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Guide to Further Reading Guide to further reading To follow contemporary debates in organisational economics and organisation theory it is necessary to consult the journals, of which there are too many to list. For organisational economics I would recommend the Journal of Economic Behavior and Organization. Of more relevance to this book, in terms of airing inter- and intradisciplinary differences, the Journal of Economic Perspectives is better. The leading journals in organisation theory have increasingly given attention to organisational economics. The most important are: Administrative Science Quarterly; Academy of Management Review; Organization Science; and Organization Studies. In addition, the editors of Human Relations are keen on including interdisciplinary work, particularly from sociologists, economists and psychologists. The main emphasis of this guide is not journal articles but edited collections of readings and introductory books. Starting with game theory, Poundstone, The Prisoner's Dilemma (1993), gives a straightforward introduction to, and a history of, the theory. Avoiding the maths again, Dixit and Nalebuff, Thinking Strategically (1991), gives an idea of the applications of game theory. Axelrod, The Evolution of Cooperation (1990), is not only influential, but highly readable. Neoclassical, managerial and behavioural theories of the firm are all dealt with clearly in Sawyer's excellent little book, Theories of the Firm (1979). For more general overviews and explicit critiques of economics, Galbraith ought to be read at some point, and his book, A History of Economics (1987) is better than the many more scholarly histories of economics. Hodgson's Economics and Institutions (1988) is a more difficult and sustained critique of contemporary economics, but he gives considerable attention to organisational economics. For organisational economics in general, Milgram and Roberts, Economics, Organization and Management (1992), seems likely to become the standard textbook for economists looking at organisational issues. This is unfortunate, since they pay almost no attention to the issues raised in this book. Douma and Schreuder's Economic Approaches to Organization (1991) is similarly flawed, but it is very accessible and will be appreciated by students. In The Economics of 226 Guide to further reading 227 Business Enterprise, Ricketts (1987) takes an openly Austrian line, but this does not detract from the clarity of his book. For an overview of neoinstitutional economics, by far the best introduction is Eggertsson, Economic Behavior and Institutions (1990), which is particularly useful for understanding property rights. North is very clear but more concerned with economics history in Institutions, Institutional Change and Economic Performance (1990a). As for edited collections, Putterman's The Economic Nature of the Firm: A Reader (1986b) is virtually indispensable as a companion to this book. Barney and Ouchi cover some of the same ground in Organizational Economics (1986), but they miss the radical literature, and compared to Putterman their introductions are anodyne. Coase's article, 'The Nature of the Firm', is reproduced in numerous collections, including Putterman (abridged) and Barney and Ouchi, but the best collection of his work is his own: The Firm, The Market and the Law (Coase, 1990a). This includes all his other seminal papers. In 1991, Coase received the Nobel Prize for economics. His Nobel Prize lecture is included in The Nature of the Firm: Origins, Evolution, and Development (1993), edited by Williamson and Winter. This is a valuable collection of papers discussing Coase's 'The Nature of the Firm'. Coase himself gives an account of how he came to write the article in the first place, which makes fascinating reading. For critiques of Coase and Williamson, Pitelis has collected contributions, largely from British academics, in Transac­ tion Costs, Markets and Hierarchies (1993). Pratt and Zeckhauser's Principals and Agents (1985) is a useful collection dealing with agency theory, while Singh's collection, Organizational Evolution: New Directions (1990) does what its title promises. Both might assume some prior knowledge in places. The writings of the organisational economists themselves can be daunting for organisation theorists, not least Williamson. He is nothing if not prolific, but the major statement of his version of transaction costs economics remains The Economic Institutions of Capitalism (1985). Economic Organization (1986b) is a useful collection of his earlier work, and contains an interesting autobiogra­ phical sketch. Demsetz gives a similar, but slightly less insightful, sketch in the introduction to a collection of his articles: Ownership, Control and the Firm (1988). Hannan and