CHAPTER IV

BIPOLAR RECYCLING IN THE TWENTIETH CENTURY

Much as one might think that received ideas about the Ming-Qing conflict were changed epochally by Chinese rejection of both the and the imperial-dynastic form of government, in truth, twentieth-century historiographies of the Ming-Qing conflict have reincarnated those of different phases in the Qing period. The antibarbarian revanchism of conquest times, the early- to middle-Qing sympathy for fonner Ming subjects who maintained their "purity," Manchu-Qing manipulation of Han Chinese frustration and disgust with late-Ming conditions, the middle- to late-Qing emphasis on loyalty to one's state unto death, the middle-Qing construction and late-Qing development of ideas of Manchu racial or ethnic distinctiveness, even the Qing claim to legitimacy for having restored order in -all have come back into play in various concatenations under changing circumstances. If the ability to draw responsively on traditions is a mark: of successful modernization, then China, at least in this respect as revealed in historiogra­ phy, has been modernizing vigorously since the Republican Revolution. If cognitive pluralism be taken as a mark of modernity, however, China's advance­ ment is less apparent. This is because, underlying the phylogenous recapitulation men­ tioned above has been a stringent abstraction of the history of the conquest period into good and bad forces-the extension of an abstraction that came about earlier, in the in­ evitable process of historiographical simplification to which all primary records are subject over time but also in the service of the Qing ideologies of dynastic legitimacy and loyalty to the state. High Qing absolutist ideologies fed directly into the Chlnese adoption, around the tum of the century, of a linear, progressive, historical paradigm born of the European Enlightenment, which, in the words of Prasenjit Duara, has "possibly played a part in the attainment of certain modernist goals, but has also involved totalization and closure in order to destroy or domesticate the Other." Integral to that have been ideas of nation and race as the principal vehicles of survival, struggle, and successful advance into a better future. l Consequently, various Qing-period understandings of the Ming-Qing conflict have recir­ culated not in an open field of thought but within one heavily polarized by obsession with distinguishing nei j7g from wai ~-"inner" from "outer," "us" from "them," "ours" from "not ours"-in which the former is absolutely valorized. The contexts, and consequently the products, of that obsession have changed, but the paradigm, conditioned by the pre­ vious success of the two-sided "Qianlong coin," has been as enduring as its forebear. Of course, by the time of the Qing dynasty, not to mention the Republic, binary constructions were far from new in Chinese historiographical thinking. There was the 88 Pan One, Chapter IV

venerable tradition of assigning "praise" (bao ~) and "blame" (bian JtZ), which during the Qianlong reign was carried to extraordinary lengths regarding actors and political entities of the Qing rise and the Ming demise. Certainly less emphasized in Qing times but always ready for service was the ancient distinction-mainly on environmental-cum-cultural grounds-between the ''florescent,'' civilized (hua .) people of the central realm and the backward, "barbaric" (yi ~) peoples of the borderlands. But the special urgency that has been felt by the Chinese, since about 1900, to envision clearly the kind of polity and citi­ zenry that will ensure their forward motion in the world has rendered more virile and com­ bative the application of such dichotomies. The Chinese who count, and can be counted on, are no longer just Huaren ¥A----ethnic Chinese-but emphatically Zhongguoren r:p ~ A ----Chinese nationals. To properly understand and em body what it means to be a Zhongguoren in terms of thought, attitude, behavior, and racial descent is to be authen­ tically nei and eligible for praise in being "correct" (zhengque IEfft). To fall short of or not subscribe to that is to be wai and subject to blame for being "incorrect" (bu l' zhengque). The former is "basic" (ben :2fs:); the latter at best is "peripheral" (mo *). Insistently, "we" are always to be "basically" "correct." Such distinctions have dominated use of the history of the Ming-Qing conflict to debate nationalism, patriotism, ideological identification, and party or factional loyalty to such an extent that its potential to inform other sorts of ques­ tions, or to function as anything other than an instrument of domestic political contention, adjustment, or propaganda, has scarcely been explored.

The fIrst wave of attention to the history of the Ming-Qing conflict in the twentieth century was generated by revolutionary activists who sought to overthrow the Qing government during the years between the failure of the 1898 reform movement and the success of the antidynastic revolution in 1911. The cast of writing on late-Ming and early-Qing affairs during those years was peculiar to the time in some respects, but it also strongly influenced the predominant form and tone of such writing in China through at least the subsequent half-century. By no means were all those interested in effecting the end of the Qing also particularly interested in the end of the Ming. For intellectuals who strove most seriously to construct a new historical narrative to undergird a new Chinese nation, macrohistory was the chal­ lenge, and the earliest, constitutive centuries of the purportedly continuous, homogeneous Han people and Han Chinese civilization were the most important 2 Moreover, such new histories did not preclude their authors from favoring extensive Westernization of Chinese culture and governance in the present and future. Promotion of knowledge regarding Ming loyalists and the Qing conquest was characteristic mainly of revolutionaries whose nation­ alism demanded the full restoration of purely native, Han Chinese civilization rather than the adoption of Western models. For those activists-best represented by members of the Society for the Preservation of National Learning (Guoxue baocun hui ~~1*ff.), the Southern Society (Nanshe m*±), and the publishers of the National Essence Journal (Guo­ cui xuebao ~~~¥~)-a return to pre-Qing conditions of state and society was acceptable and even preferable to the loss of two things that they considered to be the basis of viable nationhood: racial purity and maintenance of a unique body of customs and traditions. It was deemed essential by such activists that a purified Han "race" (zhongzu fm1f!R) remain committed to its biological and cultural continuities, the latter especially through classical and historical scholarship.3 In this conception, the nei and wai were clear: the Twentieth Century 89 alien Manchus (and their recent allies, the ''white race," Le., the Westerners) were to be expelled and kept away, while the Han Chinese were to renew their knowledge of, and dedication to, unadulterated native ways, which, if cultivated properly, would fonn the basis of national reinvigoration. This xenophobic racism reflects a combination of three elements: Qing official compilations which, since the Qianlong period, had proclaimed the distinctiveness of the Manchus as lineal descendants of earlier nation-building peoples of the Northeast;4 the ethnic content of anti-Manchu sentiment which had appeared during outbreaks of popular discontent as far back as secret society actions of the early nineteenth century;5 and Chinese intellectuals' growing familiarity with the social-evolutionary theo­ ries of Herbert Spencer, to which they fITSt had been introduced in 1895.6 As far as promotion of late-Ming and early-Qing history is concerned, the most promi­ nent participants in the "National Essence" (Guocui ~;f¢) movement were Chen Qubing ~*m, Deng Shi WJr, Binglin 1iImM, and ~Jgffi:£g.7 Between the years 1905 and 1912, these men published many scholarly essays and valuable source ma­ terials pertaining to late-Ming and Ming-loyalist figures in such periodicals as the Guocui xuebao and the Japan-based Minbao ~~~ and among such collectanea as the Guocui cong­ shu il~ and the Guxue huikan tt8J!~fU. It should be plain from the preceding chapter, however, that in resurrecting portrayals of the unhappy conditions of the Qing conquest and its aftennath, these scholar-publicists were not filling a void. They had been exposed since boyhood to such literature, which had been published in large quantities, not dis­ cernibly for anti-Qing purposes, throughout the nineteenth century. 8 Given the Guocui revolutionaries' political aims, naturally much of the material they published was calculated to impress on readers that the Manchus inalterably were barbar­ ians, that they had come to rule over China by violent means, and that they had maintained power through systematic repression of Han Chinese resistance, not only by quelling armed uprisings but also by persecuting authors of loyalist literature and destroying writ­ ings that were deemed seditious. The Guocui activists often invoked the "principles of the Spring and Autumn Annals" (Chunqiu zhi yi ~fJ

Surely the achievements of Wen [Ruilin (see II.31)] and Wan [Sitong (see p. 35)] never should have been allowed to sink from view. But the savages' [i.e., the Man­ chus'] court was cruel and violent; oppressive policies were announced time after time. The net of literary [persecution] having been drawn taut, many cases occurred of im­ prisonment for [offensive] historical writing. ·Men of determined spirit, though they may have wanted to tell the [true] reason for the dynastic change and to discuss the tragic submergence of a continent [under alien rule], feared violating taboos and dared not speak openly. Two centuries have gone by, and we still are sleeping as deeply as before. Ask anyone about the reign title Longwu or Yongli and he will be awkwardly nonplussed. Alas, this also is a tragedy! ... [K]nowledge of former rulers of fonner states cannot be obliterated. The natural boundary between Chinese and barbarian, the importance of defending the inner from the outer, the principles of the Spring and Autumn [Annals] -how can these be disregarded? Thus, I beg to relate how our Yongli emperor died for his country. (1908b) Outrage over the Qing authorities' suppression of writings about their own govern­ ment's nefarious acts, and about the nobility of the Ming cause, finds expression every­ where in Guocui publications. For instance: How painful it is that since the lianzhou barbarians entered [Shanhai] Pass, they have purported to seek out lost books [w hile actually] assembling in their palaces all the old writings by loyal and worthy, astute and insightful men who guided national affairs. [They did so] in order to pick out parts in which they, the slave-barbarians, were derided and then, one by one, ruin and incinerate [the writings] until none remained. They hoped with one hand to completely cover the eyes and ears of all four hundred million of our Great Han compatriots, who, having suffered this chastisement, there­ after sealed their mouths and bound their tongues, no longer daring to stir dead ashes or again fan them into flame. I I But, in spite of such proclivities, the Guocui element devoted little attention to the Ming resistance as an organized political or military movement They touched on it only tangen­ tially in relation to other themes and concerns: the relation between race and nationality and the call for simultaneous cultural reengagement and political disengagement. Most of the interest in late-Ming history during this time was elicited by the issue of whether the Manchus could be considered one of the various peoples of China and, if they had to be considered of barbarian origin, whether that mattered for their current and future status in the country. Anti-Qing scholar-activists looked back to the preconquest period and the history of Ming-Manchu relations for evidence that the Manchus had been ethni­ cally and geographically separate from China and had formed their own state. 12 Liu Shipei and were most articulate in advancing the Spencerian view that national vitality and survival depend on maintaining internal racial homogeneity. 13 The former attributed the robustness of the early Ming to Zhu Yuanzhang's expulsion of the Mongols and their foreign hangers-on; correspondingly, he attributed the downfall of the Ming, in the long term, to that dynasty's conquest and incorporation of many surround­ ing, non-Han peoples and, in the end, to Ming officials' willingness to cooperate with the Manchus.14 Twentieth Century 91

For Liu Shipei, Qing literary proscriptions and persecutions had to be viewed in the broad perspective of China's racial history. Such phenomena were not peculiar to the Qing, nor even to alien conquest regimes, Liu pointed out, since even native dynasties had unconsciously adopted reprehensible ways from their barbarian predecessors. In Liu' s opinion, moreover, the gradual loss of status and influence by official historians in China over the centuries was because of their degradation under successive barbarian regimes. 15 For Zhang Binglin, also, literary inquisition and racial conflict were intimately related. Now, of all species that are warm-blooded and intelligent, only humans are able to form groups, and the most important functions of such groups are in establishing nations and differentiating races. The intelWoven conditions for this are language, customs, and history. If one of these three is lost, then the people will not propagate. When the western Asians conquered , they changed the language; when the Turks conquered the eastern Roman [Empire], they changed the customs; and when the Manchus conquered China, they destroyed our history. Since this history was destroyed, successive generations have known neither of continuations [of good influ­ ences] from the Ming nor of the despicable behavior of the Manchus. This lack of knowledge, is it not an obstruction of our people's independent spirit and a severance of its source?16 The rage these figures felt over the Qing "literary inquisitions" was more than that of historians over the destruction of historical evidence and more than that of activists re­ sponding to political injustice. To them, Manchu literary policies had been intended to deprive the Han people of their identity and, thus, to render them impotent. The Qing literary proscriptions probably also were so loudly decried because, aside from that, it would have been difficult to argue that Chinese learning had not flourished under Manchu rule. Actually, the Guocui revolutionaries published a great deal more about former Ming subjects than about the Ming resistance per se. 17 Interest lay not so much in martial efforts or righteous deaths as in portraying individuals who were so distraught at the loss of their country to barbarians, and so harried by the conquerors' demands, that their lives were changed fundamentally. This certainly harked back to the tendency of much Kangxi-period biographical writing about the conquest generation (see pp. 38-39). Chen Qubing, in the preface to his "Ming yimin lu," expressed the typical sentiment. The Zhu *= [dynasty's] Ming state lasted three hundred years. Its overflowing virtue and beneficence penneated the people's hearts; 'even down to its demise, it was singu­ larly without fault Thus, its people, in harboring thoughts of their former emperors and, heartily upholding their own dynasty, may have surpassed in significance any perpetuation of [official] ceremonial sacrifices. Moreover, since [Ming] Taizu =*:m expelled the barbaric savages [Le., the Mongols] and restored [Chinese rule over] the Central Plain, the [need for] China to defend against the barbarians had become uni­ versally understood. But then, overnight, forms of dress were changed and people's hair and flesh were cruelly slashed. No measure was spared in thwarting the people's sentiment and crippling their spirit For this reason, some joined Buddhist orders and spent the rest of their lives with shaved heads, wearing monks' cassocks; others in the rustic garb of eremites drifted afar to no one knows where. Was it that they were su- 92 Part One, Chapter W

perciliously fond of standing apart from society? Perhaps their hearts were obsessed in ways that could not be dispelled. (1907) When Manchu rule was overthrown in 1911, members of the National Essence group were convinced that their propagation of literature by and about former Ming subjects had been an important contributing factor. As Deng Shi put it in 1912: The Guocui xuebao having been published for seven years, the lived again, and the China of our ancestors was restored. Achievement of the Republic was brought about halfway by determined expression of opinion among the citizenry. And this spirit was engendered by the conscientiousness of those few venerable survivors from the Ming who, with bitter fortitude and arduous truthfulness, wrote books to es­ tablish their ideas and make clear great principles to the world. Now, after the passage of more than 260 years, all of China has been nourished by this blessing. The former Ming subjects who received most enthusiastic treauneQt were men who not only withdrew from political affairs but who subsequently devoted themselves all the more ardently to the preservation and further development of Chinese learning. It was important to show that the Han race, unique in its "pure blood and sacred land,"18 had soldiered on­ ward in the face of grave difficulties and had not completely lost its identity as the con­ querors had hoped. This again harked back to the culturalloyalism of early-Qing times (see p. 33), but it now was characterized by a concern for Han Chinese continuity that was more geophysical and biological than the early-Qing determination to preserve Chinese rites and scholarship. Zhang Binglin, for example, bizarrely recounted stories of how some members of the Yongli emperor's·family had survived, through a combination of super­ natural and martial powers, among the belligerent aboriginal tribes of southwestern Yunnan and northeastern Burma (1924). Significantly, figures such as the famous poets Qian Qianyi ~~~ and Wu Weiye ~w~, who had served the Qing but then had second thoughts, were given sympathetic treatment----especially if, as with Qian and Wu, their writings had been proscribed in the Qianlong period. 19 Though stigmatized by Ming loyalists in the early Qing and condemned as double turncoats by moralists in the middle Qing, in the Guocui activists' eyes they ulti­ mately had "known their own kind."2o It stands to reason that sustaining oneself through the fall of a dynasty, rather than sacrificing one's life for the state, was advocated by the National Essence group. For one thing, in their view the Qing dynasty, since it had not been of the Han Chinese, was not worth one Han Chinese death. And it hardly would have been smart to portray the Man­ chus, whom many revolutionaries said should be slain genocidally, as having opportunities for righteous martyrdom. Intellectuals, especially, needed to preserve themselves to bear the Han Chinese nation onward in its core "essence" by dedication to "nationalleaming" at a time of uncertainty in politicS.21 Aside from the Guocui group's tendency to regard governmental matters as secondary to race and culture, there probably was another reason why the history of the Ming-Qing conflict did not elicit much direct interest among them. Attention to governmental matters in the late Ming would only have revealed the corruption, despotism, factional warfare, fiscal disarray, and military incapacity that attended the dynasty's demise, and it would thereby have weakened the case brought by the National Essence group against the alien Manchus and in favor of the native Ming order. Indeed, this vulnerability in the Guocui Twentieth Century 93

