Terrorist Cosmopolitans

Comparative framing analysis and ideological variation in contemporary jihadi propaganda:

A case study of Dabiq and Inspire magazine

Master thesis Political Science Author: W. P. J. Noldus

Specialisation: Political Theory & Behaviour Supervisor: Dr. P. van Praag August 2015 Second reader: Drs. P.W.H. Aarts

Table of Contents Introduction ...... 1 Chapter 1, Comparing al-Qaeda and the ...... 4 §1. Introduction ...... 4 §2. Salafi jihadi ideology ...... 4 §3. Tawhid and the dismissal of rationalism ...... 5 §4. The debate over ...... 6 §5. Territoriality and international relations ...... 7 §6. ...... 9 §7. Liberating sacred lands or ushering in the Apocalypse ...... 12 §8. Conclusion ...... 13 Chapter 2, On Frames and Framing ...... 15 §1. Introduction ...... 15 §2. Framing Theory ...... 15 §3. Framing Theory in the study of Islamic Terrorist Movements ...... 16 §4. The frame ...... 18 §5. The International Relations frame ...... 20 §6. The Recruitment frame ...... 22 §7. The Sharia frame ...... 24 §8. Conclusion ...... 25 Chapter 3, Methodology ...... 26 §1. Introduction ...... 26 §2. Research question and hypothesis ...... 26 §3. Data & data selection ...... 27 §4. Data processing and analysis ...... 29 §5. Validity ...... 29 §6. Reliability & replicability ...... 30 §7. Conclusion ...... 30 Chapter 4, Results ...... 31 §1. Introduction ...... 31 §2. Apostasy framing ...... 32 §2.1 Wholesale apostasy framing in Dabiq ...... 32 §2.2 Cautious apostasy framing in Dabiq ...... 35 §2.3 Wholesale apostasy framing in Inspire ...... 36 §2.4 Cautious apostasy framing in Inspire ...... 37

§3. International Relations framing ...... 38 §3.1 Dismissive IR framing in Dabiq ...... 39 §3.2 Traditional IR framing in Dabiq...... 40 §3.3 Dismissive IR framing in Inspire ...... 41 §3.4 Traditional IR framing in Inspire ...... 42 §4. Recruitment framing ...... 43 §4.1 Religious recruitment framing in Dabiq ...... 44 §4.2 Resistance recruitment framing in Dabiq ...... 45 §4.3 Religious recruitment framing in Inspire ...... 46 §4.4 Resistance recruitment framing in Inspire ...... 47 §5. Sharia framing ...... 48 §5.1 Everyday life sharia framing in Dabiq ...... 49 §5.2 Everyday life sharia framing in Inspire ...... 51 §5.3 Utopian sharia framing in Inspire ...... 51 §6. Conclusion ...... 52 Chapter 5, Discussion ...... 54 Literature ...... 60 Appendix 1, Codebook ...... 63 Notes ...... 71

1

Introduction

Over the course of the civil war in Syria we have seen the emergence of the next major Islamic terrorist organisation, the Islamic State (IS). Formerly known as the and the Levant (ISIS), IS has been subject to many name changes since its foundation in 1999 as Jama'at al-Tawhid wal-. The organisation now holds large territories in both Syria and Iraq, and on 29 June 2014 declared their territories a worldwide under al- Baghdadi, or 'Caliph Ibrahim'. In many ways IS represents a new and interesting breed of jihadist organisations. Formerly an ally, and founded by Abu Musab al-Zarqawi, who also led al-Qaeda in Iraq (AQI), the group separated from al-Qaeda in February 2014. One of the key differences between IS and more traditional jihadist organisations such as al-Qaeda, appears to have to do, perhaps surprisingly, with the timing of their respective endgames. Whereas al-Qaeda’s “...grand strategy does include an eventual, apocalyptic clash between Islamic forces and Westerners, the organization currently believes itself to be at an earlier phase in its plan. Rather than all- out battle with infidels, AQ’s current strategic stage involves executing spectacular terrorist attacks on the West.”(Gambhir 2014: 3). IS, on the other hand, already seems to believe itself to be in the closing phases of this plan, viewing the young caliphate as a springboard to worldwide domination, and, as we shall see, a means of bringing about the apocalypse. This suggests a strategical difference between the two groups: for al-Qaeda the battle with the West is now, inside every country al-Qaeda holds accountable for perceived injustices. For IS, the real battle with the rest of the world will eventually, and inevitably, arrive at its doorstep in the form of clashes at their ever increasing borders. Modern jihadi organisations show a strong presence in new media that is prompted by their need to generate support, and necessitated by the inaccessibility of traditional media outlets, who tend not to offer these organisations a platform. This ‘media jihad’ now exceeds the actual military or physical jihad, and, with its sophisticated designs and high production values, disproportionately contributes to perceptions of these organisations’ legitimacy (Awan 2007, 2012). According to Corman and Schiefelbein (2006) the media strategy of jihadi organisations revolves around three elements. Firstly, these movements—and their violent tendencies—must be legitimated by establishing social and religious norms congruent with their actions. The second aim is to propagate the movement by spreading messages to 2 sympathisers. Thirdly, opponents must be intimidated. Both al-Qaeda and the Islamic state employ deliberate and sophisticated media strategies like these. In attempting theirs, Al- Qaeda’s grasp of the potential of new media technologies is impressive, showing “…strategic sophistication. They apply message discipline. They are flexible, adaptable and move quickly. They know how to forge, project and drive messages that strike a responsive chord. The tactics basic to any political campaign translate powerfully into tools for winning the ‘war of ideas’” (Farwell 2011: 127). In an article about al-Qaeda’s use of new technologies Brachman (2006: 149, 162) even goes as far as to suggest that because of their leveraging of new information and communication technologies, the organisation has transformed itself into “an organic jihadi movement that can adapt to environmental changes, including enhanced counterterrorism policies.” A sophisticated media strategy like this also plays a key part in the operations of IS. According to Ingram (2015), IS’s “information warfare” can be characterised by three traits: “the use of a multidimensional, multi-platform approach that simultaneously targets ‘friends and foes’ to enhance the reach, relevance and resonance of its messaging; the synchronisation of narrative and action to maximise operational and strategic ‘effects’ in the field; and the centrality of the Islamic State ‘brand’ to its entire campaign.” Aside from the organisation’s official media output, there is also a steady stream of propaganda being produced by the Islamic State’s foot soldiers, representing bottom-up initiatives of individual members (Nissen 2014: 4). The way the Islamic State operates and coordinates its media output and propaganda effort is so shockingly adroit, modern and tech-savvy, that it almost comically contrasts its antiquated notions and ideals about society. When comparing IS’s media effort to al-Qaeda’s it “…stands apart for its sophisticated use and understanding of social media to achieve its goals. Its communication strategy aims to persuade all that battling to restore a caliphate is a religious duty. The group’s narrative portrays ISIS as an agent of change, the true apostle of a sovereign , a champion of its own perverse notions of social justice, and a collection of avengers...” (Farwell 2014: 49). Coordinating IS’s media output is al-Furqan, the production company of the Islamic state that was created in 2006. According to the Norwegian Defence Research Establishment’s rapport What is audio-visual jihadi propaganda?, even as early as 2010, when hardly anyone in the West could tell you who or what IS was, al-Furqan was already responsible for 9 percent of all jihadi videos, compared to a share of 13 percent for al-Qaeda. The fact that IS’s output was already comparable to al-Qaeda’s at this early stage should be taken as an indication of just how serious they take this “war of ideas”. 3

In thinking about jihadi media strategies we also need to consider the significance of the so-called foreign fighter for militant Islamists. Involvement of these, mostly unpaid, combatants in conflicts in the has become extremely important to terrorist organisations. Even though they are joining with “…no apparent link to the conflict other than religious affinity with the Muslim side. Since 1980 between 10,000 and 30,000 such fighters have inserted themselves into conflicts from Bosnia in the west to the Philippines in the east” (Hegghammer 2010: 53). According to Hegghammer, having these foreign fighters volunteering for war may also serve a key stepping-stone into involving them in attacks in their home countries later on. The importance attracting foreign fighters is also affirmed by the effort expended by both al- Qaeda and IS into enlisting them to their cause. Prime targets are marginalised youths in the West, and English language jihadi propaganda has become commonplace. Since 2010 Al- Qaeda has published a digital, glossy, Western-style magazine called Inspire, aimed at this foreign audience. According to Sivek (2013), the magazine’s usage of Western pop, youth, and celebrity culture inspired designs and narratives is likely to resonate with this kind of audience. Furthermore, the magazine medium, has the “…ability to unify audiences through the construction of communities around topics and through the medium’s distinctive mode of address” and to “…draw readers into their content and … encourage lifestyle changes” (Sivek 2013: 588-589). Not to be outdone, IS has of summer 2014 been releasing its own—even glossier and more professional looking—magazine Dabiq. These two magazines will provide the cases to be examined in this thesis, the topic of which is to compare issue framing used by the Islamic State to issue framing used by al-Qaeda in their respective magazines. The question driving this paper is to ask whether or not the Islamic State and al-Qaeda use specific ways of framing certain topics that propagate their presumed ideological preferences, and whether or not both organisations differ from one another on these topics.

The structure of this thesis will be as follows: chapter 1 will compare the ideology and policy preferences of al-Qaeda and IS on a variety of subject matters, and provide the theoretical basis for operationalizing four issue frames that we expect both organisations to use quite differently in their magazines. This, as well as a brief introduction to framing theory, and the way the theory is used in researching Islamist terrorist movements, will be treated in chapter 2. In chapter 3, our research question and hypothesis are formulated, and the methodology for analysing Dabiq and Inspire on the usage of these four frames is discussed. The results of our analysis will be the topic of chapter 4, while chapter 5 is reserved for further discussion and conclusions. 4

Chapter 1, Comparing al-Qaeda and the Islamic State

§1. Introduction

Comparing al-Qaeda to IS a complicated affair. On the one hand the groups appear to be rather similar. Both are radical, anti-Western, Salafi jihadi terrorist organisations claiming privileged access to ’s will. Both are confident enough in this knowledge that their members are willing to stake their—and our—lives on it, and both envision a utopian future in which humanity submits to a global caliphate. Despite these similarities though, both groups behave rather differently. Al-Qaeda’s priority seems to be to focus their efforts on the morally and spiritually corrupt West, attacking the Western countries inside their own borders in an effort to damage them, signify their own emergence as the new virtuous leadership of Muslims, and provoke the United States into attacking those areas of the Islamic world associated with its organisation and affiliates (Blanchard 2007: 5). Opting for a different path, the Islamic State “…invokes a specific utopian imagination of the resurrection of the Muslim (nation) and the Caliphate (Islamic empire). It rejects the modern nation state and the states created during the colonial period and instead calls for a return of the Caliphate of the Islamic ummah…” (Jabareen 2014: 52). A caliphate which it promptly declared in June 2014 in large areas of war-torn Iraq and Syria. In this section I will discuss certain key ideological differences and similarities between the two groups.

§2. Salafi jihadi ideology

Both al-Qaeda and the Islamic State share a common creed, that of the . The Salafi Movement is a faction within Sunni that has become synonymous with a strict, puritanical, and literalist approach to Islam that shuns innovation by rigorously mimicking the model of the prophet . According to Wiktorowicz (2006), three factions can be distinguished within this movement: the purists, who are primarily concerned with maintaining and promoting the purity of Islam as outlined in the , , and consensus of the companions (the contemporary followers of Muhammad), but who believe that any political action will likely lead to injustice and corruption until the religion is purified. Then there are the politicos who argue that they have a better understanding of contemporary issues and are 5 better suited to implement the Salafi doctrine in a modern context, but who generally stop short of revolutionary action. Finally there is the jihadi faction, who support the use of violence to establish and argue that the purist—as knowledgeable about Islam they may be—are either ignorant about the current state of affairs in the world, or are consciously hiding the truth from the people. Both al-Qaeda and the Islamic State exemplify the Salafi jihadi political universe. A universe that Bhatt (2014) argues is aesthetically and culturally dominated by a linkage between innate violence and political virtue. Al-Qaeda and IS embody a movement that champions the unchanging nature of Islam, so it may seem curious that both arrive at very different ideological positions on how to act in the world. As I will argue, this has a to do with their different interpretation of the modern context to which to apply the Salafi creed, and to a much lesser extent with true dogmatic differences of opinion.

§3. Tawhid and the dismissal of rationalism

The central tenet of the Salafi movement is the concept of tawhid, the oneness or unity of God. Tawhid has three components. First, central to all monotheistic religions, it states that God is the sole creator of the universe. Secondly, only God has the right to be worshipped. The third tenet, finally, may seem somewhat inconsequential but actually has some of the most pervasive real-life ramifications. It states that God is supreme, entirely unique, and does not share any characteristics or powers with humans. This has far-reaching implications for humanity’s authority to legislate because as “the Qur’an mentions God as the supreme legislator, humans are obligated to follow the shari’a in its entirety. To do otherwise is to imply that humans can legislate, a power clearly reserved for God alone. This view of tawhid leads Salafis to reject secularism and the separation of church (or ) and state, because these suggest the supremacy of human-made laws and institutions over divine governance.” (Wiktorowicz 2006: 208). In order to safeguard tawhid, Salafi Muslims must strictly follow the Quran and adhere to the purity of Muhammad’s model (the sunnah and ). As the supreme example of practising tawhid in this world, his actions and instructions must be emulated in every detail. Finally, Salafis are to be guided by the prophet’s companions (the Sahabah), who are said to have learned from the messenger of God directly. Wiktorowicz argues that for Salafis this makes applying human logic and intellect to these original sources perhaps the most significant and dangerous challenge to pure Islam. What follows from this line of reasoning is a sort of modus operandi in which the Quran and hadith are treated as self-explanatory. There is no need 6 for any philosophical system of logic, critical thought, or God forbid, a scientific approach or a historical reading of the sacred texts. The all-encompassing truth is already out there, written down in the Quran, sunnah, and hadith, and the function of religious scholars is to simply see these truths through training and knowledge of the texts. What is more, hard-line salafis believe that whatever Islamic understanding of these sources the Salafi method produces is the correct one by definition. This has to do with a certain favoured and frequently cited hadith. It prophesises that the Muslim community will eventually divide into seventy-three sects, but that only one of those sects follows the true way of the prophet and will be saved; the other seventy- two are said to be bound. The salafis believe themselves to be this chosen sect which, ipso facto, means their readings and understanding are undisputable. Of course, forbidding human logic and non-literal interpretation of scripture is far easier said than done, and different Salafi groups still tend to end up with very different ideological positions. The answer to this “…lies in the inherently subjective nature of applying a creed to new issues and problems. This is a human enterprise and therefore subject to differing interpretations of context.” (Wiktorowicz 2006: 214). So, even though there may be no disagreement on the interpretation of a specific verse whatsoever, it may still prove almost impossible to agree on who or what it is meant for in a modern context. And it is by way of this complication that al-Qaeda and the Islamic State arrive at their diverging ideologies, despite professing the same creed. An excellent example of the difficulties arising from contextual interpretation, and one of the most divisive issues within the Salafi movement, is the debate over takfir, or .

