"Imperia1 Sunset: Grand Strategies of Hegemons in Relative Decline.''
Steven Daniel Breton
Department of Political Science "McGill University, Montreal"
August, 1996
A thesis submitted to the Faculty of Graduate Studies and Research in partial fulfillment of the requirements of the degree of Masters of Art in Political Science. National library BiMiitttèque nationale du Canada Acquisitions and Acquisitions et Bibliograph'i Services seMces bibliographiques 395 Weiiinglan Street 395. rue Wellington -ON KIAûN4 OtWwaON K1AON4 Canede Canada
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"Imperia1 Sunset: Grand Strategies of Hegernons in Relative Decline."
This thesis investigates the economic and military policies hegemons pursue while expenencing relative deciine. Based upon the rising costs of leadership associated with hegemony, this thesis establishes that both systemic and dornestic environrnents equally influence the hegemon's policy-making. Furthermore, the paper contends that hegemons do practice strategic planning during relative decline, in an effort to adjust its commitments and resources to the environment. Relative success or failure in maintaining the international system and thus adjusting for decline depends on how decision-makers compensate for two prevailing variables: threat of challengers and availability of allies. This study offers a predictive theoretical mode1 for interpreting the dynamics of grand strategy formulation, compensating for the influences of the domestic environment three historical case studies, the Dutch Republic, Britain and the United States, test the accuracy and validity of the model. This thesis finds that penods of strong leadership, void of threat, while augmented by exremal balancing best support a hegemon's relative decline.
"Le Coucher du Soleil Impérial: Grandes Stratégies des Hegemons en Déclin Relatif"
Cette thèse enquête les politiques economiques et militaires que les hegemons poursuivent pendant le déclin relatif. Selon les coûts augmentants de l'autorité associé avec l'hegemonie, la thèse établit que les environs systémiques et domestiques influence également la ligne de conduite de l'hegemon. De plus, la thèse soutent que les hegemons exercicent des projets stratégiques pendant le déclin, essayant d'ajuster leur engagements et ressources a l'environ. Lè succes ou l'insuccès relatif en maintenant le système international, et ainsi l'ajustement pour le déclin depénd du manière en le quel les chefs compensent deux variables prédominants: la menace des adversaires et la présence des allies. Cet étude offre un modèle théorique pour interpréter les dynamiques des formules des grandes stratégies, compensant por les influences de l'environ domestique. Trois études historiques, le république hollandais, la Grande- Bretagne et les États-unis mets à l'épreuve l'exactitude et la validité du modèle. La thèse trouve que les périodes de direction ferme, dénué de menace, et augmenter par l'équilibrage extérieur atténue le déclin relatif de l'hegemon. This MAthesis has been both a reward'ig and traumatic experience. Over the years of constant research, theoretid development, and more research, 1combed WtuaIly every Library between McGill University and the University of Arizona. My search for the answen to the riddles of relative decline eventually led me back to the teachings of my thesis advisor, Professor Mark Brawley. His lectures, advise and publication, Liberal Leadershi3 aiways kept my focus on the basics of hegemonic theory. Where Professor Brawley indulges in economic theory, 1 concentrate on the military contributions to hegemony. The combination of both views provide for a more robust mode1 and sounder fhdings. Thank-you Mark for your guidance.
The U.S. Anny surprisingly makes a signincant contribution to the foiiowing research. My skiüs as a Miltary Intelligence Otticer directly correlate to my abilities as a student. I utilize the same analyticai tools and techniques for conducting intelligence preparation of the battlefield ([PB) that 1 use on studying British arategy in the 19th century. While my profession directly applies both analysis and conjecture to threat situations, 1 develop a new, more profound appreciation for the tireless work of the scholar. McGiil has made me a better intelligence officer while the Amy made me, 1 hope, a better scholar.
1 need to express my deepest appreciation to a plethora of individuals, so 1 will ümit the references. Thank-you to the McGill Department of Political Science, especially Ms. Susan Bartlett, Ms. Helen Wicka and Professor Mdedi, for supporthg this seemingiy endless odyssey caîled "Breton's thesis". Thanks to my forever supportive parents, sister, and &ends. Thanks to the lûth Mountain Division (Light Infantry) for aiways deploying me to the most remote locations and for forever finding new and exciting ways to manage my off-tirne. Finaily to my lovïng Me- always supportive and caring. 1 love you.
PS. To Lieutenant-General Raoul Cedras, fomer dictator of Haiti, now in exile in Panama. Sir, thank-you for the wisdom for allowùig myself and the lûth Mountain Division to peacefuliy enter your island nation on 19 September 1994. Your decision pennitted us to accomplish a politically demanding mission with great speed, safety, and effectiveness. 1 found my the spent in your country both rewarding and educational. Your decision reduced the the 1 served in Haiti while preventing me £kom asking McGill University for another extension to my thesis. TABLE OF CONTENTS
1. Introduction
1) The International System and Its Maintenance
2) interests and the International System
3) Domestic Environment
a) Liberal Regime Type
b) Economic interests
c) Public Support
4) International EnWonment
a) Threat of a Challenger
b) Availability of Allies
5) Maintaining the International System
a) Economic Trade Policy
b) Military Strategy
c) Military Force Policy pppppppppp------
d) Cornmitment Policy
6) Grand Strategies-Theoretical Model
II. Dutch Repubtic, 1672-1720s
1) Statu of Hegemony
2) Environment
a) Liberal Regime Type
b) Prevailing Econornic and Political Lnterests 3) Grand Strategy
a) Phase 1: 1672-1673 French hvasion of Dutch (Threat and No Mies)
b) Phase II: 1673- 1678 War with France (Threat and Mies)
c) Phase III: 1678-1688 Fragile Peace (No Threat and Allies)
d) Phase IV: 1688- 1697 Glonous Revolution (Threat and Mies)
e) Phase V: 1697- 1702 Partition Treaties (Threat and Allies)
f) Phase VI: 1702- 17 13 War of Spanish Succession (Threat and Allies)
g) Phase W:17 13- 1720s Post War Europe (No Threat and Allies)
4) Conclusion
III. Great Britain 1889-1932
1) Status of Hegemony
2) Environment
a) Liberal Regirne Type
b) Prevailing Economic and Political Interests
3) Grand Strategy
a) Phase 1: 1889- 1904 Splendid Isolation (Threat and No Nies)
b) Phase II: 1904-1 9 14 Preparing for War (Threat and Allies) c) PhaselII: 1914-1918 World War I (Threat and Allies)
d) Phase N: 19 19- 1932 Post War Peace (No Threat No Allies)
4) Conclusion
W.United States 1971-Present
1) Phase 1 197 1 - 1989 Cold War (Threat and Allies)
2) Phase II 1990-Present Post Cold War (No Threat and Allies)
V. Lessons Learned Smce the emergence of the modem nation-statel ,two states have Wen fiom the preeminent position of system leader, or hegemon, whüe a third2,the United States, is currently experiencing many of the same symptoms associated with decline. Histoncal patterns suggest that the current system leader wiu derthe same fate as that of the two prïor hegemons - the Dutch Republic and Britam. The leader wiU iikely experience a relative decline of its economic and military strength, increased cornpetition fiom rising powers and higher systern maintenance costs. The international system wiîl lose cohesion and order. An mcrease in müitary and poütical rivalries will result with the proliferation of bnishfire confiicts, disrupting htemational trade. Eventually, a major power wili challenge the leader's primacy, resulting in a major war and the subsequent closure of the international system.
Scholarly interest in hegemonic decline has increased sigwfïcantly in the last twenty years with the U. S. 's relative decline. Numerous factors3 and theories4 have been advanced to account for the process, the most noteworthy bemg Hegemonic Stability
Theory. Based on realist theory, Charles Kindieberger and Robert Gilpin, among others, suggea that a hegemon promotes order and cohesion through the implementation of an
- -- 1 The Treaty of Westphalia (1648) is conunonly accepted as the benchmark for the emergence of the modem nation-state. ' For this thesis. 1 use three system leaders generally accepted by shidents of hegemonic cycles: the Dutch Republic, Britain and the United States. While Gilpin and Brawley contend that either France or Britain was the system leader in the 18th century following the htch Republic, 1 use neither for this study. "include clusters in the genesis and application of economic innovation and leading-sector praiu* cycles, overspecialization, productivity differentials, technologicd and capital &ion, infiation, free trade policies, military rivdry. increased protection and leadership overhead costs, defense-investment tradeoffs. overextended commitments, increasing rates of taxation, increasing public and private consumption demands, and the proliferation of vested-interest groups." Thonipsan and Zuk, "World kwer and the Strategic Trap of Territorial Cornmitments", p.219-50. J i.e. Hegemonic Sbbility Theory (Kindleberger, Gilpin); Long Cycle Theory (Maielski, Thompson); Modem Systems (Wallerstein); Liberai Subsystems (Brawley) international fkee(r)' trade system These conditions stimulate relative peace, stability,
and economic growth. A hegemon's decline, according to the theory, initiates the
syaem's remto global anarchy. Despite tsseemingiy dominant role in the study of
international relations, reaiist theory can not satidactorily annver many issues deahg witb
the dynamics of the deciine process6. The theory discounts the role of domestic hctors
and its interaction with systemic Gctors for determining national poticy. Realists lend
little, if any, crediiihty to the role of national decision-adcers and domestic constraints,
reducmg their influence to mereiy rational costhenefit calculations7.
Recent publications, by Rosecrance, Stem and ~rawle~*,introduce domestic level
analysis to the realist's traditional systemic level hypotheses. This muhi-dimensional
approach recognizes the inmiencing factors in both the systemic and domestic
environments. The domestic level analysis captures the dynamics of the decision-making
process, accounting for the rational and sometimes "irrationai"cost/benefit calculations.
The intent is not to attack realist theory. Inaead, this fom of analysis builds upon the
findmgs of realist theory and addresses its apparent shortcomings. Advocates of this multi-dimensional approach believe it generates more reüable and predictable hypotheses than any single approach.
Free(r) trade refers to Stein's assertion that ûee tracte can never be completely 6ee nit free(r) than its previous status. See Stein, 'The Hegemon's Dilemma". 6 Realist theory has difüculty explaining a state's motivation and interests for specinc actions. For example, what is the leader's motivation for establishing an international system and for maintai~ngit during its relative decline? 7 Gilpin, War and Chan~ein World Politics, p.202. " Leadership, cdculatian, control over events - these are merely the illusions of statesmen and scholars." 8 See Rosecrance and Taw, "Japan and the Theory of International Leadership"; Rosecrance and Stein, The Domestic Bases of Grand Stratew? Stein, 'The Hegemon's Dilernrna"; and Brawley, Liberal Leadership; among other publications. In this tradition, 1 address one of those numerous fàctors advanced eariier to
account for the decline process: mcreased cost of maintahhg the mtemational system.
This hypothesis is derived nom two basic contentions: 1. the hegemoa is responsiible for the leadership and maintenance of the mtemational system; 2. the hegemon continues to maintain the system despite reduced benents of leadership and higher costsg. It follows that the system leader accelerates its own decline by 'Sgnoring7' the costhenefit calculations. Diminishing returns are diverted fiom mvestment ador consumption to protecting the international arrangement and proviàing order. Observers conclude that the system leader fàils to dwelop a long-term strategy for balancing its commitments and resources, and instead tends to 'înuddle through" its problems. The end-resuît is the gradua1 deterioration of systemic leadership and the increased IikeLihood of system clo~ure'~and/or major warl ' .
Upon fùrther investigation, 1 find initial conclusions on the problems associated with system maintenance incornplete. While a realia interpretation reduces the equation to costhenefits calculations, the addition of domestic level anaiysis expands the scope of the problem This muiti-dimensionai approach exposes the impact of both systemic and domestic environments on the system leader's decision-making process. Poiicies that seem "irrationai" f?om a realist standpoint won gain crediiüity. From this perspective, the
9 Scholars often refer to this condition as "imperial overstretch". See Kennedy, Rise and Fall of the Great Powers, and Synder, Mvths of Empire. 'O Neither major war nor hegemonic decline necessarily provokes systemic cloaire. The hegemon's decline makes it more difficult for the system leader to continue paying the price of asymmetric openness. Closure comes denthe hegemon, which will no longer bear the burâen, defects because other states rehise to redistribute the costs of maintaining the system. See Stein, "Hegemon's Dilemma", p.386. " See Calleo. Bevond American Hemmony. Calleo believes the hegemon's failure to "&volute1' itseif fiom strategic responsibility during its relative decline is directly responsible for the deterioration of the system. Insteaà, the hegemon must plan to transition the burden of leadership eveniy arnong other states creating a more pluralistic system. leader's apparent "ignorance" of the reduced benents and mcreased costs cm be attriiiiuted to policy constraints or prevaiiing interests.
1 contend, therefore, that system leader's policy making, whüe in relative decline, results directly and eqdyfiom its systemic and domestic environments. The leader's fdwe to develop a long-term plan may be explained by the state's need to adopt policies in accordance with its dominant mterests and not necessarily for tsself-preservation. Yet,
1 believe the hegemon does practice stntegic planning. Tâis process occurs when the system leader adjusts tscommitments and resources to the environment. Based on these postdations, relative success or failure m mahtaining the system and thus adjusting for deche depends on how decision-makers compensate for two prevailing variables: threat of challengers and the availabiüty of aüies.
In this thesis I propose to answer the followoig questions in support of my preceding supposition: 1. What is the international system and what is involved in maintaining it?, 2. Why &tain the international system, particularly during relative decline?, 3. How does the leader maintain the system?, and 4. What course of action, or grand strategy, do 1 expect the hegemon to pursue &en a specific environment? . In this fourth section, I present my predictive model for tracking the system leader's grand strategy. 1 test the model in the next chapters using a cross-sectional historical analysis of three cases: the Dutch Republic (1672- 1720s), Britain (1890s- 193 1) and the United States
(197 1-present)12. The ha1 chapter examines these hdings and discusses the model's
l2 While the cases themselves are generally agreed upon, the specifc dates of hegemonic decline are not. 1 try to compartmentalize the decline phase by using benchmark events, Noting Friedberg's use of calculative and perceptual assessment, 1 select key events or trends that contemprary scholars would have identifieci as signincantly weakening the hegemon's long-term power. In agreement with Wallerstein and usefidness for partially explaining hegemonic decline. 1 do not mtend to address aii aspects of decline or attempt to remedy the US'Scurrent dilemmas m this thesis.
Instead, 1 hope to shed some light on this conternporary subject and provoke some thought md discussion among the thesis' readers.
THE INTERNATIONAL SYSTEM AND ITS MAlNTENANCE
A great power must possess three distinct characteristics to qualfi tself as a hegemon: power13,mteredmotivation, and a system'". A hegemon, as dehed by scholars, uses its superior economic and miütary capabilities and the motivation for fi-ee(r) economic relations to faciiitate the development of an international tradmg system, based on liberai principles. It traditionaliy offers potential system members favorable, ifnot asymmetrical trading terms in exchange for simply more open trade relations. The hegemon promotes the wuestricted flow of goods, seMces and capital between trading partnen as well as the guarantee of state's rights, transactions and property. It also uses its military ~a~abilities'~to ensure order among tstrading partners, creating a relatively deand stable international environment conducive to open trade. These mcentives16
Brawley, 1use the closure of the systern as the end of hegemony and not major war as employed by Gilpin and Modelski. " In keeping this hypthesis as parsimonious as possible. 1 base the hegemon's power primarily on its most cornpetitive economy and its superior military. 1 use these twr, powx bases, and their interaction, to partiaily explain the decline process and their subsequent grand strategy choices. Whenever possible, 1 try to use quantinable data to rneasure the state's strength. However, I WuentIy use qualitative idormation, based on historical perspectives, to measure powr. particularly during the Dutch hegemony. 14 A system is defined as "a collection of states united by regular interaction according to a fom of control". See Gilpin, War and Change in World Politics, p.26 15 The hegemon also uses its miiitary power to coerce states to open its markets and participate in the fi- trade system (i.e. Britain opening footholds in China in 19th century) 16 Scholars den refer to these incentives as a public good; favorable conditions for the benefit of al1 participants and at no expense fiom another states' consumption. Brawley rejects this description in his atternpt to explain why some countries reject participation in the fiee trade system. encourage certain states to forge trade relations with the hegemon thus evohing hto an international fiee trade system" .
The hegemon, assuhg leadership or control ofthe system, regulates interstate trade and diplornacy through the establishment desand regimes. Control, as introduced by Gilpbyis based on the distribution of power and the hierarchy of prestige withm the system The hegemon writes the desaccordmg to tsposition of leader- and perceived authority. These desnody create conditions18 bvorable to the system leader. The regimes, as characterized by treaties, alliances and trade agreements, institutionalw the des, significantty influencing the nomof mtemationd behavior, while remforcmg the hegemon's power base.
Despite its real and perceived power, the hegemon possesses only relative control of the international system Realists recognize that states operate in anarchy. Relative control implies that a system leader's govemance depends directly on its accumulation of power and prestige. As an ascendiog power, the hegemon determines and dorces des with little opposition. Among increasingly powerfùl states, a relatively declinmg hegemon lacks the rame degree of relative controt and must depend on other means. This transition of control plays a particularly significant role in the leader's system maintenance during relative decline.
Maintainhg the mtemational system implies that the hegemon assumes the huicid costs and political obligations associated with fàcilitatmg fiee trade. Historicaliy,
17 Brawiey addresses the possibility of great powers simultaneously pursing hegemony. He theorizes that the establishment of turo liberal subsystem, based of similar principles, wwld form into one system with the superior power likely assuming the made of leadership. 18 Conditions include the international division of labor, trade arrangements, and the division of territory, particularly colonies, markets, and spheres of influence. the system leader employs its power to ophgnew markets, protecting the system fiom
extemal th.eatsl9 and pa-g mternal conilicts The hegemon seelrs to mmmiize any
disturbances while expanding the scope and participation of the fiee(r) trade system In
the process, the hegemon amasses a global network of commitments that serves to protect
its international mterests. This collection of overseas obligations, consisting of
navdmilitary bases, colonies, foreign markets and alliances, resuh fiom the leader's
projection of power mto areas determined strategicaUy important by domestic policy
makers. These giobal c~rnrnitments~~contribute to the leader's rnilitary ador economic
presence m various regions, and therefore augment the hegemon's relative control
throughout the mtemational system
ûver tirne, the sustainment costs associated with these obligations and the system
eventuaiiy outweigh the benefits derived £kom the commitments themselves. Rising
military threats, domestic unrest m colonies, and lengthy miiitary campaigns cause the hegemon to increase its military/naval presence m specific regions. This greater vigilance
significantly raises the costs of maintainhg these obügations and the system As costs rise, the benefits derived fiom the system graduaily recede. Rishg economic powers reduce the leader's relatively large &are of global trade through mcreased cornpetition. The accumulation of capital by these economic cornpetitors also causes the hegemon's rate of
19 The system leader is expected to &fend the system against political challengers, with the help of its alliedsystem members. The hegemon is also expected to guarantee the '%edam of the seas" with its superior giobal mach capability. See Modelski. 'O See Thanpson and Zuk "World hrand the Smtegic Trap of Temtorial Commitments" retum on hancial mvestment to fiIl2'. The system leader is mevitably faced with the . -. rising cost of leadership and dimmishm* g economic returns, mdicative of relative decline".
Despite these changes m the costhenefit calculations the hegemon histoncally does not abandon its responsiihy for maintainine the mtemational system. Instead, the state attempts to balance the rihg costs with its fàlling retums Its liniited bdsare s1owly diverted fkom investment and consumption towards defense spending, thereby reducmg fùture retums based on decreasing investment. This apparent reprioritization of spending creates a vicious circle, committsig the economy to slower growth. M*tary planners, on the other band, face the chdenge of protecting a Eu-flung network of strategic commitments while simultaneously checkmg growing regional and systemic threats. These global commitments, originaily amassed when they proved more cost- effective, now signincantly stretch the military's ümited resourcesa . As a result, the state eventudy overextends itse& thereby underrniuîng its military strength and mahg it systemic mterests Milnerable to attack. Scholars refer to this overextension of a leader's power, based on its commitments, as 'ïmperiai ~verstretch"~~.
See Brawley. Liberal Leadership, p. 17. ''n - Relative decline begins when other states accumulate power. Wr,also defineci as technologicai, economic and military advantages, is cifisecl though trade, foreign investment, alliances and othef forms of interaction. Emigration of skilled wrkers can also accoun t for traders of management techniques, innovation, etc. These advantages, which once propelleci the hegemon ahead of its rivals, are eventually diffused throughout the system, allowing other states to benefit and thereby increase its share of powr, most often at the expense of the system leader. 23 Hegemons demonstrate varied success in using dlies to extemally balance its military commitment costs. While a hegemon will certainly attract allies for the defense of the system against plitical challengers, it traditionally experiences dilEculty rallying support for rnaintaining the system when allies can easily fie-ri& on the public good provided by the hegemon. The hegemon, at this point, Iikely does not passess the relative control necessary to coerce states to act against its best interest (i.e. fieride). '4 Kennedy, Rise and Falla p.5 14 describes imprial overstretch as the total mm of the hegemon's global interests and obligations exceeding the state's power to defend thern al1 simultaneously. Whiie not the sole reason for relative decline, system maintenance cleariy
contributes to the process. The hegemon, rehictant to abandon its mtemationai
obligations, vimially assures tsown demise by strainmg its economy and overextending
its aiilituy. As the hegemon declines and 0th- States Ne, the system experiences a
change in the distniution of power. The system leader now mcreasingty depends on its
perceived power, or prestige7to mamtam its degree of relative control Ahhough the
relatively declining leader may accommodate wme of these Ning powers, the desand
regmies geuerally remain unchangecl, reflecting the hegemon's continued leadership. The
system leader, seemingiy trapped by its systemic responsiilities, continues to maintain the
mtemational system as it gradeapproaches clonire and/or major war.
INTERESTS AND THE iNTERNATI0NA.L SYSTEM
Systemic and domestic-lwel analyh diverge significantly when explaining the
hegemon's rationale for maintaining the international system Realids theorists
concentrate on regime formation as welî as change, but neglect how the regime is
established, maintained and abandonedu. Altbough realist theory desmies the
hegemon's mterest in Iiberal trade and its ability to create a fiee(r) trade system, it fails to
explain the process mvolved. Similarly, realist theoiy can not explain the dynamics
mvoived in maintahhg the international syçtem. Gilpm, for example, recognizes the
growhg disjuncture between commRments and capabilities during relative deciine. While he demiesthe causes for change m the distn'bution of power, Güpm can neither explain the process nor the hegemon's motivation for maintainhg the mtemational fiee-trade
25 See Stein, 'The Hegemon's Dilemma", p.357
9 system and its correspondmg cormnitments duriug its relative decline. This explmation of
a state's motivation requires both systemic and domestic-level ana@& that identities the environment, actors andor groups mvolved m causing the process to occur.
The system leader, according to Brawley, desires fiee(r) economic relations so stmngly that t is willing to bear the hi& costs of creatmg and then maintaioing a liberal international ~~stern~~. Inherent to this motivation is the state's couunitment to the maximization of its absolute returns. Rather than protect its own markets and maximize relative retums, the hegemon bears the cost of market openness, despite other states' tari&, m hopes of ammgfoliowers to open their markets. While the subsequent creation of the fkee(r) trade system proves profitable to the hegemon's economic interests, the same fiee(r) mide system proves equaily profitable to economic competitors. The system leader tends to experience absolute growth while tscompetitors, also achiewig absolute growth, undercut its relative position. The leader's adopted policies actuaily msure the state's relative economic deche and eventual decline from hegemony.
tustead of abandonhg the system duhg its decline, the syaem leader maintahs openness and continues to bear the costs. Realists could argue that maintajning an international syst em, or public good, wMe exp eriencing relative deciine is "irrationai", based on costhenefit calculations. Yet, domestic-level analysis interprets this willingness to continue maintaining the mtemational system mspite of higher leadership costs and reduced benefits as the result of it s motivation. Motivation is a product of the system leader's environment and interests. The hegemon, therefore, does not necessady "ignore the codbenefit calculation". Rather, the system leader's apparent fdure to develop a
'6 See Brawley, Liberal Leadership, p.6 stmtegy for preventing decline redsfiom its needs to adopt poiicies in accordance with its dominant interests and not necessarily its ~e~preservation.Unülre reaiist theory,
domestic-level anaiysis portrays the disequilbriwn of relative deche as the disjuocture of capabilities and motivation.
Despite the diftierence in eras, system leaders in reîative deciine generaüy experience simiiar dijuncture, contributmg to the conditions fiom which poiicies, or strategy, are formulated. While the hegemon' s capabilities evoive empmcdly through ascent and decline, the state's interests traditionaîiy resist change. The leader's economic and political mterests are Myentrenched m the state's hegemony. Smce change in real or perceived power could jeopardize their continued success, these now mature mterests promote a continuation of the status quo, at almost any coa. These interests tend to constrain any policies attempting to downsize the state's hegemonic role, regardless of relatively declining capabilities. These factors contribute to a constraining environment, iimiting the hegemon's options for managing imperid overstretch.
DOMESmC ENVIRONMENT
Realist theorists have traditionally discounted the role of the domestic environment, reducing the organizationai and politicai complications of govemment to the simplification of a single acto? . in the process, realists reduce the effectiveness of their theory. Realist theory proves usefùl for explainhg outcornes, particdarly national security issues, where shared domestic opinions lead to consensus for action. Realist theory, however, lacks detail. While reaüst theory cm predict an action and reaction, it fdsto
27 See Ailison and Halperin, 'Bureaucratic Palitics", p.42
1 I provide details on the implementation of those decisions, particuiariy in a democratic regime where organizational and domestic mteresis may ciiffer.
Domestic-level anaiysis doeglytrecognize a single poiicy maker, but the conglomeration of large organizations and political acton who mer on the government's role on any particuiar issue and who compete m bflueucmg the govemmeutai decisions and actions2'. Recent scholars contend that bureaucratie politics play a greater role m national security issues than realist theories can explain. Coalition-building and logroliiug histoncally doininate foreign policy discussion and implementation, dispelling the notion of a single actor. The foilowhg subsections outline these conditions of the domestic environment.
Liberd Re-@me T-ype
The hegemon's liberal regime provides the medium for the state's domestic constraints. This representative (republican29) govemment typically pursues poücies that are largely consistent with the median preferences of its vested interests" . Its decision- makers are particdarly sensitive to the state's political, economic and societai culture in their effort to maintain the nation's continued electoral support. The SiBnificant influence possessed by these interests with the govemment effectively constrains the state's decision-making process. As a resultythe govemment p ursues conciliatory poiicies resuiting fiom its need to satise its diverse domestic supporters. The mature hegemon
- " hici, p.42 29 Webster's Dictionary defines a republic as " a state or nation in which the supreme power rem in al1 the citizens entitled to vote (the electorate) and is exercised by representatives elected, directly or indirectly, by them and responsible to them." The &finition ofa republic becomes important when discussing the Dutch Republic. Although not directly respansible to the public, the Estates-General and the Stadholder provide the essential political institutions which represent the median preferences of the state's vested interests. 30 See Papayoanou, 'Interdependence, Institutions, and the Balance of Power", p.47 demonstrates a significant weakness for effectuatiag objective strategy despite the rising costs and reduced benefits associated with relative decline-
Aiwa ys evident m the state' s decision-making process, bureaucratic politics play an increasingly important role m the creation and miplementation of national security policy during relative decline. hterest groups fight for the hegemon's now limited resources m an effort to iaiplement policy advantageous to its continued success. These vested interests are promoted by vvious players, each with their specific conception, or motivation, for national security, organizationai, domestic and personal issues3' . These players ''pull and baul" among themsehes in their attempt to convince the decision-makers of their position's value to the state and to the govemment's longe*. Players with similar preferences ofken consolidate their efforts and influence on the govenunent through collective behavior with the creation of coalitions or carteüzed blocs. Furthemore, players cmmaoipulate the regime's political leaders and other domestic players through propaganda and/or disidormation campaigns, appeals to nationalism and the propagation of "'myths of empire'J2. These efforts to advance particular interests under the guise of national sec* ofken jeopardize the hegemon's primacy, provoking questionable spending or cornmitments in support of the players' self-preservation.
