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1·
"Imperial Sunset: Grand Strategies ofHegemons in Relative Decline."
Steven Daniel Breton
Department ofPolitical Science "McGill University, Montreal"
August, 1996
A thesis submitted to the Faculty of Graduate Studies and Research in partial fulfillment ofthe requirements ofthe degree ofMasters ofArt in Political Science.
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Canad~ ABSTRACT
....Imperial Sunset: Grand Strategies ofHegemons in Relative Decline.'~
This thesis investigates the economic and military policies hegemons pursue while experiencing relative decline. Based upon the rising costs ofleadership associated with hegemony~ this thesis establishes that both systemic and domestic environments equally influence the hegemon's policy-making. Furthennore, the Paper contends that hegemons do practice strategic planning during relative decline~ in an effort to adjust its commitments and resources to the environment. Relative success or failure in maintaining the international system and thus adjusting for decline depends on how decision-makers compensate for two prevailing variables: threat ofchallengers and availability ofallies. This study offers a predictive theoretical model for interpreting the dynamics ofgrand strategy formulation, compensating for the influences ofthe domestic environment three historical case studies~ the Dutch Republic, Britain and the United States~ test the accuracy and validity ofthe model. This thesis finds that periods ofstrong leadership, void ofthrea~ while augmented by external balancing best support a hegemon's relative decline.
'''Le Coucher du Soleil Impérial: Grandes Stratégies des Hegemons en Déclin Relatif"
Cette thèse enquête les politiques economiques et militaires que les hegemons poursuivent pendant le déclin relatif Selon les coûts augmentants de l'autorité associé avec l'hegemonie, la thèse établit que les environs systèmiques et domestiques influence également la ligne de conduite de l'hegemon. De plus~ la thèse soutent que les hegemons exercicent des projets stratégiques pendant le décli~ essayant d'ajuster leur engagements et ressources a l'environ. Lè sucees ou l'insuccès relatifen maintenant le système intemational~ et ainsi l'ajustement pour le déclin depénd du manière en le quel les chefs compensent deux variables prédominants: la menace des adversaires et la présence des allies. Cet étude offie un modèle théorique pour interprèter les dynamiques des formules des grandes stratégies, compensant por les influences de l'environ domestique. Trois études historiques~ le république hollandais, la Grande Bretagne et les États-Unis mets à l'épreuve l'exactitude et la validité du modèle. La thèse trouve que les périodes de direction ferme~ dénué de menace., et augmenter par réquilibrage extérieur atténue le déclin relatifde l'hegemon.
( ACKNOWLEDGMENTS
This M.A thesis has been both a rewarding and traumatic experience. Over the years ofconstant research, theoretical developmen~ and more research, 1combed virtually every library between McGill University and the University ofArizona. My search for the answers to the riddles ofrelative decline eventually 100 me back ta the teachings ofmy thesis advisor, Professor Mark Brawley. His lectures, advise and publication, Liberal Leadership, a1ways kept my focus on the basics ofhegemonic theory. Where Professor Brawley indulges in economic theory, 1 concentrate on the military contributions to hegemony. The combination ofboth views provide for a more robust model and sounder findings. Thank-you Mark for your guidance.
The V.S. Army surprisingly makes a significant contribution to the foUowing research. My skills as a Military Intelligence Officer directly correlate to my abilities as a student. 1 utilize the same analytical tools and techniques for conducting intelligence preparation ofthe battlefield (lPB) that 1use on studying British strategy in the 19th century. While my profession directly applies both analysis and conjecture to threat situations, 1develop a new, more profound appreciation for the tireless work ofthe scholar. McGill has made me a better intelligence officer while the Army made me, 1 hope, a better scholar.
1need to express my deepest appreciation to a plethora ofindividuals, so 1 will limit the references. Thank-you to the McGill Department ofPolitical Science, especially Ms. Susan Bartlett, Ms. Helen Wilicka and Professor Manfredi, for supporting this seemingly endless odyssey called "Breton's thesis". Thanks to my forever supportive parents, sister, and friends. Thanks to the IOth Mountain Division (Light Infantry) for a1ways deploying me to the most remote locations and for forever finding new and exciting ways to manage my off-time. Finally to my loving vâfe - always supportive and caring. 1love you.
PS. To Lieutenant-General Raoul Cedras, fonner dictator ofHaiti, now in exile in Panama. Sir, thank-you for the wisdom for allowing myselfand the IOth Mountain Division to peacefully enter your island nation on 19 September 1994. Your decision permitted us to accomplish a politically demanding mission with great speed, safety, and effeetiveness. 1 round my time spent in your country both rewarding and educational. Your decision reduced the time 1 served in Haïti while preventing me from asking McGill University for another extension to my thesis.
( TABLE OF CONTENTS
l 1. Introduction
1) The International System and Its Maintenance 5
2) Interests and the International System 9
3) Domestic Environment 11
a) Liberal Regime Type 12
b) Economie Interests 14
c) Public Support 15
4) International Environment 15
a) Threat ofa Challenger 16
b) Availability ofAllies 17
5) Maintaining the International System 17
a) Economie Trade Policy 20
b) Military Strategy 20
c) Military Force Poliey 20
d) Commitment Poliey 21
6) Grand Strategies-Theoretical Model 21
II. Dutch Republic, 1672-17205 23
1) Status ofHegemony 23
2) Environment 26
a) Liberal Regime Type 26
26 c b) Prevailing Economie and Political Interests l 3) Grand Strategy 28 a) Phase 1: 1672-1673 French Invasion ofDutch (Threat and No Allies) 31
b) Phase II: 1673-1678 War with France (Threat and Allies) 33
c) Phase ID: 1678-1688 Fragile Peace (No Threat and Allies) 35
d) Phase IV: 1688-1697 Glorious Revolution (Threat and Allies) 37
e) Phase V: 1697-1702 Partition Treaties (Threat and Allies) 39
f) Phase VI: 1702-1713 War ofSpanish Succession (Threat and Allies) 41
g) Phase VII: 1713-1720s Post War Europe (No Threat and Allies) 45
4) Conclusion 47
m. Great Britain 1889-1932 52
1) Status ofHegemony 52
2) Environment 54
a) Liberal Regime Type 54
b) Prevailing Economie and Political Interests 55
3) Grand Strategy 55
a) Phase 1: 1889-1904 Splendid Isolation (Threat and No Allies) 57
b) Phase il: 1904-1914 Preparing for War ( (Threat and Allies) 62 c) Phase ID: 1914-1918 World War l l (Threat and Allies) 67
d) Phase IV: 1919-1932 Post War Peace (No Threat No Allies) 71
4) Conclusion 76
IV. United States 1971-Present 79
1) Phase 1 1971-1989 Cold War (Threat and Allies) 80
2) Phase fi 1990-Present Post Cold War (No Threat and Allies) 83
v. Lessons Leamed 86
\ ( i l c. Since the emergence ofthe modem nation-state , two states have faDen from the 2 preeminent position ofsystem leader, or hegemon, wbile a third , the United States, is
currently experiencing many ofthe same symptoms associated with deeline. Historical
patterns suggest that the curreot system leader will suifer the same fate as that ofthe two
prior hegemons - the Dutch Republic and Britain. The leader willlikely experience a
relative decline ofits economie and military strength, increased competition from rising
powers and higher system maintenance costs. The international system williose cohesion
and order. An inerease in military and politieal rivalries will result with the proliferation of
brushfire conOicts, disrupting international trade. Eventually, a major power will challenge
the leader's primaey, resulting in a major war and the subsequent closure ofthe
mternationalsystem.
Scholarly interest in hegemonic decline has inereased significantly in the last
twenty years with the U.S.'s relative decline. Numerous factors3 and theories4 have been
advanced to account for the process, the most noteworthy being Hegemonie Stability
Theory. Based on realist theory, Charles Kindleberger and Robert Gilpin, among others,
suggest that a hegemon promotes order and cohesion through the implementation ofan
l The Treaty ofWestphalia (1648) is commonly accepted as the benchmark for the emergence ofthe modem nation-state. 2 For this thesis, [ use three system leaders generally acœpted by students of hegemonic cycles: the Dutch Republic, Britain and the United States. While Gilpin and Brawley contend that either France or Britain was the system leader in the 18th century following the Dutch Republic, [ use neither for this study. 3 "include clusters in the genesis and application ofeconomic innovation and leading-sector product cycles, overspecialization, produetivity differentials. technological and capital di1Iusion, inflation, free trade policies. military rivatry. increased protection and leadership overhead costs, defense-investment tradeoffs. overextended commitments, increasing rates oftaxation, increasing public and private consumption demands. and the proliferation ofvested-interest groups." Thompson and Zuk, uWorld Power and the Strategie Trap ofTerritorial Commitments". p.249-S0. ( 4 i.e. Hegemonie Stability Theory (Kindleberger. Gilpin)~ Long Cycle Theory (Modelski. Thompson)~ Modern Systems (Wallerstein)~ Liberal Sul>systems (Brawley) international free(r)s trade system These conditions stimulate relative peace, stability, l and ~conomic growth. A hegemon's decline, according to the theory, initiates the
system's retum to global anarchy. Despite ils seemingly dominant role in the studyof
international relations, realist theory can not satisfactorily answer many issues dealing with
6 the dynamics ofthe decline process • The theory discounts the role ofdomestic factors
and its interaction with systemic factors for determining national policy. Realists lend
little, ifany, credibility to the role ofnational decision-makers and domestic constraints,
7 reducing their influence to merely rational cost!benefit calculations •
Recent publications, by Rosecrance, Stein and Brawley8 , introduce domestic level
analysis to the realist's traditional systemic level hypotheses. This multi-dimensional
approach recognizes the influencing factors in both the systemic and domestic
environments. The domestic level analysis captures the dynamics ofthe decision-making
process, accounting for the rational and sometimes "irrational" cost!benefit calculations.
The intent is not to attack realist theory. Instea~ this form ofanalysis builds upon the
findings ofrealist theory and addresses ils apparent shortcomings. Advocates ofthis
multi-dimensional approach believe it generates more reliable and predietable hypotheses
than any single approach.
, Free(r) trade refers to Stein's assertion that Cree trade can never be completely Cree Dut free(r) than its previous status. See Stein, ''The Hegemon's Dilemma". 6 Realist theory bas difliculty explaining a state's motivation and interests for specifie actions. For example, what is the leader's motivation for establishing an international system and for maintaining it during its relative decline? 7 Gilpin~ War and Change in World Politics, p.202. ,. Leadership, calculation. control over events - these are merely the illusions ofstatesmen and scholars." Il See Rosecrance and Taw. "Japan and the Theory ofInternational Leadership"; Rosecrance and Stein. ( The Domestic Bases ofOrand Strate~ Stein. ''The Hegemon's Dilemma"~ and Brawley. Liberal Leadership; among other publications.
2 In this tradition, 1 address one ofthose numerous factors advanced earlier to
account for the decline process: increased cost ofmaintaining the international system.
This hypothesis is derived ftom two basic contentions: 1. the hegemon is responsible for
the leadership and maintenance ofthe international system; 2. the hegemon continues to
9 maintain the system despite reduced benefits ofleadership and higher costs • It follows
that the system leader accelerates its OWD decline by 'ignoring" the cost!benefit
calculations. Diminishing retums are diverted from investment and/or consumption to
protecting the international arrangement and providing order. Observers conclude that the
system leader rails to develop a long-term strategy for balancing its commitments and
resources, and instead tends to "muddle through" its problems. The end-result is the
graduaI deterioration ofsystemic leadership and the increased likelihood ofsystem
lO ll closure and/or major war •
Upon further investigation, 1 find initial conclusions on the problems as50ciated
with system maintenance incomplete. While a realist interpretation reduces the equation
to costibenefits calculations, the addition ofdomestic level analysis expands the scope of
the problem. This multi-dimensional approach exposes the impact ofboth systemic and
domestic environments on the system leader's decision-making process. Policies that
seem ''irrational'' ftom a realist standpoint 500n gain credibility. From this perspective, the
9 Scholars often refer to this condition as "imperial overstretch". See Kennedy, Rise and Faii ofthe Great Powers. and Synder, Mvths ofEmpire. 10 Neither major war nor hegemonic decline neœssarily provokes systemic c1osure. The hegemon's decline makes it more difficult for the system leader to continue paying the priee ofasymmetrie openness. Closure cornes when the hegemon, which will no longer bear the burden, defects because other states refuse to redistribute the COSlS ofmaintaining the system. See Stein, "Hegemon's Dilemma". p.386. Il See Calleo, Bevond AmericaR Hegemony. Calleo believes the hegemon's failure to "devolute" itself from strategie responsibility during its relative decline is directly responsible for the deterioration ofthe ( system. [nstead, the hegemon must plan to transition the burden ofleadership evenly among other states ereating a more pluralistie system.
3 leader's apparent "ignorance" ofthe reduced benefits and increased costs cm be attnouted l to policy constraints or prevailing interests.
1contend, therefore, that system leader's policy making, while in relative decline,
results directly and equally from its systemic and domestie environments. The leader's
failure to develop a long-tenu plan may be explained by the state's need to adopt poüeies
in aeeordanee with its dominant interests and not necessarily for its self-preservation. Yet~
1believe the hegemon does praetiee strategie planning. This proeess oecurs when the
system leader adjusts its commitments and resources to the environment. Based on these
postulations, relative success or failure in maintaining the system and thus adjusting for
deeline depends on how decision-makers eompensate for two prevailing variables: threat
ofchallengers and the availability ofallies.
In this thesis, 1propose to answer the foUowing questions in support ofmy
preceding supposition: 1. Wbat is the international system and what is involved in
maintaining it?, 2. Why maintain the international syste~ partieularly during relative
decline?, 3. How does the leader maintain the system?, and 4. What course ofaction~ or
grand strategy, do 1 expect the hegemon to pursue given a specifie environment? In this
fourth section, 1present my predictive model for tracking the system leader's grand
strategy. 1test the model in the next ehapters using a eross-sectional historieal analysis of
three cases: the Duteh Republie (1672-1720s), Britain (1890s-1931) and the United States
(1971-present)12. The final chapter examines these findings and discusses the model's
12 While the cases themselves are generally agreed upon. the specifie dates ofhegemonic decline are not. 1try to compartmentalize the decline phase by using benchmark events. Noting Friedberg's use of ( calculative and perœptual assessment. 1 select key events or trends that contemporary scholars would have identified as significantly weak:ening the hegemon's long-term power. In agreement with Wallerstein and
4 usefuJness for partially explaining hegemonic decIine. 1do not intend to address ail l aspects ofdecIine or attempt to remedythe U.S.'s cunent dilemmas in this thesis.
Instead, 1hope to shed some Iight on this contemporary subjeet and provoke some
thought and discussion among the thesis' readers.
THE INTERNATIONAL SYSTEM AND ITS MAINTENANCE
A great power must possess three distinct characteristics to qualify itselfas a
l3 14 hegemon: power , interestlmotivation, and a system • A hegemon, as defined by
scholars, uses its superior economic and military capabilities and the motivation for free(r)
economic relations to facilitate the development ofan international trading syste~ based
on hoeral principles. It traditionally offers potential system members favorable, ifnot
asymmetrical trading terms in exchange for simply more open trade relations. The
hegemon promotes the unrestrieted flow ofgoods, services and capital between trading
partners as weB as the guarantee ofstate's rights, transactions and property. It a1so uses
ils military capabilities15 to ensure order among its trading partners, creating a relatively
safe and stable international environment conducive to open trade. These incentives16
Brawley, 1use the closure ofthe system as the end ofhegemony and not major war as employed by Gilpin and Modelski. 13 ln keeping this hypothesis as parsimonious as possible, 1base the hegemon's power primarily on its most competitive economy and its superior military. 1 use these two power bases. and their interaction, to partially explain the decline process and their subsequent grand strategy choices. Whenever possible. 1try to use quantifiable data to measure the state's strength. However, [frequently use qualitative information. based on historical perspectives. to measure power. particularly during the Dutch hegemony. 14 A system is defined as "a collection ofstates united by regular interaction according ta a fonn of control". See Gilpin. War and Change in World Politics. p.26 15 The hegemon a1so uses its military power to coerce states to open its markets and participate in the free trade system (i.e. Britain opening footholds in China in 19th century) 16 Scholars often refer ta these incentives as a public g~ favorable conditions for the benefit ofail ( participants and al no expense from another states' consumption. Brawley rejects this description in bis attempt to explain why some countries reject participation in the free trade system.
