For Peer Review Journal: Journal of the History of Economic Thought

Total Page:16

File Type:pdf, Size:1020Kb

For Peer Review Journal: Journal of the History of Economic Thought Cambridge University Press Dunn's "The Economics of John Kenneth Galbraith" For Peer Review Journal: Journal of the History of Economic Thought Manuscript ID: Draft Manuscript Type: Review Article [email protected] Page 1 of 8 Cambridge University Press 1 2 3 Book Review for the Journal of the History of Economic Thought 4 5 6 7 By Cameron M. Weber, PhD student in economics and history at the New School for Social 8 9 Research and Adjunct Faculty, FIT/SUNY and St. John’s University, New York. 10 11 12 February 2013 13 14 15 Email: [email protected], homepage: cameroneconomics.com 16 17 18 For Peer Review 19 Book reviewed: Stephen P. Dunn. The Economics of John Kenneth Galbraith: Introduction, 20 21 Persuasion and Rehabilitation . (Cambridge, New York, Melbourne, Madrid, Cape Town, 22 23 Singapore, Sao Paulo, Delhi, Dubai, Tokyo, Mexico City: Cambridge University Press, 2010), 24 25 26 pp. xx, 477, US$115.00, ISBN 978-0521-51876-5. 27 28 29 Review: 30 31 32 Stephen Dunn describes this book as having its main goal to show that John Kenneth Galbraith’s 33 34 35 (JKG’s) thought has been under-appreciated by both Post-Keynesians and Institutionalists in the 36 37 history of economic thought. But in reality the book is really of two parts, the first is Dunn’s 38 39 very detailed and engaging description of JKG’s thought without tying-in in any systematic way 40 41 42 followers or precursors, the second is to relate JKG’s influence on those that followed him, 43 44 especially in Post-Keynesian Economics. It is only under this first part that the book fully 45 46 succeeds, more on this to follow. 47 48 49 50 Dunn divides JKG’s thought into to two main currents, the first is his “major trilogy” (p. 295) of 51 52 the corporatization of the American economy. This trilogy being The Affluent Society (1958), 53 54 The New Industrial State (1967) and Economics and the Public Purpose (1973). It is in these 55 56 57 volumes that JKG proposes his theories of the “bimodal” economy where the large corporations 58 59 60 [email protected] Cambridge University Press Page 2 of 8 2 1 2 3 (one-half of the economy) hold smaller businesses, the other half of the economy, in a 4 5 6 “subservient” (p. 354) position due to the social power created by the “technostructure” in the 7 8 large corporations. This current also includes JKG’s well-known “social imbalance” narrative 9 10 11 where society spends too much on personal consumption while there is the “under production of 12 13 merit and public goods” (p. 89). It is the corporate technostructure which has harnessed the 14 15 awesome technological powers of modern capitalism to produce “socially irrelevant 16 17 18 commodities” (p. 89) while,For unfortunately, Peer power Review over this technology is not in the hands of 19 20 those who provide public goods (Galbraith’s main concerns were environmental degradation, 21 22 militarization, lack of public housing, healthcare and transportation, and, an education system 23 24 25 focused too much on economic production). 26 27 28 The second thesis, where Dunn attempts to show how JKG’s thought has been influential on 29 30 subsequent Post-Keynesians, plays less of a role in the book and in fact only is discussed in 31 32 33 detail not until the last quarter of the book. The major works in this narrative are The Great 34 35 Crash, 1929 (1955), Money (1975) and A Short History of Financial Euphoria (1990). It is here 36 37 that we are introduced to the Post-Keynesian tropes of endogenous (and non-neutral) money, the 38 39 40 wage-price spiral, imperfect competition and excess capacity (only of course in the dominant 41 42 large corporations), the failure of Say’s Law in bringing adequate employment without 43 44 government fiscal policy demand management, and, the fallacy of composition where debt at the 45 46 47 macro (State) level cannot be compared to that of the household if that public debt is used to 48 49 ensure adequate levels of employment, especially for public works during periods of recession 50 51 52 and depression. 53 54 55 The two currents of the book then are held together under the “bimodal” theory. As one example 56 57 we find that retained earnings reduce risk faced by the large corporations from the endogenous 58 59 60 [email protected] Page 3 of 8 Cambridge University Press 3 1 2 3 money instabilities created by a monopolized-centralized monetary authority, whereas 4 5 6 manipulation of the interest rate can influence economic activity in the “market” (smaller 7 8 businesses) as opposed to the “planning system” (the dominant large corporations). 