Groups as Pluralities

John Horden and Dan López de Sa (Social Ontology 2020) 1. The Plural View of Groups

• Singularism: each social group is a single thing • The plural view of groups: each social group is identical to its members • In other words, each social group is identical to the plurality of its members • Previously defended by Black (1971), López de Sa (2007), and Korman (2015) • Here we aim to give the plural view a more thorough defence 1. The Plural View of Groups

• It’s not that there’s one thing, the U.S. Supreme Court, that the nine justices are identical to • Rather the Supreme Court isn’t a thing at all. It’s some things. More specifically, it’s those nine people • Accordingly, “the U.S. Supreme Court” is a disguised plural • Compare pluralia tantum like “trousers”, “sunglasses” and “scissors” • Meanwhile, syntactically plural group terms, like “the Supremes”, are undisguised plurals 2. The Objection from Changes in Membership

• Objection: unlike pluralities, social groups vary in membership over time and between possible worlds • E.g. Ruth Bader Ginsburg is currently a member of the U.S. Supreme Court, but she wasn’t always and might never have been a member of it • In contrast, the corresponding plurality has never failed to include Ginsburg, and couldn’t have failed to include her • Reply: “the U.S. Supreme Court” is non-rigid, or flexible • i.e. it denotes different pluralities of people at different times and worlds • much as “the U.S. Chief Justice” denotes different individuals at different times and worlds 2. The Objection from Changes in Membership

TRUE: “The U.S. Chief Justice used to be someone else” FALSE: “John Roberts used to be someone else” TRUE: “The U.S. Chief Justice could have been someone else” FALSE: “John Roberts could have been someone else”

Still, John Roberts = the U.S. Chief Justice 2. The Objection from Changes in Membership

TRUE: “The U.S. Supreme Court used to include different people” FALSE: “John Roberts, Clarence Thomas, Ruth Bader Ginsburg, Stephen Breyer, Samuel Alito, Sonia Sotomayor, Elena Kagan, Neil Gorsuch and Brett Kavanaugh used to include different people” TRUE: “The U.S. Supreme Court could have included different people” FALSE: “John Roberts, Clarence Thomas, Ruth Bader Ginsburg, Stephen Breyer, Samuel Alito, Sonia Sotomayor, Elena Kagan, Neil Gorsuch and Brett Kavanaugh could have included different people”

Still, John Roberts et al. = the U.S. Supreme Court 2. The Objection from Changes in Membership

• A residual problem: “The same group ruled on Dred Scott v. Sandford in 1857 and on Roe v. Wade in 1973, that group being the U.S. Supreme Court” • Solution: expressions of the form “the same F” are generally ambiguous between numerical-identity and type-identity readings • Compare: “This is the same fruit as that” (successively pointing at two apples) “The same elected official was impeached by the U.S. House of Representatives in 1998 and 2019, that elected official being the U.S. President” “The same group of people ruled on Dred Scott v. Sandford in 1857 and on Roe v. Wade in 1973, that group of people being the U.S. Supreme Court” 3. The Objection from Coextensive Groups

• Objection: unlike pluralities, different social groups can have the same members • E.g. the Supreme Court could have the same members as a Special Committee on Judicial Ethics • Yet these groups may appear to be distinct, having different powers and duties, performing different actions, and being in session at different times (Uzquiano, 2004) • Reply: such reasoning clearly overgeneralizes to individual cases • E.g. the Chief Justice could be the same person as the Head of the Special Committee on Judicial Ethics • Yet these officials may appear to distinct, having different powers and duties, performing different actions, and chairing sessions at different times (López de Sa, 2007) 3. The Objection from Coextensive Groups

• So what explains the appearance of distinct but coextensive groups? • Our diagnosis will be twofold: • To start, there is a tendency here to mistake pragmatic inappropriateness for falsehood and to mistake pragmatic appropriateness for truth • There is also a risk of confusing particular and abstract uses of group terms 3. The Objection from Coextensive Groups

• Imagine that John Roberts is currently chairing a session because he’s the Chief Justice, and not because he’s the Head of the Special Committee • Then “The Head of the Special Committee is chairing the session” is true but inappropriate • For it might suggest that he’s chairing the session because he’s the Head of the Special Committee • And this inappropriateness could be expressed by means of metalinguistic negation, as in: “The Head of the Special Committee isn’t chairing the session” • Don’t say: “The Head of the Special Committee is chairing the session.” Even if true, this could easily mislead the audience into thinking that the denoted person is chairing the session because he’s the Head of the Special Committee 3. The Objection from Coextensive Groups

• Analogously, suppose that some people are both the Supreme Court and the Special Committee, but they’re currently in session because they’re the Supreme Court, and not because they’re the Special Committee • Then “The Special Committee is in session” is true but inappropriate • For it might suggest that they’re in session because they’re the Special Committee • And this inappropriateness could be expressed by means of metalinguistic negation, as in: “The Special Committee isn’t in session” • Don’t say: “The Special Committee is in session.” Even if true, this could easily mislead the audience into thinking that the denoted people are in session because they’re the Special Committee 3. The Objection from Coextensive Groups

• Also we should distinguish particular and abstract uses of group terms. E.g. the following argument, suitably understood, may be sound: • The Chief Justice is appointed by the President • The Head of the Special Committee isn’t appointed by the President • So the Chief Justice ≠ the Head of the Special Committee • But here “the Chief Justice” denotes a social role (if anything), as does “the Head of the Special Committee” • Compare: • Being the Chief Justice involves having been appointed to that role by whoever was then the President • Being the Head of the Special Committee doesn’t involve having been appointed to that role by whoever was then the President • So being the Chief Justice ≠ being the Head of the Special Committee 3. The Objection from Coextensive Groups

• Analogously, the following argument, suitably understood, may be sound: • The Supreme Court has the power to interpret the Constitution • The Special Committee doesn’t have the power to interpret the Constitution • So the Supreme Court ≠ the Special Committee • But here “the Supreme Court” denotes a social role (if anything), as does “the Special Committee” • Compare: • Being the Supreme Court involves having the power to interpret the Constitution • Being the Special Committee doesn’t involve having the power to interpret the Constitution • So being the Supreme Court ≠ being the Special Committee 3. The Objection from Coextensive Groups

• Still, we take the recent debate on the metaphysics of social groups to be mainly concerned with particular groups rather than abstract social roles • For social roles don’t walk, talk, sing, dance, gather, fight, vote, celebrate, or rule on legal cases 4. Why Not Sets or Fusions?

• Our arguments here can be generalized in defence of other reductionist views of groups • So why not identity social groups with the sets or fusions of their members? • The set view offers a straightforward account of group membership, but has trouble accounting for how groups are located and have causal powers • The fusion view has no trouble accounting for how groups are located and have causal powers, but cannot offer a straightforward account of group membership • Perhaps these problems can be dealt with somehow. But why bother, when we can go plural? References

Black, M., 1971, “The Elusiveness of Sets”, Review of Metaphysics, 24(4): 614-636.

Korman, D. Z., 2015, Objects: Nothing Out of the Ordinary, Oxford: Oxford University Press.

López de Sa, D., 2007, “The Chief Supreme Court Justice: A Metaphysical Puzzle?”, Crítica, 39(115): 61-68.

Uzquiano, G., 2004, “The Supreme Court and the Supreme Court Justices: A Metaphysical Puzzle”, Noûs, 38(1): 135-153.