5 encourage certain states to forge trade relations with the hegemon thus evolving into an
international free trade system17 •
The hegemon, assuming leadership or control ofthe syst~ regulates interstate
trade and diplomacy through the establishment rules and regimes. Contro~ as introduced
by Gilpin, is based on the distnoution ofpower and the hierarchy ofprestige within the
system The hegemon writes the mies according to ils position ofleadership and
perceived authority. These mies normally create conditions18 favorable to the system
leader. The regimes, as characterized by treaties, alliances and trade agreements,
institutionalize the rules, significantly influencing the norms ofinternational behavior,
while reinforcing the hegemon's power base.
Despite its real and perceived power, the hegemon possesses only relative control
ofthe international system Realists recognize that states operate in anarchy. Relative
control implies that a system leader's govemance depends directly on its accumulation of
power and prestige. As an ascending power, the hegemon determines and enforces ruIes
with linle opposition. Among increasingly powerful states, a relatively declining hegemon
Jacks the same degree ofrelative contro~ and must depend on other means. This
transition ofcontrol plays a particularly significant role in the leader's system maintenance
during relative decline.
Maintaining the international system implies that the hegemon assumes the
financial costs and political obligations associated with facilitating free trade. Historically,
17 Brawleyaddresses the possibility oftwo grear powers sirnultaneously pursing hegemony. He theorizes that the establishment oftwo Iiberal sut>system~ based ofsimilar priociples, would form ioto one system with the superior power likely assuming the mantle ofleadership. C· 18 Conditions include the international division oflabor, trade arrangements, and the division ofterritory, particularly colonies, markets, and spheres ofinfluence.
6 the system leader employs its power to opening new markets, protecting the system from l extemal threats19 and pacifYing intemal contliets. The hegemon seeks to minimize any
disturbances while expanding the scope and participation ofthe free(r) trade system. In
the process, the hegemon amasses a global network ofcommitments that serves to proteet
its intemational interests. This collection ofoverseas obligations, consisting of
naval/military bases, colonies, foreign markets and alliances, result from the leader's
projection ofpower into areas determined strategically important by domestic policy
makers. These global commitments20 contnoute to the leader's military and/or economic
presence in various regions, and therefore augment the hegemon's relative control
throughout the international system.
Over lime, the sustainment costs associated with these obligations and the system
eventuaIly outweigh the benefits derived from the commitments themselves. Rising
military threats, domestic unrest in colonies, and lengthy military campaigns cause the
hegemon to increase its militaIy/naval presence in specific regions. This greater vigilance
significantly raises the costs ofmaintaining these obligations and the system As costs rise,
the benefits derived from the system gradually recede. Rising economic powers reduce
the leader's relatively large share ofglobal trade through increased competition. The
accumulation ofcapital by these economic competitors also causes the hegemon's rate of
19 The system leader is expected to defend the system against political challengers, with the help of its allies/system members. The hegemon is also expected to guarantee the "freedom ofthe seas" with its superior global reach capability. See Modelski. ( 20 See Thompson and Zuk, ··World Power and the Strategie Trap ofTerritorial Commitments"
7 21 retum on financial investment to ran • The system leader is inevitably faced with the l rising cost ofleadersbip and diminisbing economic returns~ indicative ofrelative decline22 .
Despite these changes in the cost!benefit calculations~ the hegemon historieally
does not abandon its responsibility for maintaining the international system. Instead, the
state attempts to ba1mce the rising costs with its faDing retums. Its limited funds are
slowly diverted from investment and consomption towards defense spending, thereby
reducing future retums based on decreasing investment. This apparent reprioritization of
spending creates a vicious circle, committing the economy to slower growth. Military
planners, on the other han~ face the challenge of protecting a far-flung network of
strategie eommitments while simultaneously checking growing regional and systemic
threats. These global commitments~ originally amassed when they proved more cost-
23 effective, now significantly stretch the military's limited resources • As a result, the state
eventually overextends itseJt: thereby undermining its military strength and making it
systemic interests vulnerable to attack. Scholars refer to this overextension ofa leader's
power, based on its commitments, as '1mperial overstretch,,24.
21 See Brawley, Liberal Leadership. p.17. 22 Relative decline begins when other states accumulate power. Power, also defined as technological. economic and military advantages, is diffused though trade, foreign investment, alliances and other forms ofinteraction. Emigration ofskilled workers can also account for transfers ofmanagement techniques. innovation. etc. These advantages, which once propeUed the hegemon ahead of its rivais, are eventually diffused throughout the system, allowing other states to benefit and thereby increase its share ofpower. most often al the expense ofthe system leader. 23 Hegemons demonstrate varied success in using allies to extemally balance its military commitment costs. While a hegemon will certainly attract allies for the defense ofthe system against political challengers, it traditionally experiences difficulty rallying support for maintaining the system when allies can easily free-ride on the public good provided by the hegemon. The hegemon, al this point. likely does not possess the relative control necessary to coerce states to aet against its oost interest (i.e. free-ride). ( 24 Kennedy, Rise and FaU, p.514 Kennedy describes imperial overstretch as the total sum ofthe hegemon's global interests and obligations exceeding the state's power to defend themall simultaneously.
8 While not the sole reason for relative decline, system maintenance c1early
contnbutes to the process. The hegemo~ reluctant to abandon its international
obligations, virtuaIly assures its own demise by straining its economy and overextending
its mïIitary. As the hegemon declines and other states rïse, the system experiences a
change in the d.Ïstnoution ofpower. The system leader now inereasingly depends 00 ils
perceived power, or prestige, to maintain its degree ofrelative controL Although the
relatively declining leader may accommodate some ofthese rising powers, the mies and
regimes generaUy remain unchanged, reflecting the hegemoo's continued leadership. The
system leader, seemingly trapped by its systemic responSioilities, continues to maintain the
international system as it gradually approaches closure and/or major wac.
INTERESTS AND THE INTERNATIONAL SYSTEM
Systemic and domestic-Ievel analysis diverge significantly when explaining the
hegemon's rationale for maintaining the international system Realists theorists
concentrate on regime formation as weil as change, but negleet how the regime is
2S established, maintained and abandooed • Although realist theory descnoes the
hegemoo's interest in boeral trade and ils ability to create a free(r) trade syst~ il fails ta
explain the process involved. Similarly, realist theory can oot explain the dYDamics
involved in maintaÎning the international system Gilpin, for example, recognizes the
growing disjuneture between commitments and capabilities during relative decline. WhiIe
he descnbes the causes for change in the distnoution ofpower, Gilpin can neither explain
the process oor the hegemon's motivation for maintaining the international free-trade ( 23 See Stei~ 1"he Hegemon's Dilemma", p.357
9 ( system and its corresponding commitments during its relative decline. This explanation of a state's motivation requires both systemic and domestiealevel analysis that identifies the
environment, actors and/or groups involved in causing the process to occur.
The system leader, according to Brawley, desires free(r) economic relations sa
strongly that it is wiIling to bear the high costs ofcreating and then maintaining a boeral
26 international system • Inherent to this motivation is the state's commitment to the
maximization ofits absolute returns. Rather than proteet its own markets and maximize
relative retums, the hegemon bears the cost ofmarket openness, despite other states'
tariffs, in hopes ofattracting foUowers to open their markets. While the subsequent
creation ofthe free(r) trade system proves profitable to the hegemon's economic interests,
the same free(r) trade system proves equally profitable to economic competitors. The
system leader tends to experience absolute growth while ils competitors, also achieving
absolute growth, undercut its relative position. The leader's adopted policies actually
insure the state's relative economic decline and eventual decline from hegemony.
Instead ofabandoning the system during its decline, the system leader maintains
openness and continues to bear the costs. Realists could argue that maintaining an
international syste~ or public good, while experiencing relative decline is ~'irrational",
based on costibenefit calculations. Yet, domestic-level analysis interprets this willingness
to continue maintaining the international system inspite ofhigher leadership costs and
reduced benefits as the result ofits motivation. Motivation is a product ofthe system
leader's environment and interests. The hegemon, therefore, does not necessarily ~1gnore
the cost!benefit calculation". Rather, the system leader's apparent failure to develop a ( 26 See Brawley, Liberal Leadership. p.6
10 strategy for preventing decline results from its needs to adopt policies in accordance with l its dominant interests and not necessarily its self..preselVation. Unlike realist theory,
domestic-level analysis portrays the disequiIbrium ofrelative decline as the disjuneture of
capabilities and motivation.
Despite the difference in eras, system leaders in relative decline generally
experience similar disjuncture, contnouting to the conditions from wbich policies, or
strategy, are formulated. While the hegemon's capabilities evolve empirically through
ascent and decline, the state's interests traditionally resist change. The leader's economic
and political interests are fuIly entrenched in the state's hegemony. Since change in real or
perceived power could jeopardize their continued success, these now mature interests
promote a continuation ofthe status quo, at almost any cost. These interests tend to
constrain any policies attempting to downsize the state's hegemonic role, regardless of
relatively declining capabilities. These factors contnoute to a constraining environment,
limiting the hegemon's options for managing imperial overstretch.
DOMESnC ENVIRONMENT
Realist theorists have traditionally discounted the role ofthe domestic
environment, reducing the organizational and political complications ofgovemment to the
27 simplification ofa single actor • In the process, realists reduce the effectiveness oftheir
theory. Realist theory proves useful for explaining outcomes, particularly national security
issues, where shared domestic opinions lead to consensus for action. Realist theory,
however, lacks detail. While realist theory can predict an action and reaction, it fails to
27 See Allison and Halperin, ''Bureaucratie Politics", p.42
11 provide details on the implementation ofthose decisions, particularly in a dem.ocratic l regime where organizational and domestic Înterests may düfer.
Domestic-Ievel analysis doesn't recognize a single policy maker, but the
conglomeration oflarge organizations and political aetors who düfer on the government's
role on any particular issue and who compete in influencing the govemmental decisions
28 and actions • Recent scholars contend that bureaucratic poIitics play a greater role in
national security issues thao realist theories cao explain. Coalition-building and logrolling
historica1ly dominate foreign policy discussion and implementation, dispeUing the notion of
a single actor. The foDowing subsections outline these conditions ofthe domestic
environment.
Liberal Regime Type
The hegemon's huerai regime provides the medium for the state's domestic
29 constraints. This representative (republican ) govemment typically pursues policies thal
30 are largely consistent with the Median preferences ofits vested interests • Its decision-
makers are particularly sensitive to the state's politic~ economic and societal culture in
their effort to maintain the nation's continued eleetoral support. The significant influence
possessed by these interests with the govemment effectively constrains the state's
decision-making process. As a result, the government pursues conciliatory policies
resulting from its need to satisfy ils diverse domestic supporters. The mature hegemon
28 IbicL p.42 29 Webster's Dictionary defines a republic as" a state or nation in which the supreme power rests in ail the citizens entitled to vote (the electorate) and is e"ercised by representatives elected, directlyor indirectly, by them and responsible to them." The definition ofa republic becomes imponant when discussing the Dutch Republic. Although not directly responsible to the public, the Estates-General and the Stadholder provide the essential political institutions which represent the median preferences ofthe ( state's vested interests. 30 See Papayoanou, "Interdependence, Institutions, and the Balance ofPower", p.47
12 demonstrates a significant weakness for effectuating objective strategy despite the rising l costs and reduced benefits associated with relative deeline.
Always evident in the state's decision-making process, bureaucratic politics play an
increasingly important role in the creation and implementation ofnational security poliey
during relative deeline. Interest groups fight for the hegemon's now limited resources in
an effort to implement poliey advantageous to its eontinued success. These vested
interests are promoted by various players, each with their specifie conception, or
31 motivation~ for national security, organizational, domestic and personal issues . These
players 'l>ull and haul" among themselves in their attempt to convince the decision-makers
oftheir position's value to the state and to the govemment's longevity. Players with
similar preferences often consolidate their efforts and influence on the govemment through
collective behavior with the creation ofcoalitions or cartelized blocs. Furthermore,
players can manipulate the regime's politicaJ leaders and other domestic players through
propaganda and/or disinformation campaigns, appeals to nationalism and the propagation
of"myths ofempire,,32. These efforts to advance particular interests under the guise of
national security often jeopardize the hegemon's primaey, provoking questionable
spending or commitments in support ofthe players' selt:preservation.
31 Players consist numerous individuals or groups~ to include: senior politicians, bureaucrats~ colonial govemors, military leaders~ business leaders, unions, political action groups, voters, and anyone with a specific desire to influence the decision-making process to retlect its preferences. See Allison and Halperin, "Bureaucratie Politics", p.4J. ( 32 See Synder, Myths ofEmpire. Synder discusses the interaction ofdomestic-Ievel actors in the national security decision-making process and its role in the "imperial overstretch" ofthose states.
lJ Economic Interests
The system leader derives its motivation for free(r) trade from its economic
interests. During its primacy, the hegemon's economy consists ofsuperior industries,
manufaeturing, technology, and capital-abondant financial services. The output ofthese
seetors surpass the domestic market's capacity to absorb the economy's production and
services. These sectors seek government support to establish trading agreements with
foreign states, alIowing the export ofits abondant supply. The subsequent establishment
ofthe international free(r) trade system offers the hegemon's economy seemingly endless
foreign markets for export and investment. The system leader saon becomes increasingly
dependent on world trade. Its manufacturing and financial services rely almost exclusively
on the international trade system.
Increasing foreign competition and the evolution ofthe hegemon's economy, in
relative decline, produce two diverging opinions regarding economic policy. Non
competitive manufacturing and industrial seetors, suffering from declines in world trade
seek govemment protection against foreign imports. These nationalists favor tariffs in an
effort to stimulate domestic growth. The hegemon's financial and other competitive
seetors oppose protectionism as detrimental to its high rates ofreturn on foreign
investment and trade. The state's steady export ofcapital, through investments and loans,
transforms the hegemon's strengilis from manufacturing to financial services. The high
retums from international services, or "invisibles", represent the economies most
profitable seetor. Intemationalists endorse free(r) trade as heneficial to its competitive
exports. In addition, states receiving loans depend on the hegemon's home markets to (
14 absorb its exports, aIIowing these states to compensate the originalloan or investment. l Policy-makers traditionally support the intemationalist and their competitive sectors, in
maintaining free(r) trade.
Public Support
Public support is essential for the implementation ofany national security policy in
a hoeral regime. The public's role in the decision-making process evolves substantially,
through the history ofthe modem nation-state, making the govemment ever dependent on
its support. Universal suffiage, nationalism, and mass participation all contnoute to the
democratization ofthe process. While the three modem hegemons ail experience varying
degrees ofpolitical participation, each state historically exercises extensive public
represenlation in comparison to ilS contemporaries.
The system leader's populace, during relative decline, historically suffers from
h"beral complacency. The state's rates ofpublic and private consomption typica1ly escalate
as the hegemon's society matures. Public interests groups demand government-sponsored
social programs, often at the expense ofmilitary spending. They oppose tax increases and
excessive govemment speoding that jeopardizes the current standard ofliving. Public
sentiment also endorses systemic peace. Government officiais actively elicit public
approval prior to major foreign commitments.
INTERNATIONAL ENVIRONMENT
The international environment also influences the hegemon's decision-making
process. The system leader's dependence 00 international trade refleets the exposure of
its economic survivability to foreign states. The leader derives its strength from trade with (
15 these system members. This dependence on foreign trade subsequently reduces the l 3 government's control over its economic, and even, military sovereigntY . Foreign states
exercise growing influence as the international trade system matures and the hegemon
declines.
Participants in the international free(r) trade maintain a vested interest in the
hegemon's continuing leadership. These states derive a public good from the systemic
leader - free(r) trade and systemic security. System members free-ride on the protection
and economic benefits provided by the hegemon. Proposed reductions ta systemic
maintenance, therefore, jeopardize the system's public good. Costs associated with
regional security would be redistnouted ta member states. While some stronger members
favor the re-allocation ofsystemic responsibilities, others states seek ta pressure the
hegemon to continue its systemic leadership.
The following sub-sections briefly outline two additional influences that
significantly impact the hegemon's decision-making process.
Threat (ofa Challenger)
International system characteristically experiences systemic threat during the
hegemon's relative decline. Rising expansionist powers seek to augment economic and
politîcal power at the system leader's expense. These challengers attempt ta redistnoute
systemic benefits, or spoils, which reflect the leader's former primacy. According to
Brawley, political challengers can not be accommodated within the current international
system. Conflict between the hegemon and challenger develops into major war, based on
the threat the challenger poses to both the system leadership and the system The ( 33 See Rosecrance, Rise ofthe Trading State, Ch.2.