position did not go unnoticed by scholar-officials who remained loyal to the Qing. Among a number of legitimizing measures that followed the accession of the Xuantong emperor, in March of 1909 a Hanlin academician, Zhao Binglin ~1rj., was placed in charge of scholarship on "documentary materials of the present dynasty and the actions of past wor­ thies." Zhao, observing that "affairs were deteriorating daily," fulfilled his duty by writing a "Compendium on the Rise and Fall [of States]" (Xingwang huibian J!L~t.I) in which he detailed, through nine chapters, various ways in which the early Qing government had corrected intolerable conditions of the late Miog.22 The, most enduring contribution of the Guocui writers to the pursuit of late-Ming and early-Qing history was bibliographical. For one thing, scholar-revolutionaries of the last Qing decade were determined to rescue from oblivion writings that had been banned or kept out of circulation by repressive Qing literary policies. For another, they also were moti­ vated to collect and catalog rare writings from the middle seventeenth century by the expec­ tation that before long a postdynastic official history of the Qing would be undertaken, and that perhaps even the Ming History (in their view, completed unsatisfactorily by servile court historians of the early- to middle-Qing reigns) would be revised. Zhang Binglin found the practice of writing official, standard histories so fraught with circumstances mitigating against historical truth that he advocated abandoning it Nevertheless, he agreed with many others, both inside and outside National Essence circles, that the adequacy of future historical research would depend on the utilization of many different kinds of privately generated writings.23 The standard sources having been found tainted by their origination in government bureaus, and the alternative, private sources having been im­ periled by proscription and fear-induced neglect, the importance of carrying out extensive bibliographical work before rewtiting either Ming or Qing history was deeply felt by scholar-revolutionaries at the beginning of the twentieth century. Consequently, one fmds that the figures who contributed most to the collection and study of materials on the Ming-Qing conflict during the subsequent several decades were men who had studied under and been inspired by either the Guocui leaders Zhang Binglin and Chen Qubing or, outside that circle, by the ardent political reformer ~!f(~. Zhu Xizu *:itm and Uu Yazi lW~T both were younger members of the National Essence group and were especially close to Zhang Binglin and Chen Qubing, respec­ tively.24 Zhu subsequently pursued a career in academic historical scholarship, which culminated in his service as executive secretary of the wartime Bureau of National History f@!i:flB in m.. Throughout his life, Zhu avidly collected materials related to the late and the Southern Ming and published many careful bibliographical notes on them, as well as some of the first twentieth-century articles to address historical questions about the Ming-Qing transition in a professional, scholarly style.25 Liu Yazi, on the other hand, is best known as a journalist and litterateur, and his specific interest in Southern Ming history did not arise until the middle of his life (about which more is said below). Unfor­ tunately, because of the disruptions that both of these men suffered during the Warlord period (1916-27) and the War of Resistance against Japan (1937--45), neither was able to keep his collection of materials intact Thwarted also were both men's intentions to write histories of the Southern Ming, though the term "Southern Ming," connoting status and legitimacy on a par with the Southern Song, entered Chinese historical vocabulary through their efforts.26 The drafts that they did manage to produce adhered largely to traditional 94 Part One, Chapter N

conventions in historiographical treatment, and interpretively they did not go far beyond the more astute Qing-period observations.27 One of the greatest contributors to advancing the history of the Ming-Qing transition in the twentieth century, Xie Guozhen WM~~, received stimulation that lasted a lifetime from Liang Qichao, who often was at odds with the Guocui group over both political and cul­ tural matters. Although Liang always had written and spoken prolifically on scholarly subjects, and had been stirring young intellectuals by advocating a "new history" since at least 1902,28 it was not until the last decade of his life, the 1920s, that he concentrated on scholarship and academic affairs. By the time Xie became Liang's student at Qinghua University rw_::k¥ in in 1926, Liang had published his now classic works on Qing intellectual history, the Qingdai xueshu gailun Mft~mtl~ (1920) and Zhongguo jin sanbai nian xueshu shi rJ:t~lli~sfF.~vftj5t: (1924). At Qinghua, Liang continued to develop, through his lectures, the ideas on historical philosophy and technique that he first had published in 1922 under the title Zhongguo !ishi yanjiufa rJ:t~Hl;e1iJf~fE.29 Also, during the years 1926 and 1927, Liang concurrently directed both the Beijing and Capital Jit em libraries and took a special interest in librarianship and encyclopedic reference pro­ jects.30 Thus, Xie Guozhen came under Liang's direct influence during the most intensely historiographical and bibliographical phase of his mentor's dazzling career. After gradu­ ating from Qinghua, Xie became a private tutor in'Liang's home in Tianjin ~~. Thus, he was able to continue benefiting from the latter's knowledge of early-Qing literature, as well as from his access to many important book repositories and private collections, until Liang's death in 1929.31 Among the many messages that Liang conveyed in his efforts to make Chinese his­ torical writing reflect the truly national experience of the Chinese people, Xie appears to have been most responsive to his emphasis on the careful use of a wide variety of source materials, especially those that revealed the histories of commoners and broad ranges of groups or elements in society, rather than just the affairs of the central government and its officials. This idea motivated Xie's production of the most extensive bibliography of late­ Ming and Southern Ming source materials ever compiled, the Wan Ming shiji kao ~~ ;e~~, completed in 1931.32 Liang's injunction to approach historical facts with new ideas in mind, and to be flexible and imaginative in selecting topics and themes, appears to have borne fruit in Xie's two groundbreaking studies on factional movements in the Ming­ Qing transition period and the "coastal removal" (qianjie mW-) policy of the early-Qing decades, which both appeared in 1934. Though his forte continued to be bibliography, Xie wrote many scholarly articles of high quality on Ming-Qing history.33 And, unlike Zhu Xizu or Liu Yazi, Xie was able to complete and publish (in 1957) an introductory mono­ graph on Southern Ming history, the Nan Ming shilue mlY35t:~, a great advance beyond the historiography that had been current in his youth. As for Liang Qichao' s charge to invoke from history ideas and significances that could help Chinese people of the present to cope with the future, Xie Guozhen's general response matched that of Zhu, Liu, and many other historians of that generation: celebrate the Re­ publican revolution by condemning the Qing and exalting those who had resisted the con­ quest (this in spite of Liang Qichao's criticism of anti-Manchu sentiment34 and his derision of the "praise and blame" approach to history). Mter 1949, Xie tried to adapt to the de­ mands of Communist historiography (see below), but a basic, anti-Qing, nei-wai orien­ tation characterized his work until the end of his life.35 Thus, although Liang Qichao did Twentieth Century 95

not share many of the archaistic values of the Guocui camp, his one student who became engrossed in the history of the Ming-Qing conflict remained paradigmatically in accord with members of the National Essence movement

The rapid spread of familiarity with new, mainly Western, progressive-teleological ap­ proaches and theories during the early years of the Republic led to a period of remarkable fertility and greatly heightened conceptual agility in Chinese historical thought Arising partly in opposition to Guocui historiography, with its exc1usivistic stress on the physical continuity of an unadulterated, homogeneous Chinese race, was the National Studies (Guoxue ~¥) movement, led most prominently by 1ii~!1ijJU. This school, also, was keenly interested in enabling China's past to foster a vital, virile sense of national selfbood. But, in consonance with a felt need to forge national unity in the wake of a destabilizing revolution, National Studies emphasized continuity in the sense of gradual changes in Chinese civilization over long periods of time, during which peoples of many racial and ethnic types entered and contributed to the richness of the "Central Florescence." This viewpoint was compromised, however, by wtitings that portrayed the Han race as having grown strong through successful struggles against surrounding "different kinds" (yilei :W~) of people.36 In either case, National Studies' interest was not particularly at­ tracted to the Ming-Qing transition; it seldom ranged later in time than the establishment of Buddhism in China during the middle first millennium A.D.37 The source of greatest ferment during the Republican period was Marxist histori- 0graphy and the excitement, as well as the problems, that this protean body of theory brought to Chinese scholars' understanding of their own history in a context of social and political revolution and international crises. The "Controversy over Chinese Social His­ tory," which dominated the historical scene during the decade 1927-37, reflected that ferment. However, Ming-Qing history was at best marginal to that controversy, which generated a flood of historical publications, especially in the magazines Shihuo ~:J!i and Xin shengming ff1::1fP. This is because the problematics of Marxist historiography, particularly when applied to China, of distinguishing slave, feudal, and capitalist configurations and of delineating the presumed transitions from one to the next, led again to a heavy concentration on the ancient era among Chinese Marxist historians. The two thousand years of Chinese history from the Qin dynasty through the late Qing were vaguely designated "feudal" or as "tran­ sitional" to capitalism. Moreover, within that eon, attention was directed overwhelmingly to socioeconomic phenomena, the supposed detenninants of historical evolution, whereas political and military affairs were regarded as mere epiphenomena, as manifestations of the "superstructure." In the 1920s and 1930s, there was little place in Marxist-Leninist his­ torical concepts for the serious treatment of such matters as foreign invasions or peasant rebellions. As Arif Dirlik explains of Tao Xisheng 1ItrD*~, a leading figure in the Social History Controversy: Tao discerned in this process [of the nonproductive and counterproductive use of commercial capital] the dynamics of the chronic disintegration of political power in Chinese history as manifested in dynastic changes. Peasant rebellions and the re­ current nomadic invasions, both of which became acutely threatening at such times, resulted in the change of dynasties; given the persistence of the basic economic 96 Part One, Chapter IV

features of Chinese society, however, such changes remained superficial in their effects on the sociopolitical structure.38 Not until two decades later, for reasons that had yet to appear, did the Ming-Qing conflict assume center stage in the controversies generated by applying Communist sociopolitical theories to Chinese history. This is not to say, however, that it remained unattended during the 1930s. On the contrary, for the fIrst time in the twentieth century the Ming-Qing conflict itself was taken up directly and forcefully, albeit not as part of the new developments in Chinese historical thought related to National Studies or the Social History Controversy. Rather, it became" a prime vehicle in journalistic history for the expression of Chinese alann over what tradi­ tionally and still was called neiyou waihuan ~~j}Ji§t-"trouble on the inside and calami­ ties from the outside"-now in an atmosphere of anxiety that China, having cast off the dynastic yoke, might be failing to fonn a nation-state that could bring together and galva­ nize its own for survival in a tough modern world. This anxiety gave rise to a spate of patriotic self-criticism analogous to the internal recriminations of the late Ming, which the Qing had soon played upon to claim that they were saving China from itself. On the domestic scene, the extreme frustrations of the Warlord period, which had followed the debacle of a monarchist movement, were far from eliminated after the Guo­ mindang ~~. (KMT) succeeded in forming a relatively cohesive republican government in Nanjing. Military cliques and satraps, fractious politicians and dissident groups, official corruption and fiscal mismanagement continued to be serious problems. Added to these, moreover, was the beginning of armed Communist insurgence. On the foreign scene, Chinese disillusionment with the principles and intentions of the Western powers, whose betrayal of China became manifest in the Versailles Treaty of 1919, continned for Chinese intellectuals the reality of imperialism. Indeed, "from its inception in 1928 to the outbreak of the Sino-Japanese War in 1937, the Nationalist government at Nanjing hardly enjoyed a day of peace from domestic squabbles and foreign aggression."39 Especially after 1931, when the KMT "Campaigns of Encirclement and Extermination" against the Communists in Jiangxi and the Mukden Incident in Liaodong made the Chinese even more acutely aware of the peril in struggling simultaneously on the domestic and foreign fronts, lessons were drawn readily from the late-Ming experience. For exam pIe: From the Ming Tianqi reign onward, national governance worsened with every mea­ sure. Added to that were, on one hand, threatening pressures from the Manchus, and on the other, the destructiveness of the roving bandits-troubles inside and calamities from the outside. The severity of conditions then absolutely was no less than that of present-day China. 40 Alas, I am afraid to say that today's trends are like those of the end of the Ming. The Red Bandits [i.e., the Communists], who set blazes rampantly, still have not been extirpated. The foreign bandits [Le., the Japanese and their allies] seize any chance and lie in ambush all around. The warlords in Guangdong and Guangxi [Chen Jitang ~1tf~ and Li Zongren **C] are wrecking national unity. These things, espe­ cially, make people gnash their teeth. We would do well to pity the various princes at the end of the Ming and then exhaust our hearts and minds, thinking over what we should do to take the best course in our own situation.41 Twentieth Century 97

Authors in the "Nanjing Decade" placed as much emphasis on neiyou as waihuan. Besides drawing (pejorative) parallels between the "Red Bandits" and the roving rebels who brought down the Ming, historians also cited the late Ming and Southern Ming to crit­ icize or lament, directly or indirectly, fiscal abuses in the government, weak and divided political leadership, self-serving militarists, and a perceived lack of national consciousness among the people. One author, for instance, who wrote on the occasion of a visit by the Provincial Youth Corps to the tomb of Zhang Huangyan (see I.D.2) in tt1H, clearly thought it important that young people be inspired by martyrs such as Zhang. But he concluded with the point that, unless the Chinese could pull together as a unit, such self-sacrifice would be as futile as it had been in Southern Ming times.42 Another espe­ cially telling piece was prompted by the Xi'an Incident of December 1936 in which Jiang Jieshi HfflE, leader of the Nationalist government, was kidnapped by some of his own generals and forced to form a "United Front" with the Communists against Japan. Many people now compare the present condition of the country with that at the end of the Ming. Naturally, we do not wish to suffer the same fate. But from the Xi'an Inci­ dent, I must say it is difficult to avoid thinking [that we are] "following in the tracks of an overturned cart." Just as it was three hundred years ago, the country is being lost partly through pressure from others and partly by doing ourselves in. How can it be that after three hundred years our wisdom has not progressed, and that we simply ac­ cept the dictates of the theory of historical cycles?43 The author goes on to stress that, although insurgents are a problem, worse is the stand­ pat, self-protective, uncooperative attitude of incompetent militarists who, like those at the end of the Ming, "raise troops to fatten themselves." Thus, no coordinated strategies can be put into effect Moreover, with Generalissimo Jiang removed, there is neither unity nor decisiveness of command at the top. He is most incensed, however, by "traitorous" writers who sit on the political fence, "speaking satirical words and composing sarcastic essays," showing the same irresponsible decadence and duplicity as did the late-Ming playwright and much-excoriated Hongguang minister Ruan Dacheng (see I.C.21). That such emphases required very little alteration of Qing-period views of the Ming demise can be illustrated in Xiao Yishan's If-tlJ Qingdai tongshi ?f~3!Jl~, which appeared in three parts between 1923 and 1930 and was republished as a whole in 1935.44 Therein, the chapters on late-Ming affairs and the Ming-Qing conflict are consonant with the fault­ finding spirit of the 1930s, but they also consist in bulk of long extractions from Qing sources-especially from the establishmentarian Shengwuji by Wei Yuan (see chap. ill, p. 73). As for writing that stressed the waihuan during this period, outright seizure by the Japanese of the three northeastern provinces plus Rehe ~iilJ, and further Japanese en­ croachment on eastern from 1931 into 1933, heightened Chinese anxieties and feelings of outrage. Then, in 1936, the (CCP), through the fonnation of popular organizations such as the National Salvation Society ~~III, began to promote collaboration among all political elements to resist Japan. In this year, one begins to see again vivid portrayals of the infamous massacres-notably at Yangzhou m11N and Jiading lIjE-which the Manchus, also invaders from the northeast, perpetrated in their conquest of Jiangnan. (Writers now, however, often hastened to note that the Han and Manchu peoples had become one.) In that literature, both the courage and the piteous- 98 Part One, Chapter W