'' Players consist numerous individuais or groups. to include: senior politicians, bureaucrats, colonial governors, military leaders, business leaâers, unions, political action groups, voters, and anyone with a specific desire to influence the decision-making process to refîect its preferences. See Allison and Halperin, 'Bureaucratic Politics", p.43. 32 See Synder, Mvtb of Empire. Synder discusses the interaction of domestic-level actors in the national security decision-making process and its role in the "imperid overstretch" of those States. Economic Interests
The system leader derives its motivation for fiee(r) trade fiom its economic
interests. During its primacy, the hegemon's economy consists of superior industries,
manufacturing, technology, and capitai-abundant financial services. The output of these
sectors surpass the domestic market's capacity to absorb the economy's production and
senices. These sectors seek govemment support to establish trading agreements with
foreign states, ailowing the export of ts abundant supply. The subsequent establishment of the international fiee(r) trade system offers the hegemon's economy seenmi& endless foreign markets for export and mvestment. nie system leader won becomes increasingly dependent on world trade. Its manufacturing and financiai se~cesrely almost exclusively on the international trade system.
Increasing foreign competition and the evolution of the hegemon's economy, m relative decline, produce two diverging opinions regarding economic policy. Non- cornpetitive m~nufàcturiogand industrial sectors, dering fiom declines in world trade seek govemment protection against fore@ impoxts. These nationalists favor tasin an effort to stimulate domestic growth. The hegemon's hancial and other competitive sectors oppose protectionism as detrimental to its high rates of retum on foreign inveament and trade. The state's steady export of capitai, through investmeots and loans, transforms the hegemon's strengths fiom manufachiring to financiai se~ces.The high retums nom international se~ces,or 'kinMsles", represent the economies most profitable sector. Intemationaüsts endorse &ee(r) trade as beneficial to its competitive exports. In addition, states receiving loans depend on the hegemon's home markets to absorb its exports, dowing these states to compensate the original loan or mvestment.
Policy-maicers traâitionally support the internationaiist and their cornpetitive sectors, in
maintainhg fiee(r) trade.
Public Su~poa
Public support is essential for the implementation of any national secunty policy m
a liberal regime. The public's role in the decision-making process evolves substantialiy,
through the history of the modem nation-state, making the government ever dependent on
its support. Universal &age, nationalism, and mas participation aiî contriiute to the
democratization of the process. While the three modem begemons all experience varying
degrees of political participation, each state historicaily exercises extensive public
representation m cornparison to tscontemporaries.
The system leader's populace, during relative decüoe, historically &ers fiom
liberal complacency. The state's rates of public and private consumption typicaily escalate
as the hegemon's society matures. Pubtic hterests groups demand govement-sponsored
social programs, often at the expense of military spending. They oppose tax increases and
excessive goveniment spending that jeopwdizes the curent standard of living. Public
sentiment also endorses systemic peace. Govemment officiais active1y elicit public
approvai pnor to major foreign commitments.
INTERNATIONAL ENVIRONMENT
The mtemational environment also influences the hegemon's decision-making process. The system leader's dependence on international trade reflects the exposure of its economic survivability to foreign states. The leader derives its strength fiom trade with these system members. This dependence on foreign trade subsquently reduces the govemment's control over its economic, and even, military sovereigrnfl. Foreign states exercise growing mfluence as the mtemational trade system matures and the hegemon declines.
Participants m the international fiee(r) trade &tain a vested mterest in the hegemon's contmuing leadership. These states derive a public good fiom the systemic leader - fiee(r) trade and systemic security. System members fiee-ride on the protection and economic benefits provided by the hegemon. Proposed reductions to systemic maintenance, therefoo jeopardize the system's pub tic good. Cost s associated with regional security would be redistriïuted to member states. While some stronger members favor the re-allocation of systemic responsibilities, others states seek to pressure the begemon to contmue its systemic leadership.
The following sub-sections bnefly outline two additional influences that significantly impact the hegemon's decision-making process.
Threat (of a Challenger)
International system characteristically experiences systemic threat durhg the hegemon 's relative decline. Rising expansionkt powers seek to augment economic and political power at the system leader's expense. These challengers attempt to redistribute systemic benents, or spoils, whicb reflect the leader's former primacy. Accordmg to
Brawley, political challengers cm not be accommodated within the current international system Codct between the hegemon and challenger develops into major war, based on the threat the challenger poses to both the system leadership and the system. The
" See Rosecrance, Rise of the Trading State, Ch.2.
16 hegemon reacts to threat by mob*Png its internai means and extemai support. Systemic threat stimulat es the hegemon' s domestic environment, forhg decision-makers t O solidiS, domestic support for a new course of action. Chaiienge dso rPises costs of systetnic maintenance, aggravatmg the effects of relative decline.
Availabihy of AUies
Allies externally augment the hegemon's systemic leadership. Extemal support potentidy serves to reduce costs associated with maintabhg the system, to mclude deterring systemic threat. As the leader experiences relative decline, decision-maicers hcreasingly seek means for reducmg the rising costs. Systemic disequrliiium between the leader's commitments and capabaies forces the hegemon to adopt either intemal or extemal measures for reducing the gap. intemal mobktion, during declme, traditiondy proves too costly, as determined by the domestic environment. In most cases, external support is more politicaiiy viable. Alliance responsibilities encompass multiple tasks, to mclude regional security, threat deterrence, and wdeputnershtps.
MALNTAINING THE INTERNATIONAL SYSTEM
As addressed eariier, I contend that hegemons in relative deche do practice strategic pbg,m an attempt to preserve its diminishing power and manage the international system. Instead of "muddling through" declme, the system leader adjusts its commitmeuts and resources to the environment, suggesting the formulation of a grand strategy. The following section outhes the principles and operationaiizations of grand strategy incoiporated in this theoretical rnodel. Grand strategy is defhed as the state's effofi to employ national means for the attajnment of its long-term objectives in a specinc environment that imposes constraints and threatsY . Whüe not the "single, coherent national strategy" suggested by realists, a grand strategy descnbes m ongomg process requiring various agencies and mterests to make continual assessments of the environment and to attempt to rationalize a course of action based on their motives and goals. This diversified decision-making process provides a powerfiil obstacle to the hplementation of any single, comprehensive grand strategy3'. Relative success or Wure m the pursuit of long-term objectives resuhs fiom the state's ability to meet its means with its ends.
The hegemon's long-term objectives, or end, are largely a product of the domestic and international environments, the system leader's precarious position and the democratic process. Decision makers and interests formulate objectives based on their particular assessment of the environment and their unique position m that environment. While each decision-maker may possess diverse short-term goals, each actor is likely to &are similar long-tem objectives based on the vested interest each &ares for the conhued success of the state's hegemony. These dominant actors and mterests use the democratic process36 to legitimize its long-term objectives and to implement them as the state's desired end.
in a historical context, a system leader in relative deche generaily pursues the natus quo as its end. The state seeks to preserve the prestige, economic pmileges and
11 See Ke~etiy*Grand Strateaies in War and Peace, Kaufman et ai., U.S. National Securitv Stratw, and Licldell-Hart, Stratw. 35 See Lu- Stratew. p.233 and Friedberg The Wearv Titan, for debate on the difndties of formulating strategy in democratic mes. Aiso see Fnedberg for a discussion ofthe effects of assessment and monon Britain's response to relative decline. " To include bureaumic politics systernic peace associated with hegemony. 'Ibese beneh provide the state's niling
mterests with a sense of secunty3' conducive to contgiued growth. While changes in
relative power jeopardize these conditions, the aate se& to protect its interests by
continuhg to provide leadership and system maintenance. The hegemon typicaily perceives the downsihg of responsiiüities as a loss of its privileges and a bene& to fs
competitors.
The means, for achiwmg this en4 conskt of aii the state's availnble resources.
These resources inchde such taagiiles as economic competitiveney weaith and force projection capabïlity and such mtangiiles as political motivation, sodparticipation and prestige. Decision-makers project the state's power, through its economic, military, and
diplornatic policies. The compilation of these policies, or grand strategy, reflects the state's collective effort to achieve its objective through the direct application of its means.
The crux of grand strategy lies in policy'8. For the purposes of this study, I narrow the policy considerations of the four most critical policy componentd9to a system leader. These policy areas represent the hegemon's primary means for addressing the rishg costs and decreabg benents associated with systemic maintenance. The foilowing
sub-section provides a brief operationalintion of these policy areas:
See Posen, p.232. "Grand maregy is a political-miiitary means-ends chain, a nate's theory abait how it can best 'cause' security for itseif" 38 Kennedy, p.5 39 The purpose ofthis papr is address the issues assaciated with systemic leadership and systemic maintenance. I select these specific poliq area to best refiect the interaction üehwen systemic and domestic environrnents in reférence to its systemic respo~ls~ilities. Economic Trade Poky
A system leader's economic trade policy typicaiiy endorses fiee(r) trade.
Relatively low domestic tariffs and the ficilkation of international trade reflect this cornmitment. in cases of threat or major war, hegemons are prone to restrict trade. Trade restrictions, aîthough temporary, focus on depriving the tbreat additional advaotages fiom fiee(r) trade.
Military Strategy
The hegemon traditionaliy adopts the least expensive strategic posture, without jeopardizing its comnntMents. In the absence of systemic threat, decision-&ers employ the least costly defense posture. A deterrence policy, while more hancially demanding, addresses a spec%c threat to the system The hegemon historically increases müitary spending and global force readiness m an attempt to prevent potential aggression. When deterrence fails, the system leader resorts to an wartime attrition strategy. This posture exemplifies the most expensive strategy for a hegemon to pursue Meexperiencing decline. The system leader seeks to weaken the threat through tbe application of its national means and extemal support derived iÎom allies.
Military Force Policv
M*tary force refers to the size of the hegemon's armed forces. Military expenditures represent ody one mdicator. The following case studies focus on political or economic trends associated with changes in müitary size. Anns limitation agreements and ums races both reflect state re-assessments of military &. Threat and systemic peace typic?lh, provoke decision-makers to change miiitary force (size) policy. A hegemon's coIIItnitments reflect its globai politicai and economic mterests.
Colonies, military bases, and empires all account for the system leader's territorial mterests Foreign markets and overseas access to raw materials represeot economic consideratious. Political and müitary commitments mclude ailiances, treaties, and the protection of areas, cities, or waterways deemed essential to the leader's security.
GRAND STRATEGIES - THEORETICAL MODEL
AU hidents of hegemony propose recommendations for ''fkhg" relative decline.
Robert Gilpin suggeas several such courses of action to include, preventive war, unilateral abandonment, and retrenchment. David Calleo, on the other band, advocates strategic pluralism - the encouragement of multi-polarity and regional responsiiility. While ali potentially valid, not ail courses of action satisfy the domestic constramts iniposed to the declinhg leader by its environment. The foliowing histoncal cases demonstrate the decision-makers critical reiiance on domestic support for fomulating and employing its grand strategy.
The theoretical mode1 presented below offers the reader a parsimonious hterpretation of those grand strategies pursued by system leaders in relative decline. As mentioned above, the international environment (THREAT Br ALLIES) stimulates the hegemon, through significant change to its seceandor status quo, causing it to adjust its policies, or grand strategy. Strategy, therefore, is a product of the interaction between the international and domestic environments. Table 1 depicts the relationship proposed: Table 1: Causai Rditioaship
- -- --
The resuiting polices (MODEL), advocated by the decision-makers, reflect the mterests of its domestic environment. This emphasis on domestic variables, in relation to systemic variables, produces a more accurate, detailed understanding of hegemonic policies The resihing theoretical mode1 provides a predictive tool for studying fùture US policy. The following case stuclies test the reîiability and validity ofthe proposed modeL
Table 2: Grand Strategics in Relative Dedine: Theoreticai Modd
Threat of a ChoUenger Yes
-- - - - Free(r) Trade Derciut Scrategy Yes Reduce Mültary Sbe Miintain Commitmcnn Avaüa bili ty of AUies - -- Pi.ee(r) Trade Derense SRategy
rn Mliintain MiIItory Size Maintaia Commi~nts
Rtsnict Trade Threat fite Trade and Attrition Strmtegy bcterrence Sttat- Increase Müitary Ske 1 ïacre.re Militmy Size DUTCH REPUBLIC, 1672-17209
Arguabiy the earliest of the modern hegemons, the Dutch Republic emerges 6om the early 17th century to establish an international trading system never before seen m world hisiory. Its primacy m trade, mdustry and hance as well as its powerful fleet enables this small nation to acquire power and prestige fw beyond that m proportion to its
Sze, population and resources Badon these advantages, the Dutch are able to domhate commerce m virtually every region of the world during the 17th century.
STATUS OF HEGEMONY
The Dutch Republic qualifies for hegemony based on its supenor economic and military power, its international system and it s motivation for fiee(r) trade. The foundation of its power rests in the world of trade, mdustry and finance. The Dutcb leverage their naturai and technological naval advantages to dohant bulk shipping, particularly that of western and northem ~uro~e'. The flow of these goods through the
Republic fâcilitates its development as the world's most important trade entrepot. The state's access to unlimited raw materials and foreign consumer markets also stimulate its industries and increase exports, leading to Dutch industriai and commercial primacy2.
Productive efficiency and technical superiority make Dutch products the most cornpetitive and sought-after in foreign markets. These advantages directly contnibute to the state's dominance in finance, mvestment, and other 'ïnvisibles". The establishment of the Bank of Amsterdam, the city's sound financial orghtion and practices, and most importantly,
' It is the anud ofthe Baltic trade that provides the Dutch entrepreneurs with their most impoMnt market. Dutch ships carriecl about 60% of the total Baltic tmde through the 1660s. Wallerstein, Modern World Svstem II . ' Ibicl, p.42. its access to "cheap" and abundant capital makes Amsterdam the undisputed hancial center of Europe and the heart of international trade.
The Dutch Republic derives its military might and its political prestige primdy fiom iis supenor navy. Despite its size, the Dutch maintah major power status fiom 16 10 mtil 17 133 . Its navy, possessing supenor men, ships and leadership than those of other states, reflects approhtely 50% of the world's relative shore of navai capabiüties 16 10-
1650, and 35% 1650- 1670~.This navai strength is fuaher augmented by the Republic's immense shipping capacity - by 1670, the Dutch own more tonnage than that of Engiand,
France, Portugai, Spain and the Gennan states combmed5. The Dutcb army significantiy contributes to Dutch power and prestige, particularly during wartime. Despite its srnail peacetime size (45,000), the Republic retaius the hancial capacity to expand the land forces to over 100,000. ûniy Russia and France cm field larger amies in the 1670s.
The Dutch use their economic and militaiy advantages to establisb an international fiee(r) system6 to the benefit of its economic interests. Dutch shipping permeates virtually every region of the world, thereby exposing countless markets to international trade. This access to foreign markets and goods, provided by the Dutcb entrepot, as well as its
'keady" capta17 and lower tariffs provide strong incentives for state participation in the
Dutch-led international system The Dutch military both promotes and protects this trade
Brawley, Liberal Leadenhig, p.3 1. 4 Modelski and Thompson, Seamwer in Global Politics, p. 194. 5 Wallerstein, p.46. 6 Despite not possessing the military Fr,or relative control, to subjecî France and England to its leadership, the Dutch did establish an international free trade system based on Iiberal trading principles. This inability simply means that their leadership was not totally successful. Brawley, p.38. ' 'Ready" capital refers to the htch merchants traditional mess to capital for purchasing go& in foreign markets (Le. Spanish silver, Dutch bank notes). Ready capital is a benefit of the Bank of Amsterdam, its sound banking practices and "cheap" capital, prime for investment. system to the advantage of as members. Force and persuasion successtllIly lower made barriers of rehictant states whüe a strong navol presence achieves to open threatened vade routes and prevent regional conflict fiom disrupting vital commerces. This Dutch commitment to fiee(r) trade resuhs m the creation of mternational desand regimes advocating the systemic right to "open seas" for the purpose of trade and the principle of
'%ee ship, fiee goods" ailowing neutral states to trade, without impediment, with belligerent states. Systemic participants readily accept these desbecause of Dutch willingness to enforce them and their equal application to ail trading states.
Systemic maintenance and expansion of the Dutch commercial network results m an extensive trading empire stretching nom the Americas to the East Indies. The East hdia Company (VOC),establisbed by HoIland and Zealand merchants, successfiilly exploits much of the region to include Ceylon and the Indian coast, gMng the Dutch merchants a Wtud monopolg on spices and the 'îich" oriental trades. Fortified strongpoints and gmisons on the islands and coast soiid@ Dutch regional primacy. The
West India Company (WIC), representing a mixture of trade and religion, conducts itself as a missionary-colonjzing corp~ration'~.The WIC establishes colonies and profitable trading posts throughout the Americas and the West coast of Afiica, to include New
Amsterdam, Curacao and Guhea. Both trading companies maintain amies and navies which augment Dutch relative control and prestige around the globe.
8 B rawley, p.39-40. 9 Dutch trading practices in Asia and the Americas do not always conform to the liberal tsaâing pnnciples acivocated in European uade. Rosecrance objects to Dutch liberal hegemony based on these colonial practices. Brawiey and Israel contend that htch hegemony is basecl primarily on their European trade networks and practices. Based on these observations, 1 minimize the role of the VOC and WCand concentrate on European markets and politics. more significant and applicable to Dutch grand strategy. 10 Wallerstein, p.50. ENVIRONMENT
The Dutch Republic derives its motivation for fiee(r) trade and hegemony from its domestic environment. The state's repubücan Hegoverment and its prevaiüag economic and political interests provide the motivation necessary to estabiish and maintain an mternationd &ee(r) tnde system ushg the state's economic and müitary advantages.
Liberal RedeTm
The Dutch Republic fùnctions as a signincantly decentrhd govemment, thereby ma>cmiizmg extensive political participation fiom vPrying classes and mteresis. The
Republic lacks a constitution as weîi as executive and central institutions. Instead, each province retains equal representation m the mter-provincial assembly, the States-General.
The Grand Pensionary, the leading member fiom Holland, presides over this assembly and subsequently assumes the responsiiilities of prime der.AU major policies enacted by the StatesGeneral require manimous provincial approval. In most cases, assembly delegates mua defer the decision to the provinces' multiple representative bodies, thus extending the decision-mahg process to the widest audience. This govemmental decentrabation extends to most of the state's functions, to include the navy. Five separate admiralties, representmg the seaward provinces, administer naval affiairs for the entire Republic.
Prevailmer Economic and Political Interests
The city of Amsterdam and its merchant clrss sigdicady fience state poücies throughout Dutch hegemony. Their abiüty to auencethe budget gives the city and the province of Holland real strength in the tat tes-~eneral" . The center of mtemational
11 Brawley, p.28 hance and trade, Amsterdam conmbutes hPlfof Holland's nearly 60% portion of the state budget. The merchant class, or regents, employ th& influence m the repreçentative institutions to managing the state in the interest of hancial stabüity and the advancement oftrade, shippmg, and indu-. Regent influence causes the Republic to maintain fiscal responsibüity over government spending - taxation to cover expenditures, low interest rates, and low debt repayment. The merchant class resists high costs associated with maintabhg a large army but readiîy finances a large navy to protect traâing mterests.
Regents seek those mtemationd conditions conducive to commerce which mclude fiee trade, political neutrality and systemic peace. This style of poütical intervention and business efficiency creates conditions favorable for continued economic growth of the
Republic's most successful business sectors.
The stadholder also provides signincant influence to Dutch pootics during this period. This iniiitary-political leader, inheritable to the Princes of Orange, assumes the posts of admiral-general and captain-generai when appomted by each province during wutirne. The stadholder provides a unifymg force for the provinces and at thes, a political alternative to regent leadership. Stadholder supporters, or Orangists, generaiiy consist of nobüity, religious commdties, and those di&anchised by regent (or republican) govenunent. The stadholder often represents the nationaiist position, by endorsmg a large standing army, conducting bal- of power diplomacy, and defendmg the weaker economic sectors against regent trading policies. The stadholder retains his greatest authority in wartime, rather than peace. Despite the iack of universal cage, the Dutch public maintains a signincant role m Dutch policy-making. Public opinion could not be ignored in the Dutch Republic. The populations of the towns of Holiand were probably the most literate and best mformed on both Dutch and mternational matters m ~uro~e'*. The public possesses varying degrees of political participation and representation, in each province. While usually supporting regent policies of low taxation and sustained systemic peace, the public typicaUy endorses the stadholder m times of crisis.
GRAND STRATEGY
Dutch grand strategy cleiuly reflects the state's dominant economic interests. As an extension of Dutch commercial policy, this strategy seeks to promote those conditions necessary to exploit Dutch economic strength. Decision-makers recognize the fiamof mtemational trade and the àisruptmg effects of codict on its entrepot economy.
Furthemore, the domestic market's inabüis, to absorb the Republic's manufacturhg output requires the government to locate and secure markets for expon. As a resuh, the
Dutch Republic promotes the principles of 'mare hienun' and f?ee(r) trade throughout
Europe. The state seeks to avoid offensive alliances and confiicts which nsk enemy interference with shipping or jeopardize access to foreign markets. By the mid 1600~~war could no longer offer the Republic any real advantages *ch t did not already possess13.
The Dutch Republic has few security issues that are not directly associated with its economy. Bordered by weak states and traversed by numerous water obstacles, the Dutch
Republic @rior to 1672) maintains a smali army but a substantial navy to guarantee its
'' Haley, Dutch in 17th Century, p.72 13 Haley, p. 177. security. 'Ihe htchnavy, among the most powerfùl m the 17th centwy, serves the state
m numerous capacities to inchde protecting the Republic fiom mva* providïng
security for its merchant convoys and fishing fleets, guaranteemg access through the
Sounds to the Baitics and any other responsi'biiities associated with the fiee movement of
its seabome trade. UnWe other European nations, the Republic does not eniploy its
müitary to create vast land empires or territorial expansion in Europe. Decision-makers,
acting for the merchant oligarchies, use tsforce to establisb footholds m economicdy
significant areas and while reapmg benents for the state's business interests.
A chief concem for Dutch decision-malcers is the Southem Netherlands. The
Dutch Repubiic enjoys significant economic privileges m this Spanish governed area.
Under the provisions of the 1648 Scheldt Restrictions, Spain agrees to close the river prwentmg Antwerp fiom becoming a port rival to Amsterdam. Additionai restriction on
regionai production ailows the Dutch to domhate this lucrative market with its exports.
This region also provides a vital bser between the Republic and Louis XIVYsFrance.
French expansion mto the Southem Netherlands would threaten Dutch control of the region's economy and place France at the Republic's border. in addition, a French governed Southem Netherlands could lifk ail econoniic restrictions on the region allowing it to develop into a potential rivai to the Repubiic. Such French aggression, therefore, directly threatens both Dutch economic and military security necessitating a political response.
An additional concem for Dutch hegemony is the growing trend of mercantiiism among its trading partners. England passes the Navigation Acts of 165 1 and 1663 designed to cut Dutch entrepot shippmg and consolidate made for Engiish merchPnts.
These restrictive acts foreshadow the First and Second Anglo-Dutch Wars ( 1652-54,
1665-67) which resuh 60m English attempts to break hitch commercial and naval supremacy. France, m the meanwhile, resuscitates Richelieu's program of commercial, maritime and colonial e~pansion'~.Colbert stimulates French home production, at the expense of Dutch exports, with the French tarifEs of 1664 and 1667. These mercantilia acts directly challenge Dutch economic strength, forcing the Republic to formulate a response in defense of this economic theat.
Despite the state's need for security, domhant economic mterests advocate minimal defense spending. The regent class, particularly during the stadholderless regimes, resists consistent spending which significantly effects force readiness. Regents usually defer defense spending m fkvor of contînued economic mvestment. It is the character of the Dutch, Barker argues, never to spend money for the defease of their countiy unless danger is staring them in the face1'. This practice places the Republic at a significant disadvantage at times of crisis (i.e French Invasion of 1672). Instead, decision- makers rely on extemal balancmg to compensate for the lack of spending. Political maneuvering by the De Witt regime guarantees French support during the Second Anglo-
Dutch War and the War of Devolution. Unfortunately, this dependence on allies proves nearly fatal to the Republic in 1672.
l4 Barker, Rise and Declinc of the Netherlanck, p.326. l5 ibicl, p.356. PHASE 1: 1672- 1673 French Invasion of Dutch (Threat and No Allies)
htch rehtive decline begins wiih the French Invasion of the Dutch ~e~ublic'~.
Louis XIV extends his mercantiiist campa.@ mto a potitical chdenge of Dutch hegemony. He seeks to ovemm the Southern Netherhds and the Dutch Repubiic, absorbing mto the French kingdom Dutch mdushies, trading privileges, naval resources, and financial strength. Louis XIV recnias Engiish assistance fiom Charles LI m the secret
Treaty of Dover, 1670, as well as forging altiances with German states bordering the
Republic. These French diplomatic initiatives, compounded by De Witt's pre-occupation for domestic party poîitics, successtùlly isolate the Dutch, leavuig them without allies at the tirne of the invasion. In May 1672, Louis XNattacks the Dutch Republic, with a weU-trained and well-supplied army of 118,000 infantry and 12,500 cavahy, outnumbering the Dutch regular army 4: 1" . France and its allies successhilly occupy four of the
Repubiic's seven provinces before Dutch defenders stop the allied advance. Out of desperation, Dutch troops flood the lowlands, thus creating a water bamer between the invaclhg amies and rest of the Republic.
ihe Dutch Repubiic nearly capitulates due to the Anglo-French forces. While
French troops occupy a majority of the Republic, the Dutch navy concedes naval supenordy to the Anglo-French fleet, opting to defend the Dutch coast18. T'bis strmglehold paralyzes the Dutch economy. The naval threat forces the States-Generai to
16 The French Invasion represents the first of three major conaicts, or politid challenges. with France which hastens Dutch relative decline. For this reason, the invasion of 1672 marks the beginning of the decline period. " Israel. The Dutch Remblic, p.797. 18 The exception is Admiral DeRuyter's pre-emptive strike against the combined Angle-French navy, at Solebay, 6 June 1672, which forces the allies to delay their planned invasion of the Dutch Repubiic. aispend ail navigation out of Dutch ports, causing the almost total cessation of Dutch
seabome tdicin European waterst9. Industries, domestic and fore@ markets, and
mvestments associated with the hdch entrepot experience almost total nim. Public
hostüity develops towards the niling regents, accushg them of cornipaon and blatant negligence of the country's defenses. Mass public movements condemn the Repubiic's leaders, demandmg for the elevation of the Rince of Orange to stadholder.
