rapotec', p.87, 96. 56. On developments during the first half of 1942, see M. Milazzo, op. cit, pp.61 81; L. Karchmar, op. cit, pp.453-7, 709-17; F. Verna, op. cit, pp.408-16; S. Pavlowitch, 'Lt. Rapotec', pp.82 8; F0536/12/216 Report by Gen. M. Roatta (commander of the Italian 2nd Army), February 1944, pp. 1-2; D. Martin, Ally Betrayed, p. 136, 141. 57. In correspondence with his high command in March 1942 General Roatta (see note 56) stated that the Chetniks and Communists should be allowed to 'slaughter each other'. In the same report he expressed fears that 'these people [the Chetniks], armed, battle seasoned, and flushed with success' might turn against his own troops. See F. Verna, op. cit, pp.407-8; J. Tomasevic, The Chetniks, p.215. 58. Telegrams despatched by Hudson during June would presumably have been burned in the 'Cairo bonfires' the following month, when the threat posed by Rommel caused SOE to destroy substantial quantities of documents. Nevertheless, the first of his signals to appear in the War Office files relating to this period (WO202/355) are not dated until mid-October. Summaries of his earlier messages were made available to the Foreign Office from mid- June (F0371/33467 R4180/178/92), as were at least some of the original signals (they are apparently in RJ 142). Until early 1943 SOE London appears to have adopted the practice of producing reworded versions of Hudson's telegrams, presumably in an attempt to make their contents more easily comprehensible. In the process SOE sometimes failed to retain the emphasis contained in the original messages. Notes and References 271

59. From the fragmentary records, it would appear that Hudson sent about 100 telegrams in the period June October 1942 (about 25 a month). This is not a large number when one considers that some would have dealt with routine matters (signals schedules and the like) and that others covered events in Serbia during the first half of 1942. See WO202/355. 60. Having sent 213 telegrams (not all of which were received) up to 1 June 1942, Mihailovic despatched another 1000 between then and 1 January 1943. Of these perhaps 20 per cent contained useful intelligence or comment, the rest having as their subject matter endless lists of promotions, decorations, names of traitors to be condemned over the BBC and so on. See WO202/128 and WO202/509 passim. 61. This would appear to be borne out by the SOE appreciation of 17 June 1942 in F0371/33467 R4188/178/92. 62. D. T. Hudson, St Antony's discussion, p. 12; S. K. Pavlowitch, 'D. T. Hudson', p.266. This, of course, had similarities with Mihailovic's own attitude. 63. F. Deakin, Embattled Mountain, pp. 149-51; S. K. Pavlowitch, 'D. T. Hudson', p.271. This attitude is particularly evident in Hudson's messages cited in F0371/33468 R5333/178/92 SOE appreciation, 20 July 1942; WO202/ 128 - tel. no.319, F.1391A, r. London 128, 23 July 1942. 64. F. Deakin, Embattled Mountain, p. 151. 65. N. Plecas, letter to South Slav Journal, vol.3 no.l, March 1980, pp.40-1. David Martin remarked upon this event as early as 1946 (D. Martin, Ally Betrayed, p.141). See also WO202/128 - tel. no.622, 12 September 1942 and no.38; no.628, 14 September 1942; WO202/509 tel. no.699, 25 Sep• tember 1942; F0371/33471 R6695/178/92 memorandum, P. Boughey [SOE] to P. Dixon, 5 October 1942. 66. FO371/44250 R4160/8/92 - letter R. S. Stevenson to O. Sargent, 25 February 1944 and no.38; minutes on letter by A. Eden, A. Cadogan and O. Sargent. See also S. Bailey, Discussion 'Following Barker, Bailey, Maclean and Taylor', British Policy, p.243, who confirms that Mihailovic's 'collaboration with the enemy was officially condoned' in July 1942 (the date, as he admits, is not definite). 67. F0371/33467 R4180/178/92 - extract of minutes of 3rd SOE TO com• mittee meeting, 16 June 1942. This committee was established as a result of the SOE Foreign Office 'Treaty' of May 1942, under which SOE agreed to inform the Foreign Office of all developments of political significance in occupied and enemy states and to seek FO approval for any of its own operations which might affect FO interests in such countries. See D. Stafford, Britain and European Resistance, p.77, 86. Copies of the first Hudson telegrams appear to be in RJ 142. 68. Zbornik, tom. 14, book 1, p.836: tel. V. K. no.31, Jovanovic to Mihailovic, 4 June 1942. 69. F0371/33455 R7445/21/92 - Hudson telegram, 1 November 1942. See also F. Deakin, Embattled Mountain, p. 151. 70. F0371/33467 R3976/178/92. Mihailovic's complaints were relayed by Rendel in a letter to Douglas Howard on 10 June. The telegrams to which he referred were numbers 219 and 221 (see WO202/128 tel. no.219 and 221, both r. London 4836, 6 June 1942). 272 Notes and References

71. F0371/33467 R3976/178/92 - C. L. Rose minute, 18 June and P. Dixon minute, 19 June 1942. Rose dwelt at some length on the appeal of the Partisans to the young, who were thought to be keener on fighting rather than 'twiddling their thumbs' at home while awaiting the 'day of jud• gement'. He suggested that to many both Mihailovic and the Yugoslav government were symbols of the old order, which was 'hated and despised'. 72. F0371/33467 R4188/178/92 - letter Glenconner to D. Howard, 23 June 1942. 73. Ibid, draft letter D. Howard to Glenconner, 13 July 1942: 'We entirely agree with the conclusion reached, that we should continue our policy of full support for General Mihailovic. It seems quite clear from all the reports coming in that there is no other figure or group round which it would be possible at present to rally all the forces of resistance in Yugoslavia.' Due to the crisis created by the Soviet attack on Mihailovic (see below) this letter was not in fact sent, but it can be taken to represent the opinion of the Foreign Office at this time. 74. The Russians were of course aware of Partisan allegations regarding Mihailovic and the other Chetnik commanders, but they had until summer clearly regarded the moment as inopportune to launch an attack on the Yugoslav government's Minister of War. Their reasons for this policy are probably to be found in a desire not to upset the negotiations for the Anglo- Soviet Treaty which were going on in May, their attempts to establish closer relations with the Royal Yugoslav Government (which were effectively scotched by the British), their scepticism regarding Partisan claims and the fact that they still remained at least partially committed to the establishment of a united resistance front. See S. Clissold, Documents, p. 143, 145-9, 156-7; K. St Pavlowitch, 'Yugoslav-Soviet Relations 1939-1943 as seen in British sources', Slavonic and East European Review, vol.56 no.3, July 1978, pp.416-20; S. K. Pavlowitch, 'Momcilo Nincic and the European Policy of the Yugoslav Government in Exile', Slavonic and East European Review, vol.62 no.3, July 1984, pp.413-20. 75. F0371/33467 R4400/178/92 - letter G. Rendel to O. Sargent, 30 June 1942. Rendel had been promoted to the rank of ambassador to the Yugoslav government on 15 June (F0371/33497 R4020/3405/92 - letter G. Rendel to A. Eden, 17 June 1942). 76. F0371/33467 R4400/178/92 - tel. Foreign Office to A. Clark Kerr no. 1045, 12 July 1942. 77. F0371/33468 R4788/178/92 - note handed to I. Maisky by A. Eden, 27 July 1942. 78. L. Karchmar, op. cit, pp.406-7; M. Djilas, Wartime, p. 182. 79. M. Djilas, Wartime, p. 182; W Roberts, op. cit, p.62. The radio station 'Free Yugoslavia' operated at first from the Comintern building in Moscow, then from Kuibyshev and later from Tiflis (L. Karchmar, op. cit, p.91 On). L. Karchmar, op. cit, p.912n. discusses various dates for this broadcast, and opts for 22 July. 80. F0371/33477 R6439/517/92 - precis of OSS Memorandum no.68 on General Mihailovic and the Slavic Press in the USA; F0371/33468 R4873/178/92 - extract from the Swedish newspaper Ny Dag of 20 July, forwarded to the FO 22 July 1942; FO371/33470 R6262/178/92 - New Notes and References 273

York Times article, 20 July 1942. Such articles not surprisingly brought forth a strong protest by the Royal Yugoslav Government, especially in the , where the press campaign was most significant. See C. Fotic, The War we lost - Yugoslavia's Tragedy and the Failure of the West (New York, 1948) pp.184—8; Foreign Relations of the United States, Diplomatic Papers, 1942: Vol. Ill - Europe (Washington 1961), pp.806-7, 811-13. 81. F0371/33468 R4873/178/92 - P. Dixon minute, 24 July 1942. 82. F0371/33468 R4788/178/92 - P. Dixon minute, 13 July 1942. For Dixon's attitude in May, see F0371/33466 R2855/178/92 P. Dixon minute 6 May 1942. 83. F0371/33468 R4873/178/92 - P. Dixon minute, 23 July 1942. 84. F0371/33468 R5018/178/92 - letter Major J. S. A. Pearson to P. Dixon, 27 July 1942. In strictly military terms Pearson's analysis of Partisan fortunes at this time was not as inaccurate as it might seem. By July Partisan strength in Serbia was down to no more than 500-600 fighters, while the Chetniks had established almost complete control over Montenegro and southern Hercegovina. Throughout large areas of eastern and central Bosnia Partisan activity had been suppressed, and during July German and Croat forces carried out a large-scale clearing operation in the mountains which resulted in very substantial casualties among the insurgents and the civilian population. Even in western Bosnia, where the Partisans maintained an ongoing struggle against the Ustashe and the Chetniks, the situation was not particularly promising. In addition, the Italians launched fairly large- scale attacks on Partisan units in Slovenia during the summer. Only in parts of Slavonia, in Kordun and along the Konjic-Prozor--Travnik/ line in Hercegovina were the Partisans in a favourable position. What Pearson ignored, however, was the inherent political vitality of the Partisan movement, which enabled it to absorb successive setbacks, only to emerge stronger than ever. See P. Hehn, The German struggle Against Yugoslav Guerrillas in World War II (New York, 1979) pp.128-133; P. Kacavenda, 'Saradnja Cetnika i Ustasa u Bosni 1942 godine' [Chetnik-Ustasha Cooperation in Bosnia, 1942] Vojnoistorijski Glasnik, 1966 (5), pp.54-5; M. Djilas, Wartime, p.206; situation maps in WO208/2014. 85. F0371/33468 R4788/178/92 - text of note handed to Maisky by A. Eden, 27 July 1942. Mihailovic's candour regarding his relations with Nedic had not been complete. At the start of January he had urged that the British make propaganda against Nedic, but he appears to have revealed nothing about his conversations with Acimovic in March. On 10 May he signalled that Nedic 'has not his own army; all are secretly with us I have placed a considerable number of my officers in his ranks'. In mid-July, possibly in response to the 'Free Yugoslavia' broadcast, he rejected all allegations of cooperation with traitors and asked that his government denounce Nedic, Ljotic and Pecanac over the BBC. See WO202/128 - tel. no.54, r. London 02, 6 January; no.64, r. London 042, 28 January; no.165 F.1052A, r. London 4344, 10 May (M. Wheeler, op. cit, p.312n for some reason dates this early July); no.310, 15 July 1942; W Roberts, op. cit, p.63. 86. S. Clissold, Documents, pp. 136-7. Mihailovic himself was not personally accused of all of these acts of 'collaboration'; the implication was rather 274 Notes and References

that he was ultimately responsible for the acts of all other 'Chetnik' com• manders. 87. F0371/33490 R5212/1990/92 - I. Maisky to A. Eden, 7 August 1942. H. Williams, op. cit, pp.62-3 hypothesises that the intensification of the Soviet diplomatic and propaganda offensive against Mihailovic in August can be explained by a desire to intensify resistance activities in Yugoslavia at a time when the situation on the eastern front was deteriorating (she describes the Soviet Kharkov offensive of May 1942 as 'not a major victory': it was in fact an utter disaster, and was followed by the rapid advance of Axis forces towards the Caucasus oil fields and the main supply route northwards along the river Volga), but when the British and Americans were unable or unwilling to lauch a 'Second Front' themselves. Faced with such a situation, the Soviets sought a way of drawing Axis forces out of the USSR, and under such circumstances to continue at least tacitly to back Mihailovic at the expense of the Partisans (whose protests at Moscow's propaganda were as loud as ever) seemed no longer to make much sense. 88. F0371/33468 R5165/178/92 A. Coverley Price minute, 6 August 1942. The material upon which such doubts were founded appears to be in two closed files; RJ 362 and R5122/178/92. E. Barker, 'Some Factors..', British Policy, pp.33—4 suggests that these reports were considered at the 8 August meeting. 89. In particular, the report compiled by Hugh Grey in 1944 on British relations with Mihailovic. See F0371/44276 Rl2712/11/92, p.3. See also Sir L. Woodward, British Foreign Policy in the Second World War, Vol.III (London, 1971), p.287. 90. Ibid. 91. This last suggestion appears to have been motivated by Foreign Office attempts to prevent Jovanovic sending a telegram to Mihailovic which implied that the latter should have nothing more to do with the Partisans. Such instructions, it felt, directly contradicted British policy, which was to seek to bring the two parties together. See F0371/33468 R4949/178/92 - various correspondence and minutes, 24 July to 6 August 1942. SOE was horrified by the meeting's recommendation, misinterpreting it to mean that Hudson should make a similar attempt to reconcile the Chetniks and Partisans as he had made in 1941, with near fatal results. In their view, doing so again would terminate Hudson's mission for good. The Foreign Office correctly observed that SOE had missed the point, which was that Hudson should be asked for his opinion as to whether such an approach should be made. See F0371/33469 R5538/178/92 - letter J. Pearson to D. Howard, 20 August; D. Howard minute, 21 August 1942. 92. F0371/33468 R5333/178/92 - Fortnightly SOE appreciation, dated 20 July 1942, forwarded to Foreign Office byj. Pearson, 9 August 1942. 93. F0371/33469 R5474/178/92 memorandum, R. Murray to D. Howard, 19 August 1942. 94. R. M. Kennedy, German Antiguerilla Operations in the Balkans (1941 T 944) (Facsimile edition, Washington 1989), p.21, 67. The situation in Bosnia was by the summer of 1942 slightly more clearly defined. However, the attitude of the Chetnik groups, some of which had contacts with Mihailovic, others of which had none (and who resented all attempts to establish any) was still Notes and References 275 far from uniform. The agreements concluded by many of these groups with the NDH authorities in the spring of 1942 brought relative peace to some areas, but in other regions the Serb nationalist bands resumed anti-Ustasha, and in a few cases anti-German activities. Sometimes they restricted them• selves to threats to attack fortifications (J. Marjanovic, 'The Collaboration, p.67): sometimes they actually carried out military operations, inflicting casualties on the German and Ustasha forces. Some particularly heavy clashes between the Chetniks and Ustashe in eastern and central Bosnia (where Mihailovic's influence was reasonably strong) occurred at the end of August and start of September (WO208/2032A PICME report no.28, 12 May 1944, p. 10; , London, International Military Tribunal (Nuremburg) documents, Case VII (the 'Hostages Case'), document book no.6 vs. Brig. Gen. Curt Ritter von Geitner, document no. 186 (daily German situation reports, August 1942), no. 187 (daily German situation reports, September 1942), no. 188 (10 day German situation reports, July-September 1942); I. Avakumovic, Mihailovic prema Nemackim documentima [Mihailovic in the light of German documents] (London, 1969) pp.56-7; F0371/44279 R16620/11/92 - OSS publication, Captured Chetnik Documents (June 1944), especially documents no. 14 18, 27; Zbornik, tom. 14, book 1, pp.576, 611, 904). Elsewhere, especially in west Bosnia (where of necessity the Chetnik- Croat agreements were reasonably firm, and Mihailovic's influence was weakest - see conclusion, note 12), most of the insurgent activity could be attributed to the Partisans. However, it might be pointed out that the vast majority of the latter's actions were directed against Croat army garrisons, and that the Italians and Germans were attacked only rarely. In military terms, the Croat army performed disgracefully in these engagements, frequently surrendering large quantities of material to the Partisan forces without a struggle. M. Djilas, for example, recalls that they were the 'best-natured and weakest force we were to fight', and states that the Ustashe referred to them as the 'Partisan supply unit'. When Livno was captured by the Partisans on 5 August 1942 some 700 surrendered after the briefest resistance (See Wartime, pp. 194- 195; a mass of other examples can be found in B. Davidson, Partisan Picture (Bedford, 1946) p.35). Similarly, the ex-Partisan general Franjo Tudjman notes {Les Systemes, p.228) that by mid-1942 the Croat army was becoming 'increasingly demor• alised', and that they 'hardly put up any noteworthy resistance to the Partisans'. See also M. Milazzo, op. cit, p. 106 for further evidence of this trend, cited from German documents. German losses in fighting the Par• tisans were, by contrast, fairly insignificant. For example, clearing the Kozara mountains of Partisans during July cost the Germans 33 dead, 80 wounded and 10 missing, and their Croat allies 135 dead, 54 wounded and 7 missing. The Partisans lost 1626 killed in battle and 431 shot in reprisal. Between 9 and 24 August the German armed forces in Croatia lost 2 dead, 12 wounded and 1 missing, the Croats lost 77 dead, 108 wounded and 362 missing, and the insurgents (not identified as Chetniks or Partisans), 1031 killed in battle and 212 shot in reprisal (P. Hehn, op. cit, p. 133, 137). On the situation in Bosnia at this time, see J. Marjanovic, Draza Mihailovic, pp.248 51; J. Tomasevic, The Chetniks, pp.228-9; P. Kacavenda, op. cit, pp.42-4, 46-53. 276 Notes and References

95. This report is withheld from the relevant F0371 file (F0371/33469 R5448/178/92), but H. Grey made a reference to it in 1944 (F0371/ 44276 Rl2712/11/92 H. Grey minute, 9 August 1944). That it was based on Hudson's messages is made clear by a letter from Pearson to Howard of 20 August offering an identical analysis and attributing it to Hudson (F0371/33469 R5538/178/92 - letter J. Pearson to D. Howard, 20 August 1942). 96. F0371/33469 R5427/178/92 - A. Coverley Price minute, 19 August 1942. The original suggestion appears to have been made on RJ 406. 97. F0536/6/G3155A - letter A. Eden to I. Maisky, 20 August 1942. The text of the letter in the F0371 file (R5254/178/92) is withheld from public inspection, but the weeders appear to have missed the copy in the F0536 file cited above. 98. The Yugoslav government had already made their own response, instructing their minister in the Soviet Union on 12 August to put forward Mihailovic's case to the Russians. See S. Clissold, Documents, pp. 137-9; F0371/33469 R5479/178/92). 99. The Soviets' reluctance to reply to Eden may have been motivated by a number of factors. In part their decision may have reflected a desire to avoid creating a diplomatic incident at a moment when the situation on the Russian front was deteriorating (the Germans reached Stalingrad by the start of September), and when the Soviet and Yugoslav governments had just raised their legations to embassy status. There is also evidence to suggest that the Russians remained sceptical of some of the Partisan claims regarding Mihailovic's collaboration. Alternatively, they may simply have believed that 'Free Yugoslavia' and the press could be relied upon to continue the anti-Mihailovic campaign without overt official backing. See J. Erickson, Road to Stalingrad, pp.376-84; S. Clissold, Documents, pp.139—40. See also this chapter, note 87 for a different perspective. 100. Apart from Murray's report, some of Hudson's telegrams, and certain other pieces, much of this material is withheld from public inspection (for example, in RJ 428, 430, 435, 436). The minutes on most of these papers appear to be on RJ 403, although some are cited by Douglas Howard in a report of April 1943 (F0371/37584 R3994/2/92 - D. Howard minute, 29 April 1943). 101. F0371/33469 R5577/178/92 - letter G. Rendel to D. Howard, S0214, 22 August 1942; A. Coverley-Price minute, 26 August 1942; F0371/37584 R3994/2/92 - O. Sargent minute, early September 1942, cited in D. Howard minute, 29 April 1943; F0371/33469 R5817/178/92 - tel. Foreign Office to Minister of State, no.2092, 8 September 1942. The Foreign Office was also initially rather impressed by a highly detailed paper produced by the Yugoslav government rejecting the Russian allegations against Mihailovic (See F0371/33469 R5798/178/92 and minutes thereon). 102. F0371/37584 R3994/2/92 - D. Howard minute, 1 September 1942, cited in D. Howard minute, 29 April 1943. 103. Ibid. 104. F0371 /33469 R5538/178/92 - draft telegram forwarded by J. Pearson to D. Howard, 20 August 1942. Notes and References 277

105. Ibid, Telegram forwarded by J. Pearson to D. Howard, 22 August 1942. 106. The first, like many of Hudson's telegrams from this period, took the form of an SOE appreciation (FO371/33470 R5958/178/92 - J. Pearson to D. Howard, 7 September 1942). The second (upon which the first was in fact partly based), was in its original, slightly mutilated wording, and was received by SOE London on 6 September (F0371/33470 R5973/178/92 - J. Pearson to D. Howard, 8 September 1942). 107. SOE appears quickly to have realised this, and in an apparent attempt to pre-empt any damage, Pearson suggested in the covering letter that Hudson had had 'some slight disagreement' with Mihailovic which might have caused him to speak in 'rather bitter tones'. (F0371/33470 R5958/178/92) 108. It was perhaps a little unfair to castigate the Chetniks for this operation, which was in some ways similar to those being conducted by the Partisan forces as they moved north through western Yugoslavia. The big difference was that the Moslem civilians were also made to suffer, while the Partisans frequently went out of their way to woo them instead (see P. Shoup, Communism and the Yugoslav National Question (New York and London, 1968) pp.65-7). However, the situation in the Foca district had been one of near anarchy from soon after April 1941, and many massacres and counter- massacres had already occurred. See, for example, A. Zulfikarpasic, 'The Road to Foca', South Slav Journal, vol.4 no.l, spring 1980, pp.l9~28 and M. Djilas, Wartime, pp. 139-40. Militarily, the operation was quite impressive, resulting in the annihilation of an entire Ustasha battalion (the 27th). The British were aware that this clash had occurred by mid- September, and SOE knew the unit identity of the Ustasha formation which had been destroyed by the end of the year. See WO208/2014 - Col. Thornton minute, 15 September 1942; WO202/163 - Italian intelligence summary translation, SOE copy Bl/3/1/134/19, D/H134 to D/H18, 23 December 1942. See also I. Avakumovic, op. cit, p.57 and, for a mass of documen• tation, %bornik, tom. 14, book 1 (for example, pp.591-2). 109. FO371/33470 R5973/178/92 - P. Dixon minute, 11 September 1942. 110. F0536/6/G3155A - letter G. Rendel to D. Howard, 23 September 1942. 111. FO371/33470 R6255/178/92 - letter J. Pearson to P. Dixon, 15 Sep• tember 1942. 112. F0371/37584 R3994/2/92 - O. Sargent, 24 September 1942, cited in D. Howard minute, 29 April 1943. In the version given by Howard, the words are 'no matter whether Mihailovic continues to [*] take a more active part in resisting and attacking Axis forces' (that is 'refuse to' omitted at *). This is of course a significant difference, but judging by the most contemporaneous document, Dixon's letter to Pearson of 9 October (which cites Sargent's conclusions almost verbatim), the version I have given is almost certainly correct. The actual minutes have been withheld from public inspection in RJ 484. See also F0371/33471 R7027/178/92 - C. L. Rose minute, 24 October 1942, summarising Sargent's conclusions. As stated, SOE London was informed of this policy decision on 9 October, and responded by welcoming the Foreign Office's 'renewed declaration of support'. See F0371/33470 R5973/178/92 - letter P. Dixon to J. Pearson, 9 October 1942; letter J. Pearson to P. Dixon, 15 October 1942. 113. F0371/37584 R3994/2/92 - D. Howard minute, 29 April 1943. 278 Notes and References

