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Chapter 40 Oversight and the National Intelligence Community Comprehensive Review of the Legal Framework of the National Intelligence Community Volume 3 of 4: Information, Technology, Powers and Oversight December 2019 Volume 3 Copyright Statement © Commonwealth of Australia 2020 ISBN: 978-1-921091-55-1 (Print) ISBN: 978-1-921091-56-8 (Online) With the exception of the Commonwealth Coat of Arms, this work is licensed under a Creative Commons Attribution 4.0 International licence (CC BY 4.0) (https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/). Attribution This publication should be attributed as follows: Comprehensive Review of the Legal Framework of the National Intelligence Community by Mr Dennis Richardson AC Use of the Coat of Arms The terms under which the Coat of Arms can be used are detailed on the following website: https://pmc.gov.au/cca Other uses Enquiries regarding this document are welcome at: Attorney-General’s Department 3–5 National Circuit BARTON ACT 2600 Telephone: 02 6141 6666 Page 2 Volume 3 Table of contents—Volume 3 Table of contents—Volume 3 Table of contents—all volumes ........................................................................................ 6 Table of recommendations—Volume 3 ............................................................................ 8 Acronyms and abbreviations .......................................................................................... 15 Chapter 33 Information sharing ...................................................................................... 21 Current information sharing frameworks ........................................................................ 21 The complexity of information sharing frameworks ........................................................ 30 Alternative legal frameworks for information sharing ...................................................... 45 Specific information sharing issues ................................................................................ 49 Chapter 34 Reference information ................................................................................. 57 Introduction .................................................................................................................... 57 What is ‘reference information’? ..................................................................................... 57 Why agencies require reference information .................................................................. 61 Regulating access to reference data for intelligence purposes ...................................... 64 Do National Intelligence Community agencies have the legal authority to collect, retain and use reference information, where necessary? ......................................................... 69 Are existing limits, controls and safeguards adequate? ................................................. 71 Chapter 35 Secrecy.......................................................................................................... 88 What is a secrecy provision? .......................................................................................... 88 Key principles ................................................................................................................. 89 Legislative frameworks ................................................................................................... 92 Overview of stakeholder views ....................................................................................... 97 Secrecy offences for the protection of identities ........................................................... 101 Consolidating secrecy offences in the Intelligence Services Act .................................. 112 Public interest disclosure exceptions to secrecy offences ............................................ 117 Inspector-General of Intelligence and Security exceptions to secrecy offences ........... 132 Page 3 Table of contents—Volume 3 Volume 3 Chapter 36 Cyber security ............................................................................................ 136 The current cyber security environment ....................................................................... 140 Australia’s current cyber security arrangements .......................................................... 145 Offensive cyber capabilities to disrupt cyber security incidents inside Australia ........... 161 Power to direct industry in relation to cyber security incidents ..................................... 166 Chapter 37 Artificial intelligence .................................................................................. 169 Definitions and overview of the current state of the technology ................................... 172 Australia’s current legal framework .............................................................................. 175 International approaches .............................................................................................. 178 The potential intelligence benefits of artificial intelligence ............................................ 181 Managing the risks inherent to the use of artificial intelligence, in an intelligence context .......................................................................................................................... 187 Chapter 38 Threat reduction and disruption ............................................................... 207 Principles ...................................................................................................................... 207 The threat environment ................................................................................................ 208 Definitional issues ........................................................................................................ 210 What can agencies already do? ................................................................................... 211 International comparisons ............................................................................................ 214 Legislated threat reduction functions ............................................................................ 215 Responding to online criminal activity .......................................................................... 216 Chapter 39 Australian Criminal Intelligence Commission—specific issues ............ 222 A covert or delayed notification search power .............................................................. 222 Coercive examinations offshore ................................................................................... 228 Power to request information from the private sector ................................................... 232 Extended notice to produce .......................................................................................... 234 Chapter 40 Oversight and the National Intelligence Community .............................. 236 Defining ‘oversight’ ....................................................................................................... 237 History of oversight arrangements in Australia ............................................................. 238 Page 4 Volume 3 Table of contents—Volume 3 Oversight agencies ....................................................................................................... 240 Parliamentary committee oversight .............................................................................. 245 International comparisons ............................................................................................ 247 Principles of effective oversight .................................................................................... 254 Is Australia’s oversight system effective? ..................................................................... 256 Jurisdiction of oversight bodies .................................................................................... 258 Oversight by design ...................................................................................................... 264 Chapter 41 Oversight: Independent oversight bodies................................................ 272 The Inspector-General of Intelligence and Security ..................................................... 272 The Independent National Security Legislation Monitor ............................................... 290 The Independent Reviewer of Adverse Security Assessments .................................... 294 Chapter 42 Oversight: Parliamentary committees ...................................................... 297 Parliamentary Joint Committee on Intelligence and Security operational oversight ..... 299 Committee membership ............................................................................................... 315 The Inspector-General of Intelligence and Security’s reporting requirements .............. 317 Review of privacy rules ................................................................................................ 318 Page 5 Table of contents—all volumes Volume 3 Table of contents—all volumes Volume 1: Recommendations and Executive Summary; Foundations and Principles; Control, Coordination and Cooperation Chapter 1 Foreword Chapter 2 Methodology Chapter 3 Executive summary Chapter 4 List of recommendations Chapter 5 Why a Review? Chapter 6 Intelligence legislation in Australia Chapter 7 Foundational principles Chapter 8 Foreign and security intelligence Chapter 9 Onshore and offshore operations Chapter 10 Australian and non-Australian Chapter 11 Collection, assessment and open source Chapter 12 Security
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