§4. The debate over takfir

Takfir refers to the practise of excommunication of apostates in Islam. In jihadi Salafism—as practiced by al-Qaeda and IS—if a Muslim commits apostasy, the only course of action is excommunication, followed by the transgression’s prescribed sanction of the death penalty. However, it is of course difficult to determine whether or not someone has in fact committed apostasy. He or she may act sinfully and live counter to God’s commands, but as long as this individual continues to believe in Islam, he or she remains a Muslim. But should a Muslim stop believing in Islam altogether, there is no saving them and takfir is the only course of action remaining. So the trick is to determine whether someone is a mere sinner, or an apostate. Salafis generally allow for three reasons, short of disbelieving, why a Muslim might commit a sin, thereby distinguishing between belief and behaviour, namely ignorance, coercion, or 7 intentionality. The reason why this is such a touchy subject is that “…the practise of takfir is theologically perilous. “If a man says to his brother, ‘You are an infidel,’ ” the Prophet said, “then one of them is right.” If the accuser is wrong, he himself has committed apostasy by making a false accusation” (Wood 2015). The peril of course lies in the death sentence that accompanies a false accusation. Al-Qaeda tends to side with the more moderate factions of the Salafi jihadi movement, in distinguishing between belief and behaviour when determining whether or not a Muslim no longer believes in Islam. For al-Qaeda a Muslim who does not act like a Muslim is not necessarily an apostate; he may still believe in Islam, which would make him a mere sinner. IS, on the other hand, seems to take the position that Muslims who act contrary to their interpretation of Islam, or who oppose them, have stopped believing in Islam altogether and are therefore not sinners but apostates. For instance in the article The Fight against the PKK, these perceived enemies are consistently referred to as “apostate soldiers”, and the article goes on to talk about “negotiations between the apostates Erdogan and Ocalan”, without going into any signs or proof indicating these people have in fact apostatised. 1 Instead, their apostasy is treated as self-evident; a highly unusual move, even among fanatics. This, however, has become common practise for IS, who are now reported to declare fellow Muslims to be apostates—and mark them for death—for a stunning variety of offenses, such as voting, shaving, being a Shiite, or running for office in a foreign government (Wood 2015). It would seem the Islamic state has a great deal of killing left to do in the world, and the utter extremism of their position on takfir has caused a considerable rift between al-Qaeda and IS. It eventually led Abu Muhammad al-Maqdisi, who was Abu Musab al-Zarqawi’s spiritual mentor, to distance himself from his former protégé. Al-Malqdisi, “By all measures … the key contemporary ideologue in the Jihadi intellectual universe…”, according to the 2006 Combating Terrorism Center’s Militant Ideology Atlas, and whose website Tawhed functions as “al-Qa`ida’s main online library”, even wrote al-Zarqawi and urged him to be more prudent and “not issue sweeping proclamations of takfir” or “proclaim people to be apostates because of their sins” (Wood 2015).

§5. Territoriality and international relations

Another key difference between al-Qaeda and IS revolves around the importance they attach to territory. Al-Qaeda, as an organisation, has no specific need for territorial control of their own as their focus is on “…encouraging lone-wolf Western-based terrorists to attack the West” 8

(Gambhir 2014: 1). In principle, this can be done from any country, provided their host imposes no insurmountable constraints on their ability to operate. Furthermore, even though al-Qaeda would eventually see all Muslims rally to their cause and unite in a worldwide caliphate, as a political actor the organisation at least seems to operate as though the current system of world politics, with its nation states and borders, is a political reality which they are not actively seeking to dismantle. In the United States’ Congressional Research Service’s 2007 report Al Qaeda: Statements and Evolving Ideology, Blanchard cites The Liberation of the Homelands as one of the three foundations of al-Qaeda ’s political ideology, as outlined by their current leader Ayman al-Zawahiri. Even though the first foundation is The Quran-Based Authority to Govern, and supports the creation of an Islamic state governed by sharia law, the aforementioned foundation has Zawahiri argue “…that reforms and free elections will not be possible for Muslims without first establishing “the freedom of the Muslim lands and their liberation from every aggressor” (Blanchard 2007: 11), thereby implying that there ought to be such a thing as free elections. In the final foundation, The Liberation of the Human Being, “Al Zawahiri articulated a vision of a contractual social relationship between Muslims and their rulers that would permit people to choose and criticize their leaders but also demand that Muslims resist and overthrow rulers who violate Islamic laws and principles” (Blanchard 2007: 11). This, in combination with the organisation’s well documented support of the former regime in Afghanistan, demonstrates al-Qaeda’s tacit endorsement of at least the concept of the nation state, and its inherent characteristics such as territory and borders.

Not so for the Islamic State. Conceptually, to even be considered an Islamic state, let alone The Islamic State, having your own territory is of paramount importance. It would be impossible for IS to operate as an organisation in the way it manages today if it wasn’t for the large territories under their control in Iraq and Syria. However, territory has an even more fundamental place in IS’ ideology, challenging the very concept of modern territoriality and offering a striking “…contrast to modern states in its rejection of the validity of borders. Modern states seek to control their bounded territories, which are acknowledged by the international community and the UN. However, the Islamic State … seeks to control territory that it believes to be unbounded and elastic and that will expand based on the occupation or ‘‘opening’’ of countries … it does not limit its practical activities to specific or even general borders but rather aspires to continue expanding the Islamic Caliphate until it encompasses the entire world…” (Jabareen 2015: 54). It is important to note that this applies to Western countries and Muslim countries alike, and this has some rather startling implications. If, for 9 instance, tomorrow France were to declare obsolete and replace all its laws with the sharia, IS would certainly approve of their decision. But it wouldn’t quite go far enough for theirs tastes, as France would still be France. The reason this would be insufficient to placate IS has to do with the religious implications of declaring not a, but The Caliphate, and the concept of bay’ah, or the oath of allegiance, to its caliph. This revolves around the rather tricky affair of choosing a legitimate caliph, who “…must meet conditions outlined in Sunni law— being a Muslim adult man of descent; exhibiting moral probity and physical and mental integrity; and having ’amr, or authority” (Wood 2015). In IS’s view, the positioning of Abu Bakr al-Baghdadi as the one and only legitimate caliph, puts all Muslims and Muslim rulers in a position in which they need to seriously consider pledging allegiance to this man. This is because the hadith 1851 states that “one who dies without having bound himself by an oath of allegiance will die the death of one belonging to the days of ”. Jahiliyyah means ignorance, or disbelief, and in IS’s view this means that anyone who fails to offer bay’ah to the one true caliphate and its caliph will die a death of disbelief, and be denied access to in the afterlife. Bay’ah to IS, and therefore the dismissal of the concept of the nation state, has thus become an obligatory requirement for all Muslims. In fact, for those who are able, hijrah (referring to the migration or journey of Muhammad and his followers from to ) to the Islamic State is seen as obligatory as well, and “a call for emigration was published in… Dabiq, affirming that hijrah to the Islamic State is a literal requirement for all Muslims, not just a symbolic request.” (Gambhir 2014: 4). Interestingly, al- Qaeda and IS may of course not be in disagreement about bay’ah as an Islamic concept at all, but if one does not see the existence of a true caliphate as a reality at this point in time—which al-Qaeda doesn’t—then bay’ah to it becomes a moot point.

§6. Sharia

Declaring the caliphate has brought to light another, albeit subtle, difference between al-Qaeda and IS, in the way both organisations communicate the nature and application of sharia law. As Salafi jihadists there isn’t a lot of disagreement between them on Islamic jurisprudence or , let alone on the interpretation of sharia law. It is curious and fascinating then, how much more violent and brutal IS seems compared to al-Qaeda. From al-Qaeda we have come to expect— aside from terrorist attacks, obviously—the occasional beheading. But it is nothing like the obscene outpouring of violence IS has unleashed. And it is not just the sheer savagery that 10 shocks, it is the unapologetic nature of IS’s violence. Not content in merely carrying out barbarisms, IS shows the need to revel in violence, considering it a cause for celebration. Never before have we witnessed such a steady stream of self-made videos, reports and justifications of these acts. Atrocities like beheadings, amputations, crucifixions, mass rape, acts of stoning, and burning people alive, are acted out with a demented gleefulness that is beyond disturbing. 2 This high level of violence could be directly related to the act of declaring a caliphate, and what this action means for the implementation of sharia law. In his article What ISIS Really Wants Graeme Wood interviewed , a British Muslim and activist who expressed his support of IS. Choundary explained that before the caliphate was established, “…maybe 85 percent of the Sharia was absent from our lives” and that “These laws are in abeyance until we have khilafa and now we have one.” The argument is that “Without a caliphate, for example, individual vigilantes are not obliged to amputate the hands of thieves they catch in the act. But create a caliphate, and this law, along with a huge body of other jurisprudence, suddenly awakens” (Wood 2015). The caliph then, is required to enforce sharia in its entirety, and any deviation from this duty is grounds for his replacement. And it is precisely this unhappy state of affairs that is now taking place within the territories of the Islamic State, and which is leading to medieval levels of violence. Now, all aspects of law, covering both personal status issues as well as criminal proceedings, and any and all legal disputes must be judged, settled, and if necessary punished, in full accordance with sharia law, as IS chooses to read it. Today, there are only a handful of countries that claim to apply sharia law in full. 3 However, most of even these outliers still maintain codified penal and civil codes that contain elements from other legal traditions. So even among the members of this dubious shortlist IS would instantly stand out and be considered as extreme when it states that it “…actively works to educate its citizens, preach to and admonish them, enforce their strict adherence to Islamic obligations, judge their disputes, implement the sharia hudud [crimes against God and their associated punishments], eradicate all traces of [idolatry] and …”, because they truly mean business when they say this. 4 For example, in an article called “Clamping Down on Sexual Deviance” IS offers us an insight in what everyday life becomes once the sharia hudud is enforced. According to IS homosexuals, or even people who have had nothing more than consensual sexual relations outside of a marriage, may count on little leeway or sympathy. This position “…was demonstrated recently in Wilāyat Ar- Raqqah, where the Islamic State carried out the hadd [punishments associated with hudud crimes] on a man found guilty of engaging in sodomy. He was taken to the top of a building and thrown off, as was one of the traditions … with those who committed this filthy deed. Also in Wilāyat Ar- Raqqah, a woman was stoned after being found 11 guilty of zinā [unlawful sexual relations].”5 For IS then, God’s law has now been firmly established within their territory, and with that task completed, their concern has shifted towards its implementation; a shift marked by violence.

So again, disagreement over whether or not a true caliphate has indeed been established may be the reason for this apparent behavioural discrepancy between al-Qaeda and IS. There is no particular reason to assume al-Qaeda would be any less brutal in its preferred enforcement of sharia law than IS, and in an interview with Abu Nasir al-Wuhayshi, the leader of the al- Qaeda in the , he indeed stated that “Our objectives are driving out the occupiers from the Arabian Peninsula and purifying its land from them, establishing the law of shariah, the establishment of khilafah…”6 But since they currently recognize no caliphate and the organization formally controls no territories, al-Qaeda is also not obliged to enforce sharia at this point in time. This may enable the organization to refrain from things like cutting people’s hands off for theft, and outright alienating potentially sympathetic Muslims, who may shudder at the thought of such sanctions. Other unpopular actions can thus be refrained from as well, or as Wood puts it “If al-Qaeda wanted to revive slavery, it never said so. And why would it? Silence on slavery probably reflected strategic thinking, with public sympathies in mind: when the Islamic State began enslaving people, even some of its supporters balked.” (Wood 2015). In 2014 IS began enslaving and selling Yazidi women, girls 10 years and older included.7 These Yazidis were considered infidels and are therefore fit for enslavement according to sharia law. And this decidedly unpopular course of action was not something that was optional for IS, it was obligatory (on pain of death no less, as to not do so would for them be akin to apostatizing). In an article called The Revival of Slavery before the Hour IS explains to the “weak-minded and weak hearted” that “…one should remember that enslaving the families of the kuffar and taking their women as concubines is a firmly established aspect of the Sharī’ah that if one were to deny or mock, he would be denying or mocking the verses of the Qur’ān and the narrations of the Prophet … and thereby apostatizing from Islam.” 8 So, whereas sharia enforcement for IS something they have to do, public sympathies be damned, sharia to al-Qaeda is something they would like to do. Something to be aspired to in the future, to make the world a better place once there finally exists a true caliphate. This distinction then, may just be what makes Al-Qaeda a much less explicitly violent organization than IS.

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§7. Liberating sacred lands or ushering in the Apocalypse

Although, as mentioned above, the eventual establishment of a caliphate and establishing the law of sharia is definitely a feature of al-Qaeda’s ideology, it can hardly be called one of their operational objectives. As an organisation, al-Qaeda is much more concerned with Salafi reform in Muslim societies and the necessity of armed resistance to those who, in their view, occupy Muslim lands. “In the early 1990s, Bin Laden emphasized his desire to secure the withdrawal of U.S. and other foreign troops from Saudi Arabia at all costs. Bin Laden criticized the Saudi royal family publicly and alleged that their invitation of foreign troops to the Arabian peninsula constituted an affront to the sanctity of the birthplace of Islam and a betrayal of the global Islamic community.” (Blanchard 2007: 2). A position al-Qaeda, according to Blanchard, has associated with the Islamic principle of ‘defensive jihad’, which entails the (obligatory) Islamic tradition of defending Muslim communities when they are attacked. Al-Qaeda then, has its eyes on worldly goals like expelling non-Muslims from the , ending support for dictatorships in Muslim countries, and—of course—eradicating the state of Israel. They view the plight of Muslims as the result of a “…so-called “new crusade led by America against the Islamic nations…” and emphasise a belief “…that an emerging conflict between Islam and the West would be fought “between the Islamic world and the Americans and their allies.” (Blanchard 2007: 3). Al-Qaeda therefore seems to operate much like a secret and subversive political resistance movement.

The Islamic State, on the other hand, holds much more religiously motivated operational objectives, and as an organisation exemplifies the Islamic principle of ‘offensive jihad’. This entails expanding the realm of Islam (Dar al Islam) at the expense of the House of War (Dar al-Harb). However, their objectives do not appear to stop with bringing the whole world to the House of Islam. Instead IS seems positively obsessed with millenarian notions of the coming apocalypse. Their expansion is seen as a mere tool for ushering in this inevitable event. For instance, according to Wood, during the final years of the U.S. occupation of Iraq al-Qaeda complained that IS “…saw signs of the end times everywhere. They were anticipating, within a year, the arrival of the —a messianic figure destined to lead the Muslims to victory before the end of the world.” This even led to a reproach from Bin Laden himself when he was warned in 2008 “…that the group was being led by millenarians who were “talking all the time about the Mahdi and making strategic decisions” based on when they thought the Mahdi was going 13 to arrive. “Al-Qaeda had to write to [these leaders] to say ‘Cut it out.’ ” (Wood 2015). These apocalyptic notions are quickly confirmed when one reads Dabiq. The title of the magazine itself serves as the first hint at IS’s motivations. Dabiq is also the name of a small Syrian town IS has taken, and where “the Islamic State awaits the arrival of an enemy army … whose defeat will initiate the countdown to the apocalypse.” (Wood 2015). In an article in issue four of Dabiq called The Prophecies Regarding The Roman Crusaders IS informs us about this coming “…final, greatest, and bloodiest battle – al-Malhamah al- Kubrā – between the Muslims and the Romans … This battle ends the era of the Roman , as the Muslims will then advance upon Constantinople and thereafter Rome, to conquer the two cities and raise the flag of the Khilafah over them..” The confusing and bizarre prophecy thus goes as follows: after their victory in Dabiq, the caliphate will expand to almost cover the entire world. At this point the story becomes even stranger and the Dajjal, or false (the Islamic antichrist) will appear on the scene, and destroy most of the caliphate’s fighters until there are only 5000 left. Thankfully all is not lost, and after a highly effective bit of praying, will descend to save the day for IS. From the same article: “...when they are preparing for battle and filing their ranks, the prayer is called. So ‘Īsā Ibn [Jesus] will descend and lead them. When the enemy of sees him, he will melt as salt melts in water… until ‘Īsā kills the Dajjāl … Thereafter, kuffar and its tyranny will be destroyed; Islam and its justice will prevail on the entire Earth.” In this sense, even though the Islamic State can be mistaken for a country when one looks at criteria like territory or armed forces, it in fact seems to operate and think much more like a religious cult.