9 10 11 Where the book might have been improved in Dunn’s attempt to place JKG in the historical 12 13 14 lineage of Post- Keynesian economic thought is in the chapter called “Money and the real 15 16 world”. It is here that Dunn describes JKG’s ideas relating to today’s current Post-Keynesian 17 18 tropes as espoused by,For for example, Peer Victoria Chick, Review Paul Davidson, Paul Krugman, Hyman P. 19 20 21 Minsky, Malcolm C. Sawyer, Paul Shiller and Dunn himself. (There is a curious lack of 22 23 reference to Robert Frank in this book, someone whose views on consumerism and normative 24 25 26 prescription closely follow JKG, though there are the necessary references to Veblen). Dunn 27 28 describes JKG’s ideas well, while mostly only giving relevant citations to these follow-on Post- 29 30 Keynesian thinkers. What is missing in this chapter is analysis as to how JKG’s ideas actually 31 32 33 influenced these following thinkers. Describing JKG’s ideas, then adding citations for further 34 35 readings does not complete the argument that Dunn states he sets out to achieve. For a 36 37 knowledgeable Post-Keynesian this approach might be sufficient but for a historian of economic 38 39 40 thought new to and interested in, such a popular figure as JKG, this is insufficient and perhaps 41 42 disappointing. 43 44 45 This being said, however, in the next chapter mostly about financial booms and busts called “A 46 47 48 man for our times” Dunn is much more careful and thorough while at the same time using 49 50 sparkling narrative in describing the commonalities (and some critique) amongst Post- 51 52 Keynesians on the instability of endogenous money capitalism. It appears that Dunn is more 53 54 55 interested in the analysis of this instability as opposed to more general Post-Keynesian economic 56 57 theory. Whether or not one agrees that “greed”, “speculation”, “hubris”, “deregulation” and the 58 59 60 [email protected] Cambridge University Press Page 4 of 8 4 1 2 3 herd-like behavior of the “animal spirits” create recession- and depression-causing business- 4 5 6 cycles, Dunn here has done well in presenting JKG’s influence upon Galbraithian descendants 7 8 (including Paul Krugman and Joseph Stiglitz). In this chapter we learn as well that financial 9 10 11 institutions deemed “too big to fail” are part of the dominant sector in JKG’s bimodal theory 12 13 (that is until/if they are allowed to go bankrupt and become liquidated). 14 15 16 Dunn spends most of the book on describing the “planning system” used by corporations to 17 18 minimize market risk, Fordescribing howPeer these corporat Reviewions have the ability, through monopolistic 19 20 21 power, to manipulate, in fact “victimize” (p. 63) the consumer into buying their product. The 22 23 planning system of these corporations (the tobacco, pharmaceutical, agro-business and 24 25 26 automobile industries are described in the most detail) give them power over the consumer to 27 28 where it is not price competition (nor consumer sovereignty) that determines supply and demand. 29 30 31 Large corporations support Keynesian demand management (government spending in times of 32 33 34 economic downturn) in order to keep demand high enough to produce at their capacity 35 36 (technological advance and concomitant investment leads to over-capacity), yet we find that 37 38 Galbraith admits that these fiscal stimulus policies help the dominant sector over the general 39 40 41 good. Large corporations, especially those in the military-industrial complex and those receiving 42 43 the necessary stimulus spending (some corporations seek “a protective response from the state”, 44 45 p. 61) have social and economic powers over the other half of the economy which is dependent 46 47 48 upon the market alone for survival. 49 50 51 Dunn proposes that this corporate “planning system” adds to what was missing in pre- 52 53 Galbraithian Keynesianism; a microfoundation for stability to compliment the macrofoundations 54 55 56 of the stability of monetary and fiscal policy. However, others may not agree with this as this 57 58 59 60 [email protected] Page 5 of 8 Cambridge University Press 5 1 2 3 was perhaps accomplished by Ronald Coase in 1937, albeit of course Coase is not considered of 4 5 6 the Post-Keynesian school. Dunn places JKG’s work in reference to that of Coase, but, at least 7 8 to this reviewer, credits JKG with too much originality viz-a-viz Coase. 9 10 11 In Galbraith’s “Revised Sequence” where it is not the consumer who is sovereign it is the 12 13 14 dominant large corporate sector who receives the fiscal stimulus spending (and benefits of the 15 16 “multiplier”) needed to keep producing towards capacity while not having to lower prices and 17 18 profits and who gain throughFor the wealthPeer created undReviewer capitalism and the affluent society.