ness of the Chinese people come forth. Hua, for one, laments that three hundred years after the Qing atrocities at Yangzhou and Jiading the carnage was continuing, now with scientifically developed instruments that can accomplish those heinous tasks "with the movement of a hand or foot"45 The availability of materials from which such accounts could be composed had been enhanced by republic~tion in a popular edition of the collec­ tion Tongshi 005E., "Histories of Pain," in 1931. This was followed in 1937 by the Guonan congshu ~.~., "Collectanea on National Tragedies."46 And the nei-wai paradigm was most evident in the title of the Zhongguo neiluan waihuo lishi congshu t:f:t ~ pg ~7i-m J!l5E. it. (ZNW), "Collectanea on the History of China's Internal Troubles and Externally [Caused] Calamities," frrst published in 1936. Although writings that utilized late-Ming and early-Qing history to implicitly criticize the current government, or to accentuate the past sufferings of Chinese people under alien attack, did not cease after the outbreak of war with Japan (Le., following the Marco Polo Bridge Incident of July, 1937),47 they declined drastically relative to the literature that ap­ peared on heroes and martyrs of the Ming resistance and traitors to the Ming cause. The earlier emphases must have seemed too negative for a time when courage, heroism, and solidarity were critically needed. Hu Shanyuan, for instance, drew from his studies of the massacres at Jiangyin i[~ and Jiading not cause for pity but lessons in strategy for the current resistance against Japan (1938: preface). Even the maverick essayist mf'P A, who had alienated himself from Nationalists and Communists alike by refusing to extol the virtues of the Chinese people, and who, as a longtime Japanopbile, had re­ mained in Beijing after the Japanese occupation of Hebei, was moved to condemn the invaders implicitly through essays on the Southern Ming (and on repressive Qing literary policies) after learning of the Japanese destruction and rapine in his home locale, Hangzhou.48 Because the land lies near the sea [in East Zbejiang], the people are comparatively artless and simple, rude and unrefmed; they know very few low-down, shameless, or underhanded tricks. So in the history of our people, East Zhejiang has been especially famous. From Gou Jian to ~ of the Spring and Autumn and Warring States period49 down through the Southern Song and the end of the Ming, East Zhejiang was unsub­ missive and undaunted and established a glorious history of resistance to aliens .... We should note that the time of change from Ming to Qing was the most flour­ ishing for East Zhejiang scholarship and letters .... But the sudden decline of [that region's1 literature [thereafter] also had its historical background, and suppression by an alien race was central to the turnabout That the people of Zhejiang [ thereafter] abandoned the Confucian arts and government service, retreating into agriculture and commerce, was in negative protest to the foreigners' occupation of the Central Plain.50

One of the best-known writers of national-hero literature, Yi Junzuo ~~tr:, contributed to the veritable flood of uplifting stories about famous anti-Qing resistance figures, espe­ cially the martyr of Yangzhou-greatly lionized since the middle Qing period-Shi Kefa (see I.C.24). Yi's frrst collection, written in Zhenjiang ~tI just as the War of Resistance against Japan was about to open, quickly became reading material in the secondary schools of and went through seventeen reprintings before being overwhelmed by the war.51 The Japanese invasion clearly occasioned a shift from internal criticism reminiscent of the late Ming to emphasis on death for one's state, which had been evident in some post- Twentieth Century 99 conquest writings but had been elevated to a virtual Qing-establishmentarian religion in the eighteenth century. By no means, however, was wartime writing about national heroes and national traitors in the Ming-Qing conflict all journalistic in qUality. As the Japanese moved into the central Yangzi region and then further southward, became a temporary haven for many Chinese intellectuals in the South. Under this circumstance were produced the twentieth century's fITst scholarly treatments of the ''Three Loyalists of Ouangdong," Chen Bangyan (see I.H.2), Chen Zizhuang ~Tft, and Zhang Jiayu (see I.0.12), as well as others who suffered for their support of the Yongli and Shaowu ~Jit courts, or the anti­ Qing resistance generally, in Ouangdong.52 Also during the war years, the name of Hong Chengchou (see I.D.1.f), whose crucial contribution to the Qing conquest already had been historiographically devalued in the "minting of the Qianlong coin" (see chap. Ill), became synonymous with traitors who collaborated with the Japanese to form Chinese puppet gov­ ernments. Perhaps this led the prolific historian of seventeenth-century affairs Li Ouangtao *7\:;13 to write a substantial and thoroughly documented article on Hong's service to the Qing, the moral of which was that such turncoats, sincere as they may be, end up rejected by their own people and their foreign masters alike. 53 Striking the best balance between scholarly and journalistic treatments of resistance heroes and martyrs was Liu Yazi (introduced above). Liu's interest in the history of the Ming-Qing conflict began not long after the outbreak of war with Japan, and it soon was whetted further by a loan of books from the populist writer Aying ~~, with whom he subsequently collaborated in writing some rousing patriotic plays, based on Southern Ming situations, for audiences of 1939-40.54 From 1940 through 1941, Liu published a series of biographies and studies of Ming resistance stalwarts and courageous fonner Ming subjects in the Yuzhou feng *iE'oo\, Shijie wenhua yuekan i!t Jl!. )(1l:..F!J fU, Zhong­ Mei zhoubao t:J:r§@mJ¥~, and Bitan.~ magazines of Shanghai, and in the Guomin ribao ~~ S ¥~ and Dafeng banyue kan *.M~ ..F!J fU of Hong Kong.55 The most substantial of these, on the Tai.Lake resistance leader Wu Yi and Wu's compatriot, the ardent teenaged litterateur and anti-Qing conspirator Xia Wanchun (see IC.26), were published in a col­ lection of Liu's writings, the Huaijiuji 1tW~, in 1946. Ethnic animosity toward "Manchus" (Le., Bannermen, who all had become identified with Manchu-Qing rule) had disappeared rapidly after the termination of the Qing dynasty in 1911. Under the pressing need to create a viable, modem nation, the nei-wai prism rotated easily to face foreign threats, particularly from the Japanese. For instance, Zhang Hualan ~¥~, in his 1933 preface to the Mingji Diannan yimin lu £!Ij~r.i¥.im~~, wrote that, although "racial thought" had been an important element in Song and Ming subjects' refusal to serve the Mongols and Manchus, respectively, now the Chinese world (tianxia :;R. r) had become "open" (gong 1}). He laments, however, that despite talk: of an "internationalist perspective" (shijie zhuyi i!t~±~), "though we may have ceased dis­ criminating against others, we cannot stop others from discriminating against us." He al­ ludes to the French, British, and Japanese colonizations of Vietnam, Burma, , and Korea, and he warns especially about the recent Japanese move into the Liao region. "If national sovereignty is lost, then even if we wish to be a single people that has survived [the Qing], will that be easy to attain, I ask you? Will that be easy to attain?" Nei thus had become the people of China-"race" having been internally erased and ethnic (minzu ~~) distinctions set aside-while wai had become the current external enemy. 100 Part One, Chapter W

Earlier, the anti-Qing revolutionaries had wanted to expel the Manchus (presumably back "out of the pass" through which they had entered in 1644). But the Japanese occu­ pation of the Northeast and the creation there, in 1932, of the puppet state "Manchuria" (Manzhouguo ~~~) under a Manchu figurehead, the last Qing emperor, Puyi ~f.,56 had rendered abhorrent to patriotic Chinese the idea of the Manchus and their homeland as external to China. As far as historical scholarship was concerned, however, the Chinese had been inattentive to stores of Qing governmental documents, and even more neglectful of Manchu-script materials, in the aftermath of the . Japanese assertion of control over the former Manchu-Qing capitals of Shenyang rDff$ and Beijing-just as Chinese scholars and archivists had begun to make some headway with those sources­ enabled Japanese scholars to move forward much more vigorously than the Chinese had in studying important Manchu historical records and the seventeenth-century history of the Liao region (see, e.g., I.A.1.d and III.A.2), thus establishing a lead that lasted several decades. The anti-Japanese resistance and subsequent civil war conditions, which neces­ sitated the frenetic transshipment of boxcars full of crated Qing documents from Beijing to Shanghai to Chongqing, back to Shanghai, and eventually to Taiwan or back to Beijing,S7 inhibited the development of Manchu studies among Chinese scholars until the late 1960s in Taiwan (and until the late 1970s in mainland China for additional reasons). The cessation of opportunities to pursue genuinely learned scholarship on late-Ming, and especially early-Qing, history because of the Japanese invasion of China proper is tragically illustrable in the career of Meng Sen ~~, the man who, besides Xie Guozhen, stands out as a pioneer of Ming-Qing history in twentieth-century China.58 Since early in his life, Meng had been interested in laws and state institutions, both as historical phenom­ ena and as matters crucial to governmental refonn in the last decade of Qing rule. During his middle years, from 1905 until about 1913, Meng participated in attempts to form new, modern governmental instruments and structures for China. He helped to formulate the constitutional proposals that were futilely presented to the Qing court, and he participated in the parliamentary movement, both on the provincial level before 1911 and as a member of the National Assembly thereafter. It was not until that movement was suppressed by ' s ~t!!lIL strong-arm methods that Meng began to occupy himself mainly with his­ torical research and instruction. The first installment of Meng Sen's collection of writings on Ming-Qing history, the Xinshi shiliao JL'!1:!1:*I-, appeared in 1916, containing, among other studies, the first attempt to plumb the mystery of the odgin of the name "Manchu." Writings were supple­ mented with lectures after Meng was appointed to professorial positions,S9 fITst at the National Central University t:J:t 9c*~ in Nanjing in 1929 and then at Beijing University :ltJj{*~ in 1931, where he had even better access to rare early-Qing materials. Meng's work aroused enonnous interest and respect. This was partly because he was the fIrst to make extensive use of Qing archival documents and other unpublished official sources such as the Ming, Qing, and Korean "Veritable Records" (see III.A) to draw modem historical insights, and especially because he opened up as a fIeld of academic research the history of the Manchus and the Latter JinlQing state prior to 1644--which theretofore had been al­ most exclusively the preserve of the Qing court and imperial clan (see pp. 30, 71-72. 73). Though Meng strove most for solidity in source use and historical judgment, not for immediate political or propagandistic effect, his scholarship did have ideological impli­ cations. It demythologized the Manchus, revealing their status (and that of their progen- Twentieth Century 101 itors) as tribal subjects of the Ming border administration and willing participants in Ming suzerain arrangements during most of their history. It also de-anathematized them by couching their rise to power and their takeover of China proper in state-building and state­ consolidating tenus. The message of Meng's oeuvre in Qing history, written during a period of British assertion of "special interest" in Tibet, Russian designs on Mongolia, and Japanese occupation of the Northeast, could be read thusly: The Northeast had been con­ tinuously under Chinese rule at least since early Ming times, and the Qing dynasty, though established by a formerly tribal people who had rebelled against the Ming and taken strong measures to assure their own dominance thereafter, had ruled a fully legitimate Chinese state, which had exerted direct or indirect sovereignty over vast territories that still rightly belonged to China. Meng surely was stung in 1936 when the prolific Japanese historian Imanishi Shunju ~g§:Wf)( pointed out his failure to consult Manchu-script sources­ which no Chinese historian of note could read in that day but which Japanese scholars were working on energetically. In effect, Imanishi's criticism suggested an opposite view-not of Manchu historical membership in a Chinese world but of Manchurian distinctiveness. 60 The following year, Meng, then seventy years old, refused to leave Beijing despite the Japanese occupation of that city. He fell ill under the strain and died in January of 1938.61 His voluminous chronicle of Jurchen-Manchu-Qing affairs during Ming times, the Ming­ yuan Qingxi tongji ~7trg~Ji#'a, was left unfinished,62 symbolizing the interruption in Chinese scholarship on Manchu and early-Qing history that would last until the end of the anti-Japanese resistance and the subsequent Nationalist-Communist civil war.

Beginning in 1949, with the establishment of the People's Republic of China on the main­ land and the withdrawal of the Republic of China (ROC) to Taiwan (as well as some off­ shore islands), Chinese historical treatment of the Ming-Qing conflict diverged radically in those two mutually noncommunicative polities. The divergence was thoroughgoing in both geographical concentration and sociopolitical interpretation. In Taiwan, the history of that conflict virtually became identified with the history of anti-Qing resistance in the coastal, maritime zone from eastern Guangdong to the Yangzi Delta. And within that sphere atten­ tion was focused on the qualities and achievements of the traditionally legitimate political leadership. On the mainland, the history of the Ming-Qing transition virtually became identified with that of the various roving-rebel organizations, one of which destroyed the Chongzhen court and others of which alternately threatened and supported the remnant Ming courts. This entailed a focus on inland, especially southwestern, affairs. In both the PRC and the ROC, however, the problem of what the Chinese nation needed to be and stand for, and consequent concern over questions of nei and wai, "us" and "them," re­ mained fundamental. Given the geopolitical and strategic situation of the ROC, with its "temporary capital" in Taipei, it is easy to see why the maritime aspect of the Ming-Qing conflict became para­ mount there. The uncanny historical parallel between the determination of certain Ming loyalists-based on such islands as Zhoushan :RHil, Mazu ~m, Jinmen ~r~, Xiamen JJlr" and Taiwan-to recover the mainland (or at least the coastal region) from Qing control, and the determination of the Nationalists to do the same against the Communists, turned the exploits of such irredentists as Zhang Mingzhen ~;:f5~, Zhang Huangyan, Regent Lu ~ ~Iif, and Zheng Chenggong ~ f5JGJj] into extremely popular (and officially approved) historical fare. Coincidentally, the actual tomb of Regent Lu was discovered on 102 Part One, Chapter IV

Jinmen Island in 1959 (see I.F.1.h), three hundred years after the coastal loyalists' cele­ brated Yangzi Campaign and their spectacular assault on Nanjing.63 Moreover, 1962 marked the three-hundredth anniversary of Zheng Chenggong's epochal "repatriation" of Taiwan and of his premature death. These occurrences further raised public interest in the coastal resistance movement Beginning in 1957, also, the availability of late-Ming and early-Qing source materials to amateur and professional historians, as well as to historically minded journalists, was greatly augmented by the most important publication project in the development of studies on the Ming-Qing conflict, the Taiwan wenxian congkan series (TW), which did not cease publication until 1972. It consists of 594 works (many quite rare) in 309 issues, most of which bear on the anti-Qing coastal resistance, the Southern Ming in general, or the history of Taiwan in late-Ming and early-Qing times.64 In spite of the wide range of the Taiwan wenxian congkan project, relatively little was published in Taiwan on the Ming-Qing conflict apart from the coastal resistance until the late 1970s.65 Moreover, within that emphasis on the seaboard, attention was devoted o~erwhelmingly to Zheng Chenggong. Although, looking at the 1950s, one can detect some rivalry between those who identified with the Zhejiang hero figures, the ''two Zhangs" and Regent Lu, and those who identified with the Fujian-Taiwan hero-figure, Zheng Chenggong,66 the tendency was to discuss all other aspects of the Ming-to-Qing saga as adjuncts to the saga of the Zheng family.67 Before 1949, twentieth-century treatments of Zheng Chenggong had conformed with general tendencies in writing on the Ming-Qing conflict. 68 Around the time of the 1911 Revolution, Zheng was cited especially for his anti-Manchu stance. Then, in the 1920s and early 1930s the emphasis shifted to his struggle against foreigners of the Westem­ imperialist stripe (the Dutch colonizers of Taiwan). And in the late 1930s Zheng's "liber­ ation" of Taiwan was recounted to protest continuing Japanese control of the island (since the end of the Sino-Japanese War in 1895). One writer, for instance, concluded with these words: After writing of Zheng' s career, it makes my hair stand on end to think of the current plight of people in the Ryukyus, Taiwan, and the Northeast, which territories belong to our country but have been occupied by the dwarf pirates [wokou ~~, the Japa­ nese]. The cries for help from our compatriots in those territories resound in our ears unceasingly. How can this generation stand, hands in our sleeves, and let them go on in such a living death? This is the greatest shame for our countrymen. Reading about Zheng should lift our strength and spirit to contend for the glory of the Chinese people and attain the aim of regaining our rivers and mountains.69 With the assertion of Nationalist political authority over Taiwan after the conclusion of the Pacific War in 1945, and overwhehningly after the movement of the Nationalist govern­ ment to Taipei four years later, Zheng Chenggong became lauded as the national hero who first had extended Chinese governance beyond the continent and fulfilled Taiwan's destiny to become an integral part of China. Reflecting an ambivalence in Nationalist priorities be­ tween liberating mainland China and reconsuucting Taiwan, writers alternately stressed Zheng's martial prowess in combating the Qing presence on the mainland and his achieve­ ments in establishing Taiwan as a "bastion" of legitimacy, a strong "base" for reconquering the "Central Plain."7o Twentieth Century 103

