The Political Language and the Human Body

Total Page:16

File Type:pdf, Size:1020Kb

The Political Language and the Human Body THE POLITICAL LANGUAGE AND THE HUMAN BODY: COMPARATIVE DISCURSIVE ANALYSIS OF VLADIMIR PUTIN’S 2000 AND VIKTOR ORBÁN’S 2010 CAMPAIGN RHETORICS By Anna Szilágyi Submitted to Central European University Department of Political Science In partial fulfillment of the requirements for the degree of Master of Arts in Political Science Supervisor: Zsolt Enyedi CEU eTD Collection Budapest, Hungary 2010 CEU eTD Collection Abstract In my MA thesis I compare the campaign rhetoric of Vladimir Putin and Viktor Orbán during the 2000 Russian presidential and the 2010 Hungarian parliamentary elections, respectively. These elections took place in a similar environment of political and economic crisis and both politicians won with the overwhelming majority of votes. The research explores if the similarity of contexts could trigger societal responsiveness towards a discourse that contributed to the enormous success of the candidates. The multi-disciplinary analysis focuses both on structural politico-economic contexts and discursive features of campaign texts in order to explore the complex relation between the two. The analysis combines political science concepts with a detailed analysis of linguistic practices (especially, the use of key metaphors). The major finding of the work is that the moment of deep politico-economic crisis triggers societal responsiveness towards a public discourse that is mainly characterized by the lack of the political and evokes a simple moral value system of traditional family and gender conceptualization. The popularity of this language lays in its ability to present otherwise threatening complex problems as solvable issues that require simple physical intervention. I also conclude that the distinct political and cultural traditions, as well as the position of the countries after the democratic turn largely influence the specific discursive strategies of the speakers. Accordingly, I demonstrate that the politicians evoked two distinct ‘subtypes’ of physically oriented masculinity. In Putin`s language the ideal of the army man (particularly, the army commander) emerged, while Orbán`s discourse evoked a specific rural masculinity. CEU eTD Collection i TABLE OF CONTENT 1. INTRODUCTION..........................................................................................................................1 2. THEORETICAL BACKGROUND......................................................................................................6 3. RUSSIA AND HUNGARY BEFORE THE 2000 AND 2010 ELECTIONS..............................................15 3.1 Circumstances of Accession to Power: Russia after 1991 ..................................................15 3.2 Profile: Someone Like Vladimir Putin................................................................................20 3.3 Circumstances of Accession to Power: Hungary after 1989......................................................22 3.4 Profile: Someone Like Viktor Orbán..................................................................................26 4. METAPHORICAL LANGUAGE USE BY PUTIN AND ORBÁN...........................................................31 4.1 Methods of Data Selection ...............................................................................................31 4.2 Not Just Sitting in Moscow: Putin’s Metaphors.................................................................37 4.3 Robust Guys are Needed: Orbán’s Metaphors ..................................................................48 5. THE MEANING, SIGNIFICANCE AND POTENTIAL EFFECTS OF PUTIN’S AND ORBÁN’S CAMPAIGN METAPHORS...................................................................................................................63 5.1 The Body in Discourse ......................................................................................................63 5.2 Corporeality and Morality ................................................................................................66 5.3 Morality as Strength.........................................................................................................68 5.4 Politics: a Game for Boys .................................................................................................71 5.5 Rural versus Army Masculinity..........................................................................................74 6. CONCLUSION............................................................................................................................79 7. APPENDIX A..............................................................................................................................83 7.1 Official English Transcripts of Vladimir Putin’s Campaign Texts.........................................83 CEU eTD Collection 8. APPENDIX B............................................................................................................................112 8.1 Official Hungarian Transcripts of Viktor Orbán’s Campaign Texts....................................112 BIBLIOGRAPHY:...............................................................................................................................147 ii 1. INTRODUCTION In 2000 Vladimir Putin won the Russian presidential elections for the first time. The candidate ended up with a remarkable success as 53 percent of the Russian voters elected the acting president. Ten years later, in 2010, in Hungary, parliamentary elections took place. In this case it was the centre-right party Fidesz, led by Viktor Orbán that achieved overwhelming success and reached over two-thirds