Under the newly appomted Stadholder, the Dutch consolidate their efforts and execute an effective defense strategy. Willem of Orange immediateiy conducts extensive purges of town councils in response to widespread public protest. These purges allow
WiiIem to remove regent "traitors" fiom council seats and replace them with Oriillgist supporters. Backed by extensive Oran& support, the Stadholder mobilizes the state's diplomatie and military resources. AUiances are Sgned with the Hoiy Roman Emperor and Brandenberg. By late 1672, Imperia1 and Brandenberg forces threaten France's
Gemallies, forcing Louis XIV to divert some troops fiom the occupied provinces. The
Dutch redand train several thousand chic mtlih'nmen behind the protection of the water barrier, raigng troop strength weiî above 30,000. The Dutch navy, uuder the command of Admirad DeRuyter, achieves peak effectiveness by this time, executing a defensive campaign against the ovenvhelmhgly superior Anglo-French fleet. This successful campaign ends with the defeat of the iarger ailied fieet at the Battle of Texel
( 1673). By August 1673, the Dutch gain SpPnisb support, providmg the Stadholder with the extemal balancing necessary to change his strategy
" israel, Dutch Rimacv, p.294. PHASE II: 1673- 1678 War with France (Threat and Allies)
The Dutch-Spanish Hague AlliPnce (August 1673), based on a mutuai Angio-
French threat, marks the transition to Phase II. The treaty unites hitch efforts, with those
of Hapsburg Spain and Holy Roman Empire, to combat French forces m the Southem
Nethedands and dong the Imperid border. Dutch allies divert enough French forces to its
eastem border, ailowing Wiilem to attack French forces2'. By June 1674, Dutch troops drive French forces out of the Republic, restricting their occupation to the fortresses of
Maastricht and Graves. Dutch privateering campa@ severety disrupts English seabome
commerce, making the war highly unpopular m England. Charles II withdraws fkom the contlict (February 1674), forcing Louis XIV to restrict his Let to the Mediterranean m feu of the Dutch navy. The Dutch regain naval superiority and its seaburne trade resumes. The States-General imposes mercantilist measures2' against France, restricting
French trade, in fàvor of Dutch produced goods.
In three years, the Dutch Republic regains its statu as a major sea and land power, but at a heavy cost. Dutch Generaiity expenditures finance most of the allied war effort, to mclude payment to allies and the hiring of several thousand German mercenaries m the now 100,000 soldier Dutch amy. The unprecedented state debt, resuhing fiom the risiag war costs, causes great fiscal concern among decision-makers. By 1675-76, the States-
General approves sizable cuts in military spendmg, trimmmg the myto 68,000. Pohcy-
Willem seeks to weaken, or attrit, French pwr. In 1673. Dutch forces attack French troops, driving them out of the Dutch Republic and thereby weakening their now precarious political and military situation. Willem has no intent to invade or annex land at France's expense. Regent demands for favorable trading tenns augment the Dutch desire to prevent a strong French economy. '' The Dutch Placard of 1674 restricts the importation and distribution of French wine, brandy, vinegar, paper, and sail canvas. among other items. The Dutch intend ta limit these goods in favor of Dutch home industries, hoping to replace these French goods on the intedonal market. Placard is repealed at the war's conclusion, in 1678. makers also reduce Dutch naval strength bas4 on budget consfraints and the diminished
French naval threat. These efforts to revive the wartgne economy are further hrndicapped
by French privateering and neutrai English shippmg. As a non-combatant, England
expands its seaborne trade at the expense of the Dutch, explu~gthe principle of 'mare
hienun'. Concem over the state's economic situation sparks renewed regent opposition
to the Prince's poücies.
Willem of Orange successfidiy rallies support for his wartime strategy despite the
growhg regent discontent. The Stadholder uses his Orangist appomtees as weli as his
influence with the Refomed Church to gain contgiued public support for the wuwith
Louis XIV. By 1677, he convinces the States-Generai to increase milituy spending,
expanhg the army to 90,000 soldiers. Wemadditionally gains English support through his marrïage to Rmcess Mary, the daughter of Charles II. Both States formalize an Anglo-
Dutch Defensive Treaty (1678), which becomes the foundation of Wülem's continental
strategy against France for the next half cenhiry.
The Dutch achieve both an economic and poiitical victory with the conclusion of the wu. Louis XIV, exploithg the rift between ûrangists and opposing regentsu, offers
Dutch regents favorable terms for peace, including the cancehtion of the 1667 tare in lieu of the more generous 1664 tarifflist. Willem of Orange opposes the offer, opthg to fight Louis MV until France is soundly defeated. The regents, acting through the States- her4accept these terms and halize the treaty at Nijmegen (August 1678). The Dutch conciude the wa.possessing one of the largest amies in Europe (90,000 troops) as well as navai supremacy among the combatants. In addition, the Repubüc accepts an hcreased
22 Israel, The Dutch Reoublic, p.824 commitment to the Southem Netherlands. The Hague AUiance (1673) requires the Dutch to provide ftnire niüitary assistance to Spain m defeose of the region against France. This commitment ailows for an mcreased Dutch presence m the Southern Netherknds, leadhg to the mevitable gankning of Dutch troops.
PHASE III: 1678- 1688 Fragüe Peace (No Threat and Aiiies)
Fragile peace characterizes the third phase of Dutch relative decline. Dutch decision-malcers respond with a renewed cornmitment to fiee(r) trade and systemic peace, but not *out domestic debate. In 1679, France threatens European postwar peace with its generd encroachment dong the Southem Netherlands, Lorraine, and Alsace borders. Louis XIV justifies these border area annexations on his mterpretation of the peace terms of ~ijrnegd.Louis XIV offers the Dutch a treaty of fiendship, m order to avoid codict with the Republic. hitch decision-makers, unable to corne to consensus on the French offer, fâil to provide any response.
Dutch domestic fiction, following the Franco-Dutch War, results Eom the regents and Orangists opposhg postwar strategies. Regents believe the Republic requires peace for the sake of commercial interests. With the economy slowly recovering, merchants and traders desperately depend on reduced antagonism and renewed trade between France and the Republic to anchor their recovery. Peace encourages the reduction of the state's military expendmires, to mclude reducmg noop strength. Orangins perceive this poshuar period as a temporary cessation of conflict with France. Louis XIV remains the principle threat to both the Dutch Republic and the Southem Netherlands. The state, therefore,
- - 23 'These tocal annexations, called 'reunions', were justifieci on the grounds that the peace of Nijmegen had allocated conquered border toms to France, without demarcating the border, so that districts legally 'dependent' on these conquests could legitimately be absorbeci into France." Israel, Md, p.829. needs to maintain its allies and mcrease militory strength m preparation for French aggression.
Regent interests uhmiately prevaiî, preventing the Republic fkom confkonting
France. Dutch commercial mterests, according to Israel, wili not allow the Stadholder to commit the Dutch state to oppose French expansionism, at Spain's expense, as long as
Louis XNrefiains fiom new mercantilist measures against the Dutch trading sysiern2'.
Decision-makers se& to both honor its military cornmitment to Spain and downplay any
French threat when Spain requests support for the defense of the Southem Netherlands
(1683), as stipuiated in the Hague Aliiance. While the Stadholder deploys 8000 soldiers to the region in a reserve capacity, his request to increase the army to 6 1,000 men encounters signincant regent and public opposition. His proposal eventudy fails because public opinion in the chief cities of Holiand and Zeeiand oppose mcreased taxation and the increased possibiiity of war associated with the proposaItS. Commercial oriented provinces request the state seek a treaty of niendship with France. Louis XN offers a twenty-year truce, which the Dutch accept and rat@ (lune 1684). The foilowing winter, the States-General signincantiy cuts military spendmg, reducmg the army to under 40,000 men.
Cognizant of the developmg situation in Europe, the Dutch maintain their current grand strategy. The revocation of the Edict of Nantes (1685) in France results in the mass immigration of Huguenot refùgees mto the Republic. While reinforcmg growing hostility of Dutch opinion to Louis XIV, Willem of Orange recognizes his mability to rdy enough
" Israel, hitch Ri-, p.340. 25 Israel, The Dutch Republic, p.833-4. domestic support for jobhg the League of Augsburg against France. Dutch merchants
and traders continue to trade with France on tjivorable tem. In 1685, it is iuconceivable
that the state support the Stadholder's miütary mtervention of England againsi the
ascension of James ïI. France remahs the focus of attention for the Dutch public and
regents, not ri tain^^.
PHASE IV: 1688- 1697 Glonous Revoiution & Nme Y ears Wu (Threat & mes)
Louis XIV7srenewed 'guerre de commerce7(1687-88) agahst Dutch trade
becomes the pivotai factor for change m the Dutch grand strategy. hti-Dutch
mercantilist policies, to include the reimposed 1667 tarifflist, alvm Dutch commercial
mterests to the impeding French threat. Tension witb France makes Dutch decision-
makers increahgiy concemed about James a's growing dependence on Louis XIV,
reminiscent to circumstances pnor to the 1672 invasion. The apparent Anglo-French
threat convinces regents to coordmate with Orangists for reprmnig the Republic. Willem
hires 14,000 seasoned Gennan troops and seeks coaîition with the Hapsburgs.
Amsterdam regent s, whüe supporting reamuunent, oppose economic retaliation agamst
France. These commercial interests finally acquiesce to trade sanctions and the inevitable
war with France when Louis XNissues a general arrest of ail Dutch ships in French ports
(September 1688).
Dutch wartime strategy recognizes the possiiility of a duai Anglo-French threat.
Willem convinces Dutch decision-makers to support an invasion of England?with the intent of overthrowhg James II and establishing an anti-French parüamentaiy monarchy fiiendly to the ~e~ublic~'. Wülem executes the risky venture (November 1688) with over
2 1,000 soldiers, comprishg the best regiments of the Dutch army, and a large mvasion
fleet, numbering 53 wiuships and 400 transport vessels. The Dutch dispatch their
remahhg armed forces, consisting of Dutch solâiers and Ge- mercenaries, to the
Southern Netherlmds to combat Louis XIV's expected mvasion. By February 1689,
Willem achieves his initiai objectives of the Glonous Revolution; the English throne and
relative control over the nation's government. The Dutch continue to maintain the best
part of the Dutch army in Britain until 1691, securing Wülem's highly precarious position.
The Dutch develop a highiy CO-dependentwartime relationship witb England. The
Stadholder-King Wiem of Orange brings England mto the Grand Aliiance with the Dutch
Republic md the League of Augsburg (May 1689). Willem approves a subsequent
division of Anglo-Dutch efforts: the Dutch Republic provides the larger land force to
defend the Southem Netherlands while Engiand plays the chief role at sea , providing naval power m a ratio of 5:3 vis-à-vis the utc ch". The Dutch and English, in concert with its allies, also wage a very thorough economic war against Louis XIV, depriving
France its European markets. The Dutch, with its amy dbided between Britah and the
Southem Netherlands, maintain the defensive in the wu's eariy years, leaving its Iniperial aliies to pursue a strategy of attrition. Mer 1691, the combmed Anglo-Dutch armyZ9,led by Willem, opposes French forces but with only Medsuccess. The Anglo-Dutch fleet gains only partial naval superiority by 1692. Despite their combined forces, backed by
Willem's wartime arategy is primarily aimed at depriving France its potential ally, thereûy diminishing its strength in waging both a land and sea wu against the Republic. '' Ibid, p.853. By 1693. the htch army alone was 93,000 soldier Non& Kennedy, Rise and Fall of Great Powers, p.87. maritime financiai strength, the allies fnil to defeat Louis XIV's France. The Nme Years
Wuends with an apparent staiemate, formatllcd by the Treaty of Ryswick (September
1697).
The htch Republic experiences both gains and losses as a result of the Nine
Years War. Dutch negotiators secure Spanish and French recognition for a much sought- after 'barrier' m the Southem Netherlands. Dutch soldiers ganison a string of fortress fiom Nieupoort to Namur in order to deter fùture French aggression and defend the
Republic fonvard of its border. The new cornmitment alîows for an mcreased hitch presence in the region and Merpenetration in the local economy. Negotiators aiso secure the cancellation of many French mercantilist poiicies and receive a new, more favorable tariff list ( 1699) to replace the restrictive 1667 tariEs. As a result of the war,
England supplants the Dutch Repubiic as the supreme naval power. The ailies division of effort locks the Republic into a position of mantirne inferiority, whüe condemning the state to absorb the majority of the hancial burden for maintahhg a me,expensive continental army. This relationship fuaher impacts Dutch relative decline during the War of Spanish Succession.
PHASE V: 1697- 1702 Partition Treaties ('Tnreat and Allies - Peace)
The interwar years proves to be a period of concem and crisis for hitch decision- makers. The Dutch entrepot &ers severe setbacks as a result of the war, with the loss of key markets and increased commercial cornpetition. French merchants, exploithg its naval supenority in the Mediterranean, successfùlly supplant traditionai Dutch dominance of the profitable Levant trade. English traders, in the meanwhile, make significrnt inroads in the West &cm trade and Cvibbean trade with Spanish Arnerica at the expense of the
1 Dutch. The most significant setback, however, is in the Bahic de.Following the war, the Dutch fàil to regain dominance of commercial trafnc in its most important market. By
170 1, Dutch rivals account for well over 50 percent of the tracpassing through the
Danish sounds30. High public debt, abresuhing fiom the war, provides additional anxiety for Dutch decision-rnalcers.
international concem over Spanish Succession Merjeopardizes the well-bemg of the Dutch entrepot. The uncertainty of succession to the chiidles King of Spam,
Carlos II, puts at risk Dutch trading privileges and access to vital markets in Spain,
Spanish America and the Southem Netherlands. This situation, again, puts France in direct coafi.ontation with the Dutch Republic and its aliies Louis XTV seeks the Spanish throne for his grandson, the Dauphin. A Bourbon Spain provides France a powerful dy, access to Spanish colonies and markets for its merchants, and the much sought-der
Southem Netherlands. French dominance of Spanish trade and occupation of the
Lowlands directiy threatens both Dutch economic and miiitary security, necessitating a political dor&ary response.
The Dutch pursue a deliberate peacetime grand strategy. Decision-makers prepare the state for its apparently inevitable war with France whiie concurrently pursuhg diplornatic solutions. The prevniling mtemationai tension prevents a revivd of regent opposition to Orangist policies, affiordmg the Stadholder domestic support for his actions.
Decision-makers approve the construction of new warships, resulting m its largest fleet
Israel, Dutch Rima*, p.359. since 1670~'.They deploy troops to occupy the designated bdertowns m the Southem
Netherlanck These soldiers provide secuniy for the Repubiic and a deterring force aghFrench mvasioa Dutch merchants renew fiee(r) trade witb France. In need of economic recovery, Dutch commercial bterests puraie trade m ali traditional markets, m hopes of recapturing its economic dominance. Stadholder-King Winern of &ange compliments hitch strategy by conduchg peaceful negotiation with Louis XIV over
Spanish Succession. Discussions redm the Partition Treaties of 1698 and 1700, meant to dMde the empire between the two heirs, the Archduke and Dauphin, and diffuse the political crisis.
PHASE VI: 1702- 17 13 War of Spanish Succession (Threat and Aiiies)
The War of Spanish Succession resumes Louis XIV7sthreat to Dutch hegemony.
Louis XIV immediately abandons the Partition Treaties upon the ascension of the Dauphin to the Spanish throne, as mandated by Carlos II before his death. He dispat ches French troops ( 170 1) Bito the Southem (Spanish) Netherlands and forces the Dutch to evacuate its 'barrier' g&ns. French soldiers secure the entire region for Spain, depriving the
Dutch its markets, control of the Scheldt and Antwerp, and ts buffer between France and the Repubiic. Philip V, King of Spain, gants French merchants exchisive access to
Spanish American trade, to mclude the highly profitable 'aSento ' slave trade at Dutch-
Portquese expense. The loss of this trade jeopardizes the Dutch's rich Levant and East
India trades which depend on Spanish silver. These disastrous conditions leave the hitch with Wealternative but to wage war agpmst France and fight for its nwival
" See Table A-1, "Estimated huaiNumber of Warships. l66& 1720sm, in the Appndix.
41
.. The French threat soiÏdifies Dutch domenic support for the cdüct, despite recent change in goverment. Whof Orange's death in March 1702 precedes the States-
General's restoration of a Stadholderless regime. The resolution düfb the balance of power away nom the Orangists and towards the regents. Despite their traditional position agabit reannarnent and war, the ruling regents recognizP the Republic's desperate situation and consent to the high public debt and trading restrictions associated with a wartime strategy. Mmonty Orangists and the Dutch public also support war, alarmed by the renewed French threat. The ruhg eiite seek bot. economic and müirary objectives fiom the codict which would sahage Dutch primacy. These inchide, the restoration of the favorable pre- 1700 position of Dutch commerce m Spain and the Spanish Indies;
Hapsburg wntrol of the Southem Netherlands, augmented by a Dutch 'barrier', codùmation of the Scheldt restrictions and fhvorable trading privileges for Dutch merchants; curb on France's military powa, and moderate French trade
The Dutch Repubiic renews its wartime strate&' but with mixed renihs The
Dutch ally wïth England, Savoy, Holy Roman Empire (Ad)and other lesser German states to fom the Grand Alliance. Within the aüiance, the Dutch and English again codto a combined wonof eEon accordhg to the 1689 naval and military forces agreement. The htch conaibute 100,000 soldiers for the wmbmed Anglo-Dutch arrny and NO-& (89 warships) of the cornbmed fleet. The Dutch umy reaches its ail-time peak by 17 12 with l30,OOO soldiers whde the navy sustains its highest count for the 18th
Inael. The Dut& RewbLic, p.969. 33 The Dutch, as mentioned above. seek to strengthen their economic and political situation at the expense of Fm.AngleDuch forces pursue an attrition arategy to aeaLcn French power, thereby re+ establishing the Mance of pmer, or staais qw. century (89 m 1702) durhg the war. Despite its great power, the Republic occupies a les
senior position m the allied coalition than during the previous w# . Britain ovenhadows the Republic with naval superiority, a considerably larger share of subsidies paid to the
Emperor and allied German States, more troops m the Iberian penimda war, and the appomtment of an En&h wmmander, Marlborough, to the combmed Anglo-Dutch army.
The Dutch also expience Wed aiccess with its restrictive tnde policy. In
1703, the Republic, almg with England, bans imports fiom France and the Southem
Netherlands, with the exception of wool and linens. The Dutch do not, however, extend the restrictions to Spain and Spanish Amerka. This is due to their importance - second ody to the Battics - to Dutch trade. The following year, the Dutch widen the exceptions to the ban due to its damaping consequences to Dutch trade. France, also suBering fiom restncted trade, agrees to li61 a majority of its bans and renew trade wdh ody the Dutch
Republic, despite English objections. Dutch dependence on foreign commerce forces the aate to trade with its enemies so to prevent its economic devastation as a resuh of two wars. By 17 10, both the Dutch and French renew theH trade restrictions, with Louis XN extendhg the ban to include Spain and Spanish America.
The War of SpPnish Succession produces a weakened Dutch hegemony. The
Dutch Republic overreaches it capabilities, exhausting its economic and lrmitary power to near depletion. Unprecedented wartime expendmires resuh m Dutch public debt exceeding
148 -on guilders m 17 13, up 60m 30 million m 168~~~. The significant expenses associated wah fighting a land war, leads to a financial neglect of the navy. Due to
" bid, p.971. 35 Boxer, Dutch Seaborne Empire, p. 13 8 significant troop costs, Dutch decision-makers graduaily minmn.le their navat
obligationsW,becorning mcreasingly dependent on English sea power to protect its
seabome empire. Dutch ne- of its hegemonic respons'bilities enables the English to
seek many of the same trading privileges once belonging exchigveiy to Dutch merchants.
These En@ whegaias result m a direct chaüenge to traditional Dutch economic primacy. The Anglo-French negotiated peace ( 17 12), for example, grants Britah extensive advaotages m Spain and Spanish America, mcluding the 'asiento'.
Despite the setbacks, the Dutch manage to achieve several of its prewar objeaives as a result of the conflict and the subsequent terms for peace. Anglo-Dutch campaigns m
Southem Netherlands successhilly defeat Louis XIV's forces, leading to a combmed occupation of the region. Dutch officiais, seeking to re-assert its predoniinance over the
Lowlands, gain English support for its initiatives through a senes of treaties (1706, 1709,
17 13). These agreements acknowledge En@ suppon for Dutch numerous 'barriers' m the region m exchange for a Dutch guarantee of the Protestant Succession m ri tain^'.
Ahhough the Peace of Utrecht (17 13) grants the Southern Netheriands to Hapsburg
Austria, the Dutch receive Imperia1 recognition for its 'barrier' rights m the Austro-Dutch
Treaty of Antwerp ( 17 15). The treaty codùm the Scheldt restrictions and the Eavorable
1680 tarifFlist while granhg the Dutch occupation of eight major fortress-toms dong the French fiontier and an annuai subsidg8 fkom Austria for the upkeep of bamier
36 See Table A- 1. "estimated Annual Number of Wanhipg l66û- 1720s'. in the Appendix. 37 The guarantee of Rotestant Succesiou represents an ïncreased cornmitment to the Republic. The Dutch maintain this cornmitment in 17 15 and 17 19, with troop depivents to Britain, provoked by feared Jacobite attacks. N(Yï"E: On 0 1 May 1707, England and Scdand unite under the U~onJack creating the United Kingdam of Great Britain, changing "English" teferences to "British". " The annual Austrïan subsidy provides for only 6WA of the garrison costs, leaving the Dutch Repiblic to pay the remaining costs datedwith its troop Qployment. See Wallerstein, Makm World Svstems, p.250. gurisons. The Dutch, m rehun, promise to maintain 14,000 troops in the region, a
considerable increase ikom the Spanisb agreement. The resulting increase in cornmitment
to the region provides more substantial penetration mto the AuhNetherlands markets
while the troop expense conm%utesto the growth of the state's high public debt.
PHASE W: 17 13- 1720s Postwar Europe (No Threat and Alties)
Dutch decision-makers predicate theh postwar grand strategy on an exhausted ,
non-threatening France and ailied Bntain and Austria. Extemal balancing enables the
govenunent to drasticly. cut military expenditures, significantly reducing both army and
navy strength. Troop strength fdsfiom 90,000 m 1713, to 40,000 in 17 15, and finally
34,000 soldiers m 17 17. The remaining hitch army conducts ganison duty in the
Southem Netherlmds 'bamier' toms, the Generaiity Lands, and the province of
eld der land^^. Naval strength declines steadiîy fiom 78 warships in 1713 to 42 in 1725.
Dutch warships continue to provide security for its merchant and fishmg fleets but traders bcreasingly depend on the British navy to guarantee 'fieedom of the seas'. Although maintainhg a generally defensive posture40during this phase, Dutch forces twice ( 17 15 and 17 19 ) deploy to Britain, at Parliament's request, to protect Protestant Succession against feared Jacobite attacks.
The Republic's unprecedented economic He,following the war, contniutes to deteriorating domestic CO-operationand the emergence of a neutralist sentiment m diplomacy. Open dissension among the provinces over public debt, the date's med forces, and provincial budgetary quotas leads to a senes of gatherings of the States-
'' Israel, The Dutch Re~ublic,p.985. 40 hygarrison duty and naval convoy security constitute a defensive posture for the purpose of this maclel. General(17 16- 17 17) to review the state of the Union and its fùture iùnctions. Lepding
Dutch officiais urge the provinces to mengthm the Union, by mcreasing the States-
General's authority, refom state hances, and restore the Repubiic's aniiitary and navd power, while simultaneously reducing public debt4' . Despite these arguments, most decision-ders refiain kom mcreased federabm. Instead, regents agree to reduce military strength (mdicated above), limit mcreased taxation (in the interest of public support), and adopt a neutralist diplomatic position, more conducive to renewhg f?ee(r) trade and saving the Dutch entrepot. Decision-&ers employ this sentiment when the
Republic fàils to jom the Quadruple Alliance (17 18) agaha Spain, due to concems over
Spanish trade.
During the postwar phase, the signs and effects of Dutch relative deche are clearly evident. The high public debt, associated with the preceding wars, forces the state to cut military expendmires and divert retuins for paying mterest accumulated on the debt.
Subsequent force reductions, signi6icdy below those of other major powers, and its adopted diplomatic neutrpüty contniute to the state's decreased prestige among major powers. The wars with France and these postwar developments illustrate the Republic's inability to mobiüze power necessary to provide order and protection to the international
~~stern~~.The rise of economic competition, in the last quarter cenhiry, resuhs in the loss of key markets to Dutch merchants. The loss of markets, to Britain and France, causes the loss of demand for Dutch goods. Dutch manufàcturing decreases and its mdustries gradually decay. By the 1720% Dutch entrepot trade mcreasingly consists of raw
- - --
41 Israel. The Dutch Remblic, p.987. '* Brawley, Liberai Leadcrshi~,p.71. materiais, not nnished goods. The main Holland toms, and their made and industry,
rapidly deche m both absohite and relative te11.n~~~.
Dutch hegemony ends with the relative closure of the international system,
represented by widespread industrial mercantilism throughout ~uro~e~.Northem and central European states adopt extensive mercantilist policies foUowing the Great Northem
War ( 1700- 172 1), sparked by economic nationalism- These measures seek to prevent the
odowof raw materiais and the inûow of foreign manufàctured goods in an effort to stimulate domestic industries. The impodexport restrictions and indusvial development m these regions directly threaten Dutch commerce, depriving the Repubüc fiom its most important markets. Dutch decision-makers, by the 1720% clearly lack the müitary power required to mtimate these states towvds lifting their trade restrictions. Without both adequate militaiy power and significant economic advantages, the Dutch Republic ceases fùnctioning as the system hegemon, marking the end of Dutch primacy.
CONCLUSION
The detded study of Dutch relative decline highlights several challenges encountered by decision-makers when formulating grand strategy. The Republic expenences crippling disjuncture of motivation and capabiiities, as stressed during the War of SpdSuccession. Its acceptance of significant miiitary and hanciai obligations (Le.
43 1bi4 p.993. 44 Scholars disagree on the close of Dutch hegemony. Gilpin and Modelski both contend that the Dutch reign ends with the War of Spanish Succession, based on their apparent loss of military and economic power. Brawley and Wallerstein insist that Dutch hegemony survives the war, ending in the 1730s and 1740s. They base their assertion on the state's financiai strength, which continues to dominant European markets until mid-century. Based on my definition of hegemony, 1 believe hegemony ends in the 1720s. The Dutch Republic no longer possesses the military powr or motivation to maintain the international system. Widespread mercantilism and increased cornpetition shuts Dutch commerce out of numerous markets, depriving the Dutch from many of its economic advantages. system maintenance responsiiiity), despite reduced benefits of leadership, leaves the
Repubüc economically drained following the war. Bntain reaps the apparent benefits of
leadership, m te= of economic concessions, political prestige, and a superior navy. The . .- Dutch choose to mvest their dimmtshmO g retms mto th& inüitary, m hopes of securing
favorable economic conditions for their systemic trading network The costs associated
with this stnitegy eventuaIly exceed the possible benefits as depicted by a postwar Dutch
Republic. Domestic interests and mtemational conditions force the relative& declinhg
hegemon to pursue this seemingly kationai strategy.
A review of the theoreticai mode1 (TABLE 3 and 4) indicates other significant
trends associated with Dutch decline. The Dutch Republic spends a total of 25 years at
war with France during its 47 year rehtive decüne. Threat and war drastically raise the
cost of systemic leadership, thereby diverthg hdsfrom the economy. Dutch
cornmitment to sustainhg a large w&e army, accordmg to the Anglo-Dutch agreement
for the Nome Years and Spanish Succession Wars, clearly diverts military fimding away
fiom traditional Dutch strength - its navy. In the process, the economy simdtmeously
expenences excessive govenunent spendmg and restricted trade. The French wars limit
Dutch economic growth and undermine its nationai power, thereby comniming it to
imperial overstretch. Excessive war and hitch policies causes the state to experience
müitary relative decline prior to economic relative decüne.
