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TEMARAPPORT 2017-03-15, version 1.0 Syriens minoriteter Del 1: Alawiter 27 - 04 - L04 2016 L04 Lifos Temarapport: Syriens minoriteter, del 1: Alawiter Om rapporten Denna rapport är skriven i enlighet med EU:s allmänna riktlinjer för framtagande av landinformation (2008). Den är en opartisk presentation av tillförlitlig och relevant landinformation avsedd för handläggning av migrationsärenden. Rapporten bygger på noggrant utvalda informationskällor. Alla källor refereras med undantag för beskrivningar av allmänna förhållanden, vilket i så fall anges. För att få en så fullständig bild som möjligt bör rapporten inte användas exklusivt som underlag i samband med avgörandet av ett enskilt ärende utan tillsammans med andra källor. Informationen i rapporten återspeglar inte Migrationsverkets officiella ståndpunkt i en viss fråga och Lifos har ingen avsikt att genom rapporten göra politiska eller rättsliga ställningstaganden. Temarapport: Syriens minoriteter, del 1: alawiter 2017-03-15, version 1.0 Lifos – Center för landinformation och landanalys inom migrationsområdet © Migrationsverket (Swedish Migration Agency), 2017 Publikationen kan laddas ner från http://lifos.migrationsverket.se 2017-03-15, version 1.0 2 (31) Innehåll English summary ............................................................................................ 4 1. Introduktion ............................................................................................ 4 2. Ursprung och trosföreställningar............................................................ 5 2.1. De shiitiska imamerna ..................................................................... 5 2.2. Ursprunget till den alawitiska förgreningen .................................... 6 2.3. Centrala teologiska element ............................................................ 6 2.4. Förhållandet till islam ...................................................................... 7 3. Relationen till makten ............................................................................ 9 3.1. Modern historia ............................................................................... 9 3.2. Samtida dominans av maktstrukturerna ........................................ 10 4. Geografisk utbredning .......................................................................... 10 5. Intern organisation/differentiering: klansystemet ................................ 12 6. Alawiterna och den syriska konflikten ................................................. 14 6.1. Politisk positionering ..................................................................... 14 6.1.1. Regimkritiska tendenser ......................................................... 14 6.1.2. Tilltagande rädsla och uppslutning bakom regimen .............. 15 6.2. Utsatthetsperspektivet ................................................................... 17 6.2.1. Rapporterad anti-alawitisk retorik ......................................... 17 6.2.2. Rapporter om attacker med sekteristiska förtecken ............... 18 6.3. Förövarperspektivet ....................................................................... 21 6.3.1. Armé och säkerhetsapparat .................................................... 21 6.3.2. Regimlojala miliser ................................................................ 22 7. Källförteckning .................................................................................... 25 Lifos Temarapport: Syriens minoriteter, del 1: Alawiter English summary The present report first outlines – whilst taking due note of the risks of overstated generalizations – the historic background and theological outlook of the Alawi community, specifically its changing relation to mainstream (shia) islam. Subsequent sections consider the community’s internal organization (clan structure) and its domination of state structures. The final chapter describes the situation of Syria’s Alawites in the current armed conflict, both in terms of participation/responsibility and vulnerability. 1. Introduktion Föreliggande rapport beskriver den alawitiska minoriteten i Syrien utifrån ett antal perspektiv – centrala trosföreställningar och relation till (shiitisk) islam; klanstruktur; inflytande över statsapparaten och belägenhet i samband med nuvarande konflikt. Rapportens utgångspunkt och fokus – en viss grupps etniska eller religiösa identitet – medför ett antal risker att förhålla sig till. Gruppens homogenitet riskerar exempelvis att överskattas, liksom identitetens stabilitet över tid.1 Självuppfattad och tillskriven identitet riskerar att sammanblandas, och man riskerar att framhäva en viss identitet på bekostnad av andra (klass, kön osv.).2 Det finns även en risk att i grunden politiska fenomen beskrivs som ”sekteristiska” och/eller ”etniska” – och att man därigenom ytterst bidrar till de stereotyper som konflikten delvis bygger på.3 Genom medvetenhet om dessa risker kan de emellertid reduceras, och vägas upp av behovet att också beskriva, i generella ordalag, den alawitiska gruppens bakgrund och situation. 