parliamentary majority. At first glance, it seems there is no other common element in the two cases besides the moment of major electoral success. In terms of their historical past, present significance, electoral and governmental system Russia and Hungary differ so much that from a global comparative perspective these cases could remain random examples of political success in recent times. The ‘empire’ tradition versus the past of the ‘oppressed small state’ as well as the semi-presidential system of Russia versus the parliamentary system established after the democratic turn in Hungary seem exclude any parallelism. Besides, the position of the two campaigning politicians was also different: Putin was already in power in 2000 (he became acting president in 1999) while Orbán was only a prime ministerial nominee in a competitive multi-party system in 2010. However, surprisingly, if one takes a closer look at the 2000 Russian and 2010 Hungarian elections, could notice some salient overlapping situational characteristics. These seemingly unrelated political turning points are brought together by the similarity of the politico-economic environment in which the two elections took place. It seems that the circumstances of accession to power of the two politicians were similar. Economic stagnation CEU eTD Collection and then crisis led into a financial collapse in 1998 in Russia, and almost created a collapse in 2008 in Hungary. This can be considered a major common feature. As a consequence, in the pre-election period the decline of trust in liberal market institutions, the revival of radical 1 ideology and an increasing anti-elitist societal attitude became decisive common characteristics as well. In addition, political instability also seems to be a shared feature. In Russia, in 1999 President Boris Yeltsin was forced to step down, because of health problems, before the end of his term. As another sign of political instability, there were other frequent changes in political leadership: between 1998 and 1999 Russia had five prime ministers. In Hungary, in 2008 the coalition of the socialist (MSZP) and liberal (SZDSZ) parties broke up after just two years in government. Afterwards the country was ruled by a minority government, the Prime Minister of which also resigned in 2009. Between 2009 and 2010 Hungary was led by a minority expert government. A possible consequence of this similarity of the political and economic environments could be the similarity of the winning political images. I suggest that these briefly outlined commonalities were able to produce a similar politico-economic atmosphere in Russia and Hungary before the elections and triggered responsiveness towards a certain type of political image. This opportunity was successfully realized and fulfilled by political communication of both Putin and Orbán during the 2000 and 2010 campaigns, respectively. I suggest that the similarity of images can be explored in systematic academic research from the perspective of political discourses. First, a political image largely manifests itself through discourse. Second, the nature of discursive data (e.g., it is recorded) allows truly accurate, in-depth and transparent research. Accordingly, in my thesis I compare and contrast the political language of Putin and Orbán. CEU eTD Collection My central research question is this: what were the main characteristics of the political discourse that were offered for voters’ needs and induced great responsiveness in the similar critical political and economic environments in Russia and Hungary? 2 My hypothesis is that regardless of the political and historical differences of countries, as well as the changing modern and post-modern political scene, a period of deep crisis can trigger societal responsiveness towards political discourses that metaphorically present an early modern, even pre-modern, traditional reality. In my view, this discourse can be characterized by the lack
Recommended publications
  • Advancing Freedom in Russia Steven Groves
    No. 2088 November 29, 2007 Advancing Freedom in Russia Steven Groves The current Moscow power establishment is The Moscow leadership seems impervious to leading Russia back in time. Instead of moving for- America’s and Europe’s pleas to foster democracy. ward toward a nation that cherishes and protects While the U.S. and its allies wait for a more oppor- freedom and democracy, the establishment is creat- tune time to reengage, they should consider refo- ing a state and body politic dominated by a new cusing their efforts on Russia’s neighbors that are breed of oligarchic groups composed of security willing to democratize. Ultimately, the Russians officers and their business allies. themselves need to realize that they can benefit The Russian media are no longer free and unre- more by integrating into the West and developing stricted. With the exception of a few minor show- democratic institutions that will preserve and pro- case outlets and the Internet, the media are tect their freedoms. dominated by the Kremlin and its allies. The major- On the other hand, Washington cannot ignore ity of political parties are under state control, and Moscow. Too many pressing issues—from Iran and the activities of nongovernmental organizations nuclear proliferation to arms control treaties and the (NGOs) with foreign ties are under severe scrutiny. future of conventional forces in Europe—are on the Russia is no longer a free nation. table. Even during the Soviet era, Washington and A return to authoritarianism is not in the interests Moscow at times had a robust diplomatic engage- of the Russian people, their European neighbors, or ment, despite viewing the world very differently.