16 hegemon reacts to threat by mobiJizing its internai means and external support. Systemic
threat stimulates the hegemon's domestic environment, forcing decision..makers to solidify
domestic support for a new course ofaction. Challenge also raises eosts ofsystemie
maintenance, aggravating the effeets ofrelative decline.
Availability ofAllies
Allies extemally augment the hegemon's systemic leadership. External support
potentially serves to reduce costs assoeiated with maintaining the system, to include
deterring systemic threat. As the leader experiences relative decline, decision..makers
increasingly seek means for reducing the rising eosts. Systemie disequilibium between the
leader's commitments and capabilities forces the hegemon to adopt either internai or
external measures for reducing the gap. internai mobilization, during decline, traditionally
proves too eostly, as determined by the domestie environment. In most cases, external
support is more politieally viable. Allianee responsibilities encompass multiple tasks, to
include regional security, threat deterrenee, and wartime partnerships.
MAINTAINING THE INTERNATIONAL SYSTEM
As addressed earlier, 1contend that hegemons in relative deeline do practiee
strategie planning, in an attempt to preserve ils diminishing power and manage the
international system. Instead of"muddling through" deeline, the system leader adjusts its
eommitments and resourees to the environment, suggesting the formulation ofa grand
strategy. The following section outlines the principles and operationalizations ofgrand
strategy incorporated in this theoretical model. (
17 ! Grand strategy is defined as the state's effort to employ national means for the 1 \ \., attainment ofits long-term objectives in a specific environment that imposes constraints
34 and threats • While not the "single, coherent national strategy" suggested by realists, a
grand strategy descn"bes an ongoing process requiring various agencies and ÎDterests to
make continuaI assessments ofthe environment and to attempt to rationalize a course of
action based on their motives and goals. This diversified decision-making process
provides a powerful obstacle to the implementation ofany single, comprehensive grand
strategylS. Relative success or failure in the pursuit oflong-term objectives results from
the state's ability to meet its means with its ends.
The hegemon's long-term objectives, or end, are Iargely a product ofthe domestic
and international environments, the system leader's precarious position and the democratic
process. Decision makers and interests fonnulate objectives based on their particular
assessment ofthe environment and their unique position in that environment. While each
decision-maker may possess diverse short-term goals, each actor is likely to sbare similar
long-term objectives based on the vested interest each shares for the continued success of
the state's hegemony. These dominant actors and interests use the democratic process36
to legitimize its long-term objectives and to implement them as the state's desired end.
In a historical context, a system leader in relative decline generally pursues the
status quo as its end. The state seeks to preserve the prestige, economic privileges and
34 See Kennedy9 Grand Strategies in War and Peaœ. Kaufman et al.~ V.S. National Security Strategy, and Liddell-~Strategy. 3~ See Lu~ Strategy. p.233 and Friedberg. The Weary Titan, for debate on the difficuJties of formulating strategy in democratie states. Also see Friedberg for a discussion ofthe etJects ofassessment c and adaptation on Britain'5 response ta relative decline. 36 Ta include bureaucratie polities
18 systemic peaee associated with hegemony. These benefits provide the state's ruling
interests with a sense ofsecu.rity37 ~ conducive to continued growth. While changes in
relative powerjeopardize these conditions, the state seeks to protee! its interests by
continuing to provide leadership and system maintenance. The hegemon typically
perceives the downsizing ofresponsibilities as a loss ofits privileges and a benefit to its
competitors.
The mean~ for achieving this end, consist ofall the state's available resources.
These resources include such tangibles as economic competitiveness, wealth and force
projection capability and such intangibles as poIiticaI motivatio~ social participation and
prestige. Decision-makers project the state's power, through its economic, military, and
diplomatic policies. The compilation ofthese policies, or grand strategy, reflects the
state's collective effort to achieve its objective through the direct application ofits means.
The crux ofgrand strategy lies in pOlieY8. For the purposes ofthis study, 1
39 narrow the policy considerations ofthe four MOst critical policy components to a system
leader. These policy areas represent the hegemon's primary means for addressing the
rising costs and decreasing benefits associated with systemic maintenance. The following
sub-section provides a briefoperationaIization ofthese policy areas:
3": See Pose~ p.232. ~rand strategy is a political-military means-ends c~ a state'5 theory about how it can best "cause" security for itself" 31 Kennedy, p.S 39 The purpose ofthis paper is address the issues associated with systemic leadership and systemic ( maintenance. [select these specifie policy area to best reflect the interaction œtween systemie and domestic environments in reference to its systemie responsibilities.
19 Economie Trade Policy l A system leader's economic trade policy typicaUy endorses free(r) trade.
Relatively low domestic tariffs and the facilitation ofinternational trade ref1ect this
commitment. In cases ofthreat or major war, hegemons are prone to restriet trade. Trade
restrictions, although temporary, focus on depriving the threat additional advantages from
free(r) trade.
Milituy Strategy
The hegemon traditionally adopts the least expensive strategie posture, without
jeopardizing its commitments. In the absence ofsystemic threat., decision-makers employ
the least costly defense posture. A deterrence policy, while more financially demanding,
addresses a specifie threat to the system. The hegemon historically increases military
spending and global force readiness in an attempt to prevent potential aggression. When
deterrence fails, the system leader resorts to an wartime attrition strategy. 1bis posture
exemplifies the most expensive strategy for a hegemon to pursue while experiencing
decline. The system leader seeks to weaken the threat through the application ofits
national means and external support derived from allies.
Military Force Policy
Military force refers to the size ofthe hegemon's armed forces. Military
expenditures represent only one indicator. The following case studies focus on political or
economic trends associated with changes in military SÎze. Arms limitation agreements and
arms races both reflect state re-assessments ofmilitaty SÎZe. Threat and systemic peace
lypically provoke decision-makers to change military force (size) policy. (
20 Commitment Policy l A hegemon's commitments reflect its global political and economic mterests.
Colonies, military bases, and empires an account for the system leader's territorial
ÏDterests. Foreign markets and overseas access to raw materials represent economic
considerations. Political and military commitments include alliances, treaties, and the
protection ofareas, cities, or waterways deemed essential to the leader's security.
GRAND STRATEGIES - THEORETICAL MODEL
AIl students ofbegemony propose recommendations for "fixing" relative decline.
Robert Gilpin suggests several such courses ofaction to include, preventive war, unilateral
abandonment, and retrenchment. David CaUeo, on the other hand, advocates sttategic
pluralism - the encouragement ofmulti-polarity and regional responsibility. While aU
potentially valid, not an courses ofaction satisfy the domestic constraints imposed to the
declining leader by its environment. The following historical cases demonstrate the
decision-makers critical reliance on domestic support for formulating and employing its
grand strategy.
The theoretical model presented below offers the reader a parsimonious
interpretation ofthose grand strategies pursued by system le~ders in relative decline. As
mentioned above, the international environment (THREAT & ALLIES) stimulates the
hegemon, through significant change to its security and/or status quo, causing it to adjust
its policies, or grand sttategy. Strategy, therefore, is a product ofthe interaction between
the international and domestic environments. Table 1 depiets the relationship proposed:
21 l Table 1: Causal RelatiollSbip ladepe""eatV.....bIe C••tralaiDc Factors Depe"'eat Vari.ble • Tlueat .rChalleacer • l:aYiroœneat • Gra'" S....teeles ia - (Domesdc) - ".d. DecIIae • AvaU.bUlty.rAllIes
The resu1ting polices (MODEL), advocated by the decision-makers, refleet the interests of
its domestic environment. This emphasis on domestic variables, in relation to systemic
variables, produces a more accurate, detailed understanding ofhegemonic policies. The
resu1ting theoretical model provides a predictive tool for studying future US policy. The
following case studies test the reliability and validity ofthe proposed model
Table 2: Grand Strategies iD Relative Decline: Theoretical Model
Tbreat ofa CbaUenger Yes No
(War) • Free(r) Trade SEEBELOW Yes • Defense Str.telY • Reduce Milita..,. Sbe (peace) SEEBELOW • M.iatain C.nunitmeaCs AvaUability of Allies • Free(r) Trade • Free(r) Trade • Deterreace S...atee,y • Defense StratelY No • Inaease Millta..,. Sbe • Mutain Military Sbe • Maiatala/lacre.e CcammitmeaCs • Muataia C.mmitmenls
(War) (peace)
Threat • Res1ric:t Trade • FreeTrade and • AttridoD StratelY • Deterrence StratetY Allies • laerease Millta..,. Sbe • laereue Military Sbe • laerease CommitmenCs • Malnt.ialIDcre.e Conunitmeals
22 OUTeR REPUBue, 1672-17205 l Arguably the earliest ofthe modem hegemon~the Dutch Republic emerges from
the early 17th century to establish an international trading system never before seen in
world history. Its primacy in trade, industry and finance as weB as its powerful tleet
enables this small nation to acquire power and prestige far beyond that in proportion to its
size, population and resources. Based on these advantage~ the Dutch are able to
dominate commerce in virtually every region ofthe world during the 17th century.
STATUS OF HEGEMONY
The Dutch Republic qualifies for hegemony based on its superior economic and
military power, its international system and its motivation for free(r) trade. The
foundation ofits power rests in the world oftrade, industry and finance. The Dutch
leverage their natural and technological naval advantages to dominant bulk shipping,
l particularlythat ofwestem and northem Europe . The flow ofthese goods through the
Republic facilitates its development as the worId's MOst important trade entrepot. The
state's access to unlimited raw materlals and foreign consumer markets also stimulate its
industries and increase exports, leading to Dutch industrial and commercial primacy2 •
Productive efficiency and technical superiority make Dutch produets the most competitive
and sought-after in foreign markets. These advantages directly contnbute to the state's
dominance in finance, investment, and other ''invisibles''. The establishment ofthe Bank
ofAmsterdam, the city's sound financial organization and practices, and most importantly,
1 It is the control ofthe Ballie trade that provides the Dutch entrepreneurs with their most important market. Dutch 5hips carried about 600/0 ofthe total Baltic trade through the 16605. Wallerstein. Modem ( World System II . 2 Ibid. p.42.
23 its access to "cheap" and abundant capital makes Amsterdam the uodisputed financial l center ofEurope and the heart ofinternational trade.
The Dutch Repubüc derives its military might and its political prestige primarily
from ils superior navy. Despite its size, the Dutch maintain major power status from 1610
3 until 1713 • Its navy, possessing superior m~ sbips and leadership than those ofother
states, refleets approximately 50% ofthe world's relative share ofnaval capabilities 1610-
4 1650, and 35% 1650-1670 • This naval strength is further augmented by the Republic's
immense shipping capacity -- by 1670, the Dutch own more tonnage than that ofEngland, s France, Portugal, Spain and the German states combined . The Dutch army significantly
contn"butes to Dutch power and prestige, particularly during wartïme. Despite its small
peacetime size (45,000), the Republic retains the financial capacity to expand the land
forces to over 100,000. Only Russia and France cao field larger armies in the 1670s.
The Dutch use their economic and military advantages to establish an international
free(r) system6 to the benefit ofits economic interests. Dutch shipping permeates virtually
every region ofthe world, thereby exposing countless markets to international trade. This
access to foreign markets and goods, provided by the Dutch entrepot, as weU as its
~l'eady" capital7 and lower tariffs provide strong incentives for state participation in the
Dutch-Ied international system The Dutch military both promotes and proteets this trade
3 Brawley~ Liberal Leadership. p.31. 4 Modelski and Thompson.. Seapower in Global Politics, p.194. 5 Wallerstein, p.46. 6 Despite not possessing the military power~ or relative control~ to subject France and England to its leadership, the Dutch did establish an international free trade system based on liberal trading principles. This inability simply means that their leadership was not totally sucœssful. Brawley, p.38. 7 "Ready'~ capital refers to the Dutch merchants traditional access to capital for purchasing goods in ( foreign markets (i.e. Spanish silver~ Dutch bank notes). Ready capital is a benetit ofthe Bank of Amsterdam.. its sound banking practiœs and "cheap" capital.. prime for investment.
24 system to the advantage ofits members. Force and persuasion successfully Iower trade l barriers ofreluetant states whüe a strong naval presence achieves to open threatened trade
8 routes and prevent regional confliet from disrupting vital commerce • This Dutch
commitment to free(r) trade resuhs in the creation ofintemational mies and regimes
advocating the systemic right to "open seas" for the purpose oftrade and the principle of
''free ship, free goods" aIlowing neutraI states to trade, without impediment, with
belligerent states. Systemic participants readily accept these mies because ofDutch
willingness to enforce them and their equal appücation to aIl trading states.
Systemic maintenance and expansion ofthe Dutch commercial network results in
an extensive trading empire stretching from the Americas to the East Indies. The East
Iodia Company (VOC), estabüshed by Rolland and Zealand merchants, successfully
exploits much ofthe region to include Ceylon and the Indian coast, giving the Dutch
merchants a virtual monopoly on spices and the "rich" oriental trades. Fortified
strongpoints and garrisons on the islands and coast soHdifY Dutch regional primacy. The
West India Company (WIC), representing a mixture oftrade and reügion, conducts itself
as a missionaty-colonizing corporation10. The WIC estabüshes colonies and profitable
trading posts throughout the Americas and the west coast ofAftica, to include New
Amsterdam, Curacao and Guinea. Both trading companies maintain armies and navies
which augment Dutch relative control and prestige around the globe.
Il Brawley, p.39-40. 9 Dutch trading praetices in Asia and the Americas do not always conform to the liberal trading principles advocated in European trade. Rosecrance abjects to Dutch liberal hegemony based on these colonial practices. Brawley and Israel contend that Dutch hegemony is based primarily on their European trade networks and practices. Based on these observations, 1minimize the role ofthe VOC and wrc and ( concentrate on European markets and politics. more significant and applicable to Dutch grand strategy. 10 Wallerstein, p.sO.
2S ENVIRONMENT
The Dutch Republic derives its motivation for free(r) trade and hegemony from its
domestic environment. The state's republican style govemment and its prevailing
economic and political interests provide the motivation necessary to establish and maintain
an international free(r) trade system using the state's economic and military advantages.
Liberal Regime Type
The Dutch Republic functions as a significantly decentralized govemment, thereby
maximizing extensive political participation from varying classes and interests. The
Republic lacks a constitution as weB as executive and central institutions. Instead, each
province retains equal representation in the inter-provincial assembly, the States-General.
The Grand Pensionary, the leading member from Rolland, presides over tbis assembly and
subsequently assumes the responsibilities ofprime mînister. AIl major policies enacted by
the States-General requite unanimous provincial approval. In most cases, assembly
delegates must defer the decision to the provinces' multiple representative bodies, thus
extending the decision-making process to the widest audience. This govemmental
decentralization extends to most ofthe state's functions, to include the navy. Five
separate admiralties, representing the seaward provinces, administer naval affairs for the
entire Republic.
Prevailing Economic and Political Interests
The city ofAmsterdam and its merchant class significantly influence state policies
throughout Dutch hegemony. Their ability to influence the budget gives the city and the
11 province ofRolland real strength in the States-General • The center ofinternational ( 11 Brawley. p.28
26 finance and trade, Amsterdam contnbutes halfofHoDand's nearly 60% portion ofthe l state budget. The merchant class, or regents, employ their intluence in the representative
institutions to managing the state in the interest offinancial stability and the advancement
oftrade, shipping, and industry. Regent influence causes the Republic to maintain fiscal
responSlbility over govemment spending - taxation to cover expenditures, low interest
rates, and low debt repayment. The merchant class resists bigh costs associated with
maintaining a large army but readily finances a large navy to protect trading interests.
Regents seek those international conditions conducive to commerce which include free
trade, political neutrality and systemic peace. This style ofpolitical intervention and
business efficiency creates conditions favorable for cootinued economic growth ofthe
Republic's MOst successful business sectors.
The stadholder also provides significant influence to Dutch politics during this
period. This military-politicalleader, inheritable to the Princes ofOrange, assumes the
posts ofadmiral-general and captain-general when appointed by each province during
wartime. The stadholder provides a unifYing force for the provinces and at times, a
political alternative to regent leadership. Stadholder supporters, or Orangists, generally
consist ofnobility, religious communities, and those disenfèancbised by regent (or
republican) govemment. The stadholder often represents the nationalist position, by
endorsing a large standing army, conducting balance ofpower diplomacy, and defending
the weaker economic sectors against regent trading policies. The stadholder retains bis
greatest authority in wartïme, rather than peace.