1 “Alawi identity is not static and contemporary events affect how it is constructed. This is the case in the role of the regime and its policies towards Alawis and Sunnis, but also contemporary events in Syria and the wider region either weaken or exacerbate [identity] issues”, Torstein Schiøtz Worren, Fear and Resistance. The Construction of Alawi Identity in Syria, University of Oslo, februari 2007, s. 82, länk 2 “Syrians, like most people, have multiple layers of identities. That some at times are motivated by sect, others by nation, and some by region, ideology, tribe and class should therefore not surprise us, but the varying degrees of sectarianism perhaps reflect the particularly fuzzy nature of Syria’s identity development.”, Christopher Phillips, “Sectarianism and Conflict in Syria”, Third World Quarterly, vol. 36, nr. 2, mars 2015 3 “The demonization to which the Alawites are subjected in the war in Syria takes pernicious forms. For instance, it is not rare to find very serious Western publications commenting the war in Syria from the angle of a Sunni/Alawite conflict while the Syrian conflict is essentially political, ideological, geo-strategic /…/ Accusing the Alawites of being at war against the Sunnis and vice-versa reinforces distrust between these two communities.”, UNHRC, Written statement submitted by the International Federation for the Protection of the Rights of Ethnic, Religious, Linguistic & Other Minorities, a non- governmental organization on the roster, A/HRC/30/NGO/33, 2015-09-03, s. 2f, länk; Elizabeth Shakman Hurd, The Dangerous Illusion of an Alawite Regime, The Boston Review, 2013-06-11, länk; Aziz Nakkash, The Alawite Dilemma in Homs. Survival, Solidarity and the Making of a Community, Friedrich Ebert Stiftung, mars 2013, s. 1, länk 2017-03-15, version 1.0 4 (31) Lifos Temarapport: Syriens minoriteter, del 1: Alawiter Med dessa förbehåll i minnet kan inledningsvis konstateras att Syriens alawiter bedöms utgöra en dryg tiondel av landets befolkning, och är därmed dess största minoritet. Termen ”alawit” kan åsyfta såväl en etnisk, kulturell identitet som en religiös inriktning m.m.4, men i denna rapport avses en sammantagen etnisk-religiös (”sekteristisk”) identitet. Språkligt och kulturellt uppfattar sig, och uppfattas, alawiterna som araber. Utifrån sina trosföreställningar brukar gruppen beskrivas som heterodox, eklektisk och esoterisk, med vilket menas att man avvikit från en dominerande, etablerad religiös doktrin, att man lånar drag från olika trosinriktningar och att läran är hemlig/fördold, dvs. reserverad för de initierade. Den alawitiska identiteten har dock även en tydlig politisk dimension utöver den kulturella. Denna minoritets starka inflytande inom statsapparaten i modern tid – inte minst inom armé, säkerhetstjänst och milisväsende – aktualiserar naturligtvis ansvarsfrågan, men också frågan om utsatthet eftersom alawiterna som grupp uppfattas som lojal med regimen och således associeras med (och riskerar repressalier för) dess våld.5 2. Ursprung och trosföreställningar 2.1. De shiitiska imamerna6 För att beskriva alawiternas historia och tro behöver man först säga ett par ord om shiitisk islam, inom vilken Ali – profet Muhammads kusin och fosterbror – intar en central roll. Enligt den shiitiska uppfattningen var Ali avsedd att föra islam vidare efter profetens död (till skillnad från sunniter som ser Abu Bakr som Muhammads rättmätige efterföljare som ledare för muslimerna). Därmed betraktas Ali som den förste i raden av ett förbestämt antal imamer. När Ali mördades övergick denna roll enligt shiitisk teologi till hans son Hasan, och efter Hasan till dennes bror Husayn. Husayn dog martyrdöden i samband med slaget i Karbala, varefter dennes son Zayn al- Abidin axlade rollen. Tvister kopplade till successionen av imamer har emellertid gett upphov till olika shiitiska grupperingar. De så kallade zayditerna (som idag främst återfinns i Jemen) tar fasta på den fjärde kalifens son, Zayn ibn Ali, som de alltså betraktar som den rättmätige femte – och sista – imamen (varför de också kallas ”femshia”). En annan grupp utgörs av ismailiterna, som anser att Ismail ibn Ja’far utgör den sjunde imamen, varför de även kallas ”sjushia”. Ismailiterna har i sin tur indelats i olika inriktningar, däribland nizariter och druser. Den klart största gruppen shiitier (dominerande i Iran, Irak m. m.) är imamiterna, eller ”tolvshia” 4 “The term ‘Alawi’ [may] refer not simply to an ethnic identity or a religious ideology, but
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    INSTITUT KURDDE PARIS E Bulletin de liaison et d’information N°406 JANVIER 2019 La publication de ce Bulletin bénéficie de subventions des Ministères français des Affaires étrangères et de la Culture ————— Ce bulletin paraît en français et anglais Prix au numéro : France: 6 € — Etranger : 7,5 € Abonnement annuel (12 numéros) France : 60 € — Etranger : 75 € Périodique mensuel Directeur de la publication : Mohamad HASSAN Maquette et mise en page : Şerefettin ISBN 0761 1285 Bulletin de liaison et d’information de l’Institut kurde de Paris N° 406 janvier 2019 • ROJAVA: LA TURQUIE MENACE D’OCCUPER TOUT LE NORD SYRIEN, LES FDS AVANCENT ENCORE CONTRE DAECH • TURQUIE: LIBÉRÉE, LEYLA GÜVEN POURSUIT SON JEÛNE; ALLIANCE ÉLECTORALE ENTRE PARTIS KURDES; PROTESTATIONS CONTRE LES FRAPPES TURQUES AU KURDISTAN IRAKIEN • IRAK: ACCORD BAGDAD-ERBIL ENFIN TROUVÉ SUR LE BUDGET, TENSIONS AUTOUR DU DRAPEAU KURDE À KIRKOUK • IRAN: L’UNION EUROPÉENNE SANCTIONNE L’IRAN APRÈS DES ASSASSINATS D’OPPOSANTS ET DES TENTATIVES D’ATTENTATS EN EUROPE ROJAVA: LA TURQUIE MENACE D’OCCUPER TOUT LE NORD SYRIEN, LES FDS AVANCENT ENCORE CONTRE DAECH ’annonce le 19 décembre Dans cette situation de menace ser totalement les résidents kurdes par le président améri- existentielle, les combattants des originels pour s’approprier tous cain du retrait de ses FDS ont pourtant courageusement leurs biens. Craignant les réactions troupes de Syrie a provo- poursuivi leur traque des djiha- internationales, la Turquie a rejeté L qué des consultations distes de Daech, réduisant encore la demande, mais de nombreux diplomatiques tous azimuths leur territoire. témoignages diffusés notamment impliquant toutes les parties sur Kurdistan 24 montrent que le concernées, membres de la coali- La Turquie prétend maintenant nettoyage ethnique est déjà en tion anti-Daech, Turcs, Russes, et occuper tout le nord syrien, de cours.