A crowsectional anaiysis (TABLE4) of Dutch grand strategy depicts the strengths and wealmesses of specüic policies. Trade restrictions, for example, Unposed on French aide ignificantly hurt the Dutch entrepot. Despite its motivation for fiee trade(r),
decision-makers @ose restrictions with the mtention of attriting French economic power
TaMe 3: Dutch Grand Strabegies in Relative kiine(167247209): Results
Threat of a Challenger Yes No
167û-1688 hrgik ha Yes 1713-172b Postwrr Europe
+ 1673-1678 Warwith France Threat 168%-1697 Gbrious Revolutka 1697-1702 Partition Treatics and and Nhe Years War Allies 1702-1713 Warof Sprnish Succession L
and applying pressure towards gaining Dutch concessions. The Republic gains limited
success iiom its wartime economic policies. Dutch military strategy, on the other band,
reflects political responsiibility. Faced with 30 years of French threat, decisiowmakers
adopt strategies conducive to national and systemic security. The regents willingness to
forge postwar relations with France, 167û-88, despite Louis XIV's border annexations, provides the Dutch Republic 10 years of peace and economic growth. Deciskmmakers
agree to increases its military size and commitments as a result of the French wars. Dutch commitment to providmg gPmsons m Southern Netherhds barrier towns seemingly
augments Dutch secwity and relative control of the region. The formai commitment, however, forces the state to maintain expensive garrisons m a region m which it once retained authority without ~oldiers~~.
Tabk 4: htch Grand Stratcgies (1672-172ûs): CrossScctiond Analysis
1697- 1702 1702- 17 13 War 1713-1720s IkI Partition Treaties I of Sp. Succession I Postwar Europe
1 1 Mode1 ( A-1 1 Model ( Aduol 1 Model I) Aciual Ecoaomic Free(r) Free(r) Restricî Rest/FT Free(r) Free(r) Trade Policy 1 Military Deter Deter Attrition Attrition Ddmse Ddmse strategy I
The Dutch Republic represents the first of three modem hegemon. Tbf%st case study suffiers leadership and poiicy chaiienges both simüar and dissimilar to the nea cases.
-- -- - a5 Britain suffers that same îàte when its informa1 empire becomes the target of renewed European imperialism in the 1880s. The scrarnbles for Aûica and Asia force the hegemon to station expense gamsons in areas where Britain once retained relative control without soidiers. Despite its monopolistic practices m Asia and its closhg of the Scheldt, the Dutch advocate the same principles of fiee(r) tnde and systemic responsiility as the next two hegemons. Tbe lessons leamed on the Dutch case study equaliy apply to the grand strategies adopted by Bntam and the US. GREAT BRITAIN. 1889-1932
British hegemony clearly dominates the international system for most of the 19th century. Its superior economy and world class navy combine to give Bntain unmatched global influence and power. Scholars attribute the relative systemic peace, associated with the height of British hegemony, to its predominance, or relative control, of the internat ional system, hence "Pax ~ritannica"~.
STATUS OF HEGEMONY
This quintessential hegemon possesses al1 the required elements for hegemony - economic and militaiy power, an established international system and motivation for fiee(r) trade. Britain derives its economic strength from its superior industries, technology and capital investment. The Industrial Revolution initiates widespread economic growth throughout Britain giving the state advantages in manufaring and technological development. The state achieves industrial and commercial pnmacy2through its mass export of goods, eaming it the title, "Workshop of the World". The vast capital, generated by British trade, transfomis Britain into the world's major exporter of capital.
The City of London dominates global finance, investment, and other "invisibles". This global export of capital for foreign and imperial investments creates an ''informai empire" of British economic influence. Foreign markets and raw materials associated with
Britain's forma1 empire as weU as it superior maritime capacity reinforces its position as the world's premier entrepot.
I British hegemony provides the initial basis for hegemonic stability theory, as discussed earlier in this thesis. See Brawley, Liberal Leadership, p. 109. See Appendix B, "Percentages of World Trade"
52 Britain faciltates the creation of an international flee(r) trade system based on its
extensive global econornic interests. The success of capital senices and export of
manufachired goods encourages decision-makers to repeal the Corn Laws (1 846), the
landmark obstacle to fiee(r) trade. The repeal of this protectionist act encourages the
import of agriculturai goods, opening domestic markets to foreign traders. The eventual
aboiitiod of most duties on imported goods encourages states to forge trade relations
with Bntain and gain access to its nch home and imperid markets as well as potential
investment and technology. The govemment uses both econornic incentivesJ and military
persuasion to expand its trading relations. By mid-century, Britain leads a far-flung
trading network, encompassing all continents. As system leader, it adopts the principle of
indirect nile, rather than expansive imperialism in Africa and Asia. Decision-rnakers
support this inexpensive method of relative control, based on treaties and agreements,
since it equally guarantees British merchants market penetration5.
Bntain employs its preponderant navy and irnperial army to protect its vast
econornic interests associated with the international fiee(r) trade system. The hegemon
clearly maintains naval supremacy throughout its prirnacy6. Following the Napoleonic
Wars ( 18 17), decision-makers adopt the two-power de, giving Britain a navy equal to
the navies of any two powers opposing it7. This measure results in the state's possession
of approximately 45% of the world's relative share of naval capabilities, 1850- 1900.
3 Unlike the Dutch trading companies, Britain abolishes the monopoly of the East India Company in the China trade (1834). These type measures open the British empire and trading posts to foreign trade. i.e. unilateral tarin reductions. loans, investment, manufactured goods. etc * Direct nile would be needed if the market were thnatened (Le. India and the later scrambles for Asia Africa and China). Brawley, p. 116. See Appendix 8-3, "Major Powers Estimated Annual Number of Warships. 18804932" ' See Kennedy, Rise and Fa11 of British Naval Mastem. Britain's small professional army acts as imperial police force, augmenthg British naval power. In times of war, the mycan resource the multi-million residents of the empire, creathg a sufficient defense force. Decision-makers frequently exercise bot h services for maintaining open, fiee(r) trade in remote or distant regions. Gunboat diplomacy and temporary army deployments oflen communicate British intentions in the "informal empire".
ENVIRONMENT
Britain's domestic environment creates the conditions for systemic leadership. Its political and economic interests, acting within the republican regirne, express the aate's motivation for establishing and maintaining an international fie&) trade system.
Liberal Re-pime Type
Britain's pariïamentary system embraces wide social and public participation.
Although the constitutional monarchy recognizes peerage in the House of Lords (until
19 1 l), the House of Commons and local governrnents increasingiy endorse public representation in the political process. The regulation of public schools and the proliferation of newspapers and books create conditions for greater public and social awareness. Public support becomes very signifiant, Ui the late 19th century, with renewed British hperialism in Afkica and Asia. The Boer War demonstrates massive
British support for overseas ventures. FoUowing the First World War, the goverment drastically increases social spending, at the rnilitary's expense, recognizing the public's growing role in British govemment. Prevdina Economic and Political Interests
The City of London clearly dominates the British economic agenda. Its primacy in
global financial senices contributes sigdcantly to the evolution of the "infonnal empire",
while augrnenting British relative control. The economy 's relative decline in the 1890s
inspires growing opposition to London's influence in Parliament. Non-cornpetitive
industries and agricultural sectors gain political endorsement from protectionist, Joseph
Chamberlain. Although his tariff campaign gains low-to-moderate support throughout
Britain, its effects divide the niling Unionist Party through 1905. The free trade-
protectionist debate, however, continues to plagues Parliament's backrooms foUowing the
war. Despite speculation, the govenunent maintains its cornmitment to the City of
London.
GRAND STRATEGY
British grand strategy clearly reflects its need to maintain the international fiee(r) trade system for the sake of its dominant economic interests. Since the 1840s, the British economy moves away from self-sufficiency towards an increasing dependence on multilateral trade. Systemic leadership transforms the economy, stimulating its specialization for international trade. London concentrates on financiai, shipping, and insurance seMces for much of the world while English industries cater to global exports.
By 1860, Britain conducts over 25% of al1 world trade8. This specialization in international trade also demonstrates the hegemon's signincant dependence on the continued flow of trade for its economic survivalg. Limited access to overseas markets and regional instability directly t hreaten British commerce. The hegemon must maintain systemic security, void of political challenge, to ensure the economic strength, and hence strategic security, of the state.
Britain maintains access to foreign markets through both its formai and Uiformal empires. A product of the 17th and 18th centuries, the British empue of 1850 consists of numerous overseas colonies to include Canada, Australia, New Zealand, Hong Kong, and
India. British imperial trade (1867) amounts to an impressive L40 million. India, its most sigdicant imperial market, imports L2 1 million, equal to Britain's largest foreign consumer, the United statesIo. The hegemon equally relies on its infiormal empire to absorb British goods and capital. Bntain secures trading rights with much of Africa, Asia, and South America through treaties and agreements. This arrangement grants the hegemon access to the area's markets and goods without the cost of adrninistering the region as a colony. Britain retains economic and political infiuence through its trade and investment. Regional conflict and encroaching European imperialism both jeopardize the stability and access to the Uiformal empire, necessitating a more expensive British colonial commitment.
Britain maintains systernic security through its command of the seas. Charged with protecting the Home Islands and guarding overseas interests and seabome trade routes, the Royal Navy comprises the world's largest and most powemil naval force. A network of strategic overseas naval bases and coaling stations support the navy's global deployment. These strategic bases, dong with its naval presence, manage to secure
French, British Econornic and Strateeic Planning 1905-19 15, p. 12-1 3. 10 British trade within the empire is subjat to the same &(r) vade principles as those granted to other non-imperial States. See James, Rise and Fa11 of the British Em~ire,p. 172. Britaui's most important trade routes1*- the Mediterranean, Suez, Cape of Good Hope,
Singapore and English Channel. This strategic posture gives the system leader unprecedented command of the world's watenvays. Regional naval squadrons police distant overseas interests, enforcing international rules against piracy and slave trading while upholding the principles of fiee(r) trade. Britain's cornmand of the seas provides the essential link to its relative control of the empire and international system.
In time of international cnsis, Bntain traditionally employs "balance of power" politics and national means for resolving conflict. Since the War of Spanish Succession,
British decision-makers use the state's power against any dominating or threatening power which may jeopardize British interests or secunty. Rather than forge permanent alliances,
Britain creates temporary commitments against irnrnediate threats. Decision-makers resist long-terrn arrangements which could force the state to participate in foreign wars against
British interests. While Britain readily relies on its anned services to quel1 imperial and small-scale codicts, it also employs appeasement for obtaining cnsis resolutionI2. The grant of temtorial or economic concessions represents a pacific and rational settlement of disputes. Despite its current negative connotation, appeasement often secures a peaceful answer, giving Britain the systemic conditions it seeks for international trade.
PHASE 1: 188% 1904 Splendid Isolation (Threat and No Allies)
Although Bntain experiences increasing economic and military competition throughout the 1880s, the Naval Defense Act (1 889) marks the beginning of the relative decline phase for this study. Britain's proclamation to uphold the two-power standard results fiom the govemment 's acknowledgment that foreign naval prograrns gradually
" Massie, Dreadnought, p.434. diminished Britain's naval supenonty. Separate regional disagreements with France,
Germany, and Russia, throughout the 1880s, draw British attention to the expanding naval
programs of these powers. By 1887, a combined Franco-Russian force possesses enough
battleships to significantly threaten British interests in the North Sea, Atlantic and
Mediterranean. Decision-makers address the hegemon' s relatively weakened position wit h
a five-year L23 million naval program to construct 10 battleships, 42 cmisers and 18
torpedo boats. This initiative accelerates a 20 year Angio-Franco/Russian naval arms race
that concludes in 1904.
British decision-makers initially perceive France and Russia, particularly the latter,
its principle challengers. France, the historical enemy, pre-occupies Britons with constant
rumors of cross-channel invasions of the islands. The French naval program and its
expanding Afncan empire continually almBritish decision-makers in the late 19th century, culrninating in a potential conflict over the remote outpost of Fashoda (1 898).
Decision-rnakers perceive a more legitimate French threat, as a result of its 1891 entente with Russia. Decision-makers interpret the Franco-Russian niendship as a hostile coalition aimed at challenging British control of the Mediterranean. The Russian port cal1 to Toulon (1893) consequently confimis British fears13.
Expansionist Russia poses a genuine threat to British interests throughout the world. While its naval forces threaten interests in the Mediterranean, Russia's army and rail system threaten interests in India and China. The combination of idkastructure development and territorial acquisition in central Asia creates feus among imperialists that
" See Kennedy, Strategv and Diplomaçv, Ch. 1. 13 BWnresponses to the port cal1 and apparent threat with increased naval spending, amounting to 9 first class battleships. See Friedberg, Wearv Titan, p. 155-56. Russian troops WUinvade Af'ghanistan, and then India. Militaiy planners prepare for the defense of India and a large scde land war in Mghanistan through 1905'~.In eastem
Asia, Russian forces exploit turmoii in northem China and annex Manchuria (1900).
Russia remains a threat to British trading interests in the region until Japan defeats both its fleet and eastem armies in the Russo-Japanese War (1904-05).
An additional threat to Britain's economic interests results from the impenal expansion of European powers in the late 19th century. Attracted by the economic benefits and prestige associated with an empire, the major powers initiate an "imperial" scramble for the unclaimed regions of Afnca, Asia and the Pacific. As France and
Gemany establish new colonies, British decision-makers become critically concemed that these imperial "scrambles" will close much of the hegemon's idormai empire to British trade". The British public soon develops an impenalist sentiment, encouraging the governent to seize colonies for the state's posterity. The hegemon abandons its concept of informa1 empire, or "cheap colonialism", opting to expand its formal claims in Asia and
Afîica, to include Burma, Nigeria, Egypt-Sudan, and much of Southem Afnca.
This British expansion in Southem Afiïca commits its forces to waging a costly war against the Boer Republics (1 899- 1902). As early as 1895, Cape Colony Prime
Minister Cecil Rhodes engineers the Jameson Raid, an attempt to draw Britain into confiict with Transvaal and the Orange Free State allowing it to claim the gold and diamond rich regions. Despite its failure, the raid succeeds in gaining public support for expansion. Britain instigates a war with the Boer Republic in 1899 and defeat its conventional forces the following year. Boer guedla activity continues for two additional years, necessitating 500,000 soldiers and significant expenditures to subdue the
resistance. By 1902, the Boers accept British sovereignty in the Treaty of Vereeniging, in
exchange for economic indemnities.
Britain experiences several significant realizations as a result of the Boer War. The
conflict initially demonstrates the disadvantages of imperial, or systemic, responsibility.
Decision-makers question the hegemon's abiiity to bear burden for the empire. The costs
associated with the distant war increase govenunent spending to unprecedented levels,
causing a sharp increase in taxes? This increase diminishes public support for imperiai
ventures. The vast cornmitment of the hegemon's resources to Southem Afnca reveals
other wlnerabilities in imperial security. Britain's redeployment of its forces leaves
portions of the empire dangerously exposed to attack or rebellion. As a result, the
Adrniraity forms a naval "flying squadron" to quickly reinforce imperial defense and deter
potential aggression.
The Boer War also draws attention to the hegemon's newest threat, Germany.
The infamous Kruger telegram (1896) demonstrates German sympathy for the Boers
against English aggression. British mistrust of German intentions in Southem Afiica leads to growing anirnosity between the two powers. The German policy of Weltmacht (1897) publicly declares the state's policy of expansion, colonialization, and development of its naval forces. German decision-makers justify its naval build-up based on the potential
British threat to German economic interests and imperial expansion. Gennan Admirai
Tirpitz exploits this growing Anglo-Geman antagonism to increase naval expenditures, through several Navy Laws. The second Navy Law (1900) seriously alarms British decision-makers, based on Germany's rapid naval expansion. In response, the hegemon increases its naval program, ordering 8 additional battleships. By 1902, the Adrniralty convinces British decision-makers of the threat posed by the new German fleet.
Econornic uncertainty and renewed protectionism further challenge the relatively declining hegemon. By the 1880~~new industrial powers challenge Britain's primacy.
The strength of British exports and a world-wide recession (1 872-1 896) convince several govemments to abandon fiee trade in favor of protecting their growing industries".
British exports suffer as these states erect tariff barriers. The Colonial Secretary, Joseph
Chamberlain, proposes the creation of a British customs union, for protecting imperial trade. The plan would unite the empire behind a tariff wall, charging duty on foreign goods. These duties would then be re-invested within the empire, prornoting agriculture and manufacturing. Despite Chamberlain's extensive campaigning and moderate support,
London financiers and public opinion defeat these tariff policies in the 1906 elections. The hegemon's internationalists renew the state's cornmitment to fiee(r) trade.
Faced with multiple economic and political dilemmas, the hegemon seeks to alter its grand strategy. The Boer War clearly demonstrates Britain's vulnerability and isolation among major powers. By 1900, the hegemon clearly lacks extemal support fiom other leading states for balancing power within the system. While Brîtain successtùlly deters potential extemal aggression, the high costs associated wit h systemic maintenance, to include an expanding empire and costly naval arms race, force decision-makers to adapt a less expensive approach. Bntain first seeks a possible defensive alliance with Queen
Victoria's grandson, the Gennan Kaiser. Several rapprochements and colonial
l6 ibid, p.99.
61 appeasement in Afnca and the Pacific (1898-190 1) fail to secure any Gem cornmitment. British concem over Russian expansion in China, however, stimulates a military alliance in the Far East with Japan (1 902). By 1903. Britain and France begin formal discussions to settle colonial ditlierences in Afnca. The talks result in a cordial entente (1904) between the two States, ending Britain's "splendid isolation" in Europe and notably altering its traditional grand strategy.
PHASE a: 1904- 19 14 Preparing for War (Threat and Allies)
Britain develops a new, more efficient grand strategy in the years prior to the war.
The rise of foreign threats and econornic cornpetition in the late 19th century causes disequilibrium between the hegernon's global commitments and its capabilities to maintain the ~~stern'~.Decision-makers, in this phase, seek to reduce impenal overstretch tluough diplomatic commitments and interna1 restmcturing. The rising threat fiom Germany compounds Britain's challenges to both secure the Empire and lower governrnent expenditures. The following quote, from historian Max Beloff, best describes Britain's course of action dunng this period:
An imperid system threatened by major enemies is bound to try to rid itself
of penpheral responsibilities in defense that may detract fiom its principal
concems; if the legions can be recailed, it is safer to recall them. If political
means can be found for reducing the cal1 upon military resources, then the
search for such means becomes an acceptable object of policy'g.
17 lames, p.20 1. Gilpin, War and Cbeein World Politics. Ch. 5 '' Beloff, Imperid Sunset, p.246.
62 Britain accepts a geographically constrained form of naval supenonty through
strategic accommodation with peripheral and major ~owers~'.Both tacit and irnplicit
arrangements with the US, Japan, and France dowBritain to redeploy its regional
squadrons while maintaining continued protection of its economic interests through the
auspices of these powers. The hegemon tacitly admits to US naval supremacy in the
western hemisphere in the Hay-Pauncefote Treaty (190 1). Despite no formal alliance,
Bntain recognizes the US'S potential fnendship and excludes its expanding naval forces
from the Two-Power Standard. Japan further reduces British concems in the Far East by
extending the ailiance to also encompass hdia's security, alleviating some concern over
the Russian threat. Meanwhile, France formally agrees to concentrate its fleet in the
Mediterranean ( 19 12), while Britain concentrates in the Atlantic and North Sea. Each
power provides reciprocal protection of interests in their respective regions. This tacit acceptance of strategic pluralism allows Britain to both restructure and concentrate its
forces closer to the impeding threat.
The British Adrniralty initiates far-reaching reforms throughout this period, transforming the Royal Navy into a more cost-efficient yet powerful force. Admird
Fisher's 1904 memo to the Cabinet calls for the worldwide reorganization of British naval forces. Decision-makers eliminate several of the regional squadrons and redistnbute its warships to the newly organized New Channel, Atlantic, Mediterranean (until 19 12)
Fleets. Cost-cutting reforms de-commission 154 ships deemed obsolete and reduce expenditures in several overseas dockyards. By 1907, Fisher's plan reduces naval costs to
" Friedberg, p. 168-74. L3 1.4 million, L5.4 million less than in 1904~'.In addition, naval planners achieve to
revolutionize naval warfiue through the construction of a new warship class, H.M. S.
Dreadnought.
The arrny experiences siilar refoms under Secretary of State for War Haldane.
Decision-makers reorganize the army into two forces, a professional Regular Amy
Expeditionary Force, consisting of six divisions and 160,000 soidiers, and a second-line
Territorial Army, raised in the British Ides and maintained as a reserve to the
Expeditionary orc ce? Reforms Save the government L3 million while simultaneously
creating a more effective force.
Despite this extensive refonn, military expenditures drastically increase with the
escalation of the Anglo-German naval anns race. Germany maintains rapid naval
expansion throughout this period, directly chaiienging the Royal Navy's primacy in home
waters. The British govemment responses with simiiar increases. Des pite yearly increases
in naval expenditures, the government firther accelerates ship-building as a result of the
1909 Navy Scare. The Admiralty announces to the government that current spending vis-
à-vis the German program gives Britain an advantage of merely 3 battleships by 19 12.
The impeding naval crisis grips the govemment, press and public. Decision-rnakers
resolve to drastically increase the current naval program by 8 additional Dreadnought
battleships. Between 1907 and 19 12, Britain's Liberal govemment appropriates L229
million, despite its 1905 election campaign pledges to control military spending and reduce govemment expenditures. First Lord of the Admiralty Kmston Churchill introduces more increases to the naval program from 19 12- 14. Despite improving Anglo-German relations, the British govemment continues its naval expansion bas& on Gemany's navy increases. Churchiil
fodyabandons Britain' s Two-Power Standard by 19 12, claiming it financially
impractical. Instead, the hegemon adopts a navy standard of 60% superiority over the
single threat state, ~erman~*.By 19 14, the hegemon maintains a codonable margin of supenority over its rival, 34 British Dreadnought to 18 Gennan battleships. Germany 's apparent slow-dom is attributed to the peacetime expansion of its my.
While the hegemon increases its naval strength, it maintains the size of its my.
Expansion of the British Army would require considerable cost, to include monetaiy incentives for enlistment or conscription24. The British public adarnantly opposes conscription and increased taxes associated with maintaining a large peacetime army.
Dominant economic interests refuse to support an expanded army for the defense of the
British Isles since the Royal Navy serves this mission. A large peacetime army also implies a European continental comrnitment which econornic and public interests do not support.
Besides militaiy developments, decision-makers aiso seek systemic secunty through its active foreign poiicy. British Foreign MùUster Edward Grey compliments the hegemon's military deterrence strategy with an Anglo-Russian entente and Anglo-French strategic planning. Although not a treaty, the Anglo-Russian entente (1907) eliminates fiction between the two empires in the Middle East and central kiaLS.These negotiations alleviate British fears of invasion in india while transforming this former threat into a possible ally. Secret taks between British and French staff officers (1906) lead to military contingency plans for the continent. Joint plans focus on dispatching
100,000 British soldiers to France withui two weeks of hostilities. While cabinet rninisters can not bind the state to a defensive alliance without Parliament's consent, Grey inforrnally cornmits Britain to the defense of France.
Ongoing British attempts to negotiation a peaceful settlement with Germany fail.
Multiple discussions fail to curb the Anglo-Gerxnan naval arms build-up. Gennany does offer Britain arms limitations, but based on its neutrality in a continental war. The aggressor frequently attempts to isolate Britain fiom its entente partner, employing aggressive foreign policy and military demonstrations. Germany's two attempts to humiliate France in Morocco (1905-06, 191 1) only succeeds to drive the partners closer.
German belligerency and expansionist policies cause growing concem arnong
British decision-makers. While Gennan naval build-up threatens British security interests. its expanding influence in the Ottoman Empire and support of Austria-Hungary's expansionism in the Balkans threaten British economic and regional interests. More importantly, an expansionist Germany on the continent directly threatens the European balance of power, thereby threatening the hegemon. Gennan aggression and French friendship compel the system leader to defend its political and military interests in the international systern. Domestic economic interests, however, oppose Britain 's entry to major war. Financiers and exporters grow equally concemed regarding how a European codia could breakdown the international fie&) trading system. London's international banking, investments, and insurance would likely collapse. Overseas commerce would suffer fkom naval blockades and submarine warfare. With either decision, Britain's poiicy- makers jeopardize the stability of the international system.
PHASE ïII: i 9 14- i 9 18 World War 1 (ThreatlAilies)
Scholars have longed debated the numerous strategies employed by the Allies during the First World War. Rather indulging in al1 these theories, 1 narrow the readers focus to the four specific grand strategy features ernphasized in this mode1 - econornic trade policy, rnilitary strategy, military size and commitment.
Economic Trade Policy
British policy-makers pursue a disjointed economic policy based on its diverging political and economic interests. The govenunent convinces the public, and the reluctant business sector, that Britain rnust enter the confiict due to Germany's flagrant violation to
Belgium's neutrality. German occupation of the Lowlands provides a viable staging base for a cross-border invasion of the islands. Britain, therefore, declares war on Germany, 4
August 19 14. The following day, the War Council recommends sending the
Expeditionary Force to France, with little to no opposition fkom the cabinet2!
Decision-makers convince dominant econornic interests that a "Business as Usuai" strategy can quickly win the war. Foreign policy analysts convince the business community that the impeding war with Germany will be short, resulting in decisive allied victories at land and sea. Britain could theoretically rely on the Royal Navy to protect the trading economy while British industry provides France and Russia supplies and munitions. The hegemon's expanding army would contribute to victory on the continent and provide a powerful infiuence in shaping postwar Europe in Britain's image. Decision-
'6 French, p. 126. makers, therefore, initially endorse domestic laissez-faûe economics without a national plan for econornic mobilization2'.
Decision-makers quickly impose trade restrictions aimed at depriving Gennany's economy. The British Treasury issues proclamations forbidding trade with the enemy.
The govenunent prohibit all imports and exports, either directly or through neutral states, in support of the British naval blockade2*. In addition, the British War Council(19 15)
announces that al1 cargo destined for Germany, including that of neutrals, would be detained? The unrestncted economic and naval blockade successfully depnves Germany of its overseas markets and sources of supply. The Treasury also lirnits the indiscriminate export of British capital to beiiigerents and neutrals (1 914). The Treasuy restricts the transfer of much needed capital, in the interests ofthe war effort, unless directly contributing to national, colonial, and wariirne interests.
The allies failure to achieve a quick victory forces decision-makers to increasing organization and control the British economy. The "Shell Scandai" (19 15) illustrates the economy's failure to meet the rnilitary's supply needs without national organization.
Chancellor of the Exchequer David Lloyd George soon initiates his campaign to transfonn
British industries and commerce into a "total war" economy. Under this plan, al1 human and economic resources would directly contribute to increasing the army's sue and the production of war rnateria~s~~.The McKenna Duties (1 9 15) discourage domestic consumption on goods not associated with the wu. This taritf on "consumer" items attempts to reduce the growing trade deficit caused by US imports and direct the economy
" ibid, p.34. French, British Stratem and War Aims, 1914-1916, p.27. 29 French, 1905-1915, p. 118. towards production31. This escalation of state intervention in the economy causes a partial abandonment of laissez-faire ideals and the restriction of fi&) trade in the international system.