§8. Conclusion

As we have seen, al-Qaeda and IS do share a common religious outlook, but differ substantially on how to interpret the modern context to which it applies. Most noticeable is the difference of opinion on whether or not a true caliphate has indeed been established, and the ramifications this has for applying the religion. Furthermore, IS does appear to take an overall much more extreme position on religious issues like takfir and the expected chronology of prophetic events. In this matter al-Qaeda and IS arrive at very different ideological positions on policy-making. These discrepancies are all the more interesting as ideology linked to is often treated in very monolithic terms, a practise that “...with respect to Islamic terrorist movements … is of questionable analytic utility because its treatment tends … to ignore ideological 14 variation…”, and that, “Rather than conceptualize ideology as a fairly pervasive and coherent set of beliefs and values that functions in a programmatic and doctrinaire fashion, we are closer to the mark when we view ideology as a variable phenomenon that ranges on a continuum from a tightly and rigidly connected set of values and beliefs at one end to a loosely coupled set of values and beliefs at the other end…” (Snow & Byrd 2007). IS’s and al-Qaeda’s values and beliefs appear to cover both ends of this continuum simultaneously; rigidly connected in their Salafi jihadi religious beliefs, and only loosely coupled in their ideas and values on how to apply these beliefs.

In the next chapter we will attempt to relate this comparison between both organizations to framing theory. Additionally, based on the comparison made in this chapter, four issue specific frames will be developed on which IS and al-Qaeda are expected to prefer different framing methods in Dabiq and Inspire magazine.

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Chapter 2, On Frames and Framing

§1. Introduction

This chapter will form the theoretical foundation of our research design. Before moving on to discussing our research methods in chapter 3, this chapter will treat the theoretical concept of framing theory, introduce our definition and usage of framing, and discuss the application of framing theory to Islamic terrorist movements. After this we’ll develop four issue specific frames. The four topics chosen for analysis are al-Qaeda’s and IS’s preferred frames for discussing enemy Muslims; international relations; recruitment for their organisations; and sharia law.

§2. Framing Theory

Framing is a powerful tool for discourse analysis, unfortunately however it has been plagued by theoretical and empirical vagueness. It is because of these vague conceptualizations that Scheufele (1999) argues that the term framing has been repeatedly used to label similar, but very different approaches to social research. Therefore, if we are to use framing in any research design, it is crucial to clearly define the concept, and operationalize it in such a way as to maximise reproducibility and consistency. Scheufele distinguishes between individual frames, which he defines as “…mentally stored clusters of ideas that guide individuals’ processing of information…” (1999: 107), and media frames that organize everyday reality and shape its perception. For the purpose of analysing the content of propaganda magazines like Inspire and Dabiq, media frames are an obvious choice as this particular medium’s whole raison d’étre is to perform the task of organizing and shaping reality in the way its authors desire.

One of the most clear and concise definitions of media framing, and the one we will adopt, comes from Robert Entman, who defines the process of framing as “…to select some aspects of a perceived reality and make them more salient in a communicating text, in such a way as to promote a particular problem definition, causal interpretation, moral evaluation, and/or treatment recommendation for the item described” (Entman: 1993: 52). The two main aspects of framing then are selection and salience. The desired facets of a perceived reality are selected and made more noticeable and important so as to increase their salience. Furthermore, 16 a frame must “…define problems—determine what a causal agent is doing with what costs and benefits, usually measured in terms of common cultural values; diagnose causes—identify the forces creating the problem; make moral judgments—evaluate causal agents and their effects; and suggest remedies—offer and justify treatments for the problems and predict their likely effects.” (Entman 1993: 52). For the purposes of this research design fulfilling all these requirements should be seen as an ideal type frame; a frame need not necessarily contain all four elements. For instance, diagnosing a causal interpretation may be implied or even left out altogether; and the definition of a particular problem may be implied. Moral judgments and suggested remedies however, are required.

In framing research a distinction can be made between issue specific frames and generic frames. An issue specific frame applies to specific topic or event, whereas a generic frame is more broadly applicable, and suited to a variety of topics, contexts, and even timespans. Both approaches have their advantages: “An issue-specific approach …allows for investigation of … particular events in great specificity and detail. It may capture specific aspects of selection, organization, and elaboration that are present … and pertain specifically to a well-defined issue … In contrast, generic frames … allow comparisons between frames, topics, and, potentially, framing practices in different countries” (De Vreese et al. 2001:109). Both approaches have their downsides as well according to De Vreese. The disadvantage of generic frames simply being their inability to examine the framing of an issue of event in fine detail, whereas the issue specific frame’s higher degree of detail and issue sensitivity makes it harder to use for comparisons and generalisations, and therefore less suited as a basis for theory building. In the next paragraph we will look at how framing theory can be used in the study of Islamic terrorist movements.

§3. Framing Theory in the study of Islamic Terrorist Movements

The amount of studies done on framing in Islamic terrorist movements has so far been rather scarce. Most of this research has focussed on generic framing, drawing on the framing perspective from the study of social movements that uses the concept of collective action frames. In this section we’ll discuss three papers representative of this method and determine our own approach to our case study of Dabiq and Inspire. 17

The research by Snow and Byrd (2007) exemplifies this framing perspective, which they argue “…focuses attention on the process of framing in relation to the development of innovative amplifications and extensions of, or antidotes to, existing ideologies or discourses, which, in turn, are conceptualized as collective action frames” (Snow & Byrd 2007: 123). The study looked for the generic diagnostic, prognostic and motivational framing techniques that facilitate collective action, used by a variety of Islamic militancy and terrorist movements like a-Qaeda and the in the 70s. Diagnostic framing was employed to analyse aspects of social life, event, or governmental system as problematic, while prognostic framing suggested specific remedies and motivational framing provided “prods to action”. The authors concluded that the amount of ideological variation and flexibility of these movements is such that one cannot view Islamic terrorist ideology as monolithic.

Research by Page et al. (2011) studied the media output of Al Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula (AQAP). Again, this article employed generic diagnostic, prognostic and motivational frames for its study, which consisted of a systematic review of the organisation’s e-magazine Sada al-Malahim and was used to uncover and categorise its themes. The authors in this way identified AQAP’s “grievance narratives, ideological justifications for violent actions, and means to strengthen its credibility among its intended audiences” (Page et al. 2011: 150), which revealed that “the magazine’s contributors are knowledgeable in a wide spectrum of contemporary political and religious debates … they are also intimately familiar with local issues … and exploit this knowledge as part of their attempt to appeal to a number of different … social groups. The group also demonstrates a capacity for learning at the organizational level” (Page et al. 2011: 169).

Our final example represents a more issue specific approach, analysing the way in which Islamic intellectuals were discussed. In the article Framing Jihad: Intramovement Framing Contests and al-Qaeda’s Struggle for Sacred Authority Wiktorovicz (2004) looked specifically at al-Qaeda and suggested the credibility of popular intellectuals as a point of contention between al-Qaeda and other non-violent Islamic fundamentalists groups. Wiktorovicz argues that social movements are all about persuasion, and that popular intellectuals are inseparably linked to persuasion attempts through framing processes. Using four issue frames: “(1) vilification – demonizing competing popular intellectuals; (2) exaltation – praising ingroup popular intellectuals; (3) credentialing – emphasizing the expertise of the ingroup intellectuals; and (4) decredentialing – raising questions about the expertise of rivals” (Wiktorovicz 2004: 162), it was shown that al-Qaeda attempted to assert its right to “sacred authority”. Intellectuals 18 supporting jihad were portrayed as religious experts that were logical, and of sound character and reputation, while opposing intellectuals were painted as uneducated about politics, naïve, corrupt and emotional.

How then, should we apply framing theory to our analysis of Inspire and Dabiq? The research discussed here showed a preference for generic framing. However, the outcomes of this type of research may prove too general for the purpose of our analysis. After all, we are interested in determining whether or not al-Qaeda and IS frame specific topics differently, a task which involves analysing these topics and their nuances in as much detail as possible. An issue specific approach to framing would appear to better allow for such greater specificity and detail. Therefore, even though the generic frame would be better suited for comparisons and generalizations, we will opt for issue specific frames that will be operationalized in the following paragraphs. In order to do this we should look for potential differences in contextual interpretation that could be transformed into variations of issue specific frames. That is to say we should look for specific issues on which both organizations might think and behave differently, and operationalize our frames accordingly. Building on the comparison made in the previous chapter we will design and discuss issue frames related to the four topics mentioned in the introduction to this chapter. These will be labelled: the Apostasy frame, the International Relations frame, the Recruitment frame, and the Sharia frame.

§4. The Apostasy frame

As may be expected, in many of the articles published by al-Qaeda and IS the enemies of both organisations are featured, and both organisations tend to using specific enemy frames when referring to their opposition. In this section we will attempt to formulate such an enemy frame. However, al-Qaeda and IS use very similar ways of referring to or addressing non-Muslim enemies. These are typically referred to as crusaders and infidels, and not much difference between the organisations is to be expected. The way IS and al-Qaeda treat Muslim enemies could prove to be very different though. In the previous chapter we discussed how the practice of takfir or excommunication has been a contentious issue for al-Qaeda and IS. In this section a so-called Apostasy frame (referring to the different criteria used to determine apostasy) is developed and operationalized to help determine whether or not this difference of opinion between al-Qaeda and IS will also be reflected in the frames both organizations use in Inspire and Dabiq when discussing enemy Muslims. 19

As we have seen, taking the traditionally extremely laden step of declaring takfir has become a rather straightforward affair for IS. As they have established themselves as the one true caliphate, and the one true sect of Salafi Islam, it is with little difficulty that sweeping proclamations of takfir are made against almost every Muslim acting contrary to their interpretation of Islam. The considerable ire this has drawn from the rest of the Muslim world is ostensibly of no concern, which—considering the amount of sympathy and potential recruits lost—seems to suggest this behaviour goes beyond mere intimidation and may indicate the organization’s almost unparalleled level of sincerity in their fanaticism. If this is indeed the case we ought to expect IS to take a wholesale, indiscriminate approach to its use of takfir in Dabiq.

Al-Qaeda, on the other hand, tends to be much more cautious in their use of takfir, and prefers to label most fellow Muslims who do not conform to their wishes as misguided sinners. In addition to offering them a way to return to the fold, this also safeguards the leadership of al-Qaeda against being branded apostates themselves, should an accusation on their part prove false. Al-Qaeda may very well be completely genuine in its belief that is not their place to practice takfir indiscriminately without first carefully satisfying all prerequisite religious conditions. It may also be the case that al-Qaeda is concerned with the very real possibility of offending large sections of the Muslim world—potential recruits all—on which it relies to replenish its ranks. If either of these scenarios prove true, we should expect al-Qaeda to be cautious in its use of takfir in Inspire.

The Apostasy frame then, will be operationalized using two sub frames. Sub frame 1, named Wholesale apostasy framing will be assigned to an article if it features sweeping statements, declarations, or accusations of takfir regarding Muslim opposition, enemies, or competitors, without being supported by meticulous religious scrutiny and argumentation, or argues in favour of applying takfir in this way. Sub frame 2, labelled Cautious apostasy framing, will be assigned to an article if it features statements, declarations, or accusations of takfir regarding Muslim opposition, enemies, or competitors, that are carefully constructed through religious reasoning and argumentation, or argues in favour of only applying takfir in this way. Sub frame 2 can also be assigned if, despite statements, accusations, or declarations of actions committed against the organizations principles, the article refrains from declaring takfir, and labels the offenders as deviants or sinners instead. The hypothesis is that, when discussing opposing Muslims, IS will tend to liberally make use of sub frame 1 in Dabiq, whereas al- Qaeda will be inclined to use sub frame 2 in Inspire. 20

1 Apostasy frame

(1) Wholesale apostasy framing The variable is assigned to the whole article. If the article features accusations, statements, or declarations of takfir regarding Muslim opposition, enemies, or competitors, without meticulous religious scrutiny and argumentation, or argues in favour of applying takfir in this way, the variable is assigned. (2) Cautious apostasy framing The variable is assigned to the whole article. If the article features accusations, statements, or declarations of takfir that are carefully constructed through religious reasoning and argumentation to Muslim opposition, enemies, or competitors, or argues in favour of only applying takfir in this way, the variable is assigned. The variable is also assigned if, despite statements, accusations, or declarations of actions committed against the organizations principles, the article refrains from declaring takfir, and labels the offenders as deviants or sinners instead.

§5. The International Relations frame

In the previous chapter we argued that the Islamic State and al-Qaeda think rather differently about territories, other countries, and their respective places in the current world system of politics. This could well have a profound impact on how both organisations view international relations. Here we’ll generate and operationalize a so-called International Relations frame to determine whether or not this difference in attitude towards the outside world is reflected in the way international relations are framed in Inspire and Dabiq.

As we have seen IS has, on the face of it, opted to ignore the concept of borders in favour of the idea that their caliphate will (presumably soon) envelop the whole world. Furthermore, because of the perceived obligatory nature of bay’ah or pledging allegiance to the caliph and the caliphate, IS apparently dismisses the concept of the sovereign nation state altogether. Non-Muslim territories are there to be conquered and absorbed, and Muslim territories are to pledge allegiance and join. In light of this attitude, if it indeed represents the way IS thinks, we should expect IS to be dismissive of traditional international relations as we know them in Dabiq. 21

We have also argued that al-Qaeda at least operates as if the current system of world politics and nation states is in effect. Tacitly endorsing elections (albeit conditional on the liberation of Muslim lands), and historically openly endorsing other friendly nation states. Not only that, but if its exhaustive list of demands are met, al-Qaeda has even kindly offered the prospect of peaceful coexistence with the West. Al-Qaeda, even though it formally desires an eventual caliphate, does not necessarily act on this ambition. Instead, it seemed more comfortable as a subversive and violent political actor that strives for real political change. Al- Qaeda does not however, appear to have the inclination to do away with the idea of countries any time soon. If this attitude is reflected in Inspire magazine we should expect al-Qaeda to frame international relations in a more traditional way.

The international relations frame is operationalized using two sub frames. Sub frame 1, called Dismissive International Relations framing, will be assigned to an article if it features refusals to recognize borders, traditional territoriality or territorial sovereignty, or the legitimacy or existence of countries altogether, or if the article features unconditional dismissals of peaceful coexistence with the international community. Traditional territoriality or territorial sovereignty is here defined as the idea that control of territory is the essence of a state and establishes the exclusive competence to take legal and factual measures within that territory, and prohibits foreign governments from exercising authority in the same area without consent (Malanczuk 1997: 75). Sub frame 2, which we’ll call Traditional International Relations framing, will be assigned to an article if it (implicitly or explicitly) recognizes the legitimacy of other countries, borders, traditional territoriality or territorial sovereignty, or offers the prospect of conditional peaceful coexistence with the international community. Our hypothesis is that IS will prefer the use of sub frame 1 in Dabiq, whereas al-Qaeda will tend to use sub frame 2 in Inspire.

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2 International relations frame

(1) Dismissive international relations The variable is assigned to the whole article. If the framing article features refusals to recognize borders, traditional territoriality or territorial sovereignty, or the legitimacy or existence of countries altogether, or if the article features unconditional dismissals of peaceful coexistence with the international community as a whole, the variable is assigned. (2) Traditional international relations The variable is assigned to the whole article. If the framing article (implicitly or explicitly) recognizes the legitimacy of other countries, borders, traditional territoriality or territorial sovereignty, or offers the prospect of conditional peaceful coexistence with the international community as a whole, the variable is assigned.

§6. The Recruitment frame

We have also speculated about the importance of religion for al-Qaeda and IS, and determined that religious motivations play a crucial role for both. However, we established that it al- Qaeda’s motivations may in large part stem from a desire to resist and combat injustices it perceives as being perpetrated by the West against Muslims. IS on the other hand, appeared to be solely motivated by . In this section we contemplate how these distinctive motivations might relate to recruitment. A so-called Recruitment frame is formulated to help determine whether or not these differences in motivations are also reflected in the way recruitment efforts are framed in Inspire and Dabiq.