(
27 Despite the lack ofuniversal suffiage, the Dutch public maintains a significant role l in Dutch policy-making. Public opinion could not be ignored in the Dutch Republic. The
populations ofthe towns ofRolland were probably the MOst Iiterate and best informed on
both Dutch and international matters in Europe12 • The public possesses varying degrees
ofpolitical participation and representation, in each province. While usually supporting
regent policies oflow taxation and sustained systemic peace, the public typically endorses
the stadholder in times ofcrisîs.
GRAND STRATEGY
Dutch grand strategy clearly reflects the state's dominant economic interests. As
an extension ofDutch commercial policy, this strategy seeks to promote those conditions
necessary to exploit Dutch economic strength. Decision-makers recognize the fragility of
international trade and the disrupting effects ofcont1.iet on its entrepot economy.
Furthermore, the domestic market's inability to absorb the Republic's manufacturing
output requires the govemment to locate and secure markets for export. As a result, the
Dutch Republic promotes the principles of'mare h"berum' and free(r) trade throughout
Europe. The state seeks to avoid offensive alliances and conflicts which risk enemy
interference with shipping orjeopardize access to foreign markets. By the mid 1600s, war
could no longer offer the Republic any real advantages which it did not already possess13 •
The Dutch Republic has few security issues that are not directly associated with its
economy. Bordered by weak states and traversed by numerous water obstacles, the Dutch
Republic (prior to (672) maintains a small army but a substantial navy to guarantee ilS
( 12 Ha1ey~ Dutch in 17th Century, p.72 13 Ha1ey~ p. 177.
28 security. The Dutch navy~ among the MOst powerful in the 17th century, serves the state
in numerous capacities to include proteeting the Repubüc from invasion~ providing
security for its merchant convoys and fishing fteets, guaranteeing access through the
Sounds to the Baltics~ and any other responsibilities associated with the free movement of
its seabome trade. Unlike other European nations~ the Republic does not employ its
military to create vast land empires or territorial expansion in Europe. Decision-makers~
acting for the merchant oligarchies, use its force to establisb footholds in economically
significant areas and while reaping benefits for the state's business interests.
A chiefconcem for Dutch decision-makers is the Southem Netherlands. The
Dutch Republic enjoys significant economic privileges in this Spanish govemed area.
Under the provisions ofthe 1648 Scheldt Restrictions, Spain agrees to close the river
preventing Antwerp from becoming a port rival to Amsterdam. Additional restriction on
regional production alIows the Dutch to dominate this lucrative market with its expol1s.
This region also provides a vital buffer between the Republic and Louis XIV's France.
French expansion into the Southem Netherlands would threaten Dutch control ofthe
region's economy and place France at the Republic's border. In addition, a French
govemed Southem Netherlands could lift ail economic restrictions on the region allowing
it to develop ioto a potential rival to the Republic. Such French aggression, therefore,
direetly threatens both Dutch economic and military security necessitating a poHtical
response.
An additional concem for Dutch hegemony is the growing trend ofmercantilism
among its trading partners. England passes the Navigation Aets of 1651 and 1663 (
29 designed to cut Dutch entrepot sbipping and consolidate trade for EngHsh merchants.
These restrictive aets foreshadow the First and Second Anglo-Dutch Wars (1652-54,
1665-67) which result from English attempts to break Dutch commercial and naval
supremacy. France, in the meanwhile, resuscitates Richelieu's program ofcommer~
maritime and colonial expansion14. Colbert stimulates French home production, at the
expense ofDutch exports, with the French tariffs of 1664 and 1667. These mercantilist
aets direetly challenge Dutch economic strength, forcing the Republic to formulate a
response in defense ofthis economic threat.
Despite the state's need for security, dominant economic interests advocate
minimal defense spending. The regent class, particularly during the stadholderless
regimes, resists consistent spending which significantly effeets force readiness. Regents
usually defer defense spending in favor ofcontinued economic investment. It is the
character ofthe Dutch, Barker argues, never to spend money for the defense oftheir
lS country unless danger is staring them in the face • This practice places the Republic at a
significant disadvantage at tilDes ofcrisis (i.e French Invasion of 1672). Instead, decision-
makers rely on extemal balancing to compensate for the lack ofspending. Political
maneuvering by the De Witt regime guarantees French support during the Second Anglo-
Dutch War and the War ofDevolution. Unfortunately, this dependence on allies proves
nearly fatal to the Republic in 1672.
( 14 Barker, Rise and Decline orthe Netherlands. p.326. 1" Ibi~ p.J56.
JO PHASE 1: 1672-1673 French Invasion ofDutch (Threat and No Allies) ( l6 Dutch relative decline begins with the French Invasion ofthe Dutch Republic •
Louis XIV extends bis mercantilist campaign into a political challenge ofDutch
hegemony. He seeks to ovemm the Southem Netherlands and the Dutch Repubüc,
absorbing into the French kingdom Dutch industries, trading privileges, naval resources,
and financial strength. Louis XIV recruits Englisb. assistance from Charles II in the secret
Treaty ofDover, 1670, as weU as forging alliances with German states bordering the
Republic. These French diplomatic initiatives, compounded by De Witt's pre-occupation
for domestic pany politics, successfully isolate the Dutch, leaving them without allies at
the rime ofthe invasion. In May 1672, Louis XIV anacks the Dutch Republic, with a
well-trained and weU-supplied army of 118,000 infantry and 12,500 cavaJry, outnumbering
17 the Dutch regular army 4: 1 • France and its allies successfully occupy four ofthe
Republic's seven provinces before Dutch defenders stop the allied advance. Out of
desperatio~ Dutch troops flood the lowlands, thus creating a water barrier between the
invading armies and rest ofthe Republic.
The Dutch Republic nearly capitulates due to the Anglo-French forces. While
French troops occupY a majority ofthe Republic, the Dutch navy concedes naval
l8 superiority to the Anglo-French fleet, opting to defend the Dutch coast . This
stranglehold paralyzes the Dutch economy. The naval tbreat forces the States-General to
16 The French lnvasion represents the first ofthree major conflicts. or politica1 challenges, with France which hastens Dutch relative decline. For tbis reason, the invasion of 1672 marks the beginning ofthe decline periocl. 1"1 Israel. The Dutch Republic.. p. 797. 18 The exception is Admirai DeRuyter's pre-emptive strike against the combined Anglo-French navy. al C. Solebay. 61une 1672, which forces the allies to delay their planned invasion orthe Dutch Republic.
31 suspend an navigation out ofDutch ports, causing the aImost total cessation ofDutch l l9 seabome traffic in European waters . Industries, domestic and foreign markets, and
investments associated with the Dutch entrepot experience almost total min. Public
hostility develops towards the ruIing regents, accusing them ofcorruption and blatant
negligence ofthe country's defenses. Mass public movements condemn the Repubüc's
leaders, demanding for the elevation ofthe Prince ofOrange to stadholder.
Under the newly appointed Stadholder, the Dutch consolidate their efforts and
execute an effective defense strategy. Willem ofOrange immediately conduets extensive
purges oftown councils in response to widespread publie proteste These purges allow
Willem to remove regent "traitors" from council seats and replace them with Orangist
supporters. Backed by extensive Orangist support, the Stadholder mobilizes the state's
diplomatie and miIitary resources. Alliances are signed with the Holy Roman Emperor
and Brandenberg. By Iate 1672, Imperial and Brandenberg forces threaten France's
German allies, forcing Louis XIV to divert sorne troops from the occupied provinces. The
Dutch recruit and train several thousand civic militiamen behind the protection ofthe
water barrier, raising troop strength weil above 30,000. The Dutch navy, onder the
command ofAdmirai DeRuyter, achieves peak effectiveness by this time, executing a
defensive campaign against the ovetwhelmingly superior Anglo-French Beet. This
successful campaign ends with the defeat ofthe larger allied Beet at the BattIe ofTexel
(1673). By August 1673, the Dutch gain Spanish support, providing the Stadholder with
the extemal balancing necessaIy to change his strategy.
( 19 Israel~ Dutch Primacy. p.294.
32 PHASE fi: 1673-1678 War with France (Threat and Allies) l The Dutch-Spanish Hague Alliance (August 1673), based on a mutual Anglo-
French threat, marks the transition to Phase ll. The treaty unites Dutch efforts, with those
ofHapsburg Spain and Holy Roman Empire, to combat French forces in the Southern
Netherlands and along the Imperial border. Dutch allies divert enough French forces to its
2o eastem border, allowing Willem to attack French forces • By June 1674, Dutch troops
drive French forces out ofthe Republic, restricting their occupation to the fortresses of
Maastricht and Graves. Dutch privateering campaign severely disrupts English seabome
commerce, making the war highly unpopular in England. Charles n withdraws from the
confliet (Febmary 1674), forcing Louis XIV to restrict bis fleet to the Mediterranean in
fear ofthe Dutch navy. The Dutch regain naval superiority and its seabome trade
resumes. The States-General imposes mercantilist measures21 against France, restrlcting
French trade, in favor ofDutch produced goods.
ln three years, the Dutch Republic regains its status as a major sea and land power,
but at a heavy cost. Dutch Generality expenditures finance most ofthe allied war effort,
to include payment to allies and the hiring ofseveral thousand German mercenaries in the
now 100,000 soldier Dutch army. The unprecedented state debt, resulting from the rising
war costs, causes great fiscal concem among decision-makers. By 1675-76, the States-
General approves sizable cuts in military spending, trimming the army to 68,000. Policy-
20 Willem seeks to weaken, or attrit, French power. [n 1673, Dutch forces attaek French troops. driving them out ofthe Dutch Republic and thereby weakening their now precarious political and military situation. Willem bas no intent to invade or annex land al Franœ's expense. Regent demands for favorable trading terms augment the Dutch desire to prevent a strong French economy. 21 The Dutch Placard of 1674 restriet5 the imponation and distribution ofFrench wine. brandy, vinegar, paper. and sail canvas, among other items. The Dutch intend to limit these goocls in Cavor of Dutch home ( industries. hoping to replace these French goods on the international market. Placard is repealed al the war'5 conclusion, in 1678.
33 makers also reduce Dutch naval strength based on budget constraints and the diminished l French naval threat. These efforts to revive the wartime economy are further handicapped
by French privateering and neutral English shipping. As a non-combatant, England
expands its seabome trade at the expense ofthe Dutch, exploiting the principle of'mare
hùerum'. Concem over the state's economic situation sparks renewed regent opposition
to the Prince's policies.
Willem ofOrange successfully rallies support for bis wartime strategy despite the
growing regent discontent. The Stadholder uses bis Orangist appointees as weB as bis
influence with the Refonned Church to gain continued public support for the war with
Louis XIV. By 1677, he convinces the States-General to increase military spending,
expanding the army to 90,000 soldiers. Willem additionally gains English support through
bis marriage to Princess Mary, the daugbter ofCharles II. Both states formalize an Anglo
Dutch Defensive Treaty (1678), which becomes the foundation ofWiIlem's continental
strategy against France for the next halfcentury.
The Dutch achieve both an economic and political vietol)' with the conclusion of
22 the wac. Louis XIV, exploiting the rift between Orangists and opposing regents , otrers
Dutch regents favorable terms for peaee, including the canceUation ofthe 1667 tarift: in
lieu ofthe more generous 1664 tarifffist. Willem ofOrange opposes the offer, opting to
figbt Louis XN until France is soundly defeated. The regents, acting through the States
General, aecept these terms and finalize the treaty at Nijmegen (August 1678). The Dutch
conclude the war possessing one ofthe largest armies in Europe (90,000 troops) as weil as
naval supremacy among the combatants. In addition, the Republic aecepts an increased ( 22 Israel, The Dutch Republic, p.824
34 commitment to the Southem Netherlands. The Hague Alliance (1673) requires the Dutch l to provide future military assistance to Spain in defense ofthe region against France. This
commitment allows for an increased Dutch presence in the Southem Netherlands, leading
to the inevitable garrisoning ofDutch troops.
PHASE ill: 1678-1688 Fragile Peace (No Threat and Allies)
Fragile peace charaeterizes the third phase ofDutch relative decline. Dutch
decision-makers respond with a renewed commitment to free(r) trade and systemic peace,
but not without domestic debate. In 1679, France threatens European postwar peace
with its general encroachment along the Southem Netherlands, Lorraine, and Alsace
borders. Louis XIVjustifies these border area annexations OD bis interpretation ofthe
23 peace terms ofNijmegen • Louis XIV offers the Dutch a treaty offiiendship, in order to
avoid conflict with the Republic. Dutch decision-makers, unable to come to consensus on
the French offer, fail to provide any response.
Dutch domestic friction, foUowing the Franco-Dutch War, results from the regents
and Orangists opposing postwar strategies. Regents believe the Republic requires peace
for the sake ofcommercial interests. With the economy slowly recovering, merchants and
traders desperately depend on reduced antagonism and renewed trade between France and
the Republic to anchor their recovery. Peace encourages the reduetion ofthe state's
military expenditures, to include reducing troop strength. Orangists perceive this postwar
period as a temporary cessation ofconfliet with France. Louis XIV remains the principle
threat to bath the Dutch Republic and the Sauthem Netherlands. The state, therefore,
23 ''These local annexations, called •reunions', were justified on the grounds that the peaœ of Nijmegen ( had allocated conquered border towns to France, without demarcating the border, 50 that districts legally 'dependent' on these conquests could legitimately be absorbed into France." Israel, Ibid, p.829.
35 needs to maintain its allies and increase military strength in preparation for French
aggression.
Regent interests ultimately prevaiL preventing the Republic from confronting
France. Dutch commercial interests, according to Israel, will not allow the Stadholder to
commit the Dutch state to oppose French expansionism, at Spain's expense, as long as
24 Louis XIV refrains from new mercantilist measures against the Dutch trading system •
Decision·makers seek to both honor its military commitment to Spain and downplay any
French threat when Spain requests support for the defense ofthe Southem Netherlands
( 1683), as stipuIated in the Hague Alliance. While the Stadholder deploys 8000 soldiers
to the region in a reselVe capacity, bis request to increase the anny to 61,000 men
encounters significant regent and public opposition. His proposaI eventually fails because
public opinion in the chiefcities ofHoUand and Zeeland oppose increased taxation and the
2S increased possibility ofwar associated with the proposal • Commercial oriented
provinces request the state seek a treaty offiiendship with France. Louis XIV offers a
twenty·year truce, which the Dutch accept and ratify (June 1684). The foUowing winter,
the States--General significandy cuts military spending, reducing the army to onder 40,000
men.
Cognizant ofthe developing situation in Europe, the Dutch maintain their current
grand strategy. The revocation ofthe Ediet ofNantes (1685) in France results in the mass
immigration ofHuguenot refugees into the Republic. While reinforcing growing hostility
ofDutch opinion to Louis XN, Willem ofOrange recognizes bis inability to raDyenough
( 24 Israel, Dutch Primacy.. p.340. 2.5 Israel, The Dutch Republic. p.833-4.
36 domestic support forjoining the League ofAugsburg against France. Dutch merchants
and traders continue to trade with France on favorable terms. In 1685, it is inconceivable
that the state support the Stadholder's military intervention ofEngland against the
ascension ofJames II. France remains the focus ofattention for the Dutch public and
26 regents, not Britain .
PHASE IV: 1688-1697 Glorious Revolution & Nine Years War (Threat & Allies)
Louis XIV's renewed 'guerre de commerce' (1687-88) against Dutch trade
becomes the pivotai factor for change in the Dutch grand strategy. Anti-Dutch
mercantilist policies, to include the reimposed 1667 tarifflist, alarm Dutch commercial
interests to the impeding French threat. Tension with France makes Dutch decision
makers increasingly concemed about James II's growing dependence on Louis XN,
reminiscent to circumstances prior to the 1672 invasion. The apparent Anglo-French
threat convinces regents to coordinate with Orangists for rearming the Republic. Willem
hires 14,000 seasoned German troops and seeks coalition with the Hapsburgs.
Amsterdam regents, while supporting rearmament, oppose economic retaliation against
France. These commercial interests finaRy acquiesce to trade sanctions and the inevitable
war with France when Louis XIV issues a general anest ofaIl Dutch ships in French ports
(September 1688).