Milit- Strateny
Initial German advances, in the east and west, shatter early British plans for achieving a quick, decisive victory. The Asquith government concedes that the Allies can not inflict a cmshing rnilitary defeat upon the Central Powers. Instead, Mies focus on theü combined power and numerical advantage to win through attrition". The combination of Bitish finance, industry and shipping dong with France and Russia's large amies provide the with substantial economic and militaiy resources. These States solidify their wartime relations in a formal alliance, the Pact of London (19 14). Britain readily appeases its partners with financial and military support. Extensive campaigns in
France and dong the penpheral areas of the Middle East and Anica seek to weaken the continental threat. While Britain wishes to end German ambitions of world power, it equally seeks to preserve its rnilitary potential, thus prese~ngthe European balance of p~wer'~.
Milit- Size
Britain drastically increases the size of the military during the course of the war.
Pnor to the conflict, the hegemon possesses a relatively small Expeditionary Force, consisting of 254,000 soldiers. Secretary of State for War Lord Kitchener immediately
-- - .-
'O lbi4 p. 153. 31 lbi4 p. 125. 32 Brawley, p. 143. 33 The United States later contributes its significant emnomic and military power to the AUied effort (1917). requests an increase of 500,000 troops to support the initial cornmitment to France
(1914). The goverment's inability and unwillingness to commit to a continental strategy pnor to 1914 leaves rnilitary planners scrambling for support. The military must conduct voluntary recniiting fiom 19 14-19 16, due to policy-rnakers f6lure to initiate conscription.
Strong economic and public opposition to conscription effectively block its passage in
Parliament until 19 16. Kitchener fbrther augments Bntish forces with Unpenal support fiom the overseas Dominions and colonies. The total number of soldiers mobilized for war (19 14- 19 18) hclude: 5.7 million from Bntain and 2.9 million from the British
~rn~ire~~.
Commitments
Peripheral carnpaigns in the Middle East, Afnca and the Pacific graduaily increase the British Empire and extends its rnilitary commitments throughout the system. British strategy, early in the war, reflects concem over controlling the sea lanes and the potential danger posed to the British Empire by Germany's overseas colonies36. The Cornmittee on
Imperia1 Defense (CID) recommends seizing German bases and installations around the globe (1 9 14). The governrnents of India, South Mca, Australia, and New Zealand dispatch forces to capture German colonies in their respective regions. The Dominions' successes include German East Afnca, German South-West Afnca (Narnibia), the
Cameroons, and the Pacific islands of Yap, German New Guinea, Samora, and Nam.
British and French forces also seize the German colony of Togoland, dividing the region between them.
" French, 1914-16, p.216. 3S Holmes, Warfare, p. 133. 36 French, 19 14-19 16, p.26-28. Extra-European campaigns designed to alleviate Allied pressure in France, also result in British acquisitions. Regional threats, posed by the Ottoman Empire to British
Middle East interests, provoke decision-makers to annex Cyprus ( 19 14) and proclaim a protectorate over Egypt (19M), thereby guaranteeing protection of the Suez Canal.
Despite the hegemon's failed assault at Gallipoli ( 19 15- 16), British forces succeed in depriving the Ottomans the regions of Mesopotamia, Palestine and the Trans-Jordan.
At first, British decision-makers refuse to annex occupied lands for impenal gain.
British expansion would likely trigger resentment among allies over war gains. On the other hand, failure to extend British relative control would result in strategic benefits for the hegemon's possible postwar nvals, France or Russia. Britain and France conduct negotiations in 19 16, over the fate of the conquered lands. Discussions result in the secret
Sykes-Picot Treaty, calling for the division of the Ottoman Empire between the two powers. France opts for Syria while the hegemon retains control of Mesopotamia, and areas north of Egypt. The Dominions ultimately maintain several of their early conquests, through the auspices of the League of Nations following the war.
PHASE IV: 19 19- 2 932 Postwar Peace (No Threat/No Allies)
The cessation of the First World War signais the beginning of Bntain's last phase of relative decline. This phase is certainly the most challenging period to fully understand.
As both the United States and the new Bolshevik regime in Russia revert to isolationism, they leave behind a disjointed international system, clearly failing to reflect fundamental global econornic and military realities3'. Britain, both financially and militarily weakened by the war, continues to provide systemic leadership and maintenance. Although the
37 Kennedy, Rise and Fail of the Great Powers, p.xix
71 defeat of rival Gemany reinforces Bntain's relative strength in Europe, the strain of the
war, to include financial dilemmas, excessive military spending and various impenal issues,
significantly tax the hegemon's remairhg power. Britain attempts to re-establish the post-
war international free(r) trade system despite numerous challenges.
The First World War eliminates aii major threats to British systemic interests. The demise of Imperia1 Germany extinguishes politicai challenge to Britain's hegemony.
Decision-makers address remaining regional concems to systemic secunty through diplornatic means3*. Foreign rninisters resolve recurting threats of Soviet subversion in
India with a commercial agreement in 192 1. Britain and Turkey resolve their Middle East differences with the Treaty of Lausanne (1923). Secunty issues on the continent leads
Britain to sign the Treaty of Locarno (1925), guaranteeing the inviolability of Geman,
French and Belgium borders. By the mid- 1920s, Japan and Italy both pose little threat to
British regional interests.
Pre-war success with recruiting extemal support for managing the system proves difficult following the conflict. Britain desperately seeks a post-war alliance with the US, based on its common international interests. Decision-makers finnly assert that war between the two democracies would be an impossibility3g.The Dominions, especially
Canada, equally support rapprochement with the new world power. Despite British attempts, the US refuses a formal cornmitment, opting for merely fnendly relations. US concems over Britain's alliance with Japan, however, leads to American pressure on dissolving this partnership. American decision-makers view an Anglo-Japanese alliance as dangerous to US Pacific interests. As a result, Bntain abandons its oniy post-war ally in
'' to include working chrough the newly founded Leagw of Nations. the interest of Anglo-American relations. The hegemon later abandons any pursuit of an alliance with post-war France, believing any commitment would not increase British influence in paris4'. Without extemal security arrangements, Britain tries to secure systemic stability through its own national means.
Britain's systemic leadership attempts to re-establish the fiee(r) trade system. The hegemon re-initiates its pre-war trading relationships and practices, in hopes of regaining the high levels of international trade preceding the war. Plans to rejuvenate the domestic economy begin with government controls on excessive spending. Bntain prioritizes public expenditures for debt redemption and social refom4', while stabilizing military spending.
The hegemon even restores the pre-war Gold Standard, by 1925, in an effort to stabilize the international economy. Despite these government attempts, the British economy shows increasing signs of stress throughout this penod. Poor expon performances, high rates of unemployment, and higher prices, associated with the Gold Standard, demonstrate
Britain's relative weakness. Revitalized post-war foreign industries continue to erode the hegemon's share of world trade. By 1929, the world-wide depression forces decision- makers to consider more drastic measures for econornic relief
Based on the system's relative peace and Britain's economic concerns, the Cabinet announces the "Ten-Year Rule" (1919). The govemment bases its rnilitary plans on its assumption that Europe wiU not experience a major war for the next 5-10 years. As a result, the hegemon's primary military concems focus on hperial policing, maintaining rnilitary expenditures to 1914 levels (including appropriation for the new Royal Air Force)
'' Beloff, p. 130-3 1. " Fems, Men. Monev and DipiomacvSp. 103-9 Md, p.33. and the development of new technologies for replacing expensive colonial garrisons (i-e. airplanes). Its dtaiy, therefore, assumes traditional impenai defense postures as maintained in the mid- 19th century.
The Royal Navy also resumes its fomer defense posture of the overseas empire.
The Admiralty redeploys much of the navy, reminiscent to the mid and late 19th century.
It reverses its 1912 policy and re-establishes its Mediterranean fleet. Naval plmers also deploy cruiser squadrons to the West Indies, North and South Ameriq Cape of Good
Hope, East Lndies, and China stations. This mass distribution of ships ailows for British relative control of overseas regions and the direct protection of its interests in the absence of extemal balancing. The Royal Navy, therefore, resumes its traditionai mission of
"showing the flagm4*.
The military's missions refiect Britain's aim to maintain the international system with a strong postwar force. Initial cutbacks from the hegemon's wartime force and naval arms limitations, agreed at the Washington Conference (1921), leme the hegemon with the world's largest naval force43(equal to the US Navy), the second largest air force
(behind France) and among the larger peacetime armies (including tndian troops). Al1 three services operate from a fixed military budget consiaing of L 135 million, collectively.
Despite its relative power, the hegemon stretches its lirnited rnilitary assets to defend the
Larger Empire and its global interests. No longer could the hegemon depend on regional dies. Successive British govenunent frequently cut and reappropriate fùnding, based on party politics or syaemic concems. Decision-makers extend the Ten-Year Plan through
" Kennedy, British NadMastery, p.279. 43 See Appendix B, Great Britain: Major Powers Estimated Annual Number of Warships
74 the 193Os, satisfied the current international situation and military force composition would ensure systemic secunty.
Britain manages to maintain its Empire through successfbl political maneuvering.
Reverting to its past practice of indirect rule, decision-makers approve self-government for Iraq, Egypt, Trans-Jordan, and Southern Ireland. British officials work with local leaders to create a political infiastructure both f?iendly and dependent on the hegemon. In the Middle East, British officials retain many advisor positions in the new governments.
The hegemon seeks political unity with its Dominions through a series of Imperiai
Conferences du~gthis period. WeBritain favors the centralition of imperid foreign and defense policies, the Dominions support pater autonomy. Each conference attempts to define the penmeters of the British Commonwealth and the responsibilities of each state to the imperid community. The 1926 Imperiai Conference defines their relationship as an
"autonornous community within the British Empire, equal in status, in any aspect of their domestic or extemai affairs although united by a common aiiegiance to the British
Commonwealth of ~ations.~"
nehegemon initiates system closure as a result of the world economic crisis
(1 929). Britain's shrinking share of world trade (dom to 10.75% in 1929) and the City of London's significant losses, as a result of the Crash, leave the hegemon with few options for stabilizing the economy. The signiticant drop in international trade and the new protectionist measures imposed by the US, France, Italy and Germany, subsequently close the largest markets in the system. Britain soon looses its most important "cushion"; the retums on seMces and investments wnduaed by London. Britain responds to the economic crisis, along with the Dominions, at the 1932 Ottawa Imperia1 Coderence. The
British Commonwealth officïally abandons f?ee(r) trade, Unposing a 1OO/o tMon moa
imported goods from outside the Empire. The conference delegates introduce imperial
preferences, designed to favor Commonwealth trade, at the expense of other states. The
Dominions provide Britain with much-needed markets for its manufactured goods while it
provides reciprocal markets for Commonwealth agriculture and raw matenals. Great
Bntain, by 1932, adopts Joseph Chamberlain's proposal for a British custom house as its
answer to both economic crisis and hegemonic relative decline.
CONCLUSION
The preceding detaiied study of British hegemony conveys the relative success it achieves in managing decline. While Britain experiences the disjuncture of motivation and capabilities, it s decision-makers effectively initiate a two-prong campaign to close the gap, force redeployment and the recruitment of dies. It solicits suppon from domeaic interests to radically alter its traditional balance-of-power strategy in Europe. Britain, fùrther still, rallies domestic support for the Boer War and Firn World War, facilitating the application of its resources to the war effort. The post-war phase aggravates British relative dec'iïne. The Amencan and Russian isolation forces the weakened hegemon to continue systernic leadership. Its attempt to re-establish the international system taxes its economy and müitary.
A review of the theoretical mode1 (Table 5) identifies the key to Britain's relative success. The hegemon experiences only 4 years of major war, uniike the Dutch Republic which endure 25 years. Although Britain continues to deter threats for 25 years, the Table 5: British Grand Strategics in Reiativc Deciïne (18894931): Rtsults
Yes
Yes
Allies
No 1889-1904 Splendid Isolation -1919-1931 Postwar Peace
(Peace)
Threat and - 1914-1918 World War 1 ~1%~9f4 Preparing for War Mes absence of lengthy major wars allows the economic sector to engage in unintempted world trade. The economic gains, associated with systemic peace, contribute to the system leader's power, thereby easing relative decline. Britain does not su& the rapid loss of political prestige experienced by the Dutch Republic.
A cross-sectional analysis (Table 6) depicts additional findings. Whiie 37 years of fiee(r) trade contributes to easing decline, 29 years of consistent increases in military expenditures does not. Naval arms races with France and Germany deviate excessive capital that would otherwise benefit the financial sector. In addition, Bntain steadily increases its empire for 29 years. The hegemon's expanding commitments force decisios- makers to react to the state's ever pending hperial overstretch. Table 6: British Grand Strategim (1889-1932}: Cross-Sedoad Anal ysis UNITED STATES. 1971-PRESENT
Our current hegemon, the United States, requires minimal introduction to students
of political science. Its unparalleled military and econornic strength, following the Second
World War, as well as the motivation of its domestic environment for fiee trade provide
the necessary elements for a renewed international system. The US decision-makers
rapidly stabilize post-war Europe through the Marshall Plan (1948). This infusion of 3 17
billion, over five years, enables the US to re-build the continent's infiastructure while
initiating the recniitment and creation of a new fiee(r) trade system. The system leader establishes the International Monetq Fund (MF)and World Bank as institutions for
stabilizing the global monetary system. These international agencies enforce the rules agreed upon at Bretton Woods (1944) for stabilizing currencies @y fixing to the gold
standard), which facilitates international trade. The US also organizes the General
Agreement on Trade and Tariffs (GATT) to encourage a fiee trade system. These rules provide for non-discrimination in global trade and prevent noneconomic restrictions'.
The new hegemon also establishes organkations for the stability and protection of the world order. The United Nations (1945) replaces the detiinct League of Nations as the premier assembly for peacefully resolving conflict. The UN assumes an increasing large role, in the following years, mediating international settlements and organizing peace-keeping forces to enforce regional stability. The North Atlantic Treaty
Organization (NATO) provides the democracies of Western Europe with a collective
' Brawley, Liberal Leadenbi~,p. 185. security diance against the systemic threat posed by the US SR^ and its corresponding
Warsaw Pact alliance. The US also organizes other regional alliances against this threat.
PHASE 1: 197 1- 1989 Cold War (Threat and Mies)
For this study, US relative declines begins with breakdown of the international
monetary system established at Bretton Woods (1 97 1). President Nixon's decision to
devaluate the dollar, and deviate ffom a fixed exchange rate, reflects the hegemon's failure
to control a persistent balance-of-payments deficit3. The resulting weakened dollar
indicates the US'S financial inability to continue stabilizing the system based on the rapidly
growing economies of Western Europe and Japan, and their increasing demand posed to
the system. The US economy no longer posseues the infiated capital advantages its had
following the war. This US abandonment of the Bretton Woods agreement admits its
economic relative decline arnong the western economies.
While the US maintains its military superiority within the system, the hegemon
begins to experience the rising costs associated with systemic leadership. Escalating
military costs associated with the Vietnam War and the US-Soviet arms race reflect
limited overextension, or imperial overstretch, by the hegemon4. Domestic econornic and
political interests support a continued US overseas presence, particularly due to Soviet
expansionary policies. This significant military expense directly effects the US economy,
slowing investment, hiking currency values and hurting export competitiveness5. Despite
-- - ' According to Brawley, the USSR and the Warsaw Pact corntries are not memben of international system. 3 Calleo, Bevond Arnerican Hegemony, p.85. Synder, Mvths of Em~ire,Ch.7. Rosecrance, Trading: State, Ch.8. the hegemon's efforts to distribute the cost of security to its allies, the US must resolve its costs of systemic leadership aMi maintenance inspite of a relatively dechhg economy.
Numerous publications, ranging fiom Gilpin to Waiierstein, each interpret the US case according to their political affiliation. Each work offers different perspectives on the
US "imperial" dilemma while also recomrnending possible solutions. With less lofty ambitions, 1 summarize US policies dunng this period in the effort of more clearly identifying its grand strategy.
Economic Trade Policv
US governent agencies continue to enforce the principles of free trade. Through both diplomatic negotiation and retaliation, the hegemon expands the participation of the fiee(r) trade system. GATT, MF,and the World Bank al1 support the hegemon's campaign for creating stability and increasing dependency on international trade. The system leader uses loans and favorable trading privileges as both rewards and enticements for eliciting certain political behavior or rapprochement (i.e. China). The US also actively employs retaliatoiy tariffs against unfair trading practices. In August 1988, President
Reagan signs a trade bill giving him broad powers to retaliate by imposing significant tarifEs against unfair competitors, such as Japan. The US seeks to remedy several of the unilateral trading privileges it originally encouraged while creating the free(r) trade system.
This economic strategy succeeds to regulate trade practices for itself and the entire trading system.
Military Strateoy
The hegemon and its NATO allies maintain a deterring vigil against global Soviet threat. The nuclear arms race, naval msrace, the SDI (i.e. Stars Wars) program, the MX missile al1 attempt to discourage Soviet aggression. Decision-makers in the 1970s opt for diplornatic solutions against this systemic threat, resulting in détente and a relatively low rate of rnilitary growth. During the early and mid-1980s, the Reagan Administration renews military reannarnent to unprecedented levels. Decision-makers support the spending program based on the perceived global comrnunist threat. Incidents in
Afghanistan, Nicaragua, and Grenada renew the public belief in the domino theory. Other regional threats posed by Iran, Libya, and Cuba, contnbute to public support for increased spending, and therefore, a more substantial deterrent to aggression.
Militaq Size
As referred above, the rate of miiitary spending slows dunng the mid- 1970s, following disarmament fiom Vietnam. Appendix C, "United States: US Military
Expenditures7', demonstrates the reduction in expenditure growth from 1971 - 1W66, proceeded by relatively small growth through 1980. The Reagan Administration stimulates excessive increases in growth from 198 1-1986. The armed forces adopt the latest technology while also expanding their peacetime mission around the globe.
Scholars, like Kennedy, interpret these increases as the heighten cost of systemic leadership7. The slower rate of growth, from 1987- 1989, reflect the improving relations between the superpowers.
The system leader maintains its traditional commitments throughout this period.
The U.S. plays a leading role in NATO and Japan's security in the Far East. It continues
6 Ptimanly as a remît of military disarmament following the Vietnam War Aise compounded by improved East-West relations, as witnesses in the later 1970s. 7 See Kennedy, Rise and Fa11 of the Great Powers. to maintain a robust military presence in virtually every region of the world. On several occasions, the hegemon employs its armed forces for enforcing systemic security in regions deemed important to decision makers - Lebanon (1983), Caribbean (1983), Libya
(1986), Panama (1989). The US also provides foreign and military assistance to various regions - Afghanistan, Angola, and Nicaragua/Honduras/EI Salvador. The commitments the US maintains are those its has always maintained as hegemon. US diplomats ensure open communications with al1 its commitments monitoring regional adherence to the international mles,
PHASE II: 1990-Present Post Cold War (No Threat and Mies)
This current phase begins with the fall of the Soviet Union and its Eastern
European allies in late 1989. The dernolition of the Berlin Wall (1989) comrnemorates the symbolic elhination of the hegemon's systemic threat. A new world order replaces former East-West antagonism. With only 6 years into the phases, no one can accurately predict what grand strategy the hegemon will pursue. Initial postulation assumes the
1990s will reflect the growing multi-polarity of the 1920s'. Current trends indicate that the system leader wiii adopt the grand strategy predicted in this theoretical mode1 - free(r) trade policy, defense military strategy, reductions in military size and expenditures, and the staius quo of its commitments.
The following two sub-sections surnmarize growing policy trends for the 1990s:
Reductions in Military Costs
The US clearly seeks to reduce military expenditures during the 1990s. Plans proposed by the Bush Administration dictate the down-scaling of US forces fiom its Cold
8 See Kennedy, Grand Stratedes in War and Peace.
83 War posture. The US Navy looses its 500-ship force while the Amy shruiks to a 10-
division unit. While overseas posts close, the governrnent maintain security of its overseas
interests through technology and re-organization. Increased spending in surveillance
systems as weil as rapid deployment means (Le. air mobile units, pre-position equipment,
etc) ensure the hegemon's capability to project force without maintainhg the high cons
associated with a global ganison network. The US redeployment of troops resembles the
Royal Navy's re-organization of 1904.
Increase in Foreign interventions
US global force deployment UIcrease significantly dunng this phase. With the end
of the Cold War, the hegemon actively enforces its relative control throughout the intemationai system. Campaigns in the Persian Gu& Somalia, Haiti and Bosnia satisQ the hegemon's new agenda for systernic peace. A 1992 Pentagon policy study bases the future US Nategy on the "one-superpower world. The paper recomrnends that the hegemon thwart emerging rivals, check nuclear proliferation, maintain regional stability, and reject collective intemationalism. The study emphasizes America's ability to maintain its own leadership position. While the US has yet to endorse this last policy, conditions proposed by the study resemble Britain' s last phase of relative decline ( 19 19- 1 93 2). Table 7: US. Grand Sîrategies in Relative Decline (1971-prtscnt): Resuits
Tbreat of a Chaiîenger Yes No
Yes
No
(Wm (Peace)
Th rea t and -1971-1989 COI^ War Mes
Tabk 8: USGrand Strategies (1971-present): Cross-Sectional Andysis
1971-1989 1990-present Cold War Post Cold War (No 'Inreat/Allies) 1 1 Mode1 1 Actual Model 11 Actual Economic Free(r) Free(r) Trade Policy Militaly Deter Deter S-my
Military Size Increase Increase
Cornmitment Mnt/Inc Increase LES SONS LEARNED
The foiiowing buUets summarize the paper's major contributions:
Policies associated with 'Wo ThreatlAilies" prove most conducive to rnanaging the
hegemon 's relative decline.
Extended periods of warfare accelerate the hegemon's relative decline
Sy stemic threat raises the costs associated with maintaining of t he fiee(r) trade system.
The hegemon effectiveiy di stributes coas of leadership t hrough ext emal balancing .
Despite the higher costs of leadership, the system leader does not retrench
cornmitments. Inaead, it seeks to reduce the costs associated with their secunty.
The preceding theoretical mode1 and historical shidy only begin to examine the complexities associated with a hegemon's grand strategy in relative decline. The reader can draw many of the thesis' lessons fiom the preceding closing sections of the Dutch and
British cases. These lessons re-afnm rnany generalizations associated with relative decline. The arength this thesis offers is its original interpretation of hegemonic decline. based on grand strategies. While most studies on hegemony focus on "why" they decline, this stxdy targets "how" hegemons manage decline as well as "why" they pursue certain policies. This contribution to the study of hegemonic development will help the reader to understand better the past, present, and future of hegemonic transition. APPENDM A DUTCH REPUBLIC (167 2-1720s)
RELAnVE DECLINE OF DUTCH REPUBLIC ('IïMELINE) DUTCH REPUBLIC: ESTIMATED ANNUAL NUMBER OF WARSHIPS (TABLE) DUTCH REPUBLIC: MAJOR POWERS ESTIMATED ANNUAL NUMBER OF WARSHIPS (GRAEW) DUTCH REPUBLIC: ESTiMATED ANNUAL TROOP STRENGTH (TABLE)
APPENDM 8 GREAT BRITAIN (1889-1932)
RELATIVE DECLINE OF GREAT BRITAiN (TIMELLNE) GREAT BRITAIN: PERCENTAGE OF WORLD TRADE (TABLE) GREAT BRiTAIN: MAJOR POWERS ESTKMATED ANNUAL NUMBER OF WARSHIPS (GRAPH) GREAT BRITAIN: MILiTARY EXPENDlTURES (TABLE)
UNITED STATES (1971-PRESENT)
RELATIVE DECLiNE OF THE UNITED STATES (TIMELiNE) üNJ.TED STATES: DEFENSE EXPENDITURES, 197 1- 199 1. (TABLE) APPENDIX A-1: RELATIVE DECLINE OF DUTCE REPUBLIC (1672-1720s)
1672-1673 FRENCH INVASION OF DUTCH REPUBLIC PHASE 1 (THREAT AND NO ALLES)
1673- 1678 WAR WITH FRANCE PWE2 (THREAT AND ALLIES)
1678-1688 FRAGlLE PEACE PHASE 3 (NO THREAT & ALLES)
1688-1697 GLORIOUS REVOLUTION AND NINE YEARS WAR PHASE 4 (THREAT & ALLIES)
1697- 1702 PARTITION TREATIES PHASE 5 (THREAT AND ALLIES)
1702-1713 WAR OF SPAMSH SUCCESSION PHASE 6 (THREAT AND ALLIES)
17 13-1720s POSTWAR EUROPE PHASE 7 (NO THREAT AND ALLES)
1660 O8 May. England's civil \var ends after 11 years as the son of the late Charles 1 is proclaimeci king. He lands at Dover May 26, arrives at WhiteMl May 29 ami& universal rejoicing, and will reign until 1685 as Charles II.
0 1 October. Charles II acts to strengthen England's Navigation Act: certain "enurneratecl articles7' fiom England's American colonies may be e-xported only to the British Isles. Included are tobacco, sugar. wool, indigo, and apples. The list wilI be amended to include rice, molasses, and other articles, and Virginia tobacco prices take a precipitous &op as transport bottlenecks delay shipments, producing widespread economic distress and political unrest in the colony. Aimed at stopping direct Dutch trade with colonies.
French and English compete with Dutch economically while France has more political ambitions
1662 Holland and France form an alliance against possible attack by England.
1663 27 July. A Second Navigation Act passed by Parlianient forbids English colonists to trade with other European counuies. European goods bound for America must be unloaded at English ports and reshipped, men though English e.uport duties and profits to middlemen may make prices prohibitive in America. Aimed at cutting Dutch middlemen fiom transporthg colonial goods.
1664 27 August. Nieuw Amsterdam becornes New York as 300 English soldiers take the town from the Dutch under Charles II. English seamen take Afnca's Cape Verde Islands hmDutch forces in Guinea although no war has been declared.
French Tariffof 1664 restticts the trade of certain goods with Dutch traders.
03 June. Engiish naval forces defeat a Dutch fleet off Lowestoft as a second Anglo- Dutch war begins (166547).
France and Hoiland declare war on England, French forces take Antigua, Montserrat, and St. Kitts in the Greater Antilles, and an English privateer takes Tobago. The Dutch sign a treaty of alliance with the elector of Brandenburg Friedrich Wilhelm and sign a quadruple alliance with Brunswick, Brandenburg, and Denmark.
2 1 July. The Treaties of Breda end the second Anglo-Dutch war after a Dutch fleet has brokcn the chah in England's Medway River, reached Chatham. and captured the flagship Royal Charles.
Engiand receives New Nethetlands in return for sugar-rich Surinam in South America under tenns reached at Breda. Acadia is restored to Holland's ally France. Eaghd receives Antigua Montserrat, and St. Kitts fiom France. and Charles II makes a secret treaty with Louis MVagainst Spain.
French troops invade FIanders and Hainault to begin the War of Devolution (1667-68).
French Tariff of 1667 restricts the trade of certain goods with Dutch traders.
23 January. A Triple Alliance negotiated joins England Holland, and Sweden in resistance to France's Louis )(IV in the Spanish Netherlands, but Louis will soon buy off the English and Swedes.
02 May. The Treaty of Aix-la-Chapelle ends a bnef War of Devolution waged over Louis XIV's claim to the Spanish possessions in the Belgian provinces following the death of his father-in-law Philip IV of Spain in 1665. Treaty gram France 11 fortresses captured in Flanders, among them Lille and Douai.
May. France's Louis MV makes a defensive alliance with Bavaria and with England's Charles II; the Treaty of Dover. French troops occupy Lorraine the same year.
Dutch Republic owns more tonnage ihan any oiher country in the world.