Looking at IS’s motivations, their cause appeared to be rooted in a deep-seated sense of millenarianism and apocalyptic thinking; the end of times are near and you had better join the cause while you still have the opportunity. Moreover, the perceived mandatory nature of the concepts of bay’ah and hijrah, suggest that the Islamic State views joining their ranks as the religious duty of all true Muslims, and as the only means of achieving salvation. Considering IS’s attitude towards religious obligations, and the importance it attaches to prophesies, it stands to reason that recruitment attempts ought to impart the grandiosity of the occasion on the would- 23 be draftee. If this is indeed so, we should expect IS to frame its recruitment efforts in Dabiq in terms of religious duty and destiny.

Operating much like the self-appointed spokesman for aggrieved Muslims worldwide, we have seen that al-Qaeda is set on attacking the West and evicting the infidels who occupy Muslim lands and besiege Islam. For al-Qaeda there is a clear injustice being done to the Muslim world which has to be resisted and fought. In line with their religion jihad is seen as the religious duty of all Muslim, and a vehicle for getting into paradise, but the organisation’s emphasis appears to be on resistance. If this is the case, it again seems reasonable to assume that these motivations are reflected in al-Qaeda’s recruitment efforts. Because of this we should expect al-Qaeda to frame recruitment attempts in Inspire in term of religious duty and the language of the resistance fighter.

The recruitment frame then, is be operationalized using two sub frames. Sub frame 1, labelled Religious Recruitment framing, is assigned to an article if its recruitment efforts feature an appeal to a sense of religious duty, millenarianism, or celestial destiny. Sub frame 2, called Resistance Recruitment framing, is assigned to an article if it tries to facilitate recruitment by appealing to a sense of resistance to perceived injustices to the Muslim world. The hypothesis is that, when attempting recruitment in Dabiq, IS will frame these efforts using sub frame 1, whereas al-Qaeda will tend to employ sub frame 2 in Inspire.

3 Recruitment frame

(1) Religious Recruitment The variable is assigned to the whole article. If the framing article features statements aimed at facilitating recruitment, appealing to a sense of religious duty, millenarianism, or celestial destiny, the variable is assigned. (2) Resistance Recruitment The variable is assigned to the whole article. If the framing article features statements aimed at facilitating recruitment, appealing to a sense of resistance to perceived injustices to the Muslim world, the variable is assigned.

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§7. The Sharia frame

In the preceding chapter we indicated that IS may appear more violent because of its self- imposed obligation to enforce puritanical sharia in its territories. Al-Qaeda on the other hand was argued to view sharia as more of a lofty, future objective, releasing the organisation from the burden of having to enforce cruel punishments all the time and potentially damaging its image. To help analyse whether or not this difference between IS and al-Qaeda is also reflected in the way both frame topics concerning sharia law, a so-called Sharia frame is operationalized.

IS has given the world an unapologetic insight in what could be viewed as “executive Sharia”. In proclaiming the caliphate the organization has committed itself to ruthlessly upholding and enforcing their interpretation of Sharia law. This action has brought a whole body of law into effect that was formerly mostly dormant, and brought sharia from the realm of philosophy and morality into the everyday world of specific rulings and sentencing. This would explain why IS seems positively obsessed with corporal punishments and executions. This, should it indeed be the case, would lead one to expect IS to frame issues relating to sharia law in Dabiq in an unapologetically violent and explicit way.

For al-Qaeda on the other hand, sharia law appears to be a much more philosophical topic of conversation. Much like most Jihadi organizations, al-Qaeda would welcome seeing Sharia implemented wherever possible. But for now, the organisation would appear to have the luxury of not having to unnecessarily offend those of more delicate sensibilities. Sharia was argued to be an eventual goal for al-Qaeda, viewed and presented as a God’s perfect set of rules for the life of man. If this assessment of al-Qaeda’s attitude is correct, we would expect Inspire to frame sharia law as a utopian goal, and a means of facilitating a moral life and a just society.

The Sharia frame is again operationalized using two sub frames. Sub frame 1, designated as Everyday life Sharia framing, is assigned to an article if it, when featuring sharia law or its implementations, focusses on specific instances of sharia rulings, or its violations and their associated punishments. Sub frame 2, named Utopian Sharia framing, is assigned to an article if sharia is referred to as a goal to be attained, or as a means of achieving salvation, morality, or divinely sanctioned social order. Our hypothesis is that, when mentioning issues relating to sharia law, the Islamic State is likely to use sub frame 1 in Dabiq, while al-Qaeda will tend to use sub frame 2 in Inspire.

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4 Sharia frame

(1) Everyday life Sharia framing The variable is assigned to the whole article. If the article features sharia law or its implementations, focusing on specific instances of sharia rulings, or its violations and their associated punishments, the variable is assigned. (2) Utopian Sharia framing The variable is assigned to the whole article. If the article features the promise of sharia as a goal to be

attained, or as a means of achieving salvation,

morality, or divinely sanctioned social order, the variable is assigned.

§8. Conclusion

Now that we have operationalized our four issue specific frames, we can move on to our research methodology in the following chapter. In it we will discuss our research question and condense our expectations put forward for each frame into a generic hypothesis. Furthermore, we will discuss our data set, comprising of the bulk Dabiq’s and Inspire’s articles, and the research methods we shall adopt for our analysis.

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Chapter 3, Methodology

§1. Introduction

As mentioned in the introduction, our study will consist of an issue specific comparative framing analysis of al-Qaeda’s and the Islamic State’s online propaganda magazines Inspire and Dabiq. Our methods will be qualitative in nature as they will involve in-depth analysis of articles, and, where appropriate, classifying these articles into either one of the variations of the four issue frames designed in the previous chapter. The research will in essence form a case study of the relatively new phenomenon of glossy online terrorists’ magazines that are aimed at Western, English speaking audiences. The object of this study is to determine whether or not our four issue frames are in fact being used in Dabiq and Inspire and if so, to what extent, and to see whether or not both magazines do indeed frame these issues differently. The relevance of this research lies in attempting to shed some light on several theorised issues of contention and differences in motivations and objectives between the two major Islamic terrorist organisations of our time, that on the surface may appear to rather interchangeable in terms of their ideology.

§2. Research question and hypothesis

Now that we have operationalized our four theorised topics of contention between al-Qaeda and IS into our four issue frames, we can rephrase the question we asked ourselves in the introduction to this thesis into the following research question:

Do al-Qaeda and the Islamic State use specific issue frames in their propaganda magazines Inspire and Dabiq when discussing Muslims that are perceived as enemies, international relations, recruitment, and sharia law, and how does their use of these frames compare?

To reiterate, these four topics for framing analysis were selected because they represent key issues for both IS and al-Qaeda, and because we theorised the expectation that both organisations may differ considerably in the way they frame these issues. As we have argued, 27 al-Qaeda and IS appear to arrive at very different ideological positions despite their shared and connected Salafi jihadi religious beliefs. This is mostly due to their different interpretations of the context to which to apply these shared beliefs. In the previous chapter we developed four hypotheses—one for each frame—that for clarity may also be summarized in the following, more generic hypothesis:

Because of a different contextual interpretation of Salafi jihadi ideology, al-Qaeda and IS will tend to use different frames when discussing Muslims that are perceived as enemies, international relations, recruitment, and sharia law.

§3. Data & data selection

The data used for our analysis will consist of most articles from all nine currently available issues of the Islamic State’s Dabiq magazine and most articles from all thirteen currently available issues of al-Qaeda’s Inspire magazine. Dabiq is an obvious choice as it is the Islamic State’s flagship publication, and main source of ideological output. Inspire was chosen from a multitude of online al-Qaeda magazines as it represents the movement’s most ideologically driven effort, and—just like Dabiq—is aimed at a Western audience. Both magazines represent a similar propaganda tool; an online glossy magazine with a strong focus on ideology, both written in English. The nine issues of Dabiq magazine span a period from June 2014 to June 2015. The thirteen issues of Inspire cover a period from July 2010 until December 2014. Unfortunately there is therefore only a rather small period of overlap in their publications, which means that any potential shifts in the use of certain frames by al-Qaeda in response to its new competitor in IS, can only potentially be observed in the final issue of Inspire (published December 2014) and would therefore be of limited analytical value.

Both magazines feature elaborate artwork and graphic designs, giving them the slick appearance of modern, glossy magazines (see figure 1 for an example). Analysis of the symbolism and meaning of the artwork, pictures and photos in both magazines would no doubt provide further valuable insights into the propaganda operations, ideology, technical proficiency and media savvy of either organisation, but unfortunately this is beyond the scope of this thesis. 28

As both Dabiq and Inspire are published as PDF files of varying quality, with some articles consisting of actual text that can be copied and used for queries, and others as image layers that are impractical for lexical searches, all articles included in the dataset have been converted to plain text to allow for consistent analyses. Furthermore, all articles of less than 150 words have been excluded from the dataset as these are deemed too short to be of any value for our framing analyses. Finally, some articles that did fit the 150 word criterion have been excluded as these where either meant solely as contact information, or featured purely technical instructions (mostly about weaponry) without any ideological content. What we end up with is a dataset consisting of 191 articles from Inspire magazine and 145 articles from Dabiq magazine. Article length varied considerably, but under current formatting the data consists of 413 pages of plain text for Dabiq magazine, and 478 pages of plain text for Inspire magazine, making the amount of data available from either organisation quite comparable.

Figure 1, top half: cover and table of contents Dabiq 1; bottom half: cover and table of contents Inspire 13

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§4. Data processing and analysis

All text is converted to a database file and analysed at the article level using the program MAXQDA 11.1.0, which allows for relatively straightforward coding using a drag and drop interface, in which codes appear as labels. Text is assigned the desired code by selecting the relevant text and dragging and dropping the selection into the appropriate code label. The four frames that were operationalized in the previous chapter each consisted of 2 sub-frames; one corresponding to the expected framing preference of al-Qaeda, one to the expected framing preference of IS. The sub-frame will thus represent the hypothesised difference in issue framing between al-Qaeda and IS. Both magazines are analysed for the occurrence of either sub-frame.

The unit of our analyses is the entire article, and any article containing one of the sub- frames will be coded as such (for detailed coding instructions, see appendix 1). Articles may feature multiple frames. The article is chosen as the unit of analyses—instead of for instance a paragraph—because of time constraints and because we are comparing the prevalence of frames between both magazines as a whole. This way we can relate the number of frames to the total number of articles analysed, and avoid overrepresentation of a frame that is used many times in one article. After coding is completed our hypotheses can be confirmed or rejected, and a comparison between both magazines proper can be made.

§5. Validity

King, Keohane and Verba (1994) tell us that validity refers to refers to the question if we are in fact measuring what we think we are measuring. For this research design that question becomes whether or not the occurrence of a proposed variety of the Apostasy frame, the International Relations frame, the Recruitment frame, or the Sharia frame, is in fact a good indicator of ideology or contextual interpretation of Salafi jihadi religious beliefs. One of course would be hard-pressed to name an Abrahamic religion that has does not have strong opinions about divine law, excommunication and apostasy, converting new members, and the religion’s relationship to other worldly institutions. The elementary nature of these topics to Salafi jihadi ideology therefore seems implied. Furthermore, as framing involves selecting aspects of reality and trying to make these more salient in “…such a way as to promote a particular problem definition, causal interpretation, moral evaluation, and/or treatment recommendation for the 30 item described” (Entman: 1993: 52), a properly operationalized frame would appear to be a good indicator of contextual interpretation by definition.

§6. Reliability & replicability

Reliability in social research “…means that applying the same procedure in the same way will always produce the same measure. When a reliable procedure is applied at different times and nothing has happened in the meantime to change the “true” state of the object we are measuring, the same result will be observed.” (King, Keohane & Verba 1994:25).

In this research design much will depend on applying the coding instructions to the dataset, and—this being a thesis—intercoder reliability, or the extent to which multiple independent coders would agree on the coding of the content, will unfortunately not be accounted for. To counter this weak point, care has been taken to be as thorough as possible in writing the codebook and providing unambiguous coding instructions. Furthermore, to assist in coding, a list of keywords is provided for each frame that can potentially indicate its use (see appendix 1). However, as we have opted for issue specific frames, that require in-depth analysis and interpretation, idiosyncrasies native to the work of the individual coder will always remain somewhat of an issue. Replicability, however, should not prove problematic. The frames designed and operationalized in this thesis could, in principle, be coded in any similar data-set using the coding instructions.

§7. Conclusion

After discussing our theoretical framework and operationalizing our four issue frames, we have in this chapter considered our methodological approach. Now that we have discussed our research question and hypotheses, our data and methods, we can proceed to the analysis of the data-set. In the following chapter we will discuss our research results. An overview of the results will be presented, before consecutively treating the occurrence of each frame in both Dabiq and Inspire.

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Chapter 4, Results

§1. Introduction

In this section the results of our research are discussed, and our hypotheses from chapter 2 are tested. The frequency tables 1 and 2 summarise the usage of each of the four frames in Dabiq and Inspire respectively. Immediately apparent is the frequency of the Apostasy Frame in Dabiq, and that of the Recruitment Frame in Inspire. As a magazine Dabiq focused heavily on the topic of apostasy by enemy Muslims, while the other three frames were featured much less prominently. Inspire, on the other hand, shows a strong focus on recruitment. The magazine spent even less time on other frames, especially on the topic of sharia law which seemed to be given virtually no attention in Inspire. The structure of the remainder of this chapter will be as follows: Each frame will be treated separately; the occurrence and extent to which a frame is used in either magazine is determined; the way in which a particular frame is used, its style and its attributes are examined; and, finally, we will look at its development over time.

Table 1, Framing in Dabiq Magazine

Apostasy Framing IR Framing Recruitment Sharia Framing Framing

Yes 60 (41.4%) 31 (21.4%) 29 (20%) 28 (19.3%)

No 85 (58.6%) 114 (78.6%) 116 (80%) 117 (80.7%)

Total no. of articles 145 145 145 145

Table 2, Framing in Inspire Magazine

Apostasy Framing IR Framing Recruitment Sharia Framing Framing

Yes 25 (13.1%) 26 (13.6%) 79 (41.3%) 9 (4.7%)

No 166 (86.9%) 167 (86.4%) 112 (58.7%) 182 (95.3%)

Total no. of articles 191 191 191 191

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§2. Apostasy framing

Table 3 shows the frequencies of the two variations of apostasy framing in both magazines. These results partially confirm our hypothesis that Dabiq would liberally make use of the Wholesale Apostasy Frame, whereas Inspire would be inclined to use the Cautious Apostasy Frame. Percentage wise, Dabiq used the Wholesale Apostasy Frame exactly 5 times as often as Inspire. Found in 39% of its articles, the Wholesale Apostasy Frame was by far the most widely used frame in Dabiq. Both magazines only used the Cautious Apostasy Frame in 5.2% of their articles. However, for al-Qaeda this represented 40% of their apostasy framing, while it accounted for a mere 5% in Dabiq.

Table 3, Apostasy framing

Dabiq Inspire

No. of articles 145 191

Wholesale Apostasy Framing 57 (39%) 15 (7.8%)

Cautious Apostasy Framing 3 (5.2%) 10 (5.2%)

Wholesale as percentage of 95% 60% Apostasy Framing

Cautious as percentage of Apostasy 5% 40% framing

§2.1 Wholesale apostasy framing in Dabiq

The Wholesale Apostasy Frame was by far the most important frame found in Dabiq magazine. In a whopping 57 of 145 articles analysed, enemy Muslims were discussed using this frame. Wholesale apostasy framing in Dabiq generally took the form of labelling enemies as ‘apostates’, or ‘murtaddin’, with no further evidence or explanation offered for how this religious crime was established.

