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PLATO's Theory of LANGUAGE Online ISSN 2424-6158. PROBLEMOS 2017 91 DOI: http://dx.doi.org/10.15388/Problemos.2017.91.10506 PLATO’S THEORY OF LANGUAGE: THE ISOMORPHISM OF KOSMOS AND LOGOS IN THE TIMAEUS* Alexey Pleshkov Poletayev Institute for Theoretical and Historical Studies in the Humanities, The National Research University Higher School of Economics (HSE) 20 Myasnitskaya str. Moscow 101000, Russia E-mail: [email protected] Abstract. The paper considers Plato’s theory of language through the prism of the Timaeus’ metaphy- sics. It is argued that the apparent contradictions of Plato’s philosophy of language are the consequence of the two-fold nature of language, and that the metaphysical scheme proposed by Plato in the Timaeus can shed a light on his coherent theory of language. The linguo-metaphysical isomorphism of the Tima- eus presupposes that (1) words and material elements have their own meaning and nature respectively; (2) they can be reduced to an infinite variety of amorphic sounds and receptacle; (3) the participation in truth is possible only at the level of narrative and universe. According to this scheme the universe (κόσμος), as well as any speech (λόγος), can be explained by the reduction to its constituent elements, but it will be only necessary explanation. Whereas for Plato, the true understanding of cosmos and logos is possible only on the level of the coherent unity of the whole, which represents the ideal paradigm in the best possible way. Keywords: Plato, the Timaeus, theory of language, metaphysics, language naturalism, language con- ventionalism [H]is handwriting was slovenly; he misjoined his words; he cared nothing about spelling; his one concern was for the idea Porphyry. “On the Life of Plotinus” Different problems concerning the nature dedicated exclusively to the issues of lan- and functioning of language are discussed guage. The very fact of using the form of a by Plato in different dialogues, such as dialogue implies that Plato was permanently the Phaedo, the Phaedrus, the Theaetetus, concerned with the issues of language, and the Sophist. Moreover, the Cratylus is broadly construed. Nevertheless, Plato’s philosophy of language as an integral and consistent theory cannot be explicated from * The article was prepared within the framework of the Basic Research Program at the National Research his writings. University Higher School of Economics (HSE) and In the discussion concerning the origin supported within the framework of a subsidy granted to and nature of language in the Cratylus, Plato the HSE by the Government of the Russian Federation for the implementation of the Global Competitiveness consistently attacks radical conventionalism Program. of Hermogenes, and proposes extensive ety- 128 mological excursus to justify the essential phers within etymological studies and the interconnection of words and things (Crat. so called theory of sound symbolism. Some 385а–427с). But at the end of the dialogue particular linguistic elaborations are also he notices that “we should be content to introduced, such as typology of sounds have agreed that it is far better to investigate and letters, words, and sentences. The situ- them [e.g. things] and learn about them ation seems paradoxical. On the one hand, through themselves than to do so through the context of language studies in Ancient their names” (Crat. 439b), implying that Greece between the 6th and the 4th centuries naturalistic conception cannot explain the BCE is well known and is reconstructed in language in use and presupposing the pref- considerable detail on the basis of scarce erence of conventionalism. Respectively, material2. On the other hand, the place and in the discussion of the role of language role of Plato in this context, as it follows in the process of knowledge, language is from contradictory interpretations of his considered a necessary and exclusive tool philosophy, is still not clarified, despite the for the search of the truth (Phaedo 99e– generosity of history to his texts. 100a), nevertheless, language inevitably In this case, clarification of Plato’s presumes the mixture of the true and false ideas about language through the context (Soph. 259е–268d, Phileb. 