114. S. Bailey, discussion 'Following Barker', British Policy, p.235. It seems rea• sonable to assume that SOE considered 'Robertson' to be behind Hudson's messages. 115. CAB101/126 Yugoslav Historical Report, p.12; F0371/37584 R3994/2/ 92 - D. Howard minute, 29 April 1942; F. Deakin, Embattled Mountain, pMl. 116. R. Maclaren, Canadians Behind Enemy Lines 1939 1945 (Vancouver, 1981), pp. 133-7 gives many details on the recruitment of these men. See also S. Bailey, discussion 'Following Sweet-Escott', British Policy, p.212. 117. WO202/128 tel. no.339, r. London 347, 11 August 1942. F. Deakin, Embattled Mountain, p. 152 dates this message 4 August, gives a rather dif• ferent translation (which does not mention the request for a Yugoslav instructor) and states that it represented a 'veto' on sabotage activities. Even if one accepts that Deakin knew nothing about the orders issued simulta• neously by Mihailovic to his subordinates in Serbia to recruit sabotage teams, his interpretation of this telegram still seems rather unfair. According to M. Wrheeler, op. cit, p. 184, the sabotage request originated in SOE's Cairo headquarters (M04) 'in the first half of September'. It is not known whether it was M04 or SOE's London office which actually drew up the draft telegrams from General Alexander and Prime Minister Jovanovic. If it was Baker Street which was responsible, this might explain why the requests overestimated the importance of the Yugoslav railways to the Axis forces in Africa (see notes 177-92). 118. FO371/33470 R6255/178/92 letter J. Pearson to P. Dixon, 15 Sep• tember 1942. 119. Ibid, draft telegrams forwarded byj. Pearson to P. Dixon, 15 September 1942. 120. FO371/33470 R6315/178/92 letter J. Pearson to P. Dixon, 22 Sep• tember 1942. The telegram as despatched by General Alexander stated inter alia that 'constant sabotage would make an appreciable difference' to the enemy's ability to supply his forces in Africa. WTiile SOE's version had merely noted the need for 'small but constant sabotage', the draft produced for Jovanovic had requested 'constant attacks' on lines of communication. Whether the change was made in order to remove the contradiction between the two messages, or deliberately to strengthen Alexander's appeal, is rather unclear. 121. The texts of the two messages, telegrams D. V. K. Br. 116 (20 September) and D. V K. Br.l 18 (25 September) can be found in ^bormk, tom. 14, book 1, p.848 and 849 respectively. The former stated: 'The British government informs me that their supreme commander in the Middle East, General Alexander, has sent you a personal telegram in which he requests that you attack as much as possible the enemy communication lines. I am convinced that the enemy's communications are at this critical juncture working under heavy strain and that by constant attacks you will be able to make a new contribution to the allied cause.' The second telegram, despatched on 25 September, requested that Mihailovic 'Undertake the greatest possible sabotage measures with the aim of further hampering the arrival of material at Salonika. This is of special significance for the common allied cause.' V Kljakovic cites a letter from Jovanovic to George Rendel, dated 25 Sep• tember, in which the Yugoslav Prime Minister pointed out that attacks on Notes and References 279

lines of communications by Mihailovic's forces would be bound to lead to enemy countermeasures. M. Milazzo also refers to this document, apparently as further evidence of the Yugoslavs' lack of enthusiasm for a sabotage campaign. While it may be true, and indeed understandable, that both the Yugoslav government and Mihailovic were unwilling to expose the Chetnik organisation to German countermeasures unless absolutely necessary, the fact remains that on the same ^Jovanovic did despatch the telegram quoted above. See V Kljakovic, 'Promjena politike Velike Britanije prema Jugoslaviji u prvoj polovici 1943. godine' [The Change in British Policy towards Yugoslavia in the First Half of 1943], Jugoslovenski Istorijski Casopis, vol.3 (1969), p.25; M. Milazzo, op. cit, p. 104. See also W Roberts, op. cit, p.71. 122. Sporadic outbreaks of intense violence between the Ustashe and the Chetniks (which undoubtedly led to greater actual loss of life than the sabotage campaign) occurred in parts of Bosnia throughout 1942 and 1943, but in terms of a relatively coordinated and reasonably long-term effort, the events in Serbia during autumn 1942 must be regarded as of greater significance. It ought also to be remembered that Mihailovic had little influence over many of the Bosnian Chetniks, and that clashes between the latter and the Croat Fascists, while meeting with his approval, were not usually the direct result of his orders. 123. M. Milazzo, op. cit, p. 104. Jozo Tomasevic, whose book represents the other main English- language study of the wartime Chetnik movement, seems to regard the sabotage campaign as of minimal significance, and devotes only a few paragraphs to its analysis (see The Chetniks, pp.20103). L. Karchmar, op. cit, pp.566 8 gives a more detailed analysis, but cites very few specific incidents. 124. F. Deakin, Embattled Mountain, pp. 152-4. 125. M. Wheeler, op. cit, p. 184. Brief comments on the sabotage campaign can also be found in E. Barker, British Policy in South-East Europe, pp.l61~2, D. Stafford, Britain and European Resistance, p.96; W Roberts, op. cit, p.71; B. Davidson, Special Operations Europe, pp.103 4; M. Kay, op. cit, p.72, 277n. Even the strongly pro-Chetnik works produced by M. Lees (The Rape of Serbia) and D. Martin (Patriot or Traitor and Ally Betrayed) say very little on the subject. One could perhaps argue that this is because both are more interested in what they regard as the months of decision, August-December 1943, than in analysing the long-term deterioration in British Chetnik relations which rendered the events of that period rather less important than they think. Needless to say, Yugoslav sources are of minimal help. The relevant volumes of %bornik - tom. 1, book 21 and tom. 14, book 1 - are clear examples. The former has had all references to Chetnik sabotage actions in Serbia throughout the war deleted, while the latter, although quoting telegrams from Mihailovic's internal signals log throughout most of 1942, contains nothing on the period between 10 September and 23 November. This was, of course, the period during which the Chetniks were most active. Nevertheless, a few examples of sabotage orders can be found in this volume. 126. For a map of the Serbian railway network as it was in 1943, see K. Schlarp, Wirtschqft und Besatzung in Serbien 1941 1944 (Stuttgart, 1986) map 3. 280 Notes and References

Detailed surveys of the Yugoslav railway system can be found in WO208/ 80. 127. L. Karchmar, op. cit, pp.528-31, 533-5; M. Milazzo, op. cit, pp.86-9. By mid-1942 Mihailovic had organisers operating in most areas of Serbia, and armed bands re-established in some. Overall command was in the hands of General Trifunovic, who according to Karchmar acted as 'inspector-cum- chief' of rear services, while operational control lay in the hands of the regional commanders. These were Major Piletic (east Serbia), Major Djuric (south Serbia) and Colonel Pavlovic (west Serbia). Other commanders included Captain Ocokoljic (Homolje), Captain Racic (Podrinje), Major Palosevic (Valjevo) and Major Keserovic (Kopaonik). See also F0371/ 33468 R5333/178/92 for SOE's list of commanders (July), and WO202/ 128, tel. no.220 of 6 June and no.265 of 27 June 1942. An account of the development of the Chetnik organisation during 1942 in one part of Serbia can be found in %bornik, tom. 14, book 1, pp.688-93 (report by Major. M. Palosevic, concerning organisation of Chetnik units in Serbia, 21/3/42-4/ 11/42). 128. In April 1942 there were 19 legalised Chetnik detachments in Serbia, as well as about 60 Pecanac units (J. Tomasevic, The Chetniks, p.200). On the infiltration of the Nedic regime, see L. Karchmar, op. cit, pp.287-292; TDM, p.267; I. Avakumovic, op. cit, pp.50-51. L. Karchmar (op. cit, p.290) estimates that Mihailovic ultimately secured the loyalty of 'perhaps three-quarters' of the administrators. Zvonimir Vuckovic, an important JVO commander in western Serbia holds a similar view (personal correspondence, 1992). In August 1943 'Ultra' decrypts revealed that the Chetniks no longer considered it necessary to attack the Serbian gov• ernment, since it had been sufficiently permeated by their own sympathisers, and could be expected to come over to Mihailovic without any opposition (DEFE3/871 JP39/CO/AL, 5 August 1943). 129. L. Karchmar, op. cit, p.285, 539-42, 614n; S. Pavlowitch, 'Lieutenant Rapotec', p,100;J. Marjanovic, Draza Mihailovic, p.328). 130. The last Partisans in northwest Serbia were the 90 survivors of the Valjevo Partisan odred. This was the group which was forced to withdraw into Bosnia in March (M. Pantelic, 'Cetnici Draze Mihailovica u danima 'sloma' Uzicke republike' [Draza Mihailovic's Chetniks at the Time of the 'Collapse' of the Uzice Republic], Vojnoistorijski Glasnik, 1982 vol.33 (1-2), p.240). See also L. Karchmar, op. cit, p.286. 131. W. Roberts, op. cit, p.76 (citing report by Partisan command for Serbia to Tito, June 1942); L. Karchmar, op. cit, pp.297 ~8, 371 n. 132. D. Martin (ed.), Patriot or Traitor - the Case of General Mihailovic (California, 1978) p.46. 133. Himmler's attitude in this respect may well be partly accounted for by that of his subordinate in Serbia, SS-Gruppenfuhrer August Meissner (to whom he refers in the letter). Meissner was notorious for his hatred of the Serbs (L. Karchmar, op. cit, pp.296, 370n), and considered both the Nedic gov• ernment and Mihailovic to be committed to resisting the German occu• pation. See 'The 1942 Meyszner [sic] Report on Serbia' (29 August 1942), South Slav Journal, vol.5 no.3 (17), autumn 1982, pp.41-6. Three days earlier (12 July) General Kuntze, German C-in-C Southeast, had noted that 'the Notes and References 281 most dangerous opponent' in Serbia was Mihailovic, and that the latter's influence was spreading to Montenegro, Bosnia, Croatia and even Slovenia. He considered that his organisation 'must not be allowed to become effective'. See P. Hehn, op. cit, p. 134. On the German attitude to the Serbs, see M. Deroc, op. cit, pp.21-2, 33-4, and passim. In August the Germans considered the total strength of Mihailovic's organisation to be about 100000 men (L. Karchmar, op. cit, p.545), a figure which must represent something of an over-estimate, even if all those forces in Bosnia, Hercegovina and elsewhere (which often owed him only the most tenuous of loyalties) are included. L. Karchmar, op. cit, p.285, 293-4; M. Milazzo, op. cit, p.88; I. Ava• kumovic, op. cit, pp.53-4. The breaking of the Chetnik codes in July allowed the Germans to put together a complete Chetnik order of battle in Serbia within a few weeks. See R. Kennedy, op. cit, p.32; M. Milazzo, op. cit, p.88; L. Karchmar, op. cit, pp.540-1, 615n. On the inadequacy of Chetnik codes, see also WO208/2018A - Bailey Report, April 1944, Appendix 23, p.20. P. Hehn, op. cit, p. 140. The SS division (later known as the 7 SS Mountain Division 'Prince Eugen') was formed out of some 22 000 Volksdeutsche (racial Germans living outside the Reich) resident in Serbia, Croatia, Hungary and Rumania, and was by far the most powerful division available in Yugoslavia during 1942. See O. Kumm, Prinz Eugen — the History of the 7 SS Mountain Division (Prinz Eugen' (Winnipeg, Manitoba, 1995) pp. 16-21; R. J. Bender and H. P. Taylor, Uniforms, Organization and History of the Waffen-SS, vol.3 (San Jose 1986 edition) pp.8-23. The 714th Infantry Division had of course been resident in Yugoslavia since mid-1941. Having only about 6000 men (L. Karchmar, op. cit, p.56n), it was less than a third of the strength of the SS division which replaced it in Serbia. See, for example, C. Lawrence, Irregular Adventure (London, 1947) p. 134, who cites Mihailovic's orders in this respect to Major Keserovic. See J. Tomasevic, The Chetniks, p.201, citing order of 9 August; %bornik, tom. 14, book 1, pp.559-60 (tels. nos.467, 469, 470 and 472 of 21 August, dealing with establishment of railway intelligence staffs in Belgrade, Nis, Kraljevo and Milanovac respectively); L. Karchmar, op. cit, p.285, 566; M. Milazzo, op. cit, p. 104; Imperial War Museum, International Military Tribunal (Nuremburg) documents, Case VII (the 'Hostages Case'), trial transcript, vol.130, p.785 (citing report by C-in-C Southeast to OKH of 9/9/42). In addition to the main sabotage cells created in Belgrade, Nis and Mitrovica, smaller groups appear to have operated on the branch lines (for example at Caribrod, Pirot, Bela Palanka, Luznica, , Knjazevac and, in the words of Z. Vuckovic, almost certainly at 'every single depot or station with more than three employees'). See D. Sijacki, Nas Put - istorijski razmatranja o Ravno- gorskom pokreta i njegovim neprijatelijima [Our Way - a Historical Consideration of the Ravna Gora Movement and its Enemies] (Chicago, 1969) p.32; Z. Vuckovic, personal correspondence. The reason/s for Mihailovic's decision to renew sabotage actions in the summer of 1942 are somewhat unclear. M. Milazzo, op. cit, p. 103 thinks that his main objective was to 'maintain the confidence of the British'. Given his concern to dissociate the population from the campaign (note, for example, his continued demands that the BBC 282 Notes and References

should say nothing about Chetnik successes), it would seem unlikely that the primary aim was to bolster Serbian morale or to convince the population that his organisation was as anti-Axis as the Partisans. In any case, the weakness of the Partisan organisation in Serbia during 1942 (and indeed until well into 1944) can hardly have convinced him that there was any need to compete with them for the affections of the population. Alternatively, he may have been trying to impress Hudson, who was by now transmitting his own analyses of the situation to SOE, and who otherwise might be tempted to concentrate his attentions on the compromise existing between the Mon• tenegrin nationalists and the Italians. However, given the physical remo• teness of Montenegro, Mihailovic's apparent lack of concern over Hudson's opinion (or that of the British generally) at any time, and the fact that SOE's liaison officer was far from condemning the Italian-Chetnik relationship, this also seems unlikely. If this was the reason, he clearly failed, for throughout the autumn Hudson remained almost completely unmoved by the Chetniks' sabotage efforts. In such a position it would have been reckless for Mihailovic to continue putting his entire organisation in Serbia at risk for the sake of persuading one junior officer of his good intentions. In the light of these considerations, it would appear that Mihailovic was motivated by a genuine belief, which was reinforced by the appeals of General Alexander and the Yugoslav Prime Minister, that he was making a valuable contribution to the allied war effort. The contents of the telegrams sent by Mihailovic to his commanders (cited by Karchmar, op. cit, p.567) suggest that there is some truth in this assertion. 138. J. Tomasevic, The Chetniks, pp.201 2, citing sabotage order of 26 August; Zbornik, tom. 14, book 1, p.616 tel. no.460, sabotage orders of 8 September. Throughout 1942 Mihailovic appears to have considered connections with Ljotic highly distasteful and to be avoided at all costs. See, for example, ^bornik, tom. 14, book 1, p.386 (tel. no.56 of 24 May). On 18 August he ordered all of his commanders to 'destroy without mercy the Communists and Ljoticevci wherever they appear' (ibid, p.558, tel. no.461), while on 8 September he instructed his subordinates in Serbia that 'Traitors, Ljoticevci, Communists and Pecanacists are to be immediately destroyed' (ibid, p.616, tel. no.467-8). Assassinations of Ljotic's officers and officials, and attacks on his units, occurred throughout the autumn. See B. Karapandzic, Gradjanski rat u Srbiji (1941-1945) [Civil War in Serbea 1941-1945] (Ohio, 1958) pp.267-9, Z. Vuckovic, op. cit, pp.218-20, WO202/509 - tel. no. 1007 of 23 November; Imperial Wrar Museum, International Military Tribunal (Nuremburg) documents, Case VII, document book no.6, document no. 187 (daily German situation reports, September 1942, for example entries for 9/9 and 28/9/42); K. Pavlovic (ed.), 'Iz Ratnog Dnevnika Vrhovne Komande Vermahata' [From the Daily War Diary of the Wehrmacht High Command - edited extracts of OKW war diary, November-December 1942], Vojnoistorijski Glasnik, Jan-Apr 1988 no. 1, yr.XXXIX, pp.307~43; L. Karchmar, op. cit, p.286 for examples. The Ljoticevci appear to have been equally determined to destroy Mihai• lovic's organisation. According to a report from one of Mihailovic's com• manders, the situation in Serbia by late August was 'desperate'; the Ljoticevci were accused of acting with 'unprecedented brutality' against the Chetniks (%bornik, tom. 14, book 1, p.590). Notes and References 283

139. J. Tomasevic, The Chetniks, p.202; W. Roberts, op. cit, p.67; L. Karchmar, op. cit, p.285, 565; Imperial War Museum, International Military Tribunal (Nuremburg) documents, Case VII, document book no.6, document no. 187 (daily German situation reports, September 1942, for example entry for 15/ 9/42), no. 188 (10-day German situation reports, August 1942, for example reports for period 1-10/8/42), 11-20/8/42), no.191 (10-day German situation reports, October 1942, for example report for period 1-10/10/ 42). The same trial transcript (vol.130, p.775) notes a German report of 11 September 1942 which refers to 'considerable harvest losses in Serbia', although whether this was due to bad weather, JVO civil disobedience orders or a natural inclination on the part of the citizentry to look after their own interests rather than fulfil German quotas, is unclear. 140. Zbornik, tom. 14, book 1, p.744 - tel. no.1857, Orel-262 8 of 24 November to Major Keserovic. A week later, on 30 November, Jovanovic instructed Mihailovic: 'During winter maintain under arms only those units for attacks on communications and for the protection of Serb lives in Bosnia. In the case of an allied landing in the Balkans and the launch of the uprising mobilise only those men who you are able to arm with sufficient ammu• nition. Undertake measures so that the Serbs, according to custom, do not revolt before the leaves are on the trees and thus set off with sticks against machine guns. Take account of the dead to date and mobilise only as many as you are able to arm. We are doing everything and will do more to provide you with arms and ammunition for that time.' (^bornik, tom. 14, book 1, p.853, tel. D. V K. Br. 153 of 30 November). SOE would of course have known the contents of this message. 141. WO202/128 - tel. no.636 of 14 September, no.643 of 15 September, 651 of 16 September. Lest it be thought that Chetnik claims were the product of over-active imaginations, it might be mentioned that many can be con• firmed by 'Ultra' intelligence and German reprisal proclamations. This is especially true of incidents during November and December, when the Germans started shooting Mihailovic's supporters on a large-scale in reprisal for specific acts of sabotage. 142. WO202/509 - tel. no.682 of 22 September, no.715 of 30 September. The latter telegram referred specifically to General Alexander's request. In it Mihailovic assured Jovanovic that 'I shall continue doing everything in my power to help and conquer our common enemy and mete out the pun• ishment they deserve'. 143. K. Duke, 'German Foreign Policy in S. and S.E. Europe, 1942 1945', Pt.II, South Slav Journal, vol.4 no.2, summer 1981, p.25. 144. Ibid. The directive for combatting the Chetnik bands was issued on 9 September J. Tomasevic, 'The Chetniks, p.202). See also M. Milazzo, op. cit, p. 104. 145. Large-scale arrests of Miliailovic's supporters began in the last week of September. Having broken the Chetnik codes, the Germans were well- informed as to the identity of Mihailovic's agents within the Nedic admin• istration. The sabotage and intelligence staffs in Belgrade appear to have suffered particularly badly during December, by which time the Germans were arresting and executing between ten and a few dozen Chetniks in the Serbian capital each day. Information and examples can be found in K. Notes and References

Pavlovic, op. cit., pp.309-43; M. Milazzo, op. cit, pp.104 5; L. Karchmar, op. cit, p.300; J. Marjanovic, Draza Mihailovic, p.328; I. Avakumovic, op. cit, pp.50, 59-60, 78, 102; W. Roberts, op. cit, p.331n; Zoornik, tom. 14, book 1, p.767 (report of Lt P. Rakovic, early December 1942); F0536/31 - Hudson's 'Series A telegrams, April 1943, p.21; WO202/509 - tel. no.839 of 22 October and no. 1037 of 27 November; WO202/510 - tel. no. 1185 of 23 December, no.1196 of 27 December; no.1198 of 27 December, no.1204 of 29 December 1942. See also the huge quantity of documentation in the Imperial War Museum, International Military Tribunal (Nuremburg) records for Case VII (the 'Hostages Case'), especially document book no.6 and trial transcript vol.130, pp.753-861, and the brief synopsis in R. Fattig 'Resprisal: The German Army and the Execution of Hostages during the Second World War', PhD dissertation, University of California 1980 pp. 167-9. The Germans had been reluctant to disarm the legalised and Pecanac Chetniks as long as they remained reasonably quiescent and as long as the leaves were on the trees, but by autumn their increasing hostility neces• sitated immediate action. Not surprisingly, a large proportion of the legalised Chetniks, as well as many of those serving under Pecanac and Nedic, fled into the mountains when threatened with arrest. See L. Karchmar, op. cit, pp.299-300; K. Hnilicka, Das Ende aufdem Balkan 1944—45 - die Militarische Raumung Jugoslaviens durch due Deutsche Wehrmacht (Gottingen, 1970) p.207; M. Milazzo, op. cit, p.88; J. Marjanovic, Draza Mihailovic, p.328; M. Gutic, 'Kvislingstvo i kolaboracionizam u Jugoslaviji 1942. godine' [Quisling and Collaborationist Movements in Yugoslavia in 1942], Vojnoistorijski Glasnik, 1983, 34 (1), pp.259-60. J. Tomasevic, The Chetniks, p.201 estimates that some 12 000 Chetniks were arrested or chose to take their chance with the illegal bands between November 1942 and March 1943 (when the last Pecanac unit was dissolved). V Glisic, 'Concentration camps in Serbia (1941-1944)', The Third Reich and Yugoslavia 1933-1945 (Belgrade, 1977) p.695 refers to the arrival of several groups of captured Chetniks at the Banjica camp during 1942, and notes (p.703) that there were about 500 Chetniks in the Sajmiste camp by the end of 1942. This article gives some useful statistics, as well as describing life and death in the camps, but like most other Yugoslav sources is reticent about giving details of executions during the autumn of 1942 - presumably because the majority of those who were killed were members or sympathisers of Mihailovic's organisation rather than the Partisans. R. Bender and H. Taylor op. cit, p. 12; I. Avakumovic, op. cit, pp.58-60; WO202/509 - tel. no.783 of 13 October and no.826 of 19 October; L. Karchmar, op. cit, pp.287, 368n. O. Kumm, op. cit, pp.228 describes the operation and says that no contact with Keserovic's Chetniks was made; however, the transcript of Case VII (the 'Hostages Case') (Imperial War Museum, International Military Tribunal (Nuremburg) records) cites (vol.130, p.811) a German report of 15 October which states that during the operation 'After the destruction of Kriva Reka the armed and resisting male population were killed'. L. Karchmar, op. cit, p.300; W Roberts, op. cit, p.67; I. Avakumovic, op. cit, p.59;J. Tomasevic, The Chetniks, p.203; WO202/509 - tel. no. 1098 of 9 Notes and References 285

December, no. 1132 of 13 December; no. 1136 of 14 December; K. Pavlovic, op. cit, pp.317-43. 149. WO202/509 - tel. no.716 of 30 September, no.750 of 7 October, no.837 of 22 October; D. Sijacki, op. cit, p.27, 42-49; L. Karchmar, op. cit, p.566, 621-2n; Z. Vuckovic, op. cit, p.220; Z. Vuckovic, personal corres• pondence. 150. F0536/31 - Hudson's 'Series A' telegrams, April 1943, p.25; WO202/509 - tel. no.831 of 21 October; WO208/2014 - minute by Col. Thornton, 21 November 1942; M. Kay, op. cit, p.277n; Imperial War Museum, Interna• tional Military Tribunal (Nuremburg) documents, Case VII, document book no.6, document no. 162 (German report of 17 October 1942), no. 191 (German 10-day situation report, 11-20/10/42). 151. The operation was in fact carried out by Chetniks under the command of Zvonimir Vuckovic (Z. Vuckovic, personal correspondence, including translated extracts of his war memoirs). Major Hudson later reported that Cosic/Javorski 'has strong claim to special Balkan medal by British'. How firmly his tongue was in his cheek when he made this remark is unclear (F0536/31 - Hudson's 'Series A' telegrams, April 1943, p.25). 152. F0371/33472 R7841/178/92 -Jovanovic's telegram D. V K. Br. 139 of 6 November 1942. See %bornik, tom. 14, book 1, p.850 for Serbo-Croat text. 153. L. Karchmar, op. cit, p.567 quotes some of these orders, leaving little doubt that Mihailovic was taking this task seriously, and that he was prepared to accept the reprisals and damage to his organisation which would inevitably result. See also Imperial War Museum, International Military Tribunal (Nuremburg) documents, Case VII, document book no.6, document no. 192 (10-day German situation reports, reports for 1-10/11/42 and 11-20/11/42). 154. Zbornik, tom. 14, book 1, p.744 footnote gives the text of the civil disobe• dience proclamation, 7 November 1942. See also L. Karchmar, op. cit, p.299 (where he dates the proclamation 8 November), 565 and Imperial War Museum, International Military Tribunal (Nuremburg) documents, Case VII, document book no.6, document no. 192 (10-day German situation report, reports for 1-10/11/42 and 11-20/11/42). Mihailovic informed Jovanovic of the issuing of this order the same day (WO202/509 - tel. no.945 of 7 November). 155. WO202/509 - tel. no.992 of 21 November, no.995 of 21 November, no. 1003 of 23 November, no. 1033 of 27 November and no. 1049 of 30 November 1942; WO208/2014 - p.37A, map showing guerrilla activity in Yugoslavia during November (from 'Ultra' sources). These successes infuriated the Communists, who were forced to resort to unconvincing denunciations of such 'cheap self-publicity'. See I. Avakumovic, op. cit, p.97; L. Karchmar, op. cit, p.622n. The Germans reported a steady increase in sabotage and raids throughout the first three weeks of November, although the number of acts of reported railway sabotage in Serbia between 26 October and 15 November still only stood at 12 (to add to a total of 14 further reported acts of railway sabotage in Serbia from 25 August - 25 October). Unfortunately, data on railway sabotage acts in Serbia between 16 November and 15 December is largely lacking, although some information on the closure of railways (by hours) is 286 Notes and References

available. (However, see this chapter, notes 167-8 and relevant text for discussion regarding the utility of such data in evaluating the success of the sabotage campaign.) See Imperial War Museum, International Military Tribunal (Nuremburg) documents, Case VII, document book no.6, document no. 153 (German report of 11 January 1943), no. 192 (10-day German situation reports, November 1942), no. 193 (10~day German situation reports, December 1942). See also K. Pavlovic, op. cit, passim. 156. WO202/509 - tel. no.987 of 21 November, no. 1075 of 2 December, no.ll 19 of 13 December, no. 1158 of 16 December; L. Yovitchitch, Within Closed Frontiers - a Woman in Wartime Yugoslavia (London, 1956) p.212. 157. For example, on 14 December Mihailovic reported that no fewer than 100 locomotives were awaiting repairs at Nis (WO202/509 - tel. no. 1138 of 14 December). For other claims of success at this time, both general and specific, see WO202/509 - tel. no.946 of 8 November, no.995 of 21 November, no. 1121 of 13 December, no. 1161 of 18 December; WO202/ 510 - tel. no. 1203 of 29 December. Zvonimir Vuckovic (personal corre• spondence) also considers the Nis group to have been particularly successful in its sabotage efforts. 158. To an extent, this probably resulted from the fact that guidelines for reprisals dealt primarily with measures to be taken in retaliation for casualties sus• tained by German troops, rather than for sabotage actions, and at this time very few Germans had been killed. A minor exception occurred when 24 men were shot in reprisal for the attack on the Lisa mine (WO202/509 - tel. no. 1059 of 30 November 1942). Information on German reprisal orders until late November can be found in R. Fattig op. cit, p. 167 and Imperial War Museum, International Military Tribunal (Nuremburg) documents, Case VII, trial transcript, vol.130, pp.807-8 (text of order of 10 October 1942). 159. J. Marjanovic, Draza Mihailovic, p.328; J. Tomasevic, The Chetniks, p.203; Z. Vuckovic, Secanja iz Rata [War Memoirs] (London, 1980) p.219; WO202/ 509 - tel. no.1053 of 30 November, no.1069 of 2 December 1942. Similarly, reflecting the increased concern about the dangers of a railway sabotage campaign, at the end of October the German Southeast Command ordered that rather than being deported to prison camps, captured members of Mihailovic's railroad sabotage staffs were to be shot (Imperial War Museum, International Military Tribunal (Nuremburg) documents, Case VII, document book no.6, document no. 167 (Oral report of Salonika conference, 31 October- 1 November 1942). 160. WO202/509 - tel. no.1051 and no.1052, both of 30 November 1942. 161. For example, 250 people were shot in Petrovac on 26 December in reprisal for the killing of four and wounding of two Organisation Todt personnel by the Chetniks in east Serbia, whereas the Germans appear to have taken no reprisals for the deaths of six and wounding of five of their soldiers in a clash with a Chetnik band at the start of the same month. On another occasion, when the Chetniks killed three Germans and five Ljoticevci in an attack on a train near Ljutovnica (southeast of Suvobor), 100 people, mostly gypsies, were killed. See J. Tomasevic, The Chetniks, p.203; I. Avakumovic, op. cit, p.59; Z. Vuckovic, op. cit, p.220; F0371/57667 U5160/5160/73 - Yugoslav Report on War Crimes, submitted to the Nuremburg War Crimes Tribunal, 1946. Notes and References 287

