A Brief to Government to Revitalise the General Aviation Industry in Australia

PROJECT EUREKA

A BRIEF TO GOVERNMENT TO REVITALISE THE GENERAL AVIATION INDUSTRY IN AUSTRALIA

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CONTENTS

SECTION 1 EXECUTIVE SUMMARY PAGE------4

SECTION 2 RECOMMENDATIONS PAGE------9

SECTION 3 FLIGHT REGULATIONS AND OPERATIONS PAGE------16

SECTION 4 INDUSTRY FUNDING AND TAXES PAGE------21

SECTION 5 AIRPORT AND GENERAL AVIATION PAGE------29 BUSINESS SECURITY OF TENURE

SECTION 6 CHARTER AND AIRWORK OPERATIONS PAGE------33

SECTION 7 FLIGHTTRAINING PAGE------39

SECTION 8 AVIATION MEDICINE PAGE------44

SECTION 9 AIR SPACE MANAGEMENT PAGE------47

SECTION 10 ENGINEERING PAGE------51

SECTION 11 FUTURE TECHNOLOGIES PAGE------58

APPENDIX 1 SIGNATURES OF CONTRIBUTORS AND PAGE------63 SUPPORTERS OF PROJECT EUREKA HELD BY CEO AOPA

APPENDIX 2 COMMUNITY LAND TITLE OWNERSHIP PAGE------65 MODEL FOR SECONDARY CAPITAL CITY AIRPORTS by KEITH CAMPBELL

APPENDIX 3 UNSAFE SKIES by DICK SMITH PAGE------70

APPENDIX 4 CASA V JABIRU: A CASE OF HOW THE REGULATOR AND THE INDUSTRY PAGE------71 INTERACT

APPENDIX 5 FUTURE TECHNOLOGIES by PAGE------87 PHILLIP REISS

APPENDIX 6 NATIONAL AIR SPACE SYSTEM (NAS) OF PAGE------96 AUSTRALIA

APPENDIX 7 AVIATION SAFETY REGULATION REVIEW PAGE------110 EXECUTIVE SUMMARY/RECOMMENDATIONS

APPENDIX 8 AIRPORT MOVEMENT DATA & GA STATISTICS PAGE------116

APPENDIX 9 JOHN ANDERSON’S NAS 2002 MEDIA RELEASE PAGE------118

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SECTION 1

EXECUTIVE

SUMMARY

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SECTION 1 EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

The Aircraft Owners and Pilot Association (AOPA) of Australia has been operating since 1949, some 67 years. AOPA has 2600 members in Australia and we are part of a worldwide association called International AOPA (AOPA), which has 400,000 members. Our charter is to support and be the public voice of General Aviation (GA) aircraft owners and pilots in private, commercial charter and airline operations, numbering in total some 34,000 individuals.

Australia has been at the forefront of the development of aviation. We have produced some of the world’s best-known and skilled aviators including Charles Kingsford- Smith; Nancy Bird-Walton; Bert Hinkler; Charles Ulm; Hudson Fysh and Dick Smith. We created the safest airline in the world, Qantas. That safety record came about through the local training of some of the world’s most skilful engineers and pilots. But instead of building on that skills base as we did through the '60s to '90s when we had a flourishing General Aviation (GA) industry, it is now slowly dying.

To underline the importance of the GA industry it is worth outlining its diversity while recognising that within each of these sectors there is the potential for enormous jobs growth, given the right policy settings: Private  VFR/IFR flying training; commercial flying training.  Commercial Charter and Airwork (medivac plus training) Crop-dusters; RFDS; Air Ambulances.  Helicopter operations.  Warbirds; Gliding; ultralights (now up to 600 kg, home built or factory built)  Engineering maintenance shops.  Aircraft manufacturing.  Replacement third party suppliers.

Project Eureka is a Brief to Government containing policy proposals and initiatives to revitalise this flagging Australian industry: an industry that has been in constant and unabated decline over the last 30 years. The industry recognises there is no easy solution to the current situation. It is made up of many sectors that all have to work or prosper together to create a vibrant GA industry.

Project Eureka has identified nine separate, but interrelated GA areas, that need bold and innovative policy reform if the Industry is to be revitalised:

1. Flight Regulations and Operations 2. Industry Funding and Taxes 3. Airport and General Aviation Business Security of Tenure 4. Charter and Air work Operations 4

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5. Flight Training 6. Aviation Medicine 7. Airspace Management 8. Engineering/Manufacturing 9. Future Technologies

Each section of the Brief details the problems created by existing policies and more importantly, the Recommendations summarise the suggested policy reforms to address these problems.

One of our authors and team leader, Mr Ken Lewis, is a current International Air Transport Operational Safety Auditor (IOSA) and former Chairman of the International Air Transport Association Safety Committee (IATA) and retired QANTAS Group General Manager Safety and Environment 1980-2002. Drawing on 50 years of experience dealing with the Australian regulators, CAA and CASA he stated:

“From my experience I can assure you they (the politicians) will send it (Eureka) to CASA for 'guidance.' CASA will then defer comment as long as they can which will be after any coming election. CASA comment to the politicians will be 'we are analysing the document and whilst we think it has some merit it is not a document drafted by experienced and proven regulation drafters such that exist within the professional ranks of CASA'."

The result will be that the Brief, like many before it, will not see the light of day. When such an eminent Australian aviation person, who is actively engaged globally in aviation regulations, loses complete faith in the ability of our regulators it is time for drastic remedial action.

This is why AOPA is calling this Project Eureka because we see this as a last stand against inappropriate Government industry regulation; regulation that has decimated our once thriving GA industry. It may sound melodramatic to those not associated with the industry, but those of us who have been in the industry through the period 1960- 1990 feel very frustrated that government bureaucrats, through lack of understanding of the need for businesses to be commercially viable, have failed this industry.

Through Project Eureka, AOPA and the General Aviation community presents to Government the means to revitalise this important industry for growth of jobs and businesses; and for expansion of educational and training opportunities while encouraging greater technical innovation. Our proposals will, if accepted, reduce taxpayer liabilities and generate very substantial revenue, external and internal, into the future.

AOPA representatives have constantly met and debated our problems with the Regulators. They are the Civil Aviation Safety Authority (CASA), Air Services Australia (ASA) and the Department of Infrastructure and Regional Development. AOPA representatives volunteered time and money year after year attending Australia-wide hearings, helping to develop the industry recommendations that go nowhere. As an industry we have failed to get these bodies to understand the commercial implications

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of their policy agenda.

As an example of how frustrated industry has become with the regulator we can examine CASA/ATSB/Dept performance in implementing the recommendations of the Aviation Safety Regulation Review (ASRR). This review was commissioned by the Minister in 2014. Despite a firm Ministerial Direction to CASA by the Deputy Prime Minister, Hon Warren Truss MP, to implement thirty two (and to further evaluate four) of the thirty seven recommendations, the majority have not been actioned. Ten recommendations were considered by the committee members to have been easily actioned with little effort.

ASRR Chairman, David Forsyth AO, in commenting on the implementation performance of the authorities over the last two years, stated that:

“Regarding how many of the ASRR recommendations have been implemented, I can advise my score card is as follows:

Assessing the information tabled by Minister Truss in Parliament in February, showing implementation status as at 31 December 2015, I assessed the following status.

CASA 29% implemented, 15% partially implemented and 56% not done DEPT 20% implemented, 60% partially implemented and 20% not done ATSB 33% implemented, 33% partially implemented and 33% not done.

This is being as benevolent as possible. Other may have a harder view. A number of those regarded as implemented will require ongoing monitoring to ensure change remains in place and/or that the culture has changed.”

Clearly, if the Deputy Prime Minister of the Commonwealth of Australia can’t get any significant action out of CASA, ASA, ATSB and the Department, than who can? A different approach is clearly needed.

In conclusion, the GA industry is collapsing under the weight of regulation, as any objective appreciation of the facts will attest, for no perceived or measurable increase in aviation safety. Rather, the present excessive and expensive regime is producing a reduced safety outcome when viewed against US statistics. Avgas sales are down, medicals are down, secondary airport movements are down and licensed engineers working in GA are reducing with no engineering apprentices in sight.

It seems to AOPA that it is incumbent on Government to correct this situation because CASA has proven unable to regulate without impacting commercial viability. It has taken 26 years for CASA to rewrite these rules at huge expense and incalculable losses to the GA industry and still they are not finished. The industry is united in a demand for radical change and will not rest until measures are enacted to correct this unacceptable position.

This Project Eureka Brief presents the costed solutions to revitalise an iconic Australian industry with proceeds from an Industry Trust Fund, administered like the 6

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Future Fund, for the benefit of all Australians. Project Eureka proposes that the Trust capital be generated by the sale of a financially underperforming Australian public asset, Airservices Australia. This capital is needed to re-invest and innovate general aviation business; to fund new technologies, university research and development; and to create long term, high value-added jobs. This funding model provides the means to revitalise the general aviation industry through Government investment while also improving the Treasury fiscal position.

The President AOPA has already briefed the Federal Minister for Major Projects, Territories and Local Government, the Hon Paul Fletcher MP. We are seeking broad support for the recommendations and particularly wish to bring them to the attention of appropriate Ministers where recommendations are relevant to their portfolios.

AOPA representatives are ready to meet any parliamentary member who will support Project Eureka and our plans for the revitalisation of this iconic industry.

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SECTION 2 RECOMMENDATIONS

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SECTION 2 RECOMMENDATIONS

Harmonisation

A fundamental principle for AOPA and one which ICAO has consistently had as a guiding principle given the nature of global aviation, is to harmonise our operations and regulations with other like-minded nations. CASA seems to view this principle as an anathema, partly because it has developed into a policy-setting body when it should be solely a regulatory body working with established policy. As a result, Australia has far too many local special regulations and operational requirements. In practice, the harmonisation principle means that if the FAA or EASA or NZ or Canada (and possibly other jurisdictions) have approved a license or regulation then Australia should automatically approve it, unless there is a safety of flight issue peculiar to Australian operations. In the case of aircraft maintenance procedures, Australia should follow the regulations of the country of manufacture.

Regulations

1. Implement the recommendations of the 2014 Forsyth Aviation Safety Regulation Review. These recommendations were endorsed by government but only partially implemented. (See Section 1)

2. Civil Aviation Act (1988) to be amended to allow the current CASA CAR/CAO, EASA bias rules to apply only to Regular Public Transport (Part 121) airline operations. This change will ensure no disruption or cost to the airlines for General Aviation (GA) regulatory reform that is needed to revitalise the GA industry. (See Section 3)

3. The Civil Aviation Act (1988) to be amended enabling the US FAR’s or the NZ CAA rules to be adopted for Private, Flying Training, Air work and Commercial Charter operations. From this platform we can enhance the regulations in concert with local industry involvement. The General Aviation (GA) industry can then replicate the established and proven success of the United States and New Zealand GA industries. Our flying training organisations will be more attractive to overseas students and customers and will be able to compete on a level playing field with US training organisations.

CASA has unnecessarily wasted hundreds of millions of dollars so far (the process is not complete) of tax payer and industry funds writing specific regulations that diverge our GA industry from the successful GA countries like the US, Canada and NZ. CASA believes such expenditure is necessary to align Australia with the International Civil Aviation Organisation (ICAO). Yet Australia is significantly

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behind our peers in ICAO regulatory compliance (see Fig 2 in Section 3) while Canada, US, NZ and Singapore are far ahead. At low cost we could mandate US FARs, replicating their success while ensuring Australia keeps pace with the changing and evolving aviation industry. This alignment would save the tax payer and the local industry hundreds of millions of dollars per annum by reducing unnecessary red tape and substantially reducing the CASA workforce dedicated to regulatory reform. (See Section 3)

Automatic Dependent Surveillance Broadcast (ADSB)

4. Currently, CASA/ASA require Australian Instrument Flight Rules (IFR) aircraft to be fitted with ADSB up to five years before the US. AOPA requests cost relief for GA operators and individuals from the unnecessary cost burden of the early adoption of ADSB-out equipment to the Australian GA IFR aircraft fleet. AOPA recommends the adoption of the NZ model which mandates ADSB-out capability one year after the US (US is currently 2020). Mandating after the US will allow more cost competitive installations as equipment production volumes gear up to service the large US fleet. This will result in lower overall capital cost installations.

5. For those operators or owners who have already complied with the CASA/ASA mandates AOPA requests a stay of ASA enroute and terminal charges for ten years as compensation for the higher costs associated with early adoption. AOPA has sought confirmation about fitment of ADSB to the US aircraft fleet from one of the largest flying training schools in the US, John and Martha King’s Flying School in San Diego California. They commented: “When ADSB becomes mandatory in the US in 2020 it will only apply where transponders are mandatory”. This means no mandatory ADSB for aircraft flying below 10,000 ft. in Class D, E or G airspace if they are not within a transponder veil of a Class B (capital city) airport. (See Section 3)

6. AOPA requests an investigation into the validity of the 2009 CASA Regulatory Impact Statement (RIS) that reported widespread industry savings associated with the adoption of ADSB-out technology. The RIS reported $47.7 M of ASA savings. $30M of savings were to be available to compensate GA aircraft owners for the mandatory aircraft installation costs of ABSB-out equipment. No savings or compensation has been forthcoming to date, nor is any planned under current CASA/ASA policy. AOPA support for ADSB at the time of the RIS, was based on both the RIS assumptions being valid and accompanying Industry Consultation Papers that proposed fair compensation to GA owners and operators. (See Section 3)

Competition Barriers

7. AOPA recommends the abolition of restrictive and protective barriers against overseas pilot and engineering qualifications from countries with high standards of training comparable to Australia. This will enable cross border recognition of pilot

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and engineering qualification from certain approved countries like the US, Canada, NZ, UK and the EU. The current marked decline in engineering apprentice training is of extreme concern to AOPA. This decline is at a level that will preclude the future skills base for any revitalisation of the GA industry. Since Government policies have decimated engineering apprentice numbers, particularly from 2010 when TAFE funding was reduced for LAME training, we will need access, at least in an interim period, to qualified overseas personnel to help turn the industry around. (See Section 10)

Flight Training

Instead of declining training activity Australia should be increasing its level of flight training by attracting the bulk of foreign students that are needed to service the very rapid growth in aviation in China and South East Asia. The bulk of this training is going to the US where the regulations are more suited to commercial flying training. But with future orders in the South Asia region with Boeing and Airbus currently totalling some 900 aircraft, there is an urgent requirement to establish a level playing field for flight training to allow new investment in facilities and aircraft and to regain a share of this fast growing market.

Reith General Aviation Consulting Pty Ltd has provided a small sample of flying school closures. They include: Schutt Flying Academy; Civil Flying Services; Brindabella; VH Aviation; Schofields aerodrome; Warrnambool; Colac; Stawell; Bairnsdale; Mudgee; Phillip Island; Tooradin; Whittlesea; Geelong; Hervey Bay; Wallan; Melton; and Riddels Creek. Advance Aviation at Emerald has failed and Westwing in Mt Isa and Townsville have closed in the last weeks. Many other flying schools, charter companies and engineering businesses are un-saleable.

The recent liquidation announcement by the Royal Queensland Aero Club and associate companies Airline Academy of Australia and their engineering training school ATAE is just the latest in failures, forced closures and those who have just given up as the cost of compliance. The role of Chief Pilot has become too onerous.

Over the years the number of staff required to run an AOC has increased significantly. Most of these roles just add to expense and make no significant improvement to safety. Because of red tape, operators now need to employ:  Managing Director  Chief Pilot  Head of Check and Training  Operations Manager  Safety Officer 11

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 Maintenance Controller  Line pilots

8. AOPA recommends the re-introduction of independent flight training instructors to promote jobs and training facilities particularly in the country regions. This will stimulate jobs at regional local government aerodromes and provide the opportunity for private flying training for those students in regional areas who are unable to travel to the capital cities for training. Country regions which have a greater need for GA aviation services have suffered badly by CASA's mandatory AOC requirements for independent operator training. Many regional flying schools have closed. In many country town only Recreational flying training is now available.

Fees

9. User pays CASA and ASA charges should be dropped from GA aircraft. Arguably the administrative cost of collecting the charges from GA aircraft costs CASA/ASA more than the revenue raised. (See Section 4)

Structural Changes

10. Privatise Airservices Australia (ASA) for both productivity improvement and to provide capital to reinvest in the GA industry and help reduce the budget deficit. AOPA’s model will provide a source of industry stimulus capital that is not needed from Treasury. Over the last twenty years the aviation industry has been taxed through a user pays model so that today the industry has been taxed over $1b pa for ASA alone. The industry is now, and has been for a long time, providing both Capex and Opex for ASA. Any sale of ASA needs to recognise the capital contribution the industry has made to ASA over the last 20 years. (See Section 4)

Either a full or partial (say 49%) sale of ASA, similar to the UK model, is proposed. A full privatisation is estimated by industry to raise between $1b and $4b AUD of capital. (See Section 4)

AOPA’s recommendation is for full privatisation as this provides more scope for long term productivity reform and maximises the raised capital. NAV Canada provides a relevant full privatisation model case study. (See Section 4)

11. Air navigation charges of a privatised service to be reviewed and approved by an independent body in a similar model to the privatised airport charges (See Section 4).

12. Amendment to the Civil Aviation Act as necessary requiring the regulator to take account of industry viability, efficiency and sustainability. The achievement of safety is a vitally important outcome for a vibrant aviation industry rather than its raison d'être. As a result of rethinking its overall place in supporting this industry, AOPA is of the view that the Civil Aviation Safety Authority (CASA) should be 12

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renamed the Civil Aviation Division (CAD) and absorbed back into the Department of Infrastructure and Regional Development as the appropriate policy body with oversight of the regulator.

Industry Trust Fund

13. Proceeds from the sale of ASA to be used to create an Industry Trust Fund, administered like the Future Fund, for the benefit of all Australians. This capital is needed to re-invest and innovate general aviation business; to fund new technologies, university research and development; and to create long term, high value-added jobs. This funding model provides the means to revitalise the general aviation industry through Government investment while also improving the Treasury fiscal position. Full privatisation proceeds to be equally distributed between Treasury and an Industry Trust Fund (ITF). If a partial sale is decided upon, the proceeds should go to the Industry Trust Fund (ITF) as the taxpayer will retain their shares in the new entity. (See Section 4)

ITF should: a) Have a Board of experienced business members with a mix of aviation and proven business skills and above all proven entrepreneurial expertise.

b) Provide venture capital for innovative start-up companies in the aviation industry.

c) Provide capital for research and development to universities, in commercial collaboration with industry, to develop innovative solutions and manufacturing technologies for the aviation products of the future. ITF to own the IP to any commercially viable results or products developed using ITF funds.

d) Help establish or encourage the return to Australia of the major avionic repair and maintenance companies who have all recently left Australia to base their Pacific operations in Asia.

e) Help fund the buyback of the secondary GA capital city airports. The individual lessees at the Airports can than 'buy back' their building assets under a long term community or neighbourhood title scheme to repay the ITF. This will allow aviation businesses to invest on secure premises titles. There is inadequate security of tenure at the secondary airport for aviation related business under the current arrangements. (See Section 5)

f) Fund new technologies like S-BAS that will improve the productivity of many industries, not just aviation. This will benefit the whole nation. (See Section 11)

Aviation Medicine 14. AOPA recommends Aviation Medicine reform of medicals for private GA pilots. The existing Class 2 medical should be extensively modified to allow consistent rules for both private GA flying and Sports/Recreational flying. This change would result in GA pilot medical certificates being granted by Designated Aviation Medical

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Examiners (DAME) using CASA clinical guidelines and only referred to CASA in some circumstances. (See Section 8)

National Airspace System

15. AOPA recommends, on public safety grounds, the immediate full implementation of the National Airspace System (NAS). This has been partially implemented by both CASA and ASA but the final stage was deferred in 2010 and finally halted in 2015 by Minister Truss. (See Section 9, Appendices 3, 6, 9)

Jabiru Aircraft Restrictions

Because of a number of reported engine problems, CASA currently restricts Jabiru aircraft from flying over built up areas and this is having a devastating impact on the reputation of the manufacturer and impacting sales. The manufacturer claims the Australian engine problems relate to unsatisfactory local maintenance by aircraft owners since other countries which have different maintenance regulations to Australia are not reporting such problems and have not imposed such restrictions. CASA, in collaboration with both the manufacturer and the other overseas regulators, needs to determine whether the level of local owner engine maintenance is the source of the engine problems.

16. AOPA, in support of an Australian aircraft manufacturer, Jabiru Aircraft Pty Ltd recommends that CASA consult with the national regulators of the other countries where significant numbers of Jabiru aircraft operate, including New Zealand, South Africa, USA and Canada. If this proves to be a local engine maintenance problem, CASA and RAAus should look to alter engine maintenance regulations. In South Africa for example, engine maintenance is undertaken only by Licensed Engine Engineers. (See Section 10).

17. AOPA recommends CASA and the manufacturer implement a program whereby licensed engineers can inspect and lift restrictions on an individual aircraft basis for those aircraft deemed adequately owner maintained. This would allow flight by Jabiru aircraft over built up areas to be reinstated. (See Section 10).

This appears to be an example whereby CASA has focused solely on safety aspects with blanket restrictions but has not taken account of the commercial interests of the local manufacturer.

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SECTION 3 FLIGHT REGULATIONS AND OPERATIONS

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SECTION 3 FLIGHT REGULATIONS AND OPERATIONS

Figure 1

The picture in Figure 1 above is a graphical illustration of what those involved in the GA industry face.

The small A5 booklet on the left contains the entire suite of aviation regulations required by the United States which has better GA safety statistics than Australia, when considering relative volumes of GA traffic.

The A5 Booklet in Figure 1 is called the FAR AIM which stands for Federal Aviation Regulations (pages 1-524) and Aeronautical Information Manual (pages 525-1091). The FARs contain some 80 different Parts in the first 525 pages and cover all regulatory requirements for sports aviation, general private flying, commercial charter, or indeed operating an airline, in one small A5 sized handbook.

In Figure 1 the box of printing paper on the right represents the hard copy pages that just one small part of Australia’s aviation regulation Suite, Part 61, which deals with pilot certification. Australia’s Part 61, which has only just been 'upgraded' has 3000 A4 pages with referenced material. It is written in extremely difficult to understand legal terminology. By comparison, America’s Part 61 which deals with the same topic, pilot certification, is just 100 A5 pages of plain English which is easy to understand and 16

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very user friendly.

In order to revive the GA industry, the regulatory and compliance cost to general aviation (GA) businesses has to be reduced. Government regulatory agencies need to reduce red tape and carry out cost benefit analysis on any new regulatory changes. This has not happened as is evidenced by the cost burden forced upon industry by the Civil Aviation Safety Authority (CASA) and Airservices Australia (ASA) with the premature roll out of Automatic Dependent Surveillance-Broadcast (ADSB) technology.

These semi-autonomous government agencies, which have little or no commercial in- house expertise among senior management, are not considering the cost to businesses and the impact on employment of new regulations. Nor are they routinely preparing Regulatory Impact Statements (RIS) for clearance by the Minister before introducing new regulations. Both semi-autonomous agencies operate with little oversight by government. Because the agencies are partly funded by industry levies on fuel and air navigational charges, governments appear reluctant to meddle in their decisions.

As an example, CASA/ASA have forced the industry to mandate the installation of ABS-B technology up to five years ahead of the USA and six years ahead of New Zealand. Despite a concerted campaign waged by AOPA and the GA industry, assisted by The Australian newspaper to justify the cost or safety benefits of their actions both CASA and ASA refuse to admit mistakes in the 2009 CASA Regulatory Impact Statement (RIS). This CASA RIS estimated $47.7M worth of net savings. Industry consultation papers at that time promised compensation to aircraft owners where mandatory ADSB installations were required, but this has never happened. ASA now claims there are no savings that can be re-directed to the GA owners but they and CASA who have regulatory oversight of ADSB policy insist on pushing on with the early role out years ahead of US and other countries.

Every Chief Pilot is overwhelmed by the volume of regulatory material and it is impacting their ability to supervise pilots and remain personally proficient. Many small aircraft charter companies are unable to remain financially viable if they are to fully comply with the regulations (See Section 6). Some are faced with the dilemma that to stay in business the Chief Pilot and the Company CEO risk personal prosecution if they have missed some paperwork or documentation with a flying Chief Pilot. Again, this just does not happen in the safer flying environment of the USA.

Why do CASA penalise our Industry when there is no measurable safety or cost benefit? We can only assume they have no idea of the commercial realities of the industry. Many of the CASA personnel fail to take commercial realities into consideration. CASA think they are simply improving safety or quote 'world’s best practice' with introduction of the new Part 61. There has now developed a lack of mutual respect between the parties. CASA should view the aviation industry as their client and work to establish good relations through monitoring industry performance. But a strategic review of the CASA organisation is needed to achieve this change.

The new CASA Chairman Geoff Boyd and the CEO/DAS Mark Skidmore have admitted to short comings with the implementation of Part 61. While both have 17

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instigated a 'review of its contents and unintended consequences' it continues to cause massive financial cost to industry without any evidence to support improved safety outcomes. It is the principal reason for AOPA initiating Project Eureka.

Over twenty years ago the Australian regulator was charged by government to modernise aviation regulations and align them with other first world countries and the International Council Aviation Organisation (ICAO). The rapid transformation of the industry by modern technology required the issue of a multitude of dispensations against outdated regulations.

Industry estimates are that CASA has spent hundreds of millions of dollars so far on our new, home grown regulations that are supposed to bring us in line with overseas regulations. Figure 2 below shows how poorly we are progressing against our peers despite the extraordinary amount of money spent. CASA are far from complete and they are taking us further away from the US regulations where there is a vibrant general aviation industry.

As can be seen from the ICAO State Safety Audits (Figure 2 below), the performance of Australia’s safety regulator compares poorly to counterparts in other advanced countries (Reference: http://www.icao.int/safety/Pages/USOAP Results.aspx)

The clear message from the safety audits conducted on ICAO nations below is that wherever CASA has responsibility for a key regulatory suite, Australia’s performance is well below that of comparable nations.