15d–e)1. of language studies in Ancient Greece is a By the time of Plato’s life and work, legitimate and productive strategy. The am- numerous crucial issues about language biguities of Plato’s position may be consid- had been raised and examined in Ancient ered as either his indication of insufficiency Greece. Two opposite positions concerning of both positions to explain the complicated the connection between things and words, nature of language, or Plato’s sceptical conventionalism and naturalism, were position concerning the very possibility of developed in a broader discussion about explaining the origin of language3. Never- nature (φύσις) and law (νόμος). The idea theless, the Corpus Platonicum itself can of evolutionary development of language help specify Plato’s position. I argue that is put forth in opposition to archaic intui- (a) the apparent contradictions of Plato’s tion of divine or wise founder of language. theory of language are the consequence of Epistemological resources of language are the twofold nature of language, which Plato actively absorbed by sophists and philoso- is surely aware of, as I will demonstrate; and that (b) the metaphysical scheme proposed 4 1 The same ambivalence is observed in the re- by Plato in the late dialogue the Timaeus search literature. Reviewing the history of the Cra- can shed a light on his coherent theory of tylus’ studies, Grintser (1994: 189-191; 2014: 54-58) uses the metaphor of a pendulum: some scholars (e.g. language. Although the Timaeus is rarely Clegg 1973: 27) argue that Plato is developing a natu- ralistic conception of language, while others (e.g. Rehn 1982: 25) argue that Plato stands for conventionalism. 2 E.g., Manetti (1993: 14-35), Modrak (2006: 640- Consequently, some scholars (Rehn 1982: 23; Sluiter 643), Verlinsky (2006: 92-269), Grintser (2014: 55-58, 1990: 12) consider Plato’s etymological investigations 62-79). as a mere game, unserious and ironic, while the other 3 See Gaiser (1974: 32), Woodruff (1986: 25-30). (Gaiser 1974: 49, 77; Sedley 2003: 23ff) see in these 4 For the discussions about dating of the dialogue speculations the integral part of Plato’s theory. see Zeyl (2000: xvi–xx). 129 used for the clarification of Plato’s views Thus, Solon is told about ancient Athens by on language5, the philosopher consistently an Egyptian priest (1), then Solon retells it emphasizes the importance of the linguistic to Dropides (2), Dropides tells it to Critias’ dimension throughout the dialogue and grandfather (3), the grandfather retells the gives the readers unambiguous hints at the story to his ten-year-old grandson (4), in his tight coupling of his theory of language and old age, this grandson mentions the story to metaphysics. Thus, in the paper I explicate Hermokrates the day before the dialogue the language theory of Plato’s on the basis takes place (5), then this story is retold by of his metaphysics in the Timaeus. Critias to Hermokrates and Timaeus in the morning before the dialogue (6), finally, Language Matters Socrates gets to hear the story in the dia- From the very beginning of the Timaeus’ logue (7). introductory part, Plato deliberately empha- Critias’ story, more precisely his re- sizes the importance of the linguistic dimen- telling of the retelling of the retelling… sion: “the main part of the discourse” (17c), (retelling to the power of six), seems hardly “for we said” (18a), “and it was said” (18b), sufficient for Socrates’ goals. Consequently, “we went on to say” (18c), “how we said” Socrates’ remark (26e) that it is “genuine (18d), “so we said” (19a), “what was said” history” (ἀληθινὸς λόγος) and not “in- (19b), etc. As noted by Catherine Rowett, vented fable” (πλασθέντα μῦθος) can there are thirteen direct references to the act be understood only as an irony and counts of speaking (λέγω) on just two of Stefanus’ in favour of the latter6. At any rate, the pages. Socrates here does not describe the whole introductory part of the Timaeus is institutes and practices of the ideal polis, but implicitly concentrated on the dimension he recalls what was said about it (Osborne of language and dedicated to words, words, 1996: 181-183). words. No less important is language in All these arguments, according to So- Timaeus’ story. crates, lack vitality, so Critias proposes his story of ancient Athens to correct this Isomorphisms of the Timaeus deficiency (20d–26d). Now Plato’s reader is captured by language even more, although There is a similarity between the two cen- not at the level of semantics, but at the tral figures of Plato’s dialogue, Timaeus level of narrative. To “vitalize” the ideal and the demiurge. First, there is almost city, Critias offers a story which is literally nothing known about both. There is only buried under linguistic layers of genera- one explicit characteristic of the demiurge tions, being retold seven times (20c–21e). in the dialogue: “he was good” (ἀγαθὸς ἦν – 29e). The goodness of the demiurge, however, is not just postulated by Timaeus, 5 While there has been some important research on but described in the whole first part of his various aspects of Plato’s theory of language in the Ti- maeus (Brague 1986; Osborne 1996; Burnyet 2005), it is significant that there are no references to the dialogue at all in the works dedicated to the general interpretation 6 Timaeus’ account is described as a “likely story” of Plato’s philosophy of language (Demos 1964; Partee (εἰκός μῦθος – 29d, 59c, 68d), nevertheless, it does not 1972; Crivelli 2008). mean a detraction of its importance (cf. Burnyeat 2005).
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