CLASSICAL ORGANIZATION THEORY: from GENERIC MANAGEMENT of SOCRATES to BUREAUCRACY of WEBER Őzgür Őnday Phd Student, Yeditepe
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Introduction Robert Gibbons and John Roberts
Introduction Robert Gibbons and John Roberts Organizational economics involves the use of economic logic and methods to understand the existence, nature, design, and performance of organizations, especially managed ones. As this handbook documents, economists working on organizational issues have now generated a large volume of exciting research, both theoretical and empirical. However, organizational economics is not yet a fully recognized field in economics—for example, it has no JournalofEconomic Literature classification number, and few doctoral programs offer courses in it. The intent of this handbook is to make the existing research in organizational economics more accessible to economists and thereby to promote further research and teaching in the field. The Origins of Organizational Economics As Kenneth Arrow (1974: 33) put it, “organizations are a means of achieving the benefits of collective action in situations where the price system fails,” thus including not only business firms but also consortia, unions, legislatures, agencies, schools, churches, social movements, and beyond. All organizations, Arrow (1974: 26) argued, share “the need for collective action and the allocation of resources through nonmarket methods,” suggesting a range of possible structures and processes for decisionmaking in organizations, including dictatorship, coalitions, committees, and much more. Within Arrow’s broad view of the possible purposes and designs of organizations, many distinguished economists can be seen as having addressed organizational issues -
History in the Study of Industrial Organization
History in the Study of Industrial Organization David Genesove Hebrew University of Jerusalem and C.E.P.R. May 13 2016 Preliminary Draft *I am grateful for comments by discussants Konrad Stahl, Chaim Fershtman, John Sutton and Bob Feinberg, and others in presentations at the 2012 Nordic IO Conference, the IDC, Herzlya, the MAACI Summer Institute on Competition Policy, Israel IO Day and the 2015 EARIE Conference. I. Introduction In studying Industrial Organization, economists have at times turned to the past to illustrate and test its theories. This includes some of the seminal papers of the new empiricism (e.g., Porter, 1983). This readiness to cull from the historical record has neither been examined critically, nor accompanied by much of an attempt to follow the industrial organization of markets over time. This paper asks how history can help us understand markets, by posing the following dual questions: (a) what are the advantages and disadvantages of using old markets to illuminate our understanding of current ones, and (b) is a historical approach to the study of Industrial Organization possible and worth pursuing? We are talking about history in two different ways: as the past, and as an analytical approach. History as the past means using old markets in empirical work in the same way one uses contemporary markets, whether that is inductively learning about markets in the “theory-development role of applied econometrics” (Morgan, cited by Snooks, 1993), estimating parameters of interest, or “using historical episodes to test economic models for their generality” (Kindleberger, 1990, p. 3). History as an analytic approach means describing a sequence of events as a logical progression informed by economic theory but unencumbered by it, with room for personalities and errors, and perhaps emphasis on certain events with overwhelming importance. -
March-Ing Towards Organizational Economics
March-ing Towards Organizational Economics Robert Gibbons MIT and NBER April, 2019 I was a student of Jim March’s in 1983, meaning that I took a mandatory 10- week doctoral class on organization theory from him that changed my life. And I have been a student of Jim’s ever since, meaning that I have tried to keep learning about Jim’s ideas—about organizations and about life. During the course and for over a decade afterwards, most of my academic learning from Jim was about how disciplines other than economics think about organizations. More recently, I have tried to discern how the roots of my own field, organizational economics, often involve Jim. This note focuses on the latter, especially informed by precious summer discussions from 2013 to 2018.