Zheng Chenggong surely is the founding ancestor of this sacred place .... This island occupies an important position on the worldwide battlefield against Communism. Not only is it our crucial base for counterattacking the mainland but, also, it is the point of reliance in the strategy for extinguishing the world Communist menace. In view of this, we cannot but feel gratitude toward the one who developed this precious is- land .... Right now the war of resistance against the Communist [Chinese] and the Russians is about to continue fOlWard. Compatriots in our whole country should deeply recognize the greatness of the national hero Zheng Chenggong and, each one of us, take action in his spirit of opposition to self-concern, surrender, or defeat. Then, it goes without saying that Taiwan will be protected, and even the counter­ attack on the mainland, when the time is ripe, will be a very smooth undertaking.71 Efforts by Communist Chinese forces to wrest Jinmen from Nationalist control in 1954 sharply called to mind Zheng' s staunch defense of that strategic island against repeated Qing assaults. One historian, reflecting on the successful Nationalist defense, introduced a study of Zheng's military exploits launched from Jinmen with these words: This great triumph has reinforced the determination of our defense forces on the var­ ious offshore islands and has become a turning point in the history of our country. Hereafter, our national forces will be sworn to defend those islands, and our sky-blue flag with a white sun will fly forever on Great Martial Hill. Now Jinmen has become the gateway through which we will retake the mainland, the great base for our victory in recovering the Central Plain .... It reminds us of three centuries ago in history when Zheng Chenggong used the two islands of Jinmen and Xiamen to resist the whole Qing anny. At will he sent out troops to attack and reconnoiter Pujian, Guangdong, and other places, and he even undertook a distant assault on Nanjiog.72 Care was exercised in -ROC writing on Zheng Chenggong to dispel any suspicions that the great national hero and Taiwanese folk hero might have had character flaws that adversely affected his leadership or might have held less than inspiring motives for some of his actions, such as engaging in negotiations with the Qing.73 Most sensitive was the question of how and why Zheng came to take over Taiwan. In the context of the rather sudden and rude transfer of the Nationalist power structure to Taiwan, and its harsh im­ position on the unenthusiastic Taiwanese, it had to be shown that Zheng's step had been a positive one, not a desperate resort: unlike other Ming resistance leaders, he never "feck­ lessly sought security in one comer" of the realm (pianan ~*, goucun 1Jj:fj) but always planned to use Taiwan as a staging area for further attacks on the Qing.74 Against the thought that Zheng' s extremely harsh treatment of subordinates might explain defections from his cause, the need to distinguish the loyal from the traitorous was asserted. A study of the relation between Zheng and one especially important defector, Shi Lang (see I.F.7), opens with these lines: In the past twenty years the Chinese people, having gone through the calamity of the War of Resistance against Japan, hav~ encountered yet another historically unprece­ dented catastrophe [Le., the Communist takeover]. We are living in a prolonged period of troubles and sorrows. Besides [learning] to hate being pushed around by foreigners, we also have [come to] despise those traitors against the Han who look upon the [Communist] marauders as parents .... According to the principle of distin- 104 Part One, Chapter W

guishing the correct from the perverse, the good from the bad, and the beautiful from the ugly, all who betray the interests of their people and country [should be] called "regicidal ministers and patricidal sons" [luanchen zeizi jijLeaJ!tX-r].75 completed the Spring andAutumn [Annals] [and therein] provided historians with a fmn standard for discussing [such] affairs.76 . Not until the latter part of the 1980s, when policy and sentiment in Taiwan favored rap­ prochement "across the Strait" with the PRC, was Zheng Chenggong's nemesis and the eventual destroyer of the Zheng regime, Shi Lang, granted "merits as well as faults" and accorded some positive recognition as a national unifier in ROC historical scholarship}7 Although such visceral approaches as those just mentioned were conducive to care­ less, tendentious use of sources and the drawing of hasty, unwarranted conclusions, by no means has all ROC historical writing on Zheng Chenggong and the anti-Qing coastal resistance been journalistic, propagandistic, or inferior in quality. Many scholars-Liao Hanchen, Yang Yunping, Mao Yibo, Huang Dianquan, Su Tongbing, Shi Wanshou, Jin Chengqian, and Zhuang Jinde, to mention a few-have steadily and soberly generated numerous excellent studies that have advanced substantially our factual knowledge and helped to delineate strategic factors in the maritime arena. 78 It was 1978, however, before one historian made bold to assert that Zhengstudies had ridden the twentieth-century waves of Chinese nationalism and thus never had been pur­ sued objectively. As a corrective, he presented a study of the chronic, inherent problems of the Zheng organization and how Chenggong's actions could be explained as attempts to deal with them.79 This was an early harbinger of a continuing trend to take the Zheng or­ ganization as a subject of study in institutional, economic, and political-cultural history, 80 which has arisen apace with the tremendous expansion of universities and growth of a more social-scientific professorate in Taiwan. But old heroes die hard. At least as late as 1987, one could still fmd indignant upholders of Zheng as the apotheosis of honor, self­ sacrifice, and patriotism.81 Besides exaggerating the importance of the coastal resistance in the history of the Ming-Qing conflict, writers in Taiwan also devoted disproportionate attention to one factor in history: the actions and personal qualities of legitimate political leaders. The correctness of certain heroes in terms of traditional governmental practice, the importance of right moral conduct and fmn decision making among persons in positions of authority, and the value of unflagging loyalty to one's ruler and his officials-these high-Qing litanies were recited in full voice. Thus, Zheng Chenggong was vigorously defended (as he had been by Qing­ period scholars ever since Quan Zuwang ~m~) against the charge in certain sources that he murdered Regent Lu. And the various Southern Ming courts, especially that of the Hongguang emperor, were disparaged (in terms sometimes drawn directly from official Qing pronouncements) for lacking moral fiber and failing to lead properly.82 The follow­ ing passages are typical: In all times of weakness and disorder, there must be a person of great ability to arrest decline and elevate mores, to replace the strings and pull them taught, to break through the existing situation .... In the case of [the end of] the Ming, though Beijing had suc­ cumbed to Li Zicheng's * 13 JVG siege, the Jiangnan part of the realm was still whole; there was no lack of opportunity to counterattack and restore the state. But, because of the stupid and muddled Hongguang [emperor], who only cared about his idle enter- Twentieth Century 105

tainments and neglected far-reaching, important matters, in no time at all everything was lost! The reason why things ended in such an impossible state lay in the decadence of people's hearts, which became manifested in the decadence of social mores. Both resulted from the prior decay of court officials. As it is said, when the ruler shows a certain propensity, those below take it farther. The trend becomes uncontrollable, and eventually they walk the road to ruin. 83 Of course, this emphasis on the conduct of important figures in positions of legitimate political authority accords with the general tendency of traditional Chinese historiography as well as with the Nationalists' promotion of loyalty to, and confidence in, certain pre­ ferred leaders (such as Jiang Jieshi) and excoriation of their detractors. However, it also accords with the particular use that the Nationalists had found for the sociopolitical theories of the independent-minded Marxist historian Tao Xisheng.84 In Tao's view, political power in China had not been wielded by any economically based social class but rather by an elite, the shidafu ±*:1(, the authority of which had derived mainly from a certain kind of intellectual, political, and administrative training. The most important implication of this argument, and one that brought Tao into conflict with his fellow Marxists, was his inference that in China political power his­ torically had remained distinct from society. The political elite was above the classes of society. Therefore, Tao concluded, the most important question that faced China was not class exploitation but the exploitation of society by the state. The renovation of China thus required the cooperation of all social classes under the leadership of a renovated political elite (interpreted to mean the KMT), not the forcible assertion of power by one class over another.85 The idea of the continuity of a shidafu elite from Ming through Qing into Re­ publican times, elements of which repeatedly had responded to national crises by sacri­ ficing themselves for the good of all Chinese society, was very appealing to those who wished to fmd models for twentieth-century activism among stalwart scholar-officials of the late Ming and Southern Ming.86 This quickened enthusiasm for studies of the refonnist Donglin *** and Fushe ~t± politico-literary societies, and it increased the disproportion­ ate attention devoted to Donglin-Fushe members who had held out for the Ming cause-an attentiveness which had been marked ever since middle-Qing times.87 Thus, the nei-wai orientation of ROC writing on the Ming-Qing conflict has had several dimensions. The "inside" has been "Free China," the Nationalist cause (seen as the true Chinese cause), and worldwide anti-Communism; "our" values have been non­ Communist ones, especially those associated with Confucian traditions in society and politics. The "outside," pariah element has been the Communist Chinese regime on the mainland (part of the global Communist threat emanating from Russia), which in the his­ toricalliterature has been fluidly associated with both the illegitimate Manchus and the rampaging bandit hordes of the Ming-Qing transition. Marked for rejection andtennina­ tion have been the values that purblind "others" have placed on the destruction of people, properties, and traditions in the name of class struggle.

After 1949 in the PRC, the history of the end of the Ming, which theretofore (as discussed above) had been largely neglected in Marx-Leninist historiography, was catapulted into prominence by the addition of Maoism to the Communist canon. In particular, the positive 106 Part One, Chapter IV

historical role that =§~* accorded to an aroused peasantry, and the big contribution that the rural popu1(\Ce recently had made to the Chinese Communist revo­ lution, brought ovelWhelming interest to popular uprisings of all sorts (generically termed "peasant wars" [nongmin zhanzheng .~~*] or "peasant uprisings" [nongmin qiyi ~~]).88 Prominent among those naturally have 1?een the rebellions ofLi Zicheng and Zhang Xianzhong ~~*, which dealt mortal blows to the Ming state in the decade prior to the Manchu invasion of 1644.89 Consequently, the history of the Ming-Qing conflict in mainland China has been inseparable from questions regarding the positions of various late-Ming rebel organizations vis-a-vis the Ming and Qing regimes, respectively. Though attention has been drawn to many different armed movements among commoners in diverse regions,90 scholarship has concentrated heavily on the activities of the remnant armies of Li and Zhang after those leaders' deaths, that is, as the forces of their surviving lieutenants went on to cooperate, in uncomfortable alliance, with regular Ming armies, mainly those of the Y ongli regime in Huguang, Guangdong, and the southwestern provinces.91 Thus, largely through the peasant war connection, the history of the end of the Ming­ which was salient in a certain way but relatively unproblematical in Taiwan--came to be highly controversial in the PRC. There, many problems of Marxist historiography were further complicated by Mao Zedong's various pronouncements on history, and historical debates were severely sharpened by their relevance to domestic political strife. The pro­ mise of universal significance that Marxism brought to Ming-Qing historical studies became a failed universality in this context, as questions were pursued in ways that only could be understood through familiarity with internal PRC sociopolitical problems. The chief sources of controversy were friction between the more familiar nationalist and the Com­ munist internationalist viewpoints, and between the common desire of the Chinese to promote social harmony (especially cooperation in the face of threats from the outside) and the Communist doctrine that true social solidarity, and hence future viability, only can be achieved through class struggle. Throughout, the debates were infused with anxiety to cor­ rectly perceive the nei and wai, the true friends and true foes, the "us" side of the "primary contradiction." Long before 1949, Chinese historians-Marxist and non-Marxist alike-had begun to argue that the most significant battles of Chinese history had not been between the Han people and various non-Han invaders; rather they had been "between oppressor and op­ pressed, aristocracy and people." As Laurence Schneider has pointed out, certain post­ May Fourth iconoclasts came to hold the following view: Yes, the Manchus as monarchs were bad; they were conquerors; they had to be re­ moved. But their being Manchus was only a melodramatic side issue on the list of evils that could have been applied to any monarchy. It was not the Chinese, as such, who had been under the thumbs of monarchs and their aristocratic accomplices, but it had been the people, the oppressed.... The concept of class oppression forged a new bond that identified the new Chinese nation not with the Han Chinese per se, but with the great and long-suffering, heterogeneous masses-a group that cut across the Han people, the Moslems, the Tibetans, the Miaos, the Mongols, and yes, even the Manchus.92 After the Communists came to power in mainland China, this view was pressed more vigorously and with increased sophistication.93 This not only accorded with the emphasis Twentieth Century 107 of the international Communist movement on the unity of all working-class people, it also was induced by the need of the central government to gain and retain the loyalties of minor­ ity populations in spite of Communist campaigns to refonn some of their traditional prac­ tices and social patterns. The following sort of expression was ubiquitous: [V]iewed from the perspective of today, when all the common people of the various nationalities have become as one host in the Chinese household, under the guidance of the Chinese Communist Party and our great, brilliant people's leader, Comrade Mao Zedong, we have a great family of nationalities with multitudes of elder and younger brothers in this motherland of wonderful streams and hills.94 Thus, grief had been brought upon China in the seventeenth century not by the Manchu "people" (renmin A~) but by the Manchu "nobility" (guizu .~) or "ruling circle" (tongzhi jituan ~rt:t~IIl). Historians were encouraged to follow Mao Zedong's injunc­ tion (born of the previous need to unite all political elements in the War of Resistance against Japan) to fully realize the "identity between national struggles [among states] and class struggles [within particular states, especially China]."95 How were the concepts of "national struggle" (minzu douzheng ~~rf ~) and "class struggle" (jieji douzheng ~t&F'1 ~) to be applied, and related to one another, in the complicated transpirations of seventeenth-century Chinese history? This became a consuming question for Ming-Qing historians in the PRC. First, it was necessary to establish that the Manchus had evolved a ruling class that could be conceived as having struggled successfully with that of I ate-Ming China During the nascence of Marxist interpretation in Chinese historical studies, debate over when and how China had experienced the stages of primitive, tribal, slave, and feudal teleological development had focused on the ancient era. Now, after decades of obsession with wrest­ ing the Northeast back from the Russians, the Qing restorationists, the Japanese, and the Nationalists, not only were PRC historians eager to incorporate the pre-1644 history of the Liao region into the Marxist scheme, but they had the additional challenge of arriving at a convincing class structure for the Manchu-Qing at the time of that regime's sharpest hostil­ ities with the Ming and subsequently with the roving rebels. Hence, there was extensive discussion of "the nature of Manchu society." Debate was especially active in the early 1950s, early 1960s, and early 1980s over whether the people who eventually called themselves Manchus had exhibited a slave society at all, and if so, when and in what manifestations. The arguments became much better informed with the increasing use of original Manchu sources from the late 1970s onward. Not surprisingly, there was virtual unanimity on the point that the Manchus had reached a feudal stage of development on the eve of the Ming collapse. Within that unanimity, opin­ ions diverged mainly over when the Manchus shed tribal- and slave-society vestiges and entered the "advanced" feudal stage, which, in Chinese-Marxist parlance, has meant what Western historians now would call the later imperial-bureaucratic order.96 It had to be agreed that the Manchus had entered some degree of feudalism when they began to seriously threaten the existence of the Ming dynasty, so that the Manchu feudal ruling class could. be portrayed as having joined in league with its social counterpart, the Han Chinese "feudal bureaucrat-landlord class" (Jengjian guanliao dizhu jieji M~'§-mt :t~:±~t.&.), to defeat those who resisted feudal oppression of the common people (i.e., the "peasant" rebels) and to maintain their class exploitation.97 It was appropriate to extol anti- 108 Part One, Chapter N