Dutch wartime strategy recognizes the possibility ofa dual Anglo-French threat.
Willem convinces Dutch decision-makers to support an invasion ofEngland, with the
intent ofovertbrowing James fi and establishing an anti-French parliamentary monarchy
( 26 Ibi~ p.842.
37 21 friendly to the Republic • Willem executes the risky venture (November (688) with over
21,000 soldiers, comprising the best regiments ofthe Dutch anny, and a large invasion
fleet, numbering 53 warships and 400 transport vessels. The Dutch dispatch their
remaining armed forces, consisting ofDutch soldiers and German mercenaries, to the
Southem Netherlands to combat Louis XIV's expected invasion. By February 1689,
Willem achieves his initial objectives ofthe Glorious Revolution; the Eng1ish throne and
relative control over the nation's govemment. The Dutch continue to maintain the best
part ofthe Dutch anny in Britain until1691, securing Willem's highly precarious position.
The Dutch develop a highly co-dependent wartime relationship with England. The
Stadholder-King Willem ofOrange brings England into the Grand Alliance with the Dutch
Republic and the League ofAugsburg (May 1689). Willem approves a subsequent
division ofAnglo-Dutch efforts: the Dutch Republic provides the larger land force to
defend the Southem Netherlands while England plays the chiefrole at sea , providing
naval power in a ratio of5:3 vis-à-vis the Dutch28 . The Dutch and English, in concert
with ils allies, also wage a very thorough economic war against Louis XIV, depriving
France its European markets. The Dutch, with its army divided between Britain and the
Southem Netherlands, maintain the defensive in the war's early years, leaving its Imperial
allies to pursue a strategy ofattrition. After 1691, the combined Anglo-Dutch army29 , led
by Willem, opposes French forces but with only limited success. The Anglo-Dutch fleet
gains only partial naval superiority by 1692. Despite their combined forces, backed by
27 Willem's wartime strategy is primarily aimed at depriving France its potential ally, thereby diminishing its strength in waging both a land and sea war against the Republic. 28 Ibid, p.853. ( 29 By 1693. the Dutch army alone was 93,000 soldier strong. Kennedy. Rise and Fan ofGreat Powers. p.87.
38 maritime financial strength, the allies fait to defeat Louis XIV's France. The Nine Years
War ends with an apparent stalemate, fonnalized by the Treaty of Ryswick (September
1697).
The Dutch Republic experiences both gains and losses as a result ofthe Nine
Years War. Dutch negotiators secure Spanish and French recognition for a much sought
after 'barrier' in the Southem Netherlands. Dutch soldiers garrison a string offortress
from Nieupool1 to Namur in order to deter future French aggression and defend the
Republic fOlWard ofits border. The new commitment allows for an increased Dutch
presence in the region and further penetration in the local economy. Negotiators also
secure the cancellation ofmany French mercantilist policies and receive a new, more
favorable tarifflist (1699) to replace the restrictive 1667 tariffs. As a result ofthe war,
England supplants the Dutch Repubüc as the supreme naval power. The allies division of
effort locks the Repubüc into a position ofmaritime inferiority, white condemning the
state to absorb the majority ofthe financial burden for maintaining a large, expensive
continental anny. This relationship further impacts Dutch relative decline during the War
ofSpanish Succession.
PHASE V: 1697-1702 Partition Treaties (Threat and Allies - Peaee)
The intelWar years proves to be a period ofconcem and crisis for Dutch decision
makers. The Dutch entrepot suffers severe setbacks as a result ofthe wu, with the loss of
key markets and increased commercial competition. French merchants, exploiting its
naval superiority in the Mediterranean, successfully supplant traditional Dutch dominance
ofthe profitable Levant trade. EngIish traders, in the meanwhile, make significant inroads (
39 in the West Afiican trade and Canobean ttade with Spanish America at the expense ofthe
Dutch. The MOst significant setback, however, is in the Battic trade. FoUowing the war,
the Dutch fail to regain dominance ofcommercial traffic in its MOst important market. By
170l, Dutch rivals account for weB over 50 percent ofthe traffic passing through the
Jo Danish Sounds • High public debt, also resulting from the war, provides additional
anxiety for Dutch decision-makers.
International concem over Spanish Succession furtherjeopardizes the weU-being
ofthe Dutch entrepot. The uncertainty ofsuccession to the childless King ofSpain,
Carlos fi, puts at risk Dutch trading privileges and access to vital markets in Spain,
Spanish America and the Southem Netherlands. This situation, again, puts France in
direct confrontation with the Dutch Republic and ilS allies. Louis XIV seeks the Spanish
throne for bis grandson, the Dauphin. A Bourbon Spain provides France a powerful aUy,
access to Spanish colonies and markets for ils merchants, and the much sought-after
Southern Netherlands. French dominance ofSpanish trade and occupation ofthe
Lowlands directly threatens both Dutch economic and military security, necessitaring a
political and/or military response.
The Dutch pursue a deh"berate peacetime grand stralegy. Decision-makers prepare
the state for its apparently inevitable war with France while concurrently pursuing
diplomatic solutions. The prevaiIing international tension prevents a revival ofregent
opposition to Orangist policies, affording the Stadholder domestic support for bis actions.
Decision-makers approve the construction ofnew warships, resulting in its largest fleet
( 30 Israel, Dutch Primacy, p.359.
40 31 since 1670 • They deploy troops to occupy the designated baniertowns in the Southem l Netheriands. These soldiers provide security for the Republic and a deterring force
against French invasion.. Dutch merchants renew free(r) trade with France. In need of
economic recovery, Dutch commercial interests pursue trade in aIl traditional markets, in
hopes ofrecapturing its economic dominance. Stadholder-King Willem ofOrange
compliments Dutch strategy by conducting peaceful negotiation with Louis XIV over
Spanish Succession. Discussions result in the Panition Treaties of 1698 and 1700, meant
to divide the empire between the two heirs, the Archduke and Daup~ and diffuse the
political crisis.
PHASE VI: 1702-1713 War ofSpanish Succession (Threat and Allies)
The War ofSpanish Succession resumes Louis XIV's threat to Dutch hegemony.
Louis XIV immediately abandons the Partition Treaties upon the ascension ofthe Dauphin
ta the Spanish throne, as mandated by Carlos fi before bis death. He dispatches French
troops (1701) iota the Southem (Spanish) NetherIands and forces the Dutch ta evacuate
its 'barrier' garrisons. French soldiers secure the entire region for Sp~ depriving the
Dutch its markets, control ofthe Scheldt and Antwerp, and its buffer between France and
the Republic. Philip V, King ofSpain, grIOts French merchants exclusive access ta
Spanish American trade, 10 include the higbly profitable 'asiento' slave trade al Dutch
Portuguese expense. The Joss ofthis tradejeopardizes the Dutch's rich Levant and East
India trades which depend on Spanish silver. These disastrous conditions Jeave the Dutch
with littIe alternative but to wage war against France and 6ght for Ïts survival.
( 31 See Table A-l, "Estimated Annual Number ofWarships. 1660-17205", in the Appendix.
41 The French threat solidifies Dutch domestic support for the confJi~ despite recent l change in govemment. Willem ofOrange's death in March 1702 precedes the States-
General's restoration ofa Stadhoiderless regime. The resolution shifts the balance of
power away from the Orangists and towards the regents. Despite their traditional position
against rearmament and war, the ruling regents recognize the Republic's desperate
situation and consent to the high public debt and trading restrictions associated with a
wanime strategy. Minority Orangists and the Dutch public aIso suppon war, alarmed by
the renewed French threal. The niling elite seek both economic and military objectives
from the confliet which would salvage Dutch primacy. These include, the restoration of
the favorable pre-1700 position ofDutch commerce in Spain and the Spanish Indies;
Hapsburg control ofthe Southem Netherlan~ augmented by a Dutch 'barrier',
confirmation ofthe Scheldt restrictions and favorable trading privileges for Dutch 32 merchants; curb on France's military power, and moderate French trade tariffs .
The Dutch Republic renews its wartime strategy3 but with mixed resuhs. The
Dutch ally with England, Savoy, Holy Roman Empire (Austria) and other lesser German
states to form the Grand Alliance. Within the alliance, the Dutch and Engfish again
commit ta a combined division ofeffon! according to the 1689 naval and military forces
agreement. The Dutch conlouute 100,000 soldiers for the combined Anglo-Dutch army
and two-fifths (89 warsbips) ofthe combined fleet. The Dutch army reaches ils ali-rime
peak by 1712 with 130,000 soldiers while the navy sustains ils highest coont for the 18th
n Israel~ The Dutch Republic. p. 969. 33 The Dutc~ as mentioned above. seek to sttengthen their economic and political situation al the expense ( ofFranœ. AngI~Dutch forces pursue an attrition strategy ta wealœn French power~ thereby re establishing the balance ofpower, or status quo.
42 centwy (89 in 1702) during the war. Despite its great power, the Republic occupies a Jess
senior position in the allied coalition than during the previous w~. Britain overshadows
the Republic with naval superiority, a considerably Iarger share ofsubsidies paid to the
Emperor and aIlied German states, more troops in the Iberian peninsula war, and the
appointment ofan English commander, Marlboro~ to the combined Anglo-Dutch anny.
The Dutch aIso experience limited success with ils restrictive trade policy. In
1703, the Republic, along with England, bans imports ftom France and the Southem
Netherlands, with the exception ofwool and linens. The Dutch do no~ however, extend
the restrictions to Spain and Spanish America. This is due to their importance - second
only to the Baltics - to Dutch trade. The following year, the Dutch widen the exceptions
to the ban due to ils damaging consequences to Dutch trade. France, also suffering from
restrieted trade, agrees to lift a majority ofils bans and renew trade with only the Dutch
Republic, despite English objections. Dutch dependence on foreign commerce forces the
state to trade with ils enemies sa to prevent ils economic devastation as a result oftwo
wars. By 1710, both the Dutch and French renew their trade restrictions, with Louis XIV
extending the ban to include Spain and Spanish America.
The War ofSpanish Succession produces a weakened Dutch hegemony. The
Dutch Republic overreaches it capabilities, exhausting ils economic and military power to
near depletion. Unprecedented wartime expenditures result in Dutch public debt exceeding
35 148 million guilders in 1713, up from 30 million in 1688 • The significant expenses
associated with fighting a land war, leads to a financial neglect ofthe navy. Due to
( 34 IbicL p.971. 35 Boxer~ Duteh Seabome Empire. p.138
43 significant troop costs, Dutch decision-makers graduaDy mininriu their naval l 36 obJigations , becoming increasingly dependent on Englisb. sea power to protect its
seabome empire. Dutch neglect ofits hegemonic responsibilities enables the English to
seek many ofthe same trading privileges once belonging exclusively to Dutch merchants.
These Englisb. wartime gains result in a direct chaDenge to traditional Dutch economic
primacy. The Anglo-French negotiated peace (1712), for example, grants Britain
extensive advantages in Spain and Spanish Americ~ including the 'asiento'.
Despile the setbac~ the Dutch manage to achieve severa! ofils prewar objectives
as a result ofthe conflict and the subsequent terms for peace. Anglo-Dutch campaigns in
Southern Netherlands successfully defeat Louis XIV's forces, leading to a combined
occupation ofthe region. Dutch officiais, seeking to re-assert ils predominance over the
Lowlands, gain English support for ils initiatives through a series oftreaties (1706, 1709,
1713). These agreements acknowledge English support for Dutch numerous 'barriers' in
37 the region in exehange for a Duteh guarantee ofthe Protestant Succession in Britain •
A1though the Peaee ofUtrecht ( 1713) grants the Southem Netherlands to Hapsburg
Austria, the Dutch reeeive Imperial recognition for ils 'barrier' rights in the Austro-Dutch
Treaty ofAntwerp (1715). The treaty confinns the Scheldt restrictions and the favorable
1680 tariffIist while granting the Dutch occupation ofeight major fortress-towns aIong
the French frontier and an annual subsidy8 from Austria for the upkeep of barrier
36 See Table A-l, "estimated Annua! Number of Warships, 1660-17205'. in the Appendix. Ji The guarantee ofProtestant Succession represents an increased commitment to the Republic. The Dutch maintain this commitment in 171 S and 1719. with troop deployments to Britai~ provoked by feared Jacobite attaeks. NorE: On 01 May 1707. England and Scotland unite under the Union Jac~ creating the United Kingdom ofGreat Bri~ changing '~nglish" referenœs to "British". JI The annual Austrian subsicly provides for only 60010 ofthe garrison costs. leaving the Dutch Republic to pay the remaining costs associated with its troop deployment. See Wa11erstei~ Modem World Systems. p.2S0.
44 garrisons. The Dote&, in r~ promise to maintain 14,000 troops in the region, a l considerable increase ftom the Spanish agreement. The resulting increase in commitment
to the region provides more substantial penetration into the Austrian Netherlands markets
while the troop expense contnoutes to the growth ofthe state's bigh public debt.
PHASE VU: 1713-1720s Postwar Europe (No Threat and Allies)
Dutch decision-makers predicate their postwar grand strategy on an exhausted ,
non-threatening France and aIlied Britain and Austria. Extemal balancing enables the
government to drastically eut military expenditures, significantly reducing both army and
navy strength. Troop strength faIls from 90,000 in 1713, to 40,000 in 1715, and finally
34,000 soldiers in 1717. The remainiog Dutch army conduets garrison duty in the
Southem Netherlands 'barrier' towns, the Generality Lands, and the province of
39 Gelderland • Naval strength declines steadily from 78 warships in 1713 to 42 in 1725.
Dutch warships continue to provide security for its merchant and fisbing fleets but traders
increasingly depend on the British navy to guarantee 'freedom ofthe seas'. Although
maintaining a generally defensive posture40 during this phase, Dutch forces twice ( 1715
and 1719 ) deploy to Britain, at Parliament's request, to proteet Protestant Succession
against feared Jacobite attacks.
The Republic's unprecedented economic strife, following the war, contnoutes to
deteriorating domestic co-operation and the emergence ofa neutralist sentiment in
diplomacy. Open dissension among the provinces over public debt, the state's armed
forces, and provincial budgetary quotas leads to a series ofgatherings ofthe States-
39 Israel, The Dutch Republic, p.985. ( 40 Army garrison duty and naval convoy security constitute a defensive posture for the purpose ofthis modeI.
45 General (1716-1717) to review the state ofthe Union and its future functions. Leading l Dutch officiais urge the provinces to strengthen the Union, by increasing the States-
General's authority, reform state finances, and restore the Republic's military and naval
41 power, while simultaneously reducing public debt • Despite these arguments, most
decision-makers refrain from increased federalism. Instead, regents agree to reduce
military strength (indicated above), Iimit increased taxation (in the interest ofpublic
support), and adopt a neutralist diplomatie position, more conducive to renewing free(r)
trade and saving the Dutch entrepot. Decision-makers employ this sentiment when the
Republic fails to join the Quadruple Alliance (1718) against Spain, due to concems over
Spanish trade.
During the postwar phase, the signs and effects ofDutch relative decline are
clearly evident. The high public debt, associated with the preceding wars, forces the state
to eut military expenditures and divert retums for paying interest accumulated on the debt.
Subsequent force reductions, significantly below those ofother major powers, and its
adopted diplomatie neutrality contn"bute to the state's decreased prestige among major
powers. The wars with France and these postwar developments illustrate the Republie's
inability to mobilize power necessary to provide arder and protection to the international
42 system • The rise ofeconomic competition, in the last quarter century, results in the loss
ofkey markets to Dutch merchants. The los8 ofmarkets, to Britain and France, causes
the loss ofdemand for Dutch goods. Dutch manufacturing decreases and its industries
gradually decay. Dy the 1720s, Dutch entrepot trade increasingly consists ofraw
( 41 Israel. The Dutch Republic. p.987. 42 Brawley, Liberal Leadership, p. 71.
46 materials, not finished goods. The main RoUand towns, and their trade and industry, l 43 rapidly decline in both absolute and relative terms •
Dutch hegemony ends with the relative closure ofthe international system,
44 represented by widespread industrial mercantilism throughout Europe • Northem and
central European states adopt extensive mercantilist policies following the Great Northem
War ( 1700-(721), sparked by economic nationaIism. These measures seek to prevent the
outflow ofraw materials and the inflow offoreign manufactured goods in an effort to
stimulate domestic industries. The import/export restrictions and industrial development
in these regions directly threaten Dutch commerce, depriving the Republic from its MOst
important markets. Dutch decision-makers, by the 1720s, clearly Jack the military power
required to intimate these states towards lifting their trade restrictions. Without both
adequate military power and significant economic advantages, the Dutch Republic ceases
functioning as the system hegemon, marking the end ofDutch primacy.