29 March. Charles II declares war on the Dutch Republic. Louis XIV declares war against the Dutch on 06 April.
May. A French army of 100,000 crosses tbe Rhine witbwt warning and invades the Dutcb Republic as Louis XIV acts to puaish the Dutch for their role in the Triple Allianca England's Charles II wppods Louis under secret provisions in the Treaty of Daver of May 1670 (3* Angio-Dutcb War). The Dutcb turn for bdp to the prince of Orange. Tbe staas-generril revive the stadholderate July 8, and they make Willem m of Orange, stridbolder, captain-general, and admirai for life. A mob at Tbe Hague bmtaily murders the grand pensionary Jaa De Witt and bis brotber Cornelius. 06 June. DeRuyter engages the Anglo-French fleet at Solebay in a surprise attack, forcing the allies to postpone their planned invasion of the Dutch Republic.
Late 1672. Imperia1 and Bradenburg troops are sent to Cologne to divert part of the French anny away fiom their offensive in the Dutch Republic, per an alliance between the Emperor, Bradenbwg and the Dutch.
French invasion and 3" Anglo-Dutch War halts Dutch seabome trade for 2 years.
1673 2 1 August. Battle of Texel. - DeRuyter drives off Anglo-French flet from the Dutch Coast preventing an dlied invasion of the Dutch Republic.
30 August. Hague Alliance of 1673 - Spain joins with the Dutch to fnistrate the ambitions of Louis XIV. Agreement between Spain and the Dutch Republic covers the protection and fuhm security of the Southern Netheriands. Alliance marks the beginning of the Dutch offensive against the French.
Dutch forces retake New York and Delaware
1674 The Treaty of Westminster Febniary 19 ends the 2-year war between England and the Dutch. [t retums New York and Delaware to England. fieeing the English IO e.=d their trade and grow prosperous while Europe becornes embroiled in deplethg warfare. Parliament cuts off funds. forcing Charles II to case hostilities. Dutch seabome tMde renewed.
Louis XIV's forces assume defensive positions on the northern border and the east by trouncing a powerfid coalition army at Seneffe and expelling ihe imperial forces that invaded Aisace.
Dutch Placard of February 1674 forbids the importation of French wine, brandy, vinegar, paper, sail canvas, etc. Removed by 1678.
1675 05 lanuacy. Marshal Turenne inflicts a heavy defeat on the Dutch at Twkheim. recovers al1 of Alsace within a few weeks, but is killed 27 July in a battle at Sassbach in Baden. The French retreat across the Rhine.
1676 In the Mediterranean, the new French fleet, commanded by Admiral Abraham Duquesne, crowned Colbert's efforts by beating the Spanisli and Dutch forces led by the Dutch admiral Michel de Ruyter. French Mctory gives France control of the Mediterranean.
1678 10 January. England and the Dutch Republic sign an Anglo-Dutch Defensive Treaty.
March. The captwe of Ghent by the French strengthens the peace party in Holland. Merchants fear that Antwerp would suffer the same fate, and then Amsterdam's prosperity would be destroyed. 10 August. The Treaty of Nijmegen offers the Dutch very favorable terms on condition htshe maintains neutrality, motivating it to abandon its other allies. The treaty retwns to Holland the temtories she lost to France and Spain and the reduction of tariffbarriers raised against Dutch merchants A second treaty signed at Nijmegen September 17 forces Spain to give up the Franche-Comte and twelve additional strongholds in Fianders. Dutch Placard of 1674 against French goods is removed. Results in delicate peace between France and the Dutch Republic (1678-1687)
Late 1679. Louis XiV offers Dutch a Treaty of Friendship; uses threat of HSto persuade Dutch to accept. Amsterdam wishes to accept but Willem üi persuades other provinces not to accept. Louis XIV. in the meanwhile, daims French "reunions". border areas, based on the Peace of Nijmegen.
30 September. France, maintaining its annies at full strength, annexes the Eree city of Strasbourg. This annexation sets off the formation of new defensive coalitions against Louis m.
Louis MV blockades Luxembourg. Despite opposition by regents, Willem III convinces the Republic to send 8000 troops to Spain's assistance in Luxembourg as stipulated in the Dutch-Spanish Pact of 1673. French forces soon lift the siege. By 1684, Louis succeeds to annex Luxembourg despite Spanish resistance.
Spain declares war on France, and Spain's Carlos II is joined by the Holy Roman Emperor Leopold. The emperor is suddenly immobilized by a fierce invasion by the Turks who approach the gates of Vienna. Spain thus has to bear alone the wrath of Louis XIV who resumes his attack on the Spanish toms in Belgium. Dutch again send troops to support Dutch-Spainish Pact; troops are kept in reserve and don't participate in conflict.
24 June. States-General accepts French offer for a 20 Year Truce in the Spanish Netherlands, leaving France with Luxembourg and other recently annexai Iocaiities.
06 Feb. James II ascends to the English throne. Pro-Catholic, the English monarch becornes a potential ally to Catholic France and a potential enemy to Protestant Dutch Republic. Also in 1685, Louis XIV revocates the Edict of Nantes, ending religious toleration in France, leading to emigration of French Huguenots to Holland, the HoIy Roman Empire, and the New World.
09 July. The League of Augsburg, created to resist France's expansion into Germany, allies the Hoty Roman Emperor Leopold 1, Spain's Carlos II, Sweden's Charles XI. and the electors of Bavaria., Saxony, and the Palatine. Last year's revocation of the Edict of Nantes has aroused Protestants against France.
September. Louis MVrevokes concessions to Dutch trade made at Treaty of Nijmegen and reimposes the French Tariff List of 1667. Dutch respond with retaliatory tarüfs against France (similar to 1674); French tariEs rally Dutch support in favor of Willem's invasion of England and the Nine Years War.
10 June. The birth of a son to England's Queen Mary suggests the likelihood of a Catholic succession. England's Whig leaders send an invitation to the king's son-in-law Willem of Orange June 30. 24 September. Louis XPV declares war against German states and moves his army toward the Rhine.
15 November. Willem lands at Tor Bay, and moves to assume the throne with his wife Mary. Louis XIV declares war on the Dutch Repubfic as invasion armada leaves Houand.
"Glorious Revolution" ends nearly 4 years of Roman Catholic nile in England. James II escapes to France December 23 and begins efforts to regain the throne.
April. Anglo-Dutch naval agreement whereby two maritime powers are to provide capital ships for joint operations in a ratio of 5 to 3.
12 May. The War of the League of Augsburg widens as England's new king William III forms a Grand Alliance with the Dutch and with the League. (England takes part by virtue of the 1678 Anglo-Dutch Defensive Alliance)
The War of the League of Augsbwg begins the involvement of the Dutch Republic in a series of land wars that wili cause the Dutch to neglect their naval strength and thus facilitate English domination of the high seas.
Spain and Savoy join the League of Augsburg against France's Louis XIV.
30 June. The Battle of Beachy Head gives the French a triumph over an English fleet.
O 1 Juiy. The Battle of Boyne completes the Protestant conquest of Ireland as Engiand's William DI defeats the Catholic pretender James II and his French supporters.
12 July. The Battie of Aughnm gives William and Mary's Dutchlbom general Godert de GinkeI a victory over Ireland's earl of Lucan Patrick Sarsfïeld and his French allies. The resulting Treaty of Limerick ends the Irish rebellion.
29 May. The Banle of La Hogue costs France 15 ships, and Louis MV's military advisers persuade him that great fleets are a waste of money. France will avenge her loss in 1693 but will leme England and the Dutch to dispute supremacy of the seas.
21 July. The Battle of Steinkirk gives France's duc de Luxembourg a victory over England.
26-27 May. French naval forces defeat an Anglo-Dutch fleet off Cape St. Vincent, and on 30 June gain another victory at the Battle of Lagos off Portugal.
29 July. The Battle of Neerwinden gives the duc de Luxembourg another victory over the English, but William III remains in the field as the French sack Heidelberg for a second time.
Swiss Protestant cantons agree to supply mercenary troops to the Dutch after Catholic cantons have supplied mercenaries for Louis XIV to throw against the Dutch.
The Royal Navy bombards Dieppe, Le Havre, and Dunkirk, but the French tum back an attack on Brest despite having been weakened by hunger and disease. 04 January. Marshal Luxembourg dies as the War of the League of Augsburg continues. Francois de Neufidle, Duc de Villeroi, succeeds to the command of French forces in the Low Countries but will prove far les capable.
August. French forces under duc de Villeroi bombard Brussels, damaging tom hall and destroying the wooden guild halls.
September. William ï.ü recaptures Namur fiom the French.
30 September. The Treaty of Ryswick ends the 9 year old War of the teague of Augsbrug. France restores to Spain al1 conquests made since the Treaty of Nijmegen in 1679 (except Strasbourg), and the French East India Company regains the Indian pepper port of Pondichery on condition that the Dutch reiain commercial privileges. Spain cedes the western third of Hispaniola to France and retains the eastern part. France recognizes William III as king of England with his sister-in-law Anne as heiress presumptive.
The Dutch Republic gets defensive barriers in Southern Netherlands and a new TM list from France in 1699. French control impori of Levant (Turkish) commodities as a result of French presence in the Meditenanean during the war.
1698 II October. A (First) Treaty of Partition signed by the European powers attempts to deal with the question of the Spanish succession. Spain's Carlos II is childless, and the Spanish house of Hapsburg is doorneci.
1700 March. (Second) Partition Treaty. France agrees to recognize the archduke Charles of Austria as successor to the Spanish throne upon Carlos II's death in return for Spanish possessions in Italy.
0 1 November. Spain's Carlos II dies at age 39 after a 35-year reign. He has narned as his heir Philip of Anjou, grandson of France's Louis XIV; the first Bourbon king of Spain ascends the throne and will reign until 1746 as Philip V. Louis XIV recognizes the succession on 16 November, bfeaking the Second Partition Treaty.
The Great Northem War begins in Europe as Russia, Poland, and Denrnark join forces to oppose Swedish supremacy in the Baitic. Sweden's Charles MI surprises the Danes by landing troops in Zeeland. Threatening Copenhagen, he forces Denrnark to sign the Treaty of Travendal August 18 and to remove itself fkom the alliance against Sweden. War significantly disturbs trade in Baltics, hurting Dutch commerce.
1701 February. French troops enter the Southern Netherlands securing Philip V's daim and forcing Dutch garrisons stationed there to withdraw to the Republic. Philip prohibits Dutch trade in Spanish Arnerica. French commerce insinuates itself into the Spanish colonies.
September. The War of Spanish Succession begins in Europe as Philip of Anjou gain recognition as king of Spain, and the Holy Roman Emperor Leopold 1 moves to take over Spain's Dutch and Italian possessions. England and Hoiland, fearful of having the France of Louis XIV joined with Spain, form a Grand Alliance with the emperor, and Eugene, prince of Savoy, joins the alliance September 7.
1702 O8 Match. England's William III dies. He is succceded by his sister-in-law Anne. who wiH reign until 17 14, the last monarch of the House of Stuart. 14 May. The Grand Ailiance declares war on France. Queen Anne names John Churchill as captain-general of England's land forces and raises him to duke of Marlborough December 14 after he has fodthe amender of Kaiserwerth on the Rhine in lune, Venlo on the Meuse in September, and Liege October 29.
Convention between England and the Dutch Republic concludes the desimi troop/naval appropriations for the war. By this time, the Dutch Republic is a secondaq militaq power in cornparison to England and France.
1702 marks the beginning of ongoing domestic debate berneen uading provinces and land provinces over rnilitary issues (naval vs. army expenditures) and economic policies (fa-trade vs. protectionisrn) king out of the War of Spanish Succession.
The Grand Alliance proclaims Austria's archduke Charles king of Spain and he prepares to invade Catalonia, The Duke of Marlborough invades the Spanish Netherlands. taking BOM. Huy, Limburg and Guelders.
27 December. The Methuen Treaty between England and Portugal facilitates trade in English woolens and Porhiguese wines. England expands its commerce role during the war often at the Dutch's expense.
June. Dutch traders are prohibited by English allies to trade with France, repealed in summer 1704. States-General bans most imports fiom France, Spain and South Netherlands. but this proves too hdto Dutch trade, leading to the evennial lifting of the ban in the summer of 1704.
Convention of 1703, ezrpanding the Anglo-Dutch Defense Treaty.
1704 13 August. The Battle of Blenheim gives the Duke of Marlborough a stunning victory over the French-Bavarian coalition.
1705 14 October. The Austrian archduke Charles lands in Catalonia and English forces help him take Barcetona in continuing the War of Spanish Succession. Holy Roman Emperor Leopold 1 dies and the throne is assumed by his son, Joseph 1.
1706 23 May. The Battie of RamiIlies gives the duke of Marlborough a victory over a French anny commanded by the duc de Villeroi. Marlborough's triumph is followed by the submission of Brusseb, Antwerp, Ghent, Ostend, and other major cities in Southern Netherlands.
23 May. English forces raise a French siege of Barcelona. Portuguese forces invade Spain and install the Austrian archduke as king at Madrid. but Philip V drives them out in October.
Anglo-Dutch Treaty. (First BherTreaty - Act of Settiement) First mention of Dutch guarantee of English succession.
1707 0 1 May. The United Kingdom of Great Britain created unites England and Scotland under the Union Jack. 11 July, Ghent and Bruges resume their ailegiance to France in early July. Fearing that other cities wili follow suit, the duke of Marlborough defeats the French at the Battle of ûudenarde with the help from Eugene of Savoy.
The United East lndia Company cfeated by a meager of Britain's two rival East India companies is the strongest European power on the coasts of India. The company ships Indian silks, cottons, indigo, coffée, and dtpeter as well as China tea.
Ready to make peace, Louis XIV can not bring himself to accept the stBterms of the alliance. which included the demand that he transfer ail Spanish possessions to the archduke Charles. recognize him as king of Spain and remove Philip V hmMadrid.
1 1 September. The Battie of Malplaquet is the bloodiest of the War of Spanish Succession taking 20,000 allied lives The French retire in good order from the triumphant prince of Savoy and duke of Mariborough (whose Tory opponents cal1 him a butcher and use his excesses to attack the power of Britain's Whigs)
Treaty of Succession and Barrier. or Townshend Barrier Treaty, conducted between the Dutch Republic and Great Britain, provides a Dutch guarantee of Protestant English succession and Dutch banier rights in the Southem Netherlands following the wu. guaranteeing Dutch security against French e.upansionism.
November. Britain achieves her first dean-cut peacefbi transfer of power. The Tory Party wins a clear majority in the Commons and ousts the Whig government headed by the duke of Marlborough. Queen Anne dismisses the duke of Marlborough by 17 1 1 as his enemies increase their influence on the queen. They have accused the duke of speculation, and the queen makes James Butler. duke of Ormonde. the commander in chief of British forces.
Louis XIV ends trading with the Dutch Republic. Dutch States-General imposes the 1703 ban against importing goods fiom France, Spain and Southern Netherlands. wkich was first repealed by 1704.
17 April. The Holy Roman Emperor Josef 1 dies of smallpox and is succeeded by his brother archduke Charles who will reign until 1740 as Charles VI. Heir to all the empire's Austrian territories, he fights to restore the empire of his Hapsburg ancestor Cliarles v.
Talks between France and English minister Bolingbroke result in preliminary peace agreement. France signs an armistice with England at Utrecht in Juiy.
24 July. French forces under Marshal Villars defeat Ailied forces @utch and Imperial) commanded by Prince Eugene and earl Albernade at Denain, the French recapture Douai, Le Quesnoy, and Bouchain, and the Congres of Utrecht opens to resolve the war.
11 April. The Treaty of Utrecht ends the War of Spanish Succession. France's huis MVagrees not to unite France and Spain under one king, recognizes the Protestant succession in Britain, agrees to tear down French fortifications at Dunkirk and to fil1 up Dunkirk harbor, and gives up some Northern American territories to Britain.
Third Barrier Treaty between Great Britain and Dutch Republic. 06 March. The Treaty of Rastatt ends the war between Austria and Spain, the Spanish Netherlands becornes the Austrian Netherlands, and Spain gives up ber possessions in Itaiy and Luxembourg dong with those in Flaaders.
1714 onward Marks major and permanent âecline in Dut& warships. Important for Dutch to gain British support for its barrier system in the Southern Netheriands to augment its secwity: reason for Banier Treaty.
0 1 September. Louis XIV dies at age 76 &er 72-year reign, His great-graadson wiii reign until 1774 as Louis XV. initially with Philip II Bourbon, duc d'Orleans as regent.
November. Ausîm-Dutch Treaty of An~erpconfirms Austria's acceptance of the 1648 Scheldt Restrictions and the 1680 TarS List and Barrier Agreement effeaively reducing Antwerp's economic role and providing for Dutch trade supremacy in Southem (Ausirian) Neiherlands.
Dutch send troops to England in fear of Jacobite attack per the Barrier Treaty agreement guaranteeing Dutch support for Protestant succession. Dutch alsa send troops to England in 17 19.
French forces in the Indian Ocean take Mauritius fiom the Dutch, who held it since 1638.
01 Janwy. The triple alliance formed by Britaui, France and the Dutch Republic forces the Old Pretender James III to leme France. Objective is to secwe stability in Europe.
02 August, Spain's Phiiip V sen& troops into Sicily in July and his seinire of the countq-raises fmof a new European war. The Quadruple AUiance formed by the Holy Roman Emperor. Britain, and France determines to prevent Philip from overtuniing the peace of 17 1.8. The Dutch Republic hesitates to join, prefening neutraiity towards Spain guaranteeïng continuai access to Spanish uade.
11 December. Sweden's Charles XII dies. Charles is sucGeeded by his sister üirika Eleanora who brings the Great Northem War to a close.
17 Febnran,. Spain's Philip V joins the Quadruple Alliance of Britain France. and Austria in lanu.ary. He signs the Treaty of The Hague giving up his Italian claims in retm for an Austrian promise that his son Charles will succeed to Parma Piacenza. and Tuscany. The Holy Roman Emperor Charles VT givs up his daim to Spain and Savoy receives Sardinia hmAustria in return for Sicily.
1720s - Spread of industrid mercantilism in Baltics and mucb of Europe. Marks beginning of the end of Dutch primacy ih Baltics commerce, iits most important market. SOURCES ON NUMBm OF WARSHIPS '78' w/3W guns (Vreugdenhil, 1938) '82' w/3W guns WreugdenhiI, 1938) '83' w/3W guns (Vreugdenbil, 1938) '87' w/3û+ guns Wreugdenhil, 1938) '95' w/3W gwis (Vreugdenhil, I938) -93' w/3W guns Wmgdenhil, 193 8) '96' w/3W gwis (Vreugdénhil, 1938) '95 ' w/30+ guns Wreugdenhil. 1938) -94' w13W guns Wreugdenhil. 193 8) wI3W guns (Vreugdenhil, 1938) '96' wnO+ guns Nreugdenbil, 1938) '80' wIWguas Wreugdenhil, 1938) '77' w/;U)+guns (Vreugdenhil, 1938) '70' w/SOt guns (Vreugdenhil, 1938) '63' w/W guns (Vreugdenhil. 1938) '63 ' w/W guns (Vmgdenhil. 1938) '51 ' wIWguns Wreugdenhil, 193 8) '51' wl50+ guns (Vreugdenhil_ 1938) -53' WIN+ guns Weug&nhil, 1938) -51' w/-MM guns (Vreugdenhd. 1938) '54' w/* gwis Wreugdenhil, 1938) -54' w/4û+ gwis (Vreugdenbil. 1938) '6 1' wIWguns Wreugdenhil. 193 8) '6 1' d4W guns ~féugdenhil.1938) -6 1' w/* guns (Vreugdenhil, 1 938) .65' w1U)i- gluls (Vreugdénhil, 1938) '53' wM+guns Weugdenhil, 1938) -55' d?Oi gun.s Nreugdenhil, 193 8) -66-wl50+ guns Wreugdenhil. 1938) '7 1' w1W guns (Vreugdenhil, 193 8) '6 1 ' w14-W guns Wreugdeahil- 193 8) '60' wI5W gwis Wreugdenhil, 1 938) '6 1' d5û+ guns Wreugdenhil. 193 8) -65' wI5W guns (Vreugdenhii, 1938) '73' wl5Qi-gwis (Vreugdenhil. 1938) '71' w/50+ guns (hqgienhil, 1938) '73 ' d50t guns (Vreugcienhil. 1938) '73 ' w/50+ guns (Vreugdeahil, 1938) -72'w15W guas Wrwgdenhil, 1938) '8 1' w/Wguns (Vreugcknhil, 1938) -86' w15W guns Wreugdenhil. 1938) '86' w/W guns (Vreugdenhil 1938) -89' w/Sû+ guns (VreugderM, 1938) 31 ~1% (de Jonge. 1869); 122 in Eutopeaa wiersj -en. (1938) 35 w/5û+ (de Jonge, 1869); (20 in European waie~~]Owen, (1938) 35 w/* (de Jonge, 1869): (3 1 in Euopean natérsj Owen (1938) 30 w/%H (de Jonge, 1869); 125 in European waten) Owen (1938) APPENDIX A-2: DUTCH REPUBLIC: ESTIMATED ANNUAL NZTMBER OF WARSLUPS,
NUMBER OF WARSHIPS SOURCES ON NUMBER OF WARSHPS 84 32 w/50+ (de longe, 1869); [26 in European waters) Owen, (1 938) 3 1 w/SW (de longe, 1869); [25 in European waters] Owen, (1938) 30 w/50+ (de Jonge, 1869); [23 in European waters] Owen, (1938) [14 in European waters] Owen, ( 1938) 50 (Charnock, 1800-3); 40 (Richmond, 1946)
* Data e.utracted fiom Modelski, George and William Thompson. Seapower in Global Politics. 1394-1 993. Seattle: Univ of Washington Press, 1988.
EVENT/SOURCE OF CHANGE (+/-l French invasion of Dutch Republic Willem mobilizes Dutch resouices
Debt forces reduction in strength
Willem rallies wartllne support despite debt
Peacetime troop strength
Willem initiates increase/Amsterdam later blocks increase in expendinires
Amsterdam forces reduction in e-upenditures
Ninc Years War - speciflc data not available Nine Years War Nine Years War Nine Years War - specific data not available Interwar period - data not available War of Spanish Succession
Treaty of Utrecht Debt forces reduction in strength 2nd Great Assembly votes reduction
* Data e.utracted fiom Israel, Jonathan. The Dutch Republic, 1377-1806. Oxford: Clarendon Press. 1995. Numbers are approximations, derived directly nom the above reading. These numbers include total military forces in Ewopean theater, including numerous foreign troops hired by Dutch particularly during wartime. VOC and WCsoldiers exciuded; approximately 7500 VOC soldiers in East Indies between 1672- 1730.
** Data from Kennedy, Paul. Rise and Fall of Great Powers. New York: Random House, 1987. APPENDIX B-1: RELATIVE DECLINE OF GREAT BRITAIN (1889-19311
PHASES
1889- 1904 SPLENDID ISOLATION PHASE 1 (THREAT AM) NO ALLIES)
1904-19 14 PREPARING FOR WAR PEIASE 2 (THREAT AND ALLES)
1914-1918 WOIUD WAR 1 PHASE 3 mATAM) ALLIES)
1919-1932 POSTWAR PEACE PHASE 4 (NO THREAT AM) NO ALLIES)
1880 8 March. Britain's Conservatives lose in the gened elections. Lord Beaconsfield (Disraeli), now 75, resigns 18 April. William Gladstone's Liberais will hold office until 1885.
De Bers Mining Corp. is founded by English diarnond operator Cecil John Rhodes and English financier Alfred Beit. Rhodes gains a virtual monopoly in the South African diamond indus@ by 1888.
French Equatonal Afnca is established as a French protectorate.
Dec 30. A Boer Republic independent of Britain's Cape Colony is proclaimed by Oom Paul Kruger who begins a short-lived revolt that will end with the establishment of the independent South Afncan Republic under British suzerainty.
1881 Boers in the Transvaal repulse British forces January 28 at Laing's Neck and defeat them February 27 at Majuba Hill. The Treaty of Pretoria conducted April5 gives independence to the South African Republic of the Boers but under British suzerainm.
1882 20 May. A Triple Alliance pledges Germany, Austria and Italy to corne to each other's aid should any be attacked by France within the next 5 years.
11 July. Ale.uandria is bombardeci by the British fleet under Sir Beauchamp Seymour. British troops are landed to protect the Suez Canal fiom nationalist forces. British forces occupy Cairo September 15 and duai Anglo-French control of Egypt is abolished November 9.
Itaiy takes over Ethiopia' northern town of Assab and will make it the basis of an Eritrean colony in 1890.
France claims a protectorate over the entire northwestem portion of Madagascar.
1883 8 June. The Convention of Marsa with the bey of Tunis assures French control of Tunisia. 25 August. Treaty signed a Hue recognizes Tonkin, Annam, and Cochin China as French protectorates, but China rejects the treaty, and continues to resist French conuol.
The Mahdi Mohammed Ahmed ibn-Seyyid AWullah of Dongola challenges Egyptian control of the Sudan.
24 April. Chancellor Bismarck cables Cape Town that Southwest Afnca (Namibia) is a Gennan colony. The consul at Tunis proclaims a protectorate over the coast of Togoland July 5 and a protectorate over the Camemn Coast a week later.
Egypt's khedive Mohammed Tewfik gives former Sudanese govemor Charles Gordon executive powers and Gordon moves out to rescue Egyptian garrisons in the Sudan from the Mahdi.
26 lanuary. Khartoum falls to the Mahdi Mohammed Ahmed whose forces massacre General Gordon and his garrison just before a British relief expedition reaches the ci'.
9 June. Britain's second Gladstone rninistry ends. Robert Arthur Talbot Gascoyne- Cecil, marquis of Salisbury, has headed the Tories since the death of Lord Beaconsfield in 188 1 and begins a brief ministry.
Russia approaches the brink of war with Britain over Afghanistan. Russia builds up its fleet in the neut few years and becornes more receptive to an entente with France. The prospect of a Franco-Russian naval alliance, which would pincer the under-strength British Mediterranean FIeet and cut that vital line of communication in time of war, provokes the British govenunent to introduce the Two-Power Standard in 1889.
British troops occupy Port Hamilton. Korea.
Britain establishes protectorates in the Niger River southorn region, in no* Bechuanaland and in Guinea.
Germany annexes Tanganyika and Zanzibar.
The king of the Belgians Leopold II assumes the title of sovereign of the Congo Free State.
27 January. Britain's first Salisbury ministry ends after 7 months and a third Gladstone ministty begins Febniary 12.
08 April. An Irish home debill introduced in Parliament by Prime Minister Gladstone provides a separate Irish legislanire but retains control of rnatters relating to the army. navy, ttade and navigation, and the crown in the British Parliament where the Irish will no longer be represented. Conservatives attack the measure, the marquis of Huntington Joseph Chamberlain resigns hmthe Gladstone cabinet and leads a secession hmthe Liberal party, the bill is defeated in July, and the third Gladstone ministry ends July 26 when a generai election gives victory to the Conservatives. A second Salisbury minisîry takes power (1886- 1892).
Britain annexes upper Burma following a third Anglo-Burrnese war, but desultov guemlla warfare will continue for ym. 1 1 January. Bismarck warns Europe against wa.in a speech advocating a much larger German anny. Ententes are fonned among the powers, the Triple Alliance of 1882 is renewed for another 5 years, and a secret Russian-Gerrnan treaty is signed 18 Jun following Russia's refusal to renew the expiring 188 1 Alliance of the Three Emperors.
22 May. Britain promises to evacuate Egypt within 3 years in the Drummond-Wolff Convention with Constantinople, but only if conditions are favorable; Bntain retains the right to feoccupy Egypt shouid the country be menaced by invasion or intemal disorder.
