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Long Night of the Tankers: Hitler’S War Against Caribbean Oil
University of Calgary PRISM: University of Calgary's Digital Repository University of Calgary Press University of Calgary Press Open Access Books 2014 Long Night of the Tankers: Hitler’s War Against Caribbean Oil Bercuson, David J.; Herwig, Holger H. University of Calgary Press Bercuson, D. J. & Herwig, H. H. "Long Night of the Tankers: Hitler’s War Against Caribbean Oil". Beyond Boundaries: Canadian Defence and Strategic Studies Series; 4. University of Calgary Press, Calgary, Alberta, 2014. http://hdl.handle.net/1880/49998 book http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/4.0/ Attribution Non-Commercial No Derivatives 4.0 International Downloaded from PRISM: https://prism.ucalgary.ca University of Calgary Press www.uofcpress.com LONG NIGHT OF THE TANKERS: HITLER’S WAR AGAINST CARIBBEAN OIL David J. Bercuson and Holger H. Herwig ISBN 978-1-55238-760-3 THIS BOOK IS AN OPEN ACCESS E-BOOK. It is an electronic version of a book that can be purchased in physical form through any bookseller or on-line retailer, or from our distributors. Please support this open access publication by requesting that your university purchase a print copy of this book, or by purchasing a copy yourself. If you have any questions, please contact us at [email protected] Cover Art: The artwork on the cover of this book is not open access and falls under traditional copyright provisions; it cannot be reproduced in any way without written permission of the artists and their agents. The cover can be displayed as a complete cover image for the purposes of publicizing this work, but the artwork cannot be extracted from the context of the cover of this specific work without breaching the artist’s copyright. -
Military Operations in Libya
Military Operations in Libya Standard Note: SN/IA/5909 Last updated: 24 October 2011 Author: Claire Taylor Section International Affairs and Defence Section On 17 March 2011 the UN Security Council adopted resolution 1973 (2011), under Chapter VII of the UN Charter, which authorised the use of force, including enforcement of a no-fly zone, enforcement of a UN arms embargo against Libya and to protect civilians and civilian areas targeted by the Qaddafi regime and its supporters. The weekend of 19/20 March saw French, British and US military action begin under Operation Odyssey Dawn. By the end of March command of that operation had been gradually transitioned to NATO. On 23 March NATO assumed command of operations to enforce the UN arms embargo. The transfer of command responsibility for the no-fly zone was agreed on 24 March; while the decision to transfer command and control for all military operations in Libya was taken on 27 March. NATO formally assumed command under Operation Unified Protector at 0600 hours on 31 March 2011. Military operations have been ongoing for seven months. During that time there have been criticisms of stalemate in the military campaign, allegations over burden sharing among NATO Member States, and questions over the existence of a viable exit strategy. Following the fall of Sirte and the death of Colonel Gadaffi, Libya’s transitional government declared liberation on 23 October 2011. The NATO Secretary General also confirmed in a statement that a preliminary decision had been taken to end Operation Unified Protector on 31 October 2011. However, he also went on to state that NATO would monitor the situation and retain the capacity to respond to threats to civilians if necessary. -
Megatraveller'
