Introduction

When the Khazar ruler Joseph wrote his response to Hasdai ibn Shaprut, a dig- nitary of the Caliph of Córdoba Abd Al-Rahman (912–961), in the mid-tenth century, he could have hardly imagined the approaching end of the Khazar Khaganate, and probably to his own rule too. The king of Togarmah (the khagan-bek?),1 Joseph, described Khazaria as a flourishing state, whose rulers governed over numerous peoples and tribes, a state that was capable of stop- ping the Rus’ and the other enemies of the Arab Caliphate from devastating all of its lands.2 Joseph’s description of the Khazar Khaganate from the mid-tenth century is not accepted by most historians. At the same time, Joseph’s letter in its unabridged and abridged edition, together with the Cambridge Document, are the only authentic Khazar written sources that exist today. This requires greater caution in accepting or denying the authenticity of the information they contain. We should ask ourselves: why does the Khazar ruler’s view of his own country differ so much from those of most modern scientists? Did he want to depict Khazaria as a powerful nation—and a kind of a defender of the Caliphate at that—on purpose, in order to seek help from the Muslim countries3 (although it is unclear how the Córdoba Umayyads could have helped Khazaria), or are the described territorial possessions an expression of his claims?4 And what if, ultimately, the solution to the posed questions does not lie in Joseph’s letter, but in the modern view of Khazaria and the basis on which it is established? This leads to the issue of the reasons why the Khazar Khaganate gradually lost its influence and power. P. Golden, although having a relatively coherent the- ory similar to that of D. Dunlop (for them both, see below), notes: “In Eastern Europe, the two most important events (the rise of the Rus’ and the decline of Khazaria) are still not fully elucidated”.5

1 The subject of the ideology of the Khazar elite, a part of which is related to the idea of authority over the descendants of the son of Japheth, Togarmah, is discussed elsewhere (see chapter 1.2) It is important to stress here that the use of this title (King of Togarmah) is not acciden- tal in that it expresses a certain authority over the majority of the peoples, considered his descendants. 2 Kokovtsov 1932. 3 Pletneva 1976, 12. 4 Artamonov 1962, 386–387. 5 Golden 1980, 263.

According to M. Artamonov, “in the middle of the tenth century, Khazaria continued to be a significant state, although its previous power was severely shaken”.6 He tries to oppose the opinion of B. Rybakov, who, of course, cannot quite agree with Joseph’s view and the idea that Khazaria had ever held such power and influence.7 M. Artamonov’s view is therefore somewhat ambigu- ous. One thing he states clearly is that in the seventh to ninth centuries, “the Khazar Khaganate was actually a huge empire, occupying almost the entire southern half of Eastern Europe (this sentence is revolutionary for Soviet sci- ence at the time—Author’s note). By the time of King Joseph, the size of this country was greatly reduced”.8 The historian lists the territories and peoples, which according to him were no longer under Khazar rule in the tenth century, and concludes that “the Khazar king still regarded himself as a ruler of a vast territory, over which his ancestors’ authority extended, although only a small part of it remained subjugated to Joseph himself”.9 Thus, M. Artamonov con- tradicts his own above-cited statement, according to which Khazaria was still a significant state in the tenth century. The Russian scholar’s view on the reasons that led to the decline of the khaganate also seems contradictory. On the one hand, he argues that peace with the Arab Caliphate was essential for Khazaria in order to develop trade, which enriched the government. But on the other, the Samanid state, the leading Muslim political force in Middle Asia during the tenth century and a conductor of the spread of Islam among the steppe peoples, is depicted as hostile and dangerous for Khazaria. The growth of its influence, along with the Volga Bulgars’ conversion to Islam, was a threat to the Khazar state, whose reaction should have been the creation of an anti-Islamic coalition among the steppe nomads. At the same time, however, it is precisely the peace with the Caliphate, which the Samanids were also subject to, even if only nominally, as well as the enrichment through trade that are indicated as reasons for the divergence of interests between the population, subject to the khagan, and the Khazar nobility. This divergence also led to the gradual seces- sion of many tribes and peoples from the Khazar Khaganate.10 According to S. Pletneva, Khazaria’s weakening and subsequent demise was caused by the Khazar khagan’s conversion to Judaism. This created an irrevers-

6 Artamonov 1962, 385. 7 On the scientific issues regarding the Khazars in the 1950s, after the publishing of the article in Pravda Newspaper in 1951, and the Soviet scientists’ stance on this topic, see chapter 4.5. 8 Artamonov 1962, 386. 9 Artamonov 1962, 386–387. 10 Artamonov 1962, 414.