Recommended publications
  • BIS Working Papers No 136 the Price Level, Relative Prices and Economic Stability: Aspects of the Interwar Debate by David Laidler* Monetary and Economic Department
    BIS Working Papers No 136 The price level, relative prices and economic stability: aspects of the interwar debate by David Laidler* Monetary and Economic Department September 2003 * University of Western Ontario Abstract Recent financial instability has called into question the sufficiency of low inflation as a goal for monetary policy. This paper discusses interwar literature bearing on this question. It begins with theories of the cycle based on the quantity theory, and their policy prescription of price stability supported by lender of last resort activities in the event of crises, arguing that their neglect of fluctuations in investment was a weakness. Other approaches are then taken up, particularly Austrian theory, which stressed the banking system’s capacity to generate relative price distortions and forced saving. This theory was discredited by its association with nihilistic policy prescriptions during the Great Depression. Nevertheless, its core insights were worthwhile, and also played an important part in Robertson’s more eclectic account of the cycle. The latter, however, yielded activist policy prescriptions of a sort that were discredited in the postwar period. Whether these now need re-examination, or whether a low-inflation regime, in which the authorities stand ready to resort to vigorous monetary expansion in the aftermath of asset market problems, is adequate to maintain economic stability is still an open question. BIS Working Papers are written by members of the Monetary and Economic Department of the Bank for International Settlements, and from time to time by other economists, and are published by the Bank. The views expressed in them are those of their authors and not necessarily the views of the BIS.
    [Show full text]
  • Effective Competition and Corporate Disclosure A
    EFFECTIVE COMPETITION AND CORPORATE DISCLOSURE A CRITICAL STUDY by RAZAHUSSEIN M, DEVJI B. Sc. (Econ)», University of London, 1961 Barrister-at-Law, Honourable Society of Middle Temple, London, 1962 A THESIS SUBMITTED IN PARTIAL FULFILLMENT OF THE REQUIREMENTS FOR THE DEGREE OF MASTER OF BUSINESS ADMINISTRATION In the Faculty of Graduate Studies We accept this thesis as conforming to the required staricTardT THE UNIVERSITY OF BRITISH COLUMBIA September, 1968 In presenting this thesis in partial ful• filment of the requirements for an advanced degree at the University of British Columbia, I agree that the Library shall make it freely available for reference and study* I further agree that permission for ex• tensive copying of this thesis for scholarly purposes may be granted by the Head of my Department or by his representatives. It is understood that copying or publication of this thesis for financial gain shall not be allowed without my written permission. Faculty of Commerce and Business Administration, The University of British Columbia, Vancouver 8, B. C. Canada. ABSTRACT Economic activity in the United States and Canada is predominantly performed by corporations. They are by far the largest private employers of workers, the biggest investors and the predominant instrument of production. They are rapidly growing in size, are generating sufficient funds internally to carry out most of their expansion programs, and are diversifying into unrelated activities. Their affairs are increasingly managed by professional executives who have little, if any, stake In the risk capital. The shareholders, who are legally pre• sumed to exercise control over the powers and actions of corporate executives, are normally too numerous and scattered so as not to be in a position to have a significant influence on the policies of the corporations.