MEGATRAVELLER' OF THE SHATTERED IMPERIUM he Imperial Navy never planned for the worst of all possible contingen- cies: a far-flung Rebellion that would shatter the empire into squab- bling factions. And with each faction went a portion of the navy's fighting strength. Now, Imperial ship fights Imperial ship as the Rebellion drives the entire Imper- ium into chaos. Fighting Ships of the Shattered Imperium is a compendium of immense battle- ships and cruisers that served with the Imperial fleet and now serve with the fleets of the many factions of the Rebellion. Included in this book are standard statistical descriptions of 58 ships, with illustrations for 16 of the most interesting. 0 Battleships and dreadnoughts from tech level 11 to 15. Examples include battle tenderhider systems for tech levels 14 and 15. 0 Cruisers, including the standard cruisers from tech level 11 to 15, plus strike cruisers, missile cruisers, and the jump-6Sample rift cruiser.file 0 Carriers, from the standard fleet carriers to the newest light Carrie! and pocket carrier. 0 Escorts, from the ED-series escort destroyers to the escort fleet and escort missile ships that maneuver with the fleet. 0'Auxiliaries, from the standard fleet tankers to the dromedary combination tanker and resupply ship, plus the rift tanker for operations in the Rifts. Fighting Ships of the Shattered Imperium-a com- pendium of 58 starships for MegaTraveller. intended for MegaTraveller referees and players. ' Intermediate complexity. Suitable for some solitaire use. Requires the MegaTraveller role-playing game system . 0218 10.00 Made in the U.S.A. -
WARFARE OFFICERS CAREER HANDBOOK II Warfare Officers Career Handbook
WARFARE OFFICERS CAREER HANDBOOK II WARFARE OFFICERS CAREER HANDBooK Warfare O fficers C areer H andbook IV WARFARE OFFICERS CAREER HANDBooK Foreword The Warfare Officers Career Handbook provides information for members of the Royal Australian Navy’s Warfare community. For the purposes of this handbook, the Warfare community is deemed to include all officers of the Seaman, Pilot and Observer Primary Qualifications. The Warfare Officer Community symbiotically contains personnel from the seaman, Submarine, Aviation, Hydrographic and Meteorological, Mine Clearance Diving and Naval Communications and Intelligence groups. The Warfare Officers Career Handbook is a source document for Warfare Officers to consult as they progress through their careers. It is intended to inform and stimulate consideration of career issues and to provide a coherent guide that articulates Navy’s requirements and expectations. The book provides a summary of the Warfare branch specialisations and the sub-specialisations that are embedded within them, leading in due course to entry into the Charge Program and the Command opportunities that follow. The Warfare Officers Career Handbook also describes the historical derivation of current warfare streams to provide contemporary relevance and the cultural background within which maritime warfare duties are conducted. It discusses the national context in which Warfare Officers discharge their duties. Leadership and ethical matters are explored, as is the inter-relationship between personal attributes, values, leadership, performance and sense of purpose. There is no intention that this handbook replicate or replace extant policy and procedural guidelines. Rather, the handbook focuses on the enduring features of maritime warfare. Policy by its nature is transient. Therefore, as far as possible, the Warfare Officers Career Handbook deals with broad principles and not more narrowly defined policies that rightly belong in other documents. -
Memoirs of Hydrography
MEMOIRS 07 HYDROGRAPHY INCLUDING Brief Biographies of the Principal Officers who have Served in H.M. NAVAL SURVEYING SERVICE BETWEEN THE YEARS 1750 and 1885 COMPILED BY COMMANDER L. S. DAWSON, R.N. I 1s t tw o PARTS. P a r t II.—1830 t o 1885. EASTBOURNE: HENRY W. KEAY, THE “ IMPERIAL LIBRARY.” iI i / PREF A CE. N the compilation of Part II. of the Memoirs of Hydrography, the endeavour has been to give the services of the many excellent surveying I officers of the late Indian Navy, equal prominence with those of the Royal Navy. Except in the geographical abridgment, under the heading of “ Progress of Martne Surveys” attached to the Memoirs of the various Hydrographers, the personal services of officers still on the Active List, and employed in the surveying service of the Royal Navy, have not been alluded to ; thereby the lines of official etiquette will not have been over-stepped. L. S. D. January , 1885. CONTENTS OF PART II ♦ CHAPTER I. Beaufort, Progress 1829 to 1854, Fitzroy, Belcher, Graves, Raper, Blackwood, Barrai, Arlett, Frazer, Owen Stanley, J. L. Stokes, Sulivan, Berard, Collinson, Lloyd, Otter, Kellett, La Place, Schubert, Haines,' Nolloth, Brock, Spratt, C. G. Robinson, Sheringham, Williams, Becher, Bate, Church, Powell, E. J. Bedford, Elwon, Ethersey, Carless, G. A. Bedford, James Wood, Wolfe, Balleny, Wilkes, W. Allen, Maury, Miles, Mooney, R. B. Beechey, P. Shortland, Yule, Lord, Burdwood, Dayman, Drury, Barrow, Christopher, John Wood, Harding, Kortright, Johnson, Du Petit Thouars, Lawrance, Klint, W. Smyth, Dunsterville, Cox, F. W. L. Thomas, Biddlecombe, Gordon, Bird Allen, Curtis, Edye, F. -