CONCLUSION
The detailed study ofDutch relative decline highlights several challenges
encountered by decision-makers when formulating grand strategy. The Republic
experiences crippling disjuncture ofmotivation and capabilities, as stressed during the War
ofSpanish Succession. Its acceptance ofsignificant military and financial obligations (i.e.
43 Ibid, p. 993. 44 Scholars disagree on the close ofDutch hegemony. Gilpin and Modelski both contend that the Dutch reign ends with the War ofSpanish Successio~ based on their apparent 1055 of military and economic power. Brawleyand Wallerstein insist that Dutch hegemony survives the war, ending in the 17305 and 17405. They base their assertion on the 5tate's financial strength, which continues to dominant European markets until mid-century. Based on my detinition ofhegemony, 1believe hegemony ends in the 17205. The Dutch Republic no longer possesses the military power or motivation to maintain the international ( system. Widespread mercantilism and increased competition shuts Dutch commerce out ofnumerous markets, depriving the Dutch from many ofits economic advantages.
47 system maintenance responsibility), despite reduced benefits ofleadership, leaves the
Republic economically drained following the war. Britain reaps the apparent benefits of
leadership, in terms ofeconomic concessions, political prestige, and a superior navy. The
Dutch choose to invest their diminisbing retums into their milîtary, in hopes ofsecuring
favorable economic conditions for their systemic trading network. The costs associated
with this strategy eventually exceed the posSIble benefits, as depicted by a postwar Dutch
Republic. Domestic interests and international conditions force the relatively declining
hegemon to pursue this seemingly inational strategy.
A review ofthe theoretical model (TABLE 3 and 4) indicates other significant
trends associated with Dutch decline. The Dutch Republic spends a total of25 years at
war with France during its 47 year relative decline. Threat and war drastically raise the
cost ofsystemic leadership, thereby diverting funds from the economy. Dutch
commitment to sustaining a large wartime army, according to the Anglo-Dutch agreement
for the Nine Years and Spanish Succession Wars, clearly diverts military funding away
from traditional Dutch strength - its navy. ln the process, the economy simuItaneously
experiences excessive government spending and restrieted trade. The French wars limit
Dutch economic growth and undermine ilS national power, thereby committing it to
imperial overstretch. Excessive war and Dutch policies causes the state to experience
military relative decline prior to economic relative decline.
A cross-sectional analysis (TABLE 4) ofDutch grand strategy depicts the
strengths and weaknesses ofspecific policies. Trade restrictions, for example, imposed on
(
48 French trade significantly hurt the Dutch entrepot. Despite its motivation for free trade(r), l decision-makers impose restrictions with the intention ofattriting French economic power
Table 3: Dutch Grand Strategies in Relative Dedine (167%-17205): Resala
Tbreat ofa Challenger Yes No
(War) -1678-1688 FnI8e Pace Yes -1713-1721s Postwar Eunpe (peaœ)
Allies
- 1672-73 French invasion (War) No
(War) (peace)
-1673-1678 Warwlth France Threat - 1688-1697 Glarlous Revolution - 1697-1702 Partition Tratles and and Nlne Years War Allies -1782-1713 War ofSpanlsh Succession
and applying pressure towards gaining Dutch concessions. The Republic gains limited
success from its wartime economic policies. Dutch military strategy, on the other band,
refleets politicai responsibility. Faced with 30 years ofFrench threat, decision-makers
adopt strategies conducive to national and systemic security. The regents willingness to
forge postwar relations with France, 1678-88, despite Louis XIV's border annexations,
provides the Dutch Republic 10 years ofpeace and economic growth. Decision-makers
agree to increases its military size and commitments as a result ofthe French wars. Dutch (
49 commitment to providing garrisons in Southem Netherlands barrier towns seemingly l augments Dutch security and relative control ofthe region. The formai commitment,
however, forces the state to maintain expensive garrisons in a region in which it once
4s retained authority without soldiers •
Table 4: Dutch Grand Strategies (1672-17205): Cross-8ectional Analysis
1672-1673 1673-1678 1678-1688 1688-1697 Freneh Invasion Warwith France Fragile Peaee Nine Years War ~Poliey (TbreatlNo Allies) (ThreatIAllies) (No ThreatlAllies) (ThreatlAllies) Model Actual Model Aaual Model Actual Model Actual Economie (Free(r) No Trade Restrict Restrict Free(r) Free(r) Restrict Restrict Trade Policy Military (Oder) Defense Attrition Attrition Defense Defense Attrition Attrition Strategy
MilitarySize (Increase lncrease Increase lncrease Reduce Reduce Increase lnerease
Commitment (Mntllne) Maintain lncrease Increase Maintain Maintain Increase Increase
1697-1702 1702-1713 War 1713-1720s Partition Treaties ofSp. Succession Postwar Europe ~Poliey (fbreatlAllies) (lbreatlAllies) (No ThreatlAllies) Model Actual Model Aetual Model Actual Economie Free(r) Free(r) Restrict RestIFT Free(r) Free(r) Trade Poliey Military Deter Deter Attrition Attrition Defense Defense Strategy
MilitarySize Inerease Increase Increase Increase Reduce Reduce
Commitment Mntllne Maintain Increase Increase Maintain Maintain
The Dutch Republic represents the first ofthree modem hegemon. This tirst case
study suffers leadership and policy challenges both similar and dissimilar to the next cases.
45 Britain suffers that sante fate when its infonnal empire becomes the target ofrenewed European ( imperialism in the 18805. The scrambles for Africa and Asia force the hegemon to station expense garrisons in areas where Britain once retained relative control without soldiers.
50 Despite its monopolistic pracriees in Asia and ils closing ofthe Scheldt, the Dutch advocate the same principles offtee(r) trade and systemic responsibility as the next two hegemons. The lessons leamed on the Dutch case study equal1y apply to the grand strategies adopted by Britain and the US.
SI GREAT BRITAIN. 1889-1932
British hegemony clearly dominates the international system for most ofthe 19th
century. Its superior economy and world class navy combine to give Britain unmatched
global influence and power. Scholars attribute the relative systemic peace, associated with
the height ofBritish hegemony, to its predominance, or relative control, ofthe
international system, hence "Pax Britannica"1.
STATUSOFHEGEMONY
This quintessential hegemon possesses ail the required elements for hegemony -
economic and military power, an established international system and motivation for
free(r) trade. Britain derives its economic strength from its superior industries, technology
and capital investment. The Industrial Revolution initiates widespread economic growth
throughout Britain giving the state advantages in manufacturing and technological
development. The state achieves industrial and commercial primacy2 through its mass
export ofgoods, eaming it the title, "Workshop ofthe World". The vast capital,
generated by British trade, transforms Britain into the world's major exporter ofcapital.
The City ofLondon dominates global finance, investment, and other "invisibles". This
global export ofcapital for foreign and imperial investments creates an "informai empire"
ofBritish economic influence. Foreign markets and raw materials associated with
Britain's formai empire as weU as it superior maritime capacity reinforces its position as
the world's premier entrepot.
1 British hegemony provides the initial basis for hegemonic stability theory, as discussed earlier in this ( thesis. See Brawley, Liberal Leadership. p.I09. 2 See Appendix B, "Percentages of World Trade"
S2 Britain facilitates the creation ofan international free(r) trade system based on its
extensive global economic interests. The success ofcapital services and export of
manufaetured goods encourages decision-makers to repeal the Corn Laws (1846), the
landmark obstacle to free(r) trade. The repeal ofthis proteetionist aet encourages the
import ofagricultural goods, opening domestic markets ta foreign traders. The eventual
abolition3 ofmost duties on imported goods encourages states to forge trade relations
with Britain and gain access to its rich home and imperial markets as weil as potential
investment and technology. The govemment uses both economic incentives4 and military
persuasion to expand its trading relations. By mid-century, Britain leads a far-tlung
trading network, encompassing ail continents. As system leader, it adopts the principle of
indirect mIe, rather than expansive imperialism in Afiica and Asia. Decision-makers
support this inexpensive method ofrelative control, based on treaties and agreements,
since it equally guarantees British merchants market penetrations.
Britain employs its preponderant navy and imperial army to protect its vast
economic interests associated with the international free(r) trade system. The hegemon
clearly maintains naval supremacy throughout its primacy6. Following the Napoleonic
Wars (181 7), decision-makers adopt the two-power rule, giving Britain a navy equal to
7 the navies ofany two powers opposing it • This measure results in the state's possession
ofapproximately 45% ofthe world's relative share ofnaval capabilities, 1850-1900.
3 Unlike the Dutch trading companies, Britain abolishes the monopoly ofthe East lodia Company in the China trade (1834). These type measures open the British empire and trading posts to foreign trade. 4 Le. unilateral tarif{ reductions, leans, investment, manufaetured goods, etc 5 Direct mie would be needed ifthe market were threatened (i.e. lodia and the later scrambles for Asia, Africa and China). Brawley, p.116. ( 6 See Appendix 8-3, "Major Powers Estimated Annua! Number ofWarships. 1880-1932" 7 See Kennedy, Rise and FaU ofBritish Naval Mastery.
S3 Britain's small professional anny acts as imperial police force, augmenting British naval l power. In times ofwar, the army can resource the multi-million residents ofthe empire,
creating a sufficient defense force. Decision-makers frequently exercise both services for
rnaintaining ope~ free(r) trade in remote or distant regions. Gunboat diplomacy and
temporary army deployments often communicate British intentions in the "informal
empire".
ENVIRONMENT
Britain's domestic environment creates the conditions for systemic leadership. Its
political and economic interests, acting within the republican regime, express the state's
motivation for establishing and maintaining an international free(r) trade system.
Liberal Regime Type
Britain's parliamentary system embraces wide social and public participation.
Although the constitutional monarchy recognizes peerage in the House ofLords (until
191 1), the House ofCommons and local governments increasingly endorse public
representation in the political process. The regulation ofpublic schools and the
proliferation ofnewspapers and books create conditions for greater public and social
awareness. Public support becomes very significant, in the Jate 19th century, with
renewed British imperialism in Africa and Asia. The Boer War demonstrates massive
British support for overseas ventures. FoUowing the First World War, the govemment
drastically increases social spending, at the military's expense, recognizing the public's
growing role in British government.
(
54 Prevailing Economie and Political Interests l The City ofLondon clearly dominates the British economic agenda. Its primacy in
global financial services contributes significantly to the evolution ofthe "informal empire",
while augmenting British relative control. The economy's relative decline in the 1890s
inspires growing opposition to London's influence in Parliament. Non-competitive
industries and agricultural sectors gain political endorsement from protectionist, Joseph
Chamberlain. Although bis tariffcampaign gains low-to-moderate support throughout
Britain, its effects divide the ruling Unionist Party through 1905. The free trade
proteetionist debate, however, continues to plagues Parliament's backrooms following the
war. Despite speculation, the govemment maintains its commitment to the City of
London.
GRAND STRATEGY
British grand strategy clearly reflects its need to maintain the international free(r)
trade system for the sake ofits dominant economic interests. Since the 1840s, the British
economy moves away from self-sufficiency towards an increasing dependence on
multilateral trade. Systemic leadership transforms the economy, stimulating its
specialization for international trade. London concentrates on financial, shipping, and
insurance services for much ofthe world while English industries cater to global exports.
8 By 1860, Britain conducts over 25% ofail world trade . This specialization in
international trade also demonstrates the hegemon's significant dependence on the
9 continued tlow oftrade for its economic survival . Limited access to overseas markets
and regional instability directly threaten British commerce. The hegemon must maintain ( 8 Ibi~ p.190.
55 systemic security, void ofpolitical challenge, to ensure the economic strength, and hence l strategie security, ofthe state.
Britain maintains access to foreign markets through both its formai and informai
empires. A produet ofthe 17th and 18th centuries, the British empire of 1850 consists of
numerous overseas colonies to include Canada, Australia, New Zealand, Hong Kong, and
India. British imperial trade (1867) amounts to an impressive L40 million. India, its most
significant imperial market, imports L21 million, equal to Britain's largest foreign
lO consumer, the United States . The hegemon equally relies on its informai empire to
absorb British goods and capital. Britain secures trading rights with much ofAfiica, Asia,
and South America through treaties and agreements. This arrangement grants the
hegemon access to the area's markets and goods without the cost ofadministering the
region as a colony. Britain retains economic and political influence through its trade and
investment. Regional conflict and encroaching European imperialism both jeopardize the
stability and access to the informai empire, necessitating a more expensive British colonial
commitment.
Britain maintains systemic security through its command ofthe seas. Charged with
protecting the Home Islands and guarding overseas interests and seabome trade routes,
the Royal Navy comprises the world's largest and most powerful naval force. A network
ofstrategie overseas naval bases and coaling stations support the navy's global
deployment. These strategie bases, a10ng with its naval presence, manage to secure
9 French. British Economic and Strategic Planning, 1905-1915, p.12-lJ. ( 10 British trade within the empire is subject to the same free(r) trade principles as those granted to other non-imperial states. See James, Rise and Fall orthe British Empire. p.172.
56 Britain's most important trade routes·· - the Mediterrane~Suez, Cape ofGood Hope, l Singapore and English Channel. This strategie posture gives the system leader
unpreeedented eommand ofthe world's waterways. Regional naval squadrons police
distant overseas interests, enforcing international rules against piracy and slave trading
while upholding the principles offree(r) trade. Britain's command ofthe seas provides the
essentiallink to its relative control ofthe empire and international system.
In time ofinternational crisis, Britain traditionally employs "balance ofpower"
politics and national means for resolving eonflict. Since the War ofSpanish Succession,
British decision-makers use the state's power against any dominating or threatening power
which may jeopardize British interests or security. Rather than forge permanent alliances,
Britain creates temporary commitments against immediate threats. Decision-makers resist
long-term arrangements which could force the state to participate in foreign wars against
British interests. While Britain readily relies on its armed services to quell imperial and
l2 small-scale conflicts, it also employs appeasement for obtaining crisis resolution . The
grant ofterritorial or economic concessions represents a pacifie and rational settlement of
disputes. Despite its current negative connotation, appeasement often secures a peaceful
answer, giving Britain the systemic conditions it seeks for international trade.
PHASE 1: 1889-1904 Splendid Isolation (Threat and No Allies)
A1though Britain experiences increasing economic and rnilitary competition
throughout the 1880s, the Naval Defense Act (1889) marks the beginning ofthe relative
decline phase for this study. Britain's proclamation to uphold the two-power standard
results from the government's acknowledgment that foreign naval programs gradually ( Il Massie, Dreadnought p.434.
57 diminished Britain's naval superiority. Separate regional disagreements with France, l Germany, and Russia, throughout the 1880s, draw British attention to the expanding naval
programs ofthese powers. By 1887, a combined Franco-Russian force possesses enough
battleships to significantly threaten British interests in the North Sea, Atlantic and
Mediterranean. Decision-makers address the hegemon's relatively weakened position with
a five-year L23 million naval program to construct 10 battleships, 42 cruisers and 18
torpedo boats. This initiative accelerates a 20 year Anglo-Franco/Russian naval arms race
that concludes in 1904.
British decision-makers initially perceive France and Russia, particularly the latter,
its principle challengers. France, the historical enemy, pre-occupies Britons with constant
rumors ofcross-channel invasions ofthe islands. The French naval program and its
expanding African empire continually a1arm British decision-makers in the late 19th
century, culminating in a potential conflict over the remote outpost ofFashoda (1898).
Decision-makers perceive a more legitimate French threat, as a result ofits 1891 entente
with Russia. Decision-makers interpret the Franco-Russian fiiendship as a hostile
coalition aimed at challenging British control ofthe Mediterranean. The Russian port cali
to Toulon (1893) consequently confirms British fears 13.
Expansionist Russia poses a genuine threat ta British interests throughout the
world. While its naval forces threaten interests in the Mediterranean, Russia's army and
rail system threaten interests in India and China. The combination ofinfrastructure
development and territorial acquisition in central Asia creates fears among imperialists that
12 See Kennedy, Strategy and Diplomacy. Ch. 1. ( 13 Britain responses to the pon cali and apparent threat with increased naval spending, amounting to 9 first class battleships. See Friedberg, WeaJy Titan. p.155-56.