Britain annexes Zduland to block the Transvaal goverrunent fiom establishing a link to the sea.
09 March. Wilhelm 1 dies at Berlin, aAer a 27-year reign of Pnissia and Gennany. Wilhelm is succeeded by his son Friedrich Wilhelm but the new emperor dies 15 June of throat cancer and is succeeded in hm by his son. Wilhelm II, 29, who will reign until 19 19 as the last German rnonarch.
17 Mar. Britain establishes a protectorate over Sarawak and over North Bomeo May 12.
30 October. The Matebele king Lobenguia accepts a British protectorate and signs a treaty giving the Cecil Rhodes interests exclusive mining rights.
10 January. The Ivory Coast becomes a French protectorate.
Marcb. The British government proclaimed its intention to maintain a two-powcr standard by introducing tbe Naval Defense Act iato Parliment - under which L21.5 million will be spent upon new construction, iucluding 10 battleships. Tbc government proposes the standard in ligùt of the Franco-Russian navd chaNengc and the public's sudden reaiization of Britain's relatively declining maritime supremacy. (Kennedy, Britisb Naval Mastery, p.178)
The British South Afnca Co. headed by Cecil Rhodes receives alrnost unlimited rights and powers of government in the area north of the Transvaal and west of Mozambique.
The Influence of Sea Power Upon Histotv. 1660-1783, by U.S. naval officer-historïan Alfred Thayer Mahan dernonstrates the decisive role of naval strength and will have enormous idluence in encouraging the world powers to develop powerful navies. His book is eagerly read in Britain, Russia, Japan and Germany.
18 March. Kaiser Wilhelm forces Bismarck to resign as prime mi~ster.
0 1 July. Anglo-Gennan disputes in east Afnca are resolved in an agreement by which the Germans give up al1 daims to Uganda, receive the island of Heligoland in the North Sea. and recognize the British protectorate over Zanzibar established 14 June.
17 Juiy. Cecil Rhodes becomes prime minister of Afnca's Cape Colony and adds the political post to his position as head of De Beers Consolidated Gold Fields and of British South Afncan Railway.
August. France and Russia reach consensus on entente, seen as a threat by Britain. Russia demonstrates this entente with the port cal1 of a Russian naval squadron at Todon in 1893. The British government believes the Russian naval presence poses a threat to the British Mediterranean neet and the Suez Canal. 1892 13 August, Britain's second Salisbury ministry falls in the general election after 6 years in power. A fourth Gladstone cabinet takes office August 18.
French forces defeat the Fulani on the Upper Niger and take Segu. French forces also depose the king of Dahomey but encounter resistance in the form of native uprisings against imperiaiism.
1893 France establishes French Guiana in South Amenca and the Ivory Coast in Afiîca as formai colonies. Laos becomes a French protectorate in 1893 as France begins to develop a new colonial empire in indochina. On the Niger River, French forces dcfeat Tuareg warriors.
Natal gains self-government while Transvaal annexes Swaziland.
1894 05 Mar. Britain's fourth Gladstone ministry ends after Gladstone has shattered the Liberal Party with his figtit for Irish home de. The Liberals retain power with Archibald Philip Primrose, earl of Rosebery, as prime minister.
12 May. The Congo Treaty with the king of the Belgians Leopold CI gives Britain a Iease on a wide corridor between Lake Tanganyh and Lake Albert Edward. German protests force the British to abandon their corridor and give up the possibility of a Capetown to Cairo railroad.
22 lune. Dahomey becomes a French colony. French imperialists have hopes of taking over the southern part of the former Egyptian Sudan and forcing the British to evacuate Egypt by threatening to divert the course of the Nile.
0 1 August. China and Japan declare war on each other, and the Japanese win easy victories in the ensuing months. Berlin and Washington reject a British invitation to Germany, France, Russia and the United States to join in a united move to inteivene.
Outraged by the Russian port cd1 at Toulon, the British governent increases naval spending to include 9 first-class battleships to maintain maritime superiority.
1895 25 June. Britain's Tories regain power in the general elections and a third Salisbury ministry begins. It wiH continue until 1902.
17 April. The Treaty of Shimonoseki ends a brief Sino-Japanese war that has destroyed the Chinese Army and Navy. China recognizes the independence of Korea, cedes Taiwan and agrees to open four more ports to Foreign commerce. France obtains tenitorial and commercial concession's in China's southern provinces.
11 June. Britain annexes Tongaland to block any possible access of the Transvaal to the sea via Swaziland, and Bechuanaland is attacheci to the Cape Colony in November.
Venezuela Border Dispute. United States declares it has a duty to determine the boundaty between Venezuela and British Guiana and would resist British aggression beyond that line. Britain recognizes this broad interpretation of the Monroe Doctrine and the boundary was finally redrawn in 1899. 29 Decernber. The Jarneson Raid is an aîternpt to forment rebellion against the Boer government of the Transvaal's Oom Paul Kruger. Leander Starr Jammu Ieads men in a 140-mile dash across the Transvaal. Jameson is defeated by Boer forces at ffigerdorp on January 1 and turned over to the British for trial in England, where he is convicted but receives only a Light sentence. A telegram of congratulations to Kruger fiom the German kaiser on January 3 strains Anglo-German relations, and mutual suspicions set in among the Boers and British in South Africa.
1896 06 January. Cecil Rhodes resigns the Cape Colony premiership; a cornmittee of the Cape Assembly fins him guilty of having engineered the Jarneson raid. The Transvaal government signs a defensive alliance with the Orange Free State in mid-March: it fortifies Pretoria and Johannesburg with munitions ordered hmEurope.
Anglo-Egyptian troops begin a reconquest of the Sudan under the command of Generai Horatio Hebert Kitchener. who builds a railmd as he advances.
June. Chamberlain first introduces his proposal for the British ZoUverein, or Customs UNon. in the British parliament. His proposai, to mate a customs union with British overseas possessions and thus discriminate against non-union goods through tariffs. encounters major opposition by the smerof 1897. The proposal is later re-introduced into parliament fier the Boer War.
06 August. France prodaims the African island of Madagascar a French colony. Also in 1896, a French e.xpedition. under Jean Baptiste Marchand. to claim the Sudan sets out for Fashoda.
1897 23 February. French forces have taken Busa and take Nikki November 30, bringing vigorous protests from Britain and raising the threat of \var between Britain and France.
22 June. Queen Victoria celebrates her Diamond Jubile.
14 November. German forces in China occupy Tsingtao following the murder of two Gennan missionaries. Gennans select Tsingtao as their reward for hating intervend in behalfof China against Japan in 1895. Their action precipitates a scramble for concessions in China by most of the great European powers (i.e. Britain, Russia France)
Germany declares policy of Weltmacht. or world power.
1898 Januuy. Lansdowne proposes adding 6 infants, battalions to the Home Defense Force. as a resuit of both invasion scare and the realization that British forces are spread thinly around the empire (ie. imperial overstretch)
15 Febniary. The U.S. battleship Maine blows up in Havana harbor, precipitating a Spanish-Amencan War that lasts for 112 days.
March. Chamberlain proposes an alliance with Germany. Both Btitish ministers rejects the proposal. Also in March, Britain shows concem over Russian pressure on North China. The government clrafts an ultimatum to Russia aimed at discouraging aggression.
Britain approves fllnding for 8 additional battleships due to Russia's intention to add 6 battleships to its fleet. Britain views both France and Russia as its most viable threat. Germany passes the First Gennan Navy Law, aimed at gaining popular support for the construction of a battie fleet. The legislation designates the British Royal Navy as the enemy.
02 September. The Battle of Omdurman gives Gen, Kitchener a decisive victory over the khalifa of the Sudan Abullah et Taashi. Kitchener's British army takes Khartoum hmthe dervishes, reaches Fashoda September 19, and fin& it occupied by French forces under Major Jean-Baptiste Marchand.
03 November. Paris orders the evacuation of Fashoda. France had claimed the left bank of the Nile and Ethiopia the right baak. London demanded that the French evacuate the territory that Britain claims for Egypt by right of conquest. The French ûy to get Russian support but fail.
2 1 March. France and Britain agree on established spheres of influence in Afnca as a resuit of the Fashoda Crisis.
11 ûctober. Samoa Incident. Competing British and German claims on the South Pacific Samoan idands ends on 8 November with the exchange of possessions behveen the two countries.
12 October. The Boer War begins in South Afiica as President Kruger of the Boer republic acts to block suspected British moves towards acquiring the rich Transvaal with its gold mines. The Boers Iay siege to British South Afnca; Mafeking October 13, Kimberley October 15. and Ladysmith November 2.
An "Open Doof' policy in China proposed by the United States receives support fiom the great powers. They agree that al1 the imperialist countries shall have equal commercial opportunity in spheres of special interest.
The Boer War continues in South Afnca where Frederick Sleigh Roberts arrives Janw 10 to assume position of commander-in-chief with Lord Kitchener as his chief of staff. British cavalry relieves Kimberley Febnrary 15 after a Q-month Boer siege. Gened Roberts forces the mender of Conje's Boer army near Paardeberg February 27 while British forces under Buller relieves Ladysmith Febniary 28. Bloemfontein falls on March 13 and Mafeking is reiieved May 17' after a 2 15 day siege. British forces, numbering 250,000, invade the Boer republics seizing Johannesburg May 3 1, Pretoria June 5 and Vlakfontein July 4. Britain annexes the Orange Free State and the Transvaal. President Kruger flees to Delagoa Bay and voyages to Europe in hopes of obtaining German support, but Kaiser Wilhelm U denies the aged Kruger an audience October 6.
2 1 May. Russia annexes Manchuria.
20 lune. A "Boxer Rebeilion" rocks China as foreign legations at Beijing are besieged by members of a militia backed by an anti-foreigner clique at the Manchu court. An eight-nation expeditionary force tifts the siege of the legations August 14, but at least 23 1 foreign civilians are killed in various parts of China, Russian troops retaliate for mid-luly Chinese bombardments across the Amur River. The Russians seize southern Manchuria in the fall.
16 October. Britain's "Khaki" election results in a Mctory for the Conservaiives who retain power under the marquis of Salisbury. Germany passes the Second German Navy Law in reaction to the British Royal Nmy stopping 3 German ships believed to be supplyîng the Boer republics in January. Legislation approves funding for 8 battleships, which seriously alarms the British Adrniralty.
Spring/Summer. Renewed taks between Britain and Germany concerning a possible alliance aimed against Russian e.upansion in Asia fails for a second time.
18 November. Second Hay-Pauncefote Treaty. Britain abandons rights to an isthrnian canal to the United States. U.S. pledges the principle of neutrality providing that the canal would be open to aiî nations on qua1 tenns. Tacit admission of U.S. supremaq in the Western Hernisphere.
20 January. The Anglo-lapanese Aiiiance ends the "spiendid isolation" of Britain and recognizes Japan's interests in Korea. if either par@ should becorne involveci in war with a third Party, its ally is to remain neutral, but if war should expand to involve any other power or powers, then the ally is obligated to enter the conflict.
15 May. Chamberlain's ''Cal1 for inquiry" speech within the Conservative pany leads to the debate on Imperia1 Preferences. Chamberlain attempts to solidm the Empire and promote imperhl uni@;campaign starts afler the Boer War with the temporary Mon importai grain to raise funds in April 1902. Campaign ends with defeat in 1905 election.
3 1 May. The Treaty of Vereeniging ends the Boer War. The Boers accept British sovereignty in South Africa, the British promise L3 million for rebuilding Boer fm.
11 My. Britain's prime minister Lord Salisbury retires and is succeeded by his nephew Arthur lames Balfour who will head the goverment until 1905.
09 December. Venezuela refuses to meet her de& obligations: British. German and Italian warships blockade Venemelan ports untii Februaq 1903 until the Venenielan deragrees to arbitration by a Hague Tribunal commission. President Roosevelt. in 1904, announces the Roosevelt Corollary to the Monroe Doctrine stating that the U.S. would act as the "policeman" of the region.
Failure of the Russians to evacuate Manchuria under last year's Russo-Chinese agreement brings lapanese notes which the Russians contemptuously ignore.
U. S. gunboat diplornacy e.upedites consvuction of the Panama Canal.
British govenunent announces its intention to maintain a 25.000 soldier garrison in South Afnca. Little of this garrison remained by 19 10. Also in 1903. British forces complete the conquest of northern Nigeria.
Gennan colonial forces face an insurrection in Gennan South-West Africa that will continue until early 1908. The revolt will be suppressed after methodical campaigns requinng 20,000 German troops. OS Febniary. Japanese riaval forces aîtack Port Arthur in southeni Manchuria bottiing up a Russian squadron, Concemed at Russia's fkdure to withdraw hmManchuria and ber mntinuing petration of Kom the Jqmese foilm their sneak aüack wiih a declaration of war Febniary 10, defeat the Rrissians at the Yalu River, at Liaoyang. occupy Dairen and Seoui. and force the Russians to pull back to Mukden.
07 April. Anglo-French Entente Cordiale. Whiie the intent addressed matlers extenial to Europe. the agreement pmvided the foudation for rnilimy backing against German aggression.
2 1 Ocîober. Dogger Bank Cnsis. Russian fleet, on its way to fight Japas fires on English fishing boats by mistake. Bntain is outrageci but both nations aven conûict-
2 1 October. Admirai Fisher becornes FiSea Lord In an Admiralty mernorandun dated 06 Damber. he announas the extensive redeployment of the Royai Naq. with the intent of reducing cost and improving force projection-
02 January. Russian forces at Pon Arthur surrender to Japanese infantry as St Petersburg verges on revolution. On 27 May, the Japanese Naw defeats the Russian fleet. sent around the Cape of Good Hope, at the Battle of Tsushima Straits. (Defeat of Russian fleets reduces perceived threat to RoH Na\?) President Roosevelt mediates the dispute and a treaty is signed September 5. Both nations agree to aacuate Manchuria Russia cedes the southeni haif of Sakhalin Island and tecognbs Japan's paramount interest in Kom
06 Febmary. Cabinet decides to FIiîhdraw troops hmWest Indies. Bermuda and Meditemean. Admiral'. announces cutbacks in Halifax Esquùnalt, Jamaica and Tnncomalee.
March. First Momccan Crisis. Emperor Wiihelm iï deiivers a speech in Tangiers challenging the French protectorate in favor of Moroccan independence and asserting Germany 's role in Momcco's destiny. While the speech w.as intended to drive Britain and France apart the crisis brought the two nations closer. Results in the Algeciras Conference. Januaq-April 1906. which affirms French protectorate.
12 Augm Britain and Japan renew their alliance in a revised and enlargeci terms. ùicluding provision for its protection of India (Japanese support in india not deemeù feasible by 1906-7)
û-t Decernber. Britain's Balfour ministry ends and the Liberals take over with a cabinet headed by Sir Henry CampbeU-Bannerman.
OS January. Aierted ty Grey of the possïbility of a German attack upon France. Secretl, of State for War Haldane initiates wide dereorganization of the British Army based on continental and cuts in expenditures; reforms resulted in an Expeditionary Force of six large divisions. simply the largest force which could be raised hmthe peacetime army.
3 1 January. British foreign secretary Su Edward Grey assumes a "moral obligation" to support France in the event of a German aüack but the Cabinet will not leam of his pledge to France until 19 11. Grey authorizes secret General SMtaiks between Britain and France. 10 Febniary. The British baîtleship KUS. Dreadnought launched; ten 12-inch guns- the fhst battleship whose guns are so large. BerIin decides in May to increase tonnages of German baîtieships, add six cruisers to the fieet, and wiâen the Kiel Canai to permit passage of larger ships (Supplementary German Navy Law). British Admiralty reaqpks Germany as threat to Royal Navy.
04 July. A Tripartite Pact declares the independence of Etbiopia but divides the coune into British French and Italian spheres of influence.
10 June. A Franco-Japanese trea'y guarantees "open doof access of both France and Japan to China.
3 1 August. An Angle-Russian entente resolves ciifferences between Britain and Russia in Persia and elsewhere in Asia The entente foUows by 2 days a Russian note recognizing British preeminenœ in the Persian Gulf.
Britain grants dominion status to New Zeaiand
05 April. Britain's prime minister Sir Henry Campbell-Bannerman resigns and is succeeded by Hebert Henry Asquith, whose Liberal minis~ywiii continue until 19 16.
05 October. Bulgaria declares independence from Turlcey; Austria annexes Bosnia and Herzegovina October 6. Berlin supports Vienna, London and Paris support objections by Russia, Turkey and Baikan nations. By 1909, Turkey recognizes Austria's anne.uation and BuIgarian independence in return for over L20 million indemnity.
Germany passes Supplernentary Navy Law accelerating the schedule of prduction to challenge British naval supremacy.
1909 WinterlSp~g.Naval Scare in Britain provoked by increases in the German Navy results in 10 new Dreadnought-cdass battleships.
August. Britain rejects limits on Gerrnan shipbuilding in exchange for British neutraiity.
Britain institutes new tau measures to finance its social security programs. Chancellor of the Exchequer David Lloyd George's budget imposes a supertav on higher incomes and lwies steep estate taxes.
1910 06 May. Edward VII dies and is succeeded by his second son, George V, who will reign until 1936.
3 1 May. The Republic of South Afnca, independent of Britain, is established under terms of the South Afnca Act. The new Union of South Afhca has dominion status. it unites the Cape CoIony, Orange River Colony, Natal and Transvaal.
22 August. Japan fodyannexes Korea by treaty and calls it Choosen.
1911 01 July. Second Moraccan Crisis. Germany sen& a gunboat "Panthet' to Agadir to protect German interests while France attempts to put down a rebeilion in the country While the crisis passes 4 November with the exchange of minor colonies, the main result was to increase British fear and hostility and to draw Britain closer to France. This crisis belped tuni the Entente Cordial into a practically binding alliance. 10 Au- Britain's House of Lords gives up its veto power under the Parliament Act passed under pressure hmPrime Minister Asquith, who threatens to create enough peers to carry the bill.
09 September. Italy declares war on îhe Ottoman Turks. Rome announces annexation of Libya, Tripolitania and Cyrenaica November 5. The 12-month war ends 18 October 19 12 with the Treaty of Lausanne according to which Turkey gives up Tripoli to Italy.
O8 February. Haldane Mission to Berlin in an attempt to dissuade accelerated Gerrnan naval build-up fails.
18 March. Churchill abandons the Two-Power Standard for 60% superiority over the German Navy.
May. Supplementary Gerrnan Navy Law approves signifiant increases in naval build- "P. September. French agree to supplement British naval presence in the Meditenanean Sea with a redistribution of the Royal Navy in the Atlantic and North Sea. Signifies mutual defense of Britain and France.
08 October. First Balkan War. Montenegro declares war on Turkey, followed by Turkey declaring war on Bulgaria and Serbia October 17. Greece also joins the conflict; the Turks suffer major reverses. Russia intercede on behalf of Twkey to prevent a Bulgarian occupation of Constantinople. Austria opposes Serbia occupation of Albania thereby mobilizing its forces which causes Russia to also mobilize its forces. An annistice December 3 ends most of the violence.
30 May. The Treaty of London resolves the Balkan War but a 324ySecond Balkan War begins 29 June when a Bulgarian commander ordes an attack on Serbo-Greek positions. Bucharest and Constantinople declare war and Bulgaria is quickly defeated. The Treaty of Bucharest 10 August ends hosti1ities.
The United States has 40 percent of world production.
28 June. The heir to the Austrian throne, archduke Ferdinand, is assassinated in Sarajevo by a Serbian terrorist, leading to the outbreak of World War.
O 1 August. The war quickly widens as Germany declares war on Russia and on France August 3. Gennan troops invade neutral Belgium August 4 and Britain declares war on Gerrnany.
05 August. The offensive sub-cornmittee of C. I.D. recommends seizing Gennan bases and installations around the globe. On 7 August, Parliament sanctions an increase in the size of the army to 500,OO men, the first of several increase. On the same day, the War Council recommends sending the expeditiomy force to the continent.
23 August. Japan declares war on Germany and on Austria August 25. They begin to land forces in Shantung for an attack on the German position at Tsingtao and a British detachment joins them. 26-30 August, The Battfe of Tannenberg ends in cnishing defeat for a large Russian army that has invaded East Pnissia to take pressure off the French on the western front.
26 August. Gennan colonial forces in Togoland surrender to an Anglo-French force. Britain and France divide the German Afncan colony between tbem. In Septernber, Australian and New Zealand troops capture Yap, Gennan New Guinea, Samora and Nm.South Afiica's prime minister Louis Botha puts down a pro-German Boer revoit. He takes command of troops that enter German South-West Africa and eventually occupies the colony 09 July 19 15.
05 September. France, Russia and Britain sign the Pact of London, formalizing their alliance. On the same day, The Battle of Marne, 5-12 September, ends the German advance.
18 September. Irish Home Rule Bill passes with an act suspending its implementation until after the Great War.
30 Octoùer-24 November. The Battle of Ypres pits Gennan troops against French poilus and British Tommies in trench warfare that wiil consume huge numbers of soldiers on both sides for the next 4 Yeats.
02 Novernber. Russia declares war on Turkey, Britain and France do likewise November 5, and Britain proclaims the annexation of Cypnis which the British have occupied since 1878. On 18 December, Britain proclaims a protectorate over Egypt after the Khedive flees to Turkey.
13 January. The British War Council agrees to allow planning for altemate theaters of wu, to include Saionika, Alexandretta and the Dardanelles. On 25 April, British troops land on Turkey's Gallipoli peninsuta. Britain wiihdraws its forces by early lanuary 1916, wMe blame for its costly failure falls on the first lord of the adrniralty Winston Churchill.
18 February. A German U-boat blockade of Britain begins while casualty lists mount for both sides on the eastem and western fionts. On 22 Febniary, David Lloyd George responds with calls on Britain to wage "total war". On 11 March, the British govemment declares an unrestricted blockade of al1 goals to Gemy.
28 April. ' Italy enters the war as an dly with the signing of Treaty of London.
07 May. Gennan U-boat sinks the Cunard Line passenger ship S.S. Lusitania off the Coast of Ireland, killing 1,198 including 128 U.S. citizens. The ship was canying 173 tons of miliw aid to Britain.
25 May. Prime minister Asquith forms a coalition governent due to public embarrassrnent over the shortage of shells incident and the resignation of Admiral Fisher over the Dardanelles campaign. The govenunent establishes a Ministry of Munitions in June.
07 August. Warsaw fds to the Germans and by Septemôer the Russians have lost al1 of Poiand, Lithuania, and Courland, dong with nearly 1 million men.
20 August. British cabinet reluctantly agrees to participate in Loos offensive, marking the collapse of the allied policy of attrition, due to pressure from allies. 25 September48 October. Artois Offensive: the Battie of Loos proves to be a defeat for the allies.
05 October: A Franco-British expeditionaxy force is sent to Salonh (Greece).
06-08 December. Aliied Conference at Chantilly. Allies conduct planning for offensive campaign, including Somme. Briîain passes the First Military Service Act in January 1916. as a prelude to conscription, followed by the Second Military SeMce Act 25 May 1916.
28 December. War Cornmittee agrees that France and Flanders are the main theaters of the war and that the allied forces can no longer remain solely on the defensive if it hopes to defeat Imperia1 Germany.
British income taxes rise to an unprecedented 15 percent as the Great War drains the nation's financial resources.
1916 2 1 Febniary-11 July. Battle of Verdun on the western front takes 350,000 French lives and nearly as many Gennan lives.
Febniary. German Cameroon faIl to British troops.
0 1 March. Berlin has notifiai Washington that German U-boats will treat anned merchantmen as cruisers, extending the Uhtcampaign. Washington has wamed Berlin that the United States will sever diplornatic relations unless Germany abandons "submarine warfare against passenger and freight-canying vesselsy'. Washington also protests against London when the London Official Gazette blacklists some 30 U.S. firms under the Enemy Act of 18 My.
24 April. Ireland's Easter rebellion las& a week but has little support. While 150,000 Irish volunteers fight for the king in Flanders, some 2.000 rebels rise at Dublin. Police arrest leaders where they are convicted of treason and hanged August 3.
16 May. Bntain and France sign the secret Sykes-Picot Treaty calling for a division of the Ottoman Empire (Middle East) between the two powers.
3 1 May-O 1 June. The Battle of Jutland ends with heavy losses on both sides, but the Ge- fleets escapes the larger British fleet.
05 June. An Arab revolt against the Ottoman Turks begins with an attack on the garrison at Medina, which surrendered June 10.
O 1 July- 15 November. The Battle of Somme is the bloodiest battle in history . The Allies dive the Germans back no more than 7 miles at any point. and the Germans will regain most of the lost ground in 1918.
04 December. Britain's Asquith govenunent resigns and a war cabinet takes over, headed by the new prime minister is Welshman David Lloyd George. Lloyd George institutes campaign for total war. On t 2 Decernber, Germany makes a peace offer through the U.S. but it is rejecteâ by the allies. 17 January. British intelligence intercepts a wireless message, the Zirnmennan telegram, outlining a Gennan proposal for an alliance with Mexico against the United States.
11 March. British-Indian forces occupy Baghdad. Aqaba in Arabia falls to Arab forces led by Col. T.E. Lawrence.
06 April. The United States declares war on Germany.
20 August. British govenunent accepts responsible governrnent as the goal of constitutional development in India. At the same time. there is a renewed interest in Imperiai Preferences by Lloyd George ministry and the Dominions.
02 November. The Balfour Dedaration, issued by Foreign Secretary Balfour, says the British govemment favors the establishment in Palestine of a national home for the Jewish people. British troops have invaded Palestine and take it hmthe Ottoman Turks. Jedemfdls to the British December 9.
03 March. The Treaty of Brest-Litovsk ends Russian participation in the "capitalist- irnpefialist" war. Russia's new Bolshevik regime abandons al1 clairns to Poland, Lithuania, the Ukraine, the Baltic provinces, and Finland.
British income taxes rise to 30 percent, up from 15 percent in 1915. as the national debi climbs to an unprecedented L8 billion. Britain dso passes its second Conscription Act. widening the age lirnit for conscription.
06 July. Montagu-Chelmsford report on the fùture govenunent in India fdls short of Indian expectations.
August. Final Allied offensive begins. with British forces breaching the Hindenberg line by October 5.
O8 November. Germany's Wilhelm II abdicates and hostilities on the western front end November 1L in an armistice signed by Germany and Allies at Compiegne outside Paris.
Following the war. Britain recognizes that its naval superiority is threatened by the US. naval building program of 1918, leading to the Washington Conference of 192 1. Britain also sen& forces to Russia to intervene in the Bolshevik Revolution. Britain rems forces in My 19 19.
2 1 January. Sinn Fein members of Parliament have proclaimed an independent Irish Republic and organized a parliament of their own. War begins November 26 between Sinn Fein and British regulars.
25 January. Delegates hmVersailles Peace conference adopt a unanimous resolution to mate a League of Nations. League meets for îïrst time 15 November 1920 but its membership includes neither the USSR nor the United States. 28 June. The Treaty of Versailks obliges Gertnany to accept sole responsibiiity for causing the Great War. Germany reninis to France the Alsace-Lorraine conquests of 187 1, cedes other tenitories to Belgium and Poland, cedes her colonies to the Allies to be administered as mandates under the League of Nations, and agrees to pay large repaxations. France aquires mandate control of Syria fkom Turkey and of Togo and Cameroon in Afica from Germany.
15 August. British Cabinet decides on Ten Year Rule"; regulates planning for miliîaq services based on assumption that Britain will not experience major war for the ne.- 10 years. States that Britain's chef concern will be imperial plicing, and that it should maintain service strength appm.uimating that of 19 14 while scientific weapons should replace manpower.