    [Show full text]
  • Putin's Macho Personality Cult*
    Communist and Post-Communist Studies xxx (2015) 1e11 Contents lists available at ScienceDirect Communist and Post-Communist Studies journal homepage: www.elsevier.com/locate/postcomstud Putin's macho personality cult* Valerie Sperling Department of Political Science, Clark University, United States article info abstract Article history: Masculinity has long been Russian President Vladimir Putin's calling card. At the center of Available online xxx Putin's macho aura is his image as a tough leader who will not allow Western countries to weaken Russia or dictate what Russia's domestic and foreign policies should look like. This Keywords: article draws attention to the role of masculinity in the Putin regime's legitimation Vladimir Putin strategy, and how it became more obvious during the escalation of the conflict in Ukraine Russia in 2014 and the Russian annexation of Crimea. To the extent that there is a “personality Ukraine cult” in contemporary Russia, the personality at the center of it is defined in highly Crimea Barack Obama gendered terms, shaping the tenor of both domestic and foreign policy. © Masculinity 2015 The Regents of the University of California. Published by Elsevier Ltd. All rights Gender reserved. Legitimacy Domestic politics Foreign policy Since his third ascension to the Russian presidency, Vladimir Putin has attracted more attention than any other contemporary state leader. From the jacket of Time Magazine in September 2013, to the front pages of newspapers detailing Russia's annexation of Crimea in March 2014, there has been no shortage of coverage of Putin in the international press. Putin's omnipresence in the Russian media is even more striking.
    [Show full text]
  • Putin's Last Term
    January 2019 Putin’s last term Taking the long view By Ian Bond and Igor Yurgens Putin’s last term: Taking the long view By Ian Bond and Igor Yurgens Vladimir Putin has dominated the Russian political scene since 1999. But he is now in what should be his final term as president. He faces economic, social and foreign policy problems; and he has to decide what will happen at the end of his term of office. The performance of the Russian economy in recent years has been mixed. Inflation has fallen, foreign reserves have risen and the ruble’s exchange rate is relatively stable; but growth has been anaemic and real disposable incomes have fallen. Putin has set ambitious economic targets for his final term, but is unlikely to achieve them. Russia is not investing enough in education to enable it to modernise and diversify the economy. The oil and gas sector is too dominant. Structural reforms (such as moving investment from the defence sector to other, more productive areas) are not on the cards. Russia has suffered from demographic problems since the Soviet period. With a shrinking working- age population and an increasing number of unhealthy pensioners, Russia risks stagnation, while countries like China leap ahead. Putin has yet to give any hint of his thinking about his successor. He could find a trusted individual to take over as president; change the Russian Constitution to allow himself to run again; or create a new position from which he could still exercise power. But if he stays in power too long, Russia could become like the late Soviet Union – a system unable to renew itself.
