"Imperia1 Sunset: Grand Strategies of Hegemons in Relative Decline.''
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"Imperia1 Sunset: Grand Strategies of Hegemons in Relative Decline.'' Steven Daniel Breton Department of Political Science "McGill University, Montreal" August, 1996 A thesis submitted to the Faculty of Graduate Studies and Research in partial fulfillment of the requirements of the degree of Masters of Art in Political Science. National library BiMiitttèque nationale du Canada Acquisitions and Acquisitions et Bibliograph'i Services seMces bibliographiques 395 Weiiinglan Street 395. rue Wellington -ON KIAûN4 OtWwaON K1AON4 Canede Canada The author has granted a non- L'auteur a accordé une licence non exclusive licence allowing the exclusive permettant à la National Library of Canada to Bibliothèque nationale du Canada de reproduce, loan, distribute or sell reproduire, prêter, distribuer ou copies of this thesis in microform, vendre des copies de cette thèse sous paper or electronic formats. la forme de microfiche/nlm, de reproduction sur papier ou sur format électronique. The author retains ownership of the L'auteur conserve la propriété du copyright in this thesis. Neither the droit d'auteur qui protège cette thèse. thesis nor substantial extracts from it Ni la thèse ni des extraits substantiels may be printed or otherwise de celIe-ci ne doivent être imprimés reproduced without the author's ou autrement reproduits sans son permission. autorisation. ABSTRACT "Imperia1 Sunset: Grand Strategies of Hegernons in Relative Decline." This thesis investigates the economic and military policies hegemons pursue while expenencing relative deciine. Based upon the rising costs of leadership associated with hegemony, this thesis establishes that both systemic and dornestic environrnents equally influence the hegemon's policy-making. Furthermore, the paper contends that hegemons do practice strategic planning during relative decline, in an effort to adjust its commitments and resources to the environment. Relative success or failure in maintaining the international system and thus adjusting for decline depends on how decision-makers compensate for two prevailing variables: threat of challengers and availability of allies. This study offers a predictive theoretical mode1 for interpreting the dynamics of grand strategy formulation, compensating for the influences of the domestic environment three historical case studies, the Dutch Republic, Britain and the United States, test the accuracy and validity of the model. This thesis finds that penods of strong leadership, void of threat, while augmented by exremal balancing best support a hegemon's relative decline. "Le Coucher du Soleil Impérial: Grandes Stratégies des Hegemons en Déclin Relatif" Cette thèse enquête les politiques economiques et militaires que les hegemons poursuivent pendant le déclin relatif. Selon les coûts augmentants de l'autorité associé avec l'hegemonie, la thèse établit que les environs systémiques et domestiques influence également la ligne de conduite de l'hegemon. De plus, la thèse soutent que les hegemons exercicent des projets stratégiques pendant le déclin, essayant d'ajuster leur engagements et ressources a l'environ. Lè succes ou l'insuccès relatif en maintenant le système international, et ainsi l'ajustement pour le déclin depénd du manière en le quel les chefs compensent deux variables prédominants: la menace des adversaires et la présence des allies. Cet étude offre un modèle théorique pour interpréter les dynamiques des formules des grandes stratégies, compensant por les influences de l'environ domestique. Trois études historiques, le république hollandais, la Grande- Bretagne et les États-unis mets à l'épreuve l'exactitude et la validité du modèle. La thèse trouve que les périodes de direction ferme, dénué de menace, et augmenter par l'équilibrage extérieur atténue le déclin relatif de l'hegemon. This MAthesis has been both a reward'ig and traumatic experience. Over the years of constant research, theoretid development, and more research, 1combed WtuaIly every Library between McGill University and the University of Arizona. My search for the answen to the riddles of relative decline eventually led me back to the teachings of my thesis advisor, Professor Mark Brawley. His lectures, advise and publication, Liberal Leadershi3 aiways kept my focus on the basics of hegemonic theory. Where Professor Brawley indulges in economic theory, 1 concentrate on the military contributions to hegemony. The combination of both views provide for a more robust mode1 and sounder fhdings. Thank-you Mark for your guidance. The U.S. Anny surprisingly makes a signincant contribution to the foiiowing research. My skiüs as a Miltary Intelligence Otticer directly correlate to my abilities as a student. I utilize the same analyticai tools and techniques for conducting intelligence preparation of the battlefield ([PB) that 1 use on studying British arategy in the 19th century. While my profession directly applies both analysis and conjecture to threat situations, 1 develop a new, more profound appreciation for the tireless work of the scholar. McGiil has made me a better intelligence officer while the Amy made me, 1 hope, a better scholar. 1 need to express my deepest appreciation to a plethora of individuals, so 1 will ümit the references. Thank-you to the McGill Department of Political Science, especially Ms. Susan Bartlett, Ms. Helen Wicka and Professor Mdedi, for supporthg this seemingiy endless odyssey caîled "Breton's thesis". Thanks to my forever supportive parents, sister, and &ends. Thanks to the lûth Mountain Division (Light Infantry) for aiways deploying me to the most remote locations and for forever finding new and exciting ways to manage my off-tirne. Finaily to my lovïng Me- always supportive and caring. 1 love you. PS. To Lieutenant-General Raoul Cedras, fomer dictator of Haiti, now in exile in Panama. Sir, thank-you for the wisdom for allowùig myself and the lûth Mountain Division to peacefuliy enter your island nation on 19 September 1994. Your decision pennitted us to accomplish a politically demanding mission with great speed, safety, and effectiveness. 1 found my the spent in your country both rewarding and educational. Your decision reduced the the 1 served in Haiti while preventing me £kom asking McGill University for another extension to my thesis. TABLE OF CONTENTS 1. Introduction 1) The International System and Its Maintenance 2) interests and the International System 3) Domestic Environment a) Liberal Regime Type b) Economic interests c) Public Support 4) International EnWonment a) Threat of a Challenger b) Availability of Allies 5) Maintaining the International System a) Economic Trade Policy b) Military Strategy c) Military Force Policy pppppppppp---------- d) Cornmitment Policy 6) Grand Strategies-Theoretical Model II. Dutch Repubtic, 1672-1720s 1) Statu of Hegemony 2) Environment a) Liberal Regime Type b) Prevailing Econornic and Political Lnterests 3) Grand Strategy a) Phase 1: 1672-1673 French hvasion of Dutch (Threat and No Mies) b) Phase II: 1673- 1678 War with France (Threat and Mies) c) Phase III: 1678-1688 Fragile Peace (No Threat and Allies) d) Phase IV: 1688- 1697 Glonous Revolution (Threat and Mies) e) Phase V: 1697- 1702 Partition Treaties (Threat and Allies) f) Phase VI: 1702- 17 13 War of Spanish Succession (Threat and Allies) g) Phase W:17 13- 1720s Post War Europe (No Threat and Allies) 4) Conclusion III. Great Britain 1889-1932 1) Status of Hegemony 2) Environment a) Liberal Regirne Type b) Prevailing Economic and Political Interests 3) Grand Strategy a) Phase 1: 1889- 1904 Splendid Isolation (Threat and No Nies) b) Phase II: 1904-1 9 14 Preparing for War (Threat and Allies) c) PhaselII: 1914-1918 World War I (Threat and Allies) d) Phase N: 19 19- 1932 Post War Peace (No Threat No Allies) 4) Conclusion W.United States 1971-Present 1) Phase 1 197 1 - 1989 Cold War (Threat and Allies) 2) Phase II 1990-Present Post Cold War (No Threat and Allies) V. Lessons Learned Smce the emergence of the modem nation-statel ,two states have Wen fiom the preeminent position of system leader, or hegemon, whüe a third2,the United States, is currently experiencing many of the same symptoms associated with decline. Histoncal patterns suggest that the current system leader wiu derthe same fate as that of the two prïor hegemons - the Dutch Republic and Britam. The leader wiU iikely experience a relative decline of its economic and military strength, increased cornpetition fiom rising powers and higher systern maintenance costs. The international system wiîl lose cohesion and order. An mcrease in müitary and poütical rivalries will result with the proliferation of bnishfire confiicts, disrupting htemational trade. Eventually, a major power wili challenge the leader's primacy, resulting in a major war and the subsequent closure of the international system. Scholarly interest in hegemonic decline has increased sigwfïcantly in the last twenty years with the U. S. 's relative decline. Numerous factors3 and theories4 have been advanced to account for the process, the most noteworthy bemg Hegemonic Stability Theory. Based on realist theory, Charles Kindieberger and Robert Gilpin, among others, suggea that a hegemon promotes order and cohesion through the implementation of an - -- 1 The Treaty of Westphalia (1648) is conunonly accepted as the benchmark for the emergence of the modem nation-state. ' For this thesis. 1 use three system leaders generally accepted by shidents of hegemonic cycles: the Dutch Republic, Britain and the United States. While Gilpin and Brawley