* Coase (1937) launched organizational economics by implicitly asking “If markets were perfect, why would we need firms?” An enormous literature eventually developed, greatly deepening our understanding of the roles that transaction costs and property rights play in determining the “institutional structure of production” (by which Coase (1992) meant not just the make-or-buy decision that determines the boundary of the firm, but also contracts and other governance structures between firms such as joint ventures and networks). Today, organizational economics consists of two halves: the “theory of the firm” (focused on the aforementioned institutional structure of production) and the “theory of internal organization” (focused on the decision processes within organizations that, in certain settings, perform sufficiently well to supplant the market alternative). One might ask whether the theory of internal organization has an animating question analogous to Coase’s for the theory of the firm (and, if so, who posed it, what else did they say, and what has become of this line of argument)? The answers I propose rest on Jim March’s collected works, especially March’s (1962) paper “The Business Firm as a Political Coalition” and Cyert and March’s (1963) emphasis on “unresolved conflict” in organizations. -
Guide to Further Reading
Guide to further reading To follow contemporary debates in organisational economics and organisation theory it is necessary to consult the journals, of which there are too many to list. For organisational economics I would recommend the Journal of Economic Behavior and Organization. Of more relevance to this book, in terms of airing inter- and intradisciplinary differences, the Journal of Economic Perspectives is better. The leading journals in organisation theory have increasingly given attention to organisational economics. The most important are: Administrative Science Quarterly; Academy of Management Review; Organization Science; and Organization Studies. In addition, the editors of Human Relations are keen on including interdisciplinary work, particularly from sociologists, economists and psychologists. The main emphasis of this guide is not journal articles but edited collections of readings and introductory books. Starting with game theory, Poundstone, The Prisoner's Dilemma (1993), gives a straightforward introduction to, and a history of, the theory. Avoiding the maths again, Dixit and Nalebuff, Thinking Strategically (1991), gives an idea of the applications of game theory. Axelrod, The Evolution of Cooperation (1990), is not only influential, but highly readable. Neoclassical, managerial and behavioural theories of the firm are all dealt with clearly in Sawyer's excellent little book, Theories of the Firm (1979). For more general overviews and explicit critiques of economics, Galbraith ought to be read at some point, and his book, A History of Economics (1987) is better than the many more scholarly histories of economics. Hodgson's Economics and Institutions (1988) is a more difficult and sustained critique of contemporary economics, but he gives considerable attention to organisational economics. -
Development Through International Economic Integration: Institutional Change to Accommodate Foreign Direct Investment in Brazil and China
Development through international economic integration: Institutional Change to accommodate Foreign Direct Investment in Brazil and China Henrique Estides Delgado ABSTRACT Foreign Direct Investment (FDI) that was mainly flowing to developing countries before the Second World War, became increasingly concentrated among developed economies since the aftermath of the war. A similar increase in the concentration of other capital flows and trade followed suit during the many decades in which the liberal post-war international order was far from being global. In the late 20th century, increased international willingness to expand global markets was matched by changes in the economic policy of developing countries, originating a process that started to reshape economic geography and reorient FDI flows and other economic flows. Eventually, in the wake of the 2008 global financial crisis, developing countries would again receive the bulk of global FDI flows. This paper argues that the primary reason for the new distribution of FDI is the way that institutional change at the