    [Show full text]
  • The Death of the Firm
    Article The Death of the Firm June Carbone† & Nancy Levit†† INTRODUCTION A corporation is simply a form of organization used by human beings to achieve desired ends. An established body of law specifies the rights and obligations of the people (including shareholders, officers, and employees) who are associated with a corporation in one way or another. When rights, whether constitutional or statutory, are ex- tended to corporations, the purpose is to protect the rights of these people.1 In the Supreme Court’s decision in Burwell v. Hobby Lob- by—and more generally in corporate and employment law—the firm as entity is disappearing as a unit of legal analysis. We use the term “firm” in this Article in the sense that Ronald Coase did to describe a form of business organization that or- ders the production of goods and services through use of a sys- tem internal to the enterprise rather than through the use of independent contractors.2 The idea of an “entity” in this sense † Robina Chair in Law, Science and Technology, University of Minneso- ta Law School. †† Curators’ and Edward D. Ellison Professor of Law, University of Mis- souri – Kansas City School of Law. We thank William K. Black, Margaret F. Brinig, Naomi Cahn, Paul Callister, Mary Ann Case, Lynne Dallas, Robert Downs, Max Eichner, Martha Fineman, Barb Glesner Fines, Claire Hill, Brett McDonnell, Amy Monahan, Charles O’Kelley, Hari Osofsky, Irma Russell, Dan Schwarcz, Lynn Stout, and Erik P.M. Vermeulen for their helpful comments on drafts of this Article and Tracy Shoberg and Shiveta Vaid for their research support.
    [Show full text]
  • Guide to Further Reading
    Guide to further reading To follow contemporary debates in organisational economics and organisation theory it is necessary to consult the journals, of which there are too many to list. For organisational economics I would recommend the Journal of Economic Behavior and Organization. Of more relevance to this book, in terms of airing inter- and intradisciplinary differences, the Journal of Economic Perspectives is better. The leading journals in organisation theory have increasingly given attention to organisational economics. The most important are: Administrative Science Quarterly; Academy of Management Review; Organization Science; and Organization Studies. In addition, the editors of Human Relations are keen on including interdisciplinary work, particularly from sociologists, economists and psychologists. The main emphasis of this guide is not journal articles but edited collections of readings and introductory books. Starting with game theory, Poundstone, The Prisoner's Dilemma (1993), gives a straightforward introduction to, and a history of, the theory. Avoiding the maths again, Dixit and Nalebuff, Thinking Strategically (1991), gives an idea of the applications of game theory. Axelrod, The Evolution of Cooperation (1990), is not only influential, but highly readable. Neoclassical, managerial and behavioural theories of the firm are all dealt with clearly in Sawyer's excellent little book, Theories of the Firm (1979). For more general overviews and explicit critiques of economics, Galbraith ought to be read at some point, and his book, A History of Economics (1987) is better than the many more scholarly histories of economics. Hodgson's Economics and Institutions (1988) is a more difficult and sustained critique of contemporary economics, but he gives considerable attention to organisational economics.
    [Show full text]
  • A Modern Reader in Institutional and Evolutionary Economics : Key Concepts / Edited by Geoffrey M
    A Modern Reader in Institutional and Evolutionary Economics EUROPEAN ASSOCIATION FOR EVOLUTIONARY POLITICAL ECONOMY Series Editor: Geoffrey M. Hodgson, University of Hertfordshire Business School, UK Mixed Economies in Europe: An Evolutionary Perspective on their Emergence, Transition and Regulation Edited by Wolfgang Blaas and John Foster The Political Economy of Diversity: Evolutionary Perspectives on Economic Order and Disorder Edited by Robert Delorme and Kurt Dopfer On Economic Institutions: Theory and Applications Edited by John Groenewegen, Christos Pitelis and Sven-Erik Sjöstrand Rethinking Economics: Markets, Technology and Economic Evolution Edited by Geoffrey M. Hodgson and Ernesto Screpanti Environment, Technology and Economic Growth: The Challenge to Sustainable Development Edited by Andrew Tylecote and Jan van der Straaten Institutions and Economic Change: New Perspectives on Markets, Firms and Technology Edited by Klaus Nielsen and Björn Johnson Pluralism in Economics: New Perspectives in History and Methodology Edited by Andrea Salanti and Ernesto Screpanti Beyond Market and Hierarchy: Interactive Governance and Social Complexity Edited by Ash Amin and Jerzy Hausner Employment, Technology and Economic Needs: Theory, Evidence and Public Policy Edited by Jonathan Michie and Angelo Reati Institutions and the Evolution of Capitalism: Implications of Evolutionary Economics Edited by John Groenewegen and Jack Vromen Is Economics an Evolutionary Science? The Legacy of Thorstein Veblen Edited by Francisco Louçã and Mark Perlman Technology and Knowledge: From the Firm to Innovation Systems Edited by Pier Paolo Saviotti and Bart Nooteboom Evolution and Path Dependence in Economic Ideas: Past and Present Edited by Pierre Garrouste and Stavros Ioannides A Modern Reader in Institutional and Evolutionary Economics: Key Concepts Edited by Geoffrey M.