The number of those executed in reprisal for sabotage and other acts carried out by the Chetniks during December is unknown. Chetnik sources claim very large numbers indeed for example, 2500 people killed on 25 26 December alone (D. Sijacki, op. cit, p.48). M. Milazzo, op. cit, p.l05n. says that 'approximately five hundred ' "Chetniks"' (not all of whom were actually members of Mihailovic's organisation) were executed during December. L. Karchmar, op. cit, p.623 estimates that 'on the basis of somewhat incomplete records, in December 1942 German firing squads and punitive expeditions in Serbia shot 657 Mihailovic supporters'. My own estimate, based on the Imperial War Museum documents and other sources is somewhat higher, at around 1100 persons. This figure does not include casualties incurred by the Chetnik detachments as a result of clashes with German and Bulgarian troops or Ljoticevci. An admittedly tentative estimate of these losses would be another 500 men. Overall, a figure of around 1600 Chetniks or Mihailovic sympathisers killed in Serbia during December would not seem excessive. See Imperial War Museum, International Military Tribunal (Nuremburg) documents, Case VII, document book no.6, trial transcript, vol.130; K. Pavlovic, op. cit., pp.321-43; F0371/57667 U5160/ 5160/73 Yugoslav Report to Nuremburg War Crimes Tribunal, 1946; F0371/59412 R9562/58/92 Nuremburg trial documents; F0536/31 Hudson's 'Series A telegrams, April 1943, p.21; WO202/357 tel. EMB 129 of 21 January 1943; F0371/37578 R850/2/92 Bailey telegram, unnumbered, forwarded to Foreign Office 23 January 1943; WO202/509 tel. (all dates December 1942 unless stated) no. 1098 of 9, no.ll 19 of 13, no.1131 of 13, no.H39of 14, no. 1147 of 15, no.H48of 15; WO202/510-- tel. no.H96of27, no. 1197 of 27, no. 1204 of 29, no. 1232 of 9January 1943, no. 1245 of 10 January 1943, no. 1258 of 14 January 1943; J. Tomasevic, The Chetniks, p.203; L. Karchmar, op. cit, p.623n; I. Avakumovic, op. cit, p.60; W. Roberts, op. cit, p.33In. L. Karchmar, op. cit, p.300, 565-6; Imperial War Museum, International Military Tribunal (Nuremburg) documents, Case VII, document book no.6, document no. 192 (10-day German situation reports, November 1942, report for period 21-30/11/42), no. 193 (lOday German situation reports, December 1942, report for period 1 10/12/42). By mid-January 1943 the Germans were reporting that 'The strict reprisal measures for sabotage and the murder of Serbian officials have caused D. M. [sic], due to pressure from the population ... to restrict his orders almost to the point of cancelling them' (ibid, document no. 194 lOday situation reports, January 1943, report for period 11-20/1/43}). For similar reasons, orders already existed to avoid harming German soldiers if at all possible when ambushing trains - a means of getting arms which was used fairly frequently by the Chetniks. See Z. Vuckovic, op. cit, pp.220-1; I. Avakumovic, op. cit, p.95. In fact, the Lisa mine had probably increased its output as a result of the Chetnik attack, since German reprisals took the form of forcing the Moravica and Dragacevo districts to finance the construction of two new mines within a month — one at the old site and the other 2 kilometres away (WO202/509 - tel. no. 1059 of 30 November). Mihailovic had requested that the British bomb Bor in September, promising that his forces would 288 Notes and References

'carry out whatever is still necessary' (WO202/128 - tel. no.651 of 16 September). The plan to attack this important mine cropped up on several subsequent occasions, but the Chetniks refused to carry it out unless they were provided with sufficient arms with which to protect the local popu• lation from the savage reprisals which would undoubtedly follow such a significant operation. See J. Rootham, Miss Fire (London, 1946), pp.53-5; I. Avakumovic, op. cit, p. 100. 166. Writing in 1944, Major Jasper Rootham (British liaison officer with the east Serbian Chetniks) noted that: 'It is a fact (reported by us at the time) that brilliant sabotage and go-slow policy in the three coal mines in eastern Serbia had resulted in a reduction of 85% in the production of the basin, the largest if not the only source of coal in Yugoslavia. This was done, and was known to be done, on the orders of Mihailovic who was at the same time [1943-44] being accused by Radio London of allowing accommo• dations with the Germans.' See F0898/159 - memorandum by Major J. Rootham, May (?) 1944. According to N. Zivkovic, 'Exploitation of Industrial Installations in Serbia during the German Occupation 1941— 1944', The Third Reich and Yugoslavia 1933-1945, pp.520-1, a severe coal shortage caused a decline in industrial output in Serbia from autumn 1943 onwards. 167. In the very first telegram concerning the sabotage campaign, Mihailovic had reported that 20 out of 28 carriages on one train had been 'thrown out of action' (presumably meaning derailed) 150 kilometres outside Serbian ter• ritory. See WO202/128 - tel. no.636 of 14 September. 168. WO208/2014 - D. Talbot Rice minute, 17 December 1942. 'German- occupied areas' could have meant Serbia, the Banat or, possibly, northern Slovenia. One might add that local guerrilla groups in Croatia, Bulgaria and so on would presumably have been only too pleased to claim as their own work destruction caused in these regions by bombs planted hundreds of miles away. One suspects that in these circumstances the task of proving any particular incident - for example, the 257 recorded acts of railway sabotage that occurred in Croatia between 25 August and 15 November 1942 - to have been the handiwork of the Partisans or the Chetniks is well-nigh impossible. 169. See especially WO202/509 - tel. no.715 of 30 September, no.906 of 6 November, no.946 of 8 November, no. 1121 of 13 December 1942, no. 1161 of 18 December 1942. An exception to this trend were the telegrams reporting the specific activities of the Kopaonik Chetniks, many of whose achievements appear to have been confirmed by 'Ultra'. 170. D. Sijacki, op. cit, p.48, citing report Str. Pov. 1902 of 22 January [sic] 1942. C. Fotic, op. cit, pp. 192-3 makes it clear that this report was in fact dated December 1942. See also D. Sotirovich, op. cit, p. 134 and D. Martin, Ally Betrayed, p. 180 for similar claims. 171. WO208/80 - MI3b summary of situation on Yugoslav railways, 17 August 1943. There were also about 3800 passenger coaches - but see note 172. 172. C. Lawrence, op. cit, p.235 notes that by May 1942 cattle trucks were being used for passenger traffic on all secondary lines in Yugoslavia 'because most of the carriages had been taken for German troop-trains'. Notes and References 289

WO208/80 MI3b summary of situation on Yugoslav railways, 17 August 1943. Narrow gauge locomotives and rolling stock were said to have been 'similarly reduced', which again appears to bear out Mihailovic's claims. L. Karchmar, op. cit, p.567: 'Rommel's main line of supply ran through the Balkans to the ports of Salonika and Piraeus.' J. Tomasevic, The Chetniks, p.202: '...railroad traffic through Serbia...was of great importance for German operations in Africa.' C. M. Woodhouse, 'The Greek Resistance, 1942-1944', European Resistance Movements I, p.381: 'it was estimated that 80 per cent of the supplies of the were at that time carried by the railway line through Greece.' On 12 July General Kuntze, German commander in the southeast, reported that with reference to the developing situation in Africa, it was particularly important to secure the (Belgrade) to Salonika railway against attacks by Mihailovic's forces (P. Hehn, op. cit, p. 134). It is important to remember that this remark was made at a time when it looked quite possible that Rommel might break through 8 Army's lines and advance on Palestine. Had he done so, the Belgrade-Salonika railroad would no doubt have taken on a greater sig• nificance than it actually possessed during the autumn of 1942. Interestingly, when the allied invasion fleet destined for French north Africa entered the Mediterranean at the start of November 1942, Hitler feared that it would land troops in central Italy. As he remarked to his armaments minister, Albert Speer: 'What will become of Rommel in that case? He will be lost in a short time. He has no reserves and supplies will no longer come through.' See A. Speer, Inside the Third Reich (London, 1983 edition), pp.341-2. Bri• gadier E. C. W. Myers, commander of the British team sent to destroy the Gorgapotamos viaduct (see below) implies that the line was important, but does not make the rash claim of his subordinate, Woodhouse, which is noted above. See E. Myers, Greek Entanglement (Gloucester, 1985 edition), p. 17. See also D. Sijacki, op. cit, p.46; M. Milazzo, op. cit, p. 103; I. Avakumovic, op. cit, p.95; E. Barker, British Policy in South-East Europe, p. 157; D. Stafford, Britain and European Resistance, p.96. C. Woodhouse, op. cit, p.381; S. Sarafis, ELAS: Greek Resistance Army (London, 1980 edition), p.321; M. Foot, Resistance, p. 180. In his later SOE, p.235, Foot appears to acknowledge that the viaduct was blown three weeks too late: nevertheless, he still says that Rommel's retreat was 'hampered' by the operation. As a result of the Gorgapotamos demolition, the main line between Salonika and Athens was closed for 39 days (D. Stafford, Britain and European Resistance, p.99). This fact is surely in itself indicative of the relative insignif• icance of the railway, for no army the size of Rommel's could have survived for over a month without 80 per cent of its supplies. R. Kennedy, op. cit, p.30 implies that the operation had local significance, and forced the Germans to take over security duties along an extensive part of the Salonika-Athens line, but says nothing about the effect on supplies to North Africa. It might also be noted that the delay in reopening the line may have been at least partly the result of the Chetnik sabotage campaign, for on hearing on the destruction of the viaduct, Mihailovic ordered his commander in Sumadija to prevent 'under all circumstances' the shipment of repair materials to Greece (L. Karchmar, op. cit, p.567). See, for example, E. Barker, British Policy in South-East Europe, p. 162. 290 Notes and References

177. See L. Craig, 'German Defensive Policy in the Balkans, a Case Study: the Buildup in Greece, 1943', Balkan Studies, vol.23 no.2, 1982, map p.420. 178. L. Craig, op. cit, p.409. The capacity of the line between Salonika and Athens, at only seven trains per day (9| by mid-May) was even less impressive. See also WO208/80 MI3b summary of situation on Yugoslav railways, 17 August 1943. 179. DEFE3/804 VM6142 CO/AL/PK of 10 March 1943. This 'Ultra' decrypt noted that on 5 March OKW had called for the carrying capacity of the Belgrade-Salonika Athens railway to be 'stepped up by most drastic measures'. 180. ADM223/45 September 1942 convoy report by the Admiralty's Medi• terranean Operational Intelligence Division; ADM223/31, pp.368-402 - Operational Intelligence Division daily reports 1-30 September 1942. 181. These were the following ships: (figures in brackets refer to tonnage, type (MV = Merchant Vessel) and date on which vessel left Piraeus): Abruzzi (680 t, tanker, late August); Stige (1342 t, tanker, 1/9); Bianchi (1477 t, MV, 2/9); Padenna (1589 t, MV,' 2/9); Sportwo (1598 t, MV, 2/9); Nerucci (1235 t, MV, 15/9?); Dora (584 t, MV, 15/9?); Foscolo (6000t?, MV, 18/9); Gualdi (3289 t, MV, 24/9); Menes (5609 t, MV, 24/9). See ADM223/45; ADM223/31. 182. Unfortunately there is no monthly report for October in the ADM223/45 file. Data has therefore been compiled from the daily reports in ADM223/ 31, pp.404—35. The four vessels which left Greece during October were the Petraca (3329 t, MV, left Piraeus 10/10); Tergestea (5890 t, MV, left Piraeus 10/10 but damaged en route and put into Suda, which it left 24/10 for Tobruk); Dora (584 t, MV, 24/10); Barletta (1975 t, naval auxiliary, 29/10). Another vessel (the Iseo, MV of 2366 t) was reported to have left Piraeus 1/ 10, but after arriving at Suda Bay its onward journey to Tobruk was cancelled. One more vessel (the Pugliola, MV of 2074 t) was reported to be loading at Piraeus in early September, but its departure for Africa was cancelled in October. I. S. O. Playfair, The Mediterranean and Middle East vol.IV, (London 1966) p.209 states that 46 ships left Italy and Greece for Africa during October. The discrepancy between this figure (46) and my own (32) is entirely accounted for by 14 ships which left Italy during October, but which arrived in Africa during November, had their voyages subsequently cancelled or (in one case) were sunk en route to an unknown destination. 183. Definite sailings from Piraeus included the £ara (1976 t, naval auxiliary, 1/ 11), Bnoni (1987 t, naval auxiliary, 1 /11) and Thessalia (2875 t, MV, 9/11). In addition, the Col di Lana (5891 t, MV, 2/11) probably loaded its cargo at Piraeus. Another two merchantmen, the Gualdi (3289 t, MV) and D'Annunzio (5000 t, MV) are merely recorded as joining convoys while in Greek waters (the former at Patras, the latter at ), but their ports of origin are unknown. See ADM223/31, pp.436-58. Tobruk was captured on 13 November, on 20 November. 184. At 2049 hrs on 6 November, German Naval Command Italy stated that shipping to Tobruk had been stopped, 'with possible resumption later by small steamships if front to the east holds'. At 0620 hrs on 7 November, Naval Command requested Rome that the despatch of personnel and stores for Benghazi or east of Benghazi should be temporarily suspended. Notes and References 291

Both of these decisions became known to the British on 8 November (ADM223/31, p.444). As noted in note 183 above, the last vessel to leave Piraeus, the Thessalia, did so on 9 November. There are no references to any vessels sailing from Greece for Africa during the period 10 November to 31 December 1942 in the daily intelligence reports contained in ADM223/31. See especially F. H. Hinsley, op. cit, vol.11, pp.418-27, 442-4. See also R. Bennett, Ultra and Mediterranean Strategy 1941-1945 (London, 1989), pp. 148- 151, 158-161, 163; R. Bennett, 'Intelligence and Strategy: Some Obser• vations on the War in the Mediterranean, 1941-1945', Intelligence and National Security, vol.5 no.2, April 1990, pp.448-9; I. S. O. Playfair, op. cit, vol. IV, p.26. As F. Hinsley, British Intelligence in the Second World War vol. II, (London, 1981) p.424 points out, ships carrying food or other relatively unimportant supplies were allowed to proceed unharmed, while tankers and steamers loaded with ammunition were targeted for destruction. However, his statement that as a result the British could give their 'undivided attention to ships leaving the Piraeus with ammunition cargoes that were badly needed in preparation for the fighting at ' is capable of misinter• pretation. As far as can be ascertained from the reports based on 'Ultra' sources in ADM223/31, only two vessels with significant cargoes of ammu• nition left Piraeus (after loading at Salonika) during the autumn - the Petraca and Tergestea. The former was damaged, the latter sunk. In addition, small amounts of ammunition were carried by two naval auxiliaries which left Piraeus on 1 November. Both were sunk. Given that the Afrika Korps appears never to have completely run out of ammunition, it must be assumed that significant quantities reached Libya from Italy. That ammu• nition was most certainly carried by steamers originating in Italy is shown by the example of the Apuania, which left Brindisi on 18 September with 'a large quantity of ammunition' on board. It arrived at Benghazi on 20 September, and was blown up two days later (Hinsley, op. cit, p.424). Most of the important tankers also originated in Italy. They included the San Andrea (5077 t, sunk 2 September); Rondine (6077 t, arrived Tobruk 24 September); Proserpina (3750 t, arrived Tobruk 26 September); Panuco (7800 t, torpedoed 19 October and towed to Crotone); Saturno (9540 t, arrived Tripoli 20 October); Alfredo (654 t, arrived in damaged condition at Tobruk on 25 October); Proserpina [second journey] (3750 t, sunk 27 October); Luisiana (2552 t, sunk 28 October); and the Porto Fino (6424 t, set on fire 6 November after unloading most of its cargo). It would appear that only two tankers, both of low capacity, loaded oil (presumably from Ploesti) in Greece during the same period. They were the Abruzzi (680 t, damaged en route to Libya, 1 September) and Stige (1342 t, arrived Tobruk 3 September); One tanker, the Picci Fassio (2261 t) sailed from Suda Bay on 31 August. It was sunk on 2 September. A large number of merchant vessels from Italian and Greek ports (for example, the Bianchi and Padenna, both sunk in September) carried oil and petrol as deck cargo or in drums. All information from ADM223/31, ADM223/45, F. Hinsley, op. cit, vol.11, p.421, 442, 444, 732-8; I. Playfair, op. cit, vol.IV, p.27, 201; D. Irving, The Trail of the Fox (London 1978 edition) p.233, 237. 292 Notes and References

187. The two merchantmen sunk in September were the Bianchi (1477 t, sunk 4 September) and the Padenna (1589 t, sunk 4 September). Two other vessels from Piraeus were damaged en route to north Africa during the same month (the Abruzzi and Menes). The one ship lost in October was the Tergestea (sunk 26 October). At 5890 tons, it represented 50 per cent of the total tonnage sailing from Greece to Africa during October. Its cargo was 1000 tons of ammunition and 1000 tons of fuel. In addition, two out of the other three steamers which left Piraeus for Libya at this time were damaged - the 3329 ton Petraca and the 584 ton Dora. Only the Barletta, a naval auxiliary carrying a very small cargo (260 tons of fuel) arrived unharmed from Piraeus in October. See ADM223/31; F. Hinsley, op. cit, p.442; D. Irving, op. cit, p.235; J. Lucas, War in the Desert: the 8th Army at El Alamein (London, 1982), pp.210-12. 188. Based on the following tables, data from ADM223/31 and ADM223/45:

September

Source number of vessels Tonnage Arrived

Italy 23 94949 18; 75 082 t (72%) Greece 10 23 403 8; 20 337 t (19.5%) Suda Bay 6 10779 5; 8518 t (8.5%)

Total 39 129 131 31; 103 937 t (100%)

October

Source Number of vessels Tonnage Arrived

Italy 28 119 343 19; 73 548 t (92.5%) Greece 4 11778 3; 5 888 t (7.5%) Total 32 131 121 22; 79 436 t (100%)

189. The three vessels lost were the £ara and Brioni, naval auxiliaries of just under 2000 tons each, and the Thessalia (2875 t). The %ara was sunk en route to Tobruk (2 November) and the Brioni blew up, with the loss of her cargo, in Tobruk harbour four hours after arriving (also 2 November). The Thessalia, carrying a cargo of petrol and tanks from Greece, was sunk west of Benghazi on 11 November. See ADM223/31; F. Hinsley, op. cit, vol. II, p.738; I. Playfair, op. cit, p.202. 190. Statistics for cargoes disembarked in north Africa during this period are given in F. Hinsley, op. cit, vol.11, p.422; I. Playfair, op. cit, vol.III, p.327 and vol.IV, p. 210. As a result of the Chetnik actions, sabotage carried out in Greece and attacks on Axis vessels sailing for Libya, the amount of tonnage offloaded in October which had originated at Piraeus or Salonika fell to around 3500 tons, compared to 42 000 tons originating in Italy. 191. R. Bennett, 'Intelligence and Strategy', p.449, gives this as one reason why 'Ultra' was not used to ensure a complete interdiction of Rommel's supply lines at this time. Notes and References 293

192. E. Myers, op. cit, p. 18. H. Williams, op. cit, p.71 sees the campaign as being primarily linked to a British desire to show the Russians that Mihailovic was the man to back. In a general sense this was certainly true (although the point was never clearly articulated in any of the documents cited in notes 118-121), but it would not explain the even earlier requests to the Greeks, and on balance I continue to believe (as the Russians themselves did) that the reasons lie in a combination of interrelated factors. A further consid• eration, for which there is unfortunately no evidence, but which nevertheless appears to have some foundation in common sense, relates to allied deception plans during the autumn of 1942. From deciphered signals, the British knew as early as 12 September that Hitler had ordered the despatch of the 22nd Air Landing Division to Crete as replacement for the 164th Division (which had moved to Africa during July and August), and that one of the former's regiments had already been earmarked as reinforcements for the Afrika Korps. Although this and subsequent decrypts during October and November illustrated the success of allied strategic deception plans, which had as one objective the creation of a supposed threat to Crete and the Aegean, it does not seem unreasonable to suggest that the existence of another powerful force within easy reach of Libya before Montgomery's offensive had actually started would have been something that the planners hoped to avoid. In other words, while it was desirable to attract German units towards the eastern Mediterranean, to have them arriving too soon might well be dangerous. Delaying them in transit would obviously be the ideal solution, and Mihailovic's forces might make themselves useful for this purpose. See F. Hinsley, op. cit, vol.11, pp.425, 428, 478, 481; M. Howard, British Intelligence in the Second World War, vol.V (London, 1990) pp.65-7; R. Bennett, Ultra and Mediterranean Strategy, pp. 184-6. 193. WO202/356 - tel. GESH 176 of 17 November, rptd London Bl/3241; GESH 200-1 of 23 November, rptd London B1/3447-3448, GESH 228 of 2 December, rptd London B1/3745, GESH 229 of 6 December, rptd London B1/2890. 194. For example, a speech by Jovanovic over the BBC on 12 November. See Zbornik, tom. 14, book 1, p.744n. 195. Zbomik> tom- 14> book !> P-853: tel. D. V K. Br. 153, 30 November 1942, Jovanovic to Mihailovic. See this chapter, note 140 for text. 196. Of roughly 40 telegrams despatched by Mihailovic during the autumn of 1942 reporting general and specific examples of sabotage, and measures taken by the Axis in reprisal for such acts, only two appear in the Foreign Office files open to researchers. These are telegrams no.715 (30 Sep• tember) and no.946 (8 November), which were intended as generalised replies to the requests for sabotage delivered on 20 September and 6 November respectively. It is possible that SOE considered the other messages to have been of operational importance only, but the effect must surely have been to reinforce Foreign Office preconceptions regarding Chetnik 'inactivity'. 197. F0371/33471 R6801/178/92 - C. L. Rose minute, 21 October 1942, referring to Mihailovic's tel. no.715 of 30 September (in WO202/509). A similar response came from Pierson Dixon on 1 November. Commenting on information contained in a telegram from a Foreign Office official in the 294 Notes and References

USSR, which noted that the Swedish Military Attache, recently returned from the Balkans, claimed that railway travel was only possible during the day due to 'Partisan activities', Dixon minuted: 'Another example of activity by the set of "patriots" which we are not [underlining in original] sup• porting. No traveller has been incommoded lately by the Yugoslav Minister of War.' See F0371/33134 R7272/43/67 - tel. Mr Baggallay (Kuibyshev) to Foreign Office, no. 1425, 30 October 1942; P. Dixon minute, 1 November 1942. 198. F0371/33472 R7841/178/92 C. L. Rose minute, 23 November 1942 (see also D. Howard minute, 24 November 1942), in response to Mihai• lovic's tel. no.946 of 8 November (in WO202/509). 199. Robertson's telegrams, as noted elsewhere, are largely absent from the SOE signals files, but given his political sympathies, it can be assumed with a fair degree of certainty that he would have said little that was positive about the sabotage campaign. This would certainly seem to be confirmed by an SOE appreciation of 5 November which stated that: 'So far no telegram has been received from either of our liaison officers reporting any sabotage undertaken by General Mihailovic, nor have we received any reports of fighting against the Axis troops.' See F0371/33472 R7571/178/92 - SOE appreciation, forwarded to Foreign Office by P. Boughey, 5 November 1942. Examples of Hudson's signals concerning the sabotage campaign can be found in WO202/356, especially GESH 176 and 177 of 17 November, GESH 229 of 6 December and GESH 230 of 7 December. Major Hudson appears to have considered that only by doing substantial damage to the Serbian railway infrastructure (that is bridges and track) would Axis supplies be interdicted, and that 'intelligent' sabotage such as that preferred by the Chetniks was likely to be a waste of time. It might be observed that German documents show that as late as 1944, when the Partisans were carrying out substantial activities against lines of communication in conjunction with an allied bombing offensive, the Yugoslav railway system was still operating at 70 per cent of capacity. Given such information, and the figures already cited for damage done to locomotives and rolling stock in Serbia in the autumn of 1942, it might be argued that the Chetniks' activities, as well as being less likely to expose the population to reprisals, were actually at least as effective as impressive but fairly uncoordinated demolitions of bridges etc. See C. N. M. Blair, Guerilla Warfare (London, 1957) p.41. 200. WO202/356 - tel. G/2699, SOE Cairo to SOE London, 1 November 1942. 201. F0371/33472 R7571/178/92 SOE appreciation, forwarded to Foreign Office by P. Boughey, 5 November 1942. 202. Apart from about 11000 lbs of food, medical stores and explosives, and some large quantities of cash, military supplies dropped to Mihailovic between 1 June and 5 October were very limited in quantity. During this period the British parachuted the grand total of 5 mortars, 99 machine guns, 4 anti- tank rifles and 43 pistols to the Chetniks. In addition, 190 300 rounds of ammunition, 680 mortar bombs and 264 grenades were dropped. Even the apparently impressive amount of ammunition was only sufficient to provide 2000 men with enough for one day's fighting. See F0371/33471 R6695/178/92 - P. Boughey [SOE] to P. Dixon, 5 October 1942. Notes and References 295

