Frame Resonance and Failure in the Thai Red Shirts and Yellow Shirts Movements

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Frame Resonance and Failure in the Thai Red Shirts and Yellow Shirts Movements Frame Resonance and Failure in the Thai Red Shirts and Yellow Shirts Movements A dissertation submitted in partial fulfillment of the requirements for the degree of Doctor of Philosophy at George Mason University By Michael Volpe Master of Arts George Mason University, 2003 Bachelor of Science University of Maryland, University College, 2000 Director: Jack A. Goldstone, Professor School of School of Policy, Government, and International Affairs Summer Semester 2015 George Mason University Fairfax, VA [Copyright Michael Volpe, 2015] ii DEDICATION This dissertation is dedicated to my loving wife Panintorn Prakij, and to my parents John Volpe and Jacqueline Smollar. iii ACKNOLWLEDGEMENTS I would like to thank my wife Panintorn Prakij for making such an enormous sacrifice and for being so patient with me for the roughly ten years since I embarked on this journey. I would like to thank my mother and father Jackie and John for their support and encouragement, and for always pushing me to finish. Finally, I would like to thank my Dissertation Chair Jack Goldstone and committee members Janine Wedel and Agnieszka Paczynska, as well as my external reader Michael Nelson for their useful feedback and ongoing support. iv TABLE OF CONTENTS List of Tables ............................................................................................................. viii List of Figures ............................................................................................................. ix Abstract……………………………………………………………………………………...xi Chapter 1 Introduction ............................................................................................... 1 Chapter 2 Literature Review ...................................................................................... 8 2.1 Collective Action Framing 8 2.2 Frame Resonance 12 2.3 Frame Failure 20 2.4 Cultural Opportunity Structures 22 2.5 Political Opportunity Structures 24 2.6 Combining the POS and Framing Perspectives 25 2.7 Gaps and Issues in the Literature 27 Chapter 3 Methodology ........................................................................................... 29 3.1 Hypothesis 29 3.2 Definitions and Operationalization 30 3.3 Understanding the Roles of Structure and Agency in Red and Yellow Shirt Movement Emergence and Evolution 34 3.4 Frame Identification, Communication and Trends 35 3.5 Framing and Mobilization in the Red Shirts Movement 39 3.6 Triangulating Frame Resonance and Failure 43 Chapter 4 Contemporary Thai Politics and Democratic Transition .................... 44 v 4.1 Thailand’s Political Development (pre-Thaksin) 45 4.2 The Thaksin Era 70 4.3 Recipe for a Coup 77 Chapter 5 Post-Thaksin Thailand: An analysis of competing collective action frames of the 2006 coup and transition .................................................................. 88 5.1 The Coup 89 5.1.1 Step Back Coup 93 5.1.2 The Good Coup 97 5.2 The Evil Coup 112 5.3 Double Standard 118 5.4 No Interest in Democracy 119 5.5 Poor Draft Charter 121 5.6 Evil Thaksin 122 5.7 Thaksin System Frame 134 5.8 Building the Dream Society 141 5.9 Contest to Frame the Interim Government and CNS 149 5.10 Framing the New Constitution 158 5.11 Framing the Red Shirts Movement 167 5.12 Frame Analysis and Post-Coup Transition 174 Chapter 6 The Flow of Events ................................................................................ 183 6.1 A Look Back at the Military Coup Government 183 6.2 2008 - 2009: Political Upheaval 185 6.3 Culture Shift 189 6.4 Fall of the PPP and Rise of the Democrat Party 193 6.5 2010: Rachaprasong 196 6.6 Conclusion 201 Chapter 7 Red Shirts Movement, Collective Action Frames and the 2011 Election ................................................................................................................. 204 7.1 Evolution of Red Shirt Framing Efforts in Mahaprachachon 206 7.2 Framing the Abhisit Government 212 7.3 Framing the Battle Lines: The Inequality Frame 215 vi 7.4 Double Standard Frame 223 7.5 Thailand as Middle East/North Africa Dictatorship (MENA) Frame 225 7.6 Everything Gets More Expensive Frame 231 7.7 Only Good in Speaking Frame 233 Chapter 8. Analysis of Frame Resonance and Failure ....................................... 235 8.1 Analysis 238 8.1.1 Post Coup 2006-2007 241 8.2.2 PAD Mobilization, Judicial Coup and Rachaprasong 266 8.2.3 Post-Rachaprasong to the 2011 Election 281 Chapter 9 Conclusion ............................................................................................ 288 9.1 Frame Failure 288 9.2 Frame Resonance 293 Chapter 10 Post Script: Framing and the 2013-2014 Political Crisis ................ 297 Appendix: Codebook and Coding Sheet .............................................................. 303 Section 1 Sources 303 Section 2 Definitions 303 Section 3 Coding Procedure 304 Section 4 Coding Categories 305 Section 5 Coding Terms and Labels 310 Section 6: Coding Sheet 311 Bibliography ............................................................................................................. 312 vii LIST OF TABLES Table 7.2-2. Attacks Focused on the Thai Government. ............................................. 215 Table 8.1.1.-1. Evidence of failure of Evil Thaksin Frame. ......................................... 244 Table 8.1.1-3. Evidence of failure of Thaksin System Frame. ................................... 251 Table 8.1.1-4. Evidence of failure of Moral & Ethical Leadership Frame. ............... 256 Table 8.1.1.-5. Evidence of failure of Thaksin Come Home Frame. ......................... 259 Table 8.1.1-6. Evidence of success of Dictatorship and Return to Democracy Frames. ........................................................................................................................... 265 Table 8.2.2-2. Evidence of success of the Double Standard Frame. .......................... 280 Table 8.2.3-2. Evidence of success of Dictatorship and Return to Democracy Frames. ........................................................................................................................... 286 Table 9.1-1. Details about Frames that Failed to Resonate Widely. ......................... 288 Table 9.2-1. Details about Frames that Resonated. ...................................................... 293 viii LIST OF FIGURES Figure 3.2-1. Two Camps in the Recent Social and Political Conflict ........................ 33 Figure 4.1-1. Thailand’s GDP from 1992 until 2001. ...................................................... 58 Figure 4.1-2. GDP in North and Northeast Thailand.. .................................................. 63 Figure 5.1-1. Trajectory of Coup Frames by Frequency of Mention ........................... 93 Figure 5.1.1-1. The Step Back Frame ................................................................................. 94 Figure 5.1.2-1. Cognitive Structure of the Good Coup Frame. ..................................... 98 Figure 5.1.2-2. Government Supporter Discourses Referenced................................... 99 Figure 5.1.2-3. Government Supporter Discourses Referenced................................. 103 Figure 5.1.2-4. The Thaksin discourse ............................................................................ 111 Figure 5.2-1. Evil Coup Frame. ......................................................................................... 113 Figure 5.6-1. Evil Thaksin Frame. .................................................................................... 123 Figure 5.6-2. Corruption Statistics.. ................................................................................. 132 Figure 5.6-3. Media and Criticism of Thaksin. ............................................................. 133 Figure 5.7-1. Frames of Thaksin focused on the system of government. ................. 136 Figure 5.7-2. Thaksin System Frame. .............................................................................. 137 Figure 5.7-3. Thaksin System Frame Trajectory. .......................................................... 140 Figure 5.8-1. Moral and Ethical Leadership Frame. ..................................................... 143 Figure 5.8-2. The Moral and Ethical Leadership Frame .............................................. 143 Figure 5.9-1. Trajectory of Frames of the Interim Government and CNS ............... 150 Figure 5.9-2. Inept Administration Frame.. ................................................................... 152 Figure 5.9-3. Dictatorship Frame. .................................................................................... 155 Figure 5.10-1. Frames of the New Constitution.. .......................................................... 159 Figure 5.10-2. Undemocratic Charter Frame. ................................................................. 161 Figure 5.10-3. Frame Trajectory in Bangkok Post and Khaosod.. .............................. 164 ix Figure 5.10-4. Components of the Moral Thai Charter Frame. .................................. 165 Figure 5.11-1. Framing the Red Shirt Movement. ........................................................ 168 Figure 5.11-2. Pro-democracy and Thaksin Hired Thugs Frames. ............................ 169 Figure 5.12-1. Findings from a Gallup Poll ................................................................... 177 Figure 5.12-2. The Popularity of the Interim Government ......................................... 178 Figure 5.12-3. Referendum vote by region. ................................................................... 180 Figure 7-1. Major Diagnostic
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