Manchu (or preferably anti-Qing) resistance only if it could be portrayed as lower-class opposition to yet another feudal ruling-class subjugation, or as the championing of new productive forces (the increasing self-detemlination of the primary producer) against the perpetuators of feudal socioeconomic relations. A corollary of this interpretation was that commoners and peasant rebels were the most vigo~ous and effective resisters against the Qing because they selflessly fought for the liberation of the downtrodden, whereas the shidafu and Ming officials were ineffectual or traitorous because they selfishly thought only to preserve their privileged positions.98 In other words, the "real us" was not to be the Han Chinese, nor even all Chinese, but only the true "people" who had suffered under the wielders of feudal sociopolitical power. Some agile, mainly younger, historians such as Li Wenzhi $)(til were able to exe­ cute the move to class-based treatment of the Ming-Qing conflict fairly gracefully. 99 Prior to the 1950s, however, the CCP had for years emphasized forming a "United Front" of all Chinese against the Japanese, a ''New Democracy" of several classes (including capitalists) working together. Now, with China facing a new challenge from the Western powers over Korea, many Chinese scholars were slow to abandon the more familiar Chinese-versus­ aliens perspective on the Ming-Qing conflict Ye Huosheng ~!Ii~, for one, explicitly compared the Manchus with the United States, which country "for several decades had harbored intentions to aggress on China," and he unreservedly praised the rebel armies for joining in league with Ming officials (their presumed feudal oppressors) to oppose the en­ croaching foreigners. loo $~f.ti, Lai Jiadu fI*J!t, and Yang Kuan mJ[, in their studies of the valiant popular resistance movements in Jiangyin and Jiading, were careful to stress that the Ming officials and gentry proved useless in those emergencies. But otherwise their accounts were strongly nationalistic and portrayed wholehearted, democratic cooperation among people of all other backgrounds. lOl Xie Guozhen was m'ore sophisticated. In his Nan Ming shilue, an example of the re­ markable productivity of Chinese historians in the years 1955-58, Xie appropriately em­ ployed a point of Maoist doctrine (again, from the United Front period) that had been found very useful in reconciling nationalistic and class-based viewpoints: at times "national con­ tradictions" among different states could sharpen to the point of superseding in importance the "class contradictions" within a given state. 102 This idea was liberally utilized, by Xie and others, to sanction the rebels' eventual cooperation with the rump Ming courts, and further to credit them with prescience in recognizing the point of change in the relative sta­ tuses of these contradictions. lo3 Also, the Nan Ming shilue amply demonstrated Xie's consistent strength, his knowl­ edge of and feel for the participation of all kinds of people in historical events and move­ ments. In this case, his full incorporation of the late-Ming roving-rebel organizations, as well as other erstwhile "bandit" or "pirate" groups, into the Southern Ming story took a genuine great leap beyond what had gone before. But so ingrained was Xie's anti-Qing nationalism that he did not stint to give credit to the Southern Ming courts where he thought such credit was due, nor to praise anyone of any status-even high Ming officials and mili­ tarists-who sacrificed themselves for the resistance (or who opposed elements that under­ mined the resistance). In spite of their shortcomings, Xie repeatedly opined, the Southern Ming courts and their more stalwart officials had borne the hopes and received the support of the broad masses of the Chinese people. Twentieth Century 109

Unfortunately, the Nan Ming shilue was published just at the outset of the Anti­ Rightists Campaign, which began in the spring of 1957 and was followed directly by official calls for a "revolution in historiography." From this time through the "Great Leap Forward" of 1958-59, historians were challenged, in effect, to prove themselves as com­ mitted Communists by, for instance: (1) abandoning reference to dynasties, governments, or important officials, focusing instead on the history of the masses; (2) withdrawing praise from great men, subjecting them to criticism instead; and (3) assessing the actions of peas­ ant rebels even more positively, showing them alone to be, as Mao Zedong had said on one occasion (inconsistent with what he said on other occasions), the "real motive force of his­ torical development in China's feudal society."104 Accordingly, Xie's Nan Ming shilue was criticized for saying that the masses had supported the Hongguang regime, which had been vehemently inimical toward the true people's choice, the Great Shun::kJl&i government of Li Zicheng. Such a feudal, bureaucrat-landlord regime, the critic continued, was inca­ pable of doing anything genuinely in the interests of the people, who opposed the Manchus not because of loyalty to the Ming but because of the invaders' threat to agricultural pro­ duction (in which area the Qing eventually had to make "concessions"). Moreover, Xie had obscured the fact that, far from dissolving under common peril, class divisions had hardened during that time and in turn had hardened the Ming-Qing conflict. In short, Xie had "neglected the principle that struggle among peoples has its basis in struggle among classes."105 Shortly, Xie's mentor, Liang Qichao, was posthumously criticized at much greater length for his "whole set of reactionary, idealistic historical perspectives, his oblit­ eration of classes and class struggle, his propagation of the hero-[ centered] view of history, and his obscuration of the [fact that] the masses of common people are the absolute motive force of historical development."l06' Historical writing of this period on the Ming-Qing conflict was most affected by the question of how to reconcile historical relativism (fishi zhuyi ~~±~) with the applica­ tion of a correct class viewpoint (jieji guandian ~*& fI~), that is, whether the values of the past or the present (or both) should be used in judging historical phenomena. This was closely related to the "problem of evaluating historical personages" (lishi renwu pingjia wenti ~~A to/.]~1WrJjm!). Advocating moderation on these issues were the prominent and highly placed historians Jian Bozan It!fs. and ~~~tf. Iian's middle­ of-the-road position in 1961-62 was consistent with a study of the Southern Ming that he had written two decades earlier. In that, he had acknowledged both the Great Shun regime and the Hongguang court as legitimate Chinese governments, some leaders of which equally had been patriotic heroes; and he had pointed to historical circumstances by which we today, holding different values, nevertheless might understand the implacable enmity of Nanjing toward the rebels.107 Guo, also, took a position that was consistent with his longstanding interest in, and empathy for, great men of diverse ages. lOS In his preface to a collection of writings by the celebrated teenaged martyr of the Jiangnan resistance, Xia Wanchun (see I.C.26), Guo inserted what had become a pro forma apology for heroes of scholar-official background: Of course, he was born to a bureaucrat-landlord household and was deeply influenced by feudal shidafu consciousness. He regarded the Zhu-Ming court as legitimate and could not recognize the true worth of the peasant-rebel forces ... , looking on the peas­ ants' revolutionary leaders as "bandits and robbers." Under conditions of extremely 110 Part One, Chapter IV

fierce class conflict, this was an inevitable expression of his reactionary class view­ point; moreover, it was a common limitation among most of the patriotic shidafu of the time. 109 That condition, however, was not to interfere with our appreciation of such men's finer qualities, particularly their loyalty to the motherland. Both Guo and Jian, especially the latter, were to suffer severely for holding such moderate views during the "Great Prole­ tarian ," when the radical challenges of 1958-62 became extreme.110 As Arif Dirlik has cogently explained, both bipolar and structural models inform Marxist historical analyses. In the former, "class opposition detennines the alignment of all components of society and provides the ultimate motive force in historical change," whereas the latter "depicts society as a complex system of interrelated components. The bipolar model is obviously most appropriate for the revolutionary situation .... The structural model, on the other hand, is better able to take account of the "normal" historical situation .... In general, Marxists who are uncompromising on the issue of class conflict as the motive force of history have perceived history in terms of the paradigm of the revolutionary situation, and have preferred the bipolar to the struc tural model of society. This was certainly the case with those Chinese Marxists who believed that social bifurcation had detennined the nature and course of Chinese his­ tory, and insisted that class division was the "essential" datum of Chinese history .111 During the Cultural Revolution and the tenure of the infamous "," which together lasted from 1965 through the mid-1970s, the bipolar model was rigorously im­ posed on Chinese historical writing. Both national and class conflict became valued,112 though not without interpretive difficulty. In historical interpretation of the Ming-Qing conflict, two questions stood out: (1) whether the peasant-rebel armies should have allied themselves with the Southern Ming courts and loyal Ming officials; and (2) how to judge the perfonnance of Shi Kefa In discussions of both questions, increased emphasis on class divisions and class struggles led to denial that the Ming rump courts, their servitors, or anyone of landlord-class back­ ground could have played any positive role in the anti-Qing resistance, since that resistance basically had been against the very sort of feudal oppression that Ming scholar-officialdom represented. Effective resistance became attributed solely to the peasant-rebel armies and their leaders, who alone were supposed to have represented the broad masses of common people. Regarding the alliance of the remnant peasant-rebel armies with the Yongli regime, this view reached the extreme of denial that the "national contradiction had become pri­ mary" after the Manchus entered Shanhai Pass, and of insistence that the rebels should have preserved complete independence from the poisonous feudalists. Their policy of co­ operation had been a great, fatal error because it made them vulnerable to being "c.heated, seduced, corrupted, and co-opted" by the Ming bureaucrat-landlord class on both the oper­ ational and ideological levels. 113 This not only raised the historical dilemma of practically erasing the Ming rump courts and the loyal Ming officials and generals from the history of the anti-Qing resistance but it also ran against the grain of predominant sentiment by imply­ ing, unintentionally, that the "revolutionary heroes" were stupid, weakly constituted, and easily led astray. Twentieth Century 111

These problems were addressed by counterarguments that the policy of alliance with the feudal Ming political powers had been both perspicacious and necessary in order to stanch an aggressor that stood for both class and national oppression, the Manchu-Qing ruling element. Moreover, since the peasant-rebels were the only effective counterforce on the scene, for a time they were able to buttress the sagging Ming regimes, instill some new vigor in the latter's ranks, and revive popular support for the Ming cause (which the peasant-rebels saw not in "royalist" terms but as symbolizing the Chinese people). 1 14 In other words, instead of having become weak appendages to the dying Ming body politic, the rebel organizations had been vital, proletarian-revolutionary donors which gave emer­ gency transfusions to the failing Ming. Such lines of reasoning produced studies that either treated some peasant-rebel leaders (such as Li Laiheng **1J) as though they had formed no relation at all with the Ming rump courts, or portrayed others (especially Li Dingguo *JE~) as having presided over highly organized governmental activities and having be­ haved patronizingly toward the Y ongli emperor. I IS In any case, the "real us" was clear: the peasant-rebels. The debate over Shi Kefa was more emotional and vehement. In part, this was be­ cause it dealt with a figure who had been lionized since the middle Qing period, and who had become a hero to every Chinese schoolchild in the Republican period. Also, it was because the debate became closely intertwined with the frrst purge of the Cultural Revo­ lution, that of the prominent political and intellectual figure ~a-a, whose opinions on historical interpretation had been irritating ultra-leftists for years. The basic parameters of the Shi Kefa controversy were laid out in the 1950s, beginning with two articles by Ding Zhenghua and Luo Yuanzhen in the education journal Lishi jiaoxue.116 Those writers asserted that no man of landlord-class background who had served the exploitative, reac­ tionary Hongguang regime could possibly be considered a "hero of the people" at the end of the Ming, when only the peasant rebels represented the people's demands. Although Shi had been of the "upright faction" in government, like all members of his class, he had vacillated on the matter of immediately and maximally opposing the Manchus. At the same time, he had done everything in his power to oppose the rebels (much like Jiang Jieshi, who had delayed fighting the Japanese in order to first suppress Communist insurgents in the 1930s). Not wishing to worsen by confrontation the ambivalence of his fellow bureaucrat-landlords vis-a-vis the Qing, he had been as ineffectual in resolving his regime's political problems as he had been with the refractory military. Granted, he had not been afraid to die, but his will had been to die for his feudal ruler and his feudal ruling class, not for the broad masses of the Chinese people, whom he was incapable of caring about. These charges elicited spirited responses. In general, Shi's defenders were willing to acknowledge his shortcomings as a politician and military commander, but they hastened to cite many objective circumstances that had limited his range of possibilities, even though he had tried strenuously to help matters. Shi's enmity toward the peasant-rebel armies was undeniable, but it was natural considering Shi' s social background and experiences in of­ ficiallife. Worst, it was wrong, they said, to dichotomize dying for one's class and dying for one's nation. Since the "national contradiction had become primary," the fonner had melded with the latter. Shi had lacked the' opportunity, later afforded to officials of the Longwu and Yongli courts, to join hands with peasant-rebel leaders, but his performance in the Jiangnan defense had shown him to be a man who could cross class barriers. 117 In all, these rebuttals accorded with a contemporaneous article by Jian Bozan on "Problems of 112 Part One, Chapter IV

Evaluating Historical Figures" (1952), which urged that the standards of twentieth-century consciousness not be imposed on men of the past, that they not be "modernized" by attrib­ uting to them current motivations, and that they not be compared frivolously with men of the present day. For the time being, Shi Kefa's status as a great patriotic martyr seemed secure. In 1959, Zhang Xikong ~~fL, in a series edited by Wu Han, published a book on Shi that told of how: after the Qing troops entered the Pass, Shi Kefa, with the tremendous support of the common people of Jiangnan, for the sake of protecting his country and his people, and regardless of his own position, refused to be cowed or tempted. He organized forces to carry on resolute struggle against the invading Qing army and dealt it a ferocious blow. In the end he died for his country and exhibited the most laudable patriotic righ­ teousness. (author's prefatory summary) Late in 1965, the "first shots" of the Cultural Revolution were fired when Wu Han came under severe and sustained criticism for the political implications of his historical play Hai Rui baguan ~JiMW tr ("Hai Rui Dismissed from Office"). Among other things, he was charged with "beautifying" the feudal past and spreading counterrevolutionary ideas of class harmony.118 Then, in January of 1966, the same organ that had been utilized to launch the attack on Wu Han, the )(1HJl¥~ in Shanghai, criticized Zhang Xi­ kong's work thusly: This book is written according to a feudalist and capitalist-class viewpoint. It wholly repudiates use of the proletarian viewpoint as a standard in evaluating historical fig­ ures. Shi Kefa was one of the executioners who repressed the peasant uprisings. His whole life was one of cruelly massacring the common people. In a period when the nation faced a crisis of unprecedented severity, he betrayed the people's interests and beat the drums for "pacifying the interior [before] resisting outside [enemies]" and pursued the insane policy of suppressing the peasant-rebels, who were resisting the Qing. This book, in portraying Shi Kefa as a national hero, completely casts aside the class content of patriotism and is a poisonous weed to Marx -Leninism. 1 19 Thereafter the Wenhui bao issued as a "supreme directive," regarding works like Zhang's, a quotation from Mao Zedong's speech to the 1956 Conference on Propaganda Work of the CCP: "All mistaken thinking, all poisonous weeds, all ox-and-serpent demons should be subjected to criticism and absolutely not be allowed to freely spread around."120 Through­ out 1966, the Wenhui bao continued to print articles debating both the merits and demerits of Shi Kefa (and indirectly those of Wu Han and his associates),121 but the trend of as­ sessment defmitely was against Shi and his admirers. The "real us," the nei that mattered, was not China but proletarian China. No one who had not represented or sided with the working class in Chinese history could be respected, much less qualify as a national hero. When a sufficiently negative judgment had been reached on Shi, the debate was cut off. The Shanghai Wenhui bao used a simple but crude tactic. They sent specialists to Yangzhou [the site of Shi's death and his memorial shrine] to organize a seminar. At that meeting, they pressured people to show [certain] attitudes and used the method of majority rule to thoroughly discredit Shi Kefa. Afterward they even published a so- Twentieth Century 113