global level interacted with institutional change within countries. As such, this interaction will also define the endurance of this reorientation. To sustain this point, the paper takes the cases of China and Brazil and demonstrates that the change in the incentive structure provided by the international environment around the end of the Cold War and the creation of the WTO, was accompanied by major institutional transformations in Brazil and in China along which greater integration with the global economy was pursued. FDI that was always present in Brazil gained a new relevance, while in China it would emerge during the reform era in a way that is responsible for a large part of the unprecedented growth experienced by the country. -
C:\Working Papers\11849.Wpd
NBER WORKING PAPER SERIES INERTIA AND INCENTIVES: BRIDGING ORGANIZATIONAL ECONOMICS AND ORGANIZATIONAL THEORY Rebecca Henderson Sarah Kaplan Working Paper 11849 http://www.nber.org/papers/w11849 NATIONAL BUREAU OF ECONOMIC RESEARCH 1050 Massachusetts Avenue Cambridge, MA 02138 December 2005 This paper has benefited from the comments of participants in the 2004 Organization Science Conference “Frontiers of OS,” and from the comments of seminar participants at NYU, Wharton, INSEAD, the Stockholm School of Economics and the London Business School. We would also like to thank Robert Gibbons, Michael Jacobides, Bruce Kogut, Dan Levinthal, William Ocasio, Steven Postrel, Jesper Sørensen, Sid Winter and three anonymous reviewers. All errors or omissions remain our own.The views expressed herein are those of the author(s) and do not necessarily reflect the views of the National Bureau of Economic Research. ©2005 by Rebecca Henderson and Sarah Kaplan. All rights reserved. Short sections of text, not to exceed two paragraphs, may be quoted without explicit permission provided that full credit, including © notice, is given to the source. Inertia and Incentives: Bridging Organizational Economics and Organizational Theory Rebecca Henderson and Sarah Kaplan NBER Working Paper No. 11849 December 2005 JEL No. L0, M0 ABSTRACT Organizational theorists have long acknowledged the importance of the formal and informal incentives facing a firm’’s employees, stressing that the political economy of a firm plays a major role in shaping organizational life and firm behavior. Yet the detailed study of incentive systems has traditionally been left in the hands of (organizational) economists, with most organizational theorists focusing their attention on critical problems in culture, network structure, framing and so on n in essence, the social context in which economics and incentive systems are embedded. -
Edith Penrose's 'The Theory of The
Munich Personal RePEc Archive Edith Penrose’s ‘The Theory of the Growth of the Firm’ Fifty Years Later Pitelis, Christos 13 March 2009 Online at https://mpra.ub.uni-muenchen.de/23180/ MPRA Paper No. 23180, posted 10 Jun 2010 05:46 UTC Edith Penrose’s ‘The Theory of the Growth of the Firm’ Fifty Years Later∗∗∗ Christos N. Pitelis Judge Business School and Queens’ College University of Cambridge Trumpington Street Cambridge CB2 1AG UK Tel: 0044 1223 339618 Fax: 0044 1223 766815 Email: [email protected] 13 March 2009 ∗ This paper draws and builds upon earlier work by Penrose and Pitelis (1999) and Pitelis (2004, 2005, 2007a, 2007b). am grateful to Edith Penrose for discussion and numerous colleagues for comments on earlier drafts, especially Mie Augier, (ohn Dunning, (oe Mahoney, Robin Marris, Perran Penrose, David Teece and Alain ,erbeke. Errors are mine. 1 Electronic copy available at: http://ssrn.com/abstract=1477885 I. INTRODUCTION 2009 marks the 50th anniversary of Edith Penrose’s The Theory of the Growth of the Firm (TGF thereafter). In a review of the book in the Economic Journal, Robin Marris (1961) predicted that TGF would prove one of the most influential of the decade. In his 1987 entry to the New Palgrave he added that “this proved an understatement” (p831). Marris’ statements were referring mainly to the economic theory of the firm, especially the literature on ‘managerial theories’, which were popular in the 1960s and in which he himself was a major contributor (Marris 1964). Neither Marris nor Penrose herself could foresee what appears to be the case 50 years on; this is a situation where the influence of TGF in mainstream economics has been rather limited (also Marris, 1987 and below). -