203. E. Barker, 'British decision-making', British Policy, pp.28 9. 204. F0371/33467 R3868/178/92 - letter S. Jovanovic to G. Rendel, 5 June 1942. Jovanovic's point about reduced press coverage, while exaggerated, appears to have been partly valid. The newspaper editors had clearly been deterred from producing large quantities of laudatory articles about Mihailovic by the memorandum circulated at the end of April. See M. Kay, 'The British Attitude Towards the Yugoslav Government in Exile 1941- 1945' unpublished PhD dissertation, University of Southampton, 1986 p.71. In August PWE and the Foreign Office agreed that it was important to restrain the press from publishing 'wild stories' about Yugoslav resistance. See F0371/33445 R5515/21/92 - letter R. Murray to D. Howard, 20 August 1942; P. Dixon minute, 24 August 1942. 205. F0371/33467 R4157/178/92 - letter R. Murray to P. Dixon, 21 June 1942. 206. F0898/157 - letter G. Rendel to D. Howard S0147, 3 July 1942. 207. F0898/157 - text of BBC's Balkan news talk, 21 June 1942, by Hubert D. Harrison. Admittedly, the compliment was only implicit, taking the form of an appeal to the Yugoslav people to help all those who were fighting the enemy, regardless of whether they be Partisan or Chetnik, Radical or Democrat, Serb or Croat, and so on. Elisabeth Barker, who worked within the PWE, considered that Harrison had been 'rather naughty' in men• tioning the Partisans so soon after Jovanovic's protest (ibid, undated note E. Barker to R. Murray). 208. F0898/157 - letter R. Murray to P. Dixon, 15 July 1942; F0371/33467 R4516/178/92 - letter Glenconner to P. Dixon, 3 July 1942; F0371/33491 R4853/2096/92 - letter P. Dixon to G. Rendel, 27 July 1942. 209. F0371/33468 R4873/178/92 - P. Dixon minute, 23 July 1942; M. Stenton, 'British Propaganda and Political Warfare 1940-44: A study of British views on how to Address Occupied Europe', unpublished PhD dissertation Peterhouse, Cambridge, 1979, p.200. 210. Ralph Murray gave expression to this attitude when submitting his lengthy analysis of foreign press reporting of the war in Yugoslavia to the Foreign Office on 19 August. In his view, 'At present., our propaganda advocating Mihailovic risks bearing little relation to the real situation in Yugoslavia and our appeals for unity have no basis' (F0371/33469 R5474/178/92 - R. Murray to D. Howard, 19 August 1942). As well as Axis and neutral press stories, PWE was aware of disturbing reports from Yugoslav sources regarding Chetnik 'collaboration' and the existence of a powerful 'Com• munist' organisation in the country. See F0898/157 letter R. Murray to J. Pearson, 31 July 1942. As M. Stenton, op. cit, pp.202-3 points out, however, in believing Axis reports of 'Communist' activities in Yugoslavia, PWE may well have failed to account for the fact that the Germans had a vested political interest in identifying acts of resistance as being perpe• trated by 'Communists' whether or not the latter were actually responsible. 211. FO371/33470 R6012/178/92 - letter R. Murray to D. Howard, 8 Sep• tember 1942; letter D. Howard to R. Murray, 12 September 1942. Both 'Free Yugoslavia' and the Communist press were monitored. An article in the Soviet War News (published by the Russian embassy) of 12 August named Tito as the leader of the Yugoslav guerrillas and accused Mihailovic's 296 Notes and References

Chetniks of guarding the railways for the enemy (F0371/33468 R5334/ 178/92). See also F0371/33469 R5532/178/92 and F0371/33470 R6012/178/92 for 'Free Yugoslavia's' approach. 212. This occurred despite PWE's best efforts to prevent such broadcasts. See M. Stenton, op. cit, p.205; M. Kay, op. cit, p.72; F0371/33470 R6304/178/ 92 - letter G. Rendel to S. Jovanovic, 22 September 1942; F0536/6/3611 - letter P. Boughey to J. Greenway, 20 September 1942. 213. L. Karchmar, op. cit, pp.562-3. B. Karapandzic, op. cit, pp.270-3 gives a full list of all 'Z' names and the dates upon which they were broadcast. Nedic himself was condemned in this manner on 15 July (L. Karchmar, op. cit, p.620n), but Dimitrije Ljotic was apparently left unmentioned (S. Vlahovic, letter to South Slav Journal vol.11 no.2~3 (40-41), summer-autumn 1988, p.85). TDM, pp.352-5 suggests that the meaning of 'Z' was delib• erately ambiguous, and even the Yugoslav government appear to have been unsure what it stood for (tyornik, tom. 14, book 1, p.836 - tel. V K. 27, 15 May 1942, Jovanovic to Mihailovic). 214. F0371/33469 R5766/178/92 - letter R. Murray to P. Dixon, 29 August 1942, enclosing letter S. Jovanovic to Bogomolov, 24 August 1942. 215. M. Kay, op. cit, p.73; F0371/33492 R6892/2268/92 - Royal Yugoslav Government memorandum, communicated to the Foreign Office, 16 October 1942; F0371/33473 R8143/178/92 - letter J. Pearson to D. Howard, 25 November 1942. The British were also influenced by a desire to cut back on the number of telegrams being despatched by Mihailovic, most of which were of very minor importance, and which only had the effect of overburdening the communications link. Similar was the case of Mihai• lovic's requests that the promotion or decoration of individual Chetniks be announced over the BBC. Once again, the British were concerned that very large numbers of signals did nothing other than provide long lists of names, and they were also worried that many of these men were apparently being rewarded for fighting the Partisans. See F0371/33470 R6013/178/92 - letter J. Pearson to G. Rendel, 9 September 1942; R6303/178/92 - letter P. Dixon to J. Pearson, 23 September 1942; F0371/33471 R6456/178/92 - letter J. Pearson to P. Dixon, 26 September 1942. 216. F0898/157 - letter J. Pearson to R. Murray PB/JU/806, 23 September 1942. A similar argument was deployed in letters from P. Dixon to Murray and Pearson the same day (F0371/33470 R6303/178/92). See also M. Stenton, op. cit, p.207. 217. F0898/157 - memorandum, R. Murray to Mr Scarlett, 1 October 1942. 218. F0898/56 - memorandum, Mr Neate to J. Pearson, 29 September 1942; letter R. Murray to J. Pearson, 29 September 1942; letter R. Murray to J. Pearson, 6 October 1942. 219. See F0371/33471 R6556/178/92 - Stockholm P.R.B. to Foreign Office, memorandum no.6, 24 September 1942 (received 3 October); C. L. Rose minute, 5 October 1942. 220. F0371/33471 R7027/178/92 - letter R. Murray to R. Bruce Lockhart, 14 October 1942. 221. Dixon's letter to Pearson of 9 October did not represent a new definition of policy, as it merely repeated Sargent's conclusions of 24 September (F0371/ 33470 R5973/178/92). Notes and References 297

222. See F0371/33471 R6959/178/92 - tel. Foreign Office to-Washington, for PWE, no.6077, 7 October 1942; F0371/33477 R6439/517/92 - Foreign Office to Chancery, British Embassy, Washington, 9 October 1942 and letter P. Dixon to G. Rendel, 9 October 1942; W Roberts, op. cit, p.73. 223. F0371/33471 R7027/178/92 - C. L. Rose minute, 24 October; P. Dixon minute, 26 October 1942. 224. F0371/37584 R3994/2/92 - D. Howard minute, 29 April 1943 citing O. Sargent minute, 27 October 1942 (original Sargent minute in RJ 526). 225. F0371/33471 R7027/178/92 - P. Dixon minute, 26 October 1942; F0371/33472 R7336/178/92 - letter R. Murray to P. Dixon, 2 November 1942. 226. F0371/33471 R7027/178/92 - letter O. Sargent to G. Rendel, 31 October 1942; see also P. Dixon minute, 26 October and O. Sargent minute, 27 October 1942. 227. F0371/33445 R7177/21/92 - text of Balkan news talk by H. D. Harrison, 18 October 1942. As M. Stenton, op. cit, p.212 observes, Harrison's broadcast 'was not only Partisan propaganda, it was fairly unmistakable as such' and, in stating that Mihailovic was believed to desire sincere collaboration with all Serb, Croat and Slovene fighters who were willing to strike the Axis, that Harrison was seeking to convey 'a faint note of menace to Chetnik ears'. The contradictions within propaganda policy were emphasised by a broadcast produced by Dr Krek the same day, which identified Mihailovic as the leader of the only legitimate resistance force in Yugoslavia, and which called for the destruction of all movements not accepting his authority (that is the Partisans). See F0371/ 33445 R7178/21/92 - Slovene broadcast by Dr M. Krek, 18 October 1942. 228. What Mihailovic appears to have objected to was not so much the statement that the 'old Yugoslavia was gone for ever', which according to Hudson he had approved, as the fact that the Partisans were implicitly identified as sharing his own democratic aims. See F0371/33445 R7445/21/92 - letter J. Pearson to P. Dixon, 5 November 1942. See also WO202/509 - tel. no.828, 19 October 1942; F0536/6/G3155A - letter G. Rendel to P. Dixon, S0336, 20 October 1942 (here Rendel described Harrison as 'an excellent man but strongly leftist in sympathy'); F0371/33445 R7177/21/ 92 - letter G. Rendel to Foreign Office, 26 October 1942. On 2 November P. Dixon admitted that Harrison's broadcast had been 'revolutionary', but as it tallied with the new policy he was not inclined to complain (Ibid, letter P. Dixon to I. Kirkpatrick, 2 November 1942). Harrison's broadcast was not the only one, however, in which the Partisans were complimented before the decision to do so had officially been taken. Transmissions on 19, 21 and 22 October took a similar line (F0371/33445 R8114/21/92 - Analysis of news items, E. Barker to Foreign Office, 27 November 1942). See also E. Barker, 'British Decision-making', British Policy, p.29; M. Kay, op. cit, p.74, 279n. 229. F0371/33445 R7445/21/92 unnumbered Hudson telegram, 1 November 1942. 230. F0371/33473 R8261/178/92 - Hudson telegram, 23 November 1942 (original text in WO202/356 - GESH 199 of 23 November). 298 Notes and References

231. WO202/509 - tels. no.935, 936, 963 (7-13 November), 1100 (9 December 1942). 232. For example, Mihailovic's omnibus protest against British propaganda des• patched in early November, was apparently not passed on to the Yugoslav government until the end of December (F0371/33474 R8659/178/92). The British restated their commitment to praising the Partisans on several occasions (for example F0371/33473 R8261/178/92 - C. L. Rose minute, 6 December; D. Howard minute, 8 December; R8015/178/92 - C. L. Rose minute, 10 December; R8045/178/92 - letter D. Howard to G. Rendel, 23 December; F0371/33474 R8705/178/92 M. Rose minute, 18 December 1942). See also M. Stenton, op. cit, pp.215-17. 233. F0371/33473 R8377/178/92 - telegram, P. Vellacott [PWE] to Foreign Office, no.2112 Pilot, 7 December 1942; telegram, Foreign Office to P. Vellacott, no.3081, 11 December 1942. Major Pearson had preempted this objection in mid-November, by arguing that propaganda support for the Partisans gave Bailey a bargaining counter in his negotiations with Mihailovic. The Foreign Office agreed (F0371/33472 R7826/178/92 - letter J. Pearson to P. Dixon, 16 November 1942; D. Howard minute, 26 November 1942). See also M. Kay, op. cit, p.76. 234. F0371/33472 R7826/178/92 - C. L. Rose minute, 25 November 1942. 235. See telegrams cited in L. Karchmar, op. cit, p.567: 'It is of extraordinary importance at any cost to break or reduce to a minimum enemy transport traffic'; 'A temporary disruption of railway traffic is not enough. The main line to Salonika is to be destroyed'; 'Spare no effort on this task. Later you will understand what a contribution you have made to our purpose - victory.' It is impossible to put an accurate figure on Chetnik losses and casualties resulting from Axis operations against Mihailovic supporters in Serbia during the period August-December 1942 inclusive, but the number must run into thousands. 236. Extracts from the Military Cabinet broadcasts can be found in F0371 /33473 R8015/178/92 and F0371/33445 R8917/21/92 (together with comments by E. Barker to P. Dixon, 21 December 1942). See also E. Barker, 'British Decision-making', British Policy, p.34,51 n; M. Wheeler, op. cit, p. 185; M. Kay, op. cit, p.77. As will be seen in the conclusion to this work, the output of the British press was by late 1942 completely inconsistent. The debate in the American press exploded in December, with the publication of two articles highly critical of Mihailovic. The first appeared in Time on 14 December ('Mihailovic Eclipsed'), and the second, by the respected Slovene-American writer, Louis Adamic, in the Saturday Evening Post five days later ('Mikhailovitch [Sic]: Balkan Mystery Man'). The text of the Adamic article can be found in WO201 /2717 and a summary of the Time article is in F0371/33474 R8686/ 178/92. For discussion, see W Roberts, op. cit, p.75; L. Modisett, 'The Four Cornered Triangle: British and American Policy Toward Yugoslavia 1939- 1945, unpublished PhD dissertation, Georgetown University, 1981, pp.332- 334, and B. Novak, 'Why Adamic Shifted his Support from Mihailovic to Tito', Slovene Studies no. 12 (1989) pp.185-92. Novak's conclusion is that although Adamic was already politically predisposed to the Partisans, the American Communist Party, acting under Comintern directives, successfully influenced him to prosecute the anti- Mihailovic campaign on behalf of the Soviet Union. Notes and References 299

J. Tomasevic, The Chetniks, pp.275-7, reviews developments in the Slavic press in the USA during 1942. 237. F0536/6/G3155A - letter D. Howard to G. Rendel, 7 November 1942. See also similar request in F0371/33471 R7027/178/92 - letter O. Sargent to G. Rendel, 31 October 1941. 238. F0371/33445 R7177/21/92 - letter G. Rendel to Foreign Office, 26 October; F0371/33472 R7635/178/92 - letter G. Rendel to O. Sargent, S0396, 11 November; F0536/6/G3155A - letter G. Rendel to D. • Howard, SO420, 22 November; F0371/33445 R8168/21/92 - letter G. Rendel to R Dixon, 30 November 1942; E. Barker, 'British Decision- making', British Policy, p.29. 239. F0371/33472 R7635/178/92 - C. L. Rose minute, 19 November; D. Howard minute, 21 November; F0371/33473 R8015/178/92 - C. L. Rose minute, 10 December 1942. 240. F0371/33470 R5973/178/92 - letter J. Pearson to P. Dixon, 15 October 1942. 241. F0371/33445 R7445/21/92 - letter J. Pearson to P. Dixon, 5 November 1942, enclosing text of Hudson telegram dated 1 November. 242. F0371/33472 R7571/178/92 - P. Boughey to Foreign Office, 5 November 1942, enclosing SOE appreciation. 243. As pointed out in other notes, the situation in BosniaHercegovina was completely chaotic throughout 1942. In late July Mihailovic met with Ilija Trifunovic-Bircanin and Dobrosav Jevdjevic, the principal 'Chetnik' organ• isers in the region, at the village of Avtovac in Hercegovina. According to the official Italian report on the meeting (no Italian representative attended, however), Mihailovic took this opportunity to approve the nationalists' policy of collaboration with the Italians. See J. Marjanovic, The Collaboration, pp.50-2. Milazzo's highly detailed analysis of Mihailovic's policy at this time suggests that the Chetniks were convinced that the Italians had changed their previous policy of antagonism towards the Croat regime, and that it was considered likely that large-scale operations by the Chetniks against the Ustashe were imminent. In such a situation the nationalists attempted to make sure that their other principal enemy, the Partisans, were dealt with. To this end they negotiated with the Italians and participated alongside them during the autumn in a series of (strategically unsuccessful) operations against Tito's main force in western Bosnia. On occasion, especially in the area, there was also fairly extensive cooperation with the Ustashe, Croat Wehrmacht and Germans. Elsewhere, however, the Chetniks fought the Ustashe and terrorised Croat and Moslem villages (frequently in reprisal for the latter's participation in Ustasha atrocities). Disgust at the Italians' change of policy may even have been manifested in some limited military action and sabotage against them in parts of western Yugoslavia. In December 1942, for example, Mihailovic claimed that Chetniks in Lika had destroyed sections of the Jasenica-Vrhovina railway both during the summer and in November (WO202/509 - tel. no. 1106 of 11 December 1942). Mihailovic's own role in all this is extremely unclear, although Milazzo maintains that in September he 'probably had little if any control over many of the Serb armed formations', and that the Italians had a tendency to overestimate his authority, which was exercised mainly through 300 Notes and References

his delegate in Bosnia-Hercegovina, Major Petar Bacevic. In east Bosnia the Germans and Croats carried out military operations against rebel Chetniks during November and December. See M. Milazzo, op. cit, pp.95-103; J. Tomasevic, The Chetniks, pp.216-7, 228-9, 232-3, 259; J. Marjanovic, The Collaboration, pp.58-65; I. Avakumovic, op. cit, p.59 (E. Bosnia operations, confirmed by F0371/37586 R4705/2/92 - MI3b report on Yugoslav resistance, forwarded to Foreign Office 21 May 1943, p. 14); C. Sporer, 'Air Force Reminiscences (I)', South Slav Journal vol. 8 no. 1-2 (27-8) pp.51-6 (situation in Banja Luka-Sanski Most area); TDM, pp.140, 144; F0371/ 44279 R16620/11/92 - OSS book of captured Chetnik documents (espe• cially useful on the situation in the Banja Luka area); WO208/2018A - SOE report on collaboration of Chetnik forces with the enemy, 25 pages, E. C. Last [SOE] to T. Hodgkinson [MI3b], 23 January 1944; WO202/159A - SOE notes on Maj. P. Bacevic, March 1944; WO202/297A - interro• gation report of Capt. J. Drecun, BY/P/77/145, SILO, CMF, 21 Sep• tember 1944. 244. F0371/33445 R7445/21/92 - Hudson telegram, 1 November 1942. 245. This, SOE felt, was certainly true of the Partisans and the Croats, although Mihailovic's attitude towards the Serbian quisling authorities was thought to be more ambivalent. 246. F0371/33472 R7841/178/92 - telegram Jovanovic to Mihailovic, 6 November 1942. 247. The Italian-Chetnik relationship in Montenegro had been formalised on 24 July 1942, when the Italian command concluded a comprehensive agreement with the Serb nationalist representative, General Djukanovic. The text of the agreement is given in J. Marjanovic, The Collaboration, pp.46-9, but in essence Djukanovic was recognised as commander of all armed Serb formations, separatist and centralist, in Montenegro. He was to have his headquarters at Cetinje. The Italians promised to supply arms to the Chetniks, while both parties pledged themselves to a relentless fight against Communism. Certain areas of territory were allocated to the three principal Serb commanders; Krsto Popovic (the separatist leader), who controlled a strip of the coast and hinterland; Bajo Stanisic, whose forces operated in central Montenegro; and Pavle Djurisic, who was in charge of northern Montenegro and the Sandzak. Their forces totalled some 15 000 armed men, although under the provisions of the agreement each was only supposed to maintain a detachment 1500-strong. The separatists and cen• tralists hated each other, the latter regarding the former (not without reason) as pro-Partisan in sympathy. On occasion this antipathy was manifested in open fighting. (In November, for example, Mihailovic instructed that the 'most energetic measures' be undertaken to destroy the ^elenasi - ^Jbornik, tom. 14, book 1, p.712.) See L. Karchmar, op. cit, pp.407-14 for a detailed analysis and p.458 for a map showing the territorial division. See also J. Tomasevic, The Chetniks, pp.211-2; M. Milazzo, op. cit, p.83, WO202/ 215A - report by the commander of the Italian 'Taurinense' division, CSDIC, CMF (East)/CD/17, 13 September 1944; TDM, pp.146, 166, 302. According to a telegram from SOE Cairo to their London head• quarters on 30 October 1942, Djukanovic was 'rabidly anti-Partizan and... prepared to work with NEDIC to clear the country of PARTIZAN Notes and References 301

elements, rather than work with Partizans against AXIS' (WO202/355 - tel. SOE Cairo to SOE London, B/2605, 30 October 1942). 248. F0371/33472 R7571/178/92 - SOE appreciation, 5 November 1942. 249. Ibid, D. Howard minute, 20 November 1942. 250. Ibid, O. Sargent minute, 20 November 1942. 251. F0371/33471 R7027/178/92 - P. Dixon minute, 26 October 1942. 252. F0371/33472 R7756/178/92 - letter G. Rendel to J. Pearson, 14 November 1942. 253. Ibid, E. M. Rose minute, 19 November 1942. 254. F0371/33467 R3795/178/92 - letter Glenconner to P. Dixon, 6 June 1942. 255. J. Amery op. cit, pp.306-7. At this time 'several tons' of documents were burned, including, no doubt, a large amount of the material relating to SOE's links with the Yugoslav guerrillas over the previous ten months. The seven successful sorties carried out by SOE and SIS in July, August and September were obviously an exception to the general rule, but as pointed out elsewhere, very little material was dropped to the Chetniks during 1942. 256. B. Sweet-Escott, Baker Street, pp.79, 155 and 'SOE in the Balkans', British Policy, pp. 18-19. Sweet- Escott dates the purge 21 August, but obviously it took several weeks to implement the changes laid down by Glenconner. Airey was himself a regular officer. 257. P. Kemp, No Colours or Crest (London, 1958), pp.73-4. Bennett had of course been involved in the briefing of Mission 'Bullseye', and after Bailey, was probably SOE's best-informed officer on Yugoslav affairs. He appears to have been in charge of intelligence and briefing within M04's Yugoslav section. See F0371/5469 R10672/170/92 - Bailey's note on the despatch of Captain Robertson; letter from N. Plecas to South Slav Journal vol. 3 no. 1, March 1980, p.41. James Klugmann was born in 1912 and attended Gresham's Holt public school, where he was friendly with Donald Maclean, before going on to Cambridge University. There he helped found the University Labour Federation, and was also a member of the Communist group which comprised, among others, Kim Philby, Guy Burgess, Anthony Blunt, John Cairncross, John Cornford, David Haden-Guest and Allan Nunn-May. According to various sources, he had close links with Harry Pollitt, leader of the Communist Party of Great Britain and his national organiser, Douglas Springhall, and may have been involved in the recruitment of Soviet agents. In 1936, after taking a double first in modern languages, he moved to Paris, where he worked at the headquarters of the World Student Movement. After the fall of France he joined the Pioneer Corps as a private, and then served as an NCO in the Cairo office of military intelligence. A chance encounter with Terence Airey, who knew him as an extremely bright student at Gresham's Holt, resulted in his transfer in February 1942 to SOE Cairo. Working on Yugoslav matters, he made a good impression as a result of his linguistic abilities, and in June 1942 he was promoted to the rank of 2nd Lieutenant. During the autumn of 1942 his primary concern appears to have been the welfare of a number of Canadian-Croat Communists, who had been recruited by SOE and moved to the Middle East in readiness for missions which might be launched to make contact with the Partisans. See D. Martin, 'James Klugmann, SOE- 302 Notes and References

Cairo and the Mihailovich Deception', in D. A. Charters & M. A. J. Tugwell (eds), Deception Operations - Studies in the East-West Context (London, 1990) pp.58 61; B. Davidson, Special Operations Europe, pp.83-7; A. Sinclair, The Red and the Blue - Intelligence, and the Universities (London, 1986) pp.35-6, 40-1, 134; R. Kisch, The Days of the Good Soldiers - Communists in the Armed Forces WWII (London, 1985) pp.42-3; P. Wright, Spycatcher (Australia, 1987 edition) p.222, 2489, 264; C. Pincher, Traitors - The Labyrinths of Treason (London, 1987) pp.66-7. 258. B. Davidson, Special Operations Europe, pp.89-90; letter from B. Davidson to South Slav Journal, vol. 3 no.l, March 1980, p.37. 259. 'Statement by George Taylor', British Policy, p.232. See also S. Bailey, 'British Policy towards Mihailovic', British Policy, pp.67-8 for a similar analysis. 260. Basil Davidson has recalled that when appointed to command the Yugoslav section of M04 he received 'not one word of advice or information about the Partisans' (B. Davidson, Special Operations Europe, p. 104). See also B. Davidson, Discussion 'Following Barker...', British Policy, p.236. George Taylor acknowledges that SOE's understanding of the strengths of the Partisan movement at this time was less than perfect (British Policy, p.231). 261. N. Plecas, Ratne Godine 1941-1945 [War Years 1941 1945] (Columbus, Ohio 1983), p. 103. 262. In 1946 Bill Bailey wrote that 'Scrutiny of SOE archives reveals many telegrams and appreciations which passed between London and Cairo in 1942 in which such phrases as 'the liquidation of the Partisans' are regrettably only too frequent'. It is unfortunate that such archives remain largely inaccessible to researchers. See F0371/59469 Rl0220/170/92 - note by Col. Bailey, 4 July 1946. (Bailey's paper dealt with charges made against the British government at Mihailovic's trial.) On the other hand, Mihailovic's account of his conversation with Plecas, as cited by Plecas himself, states that the latter said that the British wanted Mihailovic 'to stop fighting against the Partisans' (N. Plecas, letter to South Slav Journal, Vol.3 no.l, March 1980, p.40). George Taylor's statement in 1973 implies that SOE believed that the Germans might be able to destroy the Partisans, thus rendering the problem academic (British Policy, p.231). 263. British Policy: F. Deakin and G. Taylor, Discussion 'Following Sweet-Escott', pp.212-214 and H. Seton-Watson, 'Afterword', pp.290~2; personal corre• spondence with Major (ret'd) A. Jack MC. See also discussion in R. Bennett, Ultra and Mediterranean Strategy, pp.395 6 and F. Hinsley, British Intelligence Vol.11, p.20 and vol.III Pt.l, p 502. 264. G. Taylor, Discussion 'Following Sweet-Escott', pp.214-15 and 'Following Barker...', p.238, British Policy. 265. On 1 November Glenconner wrote: 'We realise that A/H31 [Mihailovic's SOE codename] must defend against Partisans, nor can we deter him from doing so. So far, however, he has achieved no major sabotage against railways which interests us most and, though he is no doubt of political value, he has failed us at the crucial time as a military factor, in spite of all appeals' (WO202/356 - tel. AD/3 [Glenconner's SOE codename] to SOE London G/2699, 1 November 1942. See also 'Statement by George Taylor', British Policy, p.230. Notes and References 303