The problem definition promoted in the Wholesale Apostasy Frame appeared to be that for Muslims, opposing the Islamic States constitutes the ultimate religious crime of apostatising. The underlying causal interpretation here is that, for any Muslim, it ought to be obvious to see 33 that IS represents the one true version of Islam to such a degree, that to not accept IS’s supremacy in its entirety, is akin to leaving the religion altogether. The moral recommendation implied in the frame is twofold; any true Muslim should conform to the Islamic State; and any Muslim that does not should be killed. The following quotations offer some examples representative of this type of framing:

“The Islamic State did not hesitate to wage war against the communist murtaddin of the PKK.” 9

“These jāhilī flags essentially represent the crusaders, their apostate agents, Arab nationalism, and the puppet tawāghīt loyal to the crusaders. 10

“The hearts of the Muslims were healed as they saw their brothers in West Africa terrorizing the Christians and the Nigerian army of murtaddin…” 11

“DĀBIQ: Tell us about yourself. What is your name? Where are you from? How old are you? MURTADD: My name is Mu’ādh Sāfī Yūsuf al-Kasāsibah. I’m Jordanian, from al-Karak. I was born in 1988. I’m 26 years old. DĀBIQ: What was your position in the murtadd airforce? When did you start upon this kuffarī path?” 12

In these examples it becomes that IS in the habit of simply declaring everyone who is not on their side an apostate. For a number of reasons this practise has far-reaching consequences for both IS as for the people who are being branded apostates. First, these declarations of takfir constitute non-reversible actions, as any false accusations of takfir imply that the accuser has himself apostatized. Therefore, once IS considers a group of people their enemy, they will remain so forever. Secondly, as far as the Islamic State is concerned, this crime carries a death sentence, the execution of which is to be taken as a religious obligation. Which means that the Islamic State is officially committed to at some point, if they are able to, kill everybody they have at some point labelled as an apostate. This prolific use of wholesale apostasy framing has huge implications for people who find themselves living in or near IS controlled territories. Either one conforms, or runs an unimaginably intimidating risk of having made a mortal enemy for life.

Wholesale apostasy framing is not evenly spread out across Dabiq’s issues, but has gradually been used more and more throughout the magazine’s publication (see figure 2). The language used remained unchanged, however, the scope of suitable targets has increased substantially. 34

Figure 2

In issue 7, aptly titled From to Apostasy, the frame is used in a record 16 articles.13 This issue also featured a series of articles covering what amounts to new guidelines for declaring takfir. Before (in issue 4) it is made clear that apostasy mostly applies to Muslims supporting the West: “Whoever aligns with the kuffar has disbelieved” and “Even if he supported them just by a single word … falls into apostasy – extreme apostasy”.14 In issue 7, however, the criteria become much looser. The authors explain in an article called The Extinction of the Grayzone—the title referring to the difficulty in distinguishing between hypocrisy and sin, and outright apostasy—that now “After the Khilafah and the subsequent crusade, the grayzone also encompasses “independent” and “neutral” Islamic parties that refuse to join the Khilafah … What the scholars mean is that sins – including bid’ah – will get a person into committing further sins. Each time he commits a sin, Allah will punish him with greater sins. Eventually, Allah could punish him with kuffar.”15 Here, the Islamic State starts threatening takfir not only on those who oppose them, but on those Muslims that fail to join them. Muslims are in essence told that, if they should keep it up, IS might just be forced to declare them apostates. The word bid’ah in this quote, referring to innovation, is of special significance as with its inclusion the Islamic State handily covers all other forms of governments (which are considered innovations on God’s law) as candidates for apostasy as well. It is not until issue 8 however that IS’s final position on takfir is developed. In the article Irja The Most Dangerous Bid’ah, we are now told that even the slightest infraction of almost any Islamic rule, is sufficient proof for apostasy. From now on IS will be “…considering the abandonment of prayer to be apostasy and … declaring those tribes who resisted zakāh [obligatory alms-giving and religious tax in Islam] to be apostates. The latter is the evidence proving the kuffar of parties who forcefully resist other clear-cut and famous shar’i rulings 35 such as the prohibition of khamr (alcohol), the prohibition of incest, and the prohibition of ribā (usury).” The article goes on to say: “So any resistant party that resists some of the obligatory prayers, fasting, [annual Islamic pilgrimage to Mecca], or resists abiding by the prohibition of spilling blood, looting wealth, alcohol, gambling, incest, or resists adherence to jihad against the kuffar or the enforcement of jizyah [tax imposed on non-Muslims] … or abiding by anything else of the obligations and prohibitions of the religion, those rulings which no one has an excuse for being ignorant of or abandoning and which the individual commits kuffar by denying.” 16 For all intents and purposes, this may cover any and all behaviour IS dislikes, and this latest shift in takfir policy could be taken as an indication that wholesale apostasy framing will become even more widely used by IS in the future.

§2.2 Cautious apostasy framing in Dabiq

Even though this frame played a very insignificant role in Dabiq, the interesting way in which cautious apostasy framing was used merits a short digression. The Cautious Apostasy Frame simply appeared to be there to implicitly justify IS’s practise of wholesale apostasy framing.

Readers were told that:

“Therefore, know my dear brother that the label and ruling of kuffar is a right that belongs to Allah … and which you are not allowed to apply to anyone except those who deserve it according to the Shariah. And know that takfir has both conditions and preventative factors, so we don’t declare takfir of someone unless the conditions are fulfilled and the preventative factors are eliminated … Therefore, one whose Islam is established with certainty is not expelled from Islam except with certainty. So beware of suspicion, and ensure that you’re well-informed regarding the issues that the practicing scholars have differed over.”17

Of course, this statement was preceded, and then followed, by copious amounts of wholesale apostasy framing. The problem thus defined by this frame appears to be that declaring takfir is indeed a very serious matter that one should not take lightly, and is forbidden to undertake unless all the necessary conditions are fulfilled, and that the Islamic State is doing just that, each and every time they declare yet another group to have left the religion. 36

§2.3 Wholesale apostasy framing in Inspire

The Wholesale Apostasy Frame was not widely used in Inspire at all. Appearing in only 7.8% of articles, apostatising enemy Muslims seems low on al-Qaeda’s agenda. Wholesale apostasy framing in Inspire took a similar form to the way IS used it. However, the problem definition it was used to promote was different. It appeared to be that for Muslims rulers, or their armed forces, or supporters in countries that have long standing conflicts with al-Qaeda, or for Muslim supporters of the West or Israel in general, continuing defiance of al-Qaeda constitutes the ultimate religious crime of apostasy.

The underlying causal interpretation here is that these groups have been warned of their un-Islamic behaviour so many times in the past, that their continued provocation now constitutes sufficient evidence for takfir. The moral recommendation again is twofold; these groups should stop supporting the West and Israel and back al-Qaeda’s agenda; and groups that insist on not doing this should be killed as apostates. The following quotations offer some examples representative of this type of framing:

“They have entered into apostasy from more than one door and Islam orders me and orders every Muslim to revolt against them and fight them. Fighting Jihad against the al- Saud government is a religious duty.”18

“Al-Qaeda declared war against the and Christians and their murtaddin agents”19

“With regard to those, indeed we have killed of them more than we killed of the kufâr of origin because the American’s were a lot cleverer than the apostates since they ransomed their blood for the blood of those who sold their religion in exchange of preserving the life of others (i.e., Americans); and to us the rule concerning them is that they are apostate agents and it is an obligation to get rid of them”20

Wholesale apostasy framing was used very sparingly throughout Inspire and because of this, it seems unfitting to speak of any trends, other than that it stopped appearing altogether in the final three issues (see figure 3). The way in which the frame was used was consistent throughout; the same select few groups of enemies were labelled as apostates. 37

Figure 3

§2.4 Cautious apostasy framing in Inspire

Even though cautious apostasy framing occurred even less frequently than wholesale apostasy framing in Inspire—again suggesting that apostasy is not a key issue for al-Qaeda—it did appear to represent al-Qaeda’s overall position on takfir better than did the wholesale framing.

In the majority of the ten articles in which it was used, it was the main topic of the entire article. Furthermore, the way in which it was used was much more elaborate than the way IS used it. Cautious apostasy framing also featured in the final two issues of Inspire (figure 3). For al-Qaeda the question of takfir takes the form of a religious argument much more so than for IS. The frame tended to promote notion that takfir can be practised either too easily or to cautiously, and that its loose implementation today is a major problem, so a carefully constructed middle ground has to be found. Here again, the frame suggested two moral recommendations: Do not go around declaring every sinner to be an apostate, but make sure you do practise takfir when apostasy is abundantly clear and religiously uncontroversial. The following quotes clarify this position:

“A specified individual is not judged with disbelief except if we knew the existence of the confirming conditions of that rule and also the absence of its preventers and this is known by the scholars … common people and those who have no access to knowledge … should refrain from rushing into making a disbeliever any one of whom their takfir is an evidential and jurisprudential one. This is instead the work of the people of knowledge. The layman who is not specialized in knowledge should say: “I do not know, ask the scholars,”21 38

“The Messenger of Allah warned against the khawarij who represented a manifestation of extremist belief and actions. There are two traits of the khawarij that stand out: Firstly, they used to accuse Muslims of based on acts that are considered to be major sins and not acts of disbelief. They considered the one who commits such sins to be destined to an eternal punishment in Hellfire. So adultery, fornication, drinking alcohol, and theft are all sins that commit a person to eternal punishment … The second trait: They kill Muslims and spare the lives of disbelievers” 22

“An apostate is determined by the action he had done publicly. For instance, if he were to become a Christian, or spy on the Muslims for the disbelievers, or join the ranks of the enemy to fight the Muslims and such, he would have committed major disbelief (kafir akbar) as is recognized by our classical scholars in consent. Islamic scholars have given a little over ten major acts that would lead one to apostasy … One has to be careful to not take someone outside the fold of Islam (i.e. takfir) on major sins … The khawarij had an extreme creed that included all sinners into the category of apostasy. Praise be to Allah, the mujahidin of today are nothing like this.”23

The references to khawarij above are significant for the position they take in Salafism. The khawarij first emerged in the late 7th century and represent a split in Islam that is even older than the Sunni-Shia split. The term refers to Muslims who rejected the leadership of ibn Abi Talib (Muhammad’s son-in-law and cousin), that began to exhibit fanatical tendencies, declaring almost everyone who committed sin an apostate. The sect is almost universally condemned by modern Muslims for their extremism. The murji'ah (“one who postpones judgement”) emerged in opposition of this group, stating that only God has the authority to judge a person’s faith, so Muslims should consider all other Muslims as part of the Islamic community regardless of sin. This group is thought of as much too lenient by modern-day fundamentalist Islamists and Inspire advocates an intermediate position on takfir.

§3. International Relations framing

Table 4 shows the frequencies of the two varieties of IR framing in both magazines. The results confirm our hypothesis that Dabiq prefers the Dismissive IR Frame, and that Inspire prefers to use the Traditional IR frame. Percentage wise, Dabiq made use of dismissive international relations framing more than 5 times as often as did Inspire, whereas the latter used traditional IR framing more than 13 times as often than Dabiq. Furthermore, both magazines showed a clear preference in the way they chose to frame international relations, with Dabiq opting for 39 the dismissive frame in 97% of cases and Inspire favouring the traditional frame in almost 70% of cases.

Table 4, International Relations framing

Dabiq Inspire No. of articles 145 191 Dismissive IR Framing 30 (20.7%) 8 (4.2%) Traditional IR Framing 1 (0.7%) 18 (9.4%) Dismissive as percentage of IR 97% 30.1% Framing Traditional as percentage of IR 3% 69.9% framing

§3.1 Dismissive IR framing in Dabiq

The Dismissive IR Frame was the second most used frame found in Dabiq. A distant second to the Wholesale Apostasy Frame, but nonetheless featured in a considerable 20.7% of articles. Dismissive international relations framing in Dabiq generally took the form of statements reflecting the notion of an unconditional state of war between the caliphate and the rest of the world, in which the caliphate is bound to expand and conquer. The traditional language of war between countries was usually forsaken, either by denying the legitimacy of other countries’ existence, or by simply referring to enemy states, or geographical areas, in ways other than their historically used designations.

The problem definition Dabiq promoted in the Dismissive International Relations frame seems to be that modern-day countries, institutions and international relations represent un- Islamic fictions that should be ignored and abolished in favour of a global caliphate. The underlying causal interpretation is that, since man-made laws can never replace, nor supplement God’s law, all lands that do not submit to the Islamic State constitute the House of War or Dar al-Harb, and that the best another country may hope for is a temporary truce until they finally submit. The moral recommendation implied in the frame is simple: Wage war until there exists a global caliphate. The following quotations illustrate this line of reasoning:

“We will conquer your Rome, break your crosses, and enslave your women, by the permission of Allah, the Exalted. This is His promise to us; He is glorified and He does not fail in His promise. If we do not reach that 40

time, then our children and grandchildren will reach it, and they will sell your sons as slaves at the slave market”24

“The mujahidin of the Khilafah delivered yet another blow to nationalism and the Sykes-Picot-inspired borders that define it.25

“These hādīth indicate that the Muslims will be at war with the Roman Christians. Rome … refers to the Christians of Europe and their colonies in Shām…”26

IS tends to refrain from calling countries or enemy states by their conventional names, instead preferring scriptural references, invoking the notion that these are not ‘real’ entities as God intended and that treating them as such should abandoned. For instance, the United States and European countries are constantly being referred to as “Rome”, and the countries and regions that comprise the Levant as “Shām”. Moreover, there appears to be no conditional aspect to the hostile nature of IS’s attitude towards international relations. No realistic way of appeasing the Islamic State is ever articulated in Dabiq. Usage of the dismissive IR frame in Dabiq did not appear to follow a clear trend over the course of publication (figure 4), making one to a few appearances in most issues, peaking at nine articles in issue 4.

Figure 4

§3.2 Traditional IR framing in Dabiq

Traditional IR framing was only used once in Dabiq, clearly indicating IS’s disdain for traditional international relations. Its sole occurrence was in an article claimed to have been written by abducted war correspondent John Cantlie, in which IS is being presented as possessing all the characteristics of a real country: 41

“These, surely, are all hallmarks of … a country. Ah, the C-word … Could the Islamic State, the Caliphate that was only announced in June, really be a country? “ISIS will have taken more towns, more territory, consolidated more gains and really become, unfortunately, the kind of country we don’t want to see over there,” declared retired Lieutenant Colonel Bill Cowan … As uncomfortable as it may be for many in the West, there’s little reason why the State shouldn’t be considered a country. Countries can be born in days, in hours during a coup, or in minutes at the signing of a paper, they have been for centuries. So there’s no reason this one shouldn’t have been born the way it was. And if it’s not the Islamic State’s country, then just whose is it?”27

§3.3 Dismissive IR framing in Inspire

Dismissive international relations framing was only used very infrequently in Inspire, and significantly less than traditional IR framing. Dismissive IR framing by al-Qaeda either focussed on attacking Israel’s statehood, and rejecting any possibilities for a solution other than its destruction. Or the focus lied on presenting the conflict between the West and al-Qaeda as part of a “grand conflict” between Muslims and the west that must eventually end in the unification of the whole Muslim world under a caliphate.

The problem definition promoted is twofold. The first is that Israel has invaded and occupied the Holy Land and there can be no other solution than its destruction. The second is that Muslims worldwide are engaged in a clash of civilisations with the West, and must unite under the guiding principles set forth by al-Qaeda. The moral recommendation suggested by this frame is to accept al-Qaeda’s moral leadership and unite, and to attack Israel and al-Qaeda’s Western enemies in whatever way possible.