Freeman, Organizational Ecology (1989), and Nelson and Winter, An Evolutionary Theory of Economic Change (1982), are the major books on evolutionary perspectives. Both are intimidating and time-consuming to read. There are valuable articles dealing with the relationship between economics and sociology in several collections, mainly from the sociologists' side, it should be said. Probably the best is Zukin and DiMaggio's Structures of Capital (1990b), followed by Martinelli and Smelser's Economy and Society (1990). Both books contain articles that are relevant to the other issues dealt with in this book. Granovetter and Swedberg have brought together many of the seminal papers in economic sociology in The Sociology of Economic Life (1992). For a general insight into the way economists work, the series of books by 228 Guide to further reading McCloskey are useful, starting with The Rhetoric of Economics (1986). If You're so smart (1990) is probably the most accessible. The Supplement to vol. 94 of the American Journal of Sociology (1988) contains useful articles on the 'Sociological Analysis of Economic Institutions' and 'Economic Analysis of Social Institu­ tions'. There is no generally accepted textbook on organisation theory, but Perrow's Complex Organizations (1986) gives the best history and overview of the field, albeit from his own radical perspective. Perspectives on Organization Design and Behavior, edited by Van de Yen and Joyce (1981), is a little dated but still contains many of the major debates in organisation theory. Thompson and McHugh, Work Organisations (1990, now in a second edition) provides a radical critique and overview of contemporary developments in organisational be­ haviour and organisation theory. They pay particular attention to the treat­ ment of power. Organization Theory: From Chester Barnard to the Present and Beyond, edited by Williamson (1995), is idiosyncratic. It does not reflect the diverse concerns of many organisation theorists as well as Reed and Hughes' Rethinking Organization (1992). The Academy of Management Review, vol. 15, no. 3 (1990) contains a Theory Development Forum devoted to organisational economics, but it is mainly concerned with the relationship with mainstream organisation theory. The 'Symposium' on 'Organizations and Economics' in The Journal of Economic Perspectives, vol. 5, no. 2 (1991) is more interesting. For an insight into the divisions within organisation theory, Hassard's Sociology and Organization Theory (1993) summarises many contemporary developments, including postmodernism. Powell and DiMaggio, The New Institutionalism in Organizational Analysis (1991), contains important empirical and theoretical papers, including their own. Stinchcombe deserves a mention, even though it is difficult to categorise his idiosyncratic synthesis of economic sociology and organisational economics. His Information and Organizations (1990) contains several useful chapters. Although they are not aimed at the debate between organisational economics and organisation theory, Lukes' Power: A Radical View (1974), and Putterman's Division of Labor and Welfare (1990), provide excellent insights into the concepts of power and efficiency respectively. Abridged versions of the major work on divisions of labour and hierarchy are contained in Putterman (1986b). Nichols' Capital and Labour (1980) contains the major Marxist contributions but has been superseded by the labour process debate. Thompson's The Nature of Work (1989) remains the best overview of this debate. Labour Process Theory (1990), edited by Knights and Willmott, includes some impenetrable pieces, but gives a taste of the labour process debate concerns with power and subjectivity. Child's Organization (1984) is possibly outdated as a textbook (the purpose it was intended for), but it remains a clear statement of the strategic choice perspective in organisation theory, especially in relation to work organisation. Braverman's Labor and Monopoly Capital (1974) has been criticised endlessly. The critics are probably motivated in part by the power of Braverman's Marxist argument, which they Guide to further reading 229 are hard put to match. His book must remain the major starting point for discussions of work organisation in sociology. It would be almost impossible to summarise the vast literature on the Industrial Revolution in England. Fortunately, it is not necessary since Berg has already virtually done it in The Age of Manufactures, 1700-1820 (1994). She covers the major debates concerning work organisation during the period. Nelson's Managers and Workers: Origins of the New Factory System in the United States 1880-1920 (1975) is more concerned with organising original data than addressing broader debates. It could therefore
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