Figure 2

The sheer volume of aviation regulations the Australian industry is required to comply with, which expands exponentially as each new set of rules is promulgated, makes compliance a logistical nightmare and increasingly impossible to comprehend. Since regulations are promulgated to promote safety, Australia is failing because already,

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many dispensations are being issued against new regulations shortly after they are enacted. The question of safety is also relevant to another development unique to Australia where CASA has created a regulatory regime far more attractive than General Aviation. By creating a maximum 600 kg AUW self administered category they have induced thousands of flyers into ultralights. While aircraft designers and engineers are to be complimented on their ingenuity in building down to a weight, these aircraft cannot be registered for IFR as they are not strong enough; they are not suited to the windy and turbulent conditions prevalent in Australia; they have very limited range; and no carrying capacity for water, survival equipment or baggage.

While not suggesting ultralights do not have a place in global aviation, their popularity in Australia has as much to do with their simplified regulatory regime as it has to do with their low cost and convenience. Its popularity is a pointer to the way GA aircraft regulations should be heading.

There is an obvious solution and the most effective and least costly. Most of the General Aviation pilots and Engineers spend time in the US studying US Regulations for endorsements or qualifications. It make practical sense to implement the US Regulations in Australia. It would be a real productivity reform not to have to study one set of rules (US or EU) and operate on another set of Regulations (CASA).

Some years ago a Royal Commission was formed in New Zealand as a result of a tragic accident. From that Royal Commission New Zealand embarked on a complete reform of their Aviation regulator. Starting with the Act, everything was rewritten to mirror the US regulations. Today New Zealand’s aviation industry is thriving and their regulations are recognised around the world as some of the best, witnessed by the number of countries that have adopted them.

The industry’s solution to fixing general aviation flight operations and regulations is to replace the existing CASA Regulations with either the US FAR’s or the New Zealand CAR’s. This would require an amendment to the Civil Aviation Act. For instance if the airlines wish to continue under the present EASA (European) BIAS Regulations the Act needs to be amended.

What is clear to the general aviation section of the industry is that we cannot continue under a set of airline centric regulations.

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SECTION 4 INDUSTRY FUNDING AND TAXING

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SECTION 4

INDUSTRY FUNDING AND TAXING

Federal Government funding and taxing policy have failed the general aviation (GA) industry over the last two decades. Employment has been in severe decline over this period. 8000 people were employed in aviation activities at Bankstown Airport in the 1980’s. Today it is down to 2500. User pays was introduced over this period but it has crippled the GA industry. AOPA wants to copy a taxing model from the most successful GA country in the world, the US where user pays charges do not apply to GA aircraft. Given their much higher volume of GA flights and despite their severe weather and mountainous terrain, US accident rate statistics demonstrate a better safety record than Australia. We need to eliminate Airservices Australia enroute and terminal charges as per the successful US model. We could dramatically reduce the staff and wages bill at CASA if we simply enacted US FAA Regulations for GA. By dropping charges we can stimulate industry activity and jobs growth. More importantly, by enacting the FAA Regulations immediately, we can reduce the red tape burden on operators. This is a universal cry from all our members across the country. Australia is trying to re-invent the regulatory wheel when we have readily available and sensible regulations from the world leader in GA. All sections of the GA industry has been in constant and unabated decline over the last twenty years. The statics prove this undeniably. Bankstown Airport, the centre of the Australian GA industry in the 1980’s, was the busiest airport in the southern hemisphere with over 550,000 aircraft movements per annum. It is now below 180,000. A similar disastrous story exists at all our privatised secondary general aviation airports in all States (except SA) (See Appendix 9). You would expect any healthy industry sector to grow at CPI level per annum. If you factored in a three percent annual CPI increase over the last 20 years the movements at Bankstown should be nearer to one million. Bankstown Airport today looks like a ghost town. Very few new hangers have been constructed in recent years. However non-aviation developments are booming. Where once it was difficult for a Bankstown flying school in the 1980’s to find an aircraft parking spot, today you have to scour the airport to spot an aircraft. A normal commercial business park land bank has been created post the Coalition sell off overseen by the then-Deputy Prime Minister, John Anderson MP. Commercial business parks can be established anywhere where appropriate land zoning exist. Aviation businesses need a runway to survive. Runways just can’t be built or located anywhere. They are essential pieces of infrastructure. AOPA can recall only two new commercially constructed runways in Australia that were not related to the resources sector. They are Wellcamp Airport in Toowoomba and Mascot’s third runway.

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Governments seemed to have ignored the business development potential within the GA industry. This is only conclusion one can draw when considering the policy decisions over the last 20 years. GA is most likely widely seen as consisting predominantly of personal or private flying activities. But in fact it is a real commercial industry that in the past supported many jobs in flight training for local and overseas organisations, charter operations servicing our vast land and engineering repair shops and manufacturing aircraft and replacement parts. With likely future Boeing 737 orders for Indonesia and Airbus A320 orders for India tipped to exceed 900 aircraft in total, Australia is the obvious place for commercial pilot training to ensure high standards of safety within the region. The regional and international airlines have traditionally supported pilot and engineering jobs by taking employees from the GA employee base. With GA in decline this means that Airlines have to import skills from other countries or train their own. Training is expensive so we are always going to see foreign pilots in the Australian airlines and maintenance moving offshore under the current GA policies. Heavy airline aircraft maintenance is moving overseas. There seems a view in Government that in a modern globalised economy all Australian heavy maintenance will eventually end up in Asia. This does not have to happen. New Zealand, with a much more flexible industrial relations policy than Australia, is actively encouraging local heavy maintenance and pilot employment for Qantas, Virgin and Jetstar. In the 1980’s we used to carry out 'D checks' at Avalon Airport, the heaviest maintenance possible on Boeing 747. Tragically, we have lost those highly skilled jobs to other countries and we need government to reverse this decline and revitalise Australia's involvement in this very important global industry. But we will need bold, innovative and supportive Government industry policy initiatives in education, training, airports and infrastructure as well as substantial investment. In the current fiscal environment, savings need to be found. New Zealand with a similar, if not worse, fiscal outlook started a Regulations reform process after the 1979 Mt Erebus accident in Antarctica. They pinned the FAA rules to their regulatory mast after the review. CASA decided to go the European way via EASA regulations. EASA may be good for airlines but it a disaster for GA operators because of their complexity. EASA and now CASA treat small GA businesses as airlines. Despite the prevailing environment, there are some success stories. Boeing Australia is a very successful organisation supplying parts for new heavy airline aircraft. Boeing USA executives have described their Australian operation as one of the most productive in their global company. We need more businesses like Boeing Australia; we need to study their business model and expand it into other parts of the aviation industry. We have to stop the recent practice of repair and support companies like Rockwell Collins Avionics packing up and re-locating to Asia. With appropriate Industry support policies these outcomes can be reversed.

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We need more research and development. Companies need to collaborate with universities to develop the technology, materials and the manufacturing know-how to lead innovation in the industry. In terms of where the funding should come from AOPA proposes either a partial or full privatisation of Airservices Australia (ASA). This could be undertaken to raise up to an estimated $1b to $4b AUD. The Government could retain a 51% controlling interest, like the UK model or sell the entire entity, like the Canadian, Middle East or German model. ASA is a semi-autonomous government agency that has been essentially funded in the last 20 years by the aviation industry with user pays charges. AOPA understands they deliver a token $50M 'dividend' to the Government per annum. Given the value of the asset this is a very poor commercial return on capital. ASA is in need of productivity reform that can only come from private Industry. Such a change would lead to lower air navigational enroute and terminal charges for the airlines and lead to lower travel costs for the public. AOPA understands Qantas paid a staggering $600M in ASA charges last year. There are many overseas examples of privatised or semi-privatised national air services. What is evident is Australia has relatively expensive air navigation charges and a less safe air traffic control system than that exists in Europe and America (see Section 8 Air Space Management). According to the Australian Financial Review (AFR) ASA has recently agreed to non- commercial enterprise bargaining agreements with employees allowing four percent annual wage increases when the remainder of the Commonwealth Public Servants averages one and a half percent. This wages outcome is inevitable when dealing with a semi-autonomous Government monopoly. ASA has been circulating to industry a proposed new five year charges agreement with increases of five point three percent next year and three percent thereafter. At the same time ASA is closing down over two hundred ground based navigational aids in favour of much cheaper GPS navigation systems which will substantially lower their recurrent costs. These increases are causing understandable issues with the airline industry. The AFR is reporting that ASA may now be dropping the proposed increases. ASA should be reducing their cost base and charges to bring their charges in line with peer organisations around the world. AOPA proposes the funds raised in a full privatisation sale be disbursed as follows: 1) Fifty percent be returned to Treasury to reduce the budget deficit. This will be seen as a repayment to taxpayers of what the Australian Government initially invested in the network. As ASA has been industry funded in recent times by the user pay model it is reasonable to say the industry has paid for a significant proportion of the current operational Capex. Things like the ADSB role out and the 'One Sky' project are essentially industry funded by the user pays model introduced twenty five years ago. Therefore, a large

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proportion of the capital raised in any sale should rightly be re-invested in the industry.

2) Fifty percent be placed in an Industry Trust Fund and administered in a similar model to the Future Fund, but with an emphasis of venture capital to foster jobs and research & development in new technologies that will revitalise the Australian general aviation industry.

If a partial privatisation was proposed then the funds raised from the percentage sold should all go into the Industry Trust Fund and not Treasury.

A Board of eminent and experienced venture capital business persons, headed up by someone with both vast industry and proven entrepreneurial experience should run the Board. AOPA proposes that Dick Smith AC be included among those considered for the initial selection of Chairman. Funds that are invested in start-ups should result in the Industry Fund having equity in the Companies. A mechanism should be developed that the Fund can exit the investment at an appropriate return to the Fund for the risk undertaken. Companies should also be allowed call options at a premium to the fund valuation if they want to exit the Government provided capital. If the Government remains a long term shareholder in the new ventures this will ensure a future revenue stream, and a good commercial return, to the taxpayer.

Funds from the Trust should be used to assist the buyback of the secondary GA Airports by the aviation business operators. The current Airport owners are not acting in the spirit of the Airports Privatisation Act which was supposed to foster aviation activates. Instead they are simply being run as a business park with rents benchmarked or based upon similar the airports like any business parks in the surrounding areas. This was not the intent of the Coalition's Airport Privatization Policy. Some of the Fund’s capital is needed to help rectify the situation. Bankstown Airport has been in virtual receivership by the Commonwealth Bank for some time. It has recently been reported as 'sold' but the Minister has not signed off on the sale as the Airports Privatization Act requires. The Minister is reported to have said he does not need to sign off on the sale as the same Company has been bought by new owners or Shareholders. This does not pass the “pub test”. Clearly if you have new beneficiaries or shareholders than there is a 'new sale' under the Act. The proposed sale to a property developer/Superannuation Trust should be stopped by the Minister as AOPA has serious misgivings about the entire sale process. Senate Estimates hearing have the details. The Individual Airport Operators could than 'buy' back their facilities with a Community or Neighbour title scheme. AOPA believes the Industry Trust Fund could be repaid the purchase price by all the current individual building asset lessee operators. This would provide a big boost to the industry by reversing the trend of 'repossession' of assets by the Airport owners at the end of the original Federal Airports Corporation (FAC) twenty five year ground leases. There are many examples, in AOPA’s opinion, of unconscionable behaviour by airport owners taking over buildings when the ground

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lease expires. This has resulted in some cases of non-aviation business occupying the premises. If we can get a model where the asset occupier can 'purchase' the buildings, giving them security of tenure, we can start to rebuild the industry. Companies can than borrow from banks to build. Without secure premises business owners can’t sensibly invest to grow their businesses. This would guarantee the airports stayed dedicated to aviation without costing the Commonwealth Bank, or the Industry Trust Fund for that matter, any long term financial commitment. This process could then be repeated at Archerfield, Moorabbin, Jandakot, and Parafield. Funds from the Trust should be allocated to support recurrent costs at Regional Local Council Airports to ensure that these airport remain open. There has been a number of Local Council airports lost forever due the Councils not willing to pay the upkeep on the asset. Revenue from GA activity has been declining in line with the rundown of the GA industry. Local Council’s ability to maintain airports has become more difficult given the loss of activities at the airports. Regional airports need to be maintained if we are to have any ability to revitalise engineering and flight training businesses in these areas. With Regulatory reform these businesses will be able to re-start. Funds from the Trust should be made available for low interest debt facilities, on commercial business terms, to engineering and flight training companies willing to re- commence operations at regional airports. Companies would need to provide a business plan that supports regional employment and training. One aspect of the business plan for maintenance shops should be to mandate minimum apprentice to licensed engineers employment ratios in return for the low interest start up loans. Funds could be allocated to both industry and universities in partnerships to provide the high tech innovation the industry constantly needs to survive, grow and prosper. Our universities are some of the finest in the world. They have the ability to provide world leading technical solutions and innovation but we need to foster and develop that resource. Overseas manufacturers could be encouraged to come here, like the successful Boeing model, to partner with locals to develop the materials, manufacturing processes and the products that drive innovation and high value jobs. Funds should also be used to revitalise the GA commercial flight training industry. Low 'doc' loans could be made available to individual for commercial flight training with a 'HECS' type repayment model. In the 1980's Australia was a world leader in flight training. As an example, in 1988 Axis Flight Training Centre at Bankstown Airport had a business plan that identified the annual Asian commercial pilot training market at $500 M USD. Today it’s most likely to be three to five times that amount. But Axis were competing unsuccessfully with US based training organisations due to CASA red tape cost imposts on the industry. With appropriate regulatory reform, like introducing the American FAR Regulations, Australian flying training organisations could more successfully compete on a level playing field with US organisations. Couple this with the devaluation of the Australian dollar, and Australia geographically being in the Asia Pacific Region, we would have success in attracting overseas students. All we need is investment in

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modern local infrastructure, flying schools, modern aircraft and onsite classrooms and accommodation. Current Airport short term land leases preclude any bank lending to business ventures on very short period ground lease security. One attempt by an AOPA member to get a long term (>25 years) ground lease from Bankstown Airport Limited (BAL) at Bankstown Airport to build his own hanger failed. Instead, BAL wants to build one and charge an uneconomic rent to occupy it. They effectively operate a monopoly in hanger space in the Sydney basin. This same AOPA member has been refused permission to build a GA hanger at Mascot since GA does not suit Macquarie’s Master Plan. Instead, an existing hanger lessee has offered the only existing hanger space available at Mascot at the rate of $168,000 pa, a commercially ridiculous rate for one GA aircraft. Bankstown is the only real commercial option for hanger space in the Sydney basin after Hoxton Park was sold to developers and Camden is too remote. Unless one agrees to BAL terms hanger space is unavailable. The Airports Privatisation Act did not envisage this outcome and the current situation is a real disincentive to investment in the building assets needed to develop and grow a business. Funds from the Trust could be used to invest in new technologies to improve productivity as outlined in Section 11 of this Brief. One technology, for instance, the satellite S-BAS system, would have a very significant productivity increase across many industries, not just aviation. Funds are needed for these exciting new industries to keep pace with our global peers who are already embracing these new technologies. The whole of the northern hemisphere has S-BAS capability. Nobody in the southern hemisphere has it. New Zealand are very keen to contribute to part of the $200M cost but they need Australia to join them to gain access to the satellite space. Moving on from the rapid decline in the low value added resources recession, Australia needs to have high value added industries for our future generations’ jobs security and job growth in the global economy. Aviation is one of those industries and Australia is well placed to recover lost ground with the right funding support and Government Industry policy. Investment could be arranged in semi-Government institutions like universities flying academies, or in partnership with the universities. Some universities already have small flight training colleges, like the University of NSW but they don’t have the scale to be a major world force in training. Importantly though, they have the skills and procedures in place to advance the industry if economies of scale and investment in buildings and aircraft can be facilitated. Australian airline piloting skills are second to none by world standards. In a country with suitable weather and terrain we should be leading the world in commercial flight training. One other AOPA member with an aviation charter business recently had to import a 457 Visa American pilot because a suitable local candidate to meet CASA’s experience rules could not be found. This is not an attack on the CASA experience requirements but recognition of the sad state of employment in the GA industry.

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The world's most prosperous countries are those that have high tech and high value added industries: Germany, America, France, Japan and now China. They all focus on supporting local, high value added manufacturing. We can do the same in aviation with the right regulations and Government industry policy, simply by copying the US or NZ model. For future jobs for our younger generation and for the long term prosperity of our nation we need to act now. The average age of the Engineering LAME pool is 57 years old. Couple this with the fact we are not training any apprentices and one can see why AOPA has launched Project Eureka.

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SECTION 5 AIRPORT AND GENERAL AVIATION BUSINESS SECURITY OF TENURE

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SECTION 5 AIRPORT AND GENERAL AVIATION BUSINESS SECURITY OF TENURE

No business in any industry can operate successfully without security of tenure for their operations. In the case of the General Aviation industry these premises are mostly located at the secondary capital city airports Bankstown, Camden, Moorabbin, Geelong, Essendon, Archerfield, Parafield and Jandakot. Since the privatisation of the secondary airports there has been a decline in the security of tenure for aviation business. Ground lease periods have been reducing for aviation businesses while non-aviation business leases have increased. AOPA is advised that Bankstown Airport Limited is offering 10 year lease periods only to GA operators. They are offering much longer periods to Hardware Stores, Petrol Stations, Schools, Bus Companies and other non-aviation businesses.

The intent of the Airports Privatization Act was not to offer more secure tenure to non- aviation businesses. Since privatisation the landlords have been enforcing their rights to resume properties or improvements at the end of the lease period. Lessees have to demolish the improvements and hand back cleared land or hand over the improvements to the airport owner. Worse still, we have heard instances where the lessee has been issued a notice by the airport owners to improve their buildings to current Building Code of Australia standards before the airport owners resume the property at the end of the lease period. The lessee has to wear this cost, or the higher cost of demolition, before vacating. All this may be legal but it is immoral. These were the conditions the Coalition Government and the Deputy Prime Minister John Anderson agreed to when they sold out the GA industry by disposing of secondary airports. The Government had sold the major capital city airports for a fortune and had no interest in running secondary 'non-profitable' airports. The amounts they raised for the secondary airports were paltry. The new owners have viewed these secondary airports as land banks for straight business park property deals. Business parks can be established anywhere in cities where the appropriate zoning exists. The aviation industry needs runways to function and there are very few of these in the Australian Capital cities. Without reasonable commercial access to the runways we don’t have a GA industry. Lease periods from the Federal Airports Corporation were already relatively short at 25 years making it difficult to borrow from banks for buildings. When the Federal Government owned the airports the leases were 'rolled' into new 25 year leases when they expired.

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The devastating impact of privatisation of secondary airports can be seen by looking at Bankstown following Senate Estimate Hearings chaired by Senator Heffernan. Detailed evidence was presented which showed that:

1) The North/South Runway 36/18 has been closed down contrary to the Airport Privatization Act to allow for non-aviation developments. 2) State Government Stamp duty has not been paid on the transfer of the original lease. 3) Contaminated fill (allegedly containing asbestos) has been used to increase the building Relative Level on the flood plain. This land has been used for major non-aviation developments. 4) Fill being placed on the flood plain without a proper EIS.

The Dept. of Infrastructure and Regional Development, headed by Mr Mike Mrdak and who reported to the Deputy Prime Minister Warren Truss ( up until March) , have had the responsibility to administer the Airports Privatization Act activities at all the privatised airports. They have done nothing to intervene at Bankstown despite the repeated written requests of a Mr Keith Campbell. Keith is a retired builder, developer and private certifier who also owned and operated a commuter airline out of Mascot, past Vice President of the Sydney Chapter of the NSW Master Builders Association and Investigative Officer with the NSW Dept of Fair Trading. Keith is a tireless campaigner for General Aviation. He has helped AOPA with details on Bansktown Airport.

Some pertinent statics on the post -privatisation period at Bankstown include:

 Bankstown Aerodrome employed over 8000 people before privatisation.  Bankstown Aerodrome now employs less than 2500 people after privatisation.  Bankstown Aerodrome had over 1800 aircraft based on the Aerodrome before privatisation.  Bankstown Aerodrome since privatisation now has fewer than 320 aircraft.  Bankstown Aerodrome had at least 20 Apprentices per year before privatisation.  Bankstown Aerodrome this year has no Apprentices.

These statistics are reflected across Australia clearly demonstrating the demise of an aviation industry caused by governments failing to enforce the Airports Privatisation Act. Official ASA figures at Appendix 8 show a constant decline in all States except

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South Australia. The Department of Infrastructure and Regional Development in administering this Act, through lack of due diligence, have failed to enforce the provisions of this Act.

As an example of rent increases the following table shows rent increases for one operator over the period since 2008 at Cairns Airport. It shows an 88 percent increase over those eight years when inflation over the same period was 21 percent. The chart also shows the year-on-year increases over that same period.

Mr Keith Campbell has developed a model for community or neighbour title which will overcome the lack of security of GA aviation operators at secondary airports. The detailed model is attached at Appendix 2.

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SECTION 6 CHARTER AND AIRWORK OPERATION

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SECTION 6 CHARTER AND AIRWORK OPERATION

Introduction This section provides comment by Mr Rick Pegus of Navair Aviation, a charter brokerage company. Mr Pegus was previously Managing Director of Skypac Aviation, a Bankstown Part 135 Commercial Charter company with its own Air Operators Certificate (AOC) employing pilots, administration staff and having multiple aircraft types on its AOC ranging from small piston aircraft to light jets. SkyPac peaked at 20 aircraft on its AOC in the 1980’s. Unfortunately, Skypac which Mr Pegus purchased in 2007 had been in operation for 44 years but went into liquidation in 2015. AOPA approached him, as the principal of another failed Bankstown charter operation, to identify the causes of the downfall and what should be done to fix the problems in the Charter Industry and return it to profitability. Air Charter Industry "I have been involved in the charter industry for the past 10 years, initially as a broker and then as an AOC holder for the past 8 years. "Ever since 2008 (GFC) the industry has been tough but I feel that it has become more and more difficult to operate an AOC profitably due to a number of factors as time has gone by and we have moved closer to the new suite of CASA regulations. "Over the years the number of staff required to run an AOC has increased significantly. To run a small operation, we now are expected to employ:  Managing Director  Chief Pilot  Head of Check and Training  Operations Manager  Safety officer  Maintenance Controller  Line pilots

"Most of these roles are economically unproductive and make no significant improvement to safety. "The cost and time of inducting Pilots and Check and Training has increased significantly for no added safety benefit. "The time and cost of putting new aircraft online or making changes to your AOC has increased significantly. "Basically in the current environment the only type of businesses that can survive are:

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1. The one man operations where the Director is the Chief Pilot, Safety Officer, Maintenance Controller and is the pilot who flies the aircraft. 2. The business that has reached about $6m pa in turnover that can start to afford the support staff you need to run an AOC properly. "All businesses that are between these two points in current regulatory environment can only be sustained if they make no changes and this means that they cannot grow. If you try to grow your business, you cannot sustain the large expenses involved in making the changes. "In the next couple of pages, I have highlighted four very important areas that are currently causing massive problems to our industry and in particular to the smaller operators. There are many other problems smaller in nature that are all adding up to have great impacts on the cost and complexity of running an aviation business. "Indirectly the people who suffer the most from over regulation are the people who live in the regional areas as they have reduced access to affordable air transport. Something needs to be done to stop the increase in cost and reduce the requirements for smaller aircraft to participate in Regular Public Transport operations. Less affordable aircraft access forces people to use road transport over long distances which is undesirable. Introducing new aircraft online for charter operations. "Introducing new types of aircraft onto an AOC to operate has become a very lengthy and costly exercise for a number of reasons. "CASA now expect you to regurgitate the flight manual by creating our own simplified version of it that is then accepted by them as a section of your Company Operations Manual. This is very time consuming and the approval process often ends up being lengthy as drafts of the manual are bounced back and forth. "We are also expected to create a checklist that is based on the manufacturer’s procedures despite the fact that as a part of the certification of the aircraft the Manufacturer produces an approved checklist. We should be able to use this checklist and apply to CASA if we deem it necessary to make improvements. "At this stage we produce material for CASA with little guidance from CASA for CASA’s approval. The standards, philosophy and opinions of individuals within CASA on what this material should contain vary widely from one CASA office to the next. "This situation has increased our costs and reduced productivity. Major assets lay idle for long periods awaiting CASA approvals. It is very difficult to make it attractive for people or companies to buy new aircraft to put online. They know the asset will sit idle for such long periods before they can produce revenue from it. It can often take years to get back to break even when you start from so far behind. In the case of a light jet, every six months that the aircraft doesn’t fly will cost about $250,000 in repayments, insurance and hangar fees. This does not include management fees and pilot salaries. "The reason that Australia has an ageing aircraft problem is that those who would be interested in importing aircraft in to the country soon lose interest when they find out 34

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how long it will take before the aircraft can be put on an AOC so that it can earn revenue here in Australia. "Older models of aircraft are here in large numbers and are better supported. They are more popular despite being more maintenance intensive as we can still fix them faster than new ones because there are plenty of spares here. Solution:  It needs to be possible to have aircraft approved and ready for charter prior to it arriving in the country so that it can be put to work as soon as it gets here.  All companies should be using identical check lists and procedures when operating the same aircraft.  CASA should work with industry to produce Generic Operating Manuals for each aircraft type which are standardised across the county.

Checking and Training of Pilots. "In years gone by checking and training was as simple as conducting two checks per year, one being on the most complicated type flown. If you were competent on the most complicated type that you flew then it was accepted that you could fly the easier aircraft so long as you were current on them. "Pilots flying aircraft under 5700 kg were only required to do an instrument proficiency check once every 12 months. "Now under the new regulations there are instances where some pilots now require more than four checks per year because of the different types of aircraft that they fly. This has doubled the cost of check and training for minimal added safety benefit. There have been massive increases in cost in particular to smaller operators who are the ones who least can afford it. "Single pilot jets now require a minimum check on each different type every 12 months. So if you fly three different single pilot jets you will have to do a minimum three checks per year plus any other checks you may require if you fly other multi crew aircraft. These checks can cost between $6,000 to $20,000 depending on how they are done. "If you are a contract pilot who works for three different operators, you may find yourself doing the same checks for each individual operator. "Small General Aviation companies just don’t have the resources to cope with the increase in cost and the additional loss in productivity caused by the over complication of check and training. Solution:  Simplify the rules using the FAA model.  Two checks per year max only on the most complicated type of aircraft.  If you fly single pilot one check must be single pilot the other can be multi crew.  Relax the requirement for checks on specific types to every two years for single pilot jets

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 CASA assist smaller operators with their checking and training as many cannot afford to employ multiple check and training pilots.  Allow operators to share check and training costs by allowing checks to count for multiple operators.