    [Show full text]
  • THE DOUBLE-HEADED EAGLE SEMI-PRESIDENTIALISM and DEMOCRACY in FRANCE and RUSSIA by Cole Joseph Harvey Submitted to the Dean of T
    THE DOUBLE-HEADED EAGLE SEMI-PRESIDENTIALISM AND DEMOCRACY IN FRANCE AND RUSSIA By Cole Joseph Harvey Submitted to the Dean of the University Honors College In partial fulfillment Of the requirements for the degree of Bachelor of Philosophy University of Pittsburgh i 2008 UNIVERSITY OF PITTSBURGH UNIVERSITY HONORS COLLEGE This thesis was presented by Cole J. Harvey It was defended on July 14, 2008 and approved by Dr. Ronald Linden, PhD., Department of Political Science Dr. Alberta Sbragia, PhD., Department of Political Science Dr. Thomas Remington, PhD., Department of Political Science, Emory University Thesis Advisor: Dr. Jonathan Harris, PhD., Department of Political Science ii Copyright © by Cole J. Harvey 2008 iii The Double-Headed Eagle: Semi-Presidentialism and Democracy in France and Russia Cole J. Harvey University of Pittsburgh, 2008 It has become a commonplace observation in recent years that Russian democracy is in remission. Indeed there is a significant difference between the struggling democratic performance of Russia and that of a consolidated democracy such as France. The modern French and Russian states are both semi-presidential states, meaning that in each country executive power is shared between an elected president and an appointed prime minister who can (at least in theory) be voted out of office by the legislature. Despite this broad similarity, semi- presidential institutions are organized in significantly different ways in each country. This paper examines those differences in order to understand how they can help account for poor democratic performance in Russia and strong democratic performance in France. Four political institutions will be examined in each country: presidents, prime ministers, parliaments, and political parties.
    [Show full text]
  • 'Frostpolitik'? Merkel, Putin and German Foreign Policy Towards Russia
    From Ostpolitik to ‘frostpolitik’? Merkel, Putin and German foreign policy towards Russia TUOMAS FORSBERG* Germany’s relationship with Russia is widely considered to be of fundamental importance to European security and the whole constitution of the West since the Second World War. Whereas some tend to judge Germany’s reliability as a partner to the United States—and its so-called Westbindung in general—against its dealings with Russia, others focus on Germany’s leadership of European foreign policy, while still others see the Russo-German relationship as an overall barometer of conflict and cooperation in Europe.1 How Germany chooses to approach Russia and how it deals with the crisis in Ukraine, in particular, are questions that lie at the crux of several possible visions for the future European order. Ostpolitik is a term that was coined to describe West Germany’s cooperative approach to the Soviet Union and other Warsaw Pact countries, initiated by Chan- cellor Willy Brandt in 1969. As formulated by Brandt’s political secretary, Egon Bahr, the key idea of the ‘new eastern policy’ was to achieve positive ‘change through rapprochement’ (Wandel durch Annäherung). In the Cold War context, the primary example of Ostpolitik was West Germany’s willingness to engage with the Soviet Union through energy cooperation including gas supply, but also pipeline and nuclear projects.2 Yet at the same time West Germany participated in the western sanctions regime concerning technology transfer to the Soviet Union and its allies, and accepted the deployment of American nuclear missiles on its soil as a response * This work was partly supported by the Academy of Finland Centre of Excellence for Choices of Russian Modernisation (grant number 250691).
    [Show full text]
  • Underlying Meanings of the Hitler Metaphor in Western Media Eugenia Kuznetsova* Department of Social and Human Sciences, Institute of Human Rights, Spain
    un omm ica C tio s n s Kuznetsova, J Mass Communicat Journalism 2014, 4:10 a & M J o f u DOI: 10.4172/2165-7912.1000230 o Journal of r l n a a n l r i s u m o J ISSN: 2165-7912 Mass Communication & Journalism Research Article OpenOpen Access Access Underlying Meanings of the Hitler Metaphor in Western Media Eugenia Kuznetsova* Department of Social and Human Sciences, Institute of Human Rights, Spain Abstract The present research aims to analyse the metaphorical use of Hitler’s personality in the Russian context in contemporary mass media published in English. The brief analysis of the metaphor’s use was also conducted for media published in German and Spanish. The research encompasses 13 years, from May 1st 2001 to May 1st 2014. The first part of the research deals with the dynamics and frequency of the metaphor’s use, exposing the growing popularity of the Hitler metaphor in shaping the ideology of contemporary Russia in media discourse. The second part includes a critical metaphor analysis that involves 268 articles from The Times (UK), 176 articles from The Wall Street Journal (USA) and 265 articles from Die Welt (Germany) in the time range from May 1st 2001 to May 25th 2014. The analysis attempts to discover the underlying meanings of the Hitler metaphor and identify the purposes and ideologies conveyed by this particular metaphor. Keywords: Metaphor; Mass media; Critical metaphor analysis; discourse model known as critical analysis of metaphors includes Linguistic analysis analysis of rhetorical and ideological role of Hitler metaphor in political discourse, focusing on authentic data.