“Israel is a crime and must be destroyed, and everyone whose hands are steeped in this crime must pay the price, and pay it dearly.”28

“9/11 was neither the beginning of the war between the Muslims and the West nor was it the end. It was merely an episode in a long, protracted war that started at the time of the Messenger and will end with al-Malĥama, the epic battle mentioned in the hadith.”29

“Our objective is not to remove these petty states only to replace them with other petty states, but we intend to unify the Muslim lands under sharia…”30

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This type of dismissive IR framing was only used in a single publication (issue 2), prior to appearing in three consecutive publications, which coincided with a gap in traditional IR framing (see figure 5). After this, in late 2011, use of the dismissive international relations framing stopped altogether and traditional IR framing became the norm for Inspire.

Figure 5

§3.4 Traditional IR framing in Inspire

Even though IR framing in general was not that widely used in Inspire (appearing in 13.6% of articles), the Traditional International Relations Frame was al-Qaeda’s preferred way of presenting their thoughts on international relations, constituting about 70% of IR framing. Traditional international relations framing for al-Qaeda focussed on legitimising the state of war between the organisation and its enemies, the conditionality of this current state of affairs, and on what kind of relations the organisation intends to pursue. The Traditional IR frame in Inspire uses the typical status quo language of the nation state, governments, elections, foreign policies, and so on.

The problem in Inspire is defined as follows: Given their enemies’ behaviour towards Muslims, al-Qaeda’s current strategies and tactics are legitimate and the only reasonable course of action, and as long as these enemies persist in engaging in criminal actions of this kind, so too must al-Qaeda’s attacks. Underlying this definition of the problem is the causal interpretation that, when confronted with aggression by a superior force, guerrilla-like warfare and attacks are acceptable and the only means available, and that because these aggressors are , targeting their civilians is allowed as they bear responsibility. The moral 43 recommendation of this frame is for Muslims to attack the enemy in whatever way they can, and for these hostile countries and their citizens to stop their aggression. Below are some examples of this kind of framing:

“…the American people should understand that they have an option to secure their 'personal safety and material well-being'. And this could only happen by changing their government's foreign policies which are aggressive towards other nations especially Muslim nations”31

“I address you the American citizen because the game is in your hands. You are the only one who can stop yourself and your economy from bleeding. Just take the right moves and things will be good for you: This war is not your war. It is the war of the 1% … I know you may wonder why you have to be punished for the sins of the 1%. The answer is simple. You are the people. And the claim is 'your government is of the people, by the people, for the people'. It is not fair that you take credit for any success and fail to be punished for any failure. In short, you are the rightful ruler of your country. You are the majority. All credit, both good and bad, is yours.”32

“…when we look at the state of the Americans and Europeans, we see that they are in a state of war with us because of their participation in elections that choose governments that wage war against Muslims. They are in a state of war with us because their governments kill our brothers in , Afghanistan, and Iraq.”33

The most interesting aspect of this frame is perhaps its continuing focus on the conditions for potential peaceful coexistence. Again and again Inspire’s readers are reminded that it does not have to be this way. All these other countries have to do is give in to all of al-Qaeda’s demands (which are carefully formulated as to sound quite reasonable), and all the violence will come to an end. This type of traditional IR framing was used throughout publication, aside from the gap mentioned in the previous paragraph, and became the only way al-Qaeda chose to frame its position on international relations after 2011 (see figure 5).

§4. Recruitment framing

Below, in table 5, the frequencies of the two varieties of the Recruitment Frame are shown for both magazines. The results clearly confirm our hypothesis that, when attempting recruitment, Dabiq will frame these efforts using religious recruitment framing, and Inspire will prefer to use the Resistance Recruitment Frame. In fact, this was the most widely used frame in Inspire magazine, accounting for 33% of its articles, while it was almost completely absent 44 from Dabiq. Religious recruitment framing on the other hand was, percentage wise, used more than twice as often in Dabiq than in Inspire, in which it was almost completely abandoned in favour of resistance recruitment framing in later issues.

Table 5, Recruitment framing

Dabiq Inspire

No. of articles 145 191 Religious Recruitment Framing 28 (19.3%) 16 (8.4%)

Resistance Recruitment Framing 1 (0.7%) 63 (33%)

Religious as percentage of 95% 20.3% Recruitment Framing Resistance as percentage of 5% 79.7% Recruitment framing

§4.1 Religious recruitment framing in Dabiq

The Religious Recruitment Frame was almost equally important in Dabiq as the Dismissive IR frame, appearing in a solid 19.3% of articles. In Dabiq, religious recruitment framing centred mostly on declaring bay’ah or allegiance, and performing hijrah or migration, to the Islamic State. It tended to operate on two levels, taking either the form of a threat, or that of a promise. Joining the organisation was presented as a religious obligation that could ensure salvation, and failure to do so as a way of incurring God’s wrath.

Dabiq promoted a view that the existence of a caliphate forces all Muslims, who are able, to make a choice between declaring allegiance and migrating towards the Islamic State, or not fulfilling their religious obligations and risking damnation. The underlying causal interpretation is that, if the caliphate and caliph are legitimate, both bay’ah and hijrah become mandatory for any Muslim (as they are required to settle in the place that enforces the sharia, and declare allegiance to the one who safeguards it). Therefore, to not do so if one is able, equates to have lived a life of hypocrisy and ignorance which will eliminate any chance of paradise after death. The moral recommendation displayed throughout this frame is simply to join IS, or if one is not able to do so, to fight its enemies wherever possible. The following quotations show this line of reasoning:

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“Either ones performs hijrah to … the Khilafah or, if he is unable to do so, he must attack the crusaders, their allies … and their apostate forces, wherever he might be with any means available to him, and he should not hesitate in doing so, nor consult any supposed “scholar” on this obligation. He should attack after declaring his bay’ah to the Khilafah, so as not to die a death of Jāhiliyyah [ignorance] …There is no excuse for any Muslim who is capable of performing hijrah to the Islamic State, or capable of carrying a weapon where he is, for Allah … has commanded him with hijrah and jihad, and has made fighting obligatory upon him.”34

“Allah has guaranteed the one who performs jihad for His cause, having left his home for no reason other than to perform jihad for His cause and to affirm the truth of His words, that He would enter him into [paradise] or return him back home with all the rewards he has attained or the ghanīmah [war booty] he has acquired.” Let the goal of your deed be that the word of Allah becomes the highest.”35

“So do not say to yourself, “I will never succeed in my hijrah.” Most of those who have tried, have successfully reached the Khilafah. Amongst them are those who travelled by land, sometimes on foot, from country to country, crossing border after border, and Allah brought them safely to the Khilafah. Do not say to yourself, “I might get arrested.” That fear is unsure and the obligation of hijrah is certain. It is not correct to nullify what is certain with what is unsure.”36

Religious recruitment framing was used in this way throughout Dabiq, appearing in at least one article for every issue published (figure 6).

Figure 6

§4.2 Resistance recruitment framing in Dabiq

Resistance recruitment framing played no role of significance in Dabiq, appearing only once in an interview with an IS fighter who stated: 46

“I call them to wake up and fight the enemies of Allah for Allah’s cause. By Allah the Great, you would wake up and fight them if you came here and saw what they do with their planes, how they terrify the women and children, and how they strive day and night to destroy this state, and by Allah’s permission, they will never be able to do so.”37

§4.3 Religious recruitment framing in Inspire

The Religious Recruitment Frame was used in 8.4% of Inspire’s articles, representing less than a quarter of the magazine’s recruitment attempts. Religious recruitment framing in Inspire was mostly used to urge Muslims to ally themselves with al-Qaeda and perform attacks that are liable to kill them, by promising these potential recruits God’s favour in the afterlife. Dedicating one’s life to jihad was presented as an obligation, but mostly as the surest path to paradise for any Muslim.

The defining characteristic of the issue for al-Qaeda was the position that what it takes to be a good Muslim, is to obey God, and to obey God is to perform jihad and join al-Qaeda; the only sure way of achieving salvation. The causal interpretation here is that—the religious obligation of jihad being obvious—in the current situation the world is in, performing jihad equates to joining the al-Qaeda’s cause and fighting its enemies. Here too, as the following quotes indicate, the moral recommendation is simply to join the cause.

“Who among you will be of those who will meet the Messenger of Allah "on the Day of Judgment only to have him smile at you, pleased with your action, and hand you a drink from al-Kauthar because you rushed to his defence? This is a golden opportunity to have the honor of performing an act in the service of Islam”38

“The central issue is that jihad is individually obligatory ( al-Ayn) on all Muslims from East to West until all of our lands are freed. The issue of jihad being fard al-Ayn is the fulcrum of the modern jihad. The world is witnessing the rise of jihadis because of the very fact that Muslims are becoming more aware of the central issue, and thus their obligation towards God.”39

The martyr who fights and dies in the path of Allah, undoubtedly has the greatest chance of meeting his Lord as a victor. So what will your excuse be for restraining yourself from Paradise?”40

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As we can see from figure 7, this kind of religious recruitment framing was used less and less throughout publication, and appeared to be on its way to being abandoned entirely, before resurfacing in issue 13.

Figure 7

§4.4 Resistance recruitment framing in Inspire

By far the most widely used frame in Inspire magazine was the Resistance Recruitment Frame, appearing in 33% of articles and accounting for nearly 80% of all its recruitment efforts. This method of framing recruitment tended to point out all the injustices being done to Muslims by the West and their puppets, and urged them to offer up resistance and fight. Allying oneself with al-Qaeda and using their tactics was presented as a no-brainer for any self-respecting Muslim in the face of such aggression, and as the only means of bringing it to an end.

The problem defined in this resistance recruitment frame appeared to be that the United States, the West, and their allies are waging war against the Muslim world, and that therefore every Muslim must choose between allowing this indignity to continue and armed resistance. The causality behind this line of reasoning is that these powerful adversaries, that are claimed to kill countless innocent Muslims, can only be dissuaded by what the organisation considers a symmetrical use of force, which of course means by engaging in al-Qaeda style attacks. Examples of this frame include the following quotations from Inspire:

48

“For how long will you people sleep and dream, whilst the thundering sounds of tomahawk and cruise missiles are above your heads, for how long will you sleep to the sounds of B-52 bombers and screams from your wives and children” 41

“It is upon the Muslim youth residing in the West to awake the American people from their long slumber. Serve them drinks in the same cup we drink from, the cup of wars and battles, explosions and assassinations, deaths and injuries.” 42

“…we are against evil, and America as a whole has turned into a nation of evil. What we see from America is the invasion of two Muslim countries, we see Abu Ghraib, Baghram and Guantanamo bay. We see Cruise missiles and cluster bombs, and we have just seen in Yemen the death of 23 children and 17 women. We cannot stand idly in the face of such aggression, and we will fight back and incite others to do the same … How can your conscience allow you to live in peaceful coexistence with a nation that is responsible for the tyranny and crimes committed against your own brothers and sisters?” 43

The Resistance Recruitment Frame was found in every single publication of Inspire (see figure 7), making it al-Qaeda’s most consistently employed framing method, as well as its most repeated frame, with 63 instances being found. Moreover, the record 14 and 13 times it was used in issue ten and thirteen indicates a growing focus on resistance recruitment framing. Stressing the justness of their cause as a means of gaining sympathy, support and fresh recruits appears to be of paramount importance to al-Qaeda. Overall, al-Qaeda seems to put a lot more effort into its recruitment efforts than the Islamic State does, actively trying to convince their reader through logical sounding arguments and by appealing to a sense of injustice. Outside of reflecting an ideological difference between both organisations about the nature of jihad, an additional explanation might be that is also just a lot harder to convince someone to attack inside of his home country than it is to get them to fight abroad. Research by Hegghammer (2013) tentatively suggests that most Western jihadist simply prefer foreign fighting outside of the West, over domestic fighting. If this is true it could help account for the relatively meagre recruitment effort of Dabiq (with only 29 recruitment frames being found), versus the 79 instances that were found in Inspire.

§5. Sharia framing

Frequency table 6 shows how often the two variations of the Sharia Frame were used in both magazines. Our hypothesis that Dabiq prefers everyday life sharia framing evidently held 49 up, and utopian sharia framing was not found in the magazine at all. But, even though Inspire did prefer utopian sharia framing over everyday life sharia framing—as per our expectation— it seems imprudent to take this as a clear confirmation of our hypothesis, with sharia framing playing such an insignificant role in the magazine as a whole.

Table 6, Sharia framing

Dabiq Inspire No. of articles 145 191 Everyday life sharia Framing 28 (19.3%) 1 (0.5%) Utopian sharia Framing - 8 (4.2%) Everyday life as percentage of sharia 100% 11.1% Framing

Utopian as percentage of sharia - 88.9% framing

§5.1 Everyday life sharia framing in Dabiq

Again vying for that distant second place, the Everyday Life Sharia Frame still appeared in a hefty 19.3% of Dabiq’s articles. It mostly took the form of statements that used sharia law to unapologetically justify acts that in most present-day societies would be considered criminal, or at the very least brutish.

The everyday life sharia frame defined the problem in the following way: Abandonment of sharia law has led to moral depravity and sin, and the Islamic State must resolve this state of affairs by rigorously implementing every aspect of a literal reading of sharia law, and punish every infraction accordingly. The underlying causal interpretation here is that IS, as God’s caliphate on earth, has the religious obligation to ruthlessly and blindly enforce sharia law, regardless of how unpopular this might make them. The moral recommendation implied in the frame is quite straightforward; adhere to our reading of sharia law, or be punished according to our reading of sharia law. Below are several examples representative of this frame.

“Also, their women could be enslaved … After capture, the Yazidi women and children were then divided according to the Shariah amongst the fighters of the Islamic State … This large-scale enslavement of mushrik families is probably the first since the abandonment of this Shariah law.”44 50

Wilāyat Ar-Raqah - Ramadān 20 The hadd of stoning is carried out on a woman for committing adultery.” 45

In Wilāyat al- Khayr, meanwhile, a man was recently flogged as a ta’zīr (disciplinary punishment) after he was found to be in possession of pornographic material.”46

“They became lawful for the one who ends up possessing them even without pronouncement of divorce by their harbī husbands ... I had a slave-girl with whom I used to practice withdrawal … the Islamic State, by the grace of its Lord alone, brought out the Islamic punishments and rulings of the Shariah from the darkness of books and papers, and we truly lived them after they were buried for centuries”47

In these examples, and throughout Dabiq, the Islamic State is for the most part discussing one of two situations. The first is implementation of the hadd, the 6 fixed punishments for crimes against the rights of God. These are: sexual crimes (death by stoning), making unproven accusations of sexual crimes (eighty lashes), drinking alcohol (eighty lashes, although IS now also views the consumption of alcohol as potential evidence for apostasy), highway robbery (death), and apostasy (death).48 These appear to be considered uncontroversial and are simply reported on in Dabiq. The other situation in which everyday life sharia framing is used appeared to be when discussing behaviour by IS that is deemed so controversial it even evoked criticism from other extremists. Two of the examples above deal with the implementation of slavery and the sanctioned rape of slave-girls. Here IS also refers its readers to sharia law, but takes a little more time to explain its position, sometimes referring to scholars of sharia. For instance, in the article The Revival of Slavery Before the Hour IS informs us that slavery is not only sanctioned by sharia law, but that its abolishment has led to an increase in adultery and fornication, as without it there was no divinely sanctioned alternative for marriage (i.e. raping a female slave), “so a man who cannot afford marriage to a free woman finds himself surrounded by temptation towards sin.”49 There were no particular trends in everyday life sharia framing found in Dabiq. The frame was found in several articles for each issue of the magazine, with the exception of issue 5. Issue 4 and 7 stood out for more widespread use (see figure 8). 51

Figure 8

§5.2 Everyday life sharia framing in Inspire

Everyday life sharia framing was practically absent from Inspire, where it was only used once to justify the killing of civilians in the 9/11 attacks:

“In any case, it’s not like we target daycare centers and children schools or gatherings known to hold only women and children! These places of target tend to be mixed with men and women and usually have some kind of political economic ramifications; in our eyes, going after women and children is not only forbidden in the shariah, but also a useless form of slaughter. Since the shariah permits the destruction of the enemy’s land in the time of war, the twin towers were targeted.”50

§5.3 Utopian sharia framing in Inspire

Even though the Utopian Sharia Frame was in essence the only way in which sharia law was framed at all in Inspire, its meagre 8 instances make it the least used preferred sub frame of the entire magazine. The problem definition, causal interpretation and moral recommendation of the frame were very clear-cut. Without sharia there can be no just society in the eyes of God, so the final goal for Muslims must be to implement sharia everywhere, which will then lead to a utopian society. Note the following quotes:

“After salaam the believers came out of the masajid fresh; full of energy and enthusiasm. Bliss and happiness, glee and prosperity, peace and tranquillity, these are the blessings of Sharia!” 51 52

As for its long-term goal, is to reestablish the Islamic Caliphate through Jihad in the cause of Allah and to implement the Sharia of Allah in the whole land of Allah, Biidhnillah.” 52

One cannot help but feel as though sharia law, both as a topic and an objective, is treated as an afterthought by al-Qaeda. With only about 4% of 191 articles referring to it, and never being featured in more than 2 articles in a single issue over the entire course of publication (figure 9), God’s law appears to sit quite low on al-Qaeda’s agenda.

Figure 9

§6. Conclusion

After reporting the results of our analysis a few observations can be made. The first and most striking of which is that both magazines showed very different priorities in what they considered topics best suited for publication. As a magazine Inspire focusses heavily on recruitment with over 40% of its articles using recruitment framing, and with the Resistance Recruitment Frame featured as the magazine’s dominant frame. Dabiq on the other hand, appears very preoccupied with its Muslim enemies, using apostasy framing in more than 40% of its articles, and featuring the Wholesale Apostasy Frame as the dominant frame of the magazine. The attention given to the remaining frames was very evenly divided in Dabiq, where these still accounted for an average of 20% of articles each. Inspire gave considerably less attention to its remaining frames; for both apostasy and IR framing this amounted to about 13% of articles. The outlier here was sharia law, which did not seem to be a fashionable topic for Inspire at all, with sharia framing appearing in only a little over 4% of its articles. Secondly, the use of sub frames in both magazines matched our hypotheses very well overall. In line with our expectations, both Inspire and Dabiq showed a clear preference for one sub frame over the other, indicating that the 53

Islamic State’s and al-Qaeda’s different interpretations of Salafi jihadi ideology do indeed lead them to frame these topics very differently. Finally, it is notable that even when using the same sub frame, both magazines intended to promote very different problem definitions and recommendations. In our next and final chapter, reserved for discussion, we will return to our research question and attempt to consider the results of our analysis and comparison in a broader perspective.

54

Chapter 5, Discussion

In this final chapter we will return to the research question we set out to answer in this thesis, reflect on our generic hypothesis, and broadly discuss our results. The question our analysis was designed to answer was:

Do al-Qaeda and the Islamic State use specific issue frames in their propaganda magazines Inspire and Dabiq when discussing Muslims that are perceived as enemies, international relations, recruitment, and sharia law, and how does their use of these frames compare?

Our ideas and expectations about how this question might be answered were reflected by our guiding hypothesis that:

Because of a different contextual interpretation of Salafi jihadi ideology, al-Qaeda and IS will tend to use different frames when discussing Muslims that are perceived as enemies, international relations, recruitment, and sharia law.

In the previous chapter the research results indeed showed that both al-Qaeda and the Islamic State use quite specific, and quite different, frames when writing about these topics in Inpire and Dabiq. The magazines were particularly divergent on the Apostasy Frame and the Recruitment Frame. Al-Qaeda’s continual use of the Resistance Recruitment Frame, and IS’s constant use of the Wholesale Apostasy Frame fitted our hypotheses especially well. Furthermore, even though the topic of international relations was deemed less important than either magazine’s dominant frame, both organisations preferred the sub frame predicted by our hypotheses. The exception was sharia law, where the only sub frame IS used was in fact the hypothesised variety, but which was hardly a topic of note for al-Qaeda at all. All in all, the way in which framing was used across Inspire and Dabiq conformed to the expectations we had when operationalizing the frames in chapter 2, and closely matched the ideological differences we theorised and discussed in chapter one. We can therefore confirm our guiding hypothesis.

Looking back on our comparison between al-Qaeda and the Islamic State we can draw several conclusions. The most striking observation is just how different these two organisations really are. It takes a lot to make the fanatics of al-Qaeda appear like civilised—almost reasonable—people, yet this is precisely what the Islamic State has managed to achieve in Dabiq. On all four issues analysed, the treatment of enemy Muslims; international relations; 55 recruitment; and sharia law, IS’s framing exposed such boundless extremism as to make al- Qaeda’s positions, demands and threats seem level-headed and equitable in comparison. Many Muslims around the world, as well as many non-Muslims, take offense to the way the West and the United States in particular have at times—mostly for geopolitical or economic reasons— unjustly interfered in the internal affairs of Islamic countries. A moderately critical position like this is of course a far cry from arriving at al-Qaeda’s violent ideology and farcical assessment of the way things are. However, when comparing them to the Islamic State, one almost becomes tempted to view al-Qaeda within the framework of the disenfranchised Muslim who is fighting injustice. The injustice al-Qaeda perceives may be imaginary, and their hysterical reactions profoundly unethical and violent, but they are, at the very least, a reaction to something. As evidenced by their strong preference for the Resistance Recruitment Frame, al-Qaeda can in this sense indeed best be seen as a violent political movement. To be sure, a political movement inspired by extremist religious views, but these views do not necessarily represent the decisive factor in what drives the organisation’s decision making. The Islamic State’s ideology, on the other hand, indicates it can indeed best be thought of as an extremist religious sect. One that happens to own a country and a military; a distinction for which it should be considered all the more dangerous. In their use of all four frames they exhibited the impossibly harsh, uncompromising attitudes and zealotry of the religious maniac. IS may possess most of the prerequisites of an actual state, but its internal motivations, as far as we can tell from the frames it uses, are purely religious. And much like many religious factions, and as evidenced by its dismissive attitude towards international relations, and its use of wholesale apostasy and everyday life sharia framing—thoroughly unpopular positions among most Muslims—the Islamic State shows very little interest at all in how it is perceived by the outside world.

Our analysis done on Dabiq and Inspire may also provide some further insight into how both IS and al-Qaeda can, and cannot, be expected to behave. Firstly, the value of these type of magazines for understanding these organisations should not be underestimated. They represent primary sources that are meant to bring their message and ideology across. Anything al-Qaeda or IS writes in these magazines should be thoroughly analysed and scrutinised, as it can provide invaluable insights into the organisations internal workings and motivations. To uncover trends in these magazines is to uncover trends in their respective ideologies. The framing tendencies we observed suggest two properties on which both organisations appeared to land on opposite sides of the spectrum, namely rationality and predictability. Judging by their framing on the four issues analysed, al-Qaeda appears to behave as a—more or less—rational agent, and may 56 be expected to act as such. In their apostasy framing al-Qaeda was cautious and somewhat nuanced, and their recruitment and international relations framing appeared to be predicated on the (perceived) behaviour of others. This would suggest that al-Qaeda is at least susceptible to external stimuli. Judging by what Blanchard calls its “pragmatic messianism”, al-Qaeda has, in placing varying levels of emphasis on specific objectives and tactics over the years, indeed shown a willingness to adapt their strategic and tactical content to changing circumstances (Blanchard 2007: 16). Therefore, besides pursuing its dismantlement or destruction, other policies and strategies could be potentially prove effective as well. One could for instance imagine that policies aimed at effectively combatting feelings of marginalisation among certain Western Muslims youths, or at improving the perception of the West abroad (or indeed changing its behaviour), could prove detrimental to any perceived legitimacy of al-Qaeda’s grievances. The Islamic State on the other hand, judging by their framing tendencies, did not appear to act as a rational agent at all. It shows a constant longing for the good old days of Muhammad, desperately trying to relive a romanticised and glorified Islamic past. Clinging to grandiose notions of the coming apocalypse, and a future in which their utopian Islamic caliphate dominates the globe by way of unrealistic and unfeasible campaigns against the outside world, it chooses to operate solely inside the vacuum of its own deterministic and millenarian Islamic creed. Therefore, to the extent the organisation’s ideology is reflected in its policymaking, one should not expect IS to react to external policies in a rational way at all. This rigid and single-minded ideology may have an upside however. If its ideology indeed determines its policy positions, it could serve to make the organisation’s behaviour rather predictable. All one has really has to do is carefully consider how their religious doctrine (which they willingly share in Dabiq) tells them to behave in a given situation, and the answer will likely not be very far from the truth. In this sense al-Qaeda’s behaviour, driven by a variety of complicated motivations, may be much more difficult to predict.

If the evaluation of the Islamic State as an irrational, religious sect holds up, then how should its extraordinary powers of attraction be understood? Global jihadi support for the Islamic State is now reported as being higher than support for al-Qaeda.53 Why does this organisation have such an irresistible appeal to their intended recruits if it is being driven by irrational religious motivations that seem—at the risk of glossing over their impact—really rather silly? In chapter four we already mentioned the argument by Hegghammer (2013) that Western recruits may prefer foreign fighting over domestic jihad in general. This would put the Islamic State at a competitive advantage over al-Qaeda to begin with, as al-Qaeda obligates a 57 type of defensive jihad that is meant to strike at the homes of their enemies, and IS obligates hijrah to its territories. Secondly, the appeal of a movement that in many ways behaves irrationally may well be aided by the kind of audience it is trying to attract. Many Western Muslim youths who sympathise with radical Islam feel marginalised and excluded in their home countries. Aside from their socioeconomic status in these societies, these groups may feel unwelcome or discriminated against. If such feelings play a significant role in how they self- identify, it could explain the appeal of an irrational actor like the Islamic State. Research by Twenge (2002) shows that harbouring the idea of social exclusion leads to irrational, self- defeating behaviour. The study performed several experiments that showed that inducing feelings of social exclusion leads to significant changes in behaviour, causing people to make high-risk choices that are likely to produce bad outcomes (Twenge 2002: 613). It is not difficult to see how an organisation that behaves precisely in this fashion may be very appealing to a target audience in this social exclusion frame of mind. Furthermore, the fact that the Islamic State’s irrationally is grounded in its religious beliefs, and that the organisation appears far more religious than al-Qaeda in general, may exacerbate IS’s appeal to a socially marginalized audience. Several studies have argued that religious involvement is more strongly related to life satisfaction and feelings of well-being for socially marginalized groups than for other groups (Pargament 2002: 173). It would therefore appear that both IS’s irrationality and its greater religiosity may not be a disadvantage at all, and may in fact be working in the organisation’s favour when it comes to competing for jihadi support in the West.

Operating since 1988, al-Qaeda’s longevity has been firmly established. The Islamic State’s prospects however are still up in the air, and we would do well to consider them. In a recent article in the Dutch newspaper NRC Paul Aarts argues that IS might in fact be here to stay. Aside from the apparent message resonance of their ideology, IS is well funded, its well- equipped military benefits from the expertise and experience of many former Ba’ath party members, and the organisation’s military success breeds further success by reputation and in aiding its recruitment efforts. Add to this the lack of a coherent and clear agenda from the West, the unlikelihood of Western boots on the ground, and a convoluted regional opposition with diverging interests and agendas, and we may—as Aarts puts it—better start preparing for a formal recognition of the Islamic State at some point in the future. Unless these unfortunate circumstances change, IS may indeed succeed in persevering. In the meantime, in lieu of any comprehensive large-scale military intervention, Aarts and others argue that a policy of containment might be a viable strategy. In this containment scenario “…other states will need 58 to work together to teach it the facts of life in the international system. And because the Islamic State is not in fact that powerful, preventing it from expanding or increasing its power and imposing costs for its abhorrent behavior should not be all that hard” (Walt 2015). This line of reasoning does presuppose that IS can be taught anything, or has any interest whatsoever in becoming part of the international system. If the same attitude found in this paper is pervasive throughout IS’s ideology, it might be a big ask to expect the organisation to learn through this kind of conditioning. Of course, this paper has only focused on ideology, and ideology does not necessarily translate into policy (although it certainly seems like a good indicator). It could for instance very well be that the ideologues of IS do not accurately represent the attitudes of its members and therefore its future behaviour or course of action (a question beyond the scope of this paper). However, in as far as IS’s ideology does dictate its behaviour, the organisation should not be expected to be reasoned with in this way. When thinking about combatting an organisation like IS in the long term we should, aside from looking at military action, also consider the breeding grounds for militant religious extremism. This phenomenon quickly leads one to that almost dichotomous explanatory divide where the one camp sees Islamic literalism itself as the cause, and the other points out unjust Western interference in the Middle East or prejudice against Muslims. We would argue that both motivations are likely to play a part in filling IS’s ranks, and distinguishing between these constituents will be crucial in coming up with strategies to counter it. For many misguided Muslims (like the ones who had to buy a copy of “Islam for Dummies" before traveling to Syria) 54 motivations born out of anger and frustration are likely to have played a part in joining, and these motivations should perhaps best be targeted by the same additional strategies we suggested for al-Qaeda. However, we should not discount the other explanation either: That there are also men who “...actually believe what they say they believe. They believe in the literal truth of the Koran. Why did nineteen well- educated, middle-class men trade their lives in this world for the privilege of killing thousands of our neighbors? Because they believed that they would go straight to paradise for doing so. It is rare to find the behavior of human beings so fully and satisfactorily explained” (Harris 2005). For this group no amount of reasoning or containment could ever suffice, and policy makers would probably be wise to simply pursue their destruction. It is alarming and indeed frightening how much better IS’s ideology seems to fit the latter explanation than al-Qaeda’s ideology does, and one can only hope it does not accurately represent the outlook of the majority of its members and foot soldiers. 59

This research has attempted to add to the exiting body of literature on framing in Islamic terrorist movements by adopting and expanding on the issue specific approach. The issue specific framing approach may help in testing ideological hypotheses about these kind of movements, by designing frames around their perceived policy preferences and analysing their media output for their occurrence. This approach to issue specific framing research may prove especially well-suited for analysing jihadi propaganda. To members of a Western audience that may not have a background in Islamic doctrine or scripture, it is not always clear what is— precisely—being meant when confronted with the religiously saturated discourse of a typical jihadist. To your average layman, the sheer bombardment of religious and scriptural references may appear muddled and, instead of signifying and conveying a very precise meaning or message, may start to sound like nothing more than a kind of ritual incantation. By conceptualising issue specific frames, and outlining and defining the linguistic and stylistic idiosyncrasies that form them, we can systematically look for these frames in jihadist literature and confirm or dismiss their accompanying ideological and policy preferences. Issue specific frames in Islamic terrorist movements are likely to feature an abundance of religious, political and sociological elements—additional to the select few this paper considered—and future research of this kind could benefit from a more multidisciplinary approach in their design. Finally, this research has shown a clear difference in issue framing between the two most well- known jihadi organisations of our time. It seems plausible to assume that similar analyses on other Islamic terrorists groups—Boko or the al-Nusra Front come to mind—may yield comparable results and uncover and quantify a plethora of ideological variations between groups who, on the face of it, share many characteristics.

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63

Appendix 1, Codebook

Coding instructions:

• All frames are coded using the program MAXQDA 11. • The program allows for intuitive coding using a drag and drop interface. The codes will appear as labels that correspond to a specific sub-frame. An article is assigned the desired code by selecting the comprising text (of the entire article) and dragging and dropping the selection into the appropriate code label. Each paragraph in the data-set represents 1 article. The entire article must be coded. • Each article is read with the specific frames in mind. If the article appears to fit one of the frames, the coder analyses the article more thoroughly and assigns the appropriate code label. Each article may feature multiple frames. • Additionally, to help look for frames in the dataset, for each frame a list of keywords that can potentially signify its use is provided. Note: the lists of keywords are not exhaustive, nor does occurrence of a keyword automatically mean the article qualifies for a specific frame. If a keyword is found, a more detailed reading of the article is required.

64

Coding instructions Apostasy frame:

(1) Wholesale apostasy framing The variable is assigned to the whole article. If the article features accusations, statements, or declarations of Takfir regarding Muslim opposition, enemies, or competitors, without meticulous religious scrutiny and argumentation, or argues in favour of applying Takfir in this way, the variable is assigned. (2) Cautious apostasy framing The variable is assigned to the whole article. If the article features accusations, statements, or declarations of Takfir that are carefully constructed through religious reasoning and argumentation to Muslim opposition, enemies, or competitors, or argues in favour of only applying Takfir in this way, the variable is assigned. The variable is also assigned if, despite statements, accusations, or declarations of actions committed against the organizations principles, the article refrains from declaring Takfir, and labels the offenders as deviants or sinners instead.

Keywords:

Takfir: In Islamic law, takfir or takfeer refers to the practice of excommunication, one Muslim declaring a non-Muslim or an apostate, an unbeliever or kafir.

Mukaffir: The act which precipitates takfir.

Murtadd (plural murtaddin): Apostate

Kafir (plural kuffar): In an Islamic doctrine, usually translated as "unbeliever," "disbeliever," or "infidel." The term refers to a person who rejects or disbelieves in God or who hides, denies, or pays no attention to the beliefs held by Islamic religion. The practise of declaring another Muslim as a kafir is takfir. Note: to qualify for use in the takfir frame, kafir may only be applied to other Muslims, not non-Muslims.

Kufr: disbelief (replaced with kafir in document) 65

Munafiq (plural munafiqun): In Islam, a is a hypocrite who outwardly practices Islam while inwardly concealing his disbelief (kufr), perhaps even unknowingly. The hypocrisy itself is called nifaq.

Nifaq: Hypocrisy of munafiq

Fasiq: term referring to someone who violates Islamic law. As a is considered unreliable, his testimony is not accepted in Islamic courts. The terms fasiq and fisq are sometime rendered as "impious", "venial sinner", or "depraved".

Fisq: See Fasiq

Taghut (plural tawaghit): The Arabic word or taaghoot means to "cross the limits, overstep boundaries," or "to rebel.” In Islamic theology, the word refers to idolatry or to worship anything except Allah. Taghut also denotes one who exceed their limits. The first stage of error is fisq (i.e. disobeying God without denying that one should obey Him), the second is kufr, (i.e. rejection of the very idea that one should obey God). The last stage would be not only to rebel against God but also impose their rebellion against the will of God upon others. Those who reach this stage are taghut. Note: to qualify for use in the takfir frame, only the second and last stage are permitted.

Shirk: The sin of practicing idolatry or , i.e. the deification or worship of anyone or anything other than the singular God i.e. Allah. Literally, it means the establishment of "partners" placed beside God.

Apostasy

Apostate(s)

Sinner(s)

Deviant(s)

66

Coding instructions International relations frame:

(1) Dismissive international relations The variable is assigned to the whole article. If the framing article features or implies refusals to recognize borders, traditional territoriality or territorial sovereignty, or the legitimacy or existence of countries altogether, or if the article features unconditional dismissals of peaceful coexistence with the international community as a whole, the variable is assigned. (2) Traditional international relations The variable is assigned to the whole article. If the framing article (implicitly or explicitly) recognizes the legitimacy of other countries, borders, traditional territoriality or territorial sovereignty, or offers the prospect of conditional peaceful coexistence with the international community as a whole, the variable is assigned.

Traditional territoriality: The idea that control of territory is the essence of a state. This is the basis of the central notion of ‘territorial sovereignty’, establishing the exclusive competence to take legal and factual measures within that territory and prohibiting foreign governments from exercising authority in the same area without consent.

Keywords:

Khilafah Caliphate

Bay’ah: Pledging of allegiance to the Islamic state before anything else.

Border(s) Legitimacy Country

Territory or territories Coexistence Countries

Caliphate Sovereignty United Nations

Peace Sovereign America

War Government(s) NATO

Legitimate State(s) Europe 67

EU Saudi Arabia Lebanon

European Union Arabian Peninsula Oman

US Yemen

United States Israel Emirates

UN Jordan Ruler(s)

Iraq Turkey International community

Syria Palestine Rome

Iran Kuwait Shām

68

Coding instructions Recruitment frame:

(1) Religious Recruitment The variable is assigned to the whole article. If the framing article features statements aimed at facilitating recruitment, appealing to a sense of religious duty, millenarianism, or celestial destiny, the variable is assigned. (2) Resistance Recruitment The variable is assigned to the whole article. If the framing article features statements aimed at facilitating recruitment, appealing to a sense of resistance to perceived injustices to the Muslim world, the variable is assigned.

Millenarianism: The belief by a religious, social, or political group or movement in a coming major transformation of society, after which all things will be changed.

Celestial destiny: The development of events outside humanity’s control, regarded as predetermined by God.

Keywords:

Bay’ah: Pledging of allegiance to the Islamic state before anything else.

Hijrah: It is every Muslim’s duty to perform hijrah and relocate to the caliphate. If he is unable, the next best thing is bay’ah.

Muhajirin Emigrants

Mujahidin One engaged in Jihad

Khalifah Caliph

Martyr(s) Fight Liberate

Duty Fighter Injustice

Destiny Join Allegiance

Cause Contact Ally

Resistance Relocate Jihad

Resist Freedom 69

Coding instructions Sharia frame:

(1) Everyday life Sharia framing The variable is assigned to the whole article. If the article features sharia law or its implementations, focusing on specific instances of sharia rulings, or its violations and their associated punishments, the variable is assigned. (2) Utopian Sharia framing The variable is assigned to the whole article. If the article features the promise of sharia as a goal to be attained, or as a means of achieving salvation, morality, or divinely sanctioned social order, the variable is assigned.

Keywords:

Murtadd (plural murtaddin): Apostate

Kafir (plural kuffar): In an Islamic doctrine, usually translated as "unbeliever," "disbeliever," or "infidel." The term refers to a person who rejects or disbelieves in God or who hides, denies, or pays no attention to the beliefs held by Islamic religion. The practise of declaring another Muslim as a kafir is takfir.

Munafiq (plural munafiqun): In Islam, a munafiq is a hypocrite who outwardly practices Islam while inwardly concealing his disbelief (kufr), perhaps even unknowingly. The hypocrisy itself is called nifaq.

Nifaq: Hypocrisy of munafiq

Fasiq: Arabic term referring to someone who violates Islamic law. As a fasiq is considered unreliable, his testimony is not accepted in Islamic courts. The terms fasiq and fisq are sometime rendered as "impious", "venial sinner", or "depraved".

Fisq: See Fasiq

Taghut (plural tawaghit): The Arabic word taghut or taaghoot means to "cross the limits, overstep boundaries," or "to rebel.” In Islamic theology, the word refers to idolatry or to worship anything except Allah. Taghut also denotes one who exceed their limits. The first stage of error is fisq (i.e. disobeying God without denying that 70

one should obey Him), the second is kufr, (i.e. rejection of the very idea that one should obey God). The last stage would be not only to rebel against God but also impose their rebellion against the will of God upon others. Those who reach this stage are taghut.

Shirk: The sin of practicing idolatry or polytheism, i.e. the deification or worship of anyone or anything other than the singular God i.e. Allah. Literally, it means the establishment of "partners" placed beside God.

Sharia Sanction Lashing/lashed

Court(s) Slave(s) Lashes Judge Slavery Crusader(s) Judgment(s) Enslave (enslaved) Kill/killed Ruling(s) Sanctioned

Punishment Deviant(s) Beheading(s)

Salvation Implement Beheaded Morality Implementation Executed Law(s) Stoning Execution Violation Stoned

Sinner(s) Crucified Amputate

Sin Crucifixion

71

Notes

1 Author unknown (2014), The Fight against the PKK, Dabiq Issue 2 The Flood 2: 12-13. 2 http://www.zerocensorship.com/bbs/uncensored/86622-isis-marched-21-coptic-christians-to-their- death#axzz3h6vAavxA; http://www.dailymail.co.uk/news/article-2986162/Motorbike-thief-hand-hacked-ISIS-latest-display-warped- justice.html; http://www.independent.co.uk/news/world/middle-east/isis-crucifies-children-for-not-fasting-during- -in-syria-10338215.html; http://www.independent.co.uk/news/world/middle-east/yazidi-sex-slaves-reveal-isis-militants-picked-who-to- rape-in-twisted-lottery-in-distressing-accounts-10178272.html; http://www.jihadwatch.org/2014/10/video-islamic-state-stones-woman-to-death-for-adultery; http://shoebat.com/2015/02/03/watch-horrific-video-isis-burning-pow-jordanian-pilot/ 3 https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Application_of_sharia_law_by_country 4 Author unknown (2014), Da’wah and Hisbah in the Islamic State, Dabiq Issue 3 a Call to Hijrah 3: 16-17. 5 Author unknown (2015), Clamping down on sexual deviance, Dabiq Issue 7 From Hypocrisy to Apostasy 7: 42- 43

6 Author unknown (2010), Inteview with Shaykh Abu Basir, Inspire: May our Souls be sacrificed for You! 1: 13- 17. 7 http://www.haaretz.com/news/middle-east/1.633297 8 Author unknown (2014), The Revival of Slavery Before the Hour, Dabiq Issue 4 The Failed Crusade 4: 14-17. 9 Author unknown (2014), The Fight against the PKK, Dabiq Issue 2 The Flood 2: 12-13 10 Author unknown (2015), From the pages of History, Dabiq Issue 9 They plot and Allah plots 9: 20-23. 11 Author unknown (2015), The Bay’ah from West Africa, Dabiq Issue 8 Shari’ah alone will rule Africa 8: 14-16. 12 Author unknown (2014), The Capture of a Crusader Pilot, Dabiq Issue 6 Al-Qa’idah of Waziristan 6: 34-36 13 Author unknown (2015), From Hypocrisy to Apostasy, Dabiq Issue 7 From Hypocrisy to Apostasy 7: 14-17. 14 Author unknown (2014), The fading grayzone, Dabiq Issue 4 The Failed Crusade 4: 43-44. 15 Author unknown (2015), The Extinction of the Grayzone, Dabiq Issue 7 From Hypocrisy to Apostasy 7: 54-58. 16 Author unknown (2015), Irja The Most Dangerous Bid’ah, Dabiq Issue 8 Shari’ah alone will rule Africa 8: 39- 57. 17 Author unknown (2014), Advice for the soldiers of the Islamic State, Dabiq Issue 6 Al-Qa’idah of Waziristan 6: 6-16. 18 Author unkown (2010), Interview with Abu Sufyan, Inspire: Photos from the operations of Abyan 2: 42- 44.

19 Abu Mus’ab al-Awlaki (2011), Why did I choose al-Qaeda?, Inspire: Sadness, Contentment & Aspiration 6: 32- 34. 20 Author unknown (2011), An interview with Sheikh Aabu Huraira, Inspire: The Tsunami of Change 5: 26-28. 21 Add al-Rahman Atiyatullah (2011), A Question on takfir Inspire: Sadness, Contentment & Aspiration 6: 58. 22 Author unkown (2010), The New Mardin Declaration, Inspire: Photos from the operations of Abyan 2: 33-41. 23 Samir khan (2010), The Central Issue, Inspire: The Ruling on Dispossessing the Disbelievers Wealth in Dar Al- Harb 4: 12-16. 24 Author unknown (2014), Sheik ‘Adnani’s words on the Crusade, Dabiq Issue 4 The Failed Crusade 4: 37-40. 25 Author unknown (2014), Islamic State Reports: The birth of two new Wilayat, Dabiq Issue 4 The Failed Crusade 4: 18-20. 26 Author unknown (2014), The Prophesies Regarding The Roman Crusaders, Dabiq Issue 4 The Failed Crusade 4: 33-5. 27 Author unknown (2015), Paradigm Shift, Dabiq Issue 8 Shari’ah alone will rule Africa 8: 64-67. 28 Author unkown (2014), Letter to the American People, Inspire Neurotmesis 13: 12-26

29 Yahya Ibrahim (2011), Letter from the editor, Inspire: The Greatest Special Operation of all Time 7: 1. 72

30 Author unkown (2010), Interview with Sheikh Abu Sufyan, Inspire: Photos from the operations of Abyan 2: 42- 44.

31 Abu Abdillah Almoravid (2013), Who & why?, Inspire: Who & why? 11: 28-32. 32 Author unkown (2014), The battle of marathon, Inspire Neurotmesis 13: 50-57. 33 Author unknown (2010), Q&A with Sheikh Adil al-Abbab, Inspire: The Ruling on Dispossessing the Disbelievers Wealth in Dar Al-Harb 4: 20-24. 34 Author unknown (2015), And Allah is the best of plotters, Dabiq Issue 9 They plot and Allah plots 9: 50-59. 35 Author unknown (2015), Advice for the leaders of the Islamic State, Dabiq Issue 7 From Hypocrisy to Apostasy 7: 9-16. 36 Author unknown (2014), Advice for Those Embarking upon Hijrah, Dabiq Issue 3 a Call to Hijrah 3: 33-34. 37 Author unknown (2015), Interview with Abu Muqatil, Dabiq Issue 8 Shari’ah alone will rule Africa 8: 59-62. 38 Author unknown (2010), May our souls be sacrified for you!, Inspire: May our Souls be sacrificed for You! 1: 26-33. 39 Gadahn (2010), Know that jihad is your duty Inspire: The Ruling on Dispossessing the Disbelievers Wealth in Dar Al-Harb 4: 17. 40 Author unknown (2010), O martyr, you have illuminated!, Inspire: May our Souls be sacrificed for You! 1: 30- 31 41 Author unknown (2013), America will never profit from the assasination of Anwar Awlaki, Inspire: We are all Usama 10: 41-42. 42 “Jonas the Rebel” (2013), Dear American Muslim, Inspire: Who & why? 11: 17-18. 43 Author unknown (2010), Sheikh Anwas’s message to the American people and Muslims in the West, Inspire: May our Souls be sacrificed for You! 1: 56-58. 44 Author unknown (2014), The Revival of Slavery Before the Hour, Dabiq Issue 4 The Failed Crusade 4: 14-17. 45 Author unknown (2014), Islamic State News hadd for 8 shabbihah, Dabiq Issue 2 The Flood 2: 33-7. 46 Author unknown (2015), Clamping down on sexual deviance, Dabiq Issue 7 From Hypocrisy to Apostasy 7: 42- 43 47 Author unknown (2015), Slave-girls or Prostitutes? Dabiq Issue 9 They plot and Allah plots 9: 44-49 48 http://www.oxfordislamicstudies.com/article/opr/t125/e757 49 Author unknown (2014), The Revival of Slavery Before the Hour, Dabiq Issue 4 The Failed Crusade 4: 14-17. 50 Mujahid Aziz (2012), Do the Mujahidin and Christian terrorists have similar goals?, Inspire: Winning on the Ground 9: 41 51 Author unknown (2013), The untold Story, Inspire: We are all Usama 10: 11.

52 Fazul Abdullah, What is al-Qaeda ? Inspire: We are all Usama 10: 35. 53 http://www.fpri.org/geopoliticus/2014/10/al-qaeda-versus-isis-campaign--top-slot-yemen-swing-state 54 http://www.dailymail.co.uk/news/article-2684714/I-tell-I-m-going-jihad-Lol-I-ll-arrested-What-British- terrorist-Birmingham-told-childhood-friend-travelled-Syria-join-rebel-fighters.html