Maintenance "The increase in complexity of the maintenance regulations has forced many companies out of business. This reduces the level of choice and the number of locations that we have available to us for maintenance. "Maintenance support in regional locations is now almost non-existent. If you break down in the bush you are not going anywhere fast. "There are also no new aircraft apprentices coming through the ranks which is going to be a big problem when the old ones retire. I believe the average age of an aircraft technician is 57. "We have a big problem that not enough critical spare parts are kept in country which increases the down time of our aircraft and increases our freight costs. One of our new aircraft spent an average of one month per year on the ground waiting for critical spares. Because the spares are not here it also increases the time taken to fault find. "This has a massive impact on our profitability as we effectively lose one month of revenue every year. Solution: Simplified maintenance regulation for non-airline aircraft under 20,000 kg Flight and Duty Times "The new flight and duty time’s regulations are very complex and seem to be tailored towards the airlines. Charter operators need more flexible arrangements such as fatigue management that cater better to the changing nature of our work. Under the new Regulations CAO 48.1 the cost of implementing fatigue management has been placed out of reach of most of the operators who would seek to use it. "These new regulations mean that we need to employ additional pilots to cover small amounts of work which drives up the cost. The average charter pilot would be lucky to reach 400 hours per year. Less than half of the maximum 1000 hours that they are allowed to legally fly. In charter most operators do not have a fatigue problem just a regulation problem which drives up our costs. "This area is a big problem because it is a show stopper. If you require extra crew to cover flights the increase in expense is massive. Often they are not available which means that you cannot do the flight." Solution:  Make fatigue management more affordable to smaller charter operators.

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 If this was made affordable the rest CAO 48 could be reduced to cater to the airlines and multi crew operations. CAO 48 could be then simplified so people could understand how it applies.

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SECTION 7 FLIGHT TRAINING

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SECTION 7 FLIGHT TRAINING

The AOPA assessment of this sector is that it has been in steady decline since the 1980’s. There have been some years of increase (see Appendix 8) but the general trend is clearly down over the last 20 years. In a normal growth trend it should be increasing at 3% PA.

Bankstown airport was the busiest airport in the southern hemisphere and the capital of flying training in Australia in the 1980’s. Movements were over 550,000 per annum. There are now less than 180,000.

Our flat terrain, good weather and uncluttered regional skies all make Australia an ideal training ground for both local and overseas pilot training. While there are a number of reasons for the decline in training in Australia, CASA over regulation has resulted in the closure of many smaller flying schools by requiring all flying schools to have an Air Operators Certificate (AOC). The cost of compliance has caused many smaller flying schools to close, partly because there is too much red tape. The requirement for an AOC’s has had a more pronounced negative effect in regional areas.

Reith General Aviation Consulting Pty Ltd has provided a small sample of flying school closures when the actual number is much greater. They include: Schutt Flying Academy; Civil Flying Services; Brindabella; VH Aviation; Schofields Aerodrome; Warrnambool; Colac; Stawell; Bairnsdale; Mudgee; Phillip Island; Tooradin; Whittlesea; Geelong; Hervey Bay; Wallan; Melton; and Riddels Creek. Advance Aviation at Emerald has failed and Westwing in Mt Isa and Townsville have closed in the last weeks. Many other flying schools, charter companies and engineering businesses are un-saleable.

AOPA’s assessment comes via aircraft sales activities which, for many years in the 1970’s and 80’s gave us an excellent but not detailed insight into various training

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establishments across Australia.

We asked the President of Sydney Flying Club, Allan Bligh (AO) to comment on what is wrong with flying training in Australia. Here is what he says:

“As things stand today, my perception is that if you operate for an airline or engage in a government (Fee Help) sponsored training course then you are making money. If you don’t and you depend on our traditional pay as you go client then you’re hours have declined 40% (or more) since 2011, your business deteriorates and you have a very problematic flight training future.

"The aviation culture arising from WW11 manifest itself in personal aircraft ownership and a speedy acceptance of airlines as an alternative transport mode. General Aviation (GA) aircraft sales grew rapidly as did the number of airlines. However the complexities of fight, weather related dangers and high cost of personal ownership, increasingly made GA ineffective in competing against airlines.

"The volume of pilots and new GA aircraft declined, replaced by airlines carrying more passengers for each pilot employed. The same two pilots increasingly, flew more passengers siting behind them so, despite some growth in airline aircraft numbers, the airline training market contracted. Hence the training of pilot solely for airlines never replaced the fall off in private pilots disillusioned by the difficulties of personal flight, the vagaries of weather and ownership or aircraft rental costs. Training across Australia contracted into a decreasing number of predominantly airline or university backed, corporate flight colleges.

"The cumulative economic concentration of airlines measured in their investment dollars per aircraft, resulted in increased power to influence politicians and their departments; their needs commanding respect and response whereas GA needs, attract derision and apathy. Moreover, decade after decade the airline’s cavalier approach to training results in a scramble for pilots creating collateral damage for all GA.

"What can GA do to arrest this decline in the short term and what are our long term threats and opportunities? Do not conflate our specific flight training issues with wider GA issues that affect every aviation sector. These would be airport and airspace access and cost, Regulator and Airway Provider costs and relevance plus others. Indeed, you will find this letter a Part 61/141/142 free area.

"Personally, I do not see flight training salvation now or in the longer term, in an embrace of Reactional Aircraft Association of Australia (RA Aus.) machines but their self-regulation is something which, we should evaluate again.

"My concentration is what can we do now, with our existing capital equipment, staff and facilities to reverse the decline and what support would we need from government to achieve the turnaround? In addition, what in our future could startle the government and their supine subordinates, to rouse and restore GA training prominence?

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"A suite of regulatory rules similar to the US Federal Aviation Authority (FAA) style of rules is needed to replace Civil Aviation Orders and Regulations (CAOs and CARs) which would allow the re-introduction of independent flight training instructors for country PPL training. This will repeal the need for AOC for basic PPL flight training at country airports. . This change would also mean removal of the bulk of regulation from the criminal code and delete strict liability provisions. Disincentives would be removed and replaced by an emphasis on education and training for improved safety outcomes.

"In my view, as set out below, we can make GA flying relevant and reliable, change our aircraft from “Toys” to “Tools” using existing equipment and facilities. In so doing make GA today, usable and economic to a wide range of present pilots and immediate trainees.

"I cannot think of an alternative plan that we can start now and that would deliver such short term improvements and gains whilst using, increasingly, existing aeroplanes, facilities and instructor skills.

"With the increasing use of GPS technology consideration should also be given to actively encouraging private visual flight rule PPL pilots to undertake post license instrument flight training. We see an increasing trend of IFR training in the US. We should be encouraging this type of post PPL licence training to improve safety outcomes.

"In the longer term, the biggest problem aviation training providers will have is the delivery of aviation skills to a rapid growth, non-airline, mass market which, will soon arise.

"Between now and 2025, the transfer of UAV technology to existing and new GA airframes and mated with existing and new avionics packages will rapidly make individual flight far easier than it is today. The switch from complicated to simple personal flight will be quick and intense.

"The growth in acceptance of automatic personal aviation transport will be so rapid and popular that it may impinge on the viability of regional and some intrastate airlines. Whilst we will welcome this renaissance of personal aviation, it will place immense strain on the ability of the industry we know today, to rapidly train the volume of ordinary citizens that desire it. It does beg the question, should flying training be deemed necessary in that future environment of automatic flight? My view is that a pilot’s license will be required, albeit with differing training and medical standards.

"You only have to look at the immense effort and cost that went into the Commonwealth and US training efforts to produce WW11 airmen: but we could not countenance similar accident rates to achieve the goals.

"In both cases elaborated, the forecasts are reasonable and the technology (including for automatic personal flight) is available off shelf, today. Only the rules and people’s lack of awareness that this can be done stand in the way. There are most serious and well-funded efforts going into automatic flight with self-separation in the USA and Europe. 41

PROJECT EUREKA

"The government agencies will have little option against public pressure but to change their thoughts and rules. That is what our proposal is about. The objectives should be about pressing Government to give us the tools to make the Private Pilot relevant for today plus laying out a considered, orderly pathway to the future of semi-autonomous, personal flight.

"Yet today, no concern is given to this technological wave rushing towards us. There is no consideration of aviation alternatives to airlines, for use by the wider public. Our sector will be stretched to the limit to handle this speedy insertion and growth explosion of auto-flight, aviation technology.

"Today our immediate aim is to stimulate our flying training business. We should press to amend the training regulations to facilitate the conversion of all Private Pilot training to a seamless path to PVT-IFR, all CPL to a seamless path to Command instrument rating.

"Our second goal is to cause the Regulator and government to understand the potential and immediacy of automatic GA flight. To push them to less airline centric and initiate initial infrastructure consideration, to handle a proliferation of GA aircraft with UAV technology.”

SECTION 8 AVIATION MEDICINE

43 PROJECT EUREKA

SECTION 8 AVIATION MEDICINE

Current Pilot Medical Certification

Currently for non-professional pilots there is a confusing range of medical certification options.

The original class 2 medical examination for private and student pilots has remained in effect. The addition of the Drivers Licence Medical (DLM) and now called a RAMP (Recreational Aviation Medical Practitioners Certificate) was originally intended to mimic the standards used for private car drivers and which was originally seen as a less demanding medical standard for those who were happy to accept a restricted range of aircraft types (maximum take-off weight (MTOW) of 1500 kg and restricted operating conditions (one passenger and below 10,000 ft.).

This relaxed medical standard has not been implemented as intended as CASA placed restrictions on the availability of this medical. Those with medical conditions which made a standard class 2 certificate expensive to obtain due to CASA required medical tests or who had medical conditions which denied issue of a CASA medical certificate were denied access to the RAMPC.

The Sporting Aircraft Association of Australia and Recreational Aviation Australia (RA Aus) also have a medical certificate which is a self-declaration type of certificate and which requires a doctor's approval if the applicant has certain medical conditions. These certificates allow operation of aircraft such as gliders and ultralight aircraft in the SAAA and aircraft with a MTOW of less than 600 kg. In the RA Aus category, this restricts pilots in aircraft weight and operations.

Dissatisfaction with the current system is due to the confusing range of medical certificates and the restrictions on operations for pilots using these different certificates. The current CASA Avmed certification of recreational pilots is bureaucratic, overly restrictive and expensive due to requirements for medical tests which are in many cases unnecessary given the recreational nature of the flying.

Proposed Medical Certification

For all recreational aviation (i.e. non-professional aviation in aircraft with a MTOW less than 5700 Kg) medical certification should remain outside of the CASA medical assessment process with the medical certification being appropriate to the type of recreational flying being conducted. In effect nothing would change from the current situation for the pilots flying under SAAA and RA Aus. rules with the exception that RA Aus. would have a MTOW increase to 2000 kg and 3 passengers. In addition any RA Aus pilot who suffers from a condition that is currently listed under the CASA list of medical conditions must see a Designated Aviation Medical Examiner (DAME) for

PROJECT EUREKA

medical certification. The Drivers Licence Medical (RAMPC) certificate would be abandoned.

The change that is proposed is for pilots flying aircraft that are outside of the RA Aus and SAAA categories as proposed above. These pilots would be required to hold a class 2 medical certificate issued by a DAME. The DAME would make the medical certification decision using the CASA clinical guidelines, issue the certificate for the validity period that is appropriate and advise CASA that a certificate has been issued. The DAME may choose to involve CASA Avmed if the case is difficult or assistance is required in coming to a certification decision.

The current class 1 medical certification system would remain unchanged and this would be for all professional or commercial operations and for private or recreational operations in aircraft with a MTOW in excess of 5,700 Kg.

PROJECT EUREKA

SECTION 9 AIRSPACE MANAGEMENT

PROJECT EUREKA

SECTION 9 AIRSPACE MANAGEMENT

The air traffic system in Australia is managed by a semi-autonomous Government body called Airservices Australia (ASA). The Civil Aviation Safety Authority (CASA) has regulatory oversight. Traditionally the Minister of this portfolio in the Coalition has been the leader of the National Party and therefore the Deputy Prime Minister. With the recent retirement of Warren Truss there has been a break from tradition with a new National Party member from Victoria, Darren Chester MP taking over responsibility. AOPA would encourage the new Minister to get involved in the airspace reform process in order to understand the importance of moving ahead with the now abandoned National Airspace System reform (NAS). Simply put, the NAS was to introduce the safer North American airspace management system into Australia. The NAS document (see Appendix 6) was presented to the government on 14 November 2001. It was prepared in consultation and agreement with Qantas and it was then accepted as government policy on 13 May 2002 (see John Anderson’s media release, “A new era of Australian airspace” 3 May 2002 at Appendix 9). Shortly after the initial introduction of the first part of NAS various parts were 'wound- back' – due primarily to the resistance to change and the implementation team being disbanded. While there has been no official announcement of the abandonment of the NAS decision, no further movements in relation to the implementation of NAS have taken place since 2004. As recently as 2015 further wind-backs have taken place in relation to calls at aerodromes that are not marked on charts. At the present time there is no policy at CASA or ASA in relation to finalising the airspace. Action needs to be taken immediately in order to create a safer airspace environment. Dick Smith, a previous Chairman of CASA has described our current procedures at busy non-tower controlled regional airports as “1930’s style do it yourself calling in the blind airspace”. His paper titled “Unsafe Skies” (see Appendix 3) outlines the deficiencies in our current system compared to what was proposed under the US styled NAS system. The only change since “Unsafe Skies” was published in November 2005, is the responsibility for airspace regulation has been moved to the CASA due to the clear conflict of interest having ASA, as a profit-making body, also responsible for regulation. The Australian newspaper recently sponsored a US national to Australia, Mr Jeff Griffith, a former FAA air traffic controller, now Vice President, Air Traffic Management

PROJECT EUREKA

at the Washington Consulting Group. He has extensive experience with designing airspace management systems in both America and Europe. The newspaper has been putting the performance of ASA under the microscope. They have been particularly critical of operations in Ballina, Mt Hotham and Hobart and also critical of the fact that the North American style Unicom has not been introduced at non-tower airports in Australia.

Importantly, when Jeff Griffith was with the FAA some 12 years ago he travelled to Canberra joining CASA and ASA representatives on the initial planning of the Australian NAS. When he was back in Australia recently he was shocked to learn NAS had stalled and we still had antiquated procedures at airports like Ballina where IFR aircraft from airlines, charter operators and private pilots are left to self-separate themselves in cloud. Over 400,000 airline passengers fly at Ballina per annum. It is a testament to the quality of our pilots that there has not been an accident, even though there have been very serious incidents in cloud at Bundaberg and Orange. The potential for an air accident always exists and the assistance that can be provided from a control service is far better than a 1930s advisory service.

AOPA asks whether there has to be a serious loss of life accident like NZ’s Mt Erebus disaster to force us to change our air traffic system.

There has been no definitive answer as to why the full NAS was not introduced as per government policy. It is believed that:

1) A classic resistance to change exists and lack of understanding as to how the NAS was to work. This was compounded by the fact that the implementation team was disbanded shortly after the system started to be wound-back. 2) Costs of training more controlled airspace ATC personnel was a factor. However it is clear that due to the present work load existing controllers would be able to provide separation service at many non-tower airports without extra staff levels. 3) A claim that with the introduction of ADSB (Automatic Dependent Surveillance Broadcast) the North American based NAS system was no longer the most efficient way to operate the airspace. (This was despite the fact that when the US brings in mandatory ADSB in 2020 the NAS airspace remains the same.

ASA have contracted to purchase a combined military and civilian radar system, a project called “OneSKY” and close down over 200 ground based navigational aids. The justification for this closure is the fact that ADSB equipment is to be installed in all IFR aircraft at owners' cost. This will drive up GA industry costs without any measurable safety benefit. No other country in the world has such an onerous requirement. The Regulatory Impact Statement that was prepared shows the airlines will receive savings of tens of millions of dollars to compensate for ADSB whereas the cost of over $30 million to general aviation will not be compensated. In the absence of any

PROJECT EUREKA

measurable safety benefit for the compulsory mandate of ADSB, AOPA believes we should follow the most successful and safest GA sector – the US. Even in 2020 the US FAA does not have a mandate for ADSB to be fitted to aircraft that operate below 10,000 feet in E and G airspace if further than 30 miles from a Class B TCA. Last year the Senior Executives of ASA were paid $600 k in 'bonuses' according to the ASA Annual Report. Senate Estimates Hearings and The Australian newspaper unsuccessfully sought the criteria for the bonuses in a monopoly business. Being semi-autonomous, with an industry user pays funding model the Minister has not had the inclination to insist on any reforms. 'Safety' is used to justify any costs in aviation regulations. While AOPA believes safety is paramount, AOPA can attest to its being compromised by not implementing the previous Cabinet approved NAS proposals for improved airspace management. AOPA also believes the previous Coalition policy of bringing in competition in relation to rescue and firefighting services and tower services should go ahead. In the US a large number of class D control towers are run by contractors at fifty percent cost reduction to those run by the FAA.

SECTION10 ENGINEERING

SECTION 10 ENGINEERING

The health of a manufacturing and maintenance industry can be assessed by the number of apprentices who join the workforce.

FIGURE 3

General Aviation Engineering (Design, Manufacturing, Maintenance)

Figure 3 shows how poorly the aviation sector is performing. These figures were provided to AOPA by Mr Ken Cannane who is a Director of the Aviation Maintenance Repair and Overhaul Business Association (AMROBA).

What is very clear is Australian aviation apprentice training has been in freefall since 2010. We believe this is linked to CASA approving licencing courses that precluded State based TAFE funding to the MEA studies.

In Year 2000, CASA stated: 'The objective of this Plan is to rewrite the Regulations and Orders with the development of appropriate clear and concise aviation safety regulations which reflect best practice in aviation regulation.' As a result, Australia’s general aviation engineering sectors have been over-regulated for many years. Each government’s reform/development program is focused primarily on guarding against any potential risk.

Design and manufacturing.

General aviation engineering 'best practice in aviation regulation' is, without doubt, the US Federal Aviation Regulations (FAR) supplemented by some general aviation engineering requirements of Transport Canada Aviation Regulations and Standards. Both North American countries have general aviation engineering sectors that are comparable to Australia’s general aviation design, manufacturing, maintenance and airworthiness control.

The Federal Aviation Administration’s (FAA) modernisation review during Years 2000 to 2008 of their design and manufacturing requirements, which were already world’s best practice culminated in major changes to FAR Parts 21 & 183 in Year 2009. These changes devolved previously revered FAA functions to industry representatives. The FAA accepted that these changes reduced jobs in the FAA but they also recognised that the changes have improved industry productivity. Real reform was achieved by.

 FAA making changes to improve safety, reduce costs to industry and enable the FAA to concentrate more on regulatory oversight.  Amending FAR Parts 21 & 183 by writing in 'clear and concise' language that CASA continues to promise but fails to deliver.

In addition to devolving previous FAA functions to industry representatives, the amendments to FAR Part 21 removed considerable red tape and also implemented 'world’s best practice' improvements by requiring all manufacturers to use 'international quality systems'. Quality systems supplemented by CASA’s approved industry representatives would improve safety, productivity and efficiencies.

Aircraft Airworthiness Control

Without doubt, the only complete international regulatory systems addressing general aviation aircraft airworthiness control and maintenance, including maintenance personnel, are the US and Canadian systems. The US system is more appropriate as the vast majority of Australian registered aircraft are manufactured in US. However, the Canadian system has some attractive provisions such as owner maintenance for certain small aircraft, i.e. two seat aircraft normally aspirated engine with fixed landing gear.

The FAR system is more appropriate as it would enable owner/operators to use manufacturers and US promulgated requirements, much of which is included in aircraft documentation produced in the US. Both the FAR and Canadian system have compatible documentation for use by general aviation aircraft owner/operators. FAR Part 91, in particular, airworthy and regulatory requirements, are cross referenced in aircraft manufacturer’s documentation. Adopting these requirements removes the need to create unique Australian requirements to address these cross references.

The Canadian general aviation recreational aircraft sectors may be preferred to the 52

US system as these aircraft can be used for commercial purposes in the Canadian system.

Adopting the FAR system for ‘general aviation’, as defined by the Department of Infrastructure and Regional Development, will improve safety by ensuring the airworthy status of US manufactured aircraft to be maintained to the adopted FAR standards and advisory material. The FAR system is quite clear, concise, outcome based and safe. It is a proven system.

Maintenance

Ever since the creation of CAA/CASA, ‘regulatory reform’ was replaced by ‘regulatory development’ that has seen maintenance and maintenance personnel requirements out of step with 'world’s best practice' for general aviation maintenance engineering.

The FAR system addresses general aviation engineering sectors that exist in Australia better than other regulatory system. It is virtually inexcusable not to be maintaining the Australian general aviation fleet, the vast majority of which are US manufactured, to any other standards than the FAR requirements. These maintenance requirements are mirror imaged in manufacturer’s documentation.

On the other hand, the European system is decades behind the FAR development for general aviation and was also decades behind the pre-1991 Civil Aviation Regulations/Civil Aviation Orders that have been repealed for unworkable European based requirements.

In particular, adopting the FAR system for general aviation engineering will reduce red tape, devolve responsibilities to industry representatives with a resultant improvement is safety and productivity. In addition, adopting the US Department of Transport Specialised Aviation Service Operations system, also known as Fixed Based Operators (FBO) prescribed in the US Department of Transport Advisory Circular (AC) 150/5190-7 would reduce unnecessary approvals and red tape if implemented in the same manner as in US. FBOs state:

'Examples of these specialised services may include aircraft flying clubs, flight training, aircraft airframe and power plant repair/maintenance, aircraft charter, air taxi or air ambulance, aircraft sales, avionics, instrument or propeller services, or other specialised commercial flight support businesses'.

Many general aviation SASOs are not approved by the FAA as explained in the DoT AC on condition the State registered business (SASO) employs FAA approved personnel. What this AC clearly identifies is that Australia over-regulates when compared to the US general aviation maintenance engineering sectors. The FAR system enables implementation of improved safety standards that have been missing from the Australian system since at least 1990. Maintenance Personnel

The issues with the ageing general aviation maintenance engineering personnel, and

lack of industry wide maintenance personnel training meeting international training standards, have been identified in many previous inquiries and reports.

The problems go back to the 1980’s when the airlines/unions agreement implemented a unique demarcation of the international aircraft maintenance engineer training standards by recognising a ‘structures' stream not used outside the airlines. Government training facilities amended their apprentice training programs to meet the airline requirements.

General aviation aircraft maintenance engineer training suffered due to this change in training – piston engine and helicopter subjects were dropped by many training facilities.

In addition, school leavers are now two years older and most do not obtain any practical skills for trade work during secondary/tertiary training. Industry submissions have been made for pre-employment practical skill training to international training standards to be included in the tertiary training sectors. This will enable a more attractive apprenticeships reduced to two years post-employment. Knowledge skills, pre or post-employment, could be provided by full time, correspondence or on-line training methods to international training standards.

It is crucial that the National Vocational Education Training (NVET) system approves aircraft maintenance engineer and licensed aircraft maintenance engineer training courses that meet international aircraft maintenance engineer training as promulgated by ICAO and implemented by EAA, TCA, and FAA. The NVET system should be responsible for compliance with the maintenance personnel training and qualification standards.

Both Europe and the US systems enable different pathways to be skilled as an aircraft maintenance engineer. These range from experience plus self-study plus examination, or partial formal training up to full formal practical and knowledge training. Australia has no such flexibility and does not yet provide web-based training.

No Australian aviation training facility currently provides full practical and knowledge training to international training standards promulgated by the International Civil Aviation Organisation and adopted by EASA, FAA, TCA & NZ.

General aviation maintenance engineering needs similar skills as those maintaining these aircraft in their country of manufacture. It is crucial to aviation safety to be at the same level as the FAA aircraft maintenance technician (airframe and power plant mechanic) holding a FAA inspection authority.

Jepperson produce a training guide for FAA AMT inspection authority holders that should be included for all general aviation maintenance engineers holding a CASA AME licence. Sadly, 30 years of neglect and failure to maintain maintenance personnel skills meeting ICAO’s international training standards has denied aircraft maintenance engineers international recognition and acceptance.

A CASE STUDY OF HOW THE AIRCRAFT MANUFACTURING INDUSTRY AND THE REGULATOR INTERACT.

A very relevant case study that goes to the heart of the complete lack of respect and distrust between our aircraft manufacturing industry and CASA, our regulator, is the dispute currently going on between CASA and Jabiru Aircraft Pty Ltd.

Jabiru has manufactured over 2000 light sports aircraft from a factory on the Queensland Sunshine Coast. The planes have been exported overseas to countries like South Africa, USA, NZ and Canada.

The aircraft is one of the principal flying training aircraft for the recreational flying industry in Australia. This sector is self-administered by Recreational Aviation Australia (RAAus)

The manufacturer claims the Jabiru is the 'world’s safest aircraft in their category' yet CASA in 2014 restricted their operations over built up areas on safety grounds, prohibiting flights into the Capital City Secondary Airports. (See Appendix 4).

The ban was supposed to be temporary allowing time for a safety investigation of the aircraft. The ban remains in force today, almost 16 months later.

Student pilots and passengers, we understand, have to sign litigation waivers before flying in a Jabiru.

The value of the aircraft, and the manufacturer, has been severely compromised by these restrictions.

No other countries National Aviation Regulators have seen fit to impose any flight restrictions on this Australian made aircraft.

CASA imposed the restrictions due to BASI investigations. It reported Jabiru engine problems. The manufacturer disputes the BASI findings.

We have no doubt there were some legitimate concerns with the engines which required CASA to investigate the aircraft. Jabiru claim these problems were caused by inadequate maintenance by owners.