    [Show full text]
  • CPSW 3-2016.Indd
    Contemporary Problems of Social Work Современные проблемы социальной работы ACADEMIC JOURNAL Vol. 2. No. 3 (7) 2016 MOSCOW CCONTEMPORARYONTEMPORARY PPROBLEMSROBLEMS CONTENTS OOFF SSOCIALOCI AL WWORKORK VVolumeolume 22,, NNo.o. 3 ((7),7), 22016016 Maloletko A.N., Yudina T.N. 4 SOCIOLOGY ISSN 2412-5466 Bagdasaryan N.G., Korol M.P. The journal is included into the system Social Time: Concept and Reality of Modern Russia . 5 of Russian science citation index and is Dolgorukova I.V. available on the website: Corportate Social Policy As an Instrument www.elibrary.ru of Dialogue Between Capital and Labor. .12 Florya V.M. DOI 10.17922/2412-5466-2016-2-3 Methodology of Researching Social Changes. .20 Fomicheva T.V., Salistaya G.S. Health As a Value in the Value CHIEF EDITOR Consciousness of Russians: Maloletko A.N. doctor of economic sciences, associate Towards the Future of the Nation . .28 professor, vice-rector for research, Russian Gembarenko V.I., Tupitsyna I.N. State Social University, Russia Social Sphere in Modern Russia DEPUTY EDITOR in Conditions of Financial and Economic Crisis: Deformation and Prospects for Development. .34 Kaurova O.V. doctor of economic sciences, Kirilina T.Yu. associate professor, dean of the The Social Ideal and the Model of the Future faculty of training of scientific and scientific-pedagogical personnel, in the Consciousness of Modern Russian Youth . .41 Russian State Social University, Russia Kurbakova S.N., Ganyushina M.A., Lopatinskaya V.V. On Preserving National Languages EDITORIAL BOARD During Globalization As the Key Problem Feber J. (PhD, University of the Social Policy of a Modern of Trnava, Slovakia) Multiethnic State .
    [Show full text]
  • Russian Strategic Intentions
    APPROVED FOR PUBLIC RELEASE Russian Strategic Intentions A Strategic Multilayer Assessment (SMA) White Paper May 2019 Contributing Authors: Dr. John Arquilla (Naval Postgraduate School), Ms. Anna Borshchevskaya (The Washington Institute for Near East Policy), Dr. Belinda Bragg (NSI, Inc.), Mr. Pavel Devyatkin (The Arctic Institute), MAJ Adam Dyet (U.S. Army, J5-Policy USCENTCOM), Dr. R. Evan Ellis (U.S. Army War College Strategic Studies Institute), Mr. Daniel J. Flynn (Office of the Director of National Intelligence (ODNI)), Dr. Daniel Goure (Lexington Institute), Ms. Abigail C. Kamp (National Consortium for the Study of Terrorism and Responses to Terrorism (START)), Dr. Roger Kangas (National Defense University), Dr. Mark N. Katz (George Mason University, Schar School of Policy and Government), Dr. Barnett S. Koven (National Consortium for the Study of Terrorism and Responses to Terrorism (START)), Dr. Jeremy W. Lamoreaux (Brigham Young University- Idaho), Dr. Marlene Laruelle (George Washington University), Dr. Christopher Marsh (Special Operations Research Association), Dr. Robert Person (United States Military Academy, West Point), Mr. Roman “Comrade” Pyatkov (HAF/A3K CHECKMATE), Dr. John Schindler (The Locarno Group), Ms. Malin Severin (UK Ministry of Defence Development, Concepts and Doctrine Centre (DCDC)), Dr. Thomas Sherlock (United States Military Academy, West Point), Dr. Joseph Siegle (Africa Center for Strategic Studies, National Defense University), Dr. Robert Spalding III (U.S. Air Force), Dr. Richard Weitz (Center for Political-Military Analysis at the Hudson Institute), Mr. Jason Werchan (USEUCOM Strategy Division & Russia Strategic Initiative (RSI)) Prefaces Provided By: RDML Jeffrey J. Czerewko (Joint Staff, J39), Mr. Jason Werchan (USEUCOM Strategy Division & Russia Strategic Initiative (RSI)) Editor: Ms.