10 September. The Treaty of Saint-Germain obliges Austria to recognize the independence of Czechoslovakia, Hungary, Poland, and Yugoslavia.
09 October. Britain, France and the U.S. agree and sign a 15-year guarantee against unprovoked German aggression. The defense agreement is rejected by the U.S. Senate 19 November.
L9 November. The U.S. Senate rejects the Versailles Treaty and rejects U.S. membership in the League of Nations.
23 December. Government of India Act sets up government in India according to Montagu-C helmsford report.
20 Januaq. Admiralty demands that Britain shouid maintain "at Ieast" naval equality with the U.S. through a One-Power Standard.
19-26 April. San Remo Conference allocates Middle East mandates to France and Britain based on the Sykes-Picot and other inter-aliied wariime agreements.
05 May. Britain accepts mandate over Iraq in Mesopotamia fiom the supreme allied councit. A great Arab insurrection against the British begins in My, some @sons are besieged for weeks, but the uprising is finally suppressed in December. Britain installs Syria's Faisai 1 as king of Iraq in August 192 1 but continues its guardian role over the mandate.
15 May. British reinforcements arrived in Ireland to support His Majesty's forces against attacks by Sinn Fein political militants who continue resistance to British regulars and to the new "Black and Tans". By 23 December, the Government of Ireland Act passeci Parliament giving Northern and Southern Ireland the right to elect separate parliaments of their own with each to retain representatives in the British Parliament in London.
10 August. The Treaty of Sevres signed by the feeble Ottoman suitanate obliges Constantinople to renounce al1 daims to non-Turkish territory, makes Syria a French mandate and Mesopotamia and Palestine British mandates.
192 1 09 February. Governent of India Act @ec 19 19) comes into effect giving India a partial self government, or dyarchy, where power is divided between the British crown and the Indian people. 2 1 March. An Anglo-Russian commercial agreement ends hostilities in lndian provinces but is merely a hoUow cornmitment that helps reduœ the Russian/Soviet threat to Iadia.
June-August. Imperid Conference. Dominions favor autonomy over centralization of fofeign and defense policy, agree to maintain single power standard (navy), and dso discuss possible renew of Japanese alliance, but allow it to expire. On 16 June, the Cabinet accepts fecommendation for establishing a naval base in Singapore, in lieu of a Japanese alliance.
British unernptoyment reaches 2.5 million in July but then begins a gradua1 drop to 1.2 million where it will remain unti1 1930.
12 November. The Washington Conference on Limitation of Naval Armaments opens. ending February 6 after nearly 3 monh with a naval armaments treaty that provides for a 10-year period during which no new ships of more than 10,000 tons with guns larger than 8 inches in width are to be built by Britain, France, Italy, Japan or the United States. Britain and the United States are then to be permitted totals of 525,000 tons each, Japan 3 15,000 tons, France and Italy 175.000 tons each. The Conference restricts submatine warfare and the use of poison gas.
06 December. Southern Ireland gains Dominion statu in a treaty signed wiih Britain.
14 December. Geddes Cornmittee Report calls for drasiic cuts in military spending while Lalks bebveen Britain and France about establishing a security arrangement fail.
28 Febniary. Allenby Declaration of the formai independence of Egypt. Kingdom of Egypt proclaimed 15 March. Britain expresses continued interest in security matters. to include control of Suez Canal. The Sudan remains under joint Anglo-Egyptian sovereignty.
August. Cabinet approves formation of 20 HDAF squadrons - increase in RAF size
05 October. Britain and Iraq sign the Treaty of Alliance giving Britain control over Iraq's army and administration. Renewed in 1930
19 October. Lloyd George cabinet resigns afler Consematives vote to quit the coalition govenunent. Anàrew Bonar Law heads a new Conservative govenunent.
06 Damber. The Irish Free State is officially proclaimed, the parliament of Northem Ireland votes December 7 to remain outside the Free State, and the 1st British troops leave the Free State December 17.
11 January. French troops occupy Germany's rich Ruhr Basin due the Germans default on coal deliveries promised at Versaiiles in 19 19.
20 May. Britain's prime minister Andrew Bonar law resigns and his chancellor of the exchequer Stanley Baldwin heads a new Conservative cabinet until the general elections in November.
26 May. Jordan (Transjordania) becornes an autonomous state. Britain recognizes Jordanian independence in early 1928 but retains military control and some financial control. 24 July. The Treaty of Lausanne returns various islands to Turkey, Britain retains Cypm-
22 January. Baldwin's Consemative goveniment is defeated on an Impenal Preferences platform, tempody stopping the protectionist debate. Britain's first Labour govenunent takes office under James Ramsay MacDonaid who opposed British participation in the war. Britain signs a commercial treaty in which the Soviet Union gives British goais most-favored nation treatment.
04 November. Britain's Labour govemment falls derthe general election October 29 has given the Conservatives a great victory. partly through the release October 25 of the so-called Zinoviev letter, implicating Labour and cornmunism. Stanley Baldwin heads a new govemment that denounces British treaties with Russia November 2 1.
Britain's chanceiior of the exchequer Winston Churchill remto the gold standard at the prewar gold and dollar value of the pouad. Parliament and the people respond with enthusiasm but the move maka British coal. steel, rnachinery, textiles, ships, cargo rates, and other goods and services 10 percent above world prices. and the result in unemployrnent and wage cuts.
O 1 January. Syria is created by a union of Damascus and Aleppo with French general Maurice Sarrail as hi& commissioner. Starts 2-year Druse insurrection against the French ending in June 1927. Britain declares Cyprus a crown colony in 1927.
May. Cabinet redefines the One Power Standard so to exclude having dominate forces in another power's home waters, thereby weakening the standard.
17 June. A protocol signed by world powers bars use of poison gas in wu. An anns tmffic convention signed the same day governs international trade in arms and munitions.
05-16 October. The Locanio Conference results in the Locanio Treaty signed 1 Decemkr to guarantee Franco-Gennan and Belgo-German fiontiers by mutuai agreement, by arbitration treaties between World War antagonists. and by mutual assistance treaties that give Europe some sense of dty.French interpret treaty as necessaq substitution in light of failed attempt for bilateral AngleFrench alliance.
March. Creation of Empire Marketing Board announced. Aim is to promote and stimulate imperial trade in Lieu of imperial preferences. Reflects an attempt to unite the dominions without necessarily hposing tariffs and shutting out other nations.
23 May. France prodaims Lebanon a republic.
19 ûctober-23 November. Imperia1 Conference, defines Dominion status, leading to the Statute of Westminster (193 1).
24 May. London breaks relations with Moscow following accusations of blshevik espionage and subversion throughout the British Empire.
20 June-07 August. U.S. and Britain fail to reacb agreement at the Geneva Naval Conference. 28 July. Franœ and Britain compromise to violate postwar arms Limitations by eaending British light cruisers and French ciraft numbers. Compromise angers U.S. Churchill extends TenYear Rule" in 1928. reguiating growth of the militiuy senices under the assumption Britain won't face major war in the next 10 years.
27 August. ïhe Kellogg-Briand Pact (Fhct of Pans) is signeci by 63 world powers whose representatives renounce mar- The pact is implemented in September by the League of Nations.
30 May. Britaui's Labour parh, wins the geoeral eleaion and Ramsay MacDonald forms a second cabinet June 5. Diplornatic relations with Moscow resume Octobet 1.
Wall Street's Dow Jones industrial Average reaches 381 in September. but breaks in ûctober foilowing a drop in U.S. iron and steel production and a rise in British interest rates to 6.5 percent that bas pulled European capital out of the USmoney market A record 16.4 million shares trade Tuesday, October 29: the Dow plummets 30.57 points. and Liquidation continues. Speculators who have bought on margin are forced to sel1 and $30 billion dkappears.
A geaeral world economic depression sets in as world trade declines. production drops. and unemploynent increases. British unemployment tops 12.2 percent. Countries raise taM3 in response to the US'S Smoot-Hawlq TarifF An
2 1 Jmw-22 April. A London Naval Conference convened uith a treaty signe-b~ Britain. the United States. France. Italy. and Japan who agree to limit submarine tonnage and gundiber and scrap certain wanbips. Britain capitulates to U.S. demands. thereby reducing the strengih of the Royal Na?.
30 June. The 1st Aiiied mpslewe the Rbineland 5 years before the date set by the Treae- of Versailles.
12 November. First session of the Roundtable Conference on Goverment of India convening 3 1 Januw 193 1. Agrees on preliminaries for esenitive to legislature based on federal -stem.
18 June. Canada raises W. estimaring that the new customs duties hiil cut off Mo- thirds of goods importai from the United States.
01 August Britain receives a French-American Ioan but London and Glasgow have no& Septernber 10 to protest government economy measurw. nak-ai unifs mu* September 15 to protest pay cuts. the pound sterling is daduecl September 20. and Britain is forced to abandon the gold standard once again September 2 1.
24 August Britain's Labour governent resigns in a disagzement over remedies for the nation's hanciai crisis. but Prime Minister Ramsay MacDonald heads a new coalition cabinet that will retaia power until mid-1935.
18 September. Japanese forces MeManchuria Britain offers pmtest but too weak in East Asia to back protest with force.
ûctober-November. Second session of Roundtable Conference fails to hdcompromise for mioority safeguards in India 1 1 December. Statute of Westminster provides legal form for the equality of Dominions established at the Imperia1 Conference of 1926.
1 1 December. Japan abandons the gold standard
ïmport Duties Act. Britaïn abaodoas free trade for the first tirne since 1849. Btitain imposes a 10 percent tariff on most imported goods but a- at the Imperia! Conference ait Ottawa to exempt Canada, Austmiia, New Zealmd, and other CommonweaJtb nations, wbicb in turn will provide markets for Btitain's otherwise uncornpetitive testiles, steel, motorcars, and telecommuaications equipment.
Britain imposes tariffs and quantitative restrictions on miuiy farm imports while subsidizing BritiJb farmers to help them survive tbe depression. hperiai prefereaces are intduced to favor imports from coloaid and Commoawealth countries, with specid prderences given to dairy products, meat, and wheat from Austdia, Canada, and New Wand at the expense of Denmark and Argentin&
My. A tara war between Britain and Ireland begins, depriving Ireland of its chief e-uport market.
19 April. The United States abandons the gold standard by presidential proclamation but Roosevelt rejects a currency stabilization plan proposed by the gold standard countries meeting in Jdy at a World Moneîaq and Economic Conference at London. APPENDIX 8-2: GlREAT BRITAIN: PERCENTAGE OF WORLD TRADE.*
1860 1870 1880 1889 1898 191 1-1913
BRlTAIN 25.2 24.9 23.2 18.I 17.1 14.1
L I GERMANY 8.8 9.7 9.7 10.4 11.8
I FRANCE 11.2 10.4 11.2 9.3 8.4
I UNITED STATES 9.1 7.5 10.1 9.0
*Data extracted from Kennedy, Paul M. The Rise and Fall of British Naval Mastery. London: Ashfield Press, 1976. Figure B-1. Great Britain Case Study: Major Powers Estimated Annual Number of Wanhips, 1880-1932
4Britain +Russia +France +Gemany +Japan +United States APPENDIX B-4: GREAT BRITAIN: MILITARY EXPENDITURES 1889-1932. (Current Prices in L Million Sterling) pPhase 1 (%)RAF % Cross Exp. Total 1889 16.0 (1 8.5) 13.0 (1 5.0) 29.0 (33.5) 86.5
Phase II Amy (%) Navy (%) RAF (%) Total (%) Cross Exp. Total 1905 29.2 (19.5) 36.8 (24.6) 66.0 (44.1) 149.5
APPENDIX C-1: RELATIVE DECLINE OF UNITED STATES (1971-PRESENT)
1971-1989 COLD WAR (THREAT AND ALLIES)
1990-PRESENT POST COLD WAR PHASE 2 (NO THREAT AND ALLES)
1970 Paris peace talks to end Vietnam continue for a second yeaf without progress but Washington reduces US troop strength in Vietnam below 400,000 in response to mounting public pressure as causalities rise.
Gold prices in the world market at London fall below the official US price of $35 per ounce.
04 August. A "New Economic Policy" announcemi by President Nixon imposes a 90day freeze on US wages and prices, temporarily suspends conversion of dollars into gold, and asks Congress to impose a 10 percent import surcharge in an effort to strengthen the dollar as the Vietnam increases inflationary pressures.
The US unlinking the dollar fmm any gold value begins the breakdown of the international monetary system established by tbe Bretton Woods Conference of 1944.
20 December. US imports top exports by $2.05 billion - the first trade deficit since 1888. President Nixon kills the 10 percent import surcharge and raises the official gold price, thus devaluing the dollar by 8.57 percent.
US troop withdrawals from South Vietnam reduce the total number to about 200.000. down from 534,000 in mid 1969.
20 Febniary. President Nixon arrives at Beijing and confers with Chairman Mao Zedong, ending the US hostility towards the People's Republic of China that has persisted since 1949. Six days earlier, the president ordered that US uade with China be on the same bais as trade with Moscow and the Soviet-bloc nations.
22 May. President Nixon arrives at Moscow and confers with Party Secretary Leonid Brezhnev in the first visit of a US president to the Soviet Union since 1945.
17 June. The Watergate afKair that will grow into the greatest constitutional crisis in US history has its beginnings when District of Columbia police arrest five men inside Demoçratic party national headquarters in Washington's new Watergate apartment complex.
19 Jdy. The United States enters the international money market, selling German marks at decreasing prices in the fïst move since August 1971 to shore up the dollar. 28 January. A ceasefire in Vietnam ends direct involvement of US ground troops in indochinese hostilities. The last US troops lave South Vietnam March 29.
12 Febniary. Speculative selling of US dollars on foreign exchanges forces the second devaluarion of the dollar in 14 months. Dollar is devaluated by 10 percent against al1 other major world cunencies in a move to make US goods more cornpetitive in foreign trade. The devduation boost. the price of imported goods and imported oi1 to US consumers
06 October. The Yom Kippur War begins in the Middle East and is the fourth and fiercest Arab-lsraeli war since 1948.
07 November. A congressional War Powers Resolution passed over President Nixon's veto limits a president's authority to commit troops in a foreign conflict without Congressional approval. Nixon has said the resolution would impose unconstitutional and ciangemus restrictions on ptesidential power and "seriousiy undennine the nation's ability to act decisively and convincingly in tirnes of intemationai crisis.
18 January. Israel and Egypt sign a disengagement agreement after negotiations by US Secretary of State Henry Kissinger.
09 August. President Nixon resigns in disgrace - the first US chief of state to ever quit office. Vice-President Gerald Ford is sworn in the same day. One month later he grants Nixon a "Ml, k.and absolute pardon" for al1 fderal crimes.
0 1 August. The Helsinki Accord formalizes détente between East and West. The declaration issued by the Conference on Secutity and Cooperation in Europe (CSCE) emphasizes the inviolability of frontiers, N1support for the United Nations, and mutual respect for "sovereign equality and individuality".
November. Jimmy Carter wins the US presidential election with 297 electoral votes to 240 for President Ford.
2 1 September. Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty seeks to curb the spread of nuclear materials. The fifteen signatories include the United States and the USSR
24 October. US inflation pressures forces President Carter to act. he announces a program of voluntary wage-price guidelines, resisting demands that he imposes mandatory controls and raising fears that idation will worsen.
15 December. Washington recognizes the People's Republic of China, announcing that it will sever diplornatic ties with Taiwan as of 1 January 1979.
16 January. The Shah of Iran flees to Egypt after nearly 38 years in power. The Shiite Musiim leader Khomeini nies into Teheran Febniary 1 after 15 years in exile. Iranian terrorists seize the US embassy at Teheran November 4, taking 66 hostages and demanding US e.xtradition of the shah. 18 Jme. US Senate leaders block a Strategic Arms Limitation Treaty (SALT) signed at Vienna by President Carter and Premier Brezhnev after nearly 5 years of negotiations. The United States has 2283 missiles and bombers, the Soviets 2504. President Carter appmves constNction of a new generation of smaller aircraft carriers 8 January and approves development 7 June of a $30 billion MX missile plan that would survive Soviet "first strike".
07 Jdy. US grants China most-favored-nation status. allowing her the lower tariff rates available to most other US trading partners. US exports to China will reach $1.7 billion next year, imports from China will reach $600 million.
17 My. Nicaraguan âictator Anastasi0 Somoza resigns his presidency after a 7-week civil war, ending the 46 year Somoza family dynasty. Sandinista rebels enter Managua July 20.
17 September. The Camp David accord der 13 days of negotiating by Egypt's President Sadat, Israel's Prime Minister Begin, and President Carter provides what ail parties cal1 a "framework for peace" in the Middle East.
24 December. Soviet troops invade Afghanistan. allegedly at the invitation of the new Afghan president. US-supplied Afghan guerrillas will resist Soviet occupation forces for more than 9 years. forcing them to retreat into fortifiecl cities. President Carter orders a partial embargo of US grain sales to the USSR 4 January 1980 in response to the Soviet invasion.
27 June. A draft registration measure signed by President Carter requires chat some 4 million US men aged 19 and 20 register.
Double digit inflation continues in the US with pnces rising 12.4 percent by year's end. fiieling opposition ta President Carter.
November. US voters elect Ronald Reagan to the presidency, with 489 electoral votes to Carter's 49.
20 Januy. Iran releases al1 US hostages aller US negotiaiors agree to unblock certain Iranian funds and Iran agrees to repay US bank loans.
11 June. Washington announces that heavy Wswill be imposed on some steel imports in order to help stniggling US steel makers whose foreign cornpetition receives govenunent subsidies.
13 August, President Reagan signs a bill mandathg the deepest tax and budget cuts in US history, baseû on "supply-side" economic theories. While "Reaganonomics" will be credited with producing the longest peacetime boom in history, it will also lead to neglect of cities, deterioration of infrastructure, and massive deficits financed by foreign borrowing .
06 Febniary. President Reagan's budget address calls for much higher rnilitary appropriations and less spending on social programs. Congress votes 346 to 68 to increase military spending by 6 percent after inflation over fiscal 1982.
November. Recession continues hroughout most of the world, international trade declines, unemployment in the US reaches 10.8 percent. 10 November. Premier Btezhnev dies after 17 years as Soviet party secretary. Succeeded by former KGB head Yuri Andropov.
08 March. President Reagan tells an evangeiical group in Orlando, FL that "the Soviet Union is the focus of evil in the modem worlâ" and that the USSR is an " evil empire".
23 March. President Reagan proposes a "Strategic Defense Initiativen to protect America and her allies with a high-tech shield against nuclear missiles.
23 October. US Marines in Lebanon come under increasing attack in September and October. A terrorist drives a tmck packed with explosives into a Marine barracks and French paratroop barnch, killing 24 1 US and 58 French soldiers.
25 October. US Marines and Army Rangers land on Grenada to oppose Cuban presence and intentions on the island, and rescue US medical students.
US economic growth rises at a 6.8 percent rate, highest since 195 1. The inflation rate, 3 -7 percent, is the lowest since 1967.
09 Febniary. Soviet leader Yuri Andropov dies and is succeeded by Politburo member Konstantin Chernenko.
November. President Reagan is re-elected with 525 electoral votes to 13 for former vice president Walter Mondale.
1 1 March. Mikhail Gorbachev becomes Soviet leader atter death of Chernenko at age 73. Moscow and Washington reach compromise agreement 8 January to resume negotiations towards limiting and reducing nuclear weapons and preventing an arrns race in space.
16 September. The Unites States becomes a debtor nation for the first time since 19 1.). announces the Department of Commerce. After years of deficits in the balance of payments, the nation relies on foreign buying of US Treasury bonds and notes instead of on taxation.
The US national debt tops $2 trillion. up hm$1 trillion in 198 1. The nation's trade deficit worsens despite a weakening dollar, setting a record of over S 170 billion,
15 April. US warplanes bomb Libya's Muammar Qadaffi's headquarters at Tripoli in reraliation for the terrorist bombing of a West Berlin discotheque killing a US soldier.
26 June. Congres votes to appm$100 million in aid to the Contras t@ng to overthrow Nicaragua's Sandinista regime.
November. Beirut magazine reveals that the United States has sent spare parts and ammunition to Iran in hopes that "moderates" there wouid help obtain the release of US hostages. Further investigation will show that other arms sales were made to Iran with profits going to futid Contra forces in Nicaragua. 07 December. Gorbachev arrives at Washington for a three day summit on arms reduction. He and President Reagan sign the nrst treaty to reduce the size of nuclear arsenals, agreeing to disrnantie al1 Soviet and US medium and shorter range missiles, with extensive weapons inspections on both sides.
02 Janwy. President Reagan and Canadian Prime Minister Brian Mulroney sign a trade agreement that eliminates Wsand lowers trade barriers.
14 April. Moscow agrees to withdraw Soviet forces from Afghankitan. promising to have al1 1 15,000 out by mid-February 1989 and agrees to restore a non-aligned Afghan state.
0 1 July. Delegates to a Communist conference at Moscow endorse Gorbachev's proposais, including partial transfer of power fiom the party to democraticaliy elected legislahires, and approve inauguration of the position of President. Gorbachev is named President 1 October and addresses the United Nations on 7 December, promising unilateral reduction of Soviet troops, missiles, and munitions on the western frontiers of the Warsaw Bloc.
August. President Reagan signs a trade bill gMng him broad powers to retaliate against countries found to be engaged in unfair traâe practices. A protectionist vade bill to limit te.xtile imports passes the House 248 to 150 and the Senate 59 to 36 but the President vetoes the masure 28 September.
November. Vice President George Bush wins the US presidential election with 53 percent of the popular vote over Massachusetts Govemor Michael Dukakis.
06 June. Chinese students gather in Tiananmem Square for weeks to demand political reform and the resignation of Premier Li Peng. Chinese leader Deng Xiaoping sen& Mongolian soldiers who fire into the crowd killing hundreds if not thousands.
18 October. Prodemocracy demonstrations in East Germany lead to resignation of President Erich Honecker and freedom to travel to West. East Germans begin demolition of the Berlin Wall leading to the opening of the Brandenbwg Gate on 22 December and the remcation of Berlin
20 December. US troops invade Panama in an attempt to apprehend strongman Manuel Noriega. Surrenders to US authorities for trial at Miami on drug charges.
07 Febniaty. Soviet leaders agree to surender the Communist Party's 72 year monopoly on power. Gorbachev strongly endorses politicai pldism. Bons Yeltsin is elected president of the Russian Republic in May.
02 August. üaqi forces invade Kuwait. United Nations denounces Iraqi invasion and imposes economic sanctions. Iraq masses troops on the border of Saudi Arabia and Riyadh agrees to receive US ground and air forces as part of Operation Desert Shield.
03 October. Germany reunites after 43 years of sepration. A 3-day meeting at Ottawa ends with an accord by Soviet, British, French and US foreign ministers on a framework for negotiating reunification. Foreign Mi~stersShevardnadze and Baker agree to duce Soviet and US strength in Central Europe to 195,000 troops eacb, while permitting an additional 30,000 US troops to be stationed in England, Portugal, Spain, Greece and Turkey . 19 November. The Conventional Forces in Europe (CFE) treaty signed by 22 world leaders at Paris ends the "era of confrontation and division" that has followed World War II. NATO and Warsaw Pact countries agree to reduce weapons (Moscow will scrap 19.000 tanks, NATO 2,000), no one country may have more than one-third the total number of arrns in a singie category.
17 January. US and allied missiles and planes bomb targets in Iraq and Kuwait. Congress votes to approve legislation pennitting President Bush to make war on Iraq if it does not withdraw fiom Kuwait by 15 January in accordance wiîh UN resolutions.
24 Febniary. Operation Desert Storm begins and ends 100 hours later with Iraqi forces defeated. US Generai H. Norman Schwarzkopf plans the combined air and ground attack, sending 270,000 US, British and French troops in a sweep around the iraqi's western flank. More than 100,000 Iraqi troops surrender and at least 100,000 are killed.
25 Jwe. Croatia and Slovenia deciare independence fiom Yugoslavia. Seb-Croat battles erupt, Belgrade sen& in mps, the European Community tries to mediate.
19 August. A coup attempt by Communist hard liners ends 23 August aAer President Yeltsin in Moscow calls for a general strike to resist the coup. Some tank commanders support Yeltsin. and the coup leaders fk.
05 September. President Gorbachev persuades the al1 Soviet Congress to surrender power. He works with leaders of the repubtics to restore order. draft a new constitution. and create a new. non-Communist political order. He recognizes the independence of the Baltic republics an other republics gain autonomy. Gorbachev resigns 25 December.
0 1 January. Egyptian Boutros Boutros-Ghali takes office as secretaq+general of the United Nations. Within 2 years. the number of peacekeepers will have grown from 11,500 to 72,000, straining the UN'S financial resources.
29 February. Voters in Bosnia-Herzegovina opt for independence from Yugoslavia provoking khhostilities in the Balkans. Serbia's President Slobodari Milosevic sends troops into Bosnia. They besiege Sarajevo for most of the year as both sides commit bloody atrocities while European countries dither about how to end the fighting.
16 June. President Bush and Yeltsin agree to drastic cuts in their respective nuclear arsenals, scrapping key land-based missiles and reducing long-range warheads. A second Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty (START 2) announced at Geneva calls for mutual reductions of nuclear warheads.
November. US voters elect Arkansas govemor William Clinton to the presidency over President Bush with 370 to 168 electoral votes.
1993 01 Janwy. The European Community pennits free movement of goods across national borders.
08 December. The North American Free Trade Agreement (NAiTA) signed into larv by President Clinton provides the phasing out of al1 tariKs and other trade Mersover a 14 year penod between the US, Canada and Mexico. 1994 19 September. US forces occupy Haiti foiiowing last minute negotiations by former Presideat Carter and others with General Cedras to aven a miiitmy invasion. Cedras seps down by 15 October permithg the resumption of power by elected President Jean- Bertrand Aristide. who agreed to comply with Haiti's Constitution and not seek a second ter=
0 1 December. Congres gives overwhelming approval to a seventh General Agreement on Tarifk and Trade (GATT). Japan and other major countries (124 total) foüow suit and agree lowering of obstacles to free trade (including cuts in agricultural subsidies and custom duties) ushers in what proponents say wiü mate jobs. lower prias and benefit everyone. APPENDJX C-2: UNITED STATES: MILITARY EXPENDJTURES 1971-1991.*
1971 1972 1 973 1974 1975 1976 1977 1978 1979 1980
TOTAL CWNTDOLLARS 74,472 75,076 73,223 77,550 84,900 87,891 95,557 103,402 1 15,013 132,840
CONSTANT DOLLARS 259,560 24 1,450 220,994 2 16,892 2 12,658 205,53 1 208,27 1 209,524 2 17,267 224,056
PERCENT REAL GROWTH -9.1 -6.9 -8.5 -1.8 -2 -3.4 1.3 0.6 3.8 3.1
TOTAL CURRENT DOLLARS 156,035 182,850 205,012 220,806 245,370 265,636 274,007 28 1,935 294,880 286,791 292,145
CONSTANT DOLLARS 235,4 12 253,777 270,209 280,124 297,48 1 3 14,557 3 1 5,42 1 3 14,403 3 16,240 298,702 292,145
PERCENT REAL GROWTH 5.1 7 7.6 3.7 6.2 5.7 O. 3 -0.3 0.6 -5.5 -2.2
*Data from Borklund, C. W. U.S. Defense and Militay Fact Book. England: Oxford University, 199 1. General Theop
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