called Seminar Precis, very strident in tone, which delivered a "conclusion" on Shi Kefa and left no way to continue the debate. 122 Not until 1978, after the downfall of the Gang of Four, did it become possible to reopen discussion of Shi Kefa and redress the balance. Two seminars that year at Yangzhou Nor­ mal College m1HgffltiH~WG revealed a range of opinion, but the general tendency was to return the basis of discussion to the historical record and to restore Shi Kefa's dignity by placing him back in the seventeenth century, away from the demands of twentieth-century Communist morality.123 The result was to resurrect the 1950s formula for treating national heroes of scholar-official background from the premodern era: carefully cite the "historical limitations" on their ability to act as one with the masses or to abandon monarchist values, but do not allow that to interfere with portraying their self-sacrifice for the motherland. 124 "Class viewpoint" remained important but no longer was allowed to dominate to the point of insistence that, in times of threat from other nations, it is more important to stand with the disenfranchised of both sides, in opposition to the ruling elements of both sides, rather than with one's compatriots of all classes. This was consistent with the rehabilitative CCP line, begun in the middle 1970s and crystallized in 's ~/J\=¥ speech to a preparatory meeting for the Third Ple­ num of the Eleventh Congress of the CCP in December 1978: "Bring order out of chaos" by "returning things to their original appearance," and "seek truth from facts" in order to "unite as one and look to the future."125 Also, in an especially important speech of January 1980, Deng placed the "return of Taiwan" and "unification of the motherland" second in priority for the 1980s only to "resisting the hegemonism" of foreign powers and above even his much-touted "four modernizations" of the economy. 126 This not only led to some reconciliatory assessments of the historical controversies of the previous twenty years and calls for closer adherence to the primary record,127 but it also generated yet another marked change in PRC scholarly discussion of the history of the Ming-Qing conflict That change-toward emphasizing national unity and autonomy, sociopolitical order, minimal retrogression or destruction, and protection or restoration of the productive ca­ pacities of the country----obviously was appropriate to a time of recovery from, and repu­ diation of, the divisive and ruinous Cultural Revolution, that is, a time when the authority of the CCP and its leaders was being salvaged. Historical personages and forces became evaluated according to whether they had forwarded the cause of China's well-being, in the senses both of maintaining or restoring a unitary order and of advancing the universal "struggle for production" in its Chinese manifestations. Ideas about leaping over the cap­ italist stage, straight into socialism and on to communism by continuous revolutionary means, were discredited. Citations of Mao Zedong's statements about the supreme value of peasant wars were replaced with references to Marx, Engels, and Lenin that permitted consideration of mutual reinforcement among multiple historical factors in the long-term, overall advancement of productive forces. 128 This entailed a decrease in attention to and esteem for the late-Ming rebel movements, which now sometimes faded into general ref­ erences to social "chaos" or, almost in afterthought, were credited with hastening the pro­ gressive Qing reunification by fw1her weakening the Ming. 129 The corollary was a great rise in approval ratings for the Manchu-Qing enterprise and those who had joined it. A fresh blossoming of historiographical debate accompanied the rise in influence of Hu Yaobang ~mn (perceived as supportive of intellectuals), who served as general 114 Part One, Chapter IV secretary of the Central Committee of the CCP from 1982 to 1987. Interpretations of the Ming-Qing transition, within that blossoming, perhaps can be synopsized as follows. During the Ming period, China had reached a very advanced feudal stage and was showing progressive capitalist incipiences. But neither the basic modes of production among the masses nor the governmental superstructure had evolved sufficiently for genuine revolution to take place. To a considerable extent, this was because of handicaps imposed by the cor­ rupt and ossified Ming state. Basically conservative and repressive, it had entered the final phase of the kind of decay that inevitably overcame Chinese dynasties and was doomed to fall amid a welter of domestic inter- and intra-class conflicts. The peasant-rebels, repre­ sented most pertinently by Li Zicheng, might have succeeded in establishing a new dynasty and releasing some repressed productive forces, but they could only follow in the old, feudal governmental pattern. As it happened, there was a third protagonist on the scene, the Manchu-led Latter JinlQing regime, which had grown strong and evolved quickly by struggling to improve the Northeastern people's productivity and protect them from hann­ ful Ming policies. Not only did they display strategic and martial acumen sufficient to defeat both the peasant rebels and the Ming, they showed nation-building talent sufficient to restore and maintain orderly rule over much more extensive and ethnically diverse ter­ ritories than had any previous dynasty. In essence, the Qing gave a new lease on life to what had been a decrepit feudal state system, the historical "function" of which was not quite finished. This line of interpretation grants that, in the beginning, Manchu social, economic, and governmental practices were more backward than those in China proper. Moreover, dur­ ing the fust few decades of Qing rule the rapacity and ignorance of the Manchu nobility had added to the hardship and destruction already perpetrated by their adversaries and had greatly exacerbated inter-ethnic hatreds. Partly because of their early lack of economic sophistication and partly because of their very success in imitating and reforming the Ming system, they retarded even more China's evolution to capitalism. But the boldness, com­ petence, and flexible pragmatism of the Qing leaders, and their basic commitment to fonn­ ing a multi-ethnic state (despite the tensions inherent in maintaining the ultimate supremacy of the Manchu nobility) set China on a path to strength and greatness, which enabled the country to resist Russian and European imperialist encroachment until the middle nineteenth century. One article by an influential author even claimed that the Qing unification had thwarted British colonialism in the seventeenth century! 130 The following passages are quintessential: Ever since the Qin-Han period, our country has been a unitary, multi-ethnic nation. But the small-scale agricultural economy always exhibited a high degree of closed­ ness. For this reason, the [premodern] sort of political unity could only be relative [compared to the true unity we have today]. Once conditions changed, that unity could devolve into the separatism of regional powers, and regional ethnic regimes could fonn in response. Conflicts, contradictions, and warfare then became inevi­ table. The Ming-Qing wars are one example of such domestic warfare among [our] peoples .... In the various stages of the Ming-Qing wars, there was the problem of two brother peoples, the Manchus and the Han, engaging in mutual encroachment But today when we study the Ming-Qing wars, it is not to arrive at a final reckoning Twentieth Century 115

[of which side was more at fault]. Rather, it is to summarize the lessons from his­ torical experience and guide present-day actions .... So first we should see that the direct result of civil war between brother peoples was to defeat and injure both. Alike, they lost soldiers and functionaries, weakening themselves in the process of injuring the other. This was not in the interest of com­ mon prosperity among peoples. Second, we should note the imperilment and damage to society of unrighteous warfare. Because of the long, drawn-out fighting, society's productive capacity was ruined, the growth of incipient capitalism was inhibited, and the forward development of feudal [into capitalist] society was delayed. Adding to that the congenital, chronic afflictions of China's feudal system, it became very difficult for old and great China to walk forward; [our country was] cast aside far behind the newly risen capitalist countries of the West. All the way down to the Opium War, China still had not broken out of the feudal mold. The backward thus were beaten.131 Concomitantly, a host of erstwhile traitors-such as Hong Chengchou, Fan Wen- cheng m:)(~, Feng Quan {,~~, Shi Lang, and even Wu Sangui ~~:f:E-who previ- . ously had been anathematized for collaborating most closely with, and being most useful to, a horde of barbarians who had conquered China by the sword, were "reevaluated." They now were seen, on balance, as important agents of political stabilization and eco­ nomic recovery, promoters of inter-ethnic cooperation and synthesis, and consolidators of direct Chinese governmental control over strategically and developmentally crucial outlying territories such as Taiwan.132 At the same time, a series of books and major articles ap­ peared that portrayed very favorably the leadership and perspicacity of the most vigorous early-Qing autocrats-Nurhaci, Hungtaiji, Dorgon, Kangxi, and Yongzheng.133 Several of these offer sophisticated, well-balanced judgments grounded in excellent historical re­ search and insight, but their appearance together under the CCP line of the early and middle 1980s is no coincidence. In conformity with party emphases on restoring domestic unity, production, and political control, many passages in the PRC writings of this period iron­ ically echo propaganda of the early Qing reigns about (Han-chauvinist) Ming wrongs against the (minority) Manchus, the latter's great achievements in saving China from the chaos induc~d by late-Ming rule, the desirability of "Man and Han forming one body," and the good, obedient people of China being grateful for the peace and order that had been reinstituted by the Qing.134 The introduction to a volume of translations from Shun­ zhi period Manchu documents even sees the benefits of Qing rule as having been manifest from the start. After entering the Pass in 1644, the Qing rulers, at a crucial point in the change of political regimes, correctly handled class relations [by] forming a united government based primarily in the Manchu landlord class and supplementarily in the Han landlord class, [thereby] ameliorating class contlict with the latter. They applied themselves to relieving the people's hardships and bringing peace and stability to locales, [thereby] ameliorating class conflict with the broad masses of the Han people. This resulted in the Qing rulers' winning widespread support among the landlord class and the various other [social] strata, [leading to] complete victory. Consequently, the situation that had obtained since late Ming of the country bein.g split by two governmental authori­ ties existing at the same time was finally resolved. A unified country was realized in which the people had peace and stability, and China moved forward to a new age. 116 Part One, Chapter IV

This was a stupendous contribution of those progressive ones in the upper levels of the Manchu landlord class toward the peoples of Greater China.135 Nei and wai had changed positions and colors again. "We" were those who supported national recovery from almost two decades of social and political turmoil and who favored the requisite amelioration of class conflicts and ethnic separatism, as well as renewed ef­ forts to overcome the mainland-Taiwan split. The chief aim of national recovery, besides saving the CCP from total self-destruction, was to compensate for the economic retrogres­ sion of the Great Leap and Cultural Revolution years and put China back on track toward the goal of at least power parity with "them," the threatening foreign, mainly capitalist, countries. 'They" were to be held at bay through internal solidarity until China could catch up by means of increasing productivity. And the latter now entailed learning from capital­ ism (and from Taiwan) rather than leaping over (or destroying) it Yet, under conditions of the "socialist market economy," and especially since the Tiananmen ~3i:r' Incident of 1989, a number of above-board publications, of commer­ cial presses as well as prestigious research institutions, have shown that interpretation of the Ming-Qing conflict can still be a medium, if not of dissent then at least of subtle mes­ sages of non subscription to the self-serving Party line. For instance, the general editor of a series of layman-oriented biographies of the less-admirable Ming emperors candidly admits that the increasing need to attend to readers' interests and sales volume has made feasible his long-held desire to publish works on the "congenitally absurd" Ming rulers. 136 As for the end of their dynasty, more forceful than Nan Bingwen' s textbook -like treatment of the Southern Ming, which harkens back to the united-front interpretation of Xie Guozhen, is Gu Cheng's.~ book of the same title, Nan Ming shi i¥.if!f.1;E, work on which he set aside in the 1980s but returned to earnestly in 1990.137 Therein Gu stubbornly refuses to join a chorus of praise for any ruling group, least of all that of the early Qing, and adheres to an emphasis on the most decisively repressed elements in the conquest-inland the "pea­ sant insurrectionists" and the "people's resisters" on the seaboard. Gu Cheng, moreover, penned one of several articles in the 1993 issue of Qingshi luncong ~ se.MBil-a publication of the Chinese Academy of Social Sciences, located just off the Chang'an Street *~m of 1989 infamy-which caustically buck the trend to indirectly support the current political leadership by celebrating the Qing "unification" and extolling early Qing rulers. Subjects of those articles include the precariousness of Qing control when hit by a wave of defections in 1654; "Nine Righteous Gentlemen" who, hav­ ing been enslaved in Qing "suppressions of the resistance struggle," showed "in special ways absolute refusal to submit to Qing high-pressure tactics," and whose descendants in Korea showed "mutual solidarity" in never forgetting their forebears' cause; and the crush­ ing by Qing authorities of a series of Ming-restorationist attempts by coalitions of men from several social sectors in the late 1640s and 1650s in Jiangnan and Zhejiang, "a scene that manifested [anti-Qing] underground activities and open insurrections that leapt from the hills and roiled the seas, as well as the stench-laden wind from the blood-rain of Qing­ dynasty suppressions."138 The pre-Liberation historiographical language of these articles is distinctly reminiscent of the Ming-to-Qing rhetoric that surrounded the 1911 Revolution, the phylogeny of which extended back to the Qing conquest and its immediate aftennath in the seventeenth century. The wai of this language is within the Pass. Twentieth Century 117

Thus, the Chinese people continue to grope for sociopolitical and governmental insti­ tutions that can fulfIll the promise of the progressive "enlightenment history" to which they took out a long-term subscription at the beginning of the twentieth century. And interpre­ tations of the Ming-Qing conflict have come full circle, having repeated every major thren­ ody of the Qing period within a paradigmatic ally nei-wai composition on the exigencies of contemporary international and national politics. Of course, the Ming-Qing conflict origi­ nally was an enOffilOUS political phenomenon. That its primary record, the effects on its historiography of eady- and middle-Qing state measures, and its twentieth-century inter­ pretation also have been heavily political is of no surprise. History everywhere responds to politics, and Chinese historians, especially, have always needed to be attentive to the atmosphere of court and capital. . But they also have shown themselves capable of foregrounding scholarship. Back in the Jiaqing and Daoguang reign periods, a certain distance in time from the Ming-Qing conflict had been reached (roughly the same distance as between the disruptive events of the second to third Ming reigns and the remarkably objective, scholarly reassessments of them in the late Ming). Then it seemed that studies of the dynastic founding-its relevance to Manchu-Qing legitimacy nothwithstanding-might have assumed a nearly nonnal place among those of other such occurrences in Chinese history. However, forthwith China entered an era of unrelieved political crises from which it has not yet fully emerged-crises that have perpetuated heavy use of the history of the Ming-Qing conflict as a propaganda mechanism. Great advances have been made in late-Ming and early-Qing history by many scholars who have managed, in spite of discouraging conditions, to escape or ignore polit­ ical pressures, and some others have produced useful, even monumental, works while successfully riding the political tides. But to date the history of the Ming-Qing conflict remains, in China, largely a politics-refracting prism that continues to turn.

NOTES 1. Duara 1995: chap. 1, (quote) p. 17. 2. Ibid. 3. Furth 1976: 126-27; Yang Tianshi 1965. 4. See chapter III, especJally references to Crossley 1987. 5. Rhoads 1995: 10-14. On the appropriation of aspects of secret society actions and ideologies for emplotting "a larger narrative of a national romance:' see Duara 1995: chap. 4. 6. Diktltter 1992: chaps. 3-4, esp. pp. 101-3. For an excellent general discussion of the rise of intellectual anti-Manchuism in the 1898-1911 interval, see Crossley 1990: chap. 6. 7. On Zhang and Liu, see BDRC, I: 92-98, and II: 411-13, respectively; and Chang Hao 1987: chaps. 4-5. On Zhang Binglin's anti-Manchuism, see Wong Young-tsu 1989: 61--64. On the relation between Zhang's Confucian moral views (i.e., his preference for Xunzi :f1jr) and theories of evolution and survival of the fittest, see Chang Hao 1987: 109-10. Liu Shipei renounced the revolutionary cause in 1909 and served the Manchus thereafter. On Deng and Chen, see Liu Yazi 1940a: 4, and 5-7, respectively. 8. Zhang Binglints account of his introduction to such material (1965: 2), beginning·under the tutelage of his maternal grandfather during the years 1876-80, accords exactly with an acceleration in the publication 118 Part One, Chapter W

of wenji X~ and congshu •• concerning the Ming-Qing conflict that began in the early 1870s (see chap. m, pp. 72-73). A good gauge of the amount of material that had become available by 1910 is the 295-item bibliography Zhengfang Mingji yishu mu 1'lf~gij~ift. [3, compiled by Liu Shiyuan ~Jt!tJf and published that year in a spirit indistinguishable from that of the loyal Qing bibliophiles discussed in chapter m~ pp. 69-71. .