58 Russian troops will invade Afghanist~ and then India. Military planners prepare for the l 14 defense ofIndia and a large seale land war in Mghanistan through 1905 • In eastem
Asia, Russian forces exploit tunnoil in northem China and annex Manehuria (1900).
Russia remains a threat to British trading interests in the region until Japan defeats both its
fleet and eastern armies in the Russo-Japanese War (1904-05).
An additional threat to Britain's economic interests results from the imperial
expansion ofEuropean powers in the late 19th century. Attracted by the economic
benefits and prestige assoeiated with an empire, the major powers initiate an "imperial"
seramble for the unclaimed regions ofAfrica, Asia and the Pacifie. As France and
Germany establish new colonies, British deeision-makers become critically eoncemed that
these imperial "scrambles" will close much ofthe hegemon's informai empire to British
15 trade • The British public saon develops an imperialist sentiment, encouraging the
government ta seize colonies for the state's posterity. The hegemon abandons its concept
ofinformaI empire, or "eheap colonialism", opting to expand its formal daims in Asia and
Afiica, to include Bunna., Nigeria, Egypt-Sud~ and much ofSouthem Africa.
This British expansion in Southem Afriea eommits its forces ta waging a costly
war against the Boer Republics (1899-1902). As early as 1895, Cape Colony Prime
Minister Cecil Rhodes engineers the Jameson Raid, an attempt to draw Britain into
confliet with Transvaal and the Orange Free State allowing it to daim the gold and
diamond rieh regions. Despite its failure, the raid succeeds in gaining public support for
expansion. Britain instigates a war with the Boer Republic in 1899 and defeat its
conventional forces the following year. Boer guerriIla activity continues for two ( 14 Ibid, p 211.
59 additional years, necessitating 500,000 soldiers and significant expenditures ta subdue the
resistance. By 1902, the Boers accept British sovereignty in the Treaty ofVereeniging, in
exchange for economic indemnities.
Britain experiences several significant realizations as a result ofthe Boer War. The
conflict initially demonstrates the disadvantages ofimperial, or systemie, responsibility.
Decision-makers question the hegemon's ability to bear burden for the empire. The costs
associated with the distant war increase government spending to unprecedented levels,
l6 causing a sharp increase in taxes . This increase diminishes publie support for imperial
ventures. The vast commitment ofthe hegemon's resources to Southern Africa reveals
other vulnerabilities in imperial security. Britain's redeployment ofits forces leaves
portions ofthe empire dangerously exposed to attack or rebellion. As a result, the
Admiralty forms a naval "flying squadron" to quickly reinforee imperial defense and deter
potential aggression.
The Boer War also draws attention to the hegemon's newest threat, Germany.
The infamous Kruger telegram (1896) demonstrates German sympathy for the Boers
against English aggression. British mistrust ofGerman intentions in Southem Aftica leads
to growing animosity between the two powers. The German poliey ofWeltmacht (1897)
publicly declares the state's policy ofexpansion, colonialization, and development ofits
naval forces. German decision-makers justify its naval build-up based on the potential
British threat to German economic interests and imperial expansion. German Admirai
Tirpitz exploits tbis growing Anglo-German antagonism to increase naval expenditures,
through several Navy Laws. The second Navy Law (1900) seriously alarms British
( 5 1 Ibid p.46.
60 decision-makers, based on Germany's rapid naval expansion. In response, the hegemon l increases its naval program, ordering 8 additional battleships. By 1902, the Admiralty
convinces British decision-makers ofthe threat posed by the new German tleet.
Economic uncertainty and renewed protectionism further challenge the relatively
declining hegemon. By the 1880s, new industrial powers challenge Britain's primacy.
The strength ofBritish exports and a world-wide recession (1872-1896) convince several
govemments to abandon free trade in favor ofproteeting their growing industries17.
British exports suifer as these states erect tariffbarriers. The Colonial Secretary, Joseph
Chamberlai~ proposes the creation ofa British customs union, for protecting imperial
trade. The plan would unite the empire behind a tariffwall, charging duty on foreign
goods. These duties would then be re-invested within the empire, promoting agriculture
and manufacturing. Despite Chamberlain's extensive campaigning and moderate support,
London financiers and public opinion defeat these tariffpolicies in the 1906 elections. The
hegemon's internationalists renew the state's commitment to free(r) trade.
Faced with multiple economic and political dilemmas, the hegemon seeks to alter
its grand strategy. The Boer War clearly demonstrates Britain's vulnerability and isolation
among major powers. By 1900, the hegemon clearly lacks external support from other
leading states for balancing power within the system. White Britain successfully deters
potential external aggression, the high costs associated with systemic maintenance, to
include an expanding empire and costly naval arms race, force decision-makers to adapt a
less expensive approach. Britain tirst seeks a possible defensive alliance with Queen
Victoria's grandson, the German Kaiser. Several rapprochements and colonial ( 16 Ibid, p.99.
61 appeasement in Africa and the Paeifie (1898-1901) fail to secure any Gennan l commitment. British concern over Russian expansion in China, however, stimulates a
military alliance in the Far East with Japan (1902). By 1903, Dritain and France begin
formal discussions to settle colonial differences in Africa. The talks result in a cordial
entente (1904) between the two states, ending Britain's "splendid isolation" in Europe and
notably altering its traditional grand strategy.
PHASE fi: 1904-1914 Preparing for War (Threat and Allies)
Britain develops a new, more efficient grand strategy in the years prior to the war.
The rise offoreign threats and economic competition in the late 19th century causes
disequilibrium between the hegemon's global commitments and its capabilities to maintain
the system18. Deeision-makers, in this phase, seek to reduce imperial overstretch through
diplomatie eommitments and internai restructuring. The rising threat from Germany
compounds Dritain's challenges to both secure the Empire and lower government
expenditures. The fol1owing quote, from historian Max Beloff, best describes Dritain's
course ofaction during this period:
An imperial system threatened by major enemies is bound to try to rid itself
ofperipheral responsibilities in defense that May detract from its principal
eoncerns; ifthe legions can be recalled, it is safer to recall them. Ifpolitical
means can be found for reducing the cali upon military resources, then the
search for such means becomes an acceptable object ofpolicy l9.
17 James, p.201. ( 18 GiJpin, War and Change in World Politics. Ch. 5 19 Beloff: Imperial Sunset. p.246.
62 Britain accepts a geographically constrained fonn ofnaval superiority through
l 20 strategie accommodation with peripheral and major powers • Both tacit and implicit
arrangements with the US, Jap~ and France allow Britain to redeploy its regional
squadrons while maintaining continued protection ofits econornic interests through the
auspices ofthese powers. The hegemon tacitly admits to US naval suprernacy in the
western hemisphere in the Hay-Pauncefote Treaty (1901). Despite no fonnal alliance,
Britain recognizes the US's potential fiiendship and excludes its expanding naval forces
from the Two-Power Standard. Japan further reduces British concems in the Far East by
extending the alliance to also encompass India's security, alleviating sorne concern over
the Russian threat. Meanwhile, France fonnally agrees to concentrate its fleet in the
Mediterranean (1912), while Britain concentrates in the Atlantic and North Sea. Each
power provides reciprocal protection ofinterests in their respective regions. This tacit
acceptance ofstrategie pluralism a110ws Britain to both restructure and concentrate ilS
forces closer to the impeding threat.
The British Admiralty initiates far-reaching reforms throughout this period,
transforming the Royal Navy into a more cost-efficient yet powerful force. Admirai
Fisher's 1904 memo to the Cabinet calls for the worldwide reorganization ofBritish naval
forces. Decision-makers elirninate several ofthe regional squadrons and redistribute its
warships to the newly organized New Channel, Atlantic, Mediterranean (until 19(2)
Fleets. Cost-cutting reforms de-commission 154 ships deemed obsolete and reduce
expenditures in several overseas dockyards. By 1907, Fisher's plan reduces naval costs to
( :!o Friedberg. p.168-74.
63 21 L31.4 millio~ L5.4 million less than in 1904 • In addition, naval planners achieve to l revolutionize naval warfare through the construction ofa new warship c1ass, H.M.S.
Dreadnought.
The armyexperiences sunilar reforms under Secretary ofState for War Haldane.
Decision-makers reorganize the army into two forces, a professional Regular Army
Expeditionary Force, consisting ofsix divisions and 160,000 soldiers, and a second-line
Territorial Army, raised in the British Isles and maintained as a reserve to the
22 Expeditionary Force . Refonns save the govemment L3 million while simultaneously
creating a more effective force.
Despite this extensive refonn, military expenditures drastically increase with the
escalation ofthe Anglo-German naval arms race. Germany maintains rapid naval
expansion throughout this period, directly chaUenging the Royal Navy's primacy in home
waters. The British government responses with similar increases. Despite yearly increases
in naval expenditures, the government further accelerates ship-building as a result ofthe
1909 Navy Scare. The Admiralty announces to the government that CUITent spending vis-
à-vis the German program gives Britain an advantage ofmerely 3 battleships by 1912.
The impeding naval crisis grips the government, press and public. Decision-makers
resolve to drastically increase the CUITent naval program by 8 additional Dreadnought
battleships. Between 1907 and 1912, Britain's Liberal government appropriates L229
million, despite its 1905 election campaign pledges to control military spending and reduce
government expenditures.
( 21 Massie, p.466-7. 22 Ibi~ p.S63.
64 First Lord ofthe Admiralty Wmston Churchill introduces more increases to the
naval program from 1912-14. Despite improving Anglo-German relations~ the British
government continues its naval expansion based on Germany's navy increases. Churchill
fonnaUy abandons Britain's Two-Power Standard by 1912~ c1aiming it financially
impractical. Instead~ the hegemon adopts a navy standard of60% superiority over the
single threat state. Germany23. By 1914~ the hegemon maintains a comfortable margin of
superiority over its rival~ 34 British Dreadnought to 18 Gennan battleships. Gennany's
apparent slow-down is attributed to the peacetime expansion ofits army.
While the hegemon increases its naval strengt~ it maintains the size ofits army.
Expansion ofthe British Army would require considerable cost~ to include monetary
24 incentives for enlistment or conscription . The British public adamantly opposes
conscription and increased taxes associated with maintaining a large peacetime army.
Dominant economic interests refuse to support an expanded army for the defense ofthe
British Isles since the Royal Navy serves tbis mission. A large peacetime annyalso
implies a European continental commitment which economic and public interests do not
support.
Besides military developments~ decision-makers also seek systemie security
through its active foreign policy. British Foreign Minister Edward Grey compliments the
hegemon's military deterrence strategy with an Anglo-Russian entente and Anglo-French
strategie planning. AIthough not a treaty, the Anglo-Russian entente (1907) eliminates
2S friction between the two empires in the Middle East and central Asia . These
:J Ibi~ p.821-2. ~4 Friedberg. p.221-2. ( ~ . Massle. p.600.
6S negotiations a1leviate British fears ofinvasion in India while transforming this fonner
threat into a possible ally. Secret talks between British and French staffofficers (1906)
lead ta military contingency plans for the continent. Joint plans focus on dispatching
100,000 British soldiers to France within two weeks ofhostilities. While cabinet ministers
can not bind the state to a defensive alliance without Parliament's consent, Grey informally
commits Britain ta the defense ofFrance.
Ongoing British attempts to negotiation a peaceful settlement with Gennany fail.
Multiple discussions fail to curb the Anglo-German naval arms build-up. Germany does
oirer Britain arms limitations, but based on its neutrality in a continental war. The
aggressor frequently attempts to isolate Britain from its entente partner, employing
aggressive foreign policy and military demonstrations. Gennany's two attempts to
humiliate France in Morocco (1905-06, 1911) ooly succeeds to drive the partners doser.
German belligerency and expansionist policies cause growing concem among
British decision-makers. While German naval build-up threatens British security interests,
its expanding influence in the Ottoman Empire and support ofAustria-Hungary's
expansionism in the Balkans threaten British economic and regional interests. More
importantly, an expansionist Germany on the continent directly threatens the European
balance ofpower, thereby threatening the hegemon. German aggression and French
friendship compel the system leader to defend its political and military interests in the
international system. Domestic economic interests, however, oppose Britain's entry to
major war. Financiers and exporters grow equally concemed regarding how a European
confliet could breakdown the international free(r) trading system. London's international
( banking, investments, and insurance would likely collapse. Overseas commerce would
66 suffer from naval blockades and submarine warfare. With either decisio~ Britain's policy-
makers jeopardize the stability ofthe international system.
PHASE ID: 1914-1918 World War 1(Threat/Allies)
Scholars have longed debated the numerous strategies employed by the Allies
during the First World War. Rather indulging in all these theories, 1narrow the readers
foeus to the four specifie grand strategy features emphasized in tbis model - eeonomie
trade poliey, military strategy, military size and eommitment.
Economie Trade Poliey
British poliey-makers pursue a disjointed economie poliey based on its diverging
politieal and economie interests. The govemment eonvinees the public, and the reluctant
business seetor, that Britain must enter the eonfliet due to Germany's flagrant violation to
Belgium's neutrality. German occupation ofthe Lowlands provides a viable staging base
for a cross-border invasion ofthe islands. Britain, therefore, declares war on Germany, 4
August 1914. The foUowing day, the War Council reeommends sending the
26 Expeditionary Foree to France, with Iittle to no opposition from the Cabinet .
Decision-makers convinee dominant economic interests that a "Business as Usuar'
strategy can quickly win the war. Foreign policy analysts convince the business
community that the impeding war with Gennany will be short, resulting in deeisive allied
victories at land and sea. Britain could theoretically rely on the Royal Navy ta proteet the
trading economy while British industry provides France and Russia supplies and
munitions. The hegemon's expanding army would contribute to victory on the continent
and provide a powerful influence in shaping postwar Europe in Britain's image. Decision- ( -"'6 French, p.126.
67 makers, therefore, initiaUy endorse domestic laissez-faire economics without a national
21 plan for economic mobilization .
Decision-makers quickly impose trade restrictions aimed at depriving Germany's
economy. The British Treasury issues proclamations forbidding trade with the enemy.
The govemment prohibit aU imports and exports, either directly or through neutral states,
28 in support ofthe British naval blockade • In addition, the British War Council (1915)
announces that all cargo destined for Germany, including that ofneutrals, would be
29 detained • The unrestrieted economic and naval blockade successfully deprives Germany
ofits overseas markets and sources ofsupply. The Treasury also limits the indiscriminate
export ofBritish capital to belligerents and neutrals (1914). The Treasury restricts the
transfer ofmuch needed capital, in the interests ofthe war effort, unless directly
contributing to national, colonial, and wartime interests.
The allies failure to achieve a quick victory forces decision-makers to increasing
organization and control the British economy. The "Shell ScandaI" (1915) ilIustrates the
economy's failure to meet the military's supply needs without national organization.
Chancellor ofthe Exchequer David Lloyd George soon initiates his campaign to transform
British industries and commerce into a "total war" economy. Under tbis plan, all human
and economic resources would directly contribute to increasing the army's size and the
30 production ofwar materials . The McKenna Duties (1915) discourage domestic
consumption on goods not associated with the war. This tariff on "consumer" items
attempts to reduce the growing trade deficit caused by US imports and direct the economy
27 Ibi~ p.34. 28 French, British Strategy and War Aims. 1914-1916, p.27. ( 29 Frenc~ 1905-1915. p.Il8.
68 31 towards production . This escalation ofstate intervention in the economy causes a partial l abandonment oflaissez-faire ideals and the restriction offree(r) trade in the international
system.
Military Strategy
Initial German advances, in the east and west, shatter early British plans for
achieving a quic~ decisive victory. The Asquith government concedes that the Allies can
not inflict a crushing military defeat upon the Central Powers. Instead, Allies foeus on
32 their combined power and numerical advantage to win through attrition . The
combination ofBritish finance, industry and shipping along with France and Russia's large
armies provide the Allies33 with substantial economie and military resources. These states
solidify their wartime relations in a formai alliance, the Pact ofLondon (1914). Britain
readily appeases its partners with financial and military support. Extensive campaigns in
France and along the peripheral areas ofthe Middle East and Africa seek to weaken the
continental threat. While Britain wishes to end German ambitions ofworld power, it
equally seeks to preserve its military potential, thus preserving the European balance of
powe~4.
Military Size
Britain drastieally increases the size ofthe military during the course ofthe war.
Prior to the conflict, the hegemon possesses a relatively small Expeditionary Force,
consisting of254,000 soldiers. Secretary ofState for War Lord Kitchener immediately
30 IbicL p.153. 31 IbicL p.125. 3"- Brawley, p.143. 33 The United States later contributes ils significant economic and military power to the AlIied effort ( (1917).
69 requests an increase of500,000 troops to support the initial commitment to France
(1914). The govemment's inability and unwillingness to commit to a continental strategy
prior to 1914 leaves military planners scrambling for support. The military must conduct
voluntary recruiting from 1914-1916, due to policy-makers failure to initiate conscription.
Strong economic and public opposition to conscription effeetively block its passage in
Parliament until 1916. Kitchener further augments British forces with imperial support
from the overseas Dominions and colonies. The total number ofsoldiers mobilized for
war (1914-1918) include: 5.7 million from Britain and 2.9 million trom the British
3s Empire .
Commitments
Peripheral campaigns in the Middle East, Africa and the Pacific gradually increase
the British Empire and extends its military commitments throughout the system. British
strategy, early in the war, retlects concem over controlling the sea lanes and the potential
36 danger posed to the British Empire by Germany's overseas colonies . The Committee on
Imperial Defense (CID) recommends seizing German bases and installations around the
globe (1914). The govemments ofindia, South Africa, Australia, and New Zealand
dispatch forces ta capture German colonies in their respective regions. The Dominions'
successes include German East Africa, German South-West Africa (Namibia), the
Cameroons, and the Pacific islands ofYap, German New Guinea, Samora, and Nam.
British and French forces also seize the German colony ofTogoland, dividing the region
between them.
34 Frenc~ 1914-16, p.216. ( 3S Holmes, Warfare, p.133. 36 Frenc~ 1914-1916. p.26-28.
70 Extra-European campaigns~ designed to a1leviate A1lied pressure in France~ also l result in British acquisitions. Regional threats~ posed by the Ottoman Empire to British
Middle East interests, provoke decision-makers to annex Cyprus (1914) and proclaim a
protectorate over Egypt (1914)~ thereby guaranteeing protection ofthe Suez Canal.
Despite the hegemon ~ s failed assault at Gallipoli (1915-16)~ British forces succeed in
depriving the Ottomans the regions ofMesopotami~ Palestine and the Trans-Jordan.
At tirst, British decision-makers refuse to annex occupied lands for imperial gain.
British expansion would likely trigger resentment among allies over war gains. On the
other hand, failure ta extend British relative control would result in strategie benefits for
the hegemon's possible postwar rivals~ France or Russia. Britain and France conduct
negotiations in 1916, over the fate ofthe conquered lands. Discussions result in the secret
Sykes-Picot Treaty, calling for the division ofthe Ottoman Empire between the two
powers. France opts for Syrïa while the hegemon retains control of Mesopotami~and
areas north ofEgypt. The Dominions ultimately maintain several oftheir early conquests,
through the auspices ofthe League ofNations following the war.
PHASE IV: 1919-1932 Postwar Peace (No ThreatINo Allies)
The cessation ofthe First World War signais the beginning ofBritain ~ s last phase
ofrelative decline. This phase is certainly the most challenging period ta fully understand.
As both the United States and the new Bolshevik regime in Russia revert ta isolationism~
they leave behind a disjointed international system, clearly failing to reflect fundamental
31 global economic and military realities . Britai~ both financially and militarily weakened
by the war, continues ta provide systemic leadership and maintenance. Although the
37 Kennedy, Rise and FaU orthe Great Powers, p.xix
71 defeat ofrival Germany reinforces Britain's relative strength in Europe, the strain ofthe l war, to include financial dilemmas, excessive military spending and various imperial issues,
significantly tax the hegemon's remaining power. Britain attempts to re-establish the post
war international free(r) trade system despite numerous challenges.
The First World War eliminates ail major threats to British systemic interests. The
demise ofImperial Getmany extinguishes political challenge to Britain's hegemony.
Decision-makers address remaining regional concems to systemic security through
38 diplomatie means • Foreign ministers resolve recurring threats ofSoviet subversion in
India with a commercial agreement in 1921. Britain and Turkey resolve their Middle East
differences with the Treaty ofLausanne (1923). Security issues on the continent leads
Britain to sign the Treaty ofLocarno (1925), guaranteeing the inviolability ofGerman,
French and Belgium borders. By the mid-1920s, Japan and Italy both pose little threat to
British regional interests.
Pre-war success with recruiting external support for managing the system proves
difficult following the conflict. Britain desperately seeks a post-war alliance with the US,
based on its common international interests. Decision-makers firmly assert that war
9 between the two democracies would be an impossibilitt • The Dominions, especially
Canada, equally support rapprochement with the new world power. Despite British
attempts, the US refuses a formai commitment, opting for merely friendly relations. US
concerns over Britain's alliance with Japan, however, leads to American pressure on
dissolving this partnership. American decision-makers view an Anglo-Japanese alliance as
dangerous to US Pacifie interests. As a result, Britain abandons its ooly post-war aUy in ( 38 to include working through the newly founded League ofNations.
72 the interest ofAnglo-American relations. The hegemon later abandons any pursuit ofan alliance with post-war France, believing any commitment would not increase British
40 influence in Paris . Without external security arrangements, Britain tries to secure systemic stability through its own national means.
Dritain's systemic leadership attempts to re-establish the free(r) trade system. The hegemon re-initiates its pre-war trading relationships and praetices, in hopes ofregaining the high levels ofinternational trade preceding the war. Plans to rejuvenate the domestic economy begin with govemment controls on excessive spending. Dritain prioritizes public
41 expenditures for debt redemption and social reform , while stabilizing military spending.
The hegemon even restores the pre-war Gold Standard, by 1925, in an effort to stabilize the international economy. Despite these government attempts, the British economy shows increasing signs ofstress throughout this period. Poor export performances, high rates ofunemployment, and higher priees, associated with the Gold Standard, demonstrate
Britain's relative weakness. Revitalized post-war foreign industries continue to erode the hegemon's share ofworld trade. By 1929, the world-wide depression forces decision- makers to consider more drastic measures for economic relief
Based on the system's relative peace and Britain's economic concerns, the Cabinet announces the "Ten-Year Rule" (1919). The government bases its military plans on its assumption that Europe will not experience a major war for the next 5-10 years. As a result, the hegemon's primary military concerns focus on Imperial policing, maintaining military expenditures to 1914 levels (including appropriation for the new Royal Air Force)
39 Beloff, p.130-31. 40 Ferris, Men. Money and Diplomaev, p.103-9 41 Ibid, p.33.
73 and the development ofnew technologies for replacing expensive colonial garrisons (i.e.
airplanes). Its military, therefore, assumes traditional imperial defense postures as
maintained in the mid-l9th century.
The Royal Navy also resumes ilS former defense posture ofthe overseas empire.
The Admiralty redeploys much ofthe navy, reminiscent to the mid and late 19th century.
It reverses its 1912 policy and re-establishes its Mediterranean Beet. Naval planners also
deploy cruiser squadrons to the West Indies, North and South America, Cape ofGood
Hope, East Indies, and China stations. This mass distribution ofships allows for British
relative control ofoverseas regions and the direct protection ofits interests in the absence
ofextemal balancing. The Royal Navy, therefore, resumes its traditional mission of
"showing the flag"42.
The military's missions reBeet Britain's aim to maintain the international system
with a strong postwar force. Initial cutbacks from the hegemon's wartime force and naval
arms limitations, agreed at the Washington Conference (1921), leave the hegemon with
the world's largest naval force43 (equal to the US Navy), the second largest air force
(behind France) and among the larger peacetime annies (including Indian troops). AlI
three services operate from a fixed military budget consisting ofL135 million, coUectively_
Despite ilS relative power, the hegemon stretches its limited rnilitary assets to defend the
larger Empire and its global interests. No longer could the hegemon depend on regional
allies. Successive British government frequently cut and reappropriate funding, based on
party politics or systemic concems. Decision-makers extend the Ten-Year Plan through
( 41 Kennedy, British Naval Mastery, p.279. 43 See Appendix B, Great Britain: Major Powers Estjmated AnnuaJ N~ber ofWarships
74 the 193Os, satisfied the current international situation and military force composition would ensure systemic security.
Britain manages to rnaintain its Empire through successful political maneuvering.
Reverting to its past praetice ofindirect rule, decision-makers approve self-government for Iraq, Egypt, Trans-Jordan, and Southern Ireland. British officiais work with local leaders to create a political infrastructure both friendly and dependent on the hegemon. In the Middle East, British officials retain many advisor positions in the new governments.
The hegemon seeks political unity with its Dominions through a series ofImperial
Conferences during tbis period. While Britain favors the centralization ofimperial foreign and defense policies, the Dominions support greater autonomy. Each conference attempts to define the perimeters ofthe British Commonwealth and the responsibilities ofeach state to the imperial community. The 1926 Imperial Conference defines their relationship as an
""autonomous community within the British Empire, equal in status, in any aspect oftheir domestic or external affairs although united by a common aUegiance to the British
Commonwealth ofNations.44"
The hegemon initiates system closure as a result ofthe world economic crisis
(1929). Britain's shrinking share ofworld trade (down to 10.75% in 1929) and the City ofLondon's signfficant losses, as a result ofthe Crash, leave the hegemon with few options for stabilizing the economy. The significant drop in international trade and the new protectionist measures imposed by the US, France, Italy and Germany, subsequendy close the largest markets in the system. Britain soon looses its most important "cushion"; the returns on sen.ices and investments condueted by London. Britain responds ta the
44 Belof( p. 90.
7S economic crisis~ a10ng with the Dominions~ at the 1932 Ottawa Imperial Conference. The 1 ''-... British Commonwealth officially abandons free(r) trade, imposing a lOOA» tariffon most
imported goods from outside the Empire. The conference delegates introduce imperial
preferences~ designed to favor Commonwealth trade~ at the expense ofother states. The
Dominions provide Britain with much-needed markets for its manufaetured goods while it
provides reciprocal markets for Commonwealth agriculture and raw materials. Great
Brit~ by 1932, adopts Joseph Chamberlain's proposai for a British custom house as ilS
answer to both economic crisis and hegemonic relative decline.
CONCLUSION
The preceding detailed study ofBritish hegemony conveys the relative success it
achieves in managing decline. While Britain experiences the disjuneture ofmotivation and
capabilities~ its decision-makers effeetively initiate a two-prong campaign to close the gap,
force redeployment and the recruitment ofallies. Il solicits support from domestic
interests to radically alter its traditional balance-of-power strategy in Europe. Britain,
further still, rallies domestic support for the Boer War and First World War, facilitating
the application ofits resources 10 the war effort. The post-war phase aggravates British
relative deciine. The American and Russian isolation forces the weakened hegemon ta
continue systemic leadership. Its attempt to re-establish the international system taxes its
economy and military.
A review ofthe theoretical model (Table 5) identifies the key to Britain's relative
success. The hegemon experiences ooly 4 years ofmajor war~ unlike the Dutch Republic
which endure 25 years. Although Britain continues to deter threats for 25 years~ the
76 Table 5: British Grand Strategies in Relative Dediae (1889-1931): Results l Threat ofa Challenger Yes No
(War) Yes
(peace)
AiDes
No • 1889-1904 SpleDdid bolatioD • 1919-1931 Postwar Peace
(War) (Peaee)
Threat and • 1914-1918 World War 1 • 1904-1914 Prepariag for War Allies
absence oflengthy major wars allows the economic sector to engage in uninterrupted
world trade. The economic gains, associated with systemic peace, contribute to the
system leader's power, thereby easing relative declioe. Britain does oot sutrer the rapid
loss ofpoliticaI prestige experienced by the Dutch Republic.
A cross-seetional analysis (Table 6) depicts additional findings. While 37 years of
free(r) trade contributes ta easing decline, 29 years ofconsistent increases in military
expenditures does not. Naval arms races with France and Germany deviate excessive
capital that would otherwise benefit the financial sector. In addition, Britain steadily
increases its empire for 29 years. The hegemon's expanding commitments force decisior.- c makers to react ta the state's ever pending imperial overstretch.
77 Table 6: British Grand Strategies (1889-1932): Cross-Sectional Analysis
1889-1904 1904-1914 1914-1918 1918-1932 Spendid Isolation Preparing for War World WarI Postwar Peaee ~Policy (ThreatINo Allies) (Threat/Allies) (ThreatlAllies) (No ThreatINoAllies) Madel Actual Madel Actual Madel Actual Madel Actual Economic Free(r} Free(r} Free(r) Free(r) Restrict Restrict Free(r} Free(r} Trade Policy Military Deter Deter Deter Deter Attrition Attrition Defense Defense Strategy
Military Size Incresse Incresse Increase Incresse Increase [ncrease Maintain Maintain
Commitment MntlInc [ncresse Mntllnc Increase Increase [ncrease Maintain Maintain
78 UNITED STATES. 1971-PRESENT l Our current hegemon, the United States, requires minimal introduction to students
ofpolitical science. Its unparalleled military and economic strength, following the Second
World War, as weil as the motivation ofits domestic environment for free trade provide
the necessary elements for a renewed international system. The US decision-makers
rapidly stabilize post-war Europe through the Marshall Plan (1948). This infusion of$17
billion, over five years, enables the US to re-build the continent's infrastructure while
initiating the recruitment and creation ofa new free(r) trade system. The system leader
establishes the International Monetary Fund (IMF) and World Bank as institutions for
stabilizing the global monetary system. These international agencies enforce the rules
agreed upon at Bretton Woods (1944) for stabilizing currencies (by fixing to the goId
standard), which facilitates international trade. The US also organizes the General
Agreement on Trade and Tariffs (GATT) to encourage a free trade system. These rules
1 provide for non-discrimination in global trade and prevent noneconomic restrictions .
The new hegemon also establishes organizations for the stability and protection of
the world order. The United Nations (1945) replaces the defunct League ofNations as
the premier assembly for peacefully resolving conflict. The UN assumes an increasing
large role, in the following years, mediating international settlements and organizing
peace-keeping forces to enforce regional stability. The North Atlantic Treaty
Organization (NATO) provides the democracies ofWestern Europe with a collective
(' 1 Brawley, Liberal Leadership. p.18S.
79 security alliance against the systemic threat posed by the USSR2 and its corresponding
Warsaw Pact alliance. The US also organizes other regional alliances against this threat.
PHASE 1: 1971-1989 Cold War (Threat and Allies)
For this study~ US relative declines begins with breakdown ofthe international monetary system established at Bretton Woods (1971). President Nixon~s decision to devaluate the dolJar~ and deviate from a fixed exchange rate~ reflects the hegemon~s failure to control a persistent balance-of-payments deficie. The resulting weakened doUar indicates the US's financial inability to continue stabilizing the system based on the rapidly growing economies ofWestern Europe and Japan, and their increasing demand posed to the system. The US economy no longer possesses the inflated capital advantages its had following the war. This US abandonment ofthe Bretton Woods agreement adroits its economic relative decline among the western economies.
While the US maintains its military superiority within the system, the hegemon begins to experience the rising costs associated with systemic leadership. Escalating military costs associated with the Vietnam War and the US-Soviet arms race reflect
4 limited overextension~ or imperial overstretc~ by the hegemon . Domestic economic and political interests support a continued US overseas presence, particularly due to Soviet expansionary policies. This significant military expense directly etfects the US economy,
s slowing investment, hiking currency values and hurting export competitiveness . Despite
2 According to Brawley, the USSR and the Warsaw Pact countries are not members ofinternationaJ system. 3 CaUeo. Beyond American Hegemony, p.S5. 4 Synder, Myths ofEmpire, Ch.7. 5 Rosecrance. Trading State, Ch.S.
SO the hegemon's efforts to distribute the cost ofsecurity to its allies, the US must resolve its
costs ofsystemic leadership and maintenance inspite ofa relatively declining economy.
Numerous publications, ranging trom Gilpin to Wallerstein, each interpret the US
case according to their political affiliation. Each work offers different perspectives on the
US "imperial" dilemma while also recommending possible solutions. With less lofty
ambitions, 1 summarize US policies during this period in the effort ofmore clearly
identifying its grand strategy.
Economie Trade Poliçy
US government agencies continue ta enforce the principles offree trade. Through
both diplomatie negotiation and retaliation, the hegemon expands the participation ofthe
free(r) trade system. GATT, IