Revised version forthcoming in The World Economy Canada’s Antidumping and Safeguard Policies: Overt and Subtle Forms of Discrimination Chad P. Bown† Brandeis University & The Brookings Institution This Draft: February 2007 (Original draft: April 2005) Abstract Like many countries in the international trading system, Canada repeatedly faces political pressure from industries seeking protection from import competition. I examine Canadian policymakers’ response to this pressure within the economic environment created by its participation in discriminatory trade agreements such as the North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA). In particular, I exploit new sources of data on Canada’s use of potentially WTO-consistent import-restricting policies such as antidumping, global safeguards, and a China-specific safeguard. I illustrate subtle ways in which Canadian policymakers may be structuring the application of such policies so as to reinforce the discrimination inherent in Canada’s external trade policy because of the preferences granted to the United States and Mexico through NAFTA. JEL No. F13 Keywords: Canada, trade policy, antidumping, safeguards, MFN, WTO † Correspondence: Department of Economics and International Business School, MS 021, Brandeis University, PO Box 549110, Waltham, MA, 02454-9110 USA. tel: 781-736-4823, fax: 781-736-2269, email:
[email protected], web: http://www.brandeis.edu/~cbown/. I gratefully acknowledge financial support from the Centre for International Governance Innovation. I thank Rachel McCulloch for comments