This type of investigation by a national regulator is relatively common in aviation. It has happened frequently to Cessna and Piper in the USA over the years. However, it is very rare that aircraft are flight restricted in operations.

A better way forward would be for the manufacturer and CASA to collaboratively investigate and resolve the engine issues without imposing flight restrictions that severely impact both the Company and the individual owners. CASA should have consulted all the other countries regulators where Jabiru fly to get a consensus before taking actions that severely impacts an Australian manufacturing company.

The fact that no other national regulator has imposed the CASA restrictions, presumably after being formally notified of CASA’s local directive, leads AOPA to 55

conclude an Australian manufacturer has been very harshly treated by its own regulator. CASA allows Jabirus to fly so long as a legal waiver is signed by passengers. CASA’s heavy handed actions and associated litigation waivers have been viewed cynically by operators and owners.

The specifics of the dispute against CASA’s actions are contained in correspondence in Appendix 4 at the rear of this Brief.

The dispute has been before Senate Estimates hearings. Transcripts are available on the Government website.

SECTION 11 FUTURE TECHNOLOGIES

Preamble

What is presented in this Section 11 by Phillip Reiss is an edited version of his full submission which is available in Appendix 5 at the rear of this Brief. By reading the full submission one can understand the scope of the new and exciting job creating technologies available to the aviation industry.

Technology is advancing rapidly as we advance into the 21st century: smartphone’s, tablets, computers, GPS; almost all areas of our lives are affected by this technological leap forward. The benefits are immeasurable some would disagree, but it is hard to imagine conducting business or social activities in today’s world without technology.

Aviation, in particular General Aviation lags behind all other industries in technology advancement. There are many reasons for this, overly burdensome regulations, high cost brought about by certification requirements and government inertia.

Recreational Aviation without the burden of STC can purchase avionics at half the cost and of equal functionality. We need to strike a balance that allows private GA to purchase lower cost avionics, particularly to meet the ADS-B mandate.

GA is bearing the burden of cost associated with the introduction of new improved navigation and ATC technology while the service provider (ASA) lags behind particular in regard to VHF and ADS-B coverage via Receiver/Repeater stations: this needs to be addressed. AOPA will need to work with ASA to achieve this outcome.

General Aviation Revitalisation

Technology

Australia’s overall aviation infrastructure, except in the narrow case of airlines, is slipping below world standards. This is a result of a combination of technology and investment decisions, incomplete implementation and project definition, and failure to adopt contemporary approaches to service provision.

Investment in aviation infrastructure should be driven by the interests of the nation, and be regarded as part of the nation’s utility and common infrastructure with widespread economic multipliers across the economy, not a P&L item to be dictated by airlines. Unfortunately, the unique Australian aviation regulatory environment, and government policies for aviation cost recovery, have developed over the years in a curious and idiosyncratic way to arrive at a situation which does not support aircraft and facilities reinvestment, or technology-based innovation for much of the aviation sector, having become captive to vested interests and entrenched positions. This has made any change or progress difficult to achieve with resultant erosion of utility, amenity and safety. Any consideration of technology can only produce results when 58

considered in this broader context.

Arising from this state of affairs, Australian GA has been denied the advantages and benefits of being able to utilise the capabilities of contemporary technologies that are available in other countries, and with just a few exceptions, Australian industry faces a significant disincentive to originate new products and services.

The price of this evidenced in keynote accidents, and imbedded economic inefficiency in the sector. As only one, but glaring example, Australian pilots flying suitably equipped aircraft do not receive critical real-time weather, NOTAM and airspace information – the same pilot flying the same aircraft in the USA would receive this information – using the equipment already in the aircraft.

This section of the paper explores several key technological difficulties faced specifically by Australian GA (which comprises over 98% of aircraft in Australia) and proposes actionable solutions that will reduce costs, increase safety and structural efficiency and simplify compliance.

Approaches with Vertical Guidance (APV)

Australia has failed to keep up with global technological advances that enable GA and other non-airline Instrument Flight Rules (IFR) aircraft to approach airports in poor weather with vertical guidance displayed in the cockpit. Although all new GA IFR aircraft are being delivered with this capability, and the increasing majority of existing IFR have the necessary equipment as a result of refits and modernisation, Australia’s repeated failure to implement a national service to augment satellite navigation means that GA aircraft are precluded from using those capabilities in this country.

To enable APV, a Space Based Augmentation Service (SBAS)1 is required, which broadcasts error corrections, so that three-dimensional positions can be accurately determined and converted to glide-slope approach guidance for pilots, without the need for any airport infrastructure. Beyond the aviation industry, SBAS has wide applicability to many industries including maritime, forestry, agriculture, surface transport, leisure and tourism.

ICAO has passed resolutions calling on member states to implement APV, with which Australia cannot comply without the implementation of Baro-VNAV and SBAS-based LPV approaches.

Baro-VNAV solutions are available for only very few GA aircraft, and technical limitations mean that these approaches have less advantageous and higher minima than SBAS APV (termed LPV) approaches could provide. Without SBAS-derived APV, GA pilots and their passengers are largely forced to use instrument approaches with lateral guidance only, at all but the few accessible airports equipped with ILS systems, with lower levels of safety and efficiency, compared to other developed countries.

1 The implementation of SBAS in the United States is known as WAAS; EGNOS in Europe; GAGAN in India; SDCM in the Russian Federation; and MSAS in Japan. 59

The airborne capability to fly SBAS-derived APVs is substantially available and will increasingly be available in the vast majority of IFR GA aircraft through equipment needed to comply with the 2017 navigation and surveillance legislated mandates, but pilots are unable to use it for this purpose in Australia due to the lack of supporting national infrastructure.

The Australian Government should urgently establish a national taskforce to implement SBAS, not just for the GA industry, but as a critical element of national positioning infrastructure. It is believed that this can be achieved much more economically than has previously costed by exploiting in-place infrastructure.

Figure 1: European SBAS Architecture (source http://www.navipedia.net/index.php/SBAS_Fundamentals, European Space Agency)

Encouraging Australian Technology

Innovative Australian companies that develop world-class aerospace technology face a limited market in Australia with minimal government support. Typically, these companies are forced to transfer their technology investments overseas, with the resultant loss of intellectual capacity and further development capability for Australia. At the time of writing, Australian companies are active internationally with world-class products and services in the following areas:

 Electronic flight bag technology  ADS-B systems design and equipment supply  Aircraft maintenance engineering systems and services  Aircraft and component repair and overhaul services

 Consulting and aeronautical design, research and development services.

At times, it is evident that Australia’s inconsistent and unique regulations create difficulties for these organisations in accessing overseas markets and achieving regulatory compliance. Australia should lock-step its aeronautical standards to those of the United States and adopt international practices in their interpretation. Further, Australia should enable innovative Australian companies to obtain certification of products and services locally to FAA and EASA standards, without further domestic hurdles. The Australian aviation sector government specialist agencies, including CASA, Airservices Australia and the Department of Defence, should be tasked by government to support and foster these initiatives.

Very High Frequency (VHF) Radio Communications Network

The lack of coverage of Australia’s VHF radio network causes higher costs and operational inefficiencies for many GA operations. The fitment of heavy, cumbersome and expensive High Frequency (HF) radio in many smaller GA aircraft is costly, impractical and not required in other countries.

On the other hand, VHF coverage is poor in some high traffic areas of critical need, with no plan for remediation.

Further, HF radio involves labour-intensive services by ATC and Flight Watch, which would not be necessary if direct VHF radio contact were available.

Airservices Australia should extend VHF radio coverage across Australia with the goal of achieving operability to at least holding pattern (or traffic circuit) height at all aerodromes served by instrument approaches.

Figure 2: Areas of Australia shown in dark purple or white have no VHF radio coverage 61

at even 5,000 feet (source Airservices Australia)

To give effect to these changes the Australian Government as a matter of policy, should direct and/or financially support aviation infrastructure investment for:

1. VHF coverage generally to the instrument approach minima at every aerodrome with an IAL procedure, but in cases where the traffic volumes are very light, (and where there are no special factors such as adjacent terrain impacting aircraft manoeuvring), VHF coverage to the holding pattern altitude may be acceptable. 2. Contiguous ADS-B coverage everywhere there is Australian continental VHF coverage, to the same levels. 3. The use of satellite telephone to be permitted in lieu of HF for all non-RPT operations. 4. The use of cellular (mobile) telephones to be permitted for IFR SARWATCH cancellation purposes in Part 91 domestic operations provided that: a. prior to leaving VHF coverage, the pilot nominates an ops normal time and has verified mobile phone service availability; and b. There is no other IFR traffic reported or expected during the period between last radio call and ops normal time.

APPENDIX 1

Signatures AOPA

AOPA Directors Eureka Brief Supporters

David Curry

Marc De Stoop President

Stuart Burns

Allan Bligh AOPA Director

Richard Rudd

Peter Holstein

Spencer Ferrier Richard Gower AOPA Director

Aaron Stephenson

AOPA CEO Dick Smith AC

Phillip Reiss David Grant

Sandy Reith Dr Robert Liddell AOPA Director

Mark Smith Michael Apps RAAus Director

Tony Van Der Speck Gary Beck

Jan Ende

APPENDIX 2

Community Title plan General Aviation business enterprises at the Capital City Secondary Airports

A scheme to revive the Aviation Industry has been developed and was submitted to two vacationed minded senators, they advised they liked the idea and would support it and requested written submissions, this was done, the bureaucrats said it would not work, although only through the Senators and never to us, in fact, we have had no response to the submission. We received the plan to “Strata Title” and to confirmed it would work, with minor modifications, We engaged the help of the author of the Strata Titles Act and former Strata Title Commissioner and with a bit of Community Title and Neighbourhood Title modification it was confirmed it would work and would give the holders of such title the ability to raise money on their “own” property, and trade normally for the remaining duration of the lease from the C of A, about 82 years, it must be remembered their Strata Title would be responsible to the Corporate Body and not directly to the C of A.

One of the Senators requested we make three submissions. This we did and they were submitted to the Ministers office on September 2014, but we are advised the bureaucrats “refused” to deal with them because they thought the proposal would not work and they preferred to deal with developers and allow the development of airside land for commercial development.

We have attached a copy of the basic submission, it would need to be modified/negotiated when dealing with the C of A, the minister’s office.

If the Aviation Industry is to survive in Australia, the Government must address the problems of a declining essential industry and the subsequent unemployment problems that are flowing from the effects of privatisation. The Government must advise the bureaucrats that they are not to “deal” with developers concerning the development of airside land at the expense of the Aviation Industry and it is hoped the new Minister will take this all on board.

THIS MODEL WILL WORK WITH MODIFICATIONS AUSTRALIA WIDE.

PROPOSED BUSINESS PLAN BANKSTOWN AND CAMDEN AIRPORT:

In the proposed restructure there will be a Body Corporate, as the managing entity for the Bankstown and Camden Airports, controlling a Strata Title, Community Title and Neighbourhood Title in a tiered structure, the Federal Government will be responsible for the following;

1... Fences to the aerodrome are security and are seen as the responsibility of the Federal Government to provide them to the Security Standard required, the Airport Management provided by the “Body Corporate” (acting as airport manager) would advise and consult with the relevant Government Authority and arrange for the necessary repairs upgrading and call quotes for the required works from a team of

several approved Contractors, administer and oversee the works and submit all accounts for prompt payment.

2... The Federal Government shall be responsible for all of the “Airside”, including, maintenance and upgrading of all runways, taxiways and hardstand areas, including lighting and Radio Aids will be costs to the Government, the “Body Corporate” (acting as airport manager), would advise, consult with the relevant Government Authority and call quotes from a team of several previously approved contractors, administer and oversee their work and submit all accounts for prompt payment.

3... All sites, occupied by Commonwealth authorities be provided without cost of the land and if the building already exists and is owned by the C of A, the only costs to the Commonwealth would be the outgoings to the relevant authorities if applicable, given the Australian Constitution, and should CASA ever be relocated to Bankstown Aerodrome the same would apply.

4... In an effort to attract aircraft back to Bankstown and Camden Aerodromes it is planned there be no parking or landing charges levied against aircraft, so as to breathe life back into the airports and create more employment and an agreed ratio of new apprentices, the operators all agree this is necessary to bring back this failing industry and provide adequate staff to allow the aerodrome to grow.

5... It is planned that buildings with access to the “airside” would be for aviation related activities and any developments that take place on the aerodrome would be to the benefit of aviation.

6... The Minister to have one representative on the “Body Corporate”, as the Body Corporate would be carrying out the functions of the Airport Management Team.

7...When the illegal fill is removed from the flood plain to the Georges River the Runway 18/36 would be reopened as a grass runway to provide the only North/South runway in the

Sydney Basin as it is needed for the safe operation of Bankstown Aerodrome as a training aerodrome.

BANKSTOWN CITY COUNCIL

CAMDEN CITY COUNCIL

In the Proposed restructure there will be a Body Corporate, as the managing entity for the Bankstown and Camden Airports and it will be controlling a Strata Title, Community Title and a Neighbourhood Title in a tiered structure, the relevant Council will be responsible for the following;

1...The “Strata Title” holders will be required to pay rates to the relevant Council.

2...The Council would be responsible for maintaining the roads, there are no footpaths, and collect the Garbage.

3...The relevant Council would have Development Approval and Building Approval authority, a Private Certifier could be used for certain functions as is the case for other lands in the council control, as this is Commonwealth Land, it is still according to the Lease to be governed by State Laws, but it is agreed the Commonwealth in certain cases could over rule the State Laws if the Commonwealth see it as not in their best interest, The Constitution quite clearly allow for this.

4...The Commonwealth of Australia, through the relevant Minister would, as allowed for in the Australian Constitution and as the ultimate owner of the land, have the power to veto and dealing or decisions that are not in the best interests of having the airport operate as a safe airport with aviation being its core business.

OWNERS OF THEIR STRATA TITLE

In the proposed restructure the building owners will have new responsibilities and obligations and this is an attempt to spell out what will be required of them to change from the present arrangements that all agree are not satisfactory and destroying an industry.

1...Must pay rates direct to the relevant Council (Bankstown City Council / Camden City Council)

2...Must pay their own Electricity and Water accounts direct to the supply authority.

3...Must Keep lawns mowed on their leased land that they have a title to, as well as the nature strip to the area that surrounds their property (it will be agreed to and defined).

4...Common Property grassed areas will be the responsibility of the Body Corporate.

5...The “owners” will be responsible for all the maintenance of their property, where a building falls into disrepair, the Body Corporate after due process shall have the repairs carried out and then recover costs from the owner.

6...It is estimated that the land component of the proposed restructure would be in the vicinity of $460/Sq. m., the area would include an area of land around each building, plus an area for Vehicle parking and any extra land they require.

7... Where the existing building was not built by Bankstown Airport Limited (BAL) (or any other entity they have used) or the Commonwealth, the 'owner', because they built or bought the Building, and because of the clause in the lease saying they have the right to remove the building, may have to make a small extra payment so as to make the deal work, or may want to purchase extra land so as to provide sufficient to pay out the CBA bearing in mind that, the CBA lent against flood land and buildings that had the right to be removed this may not be necessary as well they lent to a company that was placed into

Liquidation and then into Administration, with the CBA appointing Korda Mentha as Receiver Managers.

8...There are two Banks that have indicated an interest in lending up to 90% of the purchase price.

9...Where the building is owned by other than the “purchaser”, it is proposed to have a Quantity Surveyor prepare an estimate of the value of the building and identify any state of disrepair, as They would for a Taxation Depreciation Valuation as well as for Insurance purposes and that cost would be minimal and borne by the purchaser.

10...Land Tax and Stamp Duty would be paid direct to the State Government on the “owned” land if the owning entity is liable to pay Land tax.

11...The Museum located in the S/W corner of Bankstown Aerodrome, (on the flood plain for the Georges River) would be given a title to the land they occupy and would be required to pay all outgoings, in the event of the Museum not continuing to operate, the property would revert to the Body Corporate.

BODY CORPORATE

The Body Corporate would be required to run the airport.

1...The Body Corporate will be responsible for the sale of any Leases, preference will be given for developments that favour those that benefit aviation and the aerodrome.

2...Mow all “community” grass on the public areas to the airport.

3...Call tenders for “Airside” runways, taxiways and hardstands, for repairs extensions and general maintenance.

4...The Tenders would be called from a “panel” of pre-registered qualified contractors.

5... The “Master Body Corporate” would be in the form of a “Pyramid Structure” and have 10 to 14 owners in each Body Corporate.

6... There will be in the structure various nomenclature; a) Strata Title. b) Community Title. c) Neighbourhood Title.

STAMP DUTY HAS NOT BEEN PAID AT THE PROPER RATE

RE: Bankstown Airport Lease and Camden Airport Lease from Commonwealth of Australia and Failure to Pay Stamp Duty along with the Destruction of the Files. Stamp Duty is an item that must be paid and listed below are the various section of the Lease that spell this requirement out Stamp Duty has not been paid; 68

Clause 2.1 Definitions

'Taxes' means all taxes (including stamp Duty)s costs, charges, expense impositions, fees and penalties of whatever nature levied or imposed by a

Government Authority in respect of instruments, transactions or activities relating to or carried out on the Airport Site.

Clause 5.6 Proof of Payment

The Lessee must before the date pay all premiums and monies payable in respect of any policy (including Stamp duty) and must provide to the reasonable satisfaction of the Lessor satisfactory proof of payment thereof.

Clause 11.1 Stamp Duty and Registration Fees

The Lessee must pay any stamp duty imposed by legislation on this Lease and any counterpart, together with any registration costs of the Lease if registered.

Clause 26.2 (c)

Where Taxes such as stamp duty, payroll tax, financial institutions duty and debits tax imposed by a Governmental Authority are not payable by the lessee because they are taxes on transactions instruments or activities on or related to the Airport Site owned by the Commonwealth, the Lessee must pay to the relevant Governmental Authority such amount as is equivalent to the amount which would be payable for such Taxes were if such taxes were levied or payable.

Clause 30 GOVERNING LAW

The Lease is governed by and construed in accordance with the Laws of New South Wales.

As can be seen in the above clauses of the Lease, NSW Stamp Duty has to be paid on both the Bankstown Airport and Camden Airport and the non-payment of the monies due and the relevant penalties along with the destruction of the files, when money is due and payable, by the Office of State revenue cannot be seen as accidental or an oversight.

The question of the “legality” of the Lease being used in several Court actions and various legal documents has yet to be ruled on and is of great concern.

The current difficult situation can be rectified if the offending party is to have the stamped and the penalties required

AOPA has more details on how this title scheme can operate. This is beyond the scope of Project Eureka. We are happy to meet and provide further detail submissions on the very important aspect of Airport Ownership.

APPENDIX 3

“Unsafe skies” by Dick Smith AC

In a 13 month period Australia has suffered an increasing commercial accident rate with the loss of 24 lives in aircraft all flown by professional flight crews in uncontrolled airspace. In addition, two serious airline incidents went close to killing a further 105 people.

This paper addresses possible causes and links the increasing commercial aviation accident rate to the failure of Government airspace and regulatory reform.

Based on an address by Dick Smith at the National Convention Centre, Canberra, on Tuesday 22 November 2005

SYNOPSIS

The commercial aviation accident rate in Australia is increasing. During a thirteen month period 24 lives have been lost in “Controlled Flight into Terrain” accidents. In addition, two serious airline incidents could have resulted in a further 105 fatalities. In all cases the aircraft were flown by professional flight crews.

The paper links the accidents to the resistance by professional flight crews to airspace and regulatory reform. The reforms were to maximise the use of controlled airspace and radar, as well as to allow local aerodrome radio operators to give information to pilots. The current system relies on uncontrolled airspace and pilot to pilot radio calls.

Also addressed is a conflict of interest issue. The organisation with responsibility for the safety regulation of airspace also makes a profit from that airspace, and the decision makers’ remuneration is linked to that profit.

The paper addresses possible causes for the increasing commercial aviation accident rate and links this to the failure of the Government to implement the Cabinet approved airspace and regulatory reforms.

Published by Dick Smith in the interest of aviation safety November 2005 PO Box 418 Terrey Hills NSW 2084 [email protected] www.dicksmithflyer.com.au

UNSAFE SKIES Table of Contents Synopsis ...... 3

Bio Details on Dick Smith ...... 6

You won’t be able to bring in reforms until people die ...... 7

Historical reasons for the lack of radar usage ...... 10

The reforms commence under the Hawke Government ...... 11

A simple explanation of the airspace system ...... 13

A local airport radio operator improves safety ...... 14

Comparisons of two airspace systems ...... 16

Allocating the airspace categories ...... 18

New airspace system accepted for Australia ...... 19

Failure to proceed due to self-interest and resistance to change ...... 20

An airliner nearly hits a mountain – radar not used ...... 24

The Benalla accident – radar not used ...... 27

The Mount Hotham accident – radar not used ...... 29

Class E – advantages still not available in Australia ...... 30

Cape York crash – 15 dead – local radio operator hijacked ...... 33

A Cerritos type mid-air collision could happen tomorrow ...... 35

Conflict of interest stops and then reverses the reforms ...... 40

Why do professional pilots support “upside down” airspace? ...... 41

Who hid the Proserpine control tower? ...... 42

ABC’s 7:30 Report undermines safety reforms ...... 43

People are dying – why nothing in the media? ...... 44

What can the public do? ...... 44

DICK SMITH

Dick Smith learnt to fly in 1972 gaining his Command Instrument Rating in 1983. In 1991 he qualified for one of most specialised ratings of all, the approval to fly a jet aircraft as a single pilot.

Dick Smith has flown a total time of 8,500 hours including over 1,000 hours single pilot jet time. He has made five flights around the world as pilot in command. Each of these flights has succeeded on time and as scheduled because of meticulous planning and thorough risk management.

Dick Smith was appointed to the CAA Board in 1988 and was appointed its Chairman in 1990 by the then Prime Minister, Bob Hawke. As Chairman of the CAA, his Board and Management made major policy decisions including a change in direction to purchase a modern “Two Centre” radar based air traffic control system using a proven design. The decision was also made to move to an international airspace system.

Dick Smith was appointed the Chairman of the Civil Aviation Safety Authority by the Transport Minister, Mark Vaile, in 1997. After the Aviation Reform Group was dissolved by John Anderson in November 2004 he now has no formal position in relation to aviation reform.

Over a fifteen year period, Dick Smith has travelled the World and met with the leaders of air safety regulation in the USA, Canada, UK, New Zealand and France. During this time he has gained an extensive knowledge of airspace design.

He holds the United Kingdom’s Guild of Air Navigators Sword of Honour, the Australian Oswald Watt Medal and the United States Lindbergh Award. In 1999 he was awarded the Order of Australia for his service to the Australian aviation industry.

Dick Smith is genuinely concerned about aviation safety in Australia. He is also concerned that important air traffic reforms that were started by the Hawke Government in 1990 have not been completed.

Prepared by Max Hazelton OBE AM

UNSAFE SKIES

1. You won’t be able to bring in reforms until people die

On 24 July last year a Qantas 737 with 87 people on board was approaching Canberra in darkness. After the crew accidentally entered the wrong data into the flight management system, the aircraft descended 1,600 feet below the legal minimum safe altitude, while heading towards Tinderry Peak. The aircraft was in full radar coverage but in uncontrolled airspace so no radar control was provided. It was only luck and the last resort black box warning system that saved the plane from hitting the mountain and everyone being killed.

It was the situation I had been dreading but expecting for many years.

This Qantas incident was very serious indeed. But after five months, the Australian Transport Safety Bureau – the independent safety investigator – published its final report. It commented on such things as crew fatigue and a faulty air conditioner in the aircraft, but made no recommendation on the major safety deficiency – that is, the airspace design and radar utilisation in Australia.

Only four days after this near disaster, a business turbo-prop aircraft was flying in the airspace south of Canberra towards Benalla. Like the Qantas situation, the aircraft was in full radar coverage and in uncontrolled airspace so no radar control was provided. Due to an error, the aircraft ended up more than ten miles away from its intended approach path and crashed into the terrain killing all six on board.

Just six months ago in May, an airliner was approaching Lockhart River in Cape York. Once again, the aircraft was in uncontrolled airspace with an experienced professional air crew. The aircraft crashed into a mountain ridge killing the 15 on board. This was Australia’s first airline crash in more than 30 years.

Two months after that, a charter aircraft was flying to Mount Hotham. Once again, under full radar coverage, an experienced professional pilot inadvertently flew the plane into the ground killing all on board.

This is a total of 24 people dead in commercial aviation accidents in just over 12 months.

Just two months ago, a commuter airline with two professional pilots nearly ran out of fuel at night on a flight to Brisbane. At the last moment the pilot diverted to Bundaberg. One engine stopped from fuel starvation on the approach, and there was just enough fuel remaining to conduct an emergency landing on the other engine. If this flight crew, and the crew of the 737 weren’t as lucky, there would have been 105 dead.

In 1990 when I was the CAA Chairman, a crusty old bureaucrat said to me words to the effect, “Dick, you won’t be able to bring in reforms until people die – look at the history of world aviation - pilots always resist change. Air safety is only improved after a crash.” People are dying and nothing is being done. It is incredibly frustrating. Notice how 6

there is hardly a word in the media about this spate of accidents. This is probably the worst commercial fatality rate ever. Remember the media campaign about the Monarch crash at Young in 1993, where seven people were killed? There were massive headlines, questions in Parliament, inquiries – the hysteria never stopped. I will explain the reason for the difference later in this presentation.

There are a number of things that are common with the accidents that killed the 24 people.

The aircraft were all flown by highly experienced professional pilots – not low time private pilots. That is why all of us who fly in commercial aircraft must be concerned. All the aircraft were in uncontrolled airspace. That is, the aircraft were not following the directions of an air traffic controller – they were flying in “do it yourself” airspace more akin to the 1920s and Bert Hinkler than the 21st century.

All the aircraft were flying in instrument conditions and appeared to be in good flying order when they collided with the ground. This is known as a “Controlled Flight Into Terrain”. Overseas, this type of airline accident has been reducing in number.

In the cases where radar was available, it was not used to warn the pilots that they were dangerously low or in the wrong location. In effect, the planes were operating “blind” on a local radio frequency with no trained radio operator at the airport able to give local weather or other safety information.