    [Show full text]
  • Volume 7 Issue 5 + 6 2020
    COSMOS + TAXIS A Galbraithian Perspective on Epistemic Institutionalism and True Liberalism THEODORE BURCZAK Denison University Email: [email protected] Web: https://denison.edu/people/theodore-burczak Near the end of his book on F. A. Hayek, Peter Boettke advocates for a “true liberalism” growing out of Hayek’s the institutional framework that best enables epistemically thought that is “most conducive to human flourishing” limited individuals to strive and flourish. (Boettke 2018, p. 252). A consistent theme in Hayek’s oeu- This is a seriously truncated vision. A “true” liberal rec- vre is a careful investigation of what Boettke calls “epis- ognizes that a “valid image of the modern economy” is not temic institutionalism.” For Boettke, it is Hayek’s explora- one where most individuals are responding to price signals tion of epistemic institutionalism that helps produce this that emerge from competitive markets (Galbraith 2001, p. true liberalism. This short paper sketches a counterargu- 118). People shaping tin are not typically working in a small ment that Hayek’s epistemic institutionalism is hobbled, shop, buying raw material from and selling their product 5 making Hayekian liberalism itself truncated and “false,” directly into the global market. Much more likely, the metal more akin to a species of conservatism. A genuine liberal- worker is employed by a large organization with production ism based on a more thoroughgoing epistemic institution- units spread around the globe, where flows of sheet metal alism is far more progressive than the typical Hayekian is are directed by administered prices and decisions of pur- likely apt to accept. chasing managers.
    [Show full text]
  • Patinkin on Keynes
    On Post Keynesian economics and the economics of Keynes1 Roger E. Backhouse University of Birmingham and Erasmus University Rotterdam and Bradley W. Bateman Denison University Version 8 June 2011 1. Introduction Given that it so clearly borrows from the title of Axel Leijonhufvud’s great book (1968), your expectation may well be that we are going to provide a detailed analysis of the analytical errors of Post Keynesian economics, setting up an opposition between Post Keynesian economics and the theory that John Maynard Keynes developed in The General Theory of Employment, Interest and Money (JMK VII [1936]). However, this is 1 This talk, was written for the Keynes Seminar at Cambridge, on 23 May 2011. Section 3 draws on Backhouse (2010a) and section 4 draws extensively on Backhouse and Bateman (2010). Many of the ideas about Keynes are discussed in Backhouse and Bateman (forthcoming). It has been revised following helpful comments from Victoria Chick, Mark Hayes, Tony Lawson and Roberto Scazzieri. It should not be inferred that any of them would endorse the conclusions we reach. 1 of 29 not the line we intend to pursue. Thus we are not challenging interpretations such as the one offered by Mark Hayes (2006) who has sought to identify a consistent theoretical framework within The General Theory. Instead, we wish to challenge the Post Keynesian claim to exclusive rights over Keynes’s legacy – that their ideas are, to use the metaphor popularized by Joan Robinson, the only legitimate progeny of The General Theory and that mainstream Keynesianism is not. Our contention is that to make such a claim is to take a position in relation to The General Theory that is very different from the one that Keynes himself took.2 The Samuelsonian neoclassical synthesis, or the new Keynesian macroeconomics are, we contend, no more Keynes’s bastard progeny than are the various strands of Post Keynesian economics.
    [Show full text]
  • The Chancellor Must End Austerity Now – It Is Punishing an Entire Generation
    Stiglitz, J., Ha-Joon, C., Graeber, D., Pettigor, A., Dorling, D., Sassen, S. et al. (2017) The chancellor must end austerity now – it is punishing an entire generation, letter, The Guardian, November 19th, https://www.theguardian.com/society/2017/nov/19/the-chancellor-must-end-austerity- now-it-is-punishing-an-entire-generation The chancellor must end austerity now – it is punishing an entire generation Alongside the human costs, cuts have hurt our economy, and we’ve now reached a dangerous tipping point, say Joseph Stiglitz, Ha-Joon Chang and 111 others Public sector workers protest against cuts. Photograph: Oli Scarff/Getty Images Letters, Sunday 19 November 2017 19.11 GMT Seven years of austerity has destroyed lives. An estimated 30,000 excess deaths can be linked to cuts in NHS spending and the social care crisis in 2015 alone. The number of food parcels given to impoverished Britons has grown from tens of thousands in 2010 to over a million. Children are suffering from real-terms spending cuts in up to 88% of schools. The public sector pay cap has meant that millions of workers are struggling to make ends meet. 1 Alongside the mounting human costs, austerity has hurt our economy. The UK has experienced its weakest recovery on record and suffers from poor levels of investment, leading to low productivity and falling wages. This government has missed every one of its own debt reduction targets because austerity simply doesn’t work. The case for cuts has been grounded in ideology and untruths. We’ve been told public debt is the outcome of overspending on public services rather than bailing out the banks.