266. As Wheeler has shown, SOE Cairo was suspicious as to the authenticity of Hudson's telegrams; but even if they were written by him, M04 was not inclined to accept his arguments. See M. Wheeler, op. cit, p. 186. 267. G. Taylor, Discussion 'Following Sweet-Escott', pp.215 16, and 'Statement by George Taylor', British Policy, pp.2323. See also E. Barker, 'Fresh Side• lights', p.579. 268. Hudson's telegrams (in so far as they were believed) gave grounds for hoping this might be the case. On 14 November he notified M04 that he had informed Mihailovic of the arrival of a British Colonel on a most important mission, and that the General was 'suitably impressed and appreciative' (WO202/356 - tel. GESH 169 of 14 November, repeated M04 to London B1/3194, 15 November 1942). 269. F0371/33473 R8377/178/92 tel. Minister of State, Cairo to Foreign Office, no.2H2 Pilot, 7 December; tel. Foreign Office to Minister of State, no.3081, 11 December 1942. 270. Part of this memorandum, which ran to nine pages in the original, and which was dated 14 December, is cited by M. Wheeler, op. cit, pp. 187-8. It is possible that this is the same message referred to by G. Taylor in Discussion 'Following Sweet-Escott', British Policy, p.214. Lord Glenconner visited London in December, and while there handed Taylor's paper to Charles Hambro, who had succeeded Nelson as Executive Director of SOE (also known as CD) in May 1942. 271. F0371/33473 R8181/178/92 P. Boughey to R Dixon, 27 November 1942. Hudson's telegrams were in fact replies to a questionnaire submitted to him by M04 on 11 November. In turn, the latter appears to have been prompted by signals received from both Hudson and Robertson several days earlier which reported a visit by the Italian military governor of Mon• tenegro, General Birolli, to Pavle Djurisic's headquarters in Kolasin. For Robertson's and Hudson's telegrams, see WO202/355 tel. ARCHDUKE ARDE unnumbered of 7 November, rptd London B1/2954, 8 November and no.38; WO202/356 - Tel. GESH 157 of 9 November, rptd London B1/3002, 10 November 1942. M04's telegram was forwarded to the Foreign Office along with SOE's reworded versions of Hudson's replies. 272. F0371/33473 R8261/178/92 -J. Pearson to P. Dixon, 3 December 1942. 273. F0371/33473 R8181/178/92; WO202/356 - tel. GESH 176 and 177 of 17 November, and 199, 200 and 201 of 23 November 1942. 274. F0371/33473 R8261/178/92; WO202/356 - tel. GESH 208 and 209 of 24 November 1942. 275. WO202/356 - tel. GESH 175 of 17 November and GESH 196, 200 and 201 of 23 November 1942, 276. F0371/33473 R8261/178/92. 277. See WO202/356 - tel. GESH 171 of 15 November 1942. 278. Ibid. 279. WO202/356 - tel. GESH 180 of 17 November 1942. 280. WO202/356 - tel. GESH 200 of 23 November 1942. 281. F0371/33473R8261/178/92. 282. F0371/33474 R8261/178/92 D. Howard minute, 9 December 1942. 283. Ibid, O. Sargent, A. Cadogan, A. Eden minutes, all 9 December 1942. In reaching their conclusion the Foreign Office also took account of 'reports 304 Notes and References

from the Croat front'. These have been withheld in RJs 606, 640 and 647. Such information may have come from an SIS transmitter in Zagreb, or possibly from Dominic Mandic, a member of the Catholic church resident in Rome. The British were certainly receiving reports alleging Chetnik atrocities against the Croat population in western Yugoslavia from the latter by December 1942. See F0371/33474 R8540/178/92 - letter G. Rendel to D. Howard S0464, 8 December, forwarding report by D. Mandic dated 29 October 1942; S. Pavlowitch, 'Lieutenant Rapotec', pp.l48-9n. 284. PREM 3/510/5 - Undated Yugoslav aides memoire, approx. 9 December 1942. 285. F0371/33474 R8720/178/92 - Mr. Rowan [PM's office] to V Lawford, 9 December 1942. 286. Ibid, D. Howard minute, 10 December 1942. 287. F0371 /33503 R8605/5606/92. 288. PREM 3/510/5 - Prime Minister's personal minute M603/2, 13 December 1942. 289. The Croat Peasant Party (HSS) was formed in 1904 under the leadership of Stjepan Radic. In 1928 he was shot in the middle of a parliamentary debate by a Serb politician; he died six weeks later. In terms of popular support the HSS was the dominant political force in Croatia, obtaining some 95 per cent of the Croat vote in 1938. At the time of Yugoslavia's invasion the party was led by Dr Vladko Macek. Given the mass support enjoyed by the party it is hardly surprising that the British came to believe that some of the Partisan groups were in fact HSS bands (they were referred to as 'Green Cadre' or 'Zeleni Kadar'). Rumours that such groups were fighting the Axis forces or organising passive resistance had been coming into the Foreign Office for much of the year, but there was little concrete evidence behind such stories, and the party's leaders in fact either sat out the war at home or in prison camps, or declared themselves for the Partisans or the Ustasha regime. See, for example, F0536/5/3147 - Report concerning situation in Yugoslavia in May 1942, forwarded by M. Krek to G. Rendel, 3 July 1942; F0536/5/3149 - letter from 'G', Berne to J. Krnjevic, London, 2 June 1942, forwarded to Foreign Office by G. Rendel, 3 July 1942; F0371/ 33472 R7850/178/92 - OSS report, forwarded to Foreign Office by Mr Hawgood [PWE], 13 November 1942. For further general details on the HSS see especially V Macek, In the Struggle for Freedom (Pennsylvania Uni• versity Press, 1957), passim', for its role during the war, see WO201/2718, various reports dated 1941-1944. See also S. K. Pavlowitch, 'Lieutenant Rapotec', pp.89-90. 290. PREM 3/510/5; F0371/33474 R8721/178/92 - Foreign Office minute, A. Eden to W Churchill, 17 December 1942. 291. F0371/33474 R8805/178/92 - letter J. Pearson to P. Dixon, 15 December 1942. The message was in fact passed to the Yugoslav Military Attache, General Radovic, for onward transmission to Mihailovic (the original text can be found in WO208/2018A - note, Brig. C. S. Vale to Gen. M. Radovic, 0168/1372/DDMI(O), 1 December 1942). This would pre• sumably have been done using SOE's wireless link, although Pearson claimed that the first his organisation had known of it was when the BBC broadcast the military cabinet bulletin. It is open to question whether the Notes and References 305

War Office note was based on a better understanding of the Chetniks' sabotage campaign (it did after all originate with the Deputy Director of Military Intelligence, Brigadier C. S. Vale), or whether (as Roberts suggests), they simply thought it would be insensitive to miss commemorating Yugo• slavia's unity day, 1 December, in some way. See W. Roberts, op. cit, p.71 for a slightly different translation, and M. Wheeler, op. cit, p.317n. 292. The broadcast was made on 10 December. However, it would seem that neither the BBC nor PWE (both of whom were highly dissatisfied with the tone of the Military Cabinet bulletins - see F0371/33445 R8917/21/92) reported this particular incident to the Foreign Office. 293. Although Sir Orme Sargent certainly knew of the existence of 'Karadjordje' by 22 December (F0371/33474 R8899/178/92), it would seem that details of its operations did not emerge until the next day, at a meeting between Sargent and members of PWE held at the Foreign Office. Sargent responded by demanding that the station be immediately suspended. (See F0898/56 - Minutes of meeting held in Foreign Office, 23 December 1942.) SOE Cairo had jealously guarded its right to produce and dissem• inate propaganda even after SO 1 had been put under the control of PWE in 1941. Although there was a supposedly-independent director of pro• paganda in the Middle East, he took his advice from SOE. The latter controlled all leaflet production, and ran both overt and covert broadcasts from their radio station in Jerusalem, including, from 20 November 1942, 'Karadjordje' (F0898/119 - letter R. Murray to R. Bruce Lockhart, 26 July 1942. See also M. Stenton, op. cit, pp. 188-90; B. Sweet-Escott, Baker Street, pp.77-80, 87-91, 97-8). According to M. Foot and C. Cruickshank, one of Glenconner's first acts on being made commander of M04 was violently to oppose the appointment of Paul Vellacott as head of PWE's new Middle East mission (M. Foot, SOE, p.40; C. Cruickshank, The Fourth Arm (Oxford, 1981), pp.37-38). Mihailovic was well-satisfied with 'Karadjordje's' tone, but even he objected when it began openly to urge Serbian rail- waymen to carry out sabotage in early December (Cf. WO202/356 - GESH 221 of 1 December and WO202/509 - Villa Resta no.l 100 of 9 December 1942). On 'Karadjordje', and for the partial texts of some of its broadcasts, see D. Petkovic, 'Cetnicka Radio Stanica "Karadjordje"' [Chetnik Radio Station 'Karadjordje'], Glasnik SIKD 'Njegos', no.3 (June 1959) pp.43-48. 294. F0371/33474 R8721/178/92 - O. Sargent minute, 26 December 1942. There is unfortunately no evidence as to whether or not the Foreign Office knew of Plecas' instructions to Mihailovic regarding the liquidation of the Partisans. Given that it appears to have been unaware of SOE's approval of Chetnik links with the Italians (also relayed to Mihailovic by Plecas), it is probably safe to assume that it did not know. 295. Ibid, A. Eden minute, 28 December 1942. 296. F0371/33474 R8899/178/92 - Yugoslav Government aide memoire, 22 December 1942. 297. TDM, pp.464^5. 298. In conversation with Rendel on 24 December, Jovanovic demanded to know precisely what the British wanted out of Mihailovic. According to the Yugoslav Prime Minister, a major campaign against the Axis would be 306 Notes and References

'suicidal', while according to his information the Chetniks had done everything that the British had asked in terms of sabotage. If the latter had any specific complaints, he would like to know what they were. Rendel appears to have been unable to answer either of these points (F0536/6/ G3155A - letter G. Rendel to D. Howard, 28 December 1942). 299. TDM, p.468. In the aftermath of this incident, SOE attempted to convince the Foreign Office that Boughey had not in fact made the remarks attributed to him by Knezevic (F0371/37578 R2/2/92 C. L. Rose minute, 2 January 1943). However, information provided by Boughey himself to M. Kay suggests that he did make such comments, his motive being 'to make them [the Yugoslavs] more aware of the jeopardy of their position'. See M. Kay, op. cit, p.280n. Similarly, H. Williams (op. cit, pp.73-4), basing her argument on a 1976 interview between Boughey and Stevan Pavlowitch, notes that Boughey was actually making a 'last-ditch attempt to save Mihailovic' by encouraging the Yugoslav government to put pressure on him to take more strenuous anti-Axis action, thus making it impossible for the British to dump him. 300. TDM, pp.469-70. See also J. Tomasevic, The Chetniks, p.290. 301. F0371/37578 R2/2/92; F0536/6/G3155A G. Rendel minutes, 31 December 1942. 302. Ibid. 303. F0536/6/G3155A G. Rendel minute, 1 January 1943. 304. Ibid. 305. Unfortunately, the original 'Ultra' decrypts for 1942 are still unavailable to the general public, while the intelligence summaries for the same year in the Public Record Office (class DEFE3) contain practically nothing concerning developments in the Balkans. Indeed, information about the anti-Axis struggle and civil war in Yugoslavia only appears with any regularity from May 1943 onwards (DEFE3/813fl). See R. Bennett, Ultra and Mediterranean Strategy, p.333, 336. 306. See, for example, WrO208/2014, Col. Thornton minute of 18 August and Maj. D. Talbot Rice minute of 17 December 1942. 307. M. Djilas, Wartime, pp.204 -205; S. Bosnitch, 'The Yugoslav Revolution 1941-1945: A Reappraisal of The Communist Revoltionary Strategy and Tactics' South Slav Journal, vol. 7, nos 3 4 (25 26) autumn-winter 1984 p. 10; P. Shoup, op. cit, pp.68 70. See also Chapter 1, notes 66 and 83, and sources referred to therein. 308. M. Djilas, Wartime, p.314. 309. S. Pavlowitch, Yugoslavia, p. 136. For evidence of the generally poor quality of the Croat armed forces, see sources cited in this chapter, note 94, and S. K. Pavlowitch, 'Lieutenant Rapotec', pp.91-2. On the particular failings of the Croat troops in western Bosnia, see P. Hehn, op. cit, pp.94, 109, 128-129, 131. The west Bosnian Chetniks complained frequently, and in bitter terms, of the tendency of Croat garrisons to surrender to the Partisans without any serious fighting (see documents in F0371/44279 R16620/11/92 - OSS publication, Captured Chetnik Documents June 1944), especially documents nos7, 11, 25). 310. Although some limited 'guerilla' activity in Hercegovina was detected by MI3b during early June, it was not until the end of the month that the main Notes and References 307

Partisan forces under Tito's direct command started moving northwest (WO208/2014, map, p.25B; M. Djilas, Wartime, p. 187). On 25 July some 4000 Partisans were reported to be on the river at Konjic (WO208/ 2014, map, p.28A), while between mid-July and early September reports were received of the capture by the Partisans of several towns in Herce• govina (ibid, see also map, p.31 A). Nothing, however, seems to have been known of the abortive Partisan attempt to capture in mid-August (M. Djilas, Wartime, p. 199) or the temporary establishment of the Partisan headquarters in Glamoc later the same month. Additionally, the main reason for the Partisans' success - the previous withdrawal of Italian troops from the areas into which they had moved in autumn 1941 (which resulted in the Partisans having only to face weak Croat forces during their advance) - went unrevealed by 'Ultra'. (On the reasons for the Italians' withdrawal, see especially P. Hehn, op. cit, pp. 130-1; J. Tomasevic, The Chetniks, p.232; M. Milazzo, op. cit, p.95; F. Verna, op. cit, pp.426, 441-2.) During September 'continual fighting between Croats and Communists' was reported in northwest Hercegovina (around Travnik, Bugojno and Kupres), while Livno, captured by the Partisans at the start of August, was known to have been retaken by the Croats on 28 September (WO208/2014, map, p.33A). Later in October, as Tito's forces continued their advance towards western Bosnia, a see-saw struggle was reported around , Mrkonjic Grad and Kljuc (WO208/2014, map, p.35B), while by mid-November it was known that the main Partisan elements were irrupting into Kordun and Banija (WO208/2014, map, p.37A). As they did so, the situation in Herce• govina stabilised, and with the exception of some Italian thrusts towards Livno, Bos Grahovo and Jajce at the end of October and into November (see WO208/2014, maps, p.35B and 37A; M. Milazzo, op. cit, p. 100; P. Kacavenda, op. cit, pp.58-9; J. Tomasevic, The Chetniks, p.233) there appears to have been little to report from these areas. For a detailed account of German-Croat operations against Partisan forces in the Bos Krajina (the area between the and Una rivers), see P. Hehn, op. cit, pp. 127-9, 131-4. This area was known by MI3b to have been a 'major centre of military operations' during late June and the first half of July (WO208/2014, map, p.25B), and 'perpetual small-scale operations' against the Partisans in the Kozara mountains were reported around the same time. Further information from Major Hudson identified 5-6000 Partisans constituting 'some kind of hill republic' on Grmec Planina on 25 July (WO208/2014*; map, p.28A), while five weeks of fighting between 60 000 Axis troops and 15 000 Partisans in the Kozara mountains was reported on 3 October (WO208/2014, map, p.33A). Guerrilla activity was reported from Slovenia during the period June- August (WO208/2014, maps, p.25B, 28A and 31 A), and occasional acts of violence (including sabotage on the Zagreb-Belgrade railway, 'raids by rebels' and Croat and German mopping up operations) were known to have taken place north of the river throughout the summer and autumn (ibid.; see also maps, p.33A, 35B and 37A). For further information on the situation north of the Sava, see P. Hehn, op. cit, pp. 137-8. WO208/2014 - Maj. D. Talbot Rice minute, 20 July 1942. Ibid, Col. Thornton minute, 15 September 1942. 308 Notes and References

315. Ibid, Col. Thornton minute, 11 June; Maj. D. Talbot Rice minute, 20 July; Col. Thornton minute, 18 August; Col. Thornton minute, 15 September 1942. 316. Ibid, Col. Thornton minute, 18 October 1942. 317. Ibid, Col. Thornton minute, 18 August 1942. 318. Ibid, Maj. D. Talbot Rice minute, 20 July; Col. Thornton minute, 18 August; Maj. D. Talbot Rice minute, 17 December 1942. See also this chapter, note 289 for further information on the wartime activities of the HSS. 319. See especially WO208/2014, Col. Thornton minute, 18 August 1942. Thornton even suggested that the Montenegrin Chetniks were double- crossing the Italians by accepting arms from them while simultaneously carrying out sabotage in the guise of Partisan forces. In this way the Chetniks derived the added benefit of seeing Partisan hostages shot in reprisal for Chetnik actions. While there is no way of knowing whether Thornton was right in this particular case, the Chetniks in parts of Serbia certainly adopted a similar practice (and for the same reasons - see sources below), while Mihailovic himself confirmed in 1946 that there had been some 'fake' attacks on Italian troops in Montenegro (TDM, p. 163). In Bosnia too, railway sabotage carried out by Chetnik forces was deliberately blamed on the Partisans, since the latter were itinerant, and the Germans would therefore find it difficult to justify reprisals on nearby Serb villages (F0371/ 37616 Rl 1994/143/92 - Press Reading Bureau, Stockholm, Yugoslav report no. 16, 16 November 1943). Similarly, in February-March 1943 the Chetnik High Command proposed carrying out sabotage in the guise of the Partisans in order to encourage the Italians to give them arms (M. Milazzo, op. cit, p.l 19). For examples of how these actions were carried out in Serbia, see J. Rootham, op. cit, pp. 183-4; WO202/162, Report on 2 Kosovski area by Capt. G. R. M. H. More, 28 May 1944, pp. 1-2. 320. WO208/2014 - Col. Thornton minute, 15 September 1942. 321. Ibid, Director of Military Intelligence (DMI) minute, 25 June; Maj. D. Talbot Rice minute, 20 July; Col. Thornton minute, 18 August; DMI minute for Chief of the Imperial General Staff (CIGS), Vice-CIGS and Director of Military Operations (DMO), 23 August; Col. Thornton minute, 15 September; Col. Thornton minute, 18 October; Brig. Kirkman (Deputy Director of Military Intelligence - I) minute, 25 November 1942. 322. Ibid, Col. Thornton minute, 15 September 1942. 323. Ibid, Maj. D. Talbot Rice minute, 17 December 1942. 324. Ibid, maps, p.28A, 33A, 35B, 37A. Given the lack of information con• cerning Partisan activity in Serbia during this period, it seems safe to assume that MI3b considered the Chetniks to be responsible for the majority of these acts, even when they were not specifically credited to the latter. Indeed, the few pieces of information about 'Communist' bands in Serbia which were received during the second half of 1942 dealt primarily with their destruction. See this chapter, notes 130-1 for further information on Partisan strength in this region. Sabotage attributed to Mihailovic's organi• sation was also reported on the Konjic-Mostar railway during early Sep• tember. In view of the independence of the Hercegovinian nationalists, it is impossible to be sure how accurate this information was, although it is Notes and References 309

known that Mihailovic requested that the Chetnik forces in this area carry out such activities during the autumn of 1942. Ibid, Col. Thornton minute, 21 November 1942. Although there is no situation map showing developments during December 1942 in WO208/ 2014, that MI3b was aware of German-Croat operations against the east Bosnian Chetniks at this time is made clear by a report on the revolt in Yugoslavia passed on to the Foreign Office in May 1943. See F0371/ 37586, MI3b report, 21 May 1943, p.14. Clashes between the Chetniks and Ustashe near Foca, which culminated in the capture of the town by Mihailovic's forces in mid-August, were reported from May onwards (ibid, maps, p.25B and 31 A), while other instances of fighting between the two groups were reported during October (map, p.37A).

CONCLUSION

As Douglas Howard minuted on 1 January 1943, it was for fear of the establishment of a Communist regime in Yugoslavia, 'and not out of excessive love for Mihailovic' that the British had decided, 'taking the long view and in spite of the difficulties it might lead us into with the Russians', to continue their support for the Yugoslav Minister of War. Howard hit the nail on the head by observing that the 'obvious and easiest solution would of course be that we and the Americans by an invasion of the Balkans should be on the spot and in a position to police that part of the world and thus prevent an immediate collapse and opening for Communist risings. It is important, however, to have alternative ideas for coping with the situation, should we not be on the spot at the right moment.' In the event, these 'alternative ideas' came to consist almost entirely of a blind hope that Tito's Partisans might prove amenable to British influence, a belief which, of course, had no basis in reality. See F0371/33154 R8820/8820/67 - D. Howard minute, 1 January 1943. See especially F. W. D. Deakin, 'The Myth of an Allied Landing in the Balkans during the Second World War (with particular reference to Yugo• slavia)', British Policy, pp. 102-14. In December 1943 Brigadier Fitzroy Maclean, senior British liaison officer at Partisan headquarters, informed of Tito's intention to establish a Communist government in Yugoslavia. The British Prime Minister responded by saying that since he did not intend making Yugo• slavia his home after the war, he did not much care what kind of gov• ernment the Yugoslavs chose; what really interested him was who was doing the most harm to the Germans (F. Maclean, , pp.322-3; M. Lees, 77k Rape of Serbia (New York, 1990) p.96). In fact, given that official German casualty figures show that the Wehrmacht (including the Wqffen-SS) lost some 23 000 dead, 26000 missing and 70000 wounded in the entire Balkan theatre during the Second World War, it is unlikely that the Partisans killed more than 13 000 Germans between 1941 and 1945, or that they had killed more than a few thousand at the time that Churchill made his remark. 310 Notes and References

See M. K. Sorge, The Other Price of Hitler's War - German Military and Civilian Losses resulting from World War II (New York, 1986), pp.42, 62-63, 65; S. Trew, 'The Myth of the Wehrmacht's Balkan Quagmire' (unpublished paper delivered to Institute for the Study of War and Society conference on Civil War and Rebellion, De Montfort University Bedford, September 1995). 4. On the factors motivating the British authorities' decision to establish contact with the Partisans during the first months of 1943, see especially M. Wheeler, Britain and the War for Yugoslavia 1940-1943 (New York, 1980), pp. 198-229. 5. Much has been made by some authors of the skewed nature of this infor• mation. They suggest that the reports of the liaison officers attached to the Partisans were coloured by political favouritism or by the liaison officers' habit of repeating Partisan claims as gospel truth, and that reports favourable to Mihailovic's Chetniks were deliberately suppressed by pro- Partisan elements within SOE's Middle East headquarters. Although there may well be some truth in their accusations, this subject is deserving of much closer attention than can be given here. Those wishing to pursue the matter further should consult two books (Patriot or Traitor and Ally Betrayed) and one article (James Klugmann, SOE-Cairo, and the Mihailovich Deception' in D. Charters and M. Tugwell (eds), Deception Operations: Studies in the East-West Context, (London 1990), pp.53-84) by David Martin, and two books by a British officer who served alongside the Serbian Chetniks, Michael Lees, The Rape of Serbia and Special Operations Executed (London, 1986). 6. Without doubt, the best objective analysis of the internal weaknesses of the Chetnik movement is the conclusion to L. Karchmar's PhD thesis, (Draza Mihailovic and the Rise of the Chetnik Movement 1941—42', Stanford University, 1973 pp.923-46. See also the sections on 'Military Organisation', pp.525- 68, and 'Political Organisation', pp.569-10. V Ivanovic, LX Memoirs of a Yugoslav (London, 1977) pp.217-38 also makes some interesting remarks. 7. There were, admittedly, some minor exceptions to this trend; for example, Major Vojislav Lukacevic was able to form a few Chetnik units out of Moslems living in the Sandzak (L. Karchmar, op. cit, p.598; I. Avakumovic, op. cit, p.70), while cooperation between the Serb nationalists and Croats occurred in parts of western Dalmatia and Lika (L. Karchmar, op. cit, pp.596- 597; J. Tomasevic, The Chetniks, p.217). However, in the majority of cases the Serbs, Moslems and Croats were incapable of coming to terms with the antipathies aroused by the events of 1941 (as well as their historical traditions), and they continued to prosecute a bloody racial war against each other throughout 1942 and into 1943 J. Tomasevic, The Chetniks, pp.233, 257~259; M. Milazzo, The Chetnik Movement and the Yugoslav Resistance (London, 1975) pp.96, 99-101, 107; A. Beljo, Yugoslavia - Genocide: a Docu• mented Analysis (Sudbury, 1985), pp.49-65). Unfortunately, the Italians did not help matters by establishing an anti-Chetnik Moslem militia in Herce• govina and the Sandzak, and by arming Albanians living in Kosovo, since the Serbs only devoted their energies to destroying them (L. Karchmar, op. cit, pp.577-8, 599, 718; WO202/215A - report by Gen. L. Vivaldi (com• mander of Italian 'Taurinense' division), CSDIC, CMF(East)/CD/17, 13 Notes and References 311

September 1944; WO202/163 - 'Report on Dipper Mission', May- December 1943, by Capt. W J. Boon, 18 May 1944, p. 3). Additionally, in those areas of western Yugoslavia in which the Croat authorities and Chetniks cooperated against the Partisans, it was clear that such arrangements were in no way symptomatic of any deeper reconciliation, and that each party was determined to destroy the other once the Com• munists had been defeated (see especially F0371/44279 R16620/11/92, OSS publication, Captured Chetnik Documents, documents no.2 and 10; F. Verna, op. cit, p.472n). On purely practical terms, of course, one also needs to recognise the technical difficulties of establishing effective liaison with, let alone control over, a mass of guerrilla groups of various political orientations in an occupied country riven by civil war. 8. L. Karchmar, op. cit, p.569; M. Deroc, British Special Operations Explored: Yugoslavia in Turmoil 1941-1943 and the British Response (New York, 1988) pp. 110~11, 226-8. Not surprisingly, there is a major difference of opinion over Mihailovic's personal role in encouraging or discouraging the anti- Moslem and anti-Croat prejudices of the Serb nationalists. M. Milazzo, op. cit, p. 109 considers the Yugoslav Minister of War to have been at least partially responsible for the atrocities committed against the Moslems in the Sandzak during the autumn of 1942, while L. Karchmar argues (op. cit, p.598) that Mihailovic displayed a 'far more conciliatory attitude towards the Moslems, and... tried, wherever he could exert a personal influence, to find a modus vivendi with them'. (Elsewhere Milazzo admits that 'nothing Mihailovic or his collaborators could have done would have completely restrained the Serb bands' from pursuing the ethnic struggle during the second half of 1942 - op. cit, p.l 11.) Documents cited in J. Marjanovic, The Collaboration, pp.60-2 suggest that Chetnik policy was in this respect (as in many others) highly confused, some of the commanders considering that to indulge in anti-Moslem activities could only lead to a deterioration in their relations with the Italians, with potentially disastrous consequences for their own people. Generally speaking, it would not seem unrealistic to argue that the attitude of the local vojvodas, and the specific political and military conditions appertaining in different regions of western Yugoslavia, were far more significant than anything Mihailovic might say or not say about how to treat the Moslems or the Croats. See also TDM, p.359. 9. L. Karchmar, op. cit, pp.715 17; M. Milazzo, op. cit, p. 112. On the Chetniks' 'Salonika Front Fixation', see especially J. Rootham, op. cit, pp.30-1. According to N. Plecas, among the instructions which he was given to relay to Mihailovic by SOE Cairo in September 1942 was an order to preserve his forces until the 'proper moment'. Given that he was simul• taneously told to inform Mihailovic that the Mediterranean theatre was to 'become very active' in the spring of 1943, and that there was a possibility that the allies would then land in the Balkans, it is perhaps not surprising that the Chetniks remained convinced that the likelihood of a British invasion was high. See N. Plecas, letter to South Slav Journal, vol.3 no.l, March 1980, pp.40-1. See also WO208/2018A, transcript fragments from trial of Capt. A. Slijepcevic, 1 August 1945 for similar instructions brought by that officer, also in September 1942. Notes and References

For example, in December 1942 Mihailovic told Captain Radovan Iva• nisevic, Trifunovic-Bircanin's second-in-command, that the latter bore sole responsibility for his decision to collaborate with the Italians, and that he was 'not acting in this on behalf of the King or myself. Mihailovic referred to Trifunovic's faith in Italian promises of aid as 'day-dreams', and expressed his personal distaste for such arrangements. See WO202/157, unsigned SOE memorandum, 5 January 1944, 'The personal responsibility of General Mihajlovic'. See also TDM, pp. 141-2, 206. K. Novak, 'Resistance Movement in Slovenia 1941-1943', South Slav Journal, vol.5 no.4 (18), winter 1982/83, pp.41-4 (Novak was Mihailovic's most important representative in this region); L. Sire, letter to South Slav Journal, vol.9 no.3-4 (33-4), autumn/winter 1986, pp.79-83; I. Avakumovic, Mihaibvic prema Nemackim dokumentima [Mihailovic in the light of German documents] (London, 1969) p.72; L. Karchmar, op. cit, p.656. On the organisation and activities of the non- Communist underground in Slovenia, see also J. Tomasevic, The Chetniks, pp.220-6. For example, Rade Radic, an important Serb commander in western Bosnia, refused to admit Mihailovic's delegates to a conference of local Chetnik commanders in mid- 1942, while at another important meeting of Chetnik vojvodas at Kulasim in December, Mihailovic was accused of com• pletely misunderstanding the situation in Bosnia (F0371/44279 R16620/ 11/92 - OSS publication, Captured Chetnik Documents, document no.2; M. Milazzo, op. cit., p.l 10; P. Kacavenda 'Saradnja Cetnika i Ustasa u Bosni 1942. godine' [Chetnik- Ustasha Cooperation in Bosnia, 1942] Vqjnoistoryski Glasnik, 1966 (5) pp.62~4). Only in parts of eastern Bosnia did Mihailovic's delegates meet with any success; elsewhere they were ignored, sent packing or even murdered by the local Chetnik commanders. See J. Tomasevic, The Chetniks, p. 158; M. Milazzo, op. cit, pp. 109-111; L. Karchmar, op. cit, pp.536, 547, 659, 675, 933. Further evidence of Mihailovic's lack of control over the actions of the western Yugoslav 'Chetniks' can be seen in the record of talks held between the commander of the Italian 2nd Army, General Roatta, and the civilian Chetnik vojvodas, Ilija Trifunovic-Bircanin and Dobrosav Jevdjevic, on 21 September 1942. Replying to Italian questions concerning the degree of Mihailovic's influence over the Chetnik formations in the areas of the Italian VI and XVIII corps (that is Hercegovina, Dalmatia, Lika and western Bosnia), both Bircanin and Jevdjevic stated that the Yugoslav Minister of War was 'effective leader only in and Macedonia... In other districts, he is only the moral leader [on je samo moralni vodja], with whom the commanders cooperate in so far as his orders take account of the actual interests of the Serbs. At the moment, in Bosnia and Hercegovina the Serb population has such a feeling of respect for the Italians that nothing will be done against them, even if they were ordered to by Mihailovic or some other.' See fyornik, tom. 14, book 1, p.882 (see also Zbornik pp.886-888). The Chetniks succeeded in getting tens of thousands of rifles out of the Italians (F. Verna, 'Yugoslavia under Italian rule 1941-1943: Civil and Military Aspects of the Italian Occupation', PhD dissertation, University of California, 1985 p.467n gives a figure of 30,000 delivered during a six- month period in 1942), but as Mihailovic himself recognised (J. Marjanovic, Notes and References 313

The Collaboration, p.61), it was mountain artillery, mortars and machine guns which really mattered. Additionally, the Italian ration of ammunition, at around 200 rounds/rifle, was, as Karchmar observes, 'a most niggardly allowance' (L. Karchmar op. cit, p.85In). The disparity in the Chetniks' and Partisans' armaments was shown most clearly during Operation 'Schwarz', the Axis anti-guerrilla offensive of late spring/early summer 1943. At that time the Germans captured from the Chetniks and Partisans roughly equal numbers of rifles (3415 and 3618 respectively), but whereas they took from the former only 38 machine guns and 6 heavy mortars, they captured from the Communist-led guerrillas no fewer than 16 pieces of artillery, 32 heavy and 25 light mortars and 220 machine guns (DEFE3/ 822, ML5054/CO AL, 24 June 1943). See also L. Karchmar, op. cit, p.541, %bornik, tom. 14, book 1, pp.634-5, and J. Marjanovic, The Colla• boration, pp.61-2 for further details of arms received by the Chetniks from the Italians during the latter part of 1942. 14. L. Karchmar, op. cit, pp.541-2. See also this work, Chapter 6, especially note 146. In November 1942 the Germans flirted with the idea of disarming some 10000 Chetniks who had agreements with the Croat authorities in eastern and central Bosnia (it should be mentioned that there were thousands of non-collaborationist Chetniks in the same areas), while in December they went even further, announcing that they no longer recognised such treaties as valid. See M. Milazzo, op. cit, p. 109; J. Tomasevic, The Chetniks, p. 181,229; J. Marjanovic, The Collaboration, pp.66- 7; this work, Chapter 6, notes 243 and 325. 15. C. Blair, Guerilla Warfare (London, 1957) p.29; L. Karchmar, op. cit, pp.550, 555-6. For criticism of the Chetniks' disregard for training, and the detri• mental effects on the latter's morale and ability to carry out operations, see reports of British liaison officers attached to Mihailovic's forces in Serbia during 1943 in WO202/162. Although no consistent pattern emerges, and some BLOs had some very positive things to say about Mihailovic's forces, much more negative are the reports by Major P. Solly-Flood ('Appreciation of the military value of Lt Col. Djuric forces to the Allied war effort', dated 8 May 1944, p.3), Lieutenant Colonel S. B. Cope ('Report on Neronian Mission', dated 25 May 1944, p.l), and Major J. Sehmer ('War Diary of Maj. J. Sehmer, 19 April 1943-13 December 1943', p.2). 16. L. Karchmar, op. cit, p.557. Elisabeth Barker suggests that Mihailovic's 'refusal to look hard unpleasant facts in the face, and [his] over-indulgence in wishful thinking' might well have been the 'fatal flaw' in the General's character (E. Barker's review of N. Plecas' Ratne Godine 1941-1945, in South Slav Journal, vol.7 nos.3-4 (25-6), autumn-winter 1984, pp.83-4). See also J. Tomasevic, The Chetniks, p. 194. 17. For further details of the Yugoslav Army in the Homeland's organisational structure, seej. Tomasevic, The Chetniks, pp. 178-82,1. Avakumovic, op. cit, pp.75-7, and L. Karchmar, op. cit, pp.528-68 passim. See also WO208/ 2002 - D. T. Hudson's 'Report on the Serbs', London, 22 April 1944, p.9. 18. L. Karchmar, op. cit, pp.534-6, 539; J. Tomasevic, The Chetniks, p. 183. 19. L. Karchmar, op. cit, pp.531-2, 550-1. Examples of Mihailovic's orders for the creation of 'flying brigades' in Serbia can be found in Zbornik, tom. 14, book 1, p.616. 314 Notes and References

20. For example, in late August 1942 Rade Radic, commander of Chetnik forces in west Bosnia, reported that he was 'compelled... to keep the major part of our forces... for the protection of our homes, children and wives from the crimes of the Ustashas'; this at a time when and in a region where the Chetniks were cooperating with the Croat authorities against the Par• tisans (F0371/44279 R16620/11/92 - OSS publication, Captured Chetnik Documents, document no.7). See also L. Karchmar, op. cit, p.552. 21. L. Karchmar, op. cit, p.585. On the membership and programme of this committee, both in its previous ad hoc form and, from December 1942, as the Central National Committee proper, see L. Karchmar, op. cit, pp.569- 77, 580-6. See also J. Tomasevic, The Chetniks, pp. 166-76 for a still more critical analysis of the Chetniks' political programme. Tomasevic arguably demonstrates here the usual failure of those setting out to damn the Chetniks, in that he attributes to them a set of coherent, if extremist, ideas and ideals which, he implies, were common to all Chetniks. However, Karchmar's argument that the 'Cetnik movement was not unitary, but fragmented by local interests; that the real interests and sentiments of Hercegovinians differed from those of east Bosnians, and those of Monte• negrins from anyone else' (op. cit, p. 717) appears to be far more realistic. 22. The Bihac assembly, which was attended by 54 Partisan delegates from throughout Yugoslavia, opened on 26 November. As a part of its pro• ceedings it appointed the Anti-Fascist Council of National Liberation of Yugoslavia (AVNOJ), which was to form the basis of the future Communist regime. However, at the express request of the Soviet Government, which was anxious to avoid creating difficulties in its relations with King Peter's government and the British, the Partisans were careful not to identify it as such at this early stage. See W. Roberts, Tito, Mihailovic and the Allies, 1941- 1945 (New Jersey, 1973) pp.77-8; M. Djilas, Wartime, p.209; F. Maclean, Disputed Barricade, pp. 195-200. 23. B. Karapandzic, Gradjanski rat u Srbiji (1941-1945) [Civil in Serbia 1941- 1945] (Ohio, 1958) pp.203-9; M. Milazzo, op. cit, p.l 12; J. Tomasevic, The Chetniks, p. 171; L. Karchmar, op. cit, pp.579-80. As usual, opinion among these authors regarding Mihailovic's attitude to the resolutions of this con• ference, which was held at Sahovici between 30 November and 2 December, differs. According to Karchmar, Mihailovic's representative, Zaharije Ostojic, attempted to exercise a moderating influence on the other delegates. Tomasevic, however, identifies the Montenegrins Lasic and Djurisic as speaking in Mihailovic's name, and states (somewhat ambiguously) that the 'conclusions of the meeting bore an official stamp'. 24. %bornik, tom. 14, book 1, pp.881-3 - record of talks between Italian and Chetnik representatives, 21 September 1942; M. Milazzo, op. cit, pp.98- 102, 106-108, 111. 25. L. Karchmar, op. cit, pp.575-7. M. Djilas, Wartime, p.252 also makes some revealing comments on Vasic's character, especially regarding the latter's opposition to collaboration with the occupying forces. 26. L. Karchmar, op. cit, pp.580-6. 27. On the War Office's attitude, see the final part of Chapter 6. For Rendel's attitude, see Chapter 6, passim; F0371/33493 R7833/2354/92 - paper, 'Resistance in Yugoslavia', G. Rendel to A. Eden, 18 November 1942; Notes and References 315

F0371/33154 R8820/8820/67 - paper, 'Analysis of the Present Situation and Future Prospects in Southeast Europe and Yugoslavia', G. Rendel to A. Eden, 19 December 1942. 28. FO371/37606 R614/143/92 - SOE Memorandum on British Policy in Yugoslavia, dated 15 January 1943, forwarded by 'CD.' [Sir Charles Hambro] to O. Sargent, CD/4277, 20 January 1943. 29. R. Bruce-Lockhart, Comes the Reckoning (London, 1947) p.215. 30. B. Davidson, Special Operations Europe, pp. 107-15. 31. See Chapter 6, note 253. 32. F0371/37578 R3/2/92 - A. Eden minute, 3 January 1943. 33. M. Kay, 'The British Attitude Towards the Yugoslav Government in Exile 1941-1945' unpublished PhD dissertation, University of Southampton, 1986, p.71, 78; F0371/33469 R5368/178/92 - Times cutting, 26 August; F0371/33471 R7027/178/92 - Times cutting, 13 October; F0371/33443 R7933/12/92 - Times cutting, 20 November 1942. 34. For example, compare F0371/33472 R7571/178/92 - Daily Telegraph cutting, 17 November, and WO106/5689A, p.23 - Daily Mail cutting, 27 November 1942. See also F0371/33474 R8805/178/92 - letter J. Pearson to P. Dixon, 15 December 1942. 35. F0371/33491 R8557/2096/92 - letter G. Rendel to O. Sargent, 12 December 1942; P. Dixon minute, 12 December 1942. 36. The Italians shared this view, dramatically overestimating both Mihailovic's degree of control over the Serb nationalists and the cohesiveness of the Chetnik formations themselves. See M. Milazzo, op. cit, p.98. As was shown in Chapter 6, the Germans' anti-Serb paranoia was also at least partly responsible for their fears of a Chetnik uprising in Serbia. 37. This report originated with Dr Dominic Mandic, one of the representatives of the Franciscan order in Rome. Mandic's report was dated 29 October 1942, and it dealt in detail with alleged Chetnik atrocities against the Croat population, especially in Dalmatia and Hercegovina. The Italians were also accused of directly and indirectly assisting the Serb nationalists in their campaign of terror. The report was relayed by Dr Krnjevic to George Rendel on 6 December, who in turn passed it on to the Foreign Office two days later. The latter was highly disturbed by its contents and, at least by implication, linked Mihailovic with the atrocities both in its minutes and in a letter to Rendel on 18 December. See F0536/6/G3155C; F0371/33474 R8540/178/92 - letter J. Krnjevic to G. Rendel, 6 December 1942, enclosing report by Dr Mandic dated 29 October 1942; letter G. Rendel to D. Howard, S0464, 8 December 1942; F0371/33474 R8590/178/92 - C. L. Rose minute, 16 December and letter D. Howard to G. Rendel, 18 December 1942. 38. See especially Major Hudson's reasons for concluding that Mihailovic believed that the British had no choice other than to 'eat out of his hand', given in his telegram of 1 November 1942 (F0371/33445 R7445/21/92). 39. For example, on 6 November Mihailovic reported: 'Priceless services to the Yugoslav cause are being rendered in Split and Dalmatia by Vojvoda Ilija Trifunovic- Bircanin. I met him in July of this year. We are working in complete agreement with each other. He is an uncompromising nationalist. I spoke to him about work in west Bosnia, Lika and Dalmatia...' (WO202/ Notes and References

509 - tel. no.933, 6 November 1942). Trifunovic-Bircanain was one of those named by Mandic (see note 37) as being primarily responsible for the Chetnik terror in Hercegovina and Dalmatia. However, in a telegram sent by Trifunovic-Bircanin to Mihailovic on 17 September, the former reported that he was 'absolutely opposed' to attacks on Moslem villages, since 'it would mean catastrophe for the Serbian people in that zone' and 'a complete severance of collaboration with the Italian Army'. See J. Mar• janovic, The Collaboration, p.60. WO202/510 - tel. no.l 181, 22 December 1942. See also W. Roberts, op. cit, p.66 and L. Karchmar, op. cit, p.666, 695n. An example of the kind of reports which the Yugoslav government was receiving on the subject of the Chetnik-Italian relationship can be found in %bornik, tom. 14, book 1, p.851 (Telegram Pov. Br.1428, Yugoslav ambassador in Berne to Royal Yugoslav Government, 9 November 1942), while one of Jovanovic's enquiries to Mihailovic on the same matter is reprinted in J. Marjanovic, The Colla• boration, p.68 (Telegram, Jovanovic to Mihailovic DVK.157, 11 December 1942). Whilst acknowledging the British authorities' right to deal with all opera• tional matters, the Yugoslav government continued to press for an inde• pendent communications link on the not entirely unreasonable grounds that they needed to discuss important political matters with their Minister of War. In addition, in April they had succeeded in passing a letter to Mihailovic which asked that the latter should add his own weight to his government's requests, and as a result the General sent a number of telegrams on the subject during the summer of 1942. For their part, the British were divided on how to respond. George Rendel, for example, argued that since couriers clearly got through to Mihailovic from Istanbul, it was fairly pointless vetoing the Yugoslavs' right to an independent wireless link. SOE and SIS, however, were unconvinced, and refused to grant the Yugoslav request on security grounds. Nevertheless, by September the Foreign Office had decided to support the Yugoslavs' case, both as a bargaining counter in its attempts to get the Royal Yugoslav Government to get rid of various of its members, and in order to improve the Yugoslavs' security. As Rendel pointed out, the British would also have no difficulty in breaking and reading the Yugoslav cipher, which might be of assistance in finding out what Mihailovic and the Yugoslav government were really thinking. However, a meeting of the Chiefs of Staff on 7 October agreed with SOE's recommendation that the Yugoslav request be refused, and the Foreign Office seems thereafter to have abandoned its attempts to get them to change their mind. See WO202/128 - tels. Mihailovic to Jovanovic no.284, 7 July 1942 and no.315, 19July 1942; F Deakin, Embattled Mountain, p. 150 (unnumbered Mihailovic telegram of 24 August 1942); F0371/33458 R4894/151/92 - letter G. Rendel to D. Howard, 23 July, and D. Howard minute, 25 July 1942; F0371/33468 R5096/178/92 - letter G. Rendel to D. Howard, 29 July 1942; F0371/33468 R5417/178/92 - letter Mr. Greenway to S. Jovanovic, 13 August 1942; F0371/33469 R5531/178/ 92 - letter Jovanovic to Greenway, 19 August 1942; F0371/33469 R5590/ 178/92 - minutes of meeting held between Yugoslav and British officials to discuss question of independent communications, 21 August 1942, and letter Notes and References 317

G. Rendel to D. Howard, 25 August 1942; WO106/5689A - M05 note, 27 September, giving details of meeting held in Foreign Office, 2 September 1942; F0371/33442 R6152/12/92 - D. Howard minute, 17 September 1942; F0371/33470 R6427/178/92 - letter Selborne to A. Eden, 24 September 1942; F0371/33471 R6479/178/92 - G. Rendel minute, 29 September 1942; W0193/768 - COS 281, 7 October 1942. Meanwhile, the Yugoslavs attempted to outwit the British by sending ciphers to Mihailovic both via Istanbul and using the Yugoslav officers dropped into the homeland during the autumn of 1942. As a result, they succeeded in establishing a one-way wireless link in late September, although nothing of significance seems to have passed through this channel. For further details, see especially Zbornik, tom. 14, book 1, p.618, 623-33, 831-2. The texts of the 14 telegrams sent by Mihailovic over the independent link between 21 September and 24 November 1942 can be found in ibid, pp.705-711. See also L. Karchmar, op. cit, pp.663-664; E. Barker, 'Tito and the British', Times Literary Supplement, 10 August 1984, p.897; S. Pavlowitch, 'General De Gaulle; the Free French and Yugoslavia', Unconventional Perceptions of Yugo• slavia, p. 19; WO208/2018A - transcript fragments from the trial of Captain A. Slijepcevic, 1 August 1945. As Brigadier Keble, Chief of Staff in SOE's Middle East headquarters, reported on 28 December: 'It is quite useless repeat useless sending any strong or other message from His Majesty's Government to Mihailovic with a view to spurring him to further activities when we lack almost entirely means of supporting him.' See CAB101/126, p. 14, citing Keble's telegram of 28 December 1942, COS3407. See also C. Blair, op. cit, pp.48-9. What, for example, might the British have made of the instructions issued to the Montenegrin Partisans on 10 March 1942, ordering the latter that 'Until you have liquidated the Chetniks, avoid fighting the Italians. Accept con• frontation only when you cannot avoid it, or when you are sure you will get loot in weapons and ammunition'? (S. K. Pavlowitch, 'London-Moscow', p.380n.) Similarly, had the British known about the negotiations between the Germans and Partisans in 1943, which went further in many respects than anything which Mihailovic might have offered at Divci or elsewhere, one suspects that British policy in 1943 might well have been rather different. Selected Bibliography

1. UNPUBLISHED DOCUMENTS (PUBLIC RECORD OFFICE, KEW)

I Foreign Office Papers

F0371: General Correspondence, Southern European Department F0536: British Embassy to Yugoslavia F0898: Political Warfare Executive

II War Cabinet Papers

CAB65: War Cabinet Minutes CAB66, 67 and 68: War Cabinet Memoranda CAB69: War Cabinet Defence Committee (Operations), Minutes GAB79: Chiefs of Staff Committee, Minutes CAB80: Chiefs of Staff Committee, Memoranda CAB101: Official War Histories CAB 106: Miscellaneous Reports CAB 119: Joint Planning Staff Files CAB 120: Minister of Defence, Secretariat Files

III Prime Minister's Papers

PREM3: Prime Minister's Office, Operational Papers See also CAB 120.

IV War Office Papers

WO 106: Directorate of Military Operations and Intelligence. WO 165: War Office Directorates, War Diaries WO 193: Miscellaneous Director of Operations Collation Files WO201: Military Headquarters, Middle East Forces WO202: Military Headquarters, Military Missions WO204: Military Headquarters, Allied Forces Headquarters (AFHQ) WO208: Directorate of Military Intelligence W0214: Alexander Papers DEFE3: Intelligence Summaries based on 'ULTRA' decrypts

V Admiralty Papers

ADM223: Operational Intelligence Centre, Naval Intelligence Division Reports

318 Selected Bibliography 319

1A. UNPUBLISHED DOCUMENTS (IMPERIAL WAR MUSEUM)

International Military Tribunal, Nuremburg; records of Case VII (The 'Hostages Case'). Various document books and trial transcripts.

2. PUBLISHED DOCUMENTARY MATERIAL, STENO• GRAPHIC RECORDS

Allied Forces Headquarters, Handbook of Jugoslav Personalities (, 1944). , The Cetniks: a Survey of Cetnik Activity in Yugoslavia, April 1941 -July 1944 (Bari, 1944). Brown, A. (ed.), The Treason of Mihailovitch: 81 Military Documents (Yugoslav Embassy Information Office, London, 1945). Captured Chetnik Documents OSS R&A Branch, R&A no. 1662, June, 1944. Christman, H. M. (ed.), The Essential Tito (Newton Abbot: David & Charles 1971). Clissold, S. (ed.), Yugoslavia and the Soviet Union 1939-1973, a Documentary Survey (Oxford University Press: London, 1975). Djonovic, J. 'Telegrami Draze Mihailovica o Engleskim misijama u svom stabu' [Draza Mihailovic's telegrams about the English mission at his headquarters] Glasnik srpskog istorisko-kulturnog drustva (Kjegos' (Henceforward, Glasnik SIKD (Njegos>), no.5, June 1960, pp.24-35. Djonovic, J. 'Telegrami Draze Mihailovica o Engleskim misijama u svom stabu i Engleskoj politici na terenu' [Draza Mihailovic's telegrams about the English mission at his headquarters and English policy on the ground] Glasnik SIKD 'Njegos', no.6/7, December 1960/June 1961, pp.53-7, 33—8 respectively. Documents on German Foreign Policy 1918-1945, Series D, 1937-45, vol.XII, HMSO, London, 1964. Gilbert, ¥. (ed.), Hitler Directs His War (Oxford University Press: New York, 1951). Marjanovic, J. and Stanisic, M. A., The Collaboration ofD. Mihailovic's Chetniks with the Enemy Forces of Occupation (1941-1944) (Arhivski Pregled: Belgrade, 1979). Martin, D. (ed.), Patriot or Traitor - the Case of General Mihailovic, proceedings and report of the commission of inquiry for a fair trial for Draja Mihailovich (Hoover Institution Press: Stanford, California, 1978). Meyszner, O., SS-Gruppenfiihrer. 'The 1942 Meyszner Report on Serbia', South Slav Journal, vol.5 no.3 (17), autumn 1982, pp.41-6. Novak, K. 'Resistance Movement in Slovenia, 1941-1943', South Slav Journal, vol.5 no.4 (18) winter 1982/83, pp.40-7. Petrovic, K. 'Iz ratnog dnevnika vrhovne komande vermahta' [from the War Diary of the High Command of the Wehrmacht (OKW war diary extracts for November-December 1942)], Vojnoistorijski Glasnik, Jan-Apr 1988 no.l, XXXIX, pp.307-43. Rhodes James, R. (ed.), Winston Churchill; his Complete Speeches 1897-1963, vol. VI, 1935-1942 (Chelsea House Publishers: London, 1974). Royal Institute of International Affairs. Documents on International Affairs 1939-1946, vol.11, Hitler's Europe (Oxford University Press: London, 1954). 320 Selected Bibliography

Stepinac, A. 'Memorandum to Poglavnik Pavelic regarding Conversions to Roman Catholicism', South Slav Journal, vol.5 no.l, spring 1982, pp. 38-47. Trevor-Roper, H. R. (ed.), Hitler's War Directives 1939-1945 (Sidgwick & Jackson: London, 1964). The Trial of Dragoljub-Draza Mihailovic: Stenographic Record and Documents from the Trial of Dragoljub- Draza Mihailovic (State Printing House: Belgrade, 1946). The Trial of the German Major War Criminals, proceedings of the international military tribunal sitting at Nuremburg, Germany; volumes I-XXII. (HMSO, London, 1946-1951). United States Department of State, Foreign Relations of the United States: Diplomatic Papers 1942 (United States Government Printing Office: Washington, 1961). , Foreign Relations of the United States: the Conferences at Washington, 1941-1942, and Casablanca, 1943 (United States Government Printing Office: Washington, 1968). Zbornik dokumenta ipodataka o Narodnooslobodilackom ratu naroda Jugoslavije [Collection of documents and information about the Yugoslav people's national liberation struggle] tom.XTV, book 1, Documents on Draza Mihailovic's Chetnik Movement, 30 June 1941 - 31 December 1942 (Military History Institute: Belgrade, 1981).

3. MEMOIRS, DIARIES, AUTOBIOGRAPHIES

Amery, J., Approach March - a Venture in Autobiography (Hutchinson: London, 1973). Beevor, J. G., SOE: Recollections and Reflections, 1940-1945 (Bodley Head: London, 1981). Churchill, W. S., The Second World War. Six volumes (Penguin: London, 1985). Ciano, G., Ciano's Diary, 1939-1943 (William Heinemann: London, 1947). Colakovic, R., Winning Freedom (Lincolns-Prager: London, 1962). Dalton, H., Memoirs 1931-1945: the Fateful Years (Frederick Muller: London, 1957). Davidson, B., Partisan Picture (Bedford Books: London, 1946). , Special Operations Europe - Scenes from the Anti-Nazi War (Victor Gollancz: London, 1980). Davies, E. R, Illyrian Venture (Bodley Head: London, 1952). Dedijer, V, Dnevnik [Diary], vol.1, 6th April 1941 -17th November 1942 (Slovenski knjizni zavod: Ljubljana, 1948). , With Tito through the War (Alexander Hamilton: London, 1951). Dilks, D. (ed.), The Diaries of Sir 1938-1945 (Cassell: London, 1971). Djelevic, J. V., 'Iz prvih meseca' [From the first months], in Knjiga o Drazi, vol.1, pp. 177-189. Djilas, M., Wartime (Seeker & Warburg: London, 1980) paperback edition. , Rise and Fall (Macmillan: London, 1985). , Memoir of a Revolutionary (Harcourt Brace Jovanovich: New York, 1983). Dodds-Parker, D., Setting Europe Ablaze (Springwood Books: Surrey, 1983). Eden, A., Memoirs: Comes the Reckoning (Cassell: London, 1965). Felman, R. L., Mihailovich and I (Neven Publishing: Wisconsin, 1964). Glen, A., Footholds against a Whirlwind (Hutchinson: London, 1975). Hamilton-Hill, D., SOE Assignment (William Kimber: London, 1973). Ismay, H., The Memoirs of Lord Ismay (William Heinemann: London, 1960). Selected Bibliography 321

Ivanovic, V, IX- Memoirs of a Yugoslav ( Weidenfeld & Nicolson: London, 1977). Jebb, G., The Memoirs of Lord Gladwyn (Weidenfeld & Nicolson: London, 1972). Kardelj, E., Reminiscences - the Struggle for Recognition and Independence; the New Yugoslavia 1944-1957 (Blond & Briggs: London, 1982). Knezevic, R. L. (ed.), Knjiga o Drazi [The Book about Draza], vol.1, 19411943 (Srpska : Ontario, 1956). Lasic-Vasojevie, M. M., Enemies on all Sides: the Fall of Yugoslavia (North American International: Washington, 1976). Lawrence, C, Irregular Adventure (Faber & Faber: London, 1947). Lees, M., Special Operations Executed (William Kimber: London, 1986). Lockhart, R. B., Comes the Reckoning (Putnam: London, 1947). Lyttelton, O., The Memoirs of Lord Chandos (Bodley Head: London, 1962). Macek, V, In the Struggle for Freedom (Pennsylvania State University Press: University Park, 1957). Maclean, R, Eastern Approaches (Pan: London, 1956). Macmillan, H., The Blast of War 1939-1945 (Macmillan: London, 1967). Meskovic, P., 'Od Bosne do Ravna Gora' [From Bosnia to Ravna Gora], in Knjiga o Drazi, vol.1, pp.28-33. Millin, S. G., World Blackout, The Reeling Earth; The Pit of the Abyss; The Sound of the Trumpet (Faber & Faber: London, 1944-1947). Myers, E. C. W, Greek Entanglement (Alan Sutton: Gloucester, 1955). Perhinek, R., 'An Interview with General Nedic', in South Slav Journal, vol.4 no.2, summer 1981, pp.38-40. Peter II, King of Yugoslavia, A King's Heritage (Cassell: London, 1955). Pimlott, B. (ed.), The Second World War Diary of Hugh Dalton 1940-45 Jonathan Cape: London, 1986). Rayner, L., Women in a Village - an Englishwoman's Experiences and Impressions of life in Yugoslavia under German Occupation (William Heinemann: London, 1957). Rendel, G., The Sword and the Olive; Recollections of Diplomacy and the Foreign Service, 1913-1954 John Murray: London, 1957). Rootham, J., Miss Fire - the Chronicle of a British Mission to Mihailovich 1943-1944 (Chatto & Windus: London, 1946). St John, R., From the Land of Silent People (George G. Harrap: London, 1942). Seitz, A. B., Mihailovic - Hoax or Hero? (Leigh House: Columbus, 1953). Sire, L., Between Hitler and Tito (Andre Deutsch: London, 1989). Sporer, C, 'Air Force Reminiscences (I)', in South Slav Journal, vol.8 no.l- 2 (27-8), springs-summer 1985, pp.51-6. Sweet-Escott, B., Baker Street Irregular (Methuen: London, 1965). Todorovich, B. J., Last Words - a Memoir of World War II and the Yugoslav Tragedy (Walker: New York, 1989). Ugrenovic, M., 'In the Interests of Truth and Justice', in South Slav Journal, vol.8 no. 1-2 (27-8), spring-summer 1985, pp.56-64. Vuckovic, Z., Secanja iz Rata [War Memoirs] (Biblioteka Nase Delo: London, 1980). Young, K. (ed.), The Diaries of Sir Robert Bruce Lockhart, 1939-1965 (Macmillan: London, 1980). Yovitchitch, L. A., Within Closed Frontiers - a Woman in Wartime Yugoslavia. W & R. Chambers: London, 1956. 322 Selected Bibliography

Zulfikarpasic, A., 'The Road to Foca', in South Slav Journal, vol.4 no.l, spring 1980, pp. 19-28.

4. SECONDARY SOURCES, BIOGRAPHIES

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5. ARTICLES

Auty, P., 'Note on Colonel D. T. Hudson's Account of his Mission to Yugoslavia 1941-4', British Policy, pp.91-92. Bailey, S. W., 'British Policy towards General Draza Mihailovic', British Policy, pp.59-90. 326 Selected Bibliography

Barker, E., 'Some Factors in British Decision-making over Yugoslavia, 1941-4', British Policy, pp.22-58. Barker, E., 'Fresh Sidelights on British Policy in Yugoslavia 1942-3', Slavonic and East European Review, vol.54 no.4, October 1976, pp.572-85. Bennett, R., 'Intelligence and Strategy; some Observations on the War in the Mediterranean, 1941-1945', Intelligence and National Security, vol.5 no.2, April 1990, pp.444-64. Bosnitch, S. D., 'The Yugoslav Revolution 1941-1945: a Reappraisal of the Communist Revolutionary Strategy and Tactics', South Slav Journal, vol.7 no. 3- 4 (25-26), autumn-winter 1984, pp.4 22. Browning, C. R., 'Wehrmacht Reprisal Policy and the Mass Murder of Jews in Serbia', Militargeschichtliche Mitteilungen, vol.1, 1983, pp.31-47. Craig, L., 'German Defensive Policy in the Balkans, a Case Study: the Buildup in Greece, 1943', Balkan Studies, a Biannual Publication of the Institute for Balkan Studies, vol.23 no.2, 1982, pp.403-20. Deakin, F. W. D., 'Great Britain and European Resistance', European Resistance Movements II, pp.98- 119. ——, 'Britain and Yugoslavia', in Conference on Britain and European Resistance, held at St Antony's College, Oxford, 10-16 December 1962. Dedijer, V, 'Who Killed General Mihailovich?', The Listener, 28 February 1980, pp.264-66. Deroc, M., 'Sources for Draza Mihailovic's Biography', South Slav Journal, vol.5 no.4 (18) winter 1982/83, pp.31-4. Djonovic, J., 'Veze sa generalom Mihailovicem sa srednjeg istoka' [Connections with General Mihailovic from the Middle East], Glasnik SIKD 'Njegos\ no.4, December 1959, pp.17-25. , 'Veze sa Drazom Mihailovicem sa srednjeg I bliskog istoka i severne afrike' [Connections with Draza Mihailovic from the Middle and Near East and North Africa], Glasnik SIKD lNjegos\ no.l, July 1958, pp.41-65. Djordjevic, D., 'Historians in Politics: Slobodan Jovanovic', Journal of Contemporary History, vol.8 no.l, January 1973, pp.21-40. Duke, K., 'German Foreign Policy in S. and S.E. Europe, 1942 1945', South Slav Journal, vol.4 no. 1, spring 1981, pp.4—18 and vol.4 no.2, summer 1981, pp. 19-28. Ferenc, T, 'Le Systeme d'occupation des Nazis en Slovenie', Les Systemes, pp.47- 134. Glisic, V, 'Concentration Camps in Serbia (1941-1944)' The Third Reich and Yugoslavia, pp.691—715. Gutic, M., 'Kvislinstvo i kolaboracionizam u Jugoslaviji 1942. godine' [Quisling and Collaborationist Movements in Yugoslavia in 1942], Vojnoistorijski Glasnik, 34 (I), 1983, pp.257-76. Hehn, P., 'Serbia, Croatia and Germany 1941 1945: Civil War and Revolution in the Balkans', Canadian Slavonic Papers, vol.XIII no.4, 1971, pp.344-73. Jelinek, A., 'Bosnia-Hercegovina at War: Relations Between Moslems and Non- Moslems', Hobcaust and Genocide Studies, vol.5 no.3, 1990, pp.275~92. Kacavenda, P., 'Saradnja Cetnika i Ustasa u Bosni 1942. godine' [Chetnik- Ustasha Cooperation in Bosnia, 1942] Vojnoistorijski Glasnik, 1966 (5) pp.37-67. Kljakovic, V, 'Velika Britanija, Sovjetski Savez i ustanak u Jugoslaviji 1941. godine' [Great Britain, the Soviet Union and theYugoslav Uprising of 1941] Vojnoistorijski Glasnik, vol.XXI, May-August 1970, pp.69-103. Selected Bibliography 327

, 'Promjena politike Velike Britanije prema Jugoslaviji u prvqj polovici 1943. godine' [The Change in British Policy towards Yugoslavia in the First Half of 1943] Jugoslovenski Istorijski Casopis, vol.3, 1969, pp.25 57. Knezevic, R. L., Jugoslovenska vlada i Draza Mihailovic' [The Yugoslav Gov• ernment and Draza Mihailovic], Poruka, no. 10 (1 February 1953) pp.5 13; no.l 3 (16 June 1953) pp.9-19; no. 18 (1 February 1954) pp.5 15; no.23 (16 October 1954) pp.5-15, no.24 (1 November 1954) pp.11-15. Lane, A., 'Allied Diplomacy and the Yugoslav Question', Imperial War Museum Review, no.2, 1987, pp.78-87. Lekovic, M., 'Boravak britanske vojne misije na oslobodjenoj teritoriji i Crne Gora i jugoistocne Bosne (februar april 1942)' [The Sojourn of the British Military Mission on the Liberated Territories of Montenegro and Southeast Bosnia (February-April 1942)] Istorijski Zapisi, no. 1-2 (1971) pp.301 28. Marjanovic, J., 'The German Occupation System in Serbia in 1941', Ijes Systemes, pp.263-302. , 'Yugoslavia and Britain', in Conference on Britain and European Resistance, held at St Antony's College, Oxford, 10-16 December 1962. Martic, M., 'Dimitrije Ljotic and the Yugoslav National Movement Zbor, 1935- 1945', East European Quarterly, vol.XIV no.2, summer 1980, pp.219 239. Martin, D., James Klugmann, SOE-Cairo, and the Mihailovich Deception', Deception Operations, Studies in the East-West Context, pp.53-84. Mihajlov, M., 'Disentangling History; the Mihailovich Tragedy', New Leader, vol.5 Pt.3, February 1975, pp.7-11. Miletic, A., 'O saradnji komandanta cetnickih odreda istocne Bosne Jezdimira Dangica sa Nemcima (avgust 1941 - april 1942)' [About the Collaboration of the Commander of the Chetnik Detachments in East Bosnia, Jezdimir Dangic, with the Germans, August 1941 - April 1942] Vojnoistorijski Glasnik, 1972 (2) pp. 135- 145. Novak, B. C, 'Why Adamic Shifted his Support from Mihailovic to Tito', Slovene Studies -Journal of the Society for Slovene Studies, nos 1-2, 1989, pp.185 92. Pantelic, M., 'Cetnici Draze Mihailovica u danima 'sloma' Uzicke republike' [Draza Mihailovic's Chetniks at the Time of the 'Collapse' of the Uzice Republic] Vojnoistorijski Glasnik, vol.33 (1-2), 1982, pp.215-42. Pavelic, A. S., 'Britanici i Draza Mihajlovic' [Britain and Draza Mihailovic] Hrvatska Revija, vol.VII, September 1957, pp.235-53. Pavlowitch, K. St, 'Yalta, De Gaulle and Tito', Review, no.8, London, 1969, pp.670-694. , 'Yugoslav-Soviet Relations 1939-1943 as seen in British Sources', Slavonic and East European Review, vol.56 no.3, July 1978, pp.411-26. Pavlowitch, S. K., 'Neither Heroes nor Traitors: Suggestions for a Reappraisal of the Yugoslav Resistance', in B. Bond and I. Roy (eds), War and Society a Yearbook of Military History (Croom Helm: London, 1975) pp.227-42. , 'The King who never was; an Instance of Italian Involvement in Croatia, 1941-3', European Studies Review, vol.8 no.4, October 1978, pp.465-87. , 'Out of Context - the Yugoslav Government in London 1941 -1945', Journal of Contemporary History, vol. 16 no. 1, January 1981, pp.89-118. —, 'Momcilo Nincic and the European Policy of the Yugoslav Government in Exile, 1941-1943', Slavonic and East European Review, vol.62 no.3, July 1984, pp.400-20 and vol.62 no.4, October 1984, pp.531 51. 328 Selected Bibliography

, 'Dedijer as a Historian of the Yugoslav Civil War', Survey: a Journal of East and West Studies, vol.28 no.3 (122) autumn 1984, pp.95-110. , 'Reserve Infantry Lieutenant Rapotec; his Missions to and from Occupied Yugoslavia', Unconventional Perceptions of Yugoslavia, pp.67-105. , 'General de Gaulle, the Free French and Yugoslavia', Unconventional Per• ceptions of Yugoslavia, pp. 1-32. , 'D. T. Hudson (1910-1995): a Depressed Witness of the First Civil War in Yugoslavia', Tokovi Istorije, no. 1-2, 1995, pp.263-73. Petkovic, D., 'Cetnicka radio stanica "Karadjordje"' [Chetnik Radio Station 'Karadjordje'], Glasnik SIKD cNjegos\ vol.3, June 1959, pp.43~8. Petrovic, D., 'Cetnicka organizacija Koste Pecanca u okupiranoj Srbiji do pocetka oktobra 1941. godine' [The Chetnik Organisation of Kosta Pecanac in Occupied Serbia up to the start of October 1941] Vojnoistorijski Glasnik, 1968 (2) pp. 173-201. Plecas, N. B., 'S mora i iz vazduha u porobljenu otadzbinu' [By Sea and from the Air into the Occupied Homeland] Glasnik SIKD Njegos3, vol.5, June 1960, pp. 36- 48. Plenca, D., 'Le Mouvement de Liberation Nationale en Yougoslavie et les Allies', European Resistance II, pp.464-504. Reinhartz, D., 'Aryanism in the Independent State of Croatia, 1941-1945: the Historical Basis and Cultural Questions', South Slav Journal, vol.9 no.3-4, autumn-winter 1986, pp. 19-25. Roberts, W. R., 'Tito: from Legend to History', South Slav Journal, vol.5 no.l, spring 1982, pp.32-8. Sepic, D., 'La Politique Italienne d'occupation en Dalmatie 1941-1943', Les Systemes, pp.377-424. Seton-Watson, G. H. N., 'Afterword: Thirty Years After', British Policy, pp.283-97. Stafford, D. A. T, 'SOE and British Involvement in the Belgrade Coup d'etat of March 1941', Slavic Review, vol.36 no.3, September 1977, pp.399-419. Sweet-Escott, B., 'SOE in the Balkans', British Policy, pp.3-21. Tudjman, F, 'The Independent State of Croatia as an Instrument of the Policy of the Occupation Powers in Yugoslavia', Les Systemes, pp. 135-262. Urbane, P., 'Slovene Losses 1941-1945', South Slav Journal, vol.l 1 nos 2-3 (40-41), summer/autumn 1988, pp.34—9. Vegh, S., 'Le Systeme du Pouvoir d'occupation Allemand dans le Banat You- goslave 1941-1944', Les Systemes, pp.425-560. Visnjic, P., 'Djestva Nemacke ojacane 342 divizije i 125 puka u severnozapadnoj Srbiji ujesen 1941. godine (septembar-oktobar 1941. godine)' [The Efforts of the Germans' Reinforced 342 Division and 125 Regiment in Northwest Serbia during the Autumn of 1941] Vojnoistorijski Glasnik, 23 (1) 1972, pp.105-135. Vlahovic, S., 'Audiatur et Altera Pars - British Wartime Policy towards Yugo• slavia', South Slav Journal, vol.2 no.3, July 1979, pp.4-9. Wheeler, M., 'The SOE Phenomenon', Journal of Contemporary History, vol.16 no.3, July 1981, pp.513-20. Woodhouse, C. M., 'The Greek Resistance, 1942-1944', European Resistance Movements I, pp.374-90. Zivkovic, N., 'Exploitation of Industrial Installations in Serbia during the German Occupation 1941-1944', The Third Reich and Yugoslavia 1933-1945, pp.517-24. Selected Bibliography 329

6. OFFICIAL HISTORIES

Butler, J. R. M., Grand Strategy. vol.III, (HMSO: London, 1964). Hehn, P. (ed.), The German Struggle against Yugoslav Guerrillas in World War II. East European Quarterly (Columbia University Press: New York, 1979). Hinsley, F. H., British Intelligence in the Second World War. vol.11 (HMSO: London, 1981); vol.III Pt.l, (HMSO: London, 1984). Howard, M., British Intelligence in the Second World War. vol.V (HMSO: London, 1990). , Grand Strategy, vol.IV (HMSO: London, 1972). Medlicott, W N., The Economic Blockade (HMSO: London, 1959). Molony, C. J. C, The Mediterranean and the Middle East, vol.V (HMSO: London, 1973). Playfair, I. S. O., The Mediterranean and the Middle East, vol.III (HMSO: London, 1960). Richards, D., RAF 1939-1945: 'The Fight at Odds (HMSO: London, 1953). Richards, D. and Saunders, H., RAF 1939-1945: The Fight Avails (HMSO: London, 1954). Woodward, L., British Foreign Policy in the Second World War, vol.III (HMSO: London, 1971).

7. THESES

Fattig, R. C, 'Reprisal: the German Army and the Execution of Hostages during the Second World War', unpublished PhD dissertation, University of California, San Diego, 1980. Karchmar, L., Draza Mihailovic and the Rise of the Chetnik Movement 1941-1942. PhD dissertation, Stanford University, 1973. Since published by Garland Publishing, New York and London 1987. Kay, M. A., The British Attitude towards the Yugoslav Government in Exile 1941- 1945, unpublished PhD dissertation, University of Southampton, 1986. Milazzo, M. J., 'The Chetnik Movement in Yugoslavia 1941-1945'. PhD disser• tation, University of Michigan, 1971. See secondary sources. Modisett, L. E., The Four Cornered Triangle: British and American Policy toward Yugoslavia 1939-1945, unpublished PhD dissertation, Georgetown University, 1981. Stenton, M. M., British Propaganda and Political Warfare 1940-1944: a Study of British Views on how to Address Occupied Europe, unpublished PhD dissertation, Peterhouse, Cambridge, 1979. Verna, E P., Yugoslavia under Italian Rule 1941-1943: Civil and Military Aspects, unpublished PhD dissertation, University of California, Santa Barbara, 1985. Williams, H., The Special Operations Executive and Yugoslavia, 1941-1945. Unpublished PhD dissertation, University of Southampton, 1994. 330 Selected Bibliography

8. REVIEW ARTICLES, BOOK REVIEWS, LETTERS TO THE EDITOR

'A.F.' and 'N.M.' 'Two Views on Tomasevich's "The Chetniks": a British and a Serbian Approach', South Slav Journal, vol.1 no.l, January 1978, pp. 17-20. Barker, E., 'Review of N. Plecas' "Ratne Godine 1941-1945" \ South Slav Journal; vol.7 nos 3-4 (25-6) autumn-winter 1984, pp.83-4. Bosnitch, S., Review of S. Loi's lLe Operazioni Delle Unita Italiene in Yugoslavia (1941- 1943)', South Slav Journal, vol.6 no.l (19) spring 1983, pp.112 20. Davidson, B., Letter to South Slav Journal, vol.3 no.l, March 1980, p.37. Ivanovic, V, Review of B. Davidson's 'Special Operations Europe\ South Slav Journal, vol.3 no.3, September 1980, pp.46-50. Kindersley, R. K., 'The Failure of the Chetniks' Canadian Slavonic Papers, vol.XVIII no.4, December 1976, pp.460-3. Pavlowitch, S. K., 'The Second World War in Yugoslavia; an Imaginary Debate'., European Studies Review, vol.11 no.4, October 1981, pp.543-54. Pavlowitch, S. K., 'London-Moscow through the Fog of Yugoslavia's Wartime Drama; Djuretic's Controversial History', Storia delle Relazioni Intemazionali, III, 1987/2, pp.369-94 and IV, 1988/1, pp. 195-212. Plecas, N., Letter to South Slav Journal, vol.3 no.l, March 1980, pp. 40-1. Radan, P., 'The British, Mihailovic and Tito', South Slav Journal, vol.4 no.3, autumn 1981, pp.8 15. Roberts, W R., Wartime in Yugoslavia', Slavic Review, vol.37 no.3, September 1978, pp.491-4. Sire, L., Letter to South Slav Journal, vol.9 nos 3-4 (33-4), autumn-winter 1986, pp.79-83. Vlahovic, S. Letter to South Slav Journal, vol.11 nos 2-3 (40-1), summer-autumn 1988, p.85.

9. CORRESPONDENCE

Archie Jack (UK) Henry More (USA) Klaus Schmider (Germany) Desimir Tosic (Yugoslavia) Zvonimir James) Vuckovic (USA) Index

Adamic, Louis, 298 see also Independent State of Croatia; Admiralty, 48, 95 Ustasha organisation Afrika Korps, see military units Boughey, Peter, 21, 175, 181 Air Ministry, 89, 95 Bracken, Brendan, 27 Airey, Terence 172 Brajici, 65 Alanbrooke, Field Marshal, 127 Britanova press agency, 20, 21, 260 Albania, 1, 4, 92 British Broadcasting Corporation, 22, Alexander, General Sir Harold, 148, 26,33,47,67,73,84,85,95, 161, 167 162, 165, 166, 167, 174, 175, 178, Amery, Julian, 21, 32~4 passim, 36,38, 180, 199,201 40, 45, 46, 48, 50, 51, 128 Broz, Josip, see Tito Amery, Leo, 45, 48 Bruce-Lockhart, Robert, 27, 123 Arandjelovac, 67 Bulgaria, 1, 3, 4, 52 Arilje, 78, 108 'Bullseye' mission, see Special Atherton, Major Terence, 102, 104-5, Operations Executive 106, 136 Auty, Phyllis, 31, 52 'C, see Secret Intelligence Service Cacak, 6, 78 Backa, 4 Cadogan, Sir Alexander, 74, 75, 84, Bailey, Colonel S.W ('Bill'), 19, 20, 89, 178 31-44 passim, 52,55, 147, 164, Campbell, Ronald (British Ambassador 171, 174, 175, 212 in Lisbon), 47, 81 Bajloni, Gordana (& family), 81 Campbell, Ronald Ian (British Minister Bakic, Milisav, 252 in Belgrade), 19 Banat, 3 Catholic Church, 12, 103, 203 Baranja, 4 Cemerno mountain, 106, 108, 109 Barker, Elisabeth, 85, 125, 161 Chandos, Lord, see Lyttelton, Oliver BBC, see British Broadcasting Chapman, Sergeant Robert, 105 Corporation Chastelain, A.G.G. see de Chastelain, Belgrade, 2, 7, 19, 37, 46, 47, 50, 67, A.G.G. 103, 152, 154, 186 Chetniks Bennett, John, 19, 40, 50, 172 Chetnik Association, 7, 8, 206 Benzler, Felix, 152 DM (Draza Mihailovic) Chetniks in Biroli, Pirzio, 269 Serbia, 6, 7-10, 15-16, 33, Bjelasi, 14 60-6 passim, 67, 75-6, 78, 81, Bogie, Dragomir, 97 87-8, 90, 91-2, 95, 107, Bogomolov, Alexander, 118 149-56, 159, 167, 186, 192, Bor (copper mines), 155 193-4, 199, 200, 235, 236, 237 Bosnia-Hercegovina DM Chetniks, military Chetniks, role therein, 9, 91, 135, weaknesses, 188, 192-4 262, 274-5 DM Chetniks, political situation, 1941, 12-14, 16, 47, 67, 95 weaknesses, 188, 190, 1945 situation, 1942, 135, 143, 169, 181, in Independent State of Croatia, 9, 257, 261-2, 274-5 13-14, 15,81, 131, 135, 183,

331 332 Index

Chetniks (Contd.) and uprising/civil war in in Croatia, 185, 186, 190, 191, 194, Montenegro, 15, 54-6, 104, 195, 197-8, 199, 299 109, 119, 120, 133-4, 140 in Montenegro, 14-15, 137-8, 140, and uprising/civil war in \75-7 passim, 300 Serbia, 11-12, 16, 60-6 sabotage activities, 6, 7, 131, passim, 67, 75-6, 78, 79, 81, 88, 148-60, 167, 185, 200 90, 227 in Slovenia, 8, 103, 191 see also Partisans use of term during World War II, Communists, Canadian-Yugoslav, 45, 8-9, 15 147 see also Great Britain; Mihailovic, Cooper, Duff, 27 Dragoljub; Yugoslav Army in Cosic, Boza, ^Javorski, Boza the Homeland Coverly-Price, A.V, 142, 143 Chiefs of Staff, 22, 69 Cripps, Sir Stafford, 83, 87, 89, 111 attitude to Yugoslav revolt, 70, 74, Crnjanski, Second Lieutenant 89,98, 113, 114, 115, 119 Pavle, 105 relations with SOE, 23-4, 25, 115 Croat Peasant Party, 179, 184, 208, Churchill, Rt Hon. WS, 18, 23, 26, 304 27,71 Cross, Ronald, 18 and Foreign Office, 72, 178-9 attitude to Yugoslav revolt, 75, 89, Daily Express, 122 126-7, 179, 188 Daily Mail, 122 and Royal Yugoslav Dalmatia, 4 Government, 48, 56, 68, 70, role of Chetniks in, 9, 13, 131, 135, 178 197 Clark-Kerr, Sir Archibald, 118,140, Dalton, Dr Hugh, 18, 19, 23, 27, 28, 180, 196 29, 41, 46, 49, 66, 100, 213 Clarke, Lieutenant Colonel Charles, 5, attitude to European resistance, 20,211 28-30, 215 Clissold, Stephen, 65 attitude to Yugoslav revolt, 88-9, 94 Comintern, 10, 11, 118, 207 Damjanovic, General Miodrag, 7 Commissioner Administration, 9 Dangic, Major Jezdimir, 76, 210, 257 Communist Party of Yugoslavia Davidson, Major Basil, 173 attitude to DM Chetniks, 11, 34, 60, Deakin, Sir William (F.W.) 67, 88,90,96, 191, 217, 228 account of'Bullseye' mission, 51, 53, attitude to fall of Yugoslavia, 11, 34 55, 222 and'class enemies', 15, 119, 133 account of D.T. Hudson's formation and inter-war years, 10-11 experiences, 1942, 108 and'national question', 11, 15, 195, account of'Hydra' mission, 103, 277 104-5 news of role in uprising reaches and Chetnik sabotage outside world, 33-4, 47 campaign, 149 policy towards future of de Chastelain, A.G.G. 31 Yugoslavia, 12, 117, 120, 146, Defence Committee, 72, 73, 74, 94, 195 113 relations with British, 57, 104, 106, Deroc, Milan, 128-9 account of 'Russian Project', 38-40 and uprising in D/H 2, see Bailey, Colonel S.W ('Bill') Bosnia-Hercegovina, 14 Dimitrijevic, Dusan, 67 Index 333

Directorate of Propaganda and Agents, passim, 175, 177-83 see Special Operations Executive passim, 186, 188, 196-7, 199, Directorate of Special Operations, see 233, 243, 272, 294, 309 Special Operations Executive relations with Political Warfare Directorate of Special Propaganda, see Executive, 123, 143, 163, 164 Special Operations Executive relations with Royal Yugoslav 'Disclaim' Mission, see Special Government, 28, 66-8, 73, Operations Executive 84-5,88, 94, 109-10, 111-13, Divci, 77, 79 138, 165, 166, 167, 170, 178-9, Dixon, Pierson, 74, 81, 119, 120, 139, 180-2 141, 144, 146, 164, 165, 171,233, relations with Special Operations 243, 294 Executive, 23, 24, 28-9, 100, Djakic, Spasoje, 104 111-12, 113, 130, 131, 138-9, Djekic, Sergeant Major, 102, 103 141, 145, 148, 167, 174, 175-7, Djelevic, Jaksa, 59-60 182 Djilas, Milovan, 11, 52-7 passim, 184, Foreign Office Research Department 209, 225 (FORD), 117 Djonovic, Jovan, 20, 33-7 passim, 39, 'Forstrat', operation, 107 40, 44, 45, 48, 67 'Free Yugoslavia', Soviet propaganda Djukanovic, General Blazo, 134, 170 station, 140, 165, 181 Djuric, Major Radoslav, 280 see also propaganda, Russian Djurisic, Captain Pavle, 133-4 personal ambition, 136 Gavrilovic, Dr Milan, 20 relations with British, 138, 173 Gendarmerie, Serbian, 9, 61, 139, 231 relations with Draza Germany/Germans Mihailovic, 134-5, 175, 177, attitude to Draza Mihailovic, 77, 92, 270 102, 107, 150, 152, 186, 246, , 6 280-1 Dragicevic, Sergeant Veljko, 58, 226 invasion and partition of river, 6, 16, 62, 91, 150 Yugoslavia, 1-4 occupation regime in Serbia, 16, 32, Eden, Sir Anthony, 67, 70-4 34, 61, 63, 90, 92, 102, 150, passim, 79, 80, 84, 88, 89, 94, 113, 152, 154, 159, 186, 192 118, 119, 141-2, 143, 147, 178-9, operations v. Insurgents in 180, 196, 246 Independent State of see also Foreign Office Croatia, 125, 184, 186, 275 Electra House, 18, 19, 26 supply lines to north Africa, 148, Elliott, Major Cavan, 105-6 149, 156-9, 289-92 Evening Standard, 122, 197 Glen, Alexander, 19, 212 Glenconner, Lord (Christopher), 80-1, Foca, 104, 145 111, 112, 113, 120, 172, 173, 174 Foreign Office, 18, 19, 22, 35, 56 Glisic, Milos, 245 attitude to newspaper Golija mountain, 107, 114 propaganda, 122, 197 Goodwill, Arthur, 20, 21, 40 attitude to Yugoslav revolt, 70-5 Gorgapotamos viaduct, 156, 159, 289 passim, 81, 83, 85, 89, 94,98, Gornjevica, 78 110, 113, 116-17, 120-1, Government Code and Cipher School, 124-5, 130, 138-40, 140-8 see Secret Intelligence Service passim, 158, 160, 164-72 G(R), 43-4 334 Index

Great Britain/British 148, 153, 159, 160, 166, 168-70, attitude to Yugoslav revolt/resistance 174, 175-7, 183, 199, 227 in occupied countries, 17, 24, 'Hydra' mission, see Special Operations 84, 97, 121, 187-8, 189, 196, Executive 199-201 policy towards Yugoslavia 193941, Ignjatovic, Vucko, 235, 240 1, 5 Ilic, General Bogoljub, 39, 44, 49, 51, relations with Royal Yugoslav 53, 55, 68, 101, 103, 110 Government, 28 30, 32-40 Independent State of Croatia (Nezavisna passim, 48, 66 8, 70, 73-4, Drzava Hrvatska/NDH), 3, 4, 79 80, 84, 88, 94, 97, 98, 102, 12-14, 63, 81, 183-6 passim, 257, 103, 105, 109-12, 114-16, 119, 261-2, 274-5 121, 124-5, 138, 153, 159, 161, see also Bosnia-Hercegovina; 163, 165, 166-7, 170, 178-9, Dalmatia; Lika; Ustasha 180, 181-2 organisation relations with Soviet Union, 38-40, Ismay, General Sir Hastings, 56 49-50, 70-2, 83, 87, 89, 111, Italy/Italians, 2, 3, 4, 13-14, 132, 134, 113, 116, 118, 119, 120, 140-6 135, 192 passim, 162, 166, 167, 173, 180, policy towards Chetniks, 134, 187, 246 135-6, 139, 190, 191, 192, 195, strategy, World War II, 17, 186-8 197, 198, 269, 299, 300, 310, see also Chiefs of Staff; Churchill, Rt 312 Hon. W.S.; Dalton, Dr Hugh; , 5, 78, 108 Foreign Office; Political Warfare Executive; Special Javorski, Boza, 92, 108, 153 Operations Executive; War Jebb, Gladwyn, 19,27, 29, 69, 86, 87, Office 111 GS(R), 18 Jelic, Miloslav, 67 Gubbins, Major Colin, 29 Jevdjevic, Dobrosav, 198 Johnstone, Lieutenant Colonel K., 42, Hadzi-Djordjevic, Ljubomir, 32, 67 43 Halifax, Lord, 18, 28 Joint Intelligence Committee, 24 Hannau, Colonel Julius, 19, 20, 31 Joint Planning Committee, 24, 69 Han Pijesak, 6, 67 Jones, Ronald Houghton, 252 Harrison, Hubert D., 161 2, 166, 168 Jovanovic, Arso, 54, 55, 56, 225, 226 'Henna' mission, see Special Operations Jovanovic, Slobodan, 36, 101, 110, Executive 111, 115, 119, 121, 138, 148, 153, Hercegovina, see Bosnia-Hercegovina 159, 161, 170, 182 Himmler, Heinrich, 150 Jovic, Sergeant, 130 Hitler, Adolf, 1, 4, 63 Hollis, Colonel Sir Leslie C, 83 Kacarevic, Corporal, 130 Hrvatska seljacka stranka, see Croat Kalafatovic, General Danilo, 2 Peasant Party Kankaras, Lieutenant, 130, 131, 266 Howard, Douglas F, 83, 117, 162, 'Karadjordje' radio station, see 167, 170, 171, 177, 178, 196 propaganda Hudson, Duane Tyrell ('Bill'), 19, 40, Karchmar, Lucien, 65 50-60 passim, 75, 76, 78, 79, Keble, Colonel C, 172, 173 83-4, 90, 92, 93, 105, 108 9, 129, Keitel, Field Marshal, 63 131-2, 137-8, 143, 145-6, 147, Kennedy, Major General J.N., 49, 74 Index 335

Keserovic, Major Dragutin, 152, 153, Margesson, Captain, 94 231, 280 Marie, Queen Mother of Klugmann, Lieutenant James, 173, 301 Yugoslavia, 178 Knezevic, Professor Radoje, 46 Masterson, Colonel Tom, 19, 21, 43, Knezevic, Major Zivan, 110,112,181, 45,55, 102,213 253 Maxwell, Terence, 42-5 passim, 46, Kojic, Ambassador, 47 50, 172 Kopaonik mountain range, 152 Meissner, Otto, 150, 280 Kosjeric, 78 Menzies, Stewart, 18 Kosovo-Metohija, 4, 133 MI3b, see War Office , Bay of, 4, 21 MI5, 23 Kovacevic, Colonel, 67 MI6, see Secret Intelligence Service Kragujevac, 57, 63, 65 MI14, 173 Kraljevo, 57, 63, 65 Mihailovic, General Dragoljub Krek, Miha, 109, 116 ('Draza') Krnjevic, Juraj, 197 activities in April war, 5, 6 Krupanj, 57 attitude to 'collaboration', 91-2, Kuntze, General, 280 135, 136, 175-7, 190-1, 198 attitude to Communist-led Lalatovic, Major Mirko, 51, 53, 55-9 'Partisans', 10, 59, 61-3 passim, 79 passim, 64-6, 68, 82, 88, 90, Lane, Arthur Bliss, 47 92-3,95-6, 117-18, 119-20, Lasic, Major Djordje, 133,134 129, 135, 169, 176, 193, 228-9, Lazarevic, Sergeant Velimir, 130 231, 232, 245 Lebedev, Viktor, 67 attitude to Serbian puppet Leeper, Rex, 19 regime, 91-2, 95, 102, 107, Lika, 13, 135 136, 149, 151, 273, 282 Lisa antimony mine, 153, 154, 185 and British, 22, 31-40 passim, 52, List, Field Marshal von, 2, 63 59-60, 68, 74, 78-9, 84, 92-3, Ljotic, Dimitrije, 102, 151, 206 102, 105, 107-9, 114, 117-18, Ljoticevci, 92, 152, 245 119-20, 121, 124, 128-30, Ljubljana, 2, 48 131-2, 135, 136-7, 145, 151, Lockhart, Robert Bruce, see 159, 160, \66-72passim, 176-7, Bruce-Lockhart, Robert 180, 182, 183, 187-8, 199-201, Lofts, Lieutenant, 132 227 Loncarevic, Sergeant, 130 and Chetnik sabotage against Long, Major, 266 Axis, 61, 81, 148-60 Loznica, 62 passim, 166, 167, 175-6 Lukacevic, Major Vojislav, 310 passim, 185, 200, 281-2, 298 Lyttelton, Oliver, 42 and Divci meeting with Germans, 76-7, 236 Macedonia, 4, 50 early links with outside world, 31, Macek, Vladko, 179, 184 32, 33, 46-7, 49, 56, 57 Mackenzie, Archie Dunlop, 21 German attempts to kill/ Maisky, Ivan, 70-2, 83, 113, 116, 140, capture, 92, 107 141, 142, 246 influence of Axis reprisals and Majevica mountain, 130 Ustasha massacres upon Maljen mountain, 6, 46 policy, 63-4, 95-6, 154, 169, Marjanovic, Jovan, 32, 33 175, 192, 193 336 Index

Mihailovic (Contd.) German Brandenburger influence of upon commandos, 21, 107 policy, 61 Yugoslav armed forces, weaknesses movements, 1942, 101-2, 106-7, thereof, 3, 5-6, 8 109, 131 Yugoslav 2nd Army, 2, 5, 6 and organisation of resistance Yugoslav 3rd, 4th, 5th and 7th movement, 1941, 7-10, 15-16, armies, 2 33, 34, 92, 95 Yugoslav 6th (Coastal) Army, 5 political attitude of, 5, 96, 145, Yugoslav Army, Chetnik 189-90, 311 battalions, 8 pre-war life, 5-6, 37 see also Chetniks; Partisans; Ustasha promotions, 1942, 95, 101, 189 organisation; Yugoslav Army in relationships with 'Chetniks' in the Homeland western Yugoslavia, 16, 76, 91, Miljkovic, Sergeant Petar, 105 134-7, 169, 175, 177, 190, Milutinovic, Ivan, 104 191-2, 193, 197-8, 299 Ministry of Economic Warfare, 18, and Royal Yugoslav 48 Government, 31-40 passim, 49, Ministry of Information, 26, 27, 66 68, 78-9, 101, 105, 151, 152, see also propaganda 155, 170, 176, 189, 194-5,223, MI(R), 18, 19, 29, 44 238, 283 Mirasevic, Captain Djoko, 55-6 and 1941 uprising/civil war in Mirkovic, General Bora, 51 Serbia, 60-7 passim, 75-6, 88, Misic, Vojvoda, 7, 33, 205 235 Misic, Major Alexander, 33, 92, 205 see also Chetniks; Yugoslav Army in Misita, Lieutenant Colonel, 62 the Homeland M04, see Special Operations Executive Miladinovic, Sergeant, 130 Mojsilovic, Vojvoda, 108 Milanovic, Vladimir, 181 Moljevic, Stevan, 195 Milazzo, Matteo, 65, 149 Montenegro, 4, 13 military units D.T. Hudson's analysis of Chetnik British 8th Army, 157, 159 position therein, 137, 140, Bulgarian forces in Serbia, 102, 150, 175-7 passim 152, 186 and Sahovici conference, 195 Croat armed forces, 184 uprising and civil war, 1941, 14—15, German 2nd Army, 2 52, 53, 54,56, 109, 119, 120, German 12th Army, 2 132-4, 268 German Afrika Korps, 149, 156, 157 see also Djurisic, Captain Pavle German 113th Infantry Moslems, Yugoslav, 4, 6, 8, 13, 14, 57, Division, 244 132, 133-5 passim, 145, 195, 310, German 342nd Infantry 311, 316 Division, 92 Murray, Ralph, 27, 143, 161, 163, German 704th Infantry 164, 165 Division, 248 Mussolini, Benito, 1, 4 German 714th Infantry Division, 150, 248, 281 Narodna Odbrana, 20, 103 German 717th Infantry Narodnyi Komissariat Vnutrennikh Del, see Division, 107, 248 • NKVD German SS Volunteer Mountain Naumovic, Captain Dimitrije, 265, Division, 150, 152, 154, 281 267 Index 337

Nezavisna Drfava Hrvatska (NDH), see Pecanac, Vojvoda Kosta, 7, 8, 61, 62, Independent State of Croatia 81, 151, 152 Nedeljkovic, Major Radoje, 102, Perhinek, Captain Rudolf, 134 104-5 Perisca Dol Bay, 53 Nedic, General Milan, 5, 62, 91, 102, Pesic, General Petar, 5 203 Peter II, King of Yugoslavia, 1, 2, 28, attitude to Draza Mihailovic 29, 46, 56, 123, 168, 178-9, 188, Chetniks, 62, 107, 251 260 Nelson, Sir Frank, 19, 42, 114 Petrovac, 53 New York Times, 141 Pijade, Mosa, 104 Nikolaev, Colonel, 39 Piletic, Major, 280 Nincic, Dr Momcilo, 20, 46, 112, 119, Piraeus, 157, 158 179, 182 Plecas, Captain Nedeljko, 131,173,266 Nis, 2, 152 Ploesti, 156 Nixon, Hilton, 21 Podgorica, 50, 53 NKVD, 39 Political Intelligence Department of the Novak, Major Karl, 103 Foreign Office, 26 Novakovic, General Ljubomir, 67, 104 see also Political Warfare Executive NyDag, 141 Political Warfare Executive, 19, 26, 27 attitude to Yugoslav revolt, 73, Oberkommando der Wehrmacht (OKW), 122-4, 143, 161, 162-3, 196 63 relations with Foreign Office, 123-4, Ocokoljic, Captain, 280 143, 162 Odavic, Sergeant, 130 relations with Special Operations O'Donovan, Sergeant Patrick, 102 Executive, 26-8, 124, 214, 305 Ostojic, Major Zaharije, 51, 53, 57, and 'Sumadija' radio station, 66, 105, 109, 314 164, 201, 231 see also propaganda Palosevic, Major, 280 Pollock, George, 41, 43 Parker, Ralph, 21 Popovic, Colonel Zarko, 50-1, 53, Parol, Corporal, 265 211,212 Partisans, 8, 9, 67, 87, 95, 210, 268 Portal, Sir Charles, 75, 89 concept of resistance, 10, 11-12,34, Pozega, 54, 57, 76, 78, 108 96, 133, 135, 151, 269 Press Reading Bureaux, 109, 164 role in Yugoslav revolts, 15, 16, prisoners of War, 5, 7, 62 54-6, 57, 60-7 passim, 104, propaganda, 18-22 passim, 26,27,36 133, 150, 153-4, 261-2, 273 British, to Yugoslavia, 1941, 31, 32, in Serbia, 1942, 149-50, 183, 265, 42-3, 44, 46, 47, 50, 66-7, 73, 273, 280 88, 97, 133 Paul, Prince Regent of Yugoslavia, 1, British, to Yugoslavia, 1942, 106, 21 114, 121-4, 135, 137, 161-8,* Pavelic, Ante, 203 169-70, 172, 174, 178, 180, 199 Pavlovic, Lieutenant Colonel Chetnik against Axis, 7 Dragoslav, 54, 56, 68 German, 164 Pavlovic, sergeants Tripkjo and newspapers, British, 122, 164, 197, Vojislav, 266 199, 295 Pavlowitch, Stevan, 103 newspapers, non-British, 141, 143, Pearson, Major J.S.A., 141, 143, 146, 164, 167 148, 163, 168, 175, 180 Partisan against Chetnik, 12, 144 338 Index

Propaganda (Cont.) attitude to 'Partisans', 68, 79-80 radio 'Karadjordje', 180, 181, 201, attitude to Yugoslav revolt, 36-7, 305 51, 53, 55, 59, 66, 73, 84-5, Royal Yugoslav Government, to 104, 148, 153, 159, 181, 198, Yugoslavia, 59, 66, 73, 84-5, 217, 234 123, 163, 164, 167, 180, 233, internal relations, 39-40, 68, 100-1, 241, 260 110-11, 181, 182, 190,205 Soviet, to Yugoslavia, 66, 123, 140, Mihailovic appointed Minister of 144, 181, 231, 242 Army, Navy and Air Force, 101 see also Britanova press agency; British relations with British, 28-30, 32-40 Broadcasting Corporation; passim, 48, 66-8, 70, 73-4, 'Free Yugoslavia'; Political 79-80, 84, 88, 94, 97, 98, 102, Warfare Executive; 103, 105, 109-12, 114-16, 119, psychological warfare; Special 121, 124-5, 138, 153, 159, 161, Operations Executive 163, 165, 166-7, 170, 178-9, psychological warfare 180, 181-2 role in British wartime strategy, 17 relations with Soviets, 38-40, 70, 80, see also propaganda 87, 111, 118 see also Mihailovic, Dragoljub; Racic, Captain, 280 propaganda; Simovic, General Radojevic, Branislav, see Robertson, Dusan Captain Charles Rozdjalovski, Major V, 253 Radovce, 53-7 passim, 59 Rudnik, 6, 33, 67 Radovic, Colonel Dusan, 39, 40 Rumania, 1 railways, see Yugoslavia, lines of 'Russian Project', 38-40, 52 communication Rakic, Dragomir, 33, 34, 36, 39, 49, Sabac, 67, 152, 229 52, 59 sabotage Rakic (Communist schoolmaster), 67 British attitude towards, 17, 18, Rankin, Carl, 47, 66, 220 19-22, 24, 54, 85, 147-8 Rapotec, Lieutenant Stanislav, 32, 33, see also Chetniks; Mihailovic, 34, 46, 48, 102, 103, 143 Dragoljub Razana, 78 Salonika, 2, 155, 157 Rendel, George, 86, 109, 112, 118, see also 140, 146, 166, 168, 171, 178, 182, Sandzak, 57, 90, 92, 95, 107, 108, 133, 197 134 reprisals, Axis, 34, 36, 63-4, 86, 95, Sargent, Sir Orme, 74, 123, 142, 146, 108, 132, 152, 154, 186, 229, 230, 164, 165, 171, 178, 180, 181, 182 283, 284, 286, 287 Secret Intelligence Service (SIS/ 'Reuters' news agency, 47 MI6), 18, 19, 23, 25-6, 106, Roatta, General Mario, 270, 312 116-17, 123, 125-7, 130, 131, Roberts, Walter, 31 145, 164,213, 214 Robertson, Captain Charles, 128-30, Section D, 18, 19-22 160, 168, 170, 262-3 Sekulic, Dr. Milos, 81 Romanija mountain, 105 Selborne, Earl of, see Wolmer, Viscount Rose, C.L., 116, 120, 138, 160, 272 Semiz, Sergeant, 252 Rose, Michael, 171, 196 Serbia, 3, 4, 8, 9, 10, 15, 16, 32, 34, Royal Yugoslav Government, 1, 2, 3, 47, 54, 60-6, 67, 75-6, 87-8, 31-4 passim, 46 90-3, 95, 107, 122, 137, 143, Index 339

148-60 passim, 175-7, 185-6, contacts with Partisans, 53-6, 57, 192, 193-4, 210, 235 \03-6 passim, 128-9, 142, 188, see also Chetniks; Mihailovic, 196, 199 Dragoljub Directorate of Propaganda and 'Serbian Residual State', 3 Agents, 44, 102, 172 Serbs Directorate of Special perceived responsibility for war, Operations, 44, 172 April 1941, 3 Directorate of Special position in Independent State of Propaganda, 44, 172 Croatia, 4, 12-14, 15, 47, 'Disclaim'mission, 1056, 112 67, 68, 127, 135-6, 190, 191 early attempts to establish links with position in Yugoslavia, as perceived occupied Yugoslavia, 31-2, byRYG, 181 35-6, 38-40, 46 position in Yugoslavia, according to establishment, charter and early SOE, 139 activities, 18-19, 21-3, 31 role in Chetnik movement, 8 'Henna' mission, 102-6 passim, 112 see also Chetniks 'Hydra' mission, 102-6 passim, 112 Seton-Watson, Captain Hugh, 172 missions to Yugoslavia, 1942, 108, Simovic, General Dusan, 2, 46, 49, 111, 128-32, 147, 173, 174, 101,110 199, 250 broadcasts to Yugoslavia, 66, 73, and outbreak of civil war in 84-5, 233, 241 Serbia, 78 relations with British, 32, 39, 48, and Radio 'Karadjordje', 180 67-8, 70, 79-80, 83-4, 85, 88, relations with Chetniks, 22, 37-8, 94, 102 102-6 passim, 108-9, 124, Sinclair, Sir Archibald, 95 131-2, 199 Sinko, Sergeant Stjepan, 102, 249 relations with Foreign Office, 28-9, Sizov, Colonel, 118 100, 113, 120, 131, 138-9, 141, Skoplje, 2 145, 148, 162, 167, 174, 175-7, Slijepcevic, Captain Acim, 130, 131, 182, 188 266, 267 relations with Political Warfare Slovenia, 3,4,8,48, 110, 184 Executive, 26-8, 124, 163, 214, Sofia, 5, 31, 113, 157 305 Soviet War News, 197,295 relations with Royal Yugoslav Special Operations Executive Government, 32, 34-40 attitude to European resistance and passim, 44, 50-1, 55, 69, 80, Yugoslav revolt, 29-30, 35, 37, 110, 114, 115, 148, 181-2 38, 45-6, 49, 52, 54, 56, 59-60, relations with Secret Intelligence 69-70, 71,80-1,86,97-8, Service, 25-6, 125, 213 104-6, 112, 114, 124, 137-9, and supplies to Mihailovic 141, 143, 145, 146, 148, 158, Chetniks, 789, 80, 88, 90, 160, 163, 167, 168-70, 173-7, 93-4,97, 102, 107, 111, 113, 181, 182, 186, 196, 222, 238-9, 114, 115-16, 119, 131, 161, 250 199, 200, 237, 251, 294 'Bullseye' mission, 50-60 Split, underground organisation in (and Cairo headquarters (M04), 22, 25, British attempts to make contact 39,40-5,98, 102, 110, 129, with same), 33, 48, 93, 103, 216, 138, 160, 168, 172-4, 180, 196, 253 199, 200 Stalin, Josef, 71 340 Index

Stanisic, Colonel Bajo, 133 relations with British, 38-40, 49-50, Stepinac, Archbishop, 103 70-2,83,87,89, 111, 113/116, Struganik, 33, 62 118, 119, 120, 140-6 passim, Struma valley, 157 162, 166, 167, 173, 180, 187, 'Sumadija' radio station, see Political 246 Warfare Executive relations with Royal Yugoslav Sumadija region, 6 Government, 38-40, 70, 80, Susak, 50 87, 111, 118 Suvobor mountain, 6, 33, 34, 37, 54, see also Comintern; Maisky, Ivan; 56, 57, 78, 102, 130 propaganda Sweet-Escott, Bickham, 19, 21, 40, 42, Ustasha organisation, 3, 4, 6, 12-14, 43, 44, 52 15, 16,47,67,95, 135, 145, 183, 184, 186, 190, 203, 207-8 Talbot Rice, Major D., 185 Uzice, 54, 57, 58, 75, 78, 90, 92 Taylor, George, 20, 21, 173, 174, 213 Thorn, HMS, 102 Valjevo, 57, 76 Thornhill, Colonel C.J.M., 42-3 Vasic, Dragisa, 9, 195 Times, The, 21, 164, 197 Visegrad, 6, 67 Tito, 10-12, 52, 78, 134 Vemic, Lieutenant Velimir, 265, meets Atherton mission, 104 267 meets Draza Mihailovic, 62-3, Vlasenica, 67 64-6, 90 Vohoska, Major Svetislav, 253 meets D.T. Hudson, 57 Vyshinsky, Andrei, 87 see also Communist Party of Yugoslavia; Partisans War Cabinet, 18, 72, 83, 89 Todorovic, Bosko, 120, 210, 259 War Office (including MI3b), attitude Todorovic, Zarko, 47, 103, 220 to Yugoslav revolt, 49-50, 74, 86, Tomasevic, Jozo, 65 125-7, 155-6, 160, 168, 180, Toplica uprising, 61 183-6, 196 Toynbee, Professor Arnold, 117 Wavell, Sir Archibald, 41 Trbic, Vojvoda Vasilije, 32, 33, 50 Weichs, Colonel General von, 2 Trbojevic, Lieutenant Jova, 266 'Western Morava' operation, 90 Trifunovic, General Miroslav, 107 Wheeler, Mark, 68, 105, 149 Trifunovic-Bircanin, Vojvoda Bija, 20, Wolmer, Viscount, 29, 100 67, 103, 198 World War I, Triumph, HMS, 53 Chetnik role in, 8 Tupanjanin, Milos, 20 Salonika front in, 5, 190

'Ultra', 26, 82, 125-7, 155, 157-9, Yugoslav Army in the Homeland, 8, 183-6, 253 95, 101 Union of Soviet Socialist Republics see also Chetniks; Mihailovic, (USSR)/Russians Dragoljub attitude to Yugoslav revolt, 70-1, Yugoslavia, 1-3, 6 87, 111, 118, 142, 173 coup d'etat in, 1, 21, 29 links with Communist Party of invasion and partition, 2-4, 204 Yugoslavia, 10-12, 116, 207, lines of communication, 3, 6, 13, 34, 256 148-60 passim possible contacts with see also Bosnia-Hercegovina; Banat; Chetniks, 1941, 31 Baranja; Chetniks; Dalmatia; Index 341

Independent State of Croatia; Zaovine, 6 Kosovo- Metohija; Lika; Zavidovici, 6 Macedonia; Montenegro; Zecevic, Pop, 91 Sandzak; Serbia; Slovenia Zelenasi, 14, 268 Zlatar mountain, 109 Zabljak, 131 Zujovic, Colonel Mladen, 31 Zagreb, 2, 47, 48, 68, 103, 106 Zveno group, 5