    [Show full text]
  • FROM Fostering Interdependence to Managing
    Kristi Raik & András Rácz (eds.) post-crimea shift in eu-russia relations: from fostering interdependence to managing vulnerabilities Title: Post-Crimea Shift in EU-Russia Relations: From Fostering Interdependence to Managing Vulnerabilities Language editing: Refiner Translations OÜ; Martin Rickerd (freelance) Layout: Kalle Toompere Project assistants: Kristi Luigelaht, Kaarel Kullamaa Keywords: EU, Russia, interdependence, security, energy Disclaimer: The views and opinions contained in this report are solely those of its authors and do not necessarily represent the official policy or position of the International Centre for Defence and Security or any other organisation. ISBN: 978-9949-7331-5-6 (PRINT) ISBN: 978-9949-7331-6-3 (PDF) ©International Centre for Defence and Security 63/4 Narva Rd. 10152 Tallinn, Estonia [email protected], www.icds.ee 3 Contents Acknowledgements ................................................................................................................... 4 List of Tables, Figures and Maps ............................................................................................ 5 List of Abbreviations ................................................................................................................ 6 1. Introduction: Competing Perspectives on Interdependence – Kristi Raik ............ 8 Part I: THE EU’S AND RUSSIA’S APPROACHES TO INTERDEPENDENCE 2. From Ostpolitik to EU-Russia Interdependence: Germany’s Perspective – Stefan Meister ......................................................................
    [Show full text]
  • DEFENCE STRATEGIC COMMUNICATIONS the Official Journal of the NATO Strategic Communications Centre of Excellence
    Volume 2 | Spring 2017 DEFENCE STRATEGIC COMMUNICATIONS The official journal of the NATO Strategic Communications Centre of Excellence STRATEGIC COMMUNICATIONS IN INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS: PRACTICAL TRAPS AND ETHICAL PUZZLES ‘HACKING’ INTO THE WEST: RUSSIA’S ‘ANTI-HEGEMONIC’ DRIVE AND THE STRATEGIC NARRATIVE OFFENSIVE THE RUSSIAN PERSPECTIVE ON INFORMATION WARFARE: CONCEPTUAL ROOTS AND POLITICISATION IN RUSSIAN ACADEMIC, POLITICAL, AND PUBLIC DISCOURSE EXAMINING THE USE OF BOTNETS AND THEIR EVOLUTION IN PROPAGANDA DISSEMINATION PUTIN, XI, AND HITLER—PROPAGANDA AND THE PATERNITY OF PSEUDO DEMOCRACY THE SIGNIFICANCE AND LIMITATIONS OF EMPATHY IN STRATEGIC COMMUNICATIONS BRITAIN’S PUBLIC WAR STORIES: PUNCHING ABOVE ITS WEIGHT OR VANISHING FORCE? A CLOSER LOOK AT YEMEN WEAPONISED HONESTY: COMMUNICATION STRATEGY AND NATO VALUES 1 ISSN 2500-9478 Defence Strategic Communications Editor-in-Chief Dr. Neville Bolt Managing Editor Linda Curika Editor Anna Reynolds Editorial Board Matt Armstrong, MA Dr. Emma Louise Briant Dr. Nerijus Maliukevicius Thomas Elkjer Nissen, MA Professor Žaneta Ozoliņa Dr. Agu Uudelepp Professor J. Michael Waller Professor Natascha Zowislo-Grünewald Defence Strategic Communications is an international peer-reviewed journal. The journal is a project of the NATO Strategic Communications Centre of Excellence (NATO StratCom COE). It is produced for scholars, policy makers and practitioners around the world. It does not represent the opinions or policies of NATO or NATO StratCom COE. The views presented in the following articles are those of the authors alone. © All rights reserved by the NATO StratCom COE. Articles may not be copied, reproduced, distributed or publicly displayed without reference to the NATO StratCom COE and the academic journal. NATO Strategic Communications Centre of Excellence Riga, Kalnciema iela 11b, Latvia LV1048 www.stratcomcoe.org Ph.: 0037167335463 [email protected] 2 3 FOREWORD ‘The world is a mess.
    [Show full text]
  • {Download PDF} Russia
    RUSSIA PDF, EPUB, EBOOK Jilly Hunt | 48 pages | 01 Feb 2012 | Heinemann Educational Books | 9781432961367 | English | Chicago, IL, United States RT - Breaking news, shows, podcasts February Main article: Economy of Russia. See also: List of the largest trading partners of Russia , List of countries by oil exports , and List of countries by natural gas exports. Main articles: Agriculture in Russia and Fishing industry in Russia. This section needs additional citations for verification. Please help improve this article by adding citations to reliable sources. Unsourced material may be challenged and removed. April Learn how and when to remove this template message. Main articles: Timeline of Russian inventions and technology records , Science and technology in Russia , List of Russian scientists , and List of Russian inventors. Main article: Water supply and sanitation in Russia. Main article: Corruption in Russia. Main articles: Demographics of Russia and Russians. Russia's population pyramid as of 1 January Main article: List of cities and towns in Russia by population. Main article: Ethnic groups in Russia. This section needs expansion. You can help by adding to it. Play media. Main articles: Religion in Russia and Consecration of Russia. Main article: Healthcare in Russia. Main article: Education in Russia. Main article: Russian culture. See also: Russian traditions , Russian political jokes , Russian fairy tales , Russian cuisine , and Gopnik. Main articles: Russian architecture and List of Russian architects. Main article: Russian artists. Main articles: Russian literature , Russian philosophy , Russian poets , Russian playwrights , Russian novelists , and Russian science fiction and fantasy. Main article: Sport in Russia. See also: Doping in Russia. Main articles: Public holidays in Russia and Cultural icons of Russia.
    [Show full text]
  • Performing Political Opposition in Russia
    2014:8 SOCIOLOGY PUBLICATIONS OF THE DEPARTMENT OF SOCIAL RESEARCH 2014:8 PERFORMING POLITICAL OPPOSITION IN RUSSIA RUSSIA IN OPPOSITION POLITICAL PERFORMING Russian civil society is often described as weak and Russians as politically apathetic. However, as a surprise for many, tens of thousands of people gathered on the streets of Moscow to protest the fraud in the parliamentary elections in December 2011. Nevertheless, this ‘awakening’ did not last for long as Vladimir Putin took hold of the Presidency again in 2012. Since then, the Russian State Duma has passed new legislation to restrict civic and political activism. This, together with the fragmentation of the opposition movement, has hindered large-scale and sustained mobiliza- tion against the government. In 2013, the number of protests has plummeted when the risks of demonstrating are high and the benefits to participate in political activism appear non-existent. Why is it impossible for the Russian opposition to find a common voice and to sustain contentious action? This book analyzes how political opportunities and restrictions in contem- porary Russia have affected the opposition activists’ activities at the grassroots level. The book examines Russian civil society, contemporary activist strategies, and democratization from the − THE CASE OF THE YOUTH MOVEMENT OBORONA OBORONA MOVEMENT YOUTH THE OF CASE THE perspective of the young activists participating in the liberal youth movement Oborona (Defense) in Moscow and St. Petersburg. Before its dissolution in 2011, Oborona was an active participant in the Russian opposition movement, and thus it is an interesting case study of the living activist traditions in Russia. The research illustrates how the Soviet continuities and liberal ideas are entangled in Russian political activism to create new post-socialist political identities and practices.
    [Show full text]