Avneri V. the Knesset
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HCJ 5239/11 HCJ 5392/11 HCJ 5549/11 HCJ 2072/12 Petitioners in HCJ 5239/11: 1. Uri Avneri 2. Gush Shalom Petitioners in HCJ 5392/11 1. Adi Barkai, Adv. 2. Iris Yaron Unger, Adv. 3. Anat Yariv 4. Dr. Adia Barkai 5. Dana Shani 6. Miriam Bialer Petitioners in HCJ 5549/11 1. Arab Movement for Renewal – Ta’al 2. MK Dr. Ahmed Tibi Petitioners in HCJ 20172/12 1. Coalition of Women for Peace 2. Supreme Monitoring Committee for Arab Affairs 3. Jerusalem Legal Aid and Human Rights Center 4. Association for Civil Rights in Israel 5. Public Council against Torture 6. Hamoked: Center for the Defence of the Individual 7. Religious Action Center of Reform Judaism 8. Yesh Din – Volunteers for Human Rights 9. Adalah – The Legal Center for Arab Minority Rights in Israel v. Respondents in HCJ 5239/11 1. Knesset 2. Speaker of the Knesset Respondents in HCJ 5392/11 1. Knesset 2. Speaker of the Knesset 3. Minister of Finance 4. Attorney General Respondent in HCJ 5549/11 Knesset Respondents in HCJ/2072/12 1. Knesset 2. Minister of Finance 3. Minister of Justice Requester to join: Legal Forum for Israel Attorneys for the Petitioners in HCJ 5239/11: Gabi Laski, Adv; Neri Ramati, Adv. Attorneys for the Petitioners in HCJ 5392/11: Adi Barkai, Adv.; Iris Yaron-Unger, Adv. Attorneys for the Petitioners in HCJ 5549/11: Osama Saadi, Adv.; Amer Yassin, Adv. Attorneys for the Petitioners in HCJ 2072/12: Hassan Jabarin, Adv.; Sawsan Zaher, Adv.; Dan Yakir, Adv. Attorneys for Respondents in HCJ 5239/11, Respondents 1-2 in HCJ 5392/11, Respondent in HCJ 5549/11, and Respondent 1 in HCJ 2072/12: Eyal Yinon, Adv.; Gur Bligh, Adv. Attorneys for Respondents 3-4 in HCJ 5392/11 and Respondents 2-3 in HCJ 2072/12: Yochi Genesin , Adv.; Uri Kedar, Adv.; Avishai Kraus, Adv. Attorneys for the Requester to join: Avi Har-Zahav, Adv.; Yifat Segal, Adv.; Tomer Meir Yisrael, Adv. The Supreme Court sitting as High Court of Justice Before: President Emeritus A. Grunis, President M. Naor, Deputy President. E. Rubinstein, Justice S. Joubran, Justice H. Melcer, Justice Y. Danziger, Justice N. Hendel, Justice U. Vogelman, Justice I. Amit Responses to an Order Nisi Facts: The petitions sought to void the Prevention of Harm to the State of Israel by means of Boycott Law, 5711-2011 (hereinafter: the Boycott Law or the Law). The Law attributes tortious liability and establishes various administrative restrictions against anyone who knowingly publishes a public call to impose a boycott on the State of Israel, as defined by the Law. The Petitioners argued that the Law was unconstitutional for infringing various constitutional rights (inter alia, freedom of expression, the right to equality, freedom of occupation), without meeting the conditions of the “Limitation Clauses” of Basic Law: Human Dignity and Liberty, and Basic Law: Freedom of Occupation. The High Court of Justice, in an expanded bench of nine justices, held: The Court unanimously decided to void sec. 2(c) of the Prevention of Harm to the State of Israel by means of Boycott Law, 5711-2011, and to deny the petitions in regard to secs. 3 and 4 of the Law. Additionally, the majority (per Melcer J., Grunis P., Naor P., Rubinstein D.P., and Amit J. concurring) denied the petitions in regard to secs. 2(a) and 2(b) of the Law, against the dissenting opinion of Danziger J., Joubran J. concurring, and the separate dissents of Hendel J. and Vogelman J. Justice Melcer: From the language of the Law, we learn that anyone who knowingly publishes a call for the imposition of a boycott against the State of Israel, as defined by the Law, may be deemed to have committed a tort. Moreover, the participation of such a person, or one who has committed to participate in such a boycott, may be restricted, and it is possible that such a person may be prevented from receiving various financial benefits (governmental grants, tax exemptions, state guarantees, etc.). Thus, most of the sanctions imposed by the Law already apply at the speech stage. Therefore, the Boycott Law indeed infringes freedom of expression and is repugnant to the constitutional right to human dignity. However, in the opinion of Justice Melcer, we are not concerned here with an infringement of the core of freedom of expression, even where political speech is concerned, inasmuch as the infringement is relatively limited, and applies only to a call for a boycott against the State of Israel, as defined by the Law, or anyone who commits to participate in such a boycott, which is a legal act that exceeds speech. However, that constitutional right, like all other constitutional rights in Israel, is not absolute, but rather