I’m sure that most Australians would believe that if flying in a jet airline aircraft that the aircraft would be under the control of an air traffic controller, and that at all airports, there would be a controller or a radio operator on the ground to give advice to the pilot.

The truth is quite different. Just a few weeks ago I departed Hamilton Island in an Airbus with over 150 passengers on board. It was probably only I, sitting in the rear of the aircraft, and the pilots up front, that knew that the control tower was not manned – and that for the first part of the flight, probably the riskiest part, we would be in a “do it yourself”, uncontrolled, “black hole” airspace system. No other modern aviation country allows this.

Only a few days before I had been in the Proserpine area, where the Virgin 737 was battling through the most terrible weather conditions, only able to fly by instruments, to land at the airport completely “calling in the blind” in uncontrolled airspace – without radar control – without an air traffic control tower, and without even a person on the ground trained to operate a radio to confirm that the plane’s radio was working correctly.

How does this extraordinary situation exist in Australia in the 21st century? How do the professional pilots allow it? It is quite a story.

2. Historical reasons for the lack of radar usage We need to go back to before the Second World War when air traffic control did not exist. Aircraft flew in uncontrolled airspace and were given advice on weather conditions and other aircraft by radio officers.

After a serious mid-air collision over the Grand Canyon in the United States 1956 – where 128 airline passengers were killed – controlled airspace was increased throughout the world. Unfortunately this has not been completed in Australia and 49 years later we still have jet airlines flying in uncontrolled airspace.

The difference between controlled airspace and uncontrolled airspace is self- explanatory. In controlled airspace the aircraft is under the control of an air traffic controller – a highly trained and skilled person who “controls” the aircraft with directions to ensure high safety levels. In uncontrolled airspace pilots are given advice about other aircraft and must make their own decisions as to the best action to take.

In other countries such as the United States, Canada, and Europe, the air traffic controllers took over the airspace where airline aircraft operate. In fact, in the USA airline aircraft can only operate in controlled airspace.

In Australia it was different. Let’s look at this diagram.

This is a simplified vertical section of the airspace that existed in 1991 between places such as Canberra and Albury, or Sydney and Proserpine.

Controlled airspace operated by air traffic controllers covered the approach airspace around the major airports, and larger country airports. It also covered the enroute airspace at high levels. If an airliner was flying between Sydney and Canberra, or Melbourne to Proserpine, it would remain under air traffic control all the way.

At other locations, including even busy jet airports like Ayers Rock or Broome, the airspace remained uncontrolled and was operated by the flight service officers – who provided a traffic information service. Pilots would then use their own radio to arrange separation. A culture developed, which still exists today, where more radio calls and talking gave the illusion that safety was higher. After the Second World War radar was introduced in Australia. Air traffic controllers were trained to use radar, but the flight service officers were not – quite a demarcation issue existed as each group was in a different union.

I was appointed Chairman of the Civil Aviation Authority in the early 90s. I set to by following the success formula I have always used – ask lots of advice and surround yourself with capable people. I will tell you a little about my background.

My flight training in the 1970s was in the area south west of Sydney, departing from Bankstown Airport. Even though I was in good radar coverage for all of my flying, and in the same airspace as commercial planes, I was not able to talk to an air traffic controller who had a radar screen as I was in uncontrolled flight service airspace. By law other pilots and I in the airspace could only talk to the flight service officer who was in a separate room at the radar Centre with a sort of quill pen and green eyeshade system with a microphone and hand written paper strips. This is a photograph of a Sydney flight service console.

You can imagine how mystified I was - flying between Bankstown and Yass with my radar interrogation light blinking on the instrument panel, but having to continuously communicate my location by radio as if the radar did not exist. It was constant wall- towall talking.

During my first flight around the world in 1982-1983 I found that other countries were different – that is, whenever you were within radar coverage, you could talk directly to the controller with the radar screen and there was no need for constant radio position reports. Most of the frequencies were very quiet – so you could concentrate on navigation and keeping a good lookout.

In Australia I was told this was not possible because the air traffic controllers considered they were the only people skilled enough to operate radar.

When I was first on the CAA Board in 1988, we were presented with a capital equipment proposal to spend many millions of dollars in developing a unit called “FISADS” – a Flight Information Service Aircraft Display System. It was to be introduced so that flight service officers could have modern technology like the air traffic controllers. It consisted of a computer screen that would show estimated

locations of aircraft after radio position reports had been hand keyed in. I was told it was to be used by flight service officers, even in radar-covered airspace.

I said, “This is ridiculous. We should just give the flight service officers a radar screen.”

I was quickly told that this would not be possible as the air traffic controllers would never allow flight service officers to use radar.

What I found interesting was that most airline pilots who flew in the uncontrolled airspace liked the flight service system with its many radio calls. Most didn’t want to have access to radar in this airspace. Some even vehemently argued that radio position reports were better than using radar. This mindset still exists today.

This mindset is undoubtedly the prime reason the benefits of radar have never been properly achieved in Australia today. Despite the increasing Controlled Flights Into Terrain (CFIT) accidents and incidents, which radar could have prevented, there are pilots in influential positions in the bureaucracy who rigidly prevent any change to a new system.

3. The reforms commence under the Hawke Government

I was appointed Chairman of the Civil Aviation Authority in February 1990. The first thing we did was to obtain expert advice on the airspace systems around the world. It became very obvious that Australia was out of step.

This was because our very low traffic densities allowed “do it yourself” separation to work. I could see that as traffic levels increased, the system would fail. It would be better to move to a radar based system in the low level airspace. Most importantly, we had not had any controlled flight into terrain accidents that the radar could have prevented.

The Hawke Government had appointed a CAA Board with top quality aviation expertise. Ron Yates was an aeronautical engineer. Captain Len Heard was a retired airline pilot. We quickly made the decision not to go ahead with unique inventions such as “FISADS”, but to move to proven equipment with a modern, “Two Centre” air traffic control radar system. A decision was made at the same time to increase the amount of controlled airspace so that the radar equipment – costing over $350 million – could be used to maximise passenger safety. The specification of the radar system included special alarms that would warn air traffic controllers if an aircraft strayed off course or was flying below the minimum safe altitude. This of course meant that to get the maximum safety benefit we would have to extend the radar usage to low level enroute airspace that was presently operated by flight service officers.

It should be noted that radar is not just used to prevent mid-air collisions. It is also used to prevent controlled flight into terrain accidents. In the past, these have been the most common form of airline accident.

At the time we received expert advice on an airspace system and it was decided to follow closely that of North America. It was considered by world authorities to be the best – the equivalent in airspace terms to a Boeing 747. The weather conditions with

many months of snow and ice are far more adverse than in Australia. And the high mountain ranges put aircraft in icing conditions and make the chance of an accident far greater. CASA Board member Ron Yates, the ex-CEO of Qantas, said that Qantas flew with Australian passengers in the North American system, both the USA and Canada, every day and found that it was highly efficient and very safe. He said they wouldn’t be flying there otherwise.

It was pointed out that North America had more radar coverage than Australia – this depended on traffic densities. This was not a problem. We decided to follow the procedures they used in their radar airspace, and also follow the procedures they used in their non-radar airspace. We noted that about 50% of the instrument approaches in North America are without radar coverage.

With the new radar equipment being installed we knew that we would have excellent radar coverage between Melbourne and Cairns. This was the area which had the highest traffic density and the greatest chance of a plane inadvertently flying into a mountain.

I arranged for a team of experts – air traffic controllers, flight service officers, and professional pilots from Qantas – to travel to Canada and the USA to familiarise themselves with the system. The team flew in the airspace and met air traffic controllers and other airspace experts. The team came back unanimously supporting the system. We then arranged for our controllers to go to San Francisco on paid “Awareness Programs”.

4. A simple explanation of the airspace system

There were clear differences in 1990 between the US and the Australian systems. Notice that rather than just having controlled and uncontrolled airspace, there are six categories of airspace. One category of uncontrolled airspace (Class G) and five categories of controlled airspace. These give different degrees of control and therefore the cost of providing the service varies.

A good airspace system is designed to give airline passengers a very high level of safety while not unduly restricting other users of the airspace. A properly designed system allocates the resources to give the same high level of safety to airline passengers - whether travelling to a small country town or to a busy city.

Obviously when there are more planes in one piece of sky, more money is required to upgrade to a higher class of airspace.

A simple explanation of these airspace categories would be to compare them with our road system. Imagine the problem if we only had two different types of roads - dirt roads and tollways. There would in fact be more fatalities on our roads because the resources available would not be effectively allocated to reduce the risk.

This diagram can be compared to our road system. Class G (in yellow) is uncontrolled airspace. It is similar to a country dirt road where farmers use CB radios to talk to each other to assist with safety. In this airspace, a radio information service is provided.

The next step up is Class E controlled airspace – that is the green. Notice how much there is of it. In the USA, all airline aircraft fly in controlled airspace. This is the equivalent to a bitumen road. In this airspace, air traffic control provides a control and separation service to aircraft that are flown on instrument flight rules – that is, the pilot flies by referring to the aircraft instruments rather than visually looking at the ground. When under radar coverage, the controllers protect aircraft flying in cloud from flying below a certain minimum safety altitude. Visual flight rules aircraft can fly in this airspace uncontrolled, and can request a traffic information service when in radar airspace. The Class E controller is not located at the airport – but at the air traffic control centre that can be thousands of kilometers away. It is therefore a 24 hour per day service.

Class D airspace would be the equivalent to a bitumen road with a white centre line. Air traffic control – located in this case in a tower at the airport – provides a control and separation service for aircraft which fly on instruments, and gives these aircraft a traffic information service on aircraft which fly visually – normally the smaller aircraft. Class D only operates when the tower is manned – it reverts to Class E in the USA when the tower closes.

Class C airspace is very much more costly as it requires more controllers and a terminal radar service at the airport. It is the equivalent to a multi-lane highway with traffic lights. Air traffic control provides a separation service between aircraft that fly on instruments, and also separates aircraft flying on instruments from those flying visually. When the controllers are not on duty it also reverts to Class E.

As you can see, the level of service and costs increase as the number of planes increases. Notice how the higher service level and category is close to the airport where collision risk is greater. You will see later that this is the opposite in Australia. Computer modelling by Airservices Australia shows that the chance of a collision is 100 times greater close to the airport than in the approach airspace above 5,000 feet.

It would be ideal to have Class C airspace at the smallest country aerodrome, however as passengers pay in full for the air traffic control system in Australia, this would make the cost of an air ticket to a country airport too expensive. Fortunately when there is less traffic, a less expensive category of airspace will still give the required high levels of safety.

Class B airspace is used at very busy airports and would be equivalent to a multi-lane tollway. Radar is required and every aircraft is separated from every other aircraft – both on instruments and flying visually.

Class A airspace is equivalent to a Bus Only highway. Only aircraft flying on instruments are allowed in this airspace and they receive a full separation service.

5. A local airport radio operator improves safety

A most important part of the US system is that not only do they have controlled airspace where jet airlines fly, but they also have either a control tower or a radio operator at the airport. At airports without a control tower this radio operator is known as a “UNICOM”.

A UNICOM operator is normally a person who resides at the airport during the hours of the airlines’ operation. It can be one of the firemen (as it is in the case of Hayden Airport in Colorado shown in this photo), or it can be the Airport Safety Officer, the refueller, a retired pilot, or any suitable person trained for the job. So not only is it controlled airspace, but there is a person on the ground with a radio to give local weather conditions and traffic information on the aerodrome frequency – an extra level of safety – just common sense.

6. Comparison of two airspace systems

Let’s look at the two diagrams together – the Australian system before the CAA Board made its decision to move ahead with a new air traffic control and airspace system in 1990, and the US system at the time.

The Australian system had two categories – controlled and uncontrolled. The US system has six categories. In Australia lots of airline aircraft flew in uncontrolled airspace – and they still do. In the USA and other leading aviation countries, this is not allowed.

In Australia the air traffic system is operated by a commercial government business enterprise called Airservices Australia, which charges the industry and makes a profit for the Government. It receives about $500 million per annum to operate the air traffic control system, and this cost is built into the price of your airline ticket – so it is user pays. Airservices Australia currently makes a profit of over $50 million, and is solely responsible for the design, declaration and management of airspace.

In the USA all control services were provided by air traffic controllers. They did not have a duplicated system as we did in Australia.

The airspace classifications are not solely US or Canadian classifications. They are classifications allocated by the International Civil Aviation Organisation – so pilots flying in different countries know the service they can expect at each location – that is all that the letters A to G mean. It is similar to looking at an international road map where a driver can identify a dirt road or a freeway.

Once you look at these diagrams, as I did with my Board in 1990, it was apparent that the US system divided the airspace into six categories, whereas Australia only had two. In the USA jet airline aircraft were protected by a minimum of Class E controlled airspace and a UNICOM radio operator. In Australia we had lots of jet airlines operating in uncontrolled Class G, without a local radio operator. Incredibly, this still happens today at places such as Proserpine, Hamilton Island and Avalon. As mentioned previously, this is where the collision risk is 100 times greater than the airspace away from the aerodrome area.

7. Allocating the airspace categories

To simplify the explanation, let’s say that all airline aircraft fly IFR, that is, on instrument flight rules, and that most other aircraft fly VFR, that is, visual flight rules. As stated, the main difference is that instrument flight rules aircraft fly using navigational equipment in the aircraft and do not have to be able to see the ground unless taking off or landing. Visual aircraft navigate clear of cloud and visually.

Allocating these airspace categories is not rocket science. They simply have to be allocated so that as the potential risk increases, safety remains at the same high level. It is obvious that if you do not have any air traffic control at all, a small airport such as Bourke in western NSW has a lower risk of collision than a busy airport such as Sydney.

It became apparent at the time to my Board and I that Australia had allowed the existing airspace to remain more because of industrial pressures rather than using an objective scientific safety criterion. In those days we had very low traffic levels and taxpayers were paying much of the cost, so many in the bureaucracy considered that it did not matter if the safety resources were misallocated to keep industrial harmony.

In Australia we had a duplicated system with two unions. Civil Air, whose members worked the controlled airspace, and the Professional Radio and Electronics Institute, whose flight service officers provided the service in uncontrolled airspace. Each union was fiercely proud of the unique and different service they provided, and would not brook any interference that may change the status quo.

To explain, let’s look at the US system diagram - an airport in Class G airspace would be one that has no instrument approaches at all – similar to Kayenta in the USA and Mittagong in New South Wales.

An airport in Class E airspace would be a small airport similar to Lake Havasu in the USA and Kalgoorlie in Australia.

Class D airspace requires a local control tower and would normally be a busy airport with more than 20,000 movements or jet services – similar to Aspen in Colorado or a busy airport such as Broome or Proserpine in Australia.

Class C airspace is used in places like Palm Beach in Florida, or Hollywood Burbank in California – normally 250,000 enplanements or more.

Class B airspace is used at Los Angeles and JFK in New York – normally 3.5 million passenger movements or more.

Class A airspace is normally only used at high altitudes, but it is also allocated for the airspace at Heathrow in the UK.

Notice how the higher classifications step up using objective criteria and are utilised close to the airport where the collision risk is higher. Class E is used in the low collision risk “link” airspace. Qantas flies through Class E many times a day going in and out of Los Angeles and JFK.

The decision was made by the CAA Board that we would copy the US system, where air traffic controllers serviced both controlled and uncontrolled airspace. Where it was practicable, flight service officers would be trained to become air traffic controllers – the CAA always seemed to be short of air traffic controllers. A Review of Resources was prepared and an agreement reached with the staff to reduce the number of flight 16

service officers from 644 to less than 100.

In the future all the airspace would be operated by air traffic controllers and the controlled airspace would be dropped down to close to the ground where necessary for safety. The remaining flight service officers would operate the pilot briefing services and a radio information system called Flightwatch.

8. A new airspace system accepted for Australia

The industry was consulted on the new plan for airspace, and it was finally agreed in mid-1991. A staged introduction over three years was planned. The first stage was planned for December 1991, and the last stage for December 1995. A small booklet was published to show the approved plan. I stress that it was not a proposal, it was the fully constituted final decision properly made by the Civil Aviation Authority – the legislated authority.

Note that it was decided to use five categories. The Class B category used at New York and Los Angeles was not considered to be required in Australia at the time because of traffic levels. The airspace classes were to be allocated objectively. Class G was to be used for small country airports with no instrument approaches (such as Mittagong). Class E controlled airspace was to be the minimum for airports with jet airline services. This would be at places such as Kalgoorlie and Karratha. Class E would also be used in the low density “link” airspace over the Class D towers.

Class D airspace would be for busy airports with jet services. This would include places such as Broome, Ayers Rock, Hamilton Island and Proserpine. Class C airspace was to be allocated to all of the major city airports – Sydney, Brisbane, Canberra etc.

The diagram shows an almost complete coverage of Class E airspace, but the published plan was to put the Class E airspace in corridors (just as in North America) to cover the airports where instrument flight rules aircraft operated. Between the Class E controlled airspace corridors there would be uncontrolled Class G airspace.

Most importantly, it was decided for the first time as a major safety improvement that US style UNICOM radio operators would be introduced. We had to mock up the following photo at Canberra Airport to show Australian pilots what a UNICOM would look like. 17

9. Failure to proceed due to self-interest and resistance to change

Ten years have gone by and the reforms have not been completed. There has been a concerted campaign – mainly by a small group of commercial pilots who have never flown overseas – to resist the introduction of Class E and keep the culture of pilot to pilot calls in uncontrolled airspace.

Air traffic controllers have also been against the changes but for another reason. Many don’t want their responsibility and risk increased with more controlled airspace at low levels when they believe the old uncontrolled airspace system worked satisfactorily. Today in Australia there is no Class E controlled airspace below 8,500 feet so planes are not protected by air traffic control from collision with mountains in enroute airspace.

A vocal group of commercial pilots insisted that the system they were taught in was safe and could not be convinced otherwise. They believed the system where they attempted to communicate by radio calls with every other nearby aircraft was the best. They didn’t accept that this system failed as the number of planes increased. They didn’t accept that radar control was necessary for safety. They also didn’t believe there was a risk that professional pilots would make mistakes and fly into the ground. They didn’t accept that collision risk was many times greater close to a runway than away from it. These genuinely held views got wide coverage in the media.

In Australia today, we have busy airports such as Proserpine with jet 737 airliners – with up to six movements in one afternoon – all in uncontrolled “calling in the blind”, “do it yourself” airspace, even close to the runway, without even a UNICOM radio operator on the aerodrome frequency. With the monsoon conditions there and the very high mountains close by, that is an accident waiting to happen.

This is a story about unions protecting their members’ interests – as they should do – and a story about a weak Government failing to protect the interests of the Australian public. It is also a story about pilots resisting change. Now I can understand why many Australian pilots have these views. Most do not understand collision risk modelling and 18

have never been given the chance to fly overseas and experience a modern radar based airspace system.

It is also a story about conflict of interest, where the management of an organisation will have less take home pay if airspace safety costs increase – I will cover this later.

We have now had 24 deaths in a 13 month period – all linked I believe to the lack of airspace and regulatory reform. On top of that we came within a hair’s breadth of killing 87 people in Canberra – once again, linked to the lack of airspace reform.

Remember this was a Qantas 737 flying at night into our nation’s capital in complete radar coverage but because the airspace was uncontrolled, no radar control was provided.

10. An airliner nearly hits a mountain – radar not used

Let me give you the information and you be the judge. Let’s look at the airspace as approved by the Civil Aviation Authority Board to be introduced by December of 95 and where we actually are ten years later. I retired from the Civil Aviation Authority after completing my term as Chairman. I believed that the airspace reforms would continue – little did I know.

Note that in the original December 1995 plan, if an aircraft made a navigational error and flew outside the controlled Class C airspace in a place such as Canberra, the 19

aircraft would still be in Class E controlled airspace under the full responsibility of the air traffic controller, with the radar system and the minimum safe altitude alarm. Now look at the current system. If an airline pilot inadvertently flew outside the Class C airspace (say at night or in cloud) it would place the aircraft with its passengers in “no man’s land” – that is, in uncontrolled dirt road Class G airspace.

That is what happened in Canberra last year, with 87 passengers and crew, and it could happen again tonight. Despite five months of investigation by the Australian Transport Safety Bureau, nothing has been done to solve the fundamental airspace design problem. The aircraft was one of the latest Boeing fly-by-wire, glass cockpit 737s, costing about $70 million US dollars. Look at this state of the art cockpit. It was about to descend in darkness into a 1920s airspace system. The crew were tired after the “red eye special” from Perth. The air conditioning system was faulty, jamming the temperature on high and causing even more problems. The aircraft descended towards Canberra with no visibility outside. The pilots intended to enter the holding pattern on descent to 5,000 feet.

It was reported to the pilot that due to an air traffic controller not being available in the Melbourne Centre, where the Canberra Approach radar console is, that the radar approach service would not be available. Of course this should not be a problem. We have air traffic control across Australia in the enroute environment, 24 hours a day. In other modern aviation countries, if the local approach control is not operating, the Class C approach airspace changes to controlled Class E, and the 24 hour per day enroute radar controller for the airspace above takes over the airspace.

But not in Australia. As the Government policy did not go ahead, the airspace becomes uncontrolled Class G. The plane dropped into the “black hole” of an uncontrolled Mandatory Broadcast Zone, where planes radio each other without air traffic control. Some professional pilots like MBZs as there are lots of radio calls and the crew has the freedom to make their own decisions. Unfortunately, radios can be on the wrong frequency and, more importantly, mountains don’t talk. This is not and cannot be a fail- safe system.

On this particular night an error was made in inputting the navigational instructions to the Flight Management Computer. The keystrokes should have directed the plane to fly a maximum leg distance of 14 miles south of the Canberra navigation aid located at the airport. But mistakenly the instruction meant that the 14 miles would be from the Church Creek navigational aid which was already 11 miles south of Canberra. The aircraft was heading well south of the protected approach path.

Now I’m sure you can see the shocking situation that was developing in this darkened and overheated cockpit as the aircraft descended to 5,000 feet outside the protected area of the approach, with the crew oblivious of the error. Everyone on board was descending towards their deaths.

Within 25 miles of Canberra to the south, for an aircraft that is not on the correct instrument approach, the minimum safe and legal altitude is 7,400 feet – not 5,000 feet. This is because there can be terrain anywhere in this area up to a height of 6,400 feet.

The aircraft was on descent to 5,000 feet – 300 feet below the top of Tinderry Peak. Fortunately, the crew started to turn back towards Canberra before the 14 miles maximum leg distance. At about the same time the “black box” last resort warning system gave an urgent voice announcement, “Caution terrain.” This system includes a database of terrain and automatically warns the flight crew if they are about to hit the ground.

For a flight crew at night on instruments and in darkness, to hear that announcement is frightening. I once departed in my Citation jet from Majuro in the Pacific in pitch darkness. As I climbed away, the Ground Proximity Warning System startled me with the announcement “Caution terrain”, and then “Terrain, terrain, pull up.” I was already climbing, so I couldn’t do anything other than increase the climb and wait in fear for the aircraft to hit the terrain. Fortunately there are no mountains in that area – it was a fault in the equipment. “Black boxes” are not 100% reliable. They are after all just a last resort to save people’s lives if everything else fails.

You may ask if there was a warning from the air traffic controller who was responsible for this uncontrolled Class G airspace outside the Canberra Approach area. This controller is on duty 24 hours a day. No, there wasn’t, and even if there was it may not have been heard by the pilot as he was on the local aerodrome MBZ frequency, not the Class G radar frequency. In fact, I am advised that the radar minimum safe altitude alarm for this uncontrolled enroute airspace is not switched on.

Acting on the terrain warning alert, the pilot climbed the aircraft and another error was made. The only legal and safe altitude to climb to was a minimum of 7,400 feet. This is shown on the instrument approach chart. However the pilot leveled off at 6,000 feet. There could have been a mountain peak 6,400 feet high hidden in the darkness directly in front of the aircraft. It was only by luck that this was not so.

It took five months for the Australian Transport Safety Bureau to produce a final report. There were no recommendations in relation to the airspace being upgraded to Class E controlled airspace consistent with Government policy. There were no comments or recommendations about the fact that the radar minimum safe altitude alarm had not been switched on. In fact, the ATSB made no safety recommendations at all – even though it is their legislated responsibility to do so.

So far in Australia we have not had a jet airline fatality but we have been very close a number of times. Imagine if instead of there being a golf course at the end of the runway at Bangkok Airport, there was a highway and a container terminal. The Qantas 747 overrun accident could have killed many people. In one fell swoop, we would have gone from one of the safest aviation countries to one of the least safe. Imagine if in 22

the Canberra incident, the last resort “black box” was not working and the pilot of the 737 had made the turn a little later?

But are we going to ever learn? Do we need hundreds of people to die before the reforms are made? I hope not, and that is why we all need to do something.

This near crash – with a possible 87 fatalities – was kept hidden for some five weeks. Not only from the public and from airline passengers in Canberra, but also from other airline crews. It was only because an airline pilot published details of the incident on the Professional Pilots Rumour Network website that it received public exposure. Even when the incident came to public notice, we had the Air Transport Safety Bureau’s Deputy Director minimising the danger. This is a quote from the Sydney Morning Herald on 19 May 2005.

“The Bureau’s Deputy Director, Alan Stray, said the plane was turning away from the terrain when the warning went off. “So they were well clear, they were turning away from it. No one was in danger,” he said.”

Why would Mr Stray say this? Surely he must have known that it was only by luck alone that the aircraft was over a valley. There could have been a 6,400 foot mountain in the path of the airliner.

I believe I have the answer. Alan is a highly experienced Australian professional pilot, who flew for many years in uncontrolled airspace without the use of radar. He, like most of the professional pilots at the ATSB and CASA, possibly believe that the system they learnt to fly in was safe and doesn’t need any changes.

What would have happened if the airspace reforms of December 1995 had gone ahead? Quite simply, there would not have been an incident and the passengers’ lives would never have been at risk. Once the aircraft had left the limits of the holding pattern, the minimum safe altitude alarm would have sounded in the Melbourne Centre. The controller would have then instructed the pilot to climb to 7,400 feet and commence the approach again. The controller would have been able to communicate directly as the pilot would have remained on the radar control frequency, not have moved off to a “calling in the blind” local airport frequency.

While the present airspace system remains in the Canberra area there will be a continuing risk to airline passengers.

11. The Benalla accident – radar not used

The sad thing is that there is just a possibility that if publicity had been given to the Canberra incident the next day, and air crews had been advised that they would not receive any proper radar advice if they drifted off course in mountainous areas south of Canberra, six people may be alive today.

It was just four days after the then unreported Canberra incident that the D & R Henderson Timber Company’s Piper Cheyenne was heading to Benalla in terrible weather conditions. For some reason the aircraft gradually drifted south of the correct 23

track. No one yet knows why.

The aircraft was in Class A airspace initially, and the “Route Adherence Monitor Alarm” sounded a number of times in the air traffic control radar centre in Melbourne. This advised the controller that the aircraft was drifting off the correct course. For some reason the controller did not notify the pilot of this. It could have been due to workload, a misunderstanding about where the aircraft was heading, or more likely that the controller realised the aircraft was heading into uncontrolled airspace, and therefore the navigation was the responsibility of the pilot.

Here is a diagram of the approach path to Benalla that the pilot normally flew. From radar information the southern line is the actual flight path*. As you can see, it was many miles to the south of the correct course. Unfortunately for the crew and passengers, there is a mountain range and the plane descended into a ridge – it appears to be a classic controlled flight into terrain.

Let’s look again at the diagram of the airspace that was to be introduced by December 24

of 1995. The aircraft would have been under air traffic control directions in Class E controlled airspace for all of the approach when in cloud. The air traffic control radar system’s minimum safe altitude alarm would have been activated, and the controller would have been trained to instruct the pilot to immediately climb to the legal minimum safe altitude.

If we look at the diagram of the current airspace system, it is obvious that when below 8,500 feet, the plane was descending into uncontrolled Class G airspace – even though it was under excellent radar coverage. In uncontrolled airspace, the air traffic controller and Airservices Australia are not responsible for the pilot’s altitude or location.

It is now over 12 months since that terrible and possibly needless accident and the Civil Aviation Safety Authority, the Australian Transport Safety Bureau and Airservices Australia have made no announcement about reclassifying the airspace and using the radar properly in that area. It is almost as if all of these Government departments are in self-denial. Could they be saying, “Aussie professional pilots don’t fly their perfectly good aeroplanes into the ground so we don’t need to use the radar with controlled airspace – it just doesn’t happen!”

Those who are against the introduction of the North American airspace system in Australia say that it will not work because we do not have as much radar coverage. This argument is certainly not valid in the Benalla or Canberra areas. The radar coverage goes almost down to ground level.

I am told that some professional pilots like the uncontrolled airspace because they have designed their own illegal instrument approaches. Can you believe this? It appears that once the aircraft is in uncontrolled airspace the controllers either do not know the location of the correct legal approach, or turn a blind eye. Could this be the explanation as to why some pilots are against the reforms? I have spoken to American controllers and they state that this situation would not occur in the USA – all instrument approaches are in a minimum of Class E controlled airspace. If a pilot tried to perform an illegal approach in radar airspace, it would be reported and licence or other action taken.

I must make it clear here that I do not blame air traffic controllers for this situation. From my experience our controllers are as good as any in the world. When I am flying I am always treated courteously and professionally. The problem is that the controllers

have taken over the uncontrolled flight service airspace without proper radar procedures being introduced, or training given to utilise the safety features of the $350 million radar system. Sad but true.

Look again at the diagram of the existing airspace system. I should mention all of the diagrams are simplified and not pedantically correct. It is obvious that much of the enroute airspace close to mountains is uncontrolled. As I have mentioned previously, from the information I have been able to obtain, the minimum safe altitude alarm is not enabled for much of this enroute radar covered airspace. This means that there is no notification to the controller at all if the aircraft is below the minimum safe altitude.

Not that it would be a lot of use because under the Australian system, an air traffic controller would not know if the pilot in uncontrolled airspace was flying in cloud or had become visual and was flying visually. In the airspace system that was to be introduced in Australia by December 95 with controlled Class E airspace, a plane would be prohibited from going below the minimum legal altitude until the pilot reported to the controller that the aircraft was on the instrument approach or was visual. It is a very disciplined fail-safe system. Unfortunately for the passengers, the system was not introduced. If it had been, they may be alive today

*Note: The radar information actually stops at TNP 00:45:21. The track from this point to the crash site has been interpolated by using the actual track of the aircraft that was estimated at the crash site, and the track of the aircraft estimated from the last radar return. Even though the route shown is the most likely approach, it cannot be proved.

12. The Mount Hotham accident – radar not used

Only 70 nautical miles away at Mount Hotham, a similar controlled flight into terrain occurred. Once again, with a licensed professional pilot flying what appears to be a properly operating aircraft in uncontrolled Class G airspace. Here is an image of the radar trace of the approach of this aircraft (in blue), and of a Qantas Dash 8 (in orange) and a Citation jet (in green) which attempted the approach on the same day.

This diagram has come from the Australian Transport Safety Bureau’s interim report and has been taken from the radar traces. This shows that radar coverage is good in that area. Note that the two other aircraft tracked over or close by the initial approach fixes HOTEA and HOTEB. The Piper Chieftain that crashed never went within 5 miles of a correct fix (HOTEA, HOTEB or HOTEC), yet was not warned by the air traffic controller.

Because the airspace reforms have not gone ahead, it was not the controller’s responsibility to do this. The controller could have had the radar switched to a scale which meant it was difficult to tell if the plane was off course, and the controller would not have known if the plane was visual or in cloud as there is no requirement for the pilot to advise the controller of this. More importantly, the controller had no authority to direct the pilot – the plane was in uncontrolled airspace.

Again, if we look at the diagram of the system that was approved for introduction by December 95, the aircraft would have been in Class E controlled airspace and under

the direct authority of the radar controller.

The pilot has been criticised in the media for commencing an approach in such bad weather conditions. This may not be fair as a Dash 8 airliner performed two approaches on that day, and a Citation jet also commenced an approach. These pilots were not criticised. Instrument approaches are designed so that if the pilot is not visual by the minima, or if the aircraft starts to ice up, the pilot can discontinue the approach and fly to an alternate airport.

Only the preliminary ATSB reports are out on the Benalla and Mount Hotham crashes – both show that in each case the pilot was well away from the correct approach path. How does the ATSB know this? You’ve got it – they used the radar information.

Our air traffic controllers can provide this upgraded service. I have no doubt that given leadership and proper protection against personal liability and loss of their careers if an error is made, (of which many are fearful) they would be prepared to extend their boundaries and learn how to operate Class E controlled airspace where it can prevent Controlled Flights Into Terrain.

I have been contacted by a controller who operates enroute airspace and he claims that there are times that the job is unremittingly boring and that he would welcome the challenge of providing a full separation service to instrument flight rules aircraft right down to the ground. He blames the bosses at Airservices Australia and the union hierarchy for the lack of support for the Government reforms.

13. Class E – advantages still not available in Australia

Class E is a unique airspace and requires quite a cultural change if the safety benefits are to be optimised. When instrument conditions exist – that is, in bad weather – it is a fully controlled airspace in the same way as Class A. The pilot must comply with air traffic control directions. However when visual conditions exist – that is, in good weather – the pilot may elect to cancel Instrument Flight Rules (IFR) and fly visually and uncontrolled. This means that Class E airspace has the advantages of Class A controlled airspace when instrument conditions exist, and the advantages of Class G uncontrolled airspace when visual conditions exist.

In Australia pilots have not been able to use these advantages because of the Civil Aviation Safety Authority’s bureaucratic resistance to change. Its officers, who are professional pilots who have flown for decades in the old system, have steadfastly refused to allow the regulations to be updated so that the airspace can be used as it is in other modern aviation countries. For this reason many pilots and controllers oppose Class E airspace.

If you remember from the diagram, we originally only had controlled airspace and uncontrolled in Australia. It is quite a cultural leap for pilots and air traffic controllers to accept that the most common form of airspace for instrument flight rules aircraft throughout the world is Class E. It can change from being controlled to uncontrolled depending on weather conditions and the pilot’s decision.

Our Class E airspace is the safest in the world as all aircraft – both the small Visual Flight Rules aircraft and the larger Instrument Flight Rules planes – must have an altitude reporting transponder. This “black box” not only sends the aircraft’s position and altitude to the radar controller in radar airspace, but also sends the aircraft’s position and altitude to a special safety device that is installed in all airline aircraft.

Called “TCAS” (Traffic Alert and Collision Avoidance System), it will show on a small screen (pictured) not only the location of nearby transponder equipped aircraft, but it will also automatically advise the airline crew to climb or descend to prevent a collision. No airline aircraft has ever been involved in a mid-air collision when following the instructions of this extraordinary safety device.

I’m particularly proud of this safety feature because as CASA Chairman, I personally brokered the agreement with the industry associations which allowed the introduction of this mandatory requirement for transponders in Class E.

14. Cape York crash – 15 dead – local radio operator hijacked

“Cape York air crash – 15 dead”. I remember reading the headline. I felt sick. Was this also linked to the failed reforms? It was our first airline crash in over 30 years. Surely not another properly operating aircraft being flown into the ground by a professional flight crew?

It was a day of terrible weather and I’m sure the 13 passengers on board the commuter airline would have expected the pilot to be talking by radio to the airport about the latest weather conditions and the best way to approach – especially considering that this area is not covered by radar.

As stated previously, a major part of the new reforms was the introduction of a North American style UNICOM radio operator at each airport with airline services.

Well it didn’t happen. Just as the Class E airspace was never brought down low enough to protect airline passengers, the UNICOM system using a local person wasn’t introduced. The explanation is extraordinary. UNICOMs were to be called Certified Air/Ground Operators (CA/GRO) in Australia. It was planned that there should be a simple training course so any competent person could become a UNICOM operator. Look at the photograph of this UNICOM operator in Sachs Harbour in Canada.

I took it a couple of years ago when I flew through the area. Sachs Harbour is a small Inuit village similar in many ways to our Aboriginal community at Lockhart River. The operator here is one of the local Inuit community who was trained to operate the UNICOM – it is a fantastic safety service. I have already shown a photograph of the airport fireman at Hayden operating the UNICOM.

Earlier on I have referred to unions protecting their members’ interests. I don’t blame them for this – it is their job – but I do blame weak Governments who do not stand up for the public interest, and that is what has happened in this case. The unions demanded that only a person with an air traffic licence could become an Air/Ground Operator. The Government kowtowed and now people die. This was the advice to the industry from the Civil Aviation Safety Authority:

“CASA has modified its original proposals and will significantly tighten the requirements for the granting of the CA/GRO certificate. The required qualification will be that an applicant holds, or has held within the last 10 years, an Australian air traffic controller licence or a flight service officer licence.”

Of course there are no people with air traffic control licences or flight service licences residing at Lockhart River – or Ayers Rock for that matter, or Kalgoorlie, or at dozens of other places which have airline services. In fact, the only way a person can get a licence is to be employed by Airservices Australia! The unions, in successfully protecting their patch, have strangled the wide introduction of this major safety improvement.

This is particularly sad in relation to the Cape York crash. I recently flew to Lockhart River and spoke to a pilot and the Airport Safety Officer. The pilot claimed that on the day of the crash, the weather to the east of the airport was clear, and that if the aircraft had overflown the mountain range, descended in the clear airspace and approached from the east, that everyone could be alive today.

I asked the airport safety officer, whose office had a view of the runway, if he would 30

be able to operate an Air/Ground service to advise pilots if the weather was clear in particular directions. He already had a two-way radio on the aerodrome frequency which he was licensed to operate, because he needed to make announcements when entering the runway to perform inspections. However, he only had a radio licence to operate the unit, he did not have an air traffic licence.

I said, “Would you be able to be trained to give local weather reports to the pilot on the aerodrome frequency?” It should be noted that the union people had told me that it would not be possible to train local people for such a job. The airport safety officer said, “Of course Dick. I am the person who does the weather observations and is paid to send the reports to the Met department that are then transmitted a few hours later by Brisbane air traffic control to the pilots.”

I said, “Could you offer a UNICOM service and give local weather conditions and traffic information to pilots?” He said, “I wouldn’t be allowed to do that.”

A little later I landed at Cooktown Airport, where the airport safety officer employed by the local Council had an office with a view over the runway. He has a radio, but of course he is not trained to talk directly to aircraft. He said, “Sometimes Dick there is a commercial aircraft in a holding pattern in cloud – we get some really bad weather here – and the pilot phones his office in Cairns. The office then phones me and I give them the weather conditions and advise if there is any other traffic around. This is then passed on by telephone to the pilot in the plane.”

Can you imagine the scene? The professional pilot is controlling the plane in instrument weather conditions, possibly on a difficult instrument approach. The passengers are sitting in the back, white faced as the pilot fumbles with his cellular phone to get the weather information when he should be talking directly by the aircraft radio to the Airport Safety Officer.

So there you have it. It is my belief that if there had have been a trained UNICOM or Air/Ground Operator at Lockhart River, he could have advised the pilot that the weather was clear to the east and the accident may not have occurred. It appears that the accident was once again a classic Controlled Flight Into Terrain. Possibly the professional crew made a simple error similar to what happened with the 737 crew in Canberra.

Most prudent pilots would fly the extra few minutes for the safer landing. The weather conditions to the west of the airport were abysmal on that day, with strong sou’ easterly winds meaning the approach over the mountain ridges shown in this photograph would have been quite frightening for the crew and passengers. Especially if in turbulence, cloud and heavy rain. The Government allowed vested interest to hijack this low cost safety enhancer. Over ten years later, because the costs are so high there are only two Certified Air/Ground Operators in Australia.

15. A Cerritos type mid-air collision could happen tomorrow

I’m sure many people have heard the claim that was spread in the media that “the reason Dick Smith is supporting airspace reform is because he wants small planes to fly uncontrolled in commercial airspace.” These claims were made by air traffic controllers who were against the reforms.

The truth is that small planes have always flown uncontrolled in airspace used by commercial aircraft. They have been doing this for decades in the higher collision risk airspace at the many hundreds of non-tower airports that have commercial services. These include most country airports in Australia – even ones with jet airline services such as Avalon (Melbourne), Ayers Rock, Ballina, Broome, Hervey Bay, Kalgoorlie, Karratha, Hamilton Island, Mt Isa, Port Hedland and Proserpine. 32

The controllers are actually referring to my support for Government policy and the National Airspace System, where “small planes” are encouraged to overfly airports in the low collision risk “link” airspace above. If you look at the diagram of the National Airspace System on page 30 you will see that Visual Flight Rules planes can overfly airports in Class E airspace uncontrolled – as they do every day in countries such as the USA and Canada.

Not only is the collision risk less when aircraft are spread further out from the runway, but as stated previously, in Class E airspace all of the small aircraft must have a “black box” transponder showing the aircraft’s position and altitude on a screen in the cockpit of airline aircraft, and also at the radar centre when in radar airspace. In the uncontrolled Class G airspace there is no such requirement.

Our present Australian system is the opposite of common sense – we focus the aircraft closer together and where the collision risk is greater. For example, Visual Flight Rules planes flying from south to north in Sydney can’t get approval to overfly the airport but must fly in uncontrolled airspace via Hornsby – a northern Sydney suburb that is directly under the approach path for airliners flying to Sydney Airport.

The Visual Flight Rules planes navigate by following flashing lights on buildings (I kid you not) while flying at low levels over heavily built up areas, where a safe forced landing would be almost impossible. They then climb to an altitude of 2,500 feet at Hornsby, where the large airliners are on descent to as low as 3,000 feet. Yes, that gives just 150 metres of separation. If either pilot makes an error with the setting of the altimeter, the aircraft could collide.

The small planes don’t require a radio or a transponder (as they are in uncontrolled airspace), so the air traffic controller would not know if the airline aircraft and the small aircraft were at the same altitude. The “black box” automatic collision avoidance system in the airline aircraft also would not operate.

This undeniably reduces safety, however Airservices Australia and the air traffic controllers cannot be held responsible for the collision because the small plane was not supposed to be in controlled airspace. That can be the only reason why they support this airspace design.

Overseas airspace professionals have informed me that airspace design should never focus airline aircraft and small planes at the same location. They believe this situation is an accident waiting to happen. In other countries small aircraft are encouraged to overfly the busy airfields, where the collision risk is minimal.

In Los Angeles, there are special aircraft lanes that allow small planes to fly overhead the airport between 3,500 feet and 4,500 feet uncontrolled. This is the safest place to put small planes, as they pass the large planes many kilometers apart, and on radar, when they go through the same altitude – not with 150 meters of separation without even a transponder requirement.

The situation at Hornsby is so serious that we could repeat one of the world’s worst midair collisions, which occurred 19 years ago over Cerritos, a suburb in the USA. In that case a small aircraft inadvertently climbed into the controlled airspace above. 82 people lost their lives – including all on board both aircraft and 15 people on the ground – and 11 homes were destroyed. To prevent a repeat of this type of accident, the US Government acted quickly and introduced a mandatory transponder requirement within 30 miles of their high traffic density airports. Australia still has no such requirement and because we focus the planes so closely together, we are more likely to have a Cerritos type mid-air collision. It could happen tomorrow.

16. Conflict of interest stops and then reverses the reforms

Why didn’t the reforms go ahead? It is nearly 15 years since the decision was made by the Hawke Government to move to the safer airspace system – where all airline aircraft fly in controlled airspace and where pilots can talk to a trained radio operator on the ground. It’s all about self-interest. The self-interest is obvious in relation to the UNICOM or Certified Air/Ground Operator. The air traffic controllers and flight service officers have got themselves great retirement jobs and there is no competition for the jobs from pilots, flying instructors or anyone else. In New Zealand the flying instructors now run the tower at the Ardmore training aerodrome under a competitive contract. They have replaced the licensed controllers and run the tower at a very much lower cost.

But why would anyone be against the obvious safety benefits of re-allocating airspace classifications to where the risk is highest? The answer lies in the structure of Airservices Australia, the profit making commercial organisation that has sole legislative responsibility for the introduction of the new airspace system.

Airservices Australia has a conflict of being in charge of the design and declaration of airspace, while at the same time being required by the Government to maximise the profits from the airspace. It is in fact a double conflict – not only can Airservices Australia maximise profits by reducing the cost and their own liability when operating the airspace system, but it also links the take home pay of the people who make the

regulatory decisions on airspace with the profits.

That was originally denied by the Government. In a letter dated 21 April 2004 from The Honourable Warren Truss MP, the Federal Member for Wide Bay, to one of his constituents, he stated:

“I assure you that contrary to the suggestion in your letter, Airservices does not pay its management bonuses based on the profits made. There can therefore be no question of a conflict of interest in its activities in this regard.”

Note how Mr Truss says, “There can be no question of a conflict of interest.” He obviously knows there would be a conflict of interest if there were a link. Fortunately the truth came out two weeks later, with this letter to a constituent from the Federal Member for Cook, Bruce Baird MP of 4 May 2004.

“I can confirm that as a commercial authority, the Board of Airservices Australia has determined a link between financial performance and at risk remuneration for senior managers.”

Could this be why the Hamilton Island Tower closes down just before the Airbus departs, or why airports like Proserpine and Broome, with many airline jet services per day, do not have controlled airspace or towers at all? It is actually worse than that. Last year Airservices Australia wound back Stage 2b of the Government’s airspace reforms. This was a stage introduced in November 2003 that brought the Class E airspace down to lower levels over the non-radar control tower airports.

Even the Civil Aviation Safety Authority, which normally remains silent to keep out of the media on airspace issues (I’ll explain why later) stated in a letter from their Chief Executive Bruce Byron AM, to Airservices Australia on 26 August 2004:

“By reversing some of the elements introduced in NAS 2b, further progress towards the improved airspace system would seem difficult to achieve.”

This was an understatement. Since the reversal, all of the progress towards the improved airspace system has stopped.

Airservices Australia claimed that this was all about passenger safety. In fact, it was the opposite. It was about reducing accountability and risk of litigation to Airservices Australia whilst the wind back most likely increased the risk to Australian airline passengers. Let’s look again at the planned system.

The Hawke Government policy was reaffirmed in May 2002 by the Coalition Government when transport Minister John Anderson announced the decision to adopt the North American based National Airspace System (NAS) as the accepted model for airspace reforms. This was selected by the Aviation Reform Group after the model was developed by Qantas and myself. The NAS was fundamentally the same as the 1995 plan with Class E in the low collision risk airspace above airports with Class D control towers.

The Aviation Reform Group was a group of experts appointed by the Minister John Anderson to advise on airspace reform. Members included Angus Houston (the current Chief of Defence), John Forsyth (Chairman of Airservices Australia), Ted Anson (Chairman of CASA), Ken Matthews (Secretary of the Department of Transport), and myself. A copy of the Cabinet approved NAS document is available on my website.

Notice how today’s system, after the reversal that took place a year ago, defies common sense and logic. Once again, just like the old days, the “link” airspace from high to low level – where the risk of a collision is low as aircraft are further apart – is now the most restrictive Class C, and the higher collision risk airspace close to the runway at places like Proserpine and Avalon has jet airliners in dirt road, uncontrolled, “do it yourself” Class G airspace.

It was the Airservices Board, with one dissenter, who made the decision to reverse the Government policy. The explanation is extraordinary. Airservices Australia had approved a safety management system which stated that airspace could only be reallocated from Class C to Class E if there was a cost benefit. The Airservices management then falsely claimed that as NAS Class C costs the same to operate as Class E, the airspace must go back to Class C.

There was, however, an advantage for Airservices Australia if this reversal took place. It is all very simple. It is about moving responsibility and risk to someone else. By placing Class C airspace above Proserpine, most pilots of small aircraft, rather than filing flight plan details for an approval to fly through the controlled airspace with a likelihood of a delay, will drop down and fly through the Class G airspace below. This is where all aircraft are closer together and the risk of a collision is higher, but Airservices Australia will not be held responsible for collisions because the airspace is uncontrolled.

As the small planes descend and fly through the uncontrolled Class G airspace, they pass airline aircraft close to the runway. There is no radar coverage at this low level. Both the Visual Flight Rules aircraft and the Instrument Flight Rules airline aircraft are in a “do it yourself” system of radio calls. Look at the mountains. If an airline pilot made a mistake on the instrument approach, as happened at Canberra, the radar controller can’t advise the crew because the radio is on the local aerodrome frequency, not the radar frequency.

If this were the NAS system, the pilot would be in Class E airspace when in cloud, under air traffic control and communicating directly with the radar controller. With the present airspace there is not even a transponder requirement for the Visual Flight Rules aircraft, so it won’t be shown on the “black box” Traffic Alert and Collision Avoidance System in the airline aircraft.

Airservices Australia has managed to transfer the prime responsibility for a mid-air collision, or a controlled flight into terrain accident, from their organisation to the pilots of the aircraft concerned.

They prepared their own safety case to justify this reversal of the Government policy. This claimed that Class E airspace did not meet adequate levels of safety. When this safety case was reviewed by Professor Terry O’Neill, the Head of the School of Applied Statistics at the Australian National University, it became obvious that it was a fraudulent document. Airservices Australia had manipulated the figures to give an outcome supporting their own self-interest. A copy of the O’Neill report and other critiques are on my website.

Look at the diagram again. Airservices own computer modelling showed that the collision risk is at least 100 times greater close to an airport than above 5,000 feet. Despite this, they have the highest risk but lowest serviced uncontrolled airspace close to the airport, and the most restrictive Class C airspace in the lower risk airspace above.

The same week that Airservices reversed the airspace in Australia, they announced they had won a contract in the USA to operate control towers for a profit in exactly the airspace that they had reversed here – that is, Class D with Class E above. Imagine that – they are giving American airline passengers the higher safety system whilst they 38

close down control towers here. Then again, why wouldn’t they? They hold the sole regulatory power to do this and it is understandable that they would want to maximise their profits while minimising the risk of litigation to their own organisation in the case of an accident. Most company directors would do the same.

I’m sure everyone must be stunned as to how Airservices Australia can use their regulatory powers to reverse the Government’s policy so that their organisation’s exposure to risk can be minimised.

17. Why do professional pilots support “upside down” airspace?

Why do the professional pilots support this “upside down” airspace system? There is a fascinating explanation, and it is primarily about resistance to change. Many pilots don’t understand that collision risk increases greatly closer to an airport. They have never received any training in the mathematics of probability. Many believe that as talking pilot to pilot using “do it yourself” radio procedures (as used at Proserpine and similar airports) has not yet resulted in a mid-air airline collision, it must be safe. Many pilots do not accept that there is much likelihood that they could make a mistake and be involved in a Controlled Flight Into Terrain Accident – so they therefore don’t need radar control. There are some vocal professional pilots who do not accept that as traffic densities increase, this system breaks down. Obviously once two pilots start talking to each other to arrange separation in cloud, no other plane in the cloud can communicate. The problems of this “calling in the blind” are known to aviation authorities – it is not a fail-safe system.

This is a graph of a rise in the safety incidents that have taken place at airports similar to Proserpine. These incidents include serious near mid-air collisions. It provides very clear evidence that the present system has safety problems. In 1993 the Bureau of Air Safety Investigation (the predecessor to the Australian Transport Safety Bureau) stated in a report on these busy uncontrolled airports with jet airline services.

“Frequency congestion sometimes prevents pilots from making the prescribed

radio calls”

“… a total of 31 occurrence reports mentioned frequency congestion during this period.”

“Interviewed crews pointed out that there is thus no means by which a faulty transmitter, incorrect frequency selection or over transmission may be detected.”

1993 BASI Report - “The Operation of Regular Public Transport Aircraft in Mandatory Traffic Advisory Frequency Airspace.” Despite this evidence from twelve years ago, the present system remains primarily because of pilots’ resistance to change, and there is also a total lack of leadership from the authorities explaining that this unique system may have worked in the 1950s but it is no longer safe. Compared to the Class G “do it yourself”, “calling in the blind” system, Class E airspace is a fail-safe system. Air traffic control simply gives instructions to pilots and there is no requirement for a frequency blocking dialogue. If a radio is not working or an aircraft is on the wrong frequency, the pilot cannot get a clearance to operate in cloud.

In the “do it yourself” Australian system – which is not fail-safe – aircraft can (and are) flying approaches in cloud and on the wrong frequency. It happened at Bundaberg on 16 May 1997, where an airline aircraft, which was on an instrument approach in cloud, came within seconds of hitting another aircraft that was on the same instrument approach in the same cloud but on a different radio frequency. Neither the Australian Transport Safety Bureau, nor the Civil Aviation Safety Authority, made any recommendations to upgrade the airspace to prevent this type of occurrence.

18. Who hid the Proserpine control tower?

In the diagram of the existing airspace system, it will be noted that there is no longer a Class D control tower at Proserpine. “What happened to the tower?” I wondered. It was certainly there when I was Chairman of the CAA. Well I did some sleuthing and I found it. It has been dismantled and dragged through the bush to the far end of the airport where it is hidden from the view of airline passengers. Here is a secret photo 40

of it.

Airservices loses money on small towers so the take home pay for the managers must be up now that this loss maker has gone.

I feel sorry for the people of Proserpine and the passengers who fly there. They have been let down by our Government. Proserpine is now probably the riskiest airport in Australia because of the very bad weather conditions that can exist, the high mountains nearby, and the lack of the use of radar and controlled airspace. There is not even a local UNICOM radio operator to advise the pilots if their radio is working correctly on the correct airport frequency.

Proserpine can be a very busy airport, with up to six jet airline movements in one afternoon, so it is an accident waiting to happen. I’ve advised my family members not to fly there.

19. ABC’s 7.30 Report undermines safety reforms

It is most important that I cover the way that The 7.30 Report on the ABC appears to have been used as a willing tool in stopping or reversing the airspace reforms. Every time the Government has attempted to move ahead with the reforms, The 7.30 Report has run a scurrilous campaign of disinformation.

Why they would do this is beyond imagination. Surely Kerry O’Brien and the other presenters value their lives. What do they think about the 24 who are dead because of controlled flight into terrain accidents – where the use of radar and a local radio operator may have saved the day?

I will give you an example of the disinformation. In May 2004, Kerry O’Brien ran a segment bagging the reforms. He started the segment by stating:

“But the battle over the contentious new system, which allows light aircraft to share airspace with commercial planes, isn’t over yet.”

Kerry O’Brien would know that light aircraft have always shared airspace with commercial planes, and I personally have told him many times that the Government policy is directed at moving this “sharing” to the airspace where not only is the collision risk lower, but light aircraft have a mandatory transponder requirement.

The remainder of the segment became more misleading. I had been interviewed for the segment and the major points I made were about the conflict of interest that existed between Airservices Australia regulating airspace and maximising their profits, and also the plan to upgrade Broome Airport to controlled airspace under the Government’s NAS policy.

When the segment went to air it was edited to remove any mention of the profit conflict, and also to remove any mention of the upgrades. The message given was that I was actually supporting a reduction of service and safety at Broome Airport – the opposite to what I had said in the interview.

I immediately wrote to Kerry O’Brien with the following request.

“I request that you give me equal time on The 7.30 Report to explain to the public the true position. That is, the extra costs at Broome Airport will not come from a downgrading of the service, but from an upgrading to a full air traffic control tower as per Government policy and the US system. That is what I have always stated and supported.” Letter from Dick Smith to Kerry O’Brien 30 May 2004

A copy of the transcript of The 7.30 Report and the relevant letters are on my website.

Although this was a personal letter to Kerry O’Brien about an important public safety issue, I received an answer from one of the ABC legal officers eleven months later. It basically said, “Get lost.”

It is hard to understand how Kerry O’Brien can be so captured by Airservices Australia and their policies to maximise their profits and minimise their risk. I understand Airservices Australia was employing some of the most expensive commercial spin doctors in Canberra. That certainly worked with the ABC. Now 18 months later, Broome Airport (which The 7.30 Report claims has 250,000 passengers each year) still does not have any controlled airspace and jet airliners are flying around in cloud in a “do it yourself” system. It is also an accident waiting to happen.

20. People are dying – why nothing in the media?

At the start of this presentation I mentioned the spate of accidents and that I would explain the reason that little was said in the media. The reason is simple. The Coalition Government has one prime aviation policy, and that is “keep aviation out of the media.” The Government organisations – including the Department of Transport, Airservices Australia, the Civil Aviation Safety Authority and the Australian Transport Safety Bureau – have complied with this direction to the hilt. Anything that may bring media attention to aviation is stifled. In fact, I have found that virtually everything that may be slightly controversial is suppressed or a spin is placed on it – as in the Canberra incident – to divert media attention.

It has worked. Civil Air, the air traffic controllers’ union with about 1,000 members, has exploited this weakness to the extreme. Good on them – that is their job to protect their members’ interests. Not only were Civil Air able to prevent non-licensed people from being radio operators at country airports, and prevent the lowering of Class E airspace where their members could be held responsible for accidents, but two other Government initiatives were stopped dead when the union voiced its objection.

The first was the removal of the conflict of interest relating to Airservices being both the regulator of airspace and the profit making service provider. The Government has been stating for over five years that it is going to set up a separate Airspace Directorate within the Department of Transport. However the union’s stated policy is against this, and so it hasn’t happened.

The other success for the union has been to stop the Government policy to introduce 42

competition for airport tower services. Once Civil Air voiced its objection, the Government’s policy stopped in its tracks. Today we have Airservices Australia operating control towers in the USA at a 50% cost saving under a competitive environment, but no such competition is allowed here.

The union’s success once again reduces safety as many airports including Ayers Rock, Broome and Proserpine, would undoubtedly have a control tower if the Government competition policy had not been stymied.

The Government must be delighted with its success in keeping aviation out of the media. Back in the days of the Monarch crash, when the Labor party was bringing in major aviation reforms and standing up to the pressure groups (both industrial and business), every proposed change, accident, or even small incident was beaten up in the media with huge headlines.

The present Government has found that by appeasement, they can stop almost any controversy. This is a disaster for people who fly, and a disaster for the 24 people who may be alive today if the reforms had gone ahead. There is however some good news. There is a new Board and management team at Airservices Australia appointed since the airspace reversal took place. Hopefully they will be able to go ahead with the reforms – but this can only happen if the conflict of interest is removed by the Government.

21. What can the public do?

What can the public do? I believe that public involvement is the key to the reforms. If you are concerned about my presentation I ask you to write to the Prime Minister at this address and tell him so. It is useless writing to anyone other than the Prime Minister.

The Hon John Howard MP Prime Minister Parliament House CANBERRA ACT 2600

Or send an email to: [email protected] And we will forward it to the Prime Minister

The points that could be made are:  The 24 people who died in aviation accidents flown by professional pilots may have been alive today if the Government reforms had proceeded.

 You could request that the Prime Minister ensures that the Government policy in relation to introducing the National Airspace System goes ahead urgently so that the use of radar and controlled airspace is maximised to save further passengers and air crew being killed.

 You could mention that you want to see the removal of the conflict of interest that exists because Airservices Australia not only makes a profit out of

airspace but also has the regulatory responsibility for airspace.

 You could also say that you believe the regulation should be changed so that a local person can be trained to operate a radio at an airport, rather than just a person who holds an air traffic licence.

As I go around Australia giving these presentations I’m hoping that more and more letters to the Prime Minister will eventually get him to step in and do something. Hopefully this will be before more people are killed.

For further information see www.dicksmithflyer.com.au

APPENDIX 4

Jabiru V CASA

JABIRU INDUSTRY COMPLAINTS COMMISSIONER LETTER

JABIRU INDUSTRY COMPLAINTS COMMISSIONER LETTER 2

REVIEW OF LETTER FROM CASA SASAO TO RAAus CEO

JABIRU APPENDIX A

JABIRU APPENDIX B

APPENDIX 5

FUTURE TECHNOLOGIES

Preamble

This General Aviation Revitalisation Technology paper has been developed with input from Phillip Reiss, Director and past President of AOPA in collaboration Andrew Andersen and Lawrence Paratz, they provided the bulk of the input with Andrew drafting the final paper; I accept responsibility for any contentious policy contained within.

Technology is advancing rapidly as we advance into the 21 St Century, Smartphone’s, Tablets, Computers, GPS; almost all areas of our lives are affected by this technological leap forward. The benefits are immeasurable some would disagree, but it is hard to imagine conducting business or social activities in today’s world without technology.

Aviation, in particular General Aviation lags behind all other industries in technology advancement; there are many reasons for this, overly burdensome regulations, high cost brought about by certification requirements and government inertia.

Recreational Aviation without the burden of STC can purchase Avionics at half the cost and of equal functionality, we need to strike a balance that allows private GA to purchase lower cost Avionics, particularly to meet the ADS-B mandate.

GA is bearing the burden of cost associated with the introduction of new improved navigation and ATC technology whilst the Service provider (ASA) lags behind particular in regard to VHF and ADS-B coverage via Receiver/Repeater stations: this needs to be addressed. AOPA will need to work with ASA to achieve this outcome.

General Aviation Revitalisation

Technology

amenity and safety. Any consideration of technology can only produce results when considered in this broader context. Arising from this state of affairs, Australian GA has been denied the advantages and benefits of being able to utilise the capabilities of contemporary technologies that are available in other countries, and with just a few exceptions, Australian industry faces a significant disincentive to originate new products and services.

The price of this evidenced in keynote accidents, and embedded economic inefficiency in the sector. As only one, but glaring example, Australian pilots flying suitably equipped aircraft do not receive critical real-time weather, NOTAM and airspace information – the same pilot flying the same aircraft in the USA would receive this information – using the equipment already in the aircraft.

Approaches with Vertical Guidance (APV). Australia has failed to keep up with global technological advances that enable GA and other non-airline Instrument Flight Rules (IFR) aircraft to approach airports in poor weather with vertical guidance displayed in the cockpit. Although all new GA IFR aircraft are being delivered with this capability, and the increasing majority of existing IFR have the necessary equipment as a result of refits and modernisation, Australia’s repeated failure to implement a national service to augment satellite navigation means that GA aircraft are precluded from using those capabilities in this country.

To enable APV, a Space Based Augmentation Service (SBAS)2 is required, which broadcasts error corrections, so that three-dimensional positions can be accurately determined and converted to glide-slope approach guidance for pilots, without the need for any airport infrastructure. Beyond the aviation industry, SBAS has wide applicability to many industries including maritime, forestry, agriculture, surface transport, leisure and tourism.

ICAO has passed resolutions calling on member states to implement APV, with which Australia cannot comply without the implementation of Baro-VNAV and SBAS-based LPV approaches.

2 The implementation of SBAS in the United States is known as WAAS; EGNOS in Europe; GAGAN in India; SDCM in the Russian Federation; and MSAS in Japan. 88

Figure 3: European SBAS Architecture (source http://www.navipedia.net/index.php/SBAS_Fundamentals, European Space Agency)

Encouraging Australian Technology Innovative Australian companies that develop world-class aerospace technology face a limited market in Australia with minimal government support. Typically, these companies are forced to transfer their technology investments overseas, with the resultant loss of intellectual capacity and further development capability for Australia. At the time of writing, Australian companies are active internationally with world-class products and services in the following areas:

 Electronic flight bag technology  ADS-B systems design and equipment supply  Aircraft maintenance engineering systems and services  Aircraft and component repair and overhaul services  Consulting and aeronautical design, research and development services. At times, it is evident that Australia’s inconsistent and unique regulations create difficulties for these organisations in accessing overseas markets and achieving

regulatory compliance. Australia should lock-step its aeronautical standards to those of the United States and adopt international practices in their interpretation. Further, Australia should enable innovative Australian companies to obtain certification of products and services locally to FAA and EASA standards, without further domestic hurdles. The Australian aviation sector government specialist agencies, including CASA, Airservices Australia and the Department of Defence, should be tasked by government to support and foster these initiatives.

Increased ADS-B Coverage

Australia is partly in advance of the world in air traffic surveillance technology through its partial implementation of Automatic Dependent Surveillance – Broadcast (ADS-B), but the deployment has been designed for full coverage only at flight levels used by airline and a small number of similar aircraft.

Adherence to international standards for ADS-B technology means that the service is usable by all sectors of the Australian aviation industry who have equipped, within the coverage areas, and will become mandatory for all IFR flights in 2017.

The United States has been able to coordinate delivery of real-time weather and other flight data to GA aircraft at no cost, as part of its ADS-B implementation, but there are no plans to provide this capability in Australia.

An increase in the number of ADS-B ground stations would extend air traffic surveillance services at lower levels, not just to the advantage of GA, but for regional airline, medical and charter services as well. The extended air traffic surveillance gained by more ADS-B ground stations would enable the lowering of Class E airspace floors, which are currently limited to 8,500 feet. Doing so would provide significant safety benefits through positive air traffic separation and informational services for IFR and VFR aircraft in regional enroute and terminal areas at a small fraction of the cost of radar. Airservices Australia should adopt the goal of extending ADS-B coverage to match enhanced VHF radio communications coverage as soon as practical.

Figure 4: Current ADS-B Coverage at 5000 feet: ADS-B in green, radar in red (source http://www.airservicesaustralia.com/projects/ads-b/ads-b-coverage/)

Navigation Aid Facility Improvements

The lack of available Instrument Landing System (ILS) capacity around Australia, away from the major capital and military airfields, and limitations on access cause significant, costly problems for GA pilots in general, and flight training schools in particular.

In Melbourne, the ILS at Essendon, which is essential for pilot testing and currency purposes, is managed under a regime that requires pre-booking the night before based on forecast, not actual conditions; as a result, capacity is frequently wasted. In other major cities, ILS pilot training and currency is entirely dependent on the goodwill of the RAAF, which will always prioritise its operations over the needs of GA. Because these problems have both safety and economic impacts, the Australian Government aviation agencies should work together, with Defence, to decouple secondary airport ILS facilities from operations at primary airports and discontinue the current reservation arrangements in favor of service on-demand, in order of arrival, for these facilities as is world standard practice.

With the wide-scale withdrawal of ground based navigation aids in 2016, GA and other parts of the Australian aviation industry will need higher levels of serviceability from the remaining navigation aids. Airservices Australia should adopt appropriate plans to reduce navigation aid unserviceability and avoid planned simultaneous outages of more than one facility in proximity to each other: for example, in Melbourne, every

effort should be made to ensure that the ILS facilities at Essendon and Avalon ILS are not unserviceable at the same time.

Very High Frequency (VHF) Radio Communications Network

On the other hand, VHF coverage is poor in some high traffic areas of critical need, with no plan for remediation.

Further, HF radio involves labour-intensive services by ATC and Flight Watch, which would not be necessary if direct VHF radio contact were available.

Figure 5: Areas of Australia shown in dark purple or white have no VHF radio coverage at even 5,000 feet (source Airservices Australia)

To give this effect, the Australian Government, as a matter of policy, should direct, and/or financially support aviation infrastructure investment for:

5. VHF coverage generally to the instrument approach minima at every aerodrome with an IAL procedure, but in cases where the traffic volumes are very light, (and where there are no special factors such as adjacent terrain impacting aircraft maneuvering), VHF coverage to the holding pattern altitude may be acceptable. 6. Contiguous ADS-B coverage everywhere there is Australian continental VHF coverage, to the same levels. 7. The use of satellite telephone to be permitted in lieu of HF for all non-RPT operations. 8. The use of cellular (mobile) telephones to be permitted for IFR SARWATCH cancellation purposes in Part 91 domestic operations provided that: a. prior to leaving VHF coverage, the pilot nominates an ops normal time and has verified mobile phone service availability; and b. There is no other IFR traffic reported or expected during the period between last radio call and ops normal time. c. d. National Aeronautical Information Processing System (NAIPS)

NAIPS is a computerised service that provides pilots with information about flight and airspace restrictions, the serviceability of aeronautical and aerodrome facilities and weather briefings, as well the acceptance of flight notifications. The user interface to NAIPS is browser based and secured by login credentials available only to authorised persons. While the need for access control is understood, unnecessarily frequent and inconvenient password changes are enforced by policy, which means that pilots are sometimes unable to access this critical information when necessary for flight safety. Additionally, the NAIPS system is ageing and incapable of supporting embedded graphics in aviation weather forecasts, among other limitations. Many pilots now access this information through Electronic Flight Bag (EFB) tablet software, for which NAIPS is unsuited as an information server. For safety reasons, Airservices Australia needs to place high priority on renewing this system to better meet the needs of GA pilots and operators, and offering open interfaces to third parties for solution development.

Aerodrome Weather Information Service (AWIS) AWIS stations are located at airports around Australia and provide automatic weather reporting to aircraft in flight via VHF radio or telephone links. By providing pilots with pertinent landing information before they reach the aerodrome, AWIS stations are a significant safety enhancer for GA, charter and regional airline flights.

Despite its importance to aviation safety, the AWIS program suffers from ill-defined cost recovery arrangements between airport owners and Australian Government agencies. The Bureau of Meteorology typically owns and operates the weather sensor component, but expects the aviation industry, either through Airservices Australia, or private arrangements, to supply and operate radio facilities to broadcast the information to pilots.

Accordingly, of the 249 AWIS stations in Australian territory3, only 122 have any kind of radio broadcast facility that a pilot can use. While 222 of the stations may be accessed by telephone, the use of mobile telephones in some, (but not all) GA aircraft can be impractical and unreliable, and even involve additional safety risks. It is imperative that government aviation agencies and airport owners reach agreement quickly to ensure that this critical information is available both by radio and telephone as a matter of policy, not just to GA pilots, but airline, charter and sport and recreational aviation operations.

Many pilots have difficulties with the click-to-transmit activation of some AWIS stations and equipment capable of continual transmission, which does not need activation, should be utilised.

Funding issues also mean that less than half of Australia’s AWIS stations have the ability to detect and report cloud and visibility. This is a critical safety deficiency. The Australian Government should act to resolve all the issues surrounding AWIS stations as a matter of safety priority.

Aviation Infrastructure Funding

A significant obstacle to resolving most aviation infrastructure issues is lack of funding. The Australian Government maintains that it is no longer responsible for aviation infrastructure funding and expects that all related costs will be met by the aviation industry through fees and charges for operational and regulatory services. This is in marked contrast to the approach taken in the case of road, rail and maritime infrastructure.

As all operational aeronautical services are provided in Australia by the state-owned Airservices Australia, GA and other sectors of the aviation industry are constrained to look to this agency to discharge its responsibility to develop and fund the needed nationally beneficial aviation infrastructure, taking into account the broad scale national economic interest.

The status of Airservices Australia as neither a Government Business Enterprise, nor a lead portfolio agency, is problematic if policies of full cost recovery are to be strictly and literally applied in the absence of appropriate overarching policy. Proposals by Airservices Australia for capital investment are subject to an incremental scrutiny process necessarily dominated by the airlines, as the largest financial contributors. It is self-evident that it is not in the narrow interests of the airlines for infrastructure to be provided for the Australian aviation industry and the broader community as a whole; their interests are understandably limited to the relatively few airports, routes and facilities they service, seeking to “ring-fence” facilities and capacity to their own advantage. Consequently, the interests and legitimate national needs of charter, aerial work, and private and business GA, as well as sport and recreational aviation, are given no priority in infrastructure planning, thus triggering and perpetuating an

3 Sourced from http://www.bom.gov.au/aviation/data/location-info/location-info-national.pdf Bureau of Meteorology. Last updated 1 May 2015. 94

increasing cycle of infrastructure decay in Australia’s aviation infrastructure. It is dismaying to contrast this position with the approach of an increasingly strong Chinese economy, where the GA sector is being actively promoted and encouraged.

Without the provision of new and renewed aviation infrastructure, non-airline sectors, including GA, will continue to diminish in scale and standards; miss out on global safety improvements; and make commensurately reduced contributions to economic growth, jobs and prosperity.

The Australian Government needs a new approach to managing the funding and decision making for Australia’s aviation infrastructure. This could be established either as a result of a suitable review, or by appropriate policy action. The resolution may well consider models by which fixed proportions of fuel levies must be allocated to whole-of-industry infrastructure projects and not simply left to the whim of the airlines.

This process would require positive and active involvement by the Department as lead portfolio agency, as distinct from its current hands-off approach to numerous issues. Projects that would be advanced by this approach include surveillance extension to support airspace reform, and an aviation industry contribution to national navigation, position and timing infrastructure, amongst other valuable initiatives. In its absence, government agencies will continue to argue among themselves to avoid funding responsibility for safety-related facilities, and opportunities will be lost that could return the declining standards of infrastructure used by non-airline aviation in Australia, to world-class levels.

APPENDIX 6

National Airspace System (NAS)

Australia

Summary

This paper details a proposal for the introduction of an Australian airspace architecture within an ICAO framework and based on international best practice. It is based on a proven airspace model which offers benefits to all airspace users while remaining simple and cost effective.

14 December 2001

EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

The National Airspace System (NAS) provides a blueprint for an Australian airspace architecture within an ICAO framework and is major move towards international harmonisation and world’s best practice.

The Main features of NAS Australia airspace are:

• Complies with ICAO Classifications with minimum differences. • Based primarily on the North American airspace system. • Provides a continuous SAR and IFR traffic service for IFR services to the terminal area. • Allows for IFR aircraft to operate on a self-announce, no enroute charge basis in Class G airspace. • Facilitates VFR climb and descent in Class E airspace for aircraft which have filed an IFR flight plan. • Changes the MBZ calling in the blind procedures to proven FAA style CTAF/UNICOMs with a third party operator. • Ensures that ATC frequencies remain free of aircraft self-announce broadcasts. • Provides an IFR separation service to 700’ AGL at non tower terminal airspace at selected locations. • Provides a full radar based advisory service on a workload permitting basis for VFR aircraft. • Simplifies procedures and makes the maximum use of modern technology.

INTRODUCTION

The importance of international standardisation and harmonisation in airspace architecture, air traffic service (ATS) provision and aircraft operating procedures is recognised by all advanced aviation nations and organisations. While aviation systems employed by individual States may have developed and evolved in isolation for historic reasons, the existence of diverse aviation systems is no longer viable in a modern global aviation market and environment. The growth in international aviation activity, the growing need for ATS and avionics system interoperability, the increasing reliance on automation and technology and safety considerations are principle drivers towards a common and global system architecture.

The International Civil Aviation Organisation (ICAO) provides a basis for States to achieve standardisation and commonality in service provision. Standards and Recommended Practices (SARPS) provide a global operational baseline for the design of aviation systems including airspace architecture and air traffic management (ATM). ICAO requires any departure from these standards to be notified and published. Annex 11 to the Chicago Convention prescribes the model of airspace architecture which should be employed by all States. Appendix 4 prescribes the services and flight requirements associated with ICAO ATS Airspace Classes as follows: 97

While ICAO provides the “tools” and framework to design the aviation system, it leaves some flexibility in its application to States. This is necessary as less developed aviation nations do not have the infrastructure to support advanced traffic management systems, nor have traffic densities which require sophisticated management. International best practice, safety, and cost / benefit provide the design basis for advanced States to determine their airspace and operational architecture within the ICAO framework.

Prior to the 1990s, Australia benefited from an aviation system, which had evolved over half a century, to serve its regional needs. Since then, significant changes have been introduced to air traffic service provision, regulation and technology. These include a more commercial focus in air traffic service provision, the introduction of an advanced ATM platform (TAAATS), the introduction of new global technologies (eg., ADS, CPDLC) and international ATM practices (eg., RVSM, RNP).

Australian airspace design and management was identified in the early 1990s as an area which needed review in terms of international best practice and global harmonisation. The ICAO classifications of airspace were introduced and some reform was made in procedural design, particularly in relation to VFR aircraft operating OCTA (AMATS). While many major aviation stakeholders were keen to redesign and modernise the system, it proved difficult to reconcile all the perceived needs and to overcome the “home grown” and ingrained operating cultures. Despite the best of intentions, these attempts at system design change have faltered.

The National Airspace System (NAS) now proposes the adoption of an architecture

based on international prescription and best practice, and a systems approach, rather than a process of selective modification to the uniquely Australian System. The Australian NAS provides the design template and principles which integrate Australian aviation into the global model, while drawing on the North America system as representing World’s best practice for both for radar and procedural ATM systems.

The transition to the NAS will require a phased approach, while recognising that the first step in the implementation of the NAS has occurred with the implementation of 1991 Airspace Management and Air Traffic Services (AMATS) project initiatives, and the second with the introduction of Classes E airspace within the ICAO Classifications of airspace framework.

Safety, cost and enabling systems will be key considerations in timing and scoping a staged implementation.

AIRSPACE ARCHITECTURE

2.1 Airspace Architecture Design Principles

The following principles provide the high level framework for the allocation of airspace classifications to Australian domestic and international airspace:

• The airspace classifications and associated procedures will be applied with minimal departure from the ICAO prescription and SARPS (Annex 2 &11); • Where practicable, an IFR/IFR separation service will be provided; • Situational awareness will be enhanced by third party traffic advice, by pilot reports or by electronic means2 ; • The fitment and use of transponders to powered aircraft, and ACAS to designated commercial operations, as a defence against systemic failure, is encouraged; • VFR aircraft will participate within the system to the degree necessary to manage system risk and safety; • Any safety analysis shall employ a methodology of comparative study of proven systems. Where this is not feasible, an ALARP / constrained cost – benefit methodology will be used; • In order to mitigate the risk of systemic (human) failure, airspace and procedures design must remain simple and logical, and will be supported by comprehensive training and education programmes. • Implementation will be phased and reflect system capabilities, including enabling technologies and costs.

2.2 Airspace distribution

The allocation of ICAO airspace classifications and associated services provides a strategic framework for mitigating risk of aircraft collision. Services and classifications are allocated to airspaces with consideration to:

• Aircraft type, category and classification, 99

• Traffic density, mix and complexity, and • System infrastructure availability and cost

The airspace classifications employed to manage Australian airspace include Class A, C, D, E & G3. (For interim application see diagram 1.)

2.3 Class A airspace

Application

Class A airspace will be established in Australian Domestic airspace, and Oceanic airspace within the Australian Flight Information Regions (FIRs) extending to 60º S Latitude, between FL 245 and FL 600. This airspace incorporates RVSM operations in all Australian airspace above FL 285. IFR operations only are permitted.

Within radar coverage and in other areas where traffic densities require, this airspace will commence at FL180.4

Procedures

In accordance with ICAO Annex 11 recommendations, Required Navigation Performance (RNP) criteria will be introduced5.

The application and system availability of User Preferred Routes (UPRs) shall be expanded to all Class A airspace for medium and long haul flights.6

Otherwise, procedures and practices will remain unchanged from present practice.

2.4 Class C airspace

Application

Class C airspace will exist in radar based controlled terminal areas (TMAs) associated with Cairns, Brisbane, Coolangatta, Canberra, Sydney, Melbourne, Adelaide and Perth. Class C procedures will also apply to Darwin and Townsville TMAs managed by the RAAF.

Class C terminal airspace in an end-state application will have an upper limit consistent with the North American architecture. The interim application of Class C airspace will extend from ground level to abut with the base of Class A airspace.

Design

The control zone will be of minimum dimensions necessary to protect IFR and visual circuit and approach procedures. Class C airspace shall be extended in nationally standardised steps to capture the arrival and departure profiles of aircraft along the major traffic flows in accordance with design principles prescribed in the Manual of Operating Standards (MOS)7 .

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Procedures

Class C Control Zones (all or segments) will be allocated to control towers to visually manage low level VFR aircraft arriving into or departing the zone, in accordance with 7 current Manual of Air Traffic Services (MATS) prescription. Auto-release departure procedures will also be introduced in accordance with current MATS prescription.

Initiatives which support operational efficiencies including Continuous Descent Approaches (CDAs) and UPRs will be pursued in accordance with the Australian ATM Strategic Plan.

2.5 Class D airspace

Application

Class D airspace will exist at non-radar controlled TMAs where a tower service is provided. GAAP aerodromes will be designated Class D aerodromes, and if necessary, a difference lodged with ICAO with respect to VMC minima.8

Design

The control zone will be of minimum dimensions so as to protect IFR and visual circuit and approach procedures in accordance with the MOS.

The CTR and associated Class D steps will capture the arrival and departure profile of high performance aircraft and extend to 4500 AMSL to abut overlying Class E airspace. The end state model will follow North American architecture.

Procedures

Class D procedures will be aligned to the FAA application.

While VFR aircraft in Class D airspace are subject to an airways clearance (ICAO Annex 11, App. 4), the clearance may be implicit as is current practice at GAAP Zones and in US Class D airspace 9

2.6 Class E airspace

Application

Class E airspace is established below Class A and/or Class C airspace, providing an IFR to IFR separation service in lower density enroute and terminal airspace.

Design

A goal in Australian airspace design is to provide maximum IFR/IFR separation services. In the North American application, Class E airspace provides IFR / IFR separation at altitudes down to 1200 ft AGL or 700 ft AGL associated with a non-tower terminal aerodrome. In remote areas, and where radar coverage does not exist at lower altitudes, the main base of Class E airspace is established at FL145. In this more 101

remote airspace, 8 Class E Corridors are established to lower levels to provide IFR/IFR separation on IFR routes and to terminals with IFR let-down procedures.

Interim design model

While universal IFR/IFR separation provision is the desirable end state, the current costs of service and training implications make the universal application of Class E to low altitudes impractical at this stage.10 Rather, it is proposed initially to introduce low level Class E airspace corridors, and on a trial basis to a limited number of aerodromes, Class E terminal airspace (base 700 ft Agl) to demonstrate cost/benefits and test the TAAATS procedural management of low level Class E procedures.

The interim establishment of Class E airspace is therefore proposed as follows:

The base of Class E airspace will be established at A08511 and generally associated with radar coverage. Elsewhere, and associated with less dense airspace, the base will be FL145. Beneath the E base, low level Class E steps will adjoin with Class D tower airspace. Low-level Class E corridors will be progressively established above 1200 ft. AGL and above A085 as appropriate where a need has been determined by an aeronautical study, or where users are prepared to pay for the service. Class E airspace will be established lower to 700 ft. Agl in terminal areas with published let down procedures but without tower services 12.

Services in Class E

In addition to IFR/IFR separation, the following services will be available in Class E airspace: • Flight following and SAR Alerting (IFR aircraft) • Hazard alerting service (directed to IFR, on request to VFR) • Traffic information service to IFR aircraft with respect to known VFR aircraft • A Radar Advisory Service will be available to VFR aircraft on a workload permitting basis. • Flight information service (FIS) (on request)

New traffic management procedures

New procedures will be introduced to improve traffic management, especially in the case of ATC clearance non-availability or restrictions. These initiatives include:

• VMC climb and decent procedures to enable self-separation between IFR aircraft subject to specified criteria 13 this is an IFR procedure where ATC delegate responsibility for separation to the two aircraft subject to their mutual acceptance and satisfying other criteria. • Ability for VFR climb in Class E airspace after departure pending availability of an airways clearance. This procedure will be available to aircraft which have filed IFR details and operating in VMC. ATC will provide flight following and known traffic. • Provision of a pop-up clearance for climb and decent through Class E airspace, or to cross Class E corridors, in IMC conditions. 102

• “VFR on top” services (known in Australia as full position VFR) will be available. ATC will provide flight following and known traffic. Normal ATS charges will apply. 2.7 Class G airspace

Application

Airspace not classified as Class A, C, D or E shall be classified Class G.

Design

Australia currently has similar continental airspace to that of the USA but only 5% of the traffic. While the limiting of Class E application initially to airspace above A085 or FL145, with lower corridors and trial terminal Class E airspace, will create considerably greater interim Class G airspace than in the end state/ideal airspace, the interim application is appropriate for reasons indicated above.

Services in Class G

ATC based separation services are not provided in this airspace. In addition to the directed traffic information services prescribed below, a Radar Advisory Service (RAS) will be available on a workload permitting basis to all aircraft within radar coverage on request. A hazard alerting service will also available on request to ATC or FIS for aircraft which are not receiving an ATC directed hazard service. An FIS will be available on request through the dedicated FIS frequency or ATC. UNICOMs will offer a cost/effective service to RPT and other operations in terminal areas (see below).

IFR management

IFR aircraft which have submitted a flight plan with Airservices Australia for enroute operations in Class G airspace will receive the following inclusive air traffic services:

• SAR alerting based on aerodrome arrival and departure. • Hazard alerting • Traffic information services with respect to known traffic in Class G terminal areas • Traffic information services in relation to observed radar tracks

Fully cost recovered ATS enroute charges will apply to those segments of IFR flight in Class G airspace for which details are filed14.

IFR aircraft proceeding into or from Class G airspace may choose to file details for that segment of flight in controlled airspace only.

IFR aircraft, operating solely in Class G airspace without filing details, may request known IFR traffic with respect to a Class G terminal area.

Radar Services

A radar advisory service (RAS) will be available for VFR aircraft when in radar covered 103

Class E or G airspace. This is known as “flight following” in the USA. The VFR aircraft will change to the controlled airspace frequency and request “flight following”. The service will be workload permitting and will give known traffic and, where requested, navigation advice.

Broadcast Procedures / CTAFs

Self-announce communication procedures will apply at non-controlled airports, including those served by UNICOMs. These procedures will closely follow the FAA model as per AIM 4.1.9.a. Pilots of arriving and departing traffic and pilots operating in the airspace normally used by arriving and departing traffic will monitor/communicate on the appropriate frequency when within 10 miles of the aerodrome.15

Multicom

All aerodromes which do not have a specific CTAF frequency allocated will use the multicom frequency of 126.7. UNICOM Services Operators of scheduled services will be required where practical to arrange for North American style UNICOM services to be provided when scheduled RPT services are present on the CTAF. These procedures will closely follow the FAA model as per AIM 4.1.9.e.

Airmanship

As part of the pilot education programme, pilots of VFR aircraft will be encouraged where practical to: • avoid routes likely to be used by IFR aircraft. • When not approaching or departing a CTAF, remain clear of arriving and departing traffic • remain clear of the circuit area of an airport unless departing or approaching the airport.

2.8 Radio requirements

Radio requirements will follow ICAO recommendations. For VFR aircraft recommended procedures will be as follows:

• When enroute in Class G or E airspace: 1. If in the airspace normally used by arriving or departing CTAF traffic, monitor/communicate on the CTAF frequency. 2. If in airspace normally used by arriving and departing aircraft to a Class D tower, monitor/communicate on the tower frequency. 3. Otherwise, monitor the relevant ATC/FIS or monitor 121.5 MHz.

• When inbound to (or outbound from) a CTAF: 1. Monitor/communicate on the relevant CTAF frequency. 2.9 Transponder requirements

Transponder requirements will follow USA FAA mandatory requirements applying to 104

aircraft with generating systems capable of more than 25 amps, as follows:

• Aircraft within Class A and C airspace • Aircraft operating above A100 in all airspace.

2.10 ATS Enroute Charges

Enroute ATS charges apply to aircraft that have filed IFR flight plans with the ATS provider.

There will be no charge to aircraft that have not filed IFR flight plans but require a short term IFR clearance to climb or descend in Class E airspace, or a clearance to cross a Class E corridor.

There will be no charge for a workload permitting RAS, flight following service for VFR aircraft.

There will be no charge for SAR alerting services to VFR flights over water.

2.11 Special use airspace

Danger Areas will be re-promulgated as Alert areas16

Restricted areas in international airspace will be re-promulgated as Warning Areas17

Military Operation Areas (MOAs) will be introduced.

2.12 Altimetry

To reduce radio congestion, altimeter settings will follow the FAA prescription (FAR 91.121). In lieu of area QNH, an altimeter setting of a station along the route within 100 nm of the aircraft can be used. Where there is no station within 100 nm that of an appropriate available station can be used.

2.13 Charting

Charting, particularly in relation to VFR flight, will be fully reviewed with the aim of simplification and the removal of unnecessary information 18

2.14 Implementation

Implementation of the new airspace design will be phased as follows:

STAGE 1 June 2002

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Class A and Class C airspace will be re-aligned. Class E airspace will also be established above A085 and FL145 as appropriate. Procedures in the residual Class G airspace will remain unchanged. UNICOMs will be established at aerodromes served by RPT operations and RAS introduced in Class G airspace

STAGE 2 December 2002

CTAF operations and procedures will be introduced. Class D tower dimensions and procedures will be modified in line with North American practice. Low level Class E corridors will be introduced at certain locations

STAGE 3 June 2003

Directed traffic for the en-route phase of flight in Class G airspace will be withdrawn.

STAGE 4 2004 +

Low level Class E airspace established consistent with the end-state proposal and North American practice.

Each implementation phase will be accompanied by a comprehensive education and training programme.

SAFETY ANALYSIS

3.1 Methodology

ICAO provides two methodologies for “determining whether the system is acceptably safe: a. comparison to a reference system, and b. Evaluation of system risks against a threshold.

Comparison with a reference system is a relative method, i.e. all the relative characteristics of the proposed system are compared with the corresponding characteristics of a reference system which has been judged to be safe. Provided that the proposed system can be demonstrated to be the same or better than the reference system in all safety aspects, then it may be assumed also to be safe…”19

As the NAS draws on international best practice and the proven ATM system of North America, process a. above is the appropriate methodology.

3.2 Application

This “comparison with a reference system” process will be applied as follows:

• Removal of directed full SAR traffic service in Class G airspace. 106

- Primary reference: The existing Australian Class G system in the Northern Territory where IFR now operate on a self-announce basis in large CTAFs to 10,000’. - Supportive reference: The USA FAA system where Class G extends to FL145 in low density traffic areas.

• Class G terminal areas. - Primary reference: The existing Australian Class G system. - Supportive reference: The Canadian Class G system in terminal areas.

• Class E radar and non-radar enroute airspace. - Primary reference: The USA FAA system. - Supportive reference: The existing Australian Class E airspace.

• Class E radar and non-radar terminal airspace: - Primary reference: The USA FAA system. - Supportive reference: The Canadian system.

• Change MBZ procedures to CTAF/UNICOMs. - Primary reference: The reference will be the USA FAA CTAF/UNICOM system. - Supportive reference: The existing Australian CTAF system as used by scheduled services.

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Notes

1 An IFR/IFR separation service is normally provided by third party ATC. However, emerging technologies have the potential to achieve separation assurance through airborne systems (eg. proposed free flight applications, ADSB CDTI, etc.). 2 Electronic means include ACAS and ADS-B/CDTI. 3 GAAP will be redesignated Class D airspace 4 This follows the North American system – i.e. The USA and Canada have FL180 for commencement of Class A airspace in high traffic density areas. Canada has Class A airspace starting at FL245 in low traffic density areas. FAA type “waivers” will be available for VFR operations (such as ballooning, gliding etc) in Class A airspace. 5 .The application of RNP will be non-exclusive 6 The management of UPRs may require an enhancement to TAAATS HMI tools. 7 It is proposed that MOS design principles be reviewed against international best practice. 8 Benefits include simplicity and standardised training. GAAP currently applies non- ICAO VMC criteria. 9 On advice of intent to the Tower an implicit clearance is assumed by VFR aircraft unless the Tower directs otherwise. This is consistent with FAA practice. 10 ADS-B based ATC surveillance is a potential enabling technology 11 This will allow at least two levels of IFR traffic – i.e. 9,000’ and 10,000’ – but still allow enroute operations above LSA in Class G airspace without an enroute charge. 12 Initially this airspace will be at two airports – possibly Mt Isa and Longreach for ATC and pilot training purposes – with the plan to move to an end result of the airspace dropping to 700’ wherever required by IFR traffic services. It is noted that this will require extensive training for air traffic controllers. 13 VMC Climb & decent based on ICAO procedure and FAA non-radar (Alaskan) application. 14 While generic enroute charges will initially apply, it is intended that service specific charges geared to actual cost taking into account additional equipment and sectors that may be required to be maintained. 15 Aerodrome traffic procedures will follow the FAA model. 16 Consistent with FAA prescription 17 Consistent with FAA prescription 18 Charting will principally follow the FAA model. ATC frequency boundaries will not be shown. Radio alerting areas, where required, will be small. 19 Manual of Airspace Planning Methodology for the Determination of Separation Minima, ICAO.

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APPENDIX 7

AUSTRALIAN GOVERNMENT

AVIATION SAFETY REGULATION REVIEW

EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

Australia has an excellent, high-capacity Regular Public Transport safety record and an advanced aviation regulatory system. However, there are opportunities for the system to be improved to ensure Australia remains a leading aviation state.

The Aviation Safety Regulation Review makes 37 recommendations for the Australian Government to consider.

Despite Australia’s good standing, the aviation industry is highly self-critical and regularly has a ‘take no prisoners’ approach to public discourse. While this critical introspection may contribute to its good record, it can at times be counter-productive to promoting rational public debate on aviation safety and to building a positive and collaborative national aviation safety culture.

The current relationship between industry and the regulator is cause for concern. In recent years, the regulator has adopted an across the board hard-line philosophy, which in the Panel’s view, is not appropriate for an advanced aviation nation such as Australia. As a result, relationships between industry and the Civil Aviation Safety Authority (CASA) have, in many cases, become adversarial.

Leading regulators across the world are moving to performance-based regulation, using a ‘trust and verify’ approach, collaborating with industry to produce better safety outcomes and ensuring the regulator stays in touch with rapidly advancing technology and safety practices. On occasions, individual operators may push the boundaries and require close regulatory oversight and a firm regulatory response. An effective risk- based regulator will judge when a hard line is necessary.

A number of countries with advanced aviation regulatory systems have developed collaborative relationships between their regulators and industry, leading to open sharing of safety data. Due to the present adversarial relationship between industry and CASA, Australia lacks the degree of trust required to achieve this important aim. Sharing safety data is a fundamental principle of good safety management.

The Panel concludes that CASA and industry need to build an effective collaborative relationship on a foundation of mutual trust and respect. Therefore, CASA needs to set a new strategic direction. The selection of a new Director of Aviation Safety should concentrate on finding an individual with leadership and change management abilities, rather than primarily aviation expertise. Other jurisdictions have appointed leaders without an aviation background, who have been successful in changing the strategic 110

direction of the safety regulator.

The CASA Board should exercise full governance over the organisation. The addition of two extra directors and filling of two upcoming vacancies provides an opportunity to ensure the CASA Board has an appropriate blend of skills including experienced practitioners from across the aviation industry. To help improve the industry – regulator relationship, the Panel recommends that CASA align its organisation with industry, re-establish small offices at major airports, adopt an industry exchange program, devolve medical renewals to DAMEs, and publish service KPIs.

The Panel also recommends a number of changes in regulatory oversight. The regulatory audit program should reflect international auditing standards, fully disclosing findings during an audit and at exit briefings. Findings should be graded on a scale of seriousness. The Panel also recommends that CASA make use of third party commercial audits as a means of supplementing its surveillance program.

Current appeals processes, while having a sound basis, can be improved. The Panel recommends that the CASA Industry Complaints Commissioner report to the CASA Board and be authorised to convene independent review panels on merits matters, chaired by a CASA non-executive director.

The Regulatory Reform Program has been ongoing for over two decades and has changed direction several times. This has led to widespread ‘reform fatigue’ within the industry. A speedy resolution to the current program is required, and a more manageable (but regular) process of periodic maintenance should be adopted. This maintenance should only change regulations when change is required to improve safety, or to ensure harmonisation with global best practice and the Standards and Recommended Practices of the International Civil Aviation Organization (ICAO). Australia should ensure that its unique regulatory requirements are minimised.

Industry is frustrated with many new Civil Aviation Safety Regulations, viewing them as overly legalistic, difficult to understand and focused on punitive outcomes. The situation has arisen from a combination of the move to a two-tier regulatory approach, policy decisions by the regulator, and government drafting requirements. The Panel recommends returning to a third tier of regulation, removing as much detail as possible from regulations, and using plain language standards in the third tier. A reduced number of high level offence and penalty provisions would remain in the regulations. The third tier of standards should be carefully drafted using small project groups of industry experts working with the regulator, separate from the day-to-day regulatory task.

The Australian Transport Safety Bureau (ATSB) has been heavily criticised in Australia for its report into the 2009 ditching of a Pel-Air Westwind off Norfolk Island1 . Canada’s Transportation Safety Board is completing a review of the ATSB and will report shortly. The Panel considers that the Pel-Air report was an aberration, and not typical of the high standard that the ATSB usually attains. The Panel recognises that the ATSB is putting measures in place to prevent a reoccurrence. To improve the ATSB’s

1 ATSB, Ditching – Israel Aircraft Industries Westwind 1124A, VH-NGA, AO-2009-072, August 2012 111

governance, the Panel recommends that an additional Commissioner be appointed, with extensive aviation experience.

ICAO requires that countries formulate a State Safety Program (SSP), which Australia has done. The Panel considers that Australia should develop the SSP as a strategic plan for the aviation safety system, under the leadership of the Aviation Policy Group. To implement this plan, the Department of Infrastructure and Regional Development should play a stronger policy role in the SSP, providing policy guidance while respecting the operational independence of CASA, the ATSB, and Airservices.

The Panel appreciates the significant level of interest, support and contribution from both the aviation community and government agencies.

LIST OF RECOMMENDATIONS

The Aviation Safety Regulation Review Panel recommends that:

1. The Australian Government develops the State Safety Program into a strategic plan for Australia’s aviation safety system, under the leadership of the Aviation Policy Group, and uses it as the foundation for rationalising and improving coordination mechanisms.

2. The Department of Infrastructure and Regional Development plays a stronger policy role in the State Safety Program.

3. The Australian Transport Safety Bureau investigates as many fatal accidents in the sport and recreational aviation sector as its resources will allow.

4. The Australian Transport Safety Bureau and the Civil Aviation Safety Authority utilise the provision in their bilateral Memorandum of Understanding to accredit CASA observers to ATSB investigations.

5. The Australian Government appoints an additional Australian Transport Safety Bureau Commissioner with aviation operational and safety management experience.

6. The Civil Aviation Safety Authority’s Board exercises full governance control. The non-executive directors should possess a range of appropriate skills and backgrounds in aviation, safety, management, risk, regulation, governance and government.

7. The next Director of Aviation Safety has leadership and management experience and capabilities in cultural change of large organisations. Aviation or other safety industry experience is highly desirable.

8. The Civil Aviation Safety Authority: a) Reinstates publication of Key Performance Indicators for service delivery functions b) Conducts a stakeholder survey every two years to measure the health of its relationship with industry c) Accepts regulatory authority applications online unless there is a valid 112

technical reason against it d) Adopts the same Code of Conduct and Values that apply to the Australian Public Service under the Public Service Act 1999.

9. The Civil Aviation Safety Authority develops a staff exchange program with industry.

10. Airservices Australia, in conjunction with the Department of Infrastructure and Regional Development and the Civil Aviation Safety Authority, reconsiders the policy on ‘Assessment of Priorities’ that stipulates that air traffic controllers sequence arriving aircraft based on category of operation, rather than on the accepted international practice of ‘first come, first served’.

11. The Australian Transport Safety Bureau and the Civil Aviation Safety Authority amend the wording of their existing Memorandum of Understanding to make it more definitive about interaction, coordination, and cooperation.

12. The Civil Aviation Safety Authority delegates responsibility for the day-to-day operational management of airspace to Airservices Australia, including the designation of air routes, shortterm designations of temporary Restricted Areas, and temporary changes to the classification of airspace for operational reasons. 13. The Department of Infrastructure and Regional Development and Department of Defence (and appropriate agencies) establish an agreed policy position on safety oversight of civil operations into joint user and military airports.

14. The Civil Aviation Safety Authority changes its regulatory philosophy and, together with industry, builds an effective collaborative relationship on a foundation of mutual understanding and respect.

15. The Civil Aviation Safety Authority continues to provide appropriate indemnity to all industry personnel with delegations of authority.

16. The Civil Aviation Safety Authority finalises its Capability Framework and overhauls its training program to ensure identified areas of need are addressed, including: a. communication in a regulatory context b. decision making and good regulatory practice c. auditing.

17. The Civil Aviation Safety Authority publishes and demonstrates the philosophy of ‘just culture’ whereby individuals involved in a reportable event are not punished for actions, omissions or decisions taken by them that are commensurate with their experience and training. However, actions of gross negligence, willful violations and destructive acts should not be tolerated.

18. The Civil Aviation Safety Authority reintroduces a ‘use of discretion’ procedure that gives operators or individuals the opportunity to discuss and, if necessary, remedy a perceived breach prior to CASA taking any formal action. This procedure is to be followed in all cases, except where CASA identifies a Serious and Imminent Risk to Air Safety.

19. The Australian Transport Safety Bureau transfers information from Mandatory 113

Occurrence Reports to the Civil Aviation Safety Authority, without redaction or de- identification.

20. The Australian Transport Safety Bureau transfers its safety education function to the Civil Aviation Safety Authority.

21. The Civil Aviation Safety Authority changes its organisational structure to a client- oriented output model.

22. The Civil Aviation Safety Authority establishes small offices at specific industry centres to improve monitoring, service quality, communications and collaborative relationships. 23. The Civil Aviation Safety Authority shares the risk assessment outputs of Sky Sentinel, its computerised risk assessment system, with the applicable authorisation holder.

24. The Civil Aviation Safety Authority provides full disclosure of audit findings at audit exit briefings in accordance with international best practice.

25. The Civil Aviation Safety Authority introduces grading of Non-Compliance Notices on a scale of seriousness.

26. The Civil Aviation Safety Authority assures consistency of audits across all regions, and delivers audit reports within an agreed timeframe.

27. The Civil Aviation Safety Authority implements a system of using third-party commercial audits as a supplementary tool to its surveillance system. 2 List of recommendations continued.

28. The Civil Aviation Safety Authority establishes a safety oversight risk management hierarchy based on a categorisation of operations. Rulemaking and surveillance priorities should be proportionate to the safety risk.

29. Recreational Aviation Administration Organisations, in coordination with the Civil Aviation Safety Authority, develop mechanisms to ensure all aircraft to be regulated under CASR Part 149 are registered.

30. The Civil Aviation Safety Authority changes the current two-tier regulatory framework (act and regulations) to a three-tier structure (act, regulations and standards), with:

a) regulations drafted in a high-level, succinct style, containing provisions for enabling standards and necessary legislative provisions, including offences b) The third-tier standards drafted in plain, easy to understand language.

31. The Civil Aviation Safety Authority structures all regulations not yet made with the threetier approach, and subsequently reviews all other Civil Aviation Safety Regulation Parts (in consultation with industry) to determine if they should be remade using the three-tier structure.

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32. The Civil Aviation Safety Authority reassesses the penalties in the Civil Aviation Safety Regulations.

33. The Civil Aviation Safety Authority applies a project management approach to the completion of all Civil Aviation Safety Regulation Parts not yet in force, with drafting to be completed within one year and consultation completed one year later, with: a. a Steering Committee and a Project Team with both CASA and industry representatives b. implementation dates established through formal industry consultation.

34. The Civil Aviation Safety Authority’s Director of Aviation Safety meet with industry sector leaders to jointly develop a plan for renewing a collaborative and effective Standards Consultative Committee.

35. The Civil Aviation Safety Authority devolve to Designated Aviation Medical Examiners the ability to renew aviation medical certificates (for Classes 1, 2, and 3) where the applicant meets the required standard at the time of the medical examination.

36. The Australian Government amends regulations so that background checks and the requirement to hold an Aviation Security Identification Card are only required for unescorted access to Security Restricted Areas, not for general airside access. This approach would align with international practice.

37. The Civil Aviation Safety Authority amends the current Terms of Reference of the Industry Complaints Commissioner so that:

a) the ICC reports directly to the CASA Board b) no CASA staff are excluded from the ICC’s jurisdiction c) the ICC will receive complaints that relate to both the merits and the process of matters d) on merits matters, including aviation medical matters, the ICC is empowered to convene an appropriately constituted review panel, chaired by a CASA non- executive director, to review the decision e) While all ICC findings are non-binding recommendations, the original decision- maker is required to give reasons to the CASA Board if a recommendation is not followed.

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APPENDIX 8 AIRPORT MOVEMENT DATA

116

GENERAL AVIATION STATISTICS

140.0

120.0

Private 100.0 Business Training Private + U/L

80.0

60.0 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013

117

APPENDIX 9

118

119