    [Show full text]
  • Money, Trust, and Central Bank Legitimacy in the Age of Quantitative Easing
    A Service of Leibniz-Informationszentrum econstor Wirtschaft Leibniz Information Centre Make Your Publications Visible. zbw for Economics Braun, Benjamin Working Paper Speaking to the people? Money, trust, and central bank legitimacy in the age of quantitative easing MPIfG Discussion Paper, No. 16/12 Provided in Cooperation with: Max Planck Institute for the Study of Societies (MPIfG), Cologne Suggested Citation: Braun, Benjamin (2016) : Speaking to the people? Money, trust, and central bank legitimacy in the age of quantitative easing, MPIfG Discussion Paper, No. 16/12, Max Planck Institute for the Study of Societies, Cologne This Version is available at: http://hdl.handle.net/10419/147500 Standard-Nutzungsbedingungen: Terms of use: Die Dokumente auf EconStor dürfen zu eigenen wissenschaftlichen Documents in EconStor may be saved and copied for your Zwecken und zum Privatgebrauch gespeichert und kopiert werden. personal and scholarly purposes. Sie dürfen die Dokumente nicht für öffentliche oder kommerzielle You are not to copy documents for public or commercial Zwecke vervielfältigen, öffentlich ausstellen, öffentlich zugänglich purposes, to exhibit the documents publicly, to make them machen, vertreiben oder anderweitig nutzen. publicly available on the internet, or to distribute or otherwise use the documents in public. Sofern die Verfasser die Dokumente unter Open-Content-Lizenzen (insbesondere CC-Lizenzen) zur Verfügung gestellt haben sollten, If the documents have been made available under an Open gelten abweichend von diesen Nutzungsbedingungen
    [Show full text]
  • WRAP THESIS Braun 2014.Pdf
    University of Warwick institutional repository: http://go.warwick.ac.uk/wrap A Thesis Submitted for the Degree of PhD at the University of Warwick http://go.warwick.ac.uk/wrap/67054 This thesis is made available online and is protected by original copyright. Please scroll down to view the document itself. Please refer to the repository record for this item for information to help you to cite it. Our policy information is available from the repository home page. Benjamin Braun Central bank agency and monetary governability in the euro area: Governing through money, trust, and expectations Thesis submitted in partial fulfilment of the requirements for a PhD in Politics and International Studies conducted in the Department of Politics and Inter- national Studies at the University of Warwick Supervised by Professor Matthew Watson and Doctor Amandine Crespy September 2014 Table of contents List of tables and figures ... vi List of abbreviations ... vii Acknowledgements ... viii Declaration ... ix Abstract ... x Introduction ... 1 Central banking – a blind spot in the political science literature on central banks? ... 3 The monetary policy paradigm of the Great Moderation, and why it (still) matters ... 6 Analytical framework and theoretical concepts: Central bank agency, governability, performativity, audi- ences, and apparatuses ... 10 Case, data, and methodology ... 15 Contributions to the literature ... 19 Chapter structure ... 22 1. The making and unmaking of governability in macroeconomic discourse ... 26 1.1 Macroeconomic governability paradigms ... 29 1.1.1 Governability paradigms vs. policy paradigms ... 30 1.1.2 Three elements of macroeconomic governability paradigms ... 33 1.2 From Keynesian uncertainty to the neoclassical synthesis ..