Mccallums DANIEL Mccallum • ISABEL SELLARS
McCALLUMS DANIEL McCALLUM • ISABEL SELLARS Their Antecedents, Descendants and Collateral Relatives A COMPILATION BY .<::, Loms FARRELL, CoLoNEL U.S. ARMY RETIRED No. 799H FLORA JANIE HAMER HOOKER No. 92S 1946 PUBLISHED BY THE COMPILERS FOR PRIVATE DISTRIBUTION Copyright, 1946 Colonel Louis Farrell, Jackson Boulevard, Nashville 5, Tennessee and Mrs. Flora Hamer Hooker, Hamer, South Carolina PRINTED IN THE U.S. A. BY THE WILLIAMS PRINTING COMPANY, INC., SPARTANBURG, SOUTH CAROLINA McCALLUMS THIS COMPILATION IS RESPECTFULLY DEDICATED to ANGUS McCALLUM 1774 - 1849 Who kept the first family records to DUGALD McCALLUM 1800- 1881 Who pioneered in writing a record of the McCallums to XANTIPPE LITTLE McCALLUM WILSON 1826 - 1901 Who was known as the McCallum Family Historian to JAMES CALVIN McCALLUM 1824 - 1893 Who gathered and compiled McCallum Family Records to ANGUS JACKSON McCALLU:M: 1853 - Living 1946 Who preserved McCallum records which provided valuable information and help to the compilers of this book to JANIE BROWN McCALLUM HAMER 1861 - 1941 Who inspired an interest in others to collect and preserve in permanent form a history of the McCallum Family ,-· ANGUS McCALLUM DUGALD McCALLUM XANTIPPE LITTLE McCALLUM WILSON JAMES CALVIN McCALLUM ANGUS JACKSON McCALLUM JANIE BROWN McCALLUM HAMER :,1. 1 ,· \ .~~. -~g-l fit),..,.. ~) INTRODUCTION HIS Compilation deals with the descendants ot Daniel McCallum who emigrated from Kenteyre, ( Cantire, Canteyre), Argyllshire, Scotland in 1770 and settled finally in what is now Robeson County, North Carolina. No real effort has ever been made to trace his relatives or the McCallum Clan in Scotland; however, it seems proper to state that there are two theories regarding the Clan McCallum. -
Public Administration Vs Private Administration
Question: Difference between Public and Private Administration? The main distinction between the private sector and the public sector is principally there ownership. Private sectors are owned by shareholders or entrepreneurs while public sectors are jointly owned by members of political communities. Public agencies are funded by taxation whereas private agencies are funded by the pay of their consumers. Public sectors are controlled by political forces and private sectors are controlled by market forces. The Difference between the Private and Public Sector It is important to understand the difference between the private sector and public sector because your privacy rights will differ depending on the legislation that an organization is governed under. The Private Sector The private sector is usually composed of organizations that are privately owned and not part of the government. These usually includes corporations (both profit and non-profit), partnerships, and charities. An easier way to think of the private sector is by thinking of organizations that are not owned or operated by the government. For example, retail stores, credit unions, and local businesses will operate in the private sector. The Public Sector The public sector is usually composed of organizations that are owned and operated by the government. This includes federal, provincial, state, or municipal governments, depending on where you live. Privacy legislation usually calls organizations in the public sector a public body or a public authority. Some examples of public bodies in Canada and the United Kingdom are educational bodies, health care bodies, police and prison services, and local and central government bodies and their departments. -
Rrs, Herman Haupt and Gettysburg
Railroads, Herman Haupt, and the Battle of Gettysburg Steve Ditmeyer Principal Transportation Technology and Economics Bull Run Civil War Round Table Public Library, Centerville, VA May 14, 2020 US Railroads just before the Civil War The Union had 20,500 miles of railroad track, and the railroads actually formed a network. The Confederacy had 9,500 miles of railroad track, originally built from fields to seaports, and had only limited interconnections. Some historians believe that the Confederacy would have had a better chance of breaking up the Union by force of arms had it attempted to do so a decade earlier, before the Union had built its railroad network. Herman Haupt: The Pre-War Years - 1 Haupt was born in Philadelphia in 1817 and raised there. He graduated from West Point at age 18 in 1835, in the same class as George Meade, with an engineering degree, and they were commissioned as 2nd Lieutenants in the US Army. The two cadets gained reputations for being highly competent but difficult to deal with. Haupt resigned his commission after 3 months to go to work for the Commonwealth of Pennsylvania as a surveyor for what was to become the Gettysburg Railroad. In 1841, he became a professor of mathematics and civil engineering at Pennsylvania College in Gettysburg; resigned in 1848 to join the Pennsylvania RR where he became chief engineer in 1853. On the PRR, he designed bridges and tunnels and oversaw construction of its main line across Pennsylvania between Philadelphia and Pittsburgh. Herman Haupt: The Pre-War Years - 2 Haupt left the Pennsylvania RR in 1856 to join the project to build the 5-mile Hoosac Tunnel through the Hoosac Mountain Range in northwestern Massachusetts on the Troy & Greenfield RR. -
“GITTIN STUFF” the Impact of Equipment Management, Supply & Logistics on Confederate Defeat
“GITTIN STUFF” The Impact of Equipment Management, Supply & Logistics on Confederate Defeat BY FRED SETH, CPPM, CF, HARBOUR LIGHTS CHAPTER “They never whipped us, Sir, unless they were four to one. had been captured. For four years they had provided equipment and supplies from If we had had anything like a fair chance, or less disparity of Europe to support the Confederacy and its numbers, we should have won our cause and established our armies. Since the beginning of the war, independence.” UNKNOWN VIRGINIAN TO ROBERT E. LEE.1 Wilmington, North Carolina had been a preferred port of entry for blockade-run- ners because Cape Fear provided two entry the destruction or capture of factories and channels, which gave ships a greater oppor- PREFACE farms in the Deep South and Richmond. tunity for escape and evasion. Also, rail fter defeat in the Civil War, known by The lack of rations at Amelia Court House, lines ran directly from Wilmington to A some in the South as “The War of which has been called the immediate cause Richmond and Atlanta.4 Northern Aggression,” Southerners were in of Lee’s surrender, is examined in detail. By the fall of 1864, Wilmington was a quandary regarding their willingness for Most importantly, the article addresses how one of the most important cities in the war. As discussed in the first article of this the inability of its leaders to conduct pro- Confederacy – it was the last operating series, the North had the overwhelming ductive logistics, equipment, and supply port. Confederate armies depended on advantage in industrial capability and man- management led to the decline and ulti- Wilmington for lead, iron, copper, steel, power. -
Paper 1 – Fundamentals of Organization and Management (Syllabus 2008)
Paper 1 – Fundamentals of Organization and Management (Syllabus 2008) MULTIPLE CHOICE QUESTIONS 1. Who is a person who advanced early scientific management principles? (a) Weber (b) Taylor (c) Vest (d) Fayol 2. A reporting relationship in which an employee receives orders from, and reports to, only one supervisor is known as: (a) Line of authority. (b) Centralization. (c) Unity of direction. (d) Unity of command. 3. Which worked on administrative management theory: I. Fayol II. Parker III. Weber (a) I and III (b) II and III (c) none of these worked on administrative management theory (d) I, II, and III 4. ________ is the study of how to create an organizational structure that leads to high efficiency and effectiveness. (a) Scientific management (b) Job specialization (c) Administrative management (d) Allocation management 5. _______ is the singleness of purpose that makes possible the creation of one plan of action to guide managers in resource allocations. (a) Unity of direction (b) Unity of command (c) Unity of authority (d) Unity of resources 6. Which is an organizational - environmental theory? I. The open-systems view II. Contingency theory III. The Theory of Bureaucracy IV. Theory Z (a) I and II (b) I, III, and IV (c) II, III, and IV (d) I, II, and III 7. Theory __ is based on positive assumptions about workers. (a) Z (b) X (c) Y (d) C 8. The _______ theory states a manager's choice of organizational structures and control systems depends on characteristics of the external environment. (a) Mechanistic (b) Management science (c) Organic (d) Contingency The Institute of Cost Accountants of India (Statutory Body under an Act of Parliament) Page 1 Paper 1 – Fundamentals of Organization and Management (Syllabus 2008) 9.