ACTION STATIONS! Winter 2018
ACTIONCANADA’S NAVAL STATIONS! MEMORIAL MAGAZINE Volume 37 - Issue 1 Winter 2018 Action Stations Winter 2018 1 Volume 37 - Issue 1 ACTION STATIONS! Winter 2018 Editor and design: Our Cover LCdr ret’d Pat Jessup, RCN Chair - Commemorations, CNMT [email protected] Editorial Committee LS ret’d Steve Rowland, RCN Cdr ret’d Len Canfield, RCN - Public Affairs LCdr ret’d Doug Thomas, RCN - Exec. Director Debbie Findlay - Financial Officer Editorial Associates Major ret’d Peter Holmes, RCAF Tanya Cowbrough Carl Anderson CPO Dean Boettger, RCN webmaster: Steve Rowland Permanently moored in the Thames close to London Bridge, HMS Belfast was commissioned into the Royal Photographers Navy in August 1939. In late 1942 she was assigned for duty in the North Atlantic where she played a key role Lt(N) ret’d Ian Urquhart, RCN in the battle of North Cape, which ended in the sinking Cdr ret’d Bill Gard, RCN of the German battle cruiser Scharnhorst. In June 1944 Doug Struthers HMS Belfast led the naval bombardment off Normandy in Cdr ret’d Heather Armstrong, RCN support of the Allied landings of D-Day. She last fired her guns in anger during the Korean War, when she earned the name “that straight-shooting ship”. HMS Belfast is Garry Weir now part of the Imperial War Museum and along with http://www.forposterityssake.ca/ HMCS Sackville, a member of the Historical Naval Ships Association. HMS Belfast turns 80 in 2018 and is open Roger Litwiller: daily to visitors. http://www.rogerlitwiller.com/ HMS Belfast photograph courtesy of the Imperial War Museum© -
Operations in Libya
House of Commons Defence Committee OPERATIONS IN LIBYA Written Evidence This is a volume of submissions, relevant to the inquiry into Operations in Libya, which have been reported to the House but not yet approved for publication in final form. Any public use of, or reference to, the contents should make clear that it is not yet an approved final record of the written evidence received by the Committee. List of written evidence 1 Ministry of Defence 2 Commodore Steven Jermy RN 3 Professor M J Williams 4 CJA Cope, Political Editor, Warship World Magazine 5 Keep Our Future Afloat Campaign (KOFAC) 6 Mike Young, Decision Workshops Ltd 7 Raytheon UK 8 Patrick M Lavender 9 Admiral Sir John Woodward and colleagues OL001 Written evidence from the Ministry of Defence On 24 February the Royal Navy and Royal Air Force started evacuating British Entitled Persons from Libya, following widespread protests and fighting across the country. Over the next two weeks almost 1000 persons were evacuated from locations across the country. Shortly after the evacuation was complete, the security situation deteriorated significantly. On the evening of 19 March UK Armed Forces, along with their US and French counterparts, launched military operations in Libya with the aim of protecting the civilian population of Benghazi from an imminent attack by Colonel Gaddafi’s forces. By 31 March NATO had assumed effective command of all operations to enforce UN Security Council Resolutions (UNSCRs) 1970 and 1973 as Operation Unified Protector (OUP). Committing military forces to Libya averted an imminent humanitarian catastrophe in Benghazi and has saved countless lives since. -
Operation Kipion: Royal Navy Assets in the Persian Gulf
BRIEFING PAPER Number 8628, 14 October 2019 Operation Kipion: Royal Navy assets in the Persian By Claire Mills Gulf 1. Historical presence: the Armilla Patrol The UK has maintained a permanent naval presence in the Persian Gulf since September 1980, when the Armilla Patrol was established to ensure the safety of British entitled merchant ships operating in the region during the time of the Iran-Iraq War. During this conflict each nation frequently attacked each other’s oil facilities and oil tankers bound for their respective ports, in the so-called “tanker war”. Kuwaiti vessels carrying Iraqi oil were particularly susceptible to Iranian attack and foreign-flagged merchant vessels were often caught in the crossfire. By 1987 the threat to international shipping through the Strait of Hormuz forced the United States to intervene in order to secure the shipping lanes. Operation Earnest Will became the largest US naval convoy operation since the Second World War. Later the Armilla Patrol contributed to the Multinational Interception Force (MIF), a naval contingent patrolling the Persian Gulf to enforce the UN-mandated trade embargo against Iraq, imposed after its invasion of Kuwait in August1990.1 In the aftermath of the 2003 Iraq conflict, Royal Navy vessels deployed as part of the Armilla Patrol were heavily committed to providing maritime security in the region, the protection of Iraq’s oil infrastructure and to assisting in the training of Iraqi sailors and marines. 1.1 Assets The Type 42 destroyer HMS Coventry was the first vessel to be deployed as part of the Armilla Patrol. After that the Royal Navy maintained at least one destroyer or frigate in the Persian Gulf, supported by a ship of the Royal Fleet Auxiliary. -
David Hyson, Seaman Uss Kirk – ’75 Rescue
DAVID HYSON, SEAMAN USS KIRK – ’75 RESCUE David Hyson: My name is David Hyson. My last name is spelled H-Y-S-O-N. Where I currently live? Producer: Where do you live now? David Hyson: I live in Rockfield, Maryland. Producer: What was your tour in the service, branch and tour and year? David Hyson: I was in the US Navy. I went into the US Navy on September 21st of 1972 shortly after I turned 18 years old. I was discharged from the Navy in July of 1976. I was discharged about 2 to 3 months early because there was an early dismissal program if I was going to be going into college, and so I was going into college and so I had an early dismissal. Producer: [inaudible 00:00:47] David Hyson: I grew in Baltimore, Maryland. In Parkfield section of Baltimore, Maryland. How I ended up in the navy, my father was in the Navy. So, I decided that I really didn't know what I wanted to do after I graduated from high school so the best thing for me to do would likely be to spend some time in the military to get my head together you might say. Then, I knew by the time I got out of the military I'd probably know what I wanted to do. That was being an account. Well I knew that I could be in involved in it. That's the reason why I joined the US Navy because I knew if I had a good chance of not being involved in conflict would probably be the Navy because the Navy was off shore at that point. -
SOME REVISIONIST HISTORY in the BATTLE of the ATLANTIC Fraser M. Mckee
SOME REVISIONIST HISTORY IN THE BATTLE OF THE ATLANTIC Fraser M. McKee Most historians decry historical revision undertaken solely for political aims. The past Soviet tendency to do this has caused much derision, even domestically; under a new regime, this provides considerable scope even to their historians. In addition, many scholars respond negatively to the all too-common practice of second-guessing the commanders of the day. Yet some cases remain controversial, as shown by a recent reassessment of Admiral Lord Mountbatten's personal responsibility for the disastrous raid on Dieppe in 1942.1 But because of the availability of huge quantities of former enemy documents, some naval history is rightly being rewritten to revise erroneous wartime judgements. This is certainly the case in assessing credits for the destruction in World War II of German U-Boats and Italian sommergibili. The British Ministry of Defence's (MOD) Historical Section has been re-examining all the supposed submarine kills during the Second World War in the Atlantic and Mediterranean theatres, matching Allied records to the German and Italian. In the modern age, this process has been facilitated substantially by using computers to search for discrepancies in the recorded details from both sides. Special attention can then be directed to those kills in which there was no concrete proof of which submarine was sunk, or even whether a sinking occurred. In many cases prisoners were taken, or sufficient debris collected, to identify U-boats with precision, even given the possibility that a struggling submerged boat might eject debris to mislead its attackers. -
Desider: Issue 74, July 2014
July 2014 Issue 74 desthe magazine for defencidere equipment and support UK’s biggest warship ready for Royal naming Latest Finance and Military Capability wallchart See inside Perfectly Airseeker A warm Trucks on Families inspect formed take-off welcome the front line Abbey Wood FEATURES on 32 all 29 MASS production With demand for ammunition set to fall as UK Forces complete the drawdown from Afghanistan, DE&S' contract e: Andy F with BAE Systems Munitions will be moving into a new phase Pictur 32 Vanguard of power projection As the first of class Queen Elizabeth aircraft carrier is set to be named this month, DE&S' Director Ships Tony Graham looks back on the project's challenges and successes 36 New look Chinook The first of the Mk6 Chinooks, with improved handling qualities and stability, has been handed over to the RAF on time, less than three years after contract signing 42 Truck of war Reservists will have a vital role in Army 2020. The Army's heavy equipment transport service has been using Sponsored Reserves for the last ten years cover image 2014 The first of the Queen Elizabeth class aircraft carriers is Y 44 DE&S family together at Abbey Wood due to be officially named this month. Queen Elizabeth The first of this summer's Families Days at DE&S is in Rosyth where the various component parts have JUL headquarters has proved a resounding success been integrated following construction at yards around the country desider NEWS www.gov.uk/government/publications/desider 6 New Chair to bring about change Assistant Head, Corporate -
Wolf Pack Operations in the North Atlantic, 10 February-22 March 1944
Failure at Sea: Wolf Pack Operations in the North Atlantic, 10 February-22 March 1944 David Syrett Despite the turning point in the Atlantic campaign in May 1943, the great strategic objective during the first months of 1944 for German U-boats still remained to try to cut the transatlantic supply lines between North America and Great Britain. If this could be done, German planners reasoned, the Allies would be incapable of mounting an invasion of northwestern Europe in the spring of 1944.1 The U-boats in 1943 thus undertook large- scale attacks on convoys in the North Atlantic in an attempt to sever the Allies' maritime supply routes. In a series of convoy battles in which the submarines suffered heavy losses but sunk few Allied ships, the Germans were decisively defeated and the U-boats were forced to withdraw from the mid-Atlantic convoy routes.2 This was a major defeat and ended any realistic chance the Germans had of cutting the transatlantic convoy routes. The defeat of the U-boats in 1943 was due to Allied superiority in tactics, weapon systems, and above all in communications intelligence.3 Not only were the locations of U-boats betrayed by communications intelligence but, by the beginning of 1944, the Allies had the resources in the form of both carrier-borne and land-based aircraft, as well as surface escorts, to operate with overpowering force against the Germans in any part of the North Atlantic.4 Moreover, these surface escorts and aircraft were equipped with the latest and most sophisticated types of detection devices and weapons.5 To make matters worse for the Germans, they did not at the time fully understand the reasons for the defeat of their U-boats in the mid-North Atlantic in 1943.6 Nor at the beginning of 1944 did they know that an Allied invasion of northwestern Europe was imminent and that it would most likely occur in the spring of 1944.7 Hence, they saw no real strategic alternative other than to continue the U-boat offensive against Allied convoys despite the losses they had sustained in the previous months.