relative, and may be restricted if the infringement meets the requirements of the “Limitation Clause” in sec. 8 of Basic Law: Human Dignity and Liberty. As is well known, the Limitation Clause comprises four cumulative tests: the infringement of the constitutional right must be made by a law or by virtue of a law; it must befit the values of the State of Israel as a Jewish and democratic state; it must serve a proper purpose; and it may only infringe the right to an extent no greater than is required. The last condition comprises three subtests, which are: the rational connection test, the least harmful means test, and the proportionality “stricto sensu” test. For the purpose of this examination, Justice Melcer also made recourse to comparative law. There is no dispute that the first condition is met. As for the remaining conditions, Justice Melcer was of the opinion that the provisions of the Law that are intended to prevent harm to the State of Israel by means of an economic, cultural, or academic boycott of a person or any other entity, merely due to its connection to the State of Israel, one of its institutions, or an area under its control, fall under the doctrine of “defensive democracy”, and promote protection of the state and its institutions, as well as equality and personal liberty, and the Law, therefore, is intended for a proper purpose that befits the values of the State of Israel as a Jewish and democratic state. Justice Melcer was also of the opinion that “calls for a boycott against the State of Israel, as defined by the Law, do not serve the classical purpose of freedom of expression”. This view is based upon Justice Melcer’s distinction between speech intended to “persuade” and speech employed as a “means of coercion”. In his opinion, a call for a boycott is a form of coercive expression, and therefore, it is entitled to less protection that that afforded to other types of political speech. However, in the context of examining the fourth condition – proportionality – and in accordance with a narrow interpretive approach, Justice Melcer concluded that whereas secs. 2(a), 2(b), 3 and 4 of the Law meet the conditions of the proportionality test, sec. 2(c) of the Law does not meet the demands of the least harmful means test. In this context, Justice Melcer referred to the chilling-effect doctrine, which addresses a deterrent effect that extends beyond the scope of expression intended by the legislature, and proposed limiting this chilling effect by means of narrow construction that would somewhat restrict the bounds of the tort under sec. 2(a) of the Law. Justice Melcer therefore recommended that the realization of the “boycott tort” be contingent upon the existence of damage, and a causal connection between the tortious conduct and the damage. However, a potential causal connection would not suffice. Rather, there must be awareness of the reasonable possibility that the call and the circumstances of its publication would lead to the imposition of a boycott, and the right to bring suit must be reserved only to the direct victim of the tort. By accepting this interpretive approach, sec. 2(b) of the Law would also be constitutional. Pursuant to that, it was further held, inter alia, that a person seeking damages under sec. 2(b) of the Law would have to prove not only the element of a call for a boycott, but also the following elements: causation as defined in sec. 62(a) of the Civil Wrongs Ordinance, breach, a causal connection between the boycott and the breach, a mental element of awareness, and monetary loss. On the other hand, as far as sec. 2(c), concerning damages not contingent upon damage (that might be categorized as “punitive damages”) and which are not capped by any ceiling in this regard, Justice Melcer was of the opinion that this section did not meet the second test of the least harmful means test, and must be voided. Thus, in accordance with this approach, even if a person calling for a boycott be found liable in tort, the damages that would be imposed upon him would not exceed the harm that he actually caused. In regard to secs. 3 and 4 of the Law, Justice Melcer was of the opinion that the administrative sanctions – preventing participation in tenders and restricting the possibility of obtaining public benefits – constitute merely “second order” infringements of freedom of expression. Accordingly, these are proportionate sanctions in view of the procedures required for the approval of the restrictions, and in view of the state’s right to withhold benefits from anyone who employs them against the state. He does not distinguish, in this regard, between a boycott against the state and a boycott against the Area.