9. Van der Loon 1961: 26-28. See the Chunqiu, 4th year of Duke Xi f111}, Gongyang 1}$ comment on passage 4, "save the Central Kingdoms and expel the barbarians"; and the 4th year of Duke Ding JE 1}, Guliang ~~ comment on passage 14, "hold faith with the Central Kingdoms and expel the barbarians."

10. On Wu Yi, see Wu Changxing bo ji ~~JHsjft with appended zhuanlue f$~, in Guocui congshu (1907 ser.). Chen's biography ofWu was expanded and revised by his younger compatriot, Liu Yazi, in 1940 and 1943 (see Liu's Huaijiuji, [1946: 198-210]). On Wu Yan and Pan Chengzhang, see Wu Chiming ji ~$~~ in Guocui congshu (1906 ser.) and writings in the Guocui xuebao 3.8 (1907), zhuanlu m~ sec. For a more recent treatment, see Du Weiyun 1979. 11. Chen Qubing 1908a: 1. 12. For instance, see Wei Yi [Lin Shipei] 1907; and Si Ou 1908. 13. Bernal 1976: 94-99; Furth 1976: 128-36. 14. Lin Shipei 1905: chaps. 15 and 16. 15. Lin Shipei's preface to Chen Qnbing's Qing mishi (1904); republished in Lin's Zuoan waiji (1935: j. 17). 16. Zhang Binglin 1919a.

17. Besides compiling the. "Ming yimin 1u," Chen Qubing also published a regular feature on yimin ~~ in the congtan.~ section of Guocui xuebao, the "Wu shi zhi" 1i:ontl, from 1906 through 1910. Other snch series that featured jottings on, and selections from the writings of, fonner Ming subjects in the Guocui xuebao include Pang Shubo's JftWffi "Longshansbi zhitan" ft~¥::I:tff~, Cao Yingcbang's .JJl\~ "Shutang yiwen" I.f1itJlx, and the "Sangxie yizheng" ~~m~, compiled by Han Si ~J~' This is not to mention many separate biographies of, and republished selections from the writings of, f01mer Ming subjects throughout the Guocui xuebao, Guocui congshu. and Guxue huibian. 18. Chang Hao 1987: 112.

19. Qian's Toubiji ~*~ was published in the Guocui congshu, 1906 ser. For a brief biography of Qian, see ECCP: 148-50; and for an extensive treatment of his life and times. see Chen Yinke 1980. On the proscription of Qian' s writings, see Zhuang Iifa 1973. On Wu Weiye and proscription of his oeuvre, see part two, II.2S; and Goodrich 1966: 42-43, 217. 20. See, for instance, Zbang Binglin 1919b.

21. See Schneider 1971: 32~1, and 1976.

22. This work can be found in Zhao Binglin's Zhao Boyenji, fase. 5. See Qingshi gao jiaozhu, II: 1024-25. 23. Zhang Binglin 1919c. See also the concluding lines ofLiu Shipei's preface to the Qing mishi, cited in note 15. Twentieth Century 119

24. For biographical sketches of Zhu Xizu and Liu Yazi, see BDRC, I: 446-47, and II: 421-23, respec­ tively. Liu's original name was Weigao mf-lj, but later he changed it twice, to Renquan AffH and then to Qiji ~~. Eventually, however, he used the last of several sobriquets, Yazi, as his name. See Liu's self­ introduction in the NanshejiIue (1940a: 8-10).

25. On the incredible vicissitudes of Zhu's personal library, the Liting g1jt, during the time of Japa­ nese encroachment and the War of Resistance, see Su Jing 1983: 158-60.. Zhu's bibliographical notes have been published collectively as the Mingji shiliao tiba (see Zhu 1961, 1943). For his most substantial pub­ lished studies, see Zhu 1929, 1932.

26. Qian Qi ~~ (1797-1858) is said to have written a long work entitled Nan Ming shu "f¥jfYH!}, but it apparently did not survive into the twentieth century (Xie Guozhen 1981: 477). A Korean work very sympathetic to the Chinese revolutionary cause, the Nammy6ng kangmok i¥.jlY:ltM §, by Ch<'Sng Kyo ~:Jf (1856-1925), was published in 1906, but it probably was little known among Chinese historians.

27. Zhu Xizu, an exacting scholar, also was inhibited by the extremely numerous problems of authen­ ticity, accuracy, and bibliographical control that he encountered in working with Southern Ming source materials. See his preface to the 1932 edition of Xie Guozhen's Wan Ming shiji kao (see Xie 1981). The manuscript of Zhu' s unpublished, brief treatment of the Southern Ming, entitled both "Nan Ming zhengzhi shi" j¥jry;]iI&t€t~ and "Nan Ming zhi guoben yu zhengquan" i¥Jry;]iL.~*~il&m, is held in the Luo Xiang­ lin Memorial Collection of the Fung Ping Shan Library, Hong Kong University. Liu's story is especially poignant. His collection consisted largely of books entrusted to him in Shanghai by the prominent left­ wing literary figure Qian Xingcun ~~~ (better known as Aying ~~) in 1939. Liu managed to both preserve and expand this collection, even though, because of Japanese pressures, he was forced to take up residence in Kowloon. On December 8-9, 1941, however, Liu and his family barely escaped with their lives from the Japanese bombing and occupation of Hong Kong and Kowloon, and Liu's precious collection subsequently was lost. See Liu Yazi 1943a. On this period in Liu's life, see Liu Wuji 1983: 104-13. A preliminary chronology of Southern Ming events, which Liu bad been publishing serially in the magazine Dafeng::kj.\ in 1941, also was cut short by the Japanese attack. Undaunted, Liu continued to champion the pursuit of Southern Ming history from his wartime refuge in Guilin, fIrst calling for the establishment of a special Southern Ming History Compilation Office in the Nationalist government's Bureau of National History (Liu Yazi 1943b: 38-39) and then advertising the fonnation of a private society to compile a series of Southern Ming histories, the Nan Ming shiliao she j¥j~!1:*4t± (see Liu Yazi xiansheng 1944: 50). These projects, however, were rendered impossible by exigencies of the resistance against Japan. See Liu Wuji 1983: 120-25.

28. Most influential were Liang's articles "Lun Zhongguo xueshu sixiang bianqian zhi dashi" ~cp~ ~VijJi!.tm~Blz::k~ and "Xin shixue" m~~, republished in Yinbingshi heji ~*~ft~ (1936), "Wenji" )(~, vol. 3, pt. 7, and vol. 4, pt 9, resp. For synopses of Liang's historiographical views, see Kamiya 1942: 77-87; Ueda 1959; and Luo Bingmian 1972.

29. Liang's lectures were added as a supplement to the 1926 edition of Zhongguo lishi yanjiufa, which was reissued several times thereafter by the ZH, in both Shanghai and Taipei. Liang bad at least one thing in common with the National Essence circle-his interest in the history of the conquest period literally was peripheral. He only studied fonner Ming subjects who took refuge in or sought aid from Japan as the Ming disintegrated, just as Liang himself had done after the failure of the Reform of 1898. See his chronological 120 Part One, Chapter IV

biography ofZhu Zhiyu (see I.F.15); Liang [1936] 1957; and his article on Zhu and Huang Zongxi (see I.C.10), Liang 1923. 30. Ding Wenjiang 1983: entries for 1926-27. On the book collection in Liang's study, the Yinbing­ shi, see Su ling 1983: 102-3. On Liang's work in librarianship and large-scale bibliography during the years of his association with Xie, see ibid.: 106-10.

31. Xie Jiqing 1983: 53; Xie Guozhen's preface to the Wan Ming shiji kao (1981 ed.: 15-16). Xie may well be the family tutor whom Liang Qichao mentions favorably in a letter to one of his daughters in June 1927 (Ding Wenjiang 1983: 1148). For a brief assessment of Xie's scholarship, see Chen and Du 1991: 36-38.

32. After the revolution of 1949, Xie began to revise and expand this work (see his postscript to the Nan Ming shiiue, dated 1956). But the new (Zengding) edition did not appear, from the SG, until 1981. 33. For Xie's most substantial bibliographical works (in addition to the Wan Ming shiji kao), see Xie 1931, 1956, 1962a, 1962b, 1979, 1980a. For a complete list of his writings, see Yamane 1983: 4-6. 34. Levenson 1970: 160-62. 35. See, for instance, one of Xie' s last publications, 1980b. 36. Duara 1995: 42-43. 37. Schneider 1971: esp. 34, 259-69. 38. Dirlik 1978: 117-18. For a brief biography of Tao, see BDRC, III: 241-43. See also p. 105. 39. Immanuel Hsu 1975: 649. 40. Wang Chongwu 1937. 41. Huang Hua 1936a (issue 17): 10. 42. Dong Zhenke 1936. For other examples see: Yi Zhenglun 1934; Wei Shoumo 1937: 70; and Gao Liangzuo 1933. On the treatment of Zhang Huangyan in twentieth-century writings, see Chen Yongming 1992b: 63-67. 43. Huang Pingsun 1936. 44. For an admiring, brief biography of Xiao Yishan, who was only twenty-two years old when the first volume of the Qingdai tongshi was published, and a favorable assessment of this work's content, see Xiao Liyan 1983. For a more balanced critique, see Chen and Du 1991: 20-27. 45. Huang Hua 1936b: 17. Also, see a response to Huang's article, Huang Buyi 1936. The medium of these writings, and many others of the same stripe, from October 1935 Ihrough September 1936, was the Yuefeng banyue kan ~.fflit# F.f ftl in Shanghai. The issues have all been reprinted in the lindai Zhongguo shiliao congkan, 2nd ser., vols. 658-60. 46. The Guonan congshu, part 1 (editor unknown), especially featured massacres and military devasta­ tions. Other important collections of Ming resistance materials that appeared during the 1920s and 1930s include the Yinli wi sitang congshu (1928) and republication (in 1936) of the Mingji baishi huibian under the title Mingji baishi chubian. 'See "Part Two References: Collections and Series." Twentieth Century 121

47. For instance, see Cheng Zongquan 1947; and Hou Sheng 1939. The latter was first published in a 1935 issue of Fuxing yuekan 11.F.J flJ and later republished three times in other periodicals. Both of these articles stress the lack of good leadership, in moral conduct as well as in decision making.

48. For a brief biography of Zbou, see BDRC, I: 424-27. On Zhou's reasons for remaining in Beijing and his circumstances during that time, see Wolf 1971: 6-9. On Zbou's attitudes toward the Chinese pop­ ulace, see Pollard 1976. On the Japanese rapacity in Hangzbou, which ensued from late December, 1937, through February of the following year, see Shubsi Hsu 1938: 195-200. For an indication that Zhou was responding at least in part to the rape of his home region, see the postscript to one of those essays, Zhou Zuoren (pen name Zhou Li' an) 1939.

49. Gou Jian acceded to the throne of the Yue ~ kingdom in 496 B.C. At first defeated in his attempts to subdue the inimical Wu ~ kingdom to the north, he never forgot his mission and eventually succeeded in overthrowing Wu through clever stratagems. For this story, see the Guoyu ~M:f, chaps. 19-21. 50. Zhou Zuoren 1939: 342-43. 51. Yi Junzuo 1954: 4.

52. See Guangdong wenwu JjBR)(~, vol. 2 (1941) for articles by Li Jianer *i1Jr" Yan Xuxin Mi liIJL" Mai Shaolin ~pllt and Li Lu'an *JfI/i. Also see several articles by Zhu Xizu (some under his pseudonym, Tixian ~;'G) in Wenshi zazhi )(!i:.§~, 2.7-8 (Aug. 1942). Ye Gongchuo published his collation of the Huang Ming sichao chengren lu (11.18) under very difficult conditions in wartime Hong Kong. Enthusiasm for celebrating the resistance activities of Guangdong loyalists continued after the war. See Nanshan Yan 1954. 53. Li Guangtao 1948a: esp. 228. On the Qing and post-Qing historiographical treaunent of Hong, see -main 1984: cbap. 8; or idem 1985. For a brief biography of and posthumous tribute to U, see Zhou Tianjian 1985. 54. See Liu's Huaijiu ji, pp. 1-5,63-79. See also note 27. 55. Also, Liu published (under the pseudonym Nanshi) two useful studies of the various posthumous titles given to the last Ming rulers (l940b). 56. For a brief biography of Puyi, see BDRC, III: 8. 57. See Bartlett 1980. 58. For a brief biography of Meng, see BDRC, III: 32-34. For a thorough discussion of his scholarship by a former student, the noted Qing history specialist Shang Hongkui ifijm~, see Meng Sen 1986a: 530- 58; and for a briefer but substantial discussion, see Chen and Du 1991: 27-36. The most important of Meng's approximately one hundred articles are collected in Meng Sen 1959, 1986a, and in the Xinshi congkan (1986b). Meng wrote two general histories, the Mingdai shi ([1957] 1966) and the Qingdai shi, ([1962] 1990). 59. See Meng's Qingshijiangyi ([1947] 1965), or Ming-Qing shijiangyi (1982). 60. Meng Sen 1959: 213-17. Fifty years later, when Sino-Russian border disputes involving the Yalu region coincided with the publication of Soviet scholarship that implied the independent nationhood of "Manchuria" in the Latter Jin period, Meng's work proved useful in Chinese refutations of that view. See Bai Chen wen 1981. . 122 Part One, Chapter IV

61. Meng's distress possibly was increased by the memory of his own early Japanophilia and certainly by the actions of one of his early mentors, Zheng Xiaoxu !IIS~f;j. Zheng had become a Qing loyalist and since 1924 had closely advised the erstwhile Xuantong emperor, Puyi, promoting the cause of Qing monar­ chical restoration. He had been a key figure in collaborating with the Japanese to establish Manzhouguo and re-enthrone Puyi there, and he himself had become premier of that puppet state (see BDRC, I: 271-75). Another supporter of Puyi and a collaborator with the Japanese in establisbing Manzhouguo was Luo Zbenyu ¥.1m.3$. (see BDRC, II: 426-27). A respected scholar, Luo earned the gratitude of his peers in helping to save tons of Qing archival documents from being recycled as scrap. But Luo' s later activity in editing and publishing materials on early-Qing history, thougb valuable, has been considered ~ted by his Qing loyalism and close association with the Japanese. 62. The first two parts of the Mingyuan Qingxi tongji, extending through middle Ming, bear a preface dated 1934. 63. For examples of the literature generated by the tricentenary of the Yangzi Campaign, see Huang Tianjian 1958; Huang Yuzhai 1958-59; and Nian Yuan 1961; as well as an earlier piece (l953b) by Li Zhenhua 64. For summaries of the contents of works in the 1W series, see Wu Fuyuan 1977a. For an index to authors and works in the series, consult Huang Dianquan 1978. Some works in the TW (published with punctuated texts in handy, inexpensive, paperback volumes) now have become collectors' items. Others have been reprinted in the TWSL series. 65. Between 1955 and 1966, Huang Yuzhai published more than a dozen articles, which covered the whole spectrum of Southern Ming political history, in the journal Taiwan wenxian ~.)(~. These articles, which consist largely of long quotations from original sources, are of little interpretive value, but at the time they served to acquaint readers with the richness of extant sources on the Southern Ming period. Later, the respected scholar of Taiwan history Yang Yunping brought a keener sense of historical problems to the study of the Hongguang and Yongli courts. See Yang 1975 and 1977. In 1963, Sun Zhihe raised the question of compiling a history of the Southern Ming, apparently desiring something fuller than the annals that bad been appended to the biographical section (vol. 8) of the Qingshi ~!t:, published by the Guofang yanjiuyuan ~~iTf~~ in 1961. In one article on the Yongli court's last, miserable years in Bunna, Li Zhenhua (1958) expressed righteous, nationalistic satisfaction that the perfidious Burmese later were punished in one of the major military campaigns of the ! 66. Compare, for instance, Cben Dingshan 1950 and Sheng Cheng 1956. This reflects, of course, a sociopolitical tension on the island, where the Taiwanese, mostly of Fujian ancestry, had become unhappily subject to domination by the Nationalist-led government of Zbejiang native Jiang Jieshi. 67. For instance, the activities of Li Dingguo, which have loomed so large in PRC treatments of the Ming resistance, have been noted by Taiwan bistorians only because of Li' s abortive attempts to join forces with Zheng Chenggong to attack . See Zhu Feng 1961; Jin Chengqian 1965; and Wei Yongzhu 1980.

68. For an early attempt to ~reak the official Qing mold and promote modern studies ofZheng Cheng­ gong, see Xue Cbengqing 1927. For a full exposition of Zheng Cheng gong as a hero-figure in Chinese culture, see Croizier 1977. Several of my points on pages 102-3 also are explained and illustrated in Croizier's fourth chapter, "The Nationalist Transfiguration" (pp. 50-62). Twentieth Century 123

69. Yang Shufang 1935: 32. See also Huang Diancheng 1936: 1-2. As Croizier points out (1977: 60-61), because Zheng was born in Japan to a Japanese woman, the Japanese also had utilized his seizure of Taiwan to assert their own historical right to the island. After the repatriation of Taiwan in 1945, Yang Yunping pointed out the irony in that position, saying that if the Japanese truly had respected Zheng for resisting the Manchus they would also have respected the Taiwanese for resisting Japanese colonialism (1948: 2).

70. For examples, see Zhou Yiou 1951; Lin Xiongxiang 1955; and Lin Zhiping 1956. 71. Li Zhenhua 1950. 72. Chen Shiqing 1955: 1. 73. See, for instance, Zhuang Jinde 1961: esp. 35; or Wu Rui 1967. 74. See, for instance, Shen Zhennong 1959; Fang Hao 1961; and Zhuang linde 1966.

75. An allusion to the Mencius, 3B.9. 76. Zhu Weijing 1959: 88. 77. See Wang Rongzu 1985; and Zhou Xueyu 1990. On the PRC turnaround regarding Shi Lang, see page 115 and note 132. 78. Representative works by the scholars named can be found in "Part One References" and "Part Two References." For a retrospective on relatively solid Chinese scholarship about the Zheng regime and the Zheng period in Taiwan, see Shi Wanshou 1989.

79. Wu Micha 1978.

80. For some good e~ples, see Zheng Ruiming 1986; Yang Hezhi 1992; and Ye Gaoshu 1993: chap.5. 81. Chen Chunsheng 1987. 82. See, for instance, Mao Yibo 1953; and Wu Rui 1964. 83. These passages are from Shen Zhennong 1957: 10; and 1961: 17, respectively.

84. See note 38. 85. Dirlik 1976: 315-20 (quote) 318. 86. For an explicit use of Tao Xisheng's tenus in this vein, see Qiu Taochang 1942. 87. See, for instance, Hu Qiuyuan 1967-68. In the same vein, Zhou Jia'an (1979) virtually equates the Southern Ming with every progressive trend in late-Ming and early-Qing elite culture. 88. For a full discussion of this subject. see Hanison 1968 or 1969. For retrospectives that especially illuminate the changes in viewpoints and issues after Mao Zedong's death in 1976, see Liu Kwang-cbing 1981; and Xie Tianyou 1983. 89. For a detailed description of these in English, see Parsons 1970. On the fates of Li and Zhang after the entry of the Manchus, see idem 1957; and Wakeman 1979. 90. For examples of such studies, see Duan Congguang 1955; and Xu Mingde 1981. ZheI)g Chenggong also has been a popular subject among mainland Chinese historians. Their emphases on his expulsion of 124 Part One, Chapter IV

the Dutch "capitalist-imperialists" and his bringing of Taiwan fully under Chinese rule have accorded closely with PRC official policy toward the ROC and the latter's chief foreign supporter, the "capitalist­ imperialist" United States. On this trend prior to the Cultural Revolution, see Croizier 1977: 70-74. For examples of Zheng studies after their revival in the late 197.os, see Zheng Chenggong yanjiu lunwen xuan 1982. 91. The earliest studies were by Zhao Lisheng and Gao Zhaoyi, in Zhao 1955: 154-62; and by Li Guangbi and Lai liadu, in Li et aI. 1958: 288-320. An even more substantial contribution was Guo Yingqiu 1960. 92. Schneider 1971: 270-1. 93. For a detailed description of the turnabout in PRC historiography on the Ming-Qing struggle dur­ ing the 1950s and early 19608, especially the transition from nationalistic to class-based treatments and the transfer of the Manchus from the status of alien enemies to that of brothers in the Chinese "big family of nationalities," see Fomina 1981. For a bibliographical outline and discussion of stages in PRC histori­ ography from 1949 through 1982, see Chen Mushan 1984. 94. Fan Wenlan 1956: 24. 95. Mao Zedong 1952, II: 503; see also 483,489. 96. For a summary of the principal views in this debate, see Xiao Li 1989: 240-42. The most respected and influential authors in this debate probably have been Zheng Tianting ~~m, Zhou Yuanlian mJ~lii, Wang Zhonghan .:EJI~, and Sun Wenliang f*')C~. Not mentioned in Xiao's summary is Zhou's impor­ tant work, the Qingchao xingqi shi (1986). Studies of the Manchu Eight Banners and the Bannerlands sys­ tem were important in judging relatively early or late stages of feudalism. For a summary of PRC schol­ arship in this area from 1979 through 1983, see Xiao Li 1989: pt. 5. 97. For a representative application of this doctrine, see Lai Jiadu 1958. Typically, scholarship in Taiwan has striven to refute PRC interpretations. Pertinent here are the works of Li Guangtao in which he argues that actually the Qing sought repeatedly to join forces with the roving rebels in order to destroy the Ming. See Li 1971, I: 349-57; and Li 1986: 129-61. 98. For a standard treatment along these lines, see Li Guangbi 1957: chap. 7. 99. Compare Li Wenzbi's relatively hard-line class treatment in 1957 to the more conventionally patri­ otic treatment in his earlier work of 1948, chapter 7. 100. Ye Huosheng 1951: esp. 2. 101. Lai liadu 1957; Yang Kuan 1957. In his opening pages, Li Tianyou (1955) lightly refers to the "national contradiction" becoming primary, but otherwise his interpretation is consonant with that of Lai and Yang. 102. Mao Zedong 1952, II: 787; see also I: 249-51.

103. An indication of how widely this idea was shared can be seen in Zhang Baoguang 1957: 7.

104. Mao Zedong 1952, II: 595. For derails on this campaign and others that affected Chinese historians from 1949 through the Cultural Revolution, see Sung Shee 1969; and Goldman 1972. On the vicissitudes of Mao Zedong' s assessment of the Chinese peasantry in revolutionary politics and history, see Harrison 1969: 47-55; and Liu Kwang-ching 1981: 304-6. Twentieth Century 125

105. Liu Yi'nan 1958. 106. Wang Jieping and Li Runcang 1959: 9. 107. Jian Bozan 1944. For information on Jian's viewpoints in 1961-62, and the reaction those elic­ ited, see Sung Shee 1969: 28-29. 108. Guo Morno 1951: esp. preface. On Guo's multifaceted career, see the BDRC, I: 458-65. At this time, he had just established, and was chairman of, the AU-China Federation of Literary and Art Circles. For a general assessment of his historiographical contribution, see Xu Guansan 1986-88, IT: chap. 13. 109. Guo Morno 1959: 3. 110. Jian Bozan committed suicide under Cultural Revolution pressures in 1968. For a critical overview of his historiography, see Xu Guansan 1988, IT: chap. 14. For examples of attacks on Jian's historicism as counterrevolutionary, see three articles in Hongqi~:tm (1966 nos. 4 and 15), reprinted and appended to the 1969 reprint of Jian's Zhongguo lishi lunji (see Jian 1944). For a rehabilitation, which praises only Jian's contributions to pre-Liberation Marxist historiography and does not even hint at his later destruction, see Rong Tianlin 1985 (esp. 105-7 on Jian's Southern Ming scholarship). 111. Dirlik 1978: 250-51. 112. Zhu Yongjia (1962), for one, expressed the view that the Ming-Qing conflict, which in those feudal times was a conflict between ruling classes, had afforded an opportunity for progressive struggle on the part of the common people, who, if it were not for obstruction by ruling elements, would be the same everywhere. In the long run, he concluded, it is better for people to mix and become one through conflict. 113. A late but quintessential example of such a view is Hong Huancbun 1978. See also one of Hong's last publications, 1983: esp. pt 5. For a later study that shares Hong's standpoint, see Gu Cheng 1985. For a summary of the more plural, nuanced fonns that the Ming-to-Qing "social-conflict" debate took in the 1980s, see Chen and Du 1991: 95-98. 114. For a succinct exposition of this view, see Lin Tiejun 1978. Leaning more to Lin's side than to Hong's in this interpretive disagreement was Xiong Zhongren in his study of Sun Kewang ~"ijJ:m (1982). For other comments on this controversy over the rebels' having "joined the Ming to oppose the Qing," see Li and Wang 1981; Qin Hui 1983; and Xu and Yin 1985. For a smnmary of these debates, see Chen and Du 1991: 98-99. 115. Of the former sort is Yi Chang 1976. Of the latter sort are Hu Kemin 1980; and Ji Hui 1981. 116. These were published in May and September, respectively, of 1952. 117. See, for instance, Dong Bi 1952; Wei Hongyun 1955: 7-23; and Qi Xia 1957. According to Qi Xia, between 1952 and 1957, sixty-seven articles were written on the problem of evaluating Shi Kefa (p. 233). 118. See Ansley 1971: 89-92. See also Fisher 1982; and Wagner 1993. 119. A notice pasted over the title page of the NLB copy of Zhang Xikong 1959. This notice para­ phrases the opening summary (Liu Hui 1966) in the Wenhui bao. For a retrospective, see Zhou Zhaojing 1979. 120. Quoted again in the warning notice on the NLB copy (see n. 119). 126 Part One, Chapter IV

121. Collected and reprinted in Liu Hui et al. 1968. 122. U Tingxian 1979: 52. See also idem 1980.

123. See articles by Li Tingxian, Qin Ziqing ~T!IW, Ai Ming )tIY3, Wang Wenqing .:E:>cm, Wang Qinjin .:Elbftl, and Cai Qi ~~ in Yangzhou shi/an xueyuan xuebao m1tlmffiB*~*¥Q, 1979.1,2, and 4, and 1980.4. See also Shu Yi 1980.

124. A prime example of such treatment can be seen in an article about Zhang Huangyan (Ran Yuda 1978). For a theoretical disquisition, see Jing Zhiben 1983. Writings for mass consumption scarcely needed such apologetics in the 19808. For examples, see You Daoji 1980; and Han Linqiang 1981. 125. Barm6 1993: 260-61.

126. Deng Xiaoping 1983: 203-4. For a rapid historiographical echo of Deng's January call. see Shang Hongkui 1980b (published in December). 127. For some such works pertaining to the Ming-Qing conflict, in particular, see Shang Hongkui 1980a; Xie Yuanyuan 1980; Fu Yiling 1982; Li Bangzbeng 1983; [Chen] Kongli et al. 1983; and Cheng Lin 1985. 128. See, for instance, a critique by Wang Qirong (1983) of an application by Chen Kongli and Li Qiang of Engels's theory of "resultant force," according to which Li Zicheng, Dorgon, and Zheng Cheng­ gong purportedly made joint contributions to the formation of a more vigorous, unified state in the seven­ teenth century. 129. See the authors' preface (p. 3) to Sun Wenliang et aI. 1985. In continuing studies of the "peasant­ rebels:' authors argued that they had promoted stability, restoration of production, and cooperation among diverse ethnic groups. See, for instance, Wang Gang 1983. 130. Wang Rongsheng 1986: 7. For other broadly interpretive articles, which are more diverse in view­ point than this synopsis might suggest, see Teng Shaozhen 1980; Li Jingping 1984, 1986; Zhang Lifan 1985; Wang Songling 1985; Li Xun 1986; Zhao Yifeng 1986; and Chen Zuorong 1987; as well as works mentioned in Xiao Li 1989: 38-39. Opinions have differed most on how "coincidental" the presence of the Manchu-Qing factor was at the time when the Ming succumbed to pandemiC rebellion. 131. Zhao Degui 1985: 60. Note the words unrighteous warfare. Whether various armed actions of the Ming-Qing dynastic transition were "jusf' or "unjust," given the aims of the perpetrators in relation to the hann inflicted on the country, was a virtual discourse in the 1980s, as is evidenced in the synopsis of Chen and Du 1991: 88-94. 132. For general discussions of the need to reevaluate "traitors" and "two-time officials," see articles by Wang Sizhi xJ~tttl and Xue RuBu iW;Effij~ in Qingshi yanjiu tongxun if;EiVf~Jmmt 1983.4: 1-4, 5-9, resp.; Li Guihai 1984; and Wang Hongzhi 1988. On Hong Chengchou, see Li Hongbin 1984; and Li Xinda 1984. On Feng Quan, see Zhang Jiacang 1984. On Dorgon, see Chen Zuorong 1983. On Fan Wencheng, see Jin Chengji 1982. For articles on Shi Lang, positively evaluating his "historical function" in consummating the "necessary" political and economic unification of Taiwan with the mainland, see Wang Duoquan 1983; Peng Yunhe 1983; and Wang Shuzhen with Shi Xiangqun (1983). In addition, see I.F.l.g (also of 1983). For an example of the concomitant of such views, the devaluation of Zheng Cheng­ gong in that he maintained a semiprivate maritime power base with no real chance of restoring Ming rule, thus thwarting the hopes for national unification of the broad masses of the Chinese people, see Chen Zai- Twentieth Century 127

zbeng 1983. The common date of all these publications on Shi and Zheng leads back not only to Deng Xiaoping's speech of 1980, mentioned on p. 113, but to subsequent speeches of September 1981 and J an­ uary 1982 in which the repatriation of Taiwan as a goal for the 1980s was repeatedly stressed. See Deng Xiaoping 1983: 350, 372. For a discussion of the controversy over Wu Sangui, who, despite an attempt to completely overturn received judgments on him, remained condemnable because of his inveterately self­ serving behavior, see Ye Gaosbu 1991. 133. For citations of the most notable of these works, see Xiao Li (1989): 252-54. Not mentioned there is Feng Erkang 1985, on the Yongzheng emperor. Of note from subsequent years are books by pro­ minent scholars on all of the early-Qing emperors in the Qingdi liezhuan m*~H' series, publisbed in Cbangchun ~~ by wenshi chubanshe s*f)(~l±l~t± in 1993. 134. Two important, now standard reference narratives. the first especially useful for study of the early­ Qing period, were produced under this ideological prescription: Qingdai quanshi (1991); and Baijuan ben Zhongguo quanshi (1994). 135. QNMD, II: preface (1988). See "Part Two References: Collections and Series." 136. General preface by Zhao Zhongnan mg:ti¥i to volumes in an unnamed series of biographies of Ming emperors (Shenyang: Liaoningjiaoyu chubansbe j1*~1ft±i~t±, 1993-94).

137. Nan's Nan Ming shi (1992) is an outgrowth of his collaboration with Tang Gang on vol. 2 of a textbook history of the Ming dynasty (1991). Gu's work (1997), is truly exhaustive (1,140 pages), espe­ cially in its treatment of popular resistance activities.

138. In that issue, besides the article by Gu Cheng, note in particular those by Zhang Yuxing ~~. and He Lingxiu filJfi~, pp. 1-51.