    [Show full text]
  • Specialization and Trade
    Specialization and Trade 100148_FM.indd 1 5/20/16 9:15 PM 100148_FM.indd 2 5/20/16 9:15 PM Specialization and Trade A RE-INTRODUCTION TO ECONOMICS Arnold Kling CATO INSTITUTE WASHINGTON, D.C. 100148_FM.indd 3 5/20/16 9:15 PM Copyright © 2016 by Arnold Kling. All rights reserved. Library of Congress Cataloging-in-Publication Data Names: Kling, Arnold S., author. Title: Specialization and trade : a reintroduction to economics : an introduction / Arnold Kling. Description: Washington, D.C. : Cato Institute, [2016] | Includes bibliographical references and index. Identifiers: LCCN 2016017478 (print) | LCCN 2016023070 (ebook) | ISBN 9781944424152 (pbk. : alk. paper) | ISBN 9781944424176 (audiobook : alk. paper) | ISBN 9781944424169 (ebook) Subjects: LCSH: Economics. | Economic specialization. | Interna- tional trade. Classification: LCC HB171 .K545 2016 (print) | LCC HB171 (ebook) | DDC 330—dc23 Printed in the United States of America. CATO INSTITUTE 1000 Massachusetts Ave., N.W. Washington, D.C. 20001 www.cato.org 100148_FM.indd 4 5/20/16 9:15 PM CONTENTS Foreword . vii. Acknowledgments . .ix . Introduction . 1. 1. Filling in Frameworks . 21. 2. Machine as Metaphor . 37. 3. Instructions and Incentives . 51 4. Choices and Commands . .61 . 5. Specialization and Sustainability . .77 . 6. Trade and Trust. 91 7. Finance and Fluctuations . 103. 8. Policy in Practice . 121. 9. Macroeconomics and Misgivings . 135. 10. Concluding Contemplation . .177 . Appendix: How Housing and Mortgage Policy Worked in Practice . .179 . v 100148_FM.indd 5 5/20/16 9:15 PM 100148_FM.indd 6 5/20/16 9:15 PM Foreword Early in 2015, I came across a volume of essays edited by E. Roy Weintraub titled MIT and the Transformation of American Economics.1 After digesting the essays, I thought to myself, “So that’s how it all went wrong.” Let me hasten to mention that my own doctorate in eco- nomics, which I obtained in 1980, comes from MIT.
    [Show full text]
  • 1 February 20, 2015 HAROLD DEMSETZ Arthur Andersen UCLA Alumni Emeritus Professor Emeritus Business Economics Address: Departmen
    February 20, 2015 HAROLD DEMSETZ Arthur Andersen UCLA Alumni Emeritus Professor Emeritus Business Economics Address: Department of Economics, University of California, Los Angeles, California 90095. Telephones: Office: (2l3) 825-365l; Home: (818) 343-8743 Fax: 310-825-9528 (Departmental fax). Education Northwestern University, Evanston, Illinois: Ph.D. and M.A. (Economics, l959); MBA (1954) University of Illinois, Urbana, Illinois: B.S. (Economics, l953) Professional Employment Academic Emeritus Professor, UCLA 1994 University of California, Los Angeles, California. Professor, l97l to 1994. Arthur Andersen UCLA Alumni Chair in Business Economics, 1986 to 1995. Director, Economic/Business Program, l983 to 1995. Chairman, Economics Department, l978-l980. Assistant Professor to Associate Professor, 1960-1963. Senior Research Fellow, the Hoover Institution, l97l-l979; Washington University, St. Louis, Missouri Visiting Distinguished Professor, l982-l983. University of Chicago, Chicago, Illinois Associate to full Professor of Economics, Graduate School of Business and the Law School, l963-l97l; visiting Professor, 1990. University of Michigan, Ann Arbor, Michigan Instructor to Assistant Professor, Economics Department, l958-l960. Non-academic Consultant to the RAND Corporation, l96l-l962. 1 Scientific Analyst for the Center for Naval Analyses, while on leave from U.C.L.A., l963. Consultant to General Motors, l974. Consultant to ARCO, l976-l985. Honorary Societies and Awards Fellow, American Academy of Arts and Sciences. Honorary Doctorate of Humane Letters, received from Northwestern University 1994 Honorary Doctorate of Social Studies, received from Francisco Marraquinn University 1996 Listed in Great Economists Since Keynes, by Mark Blaugh, l983. Listed in Who=s Who in Economics, Who=s Who in America, Who's Who in the Social Sciences, Who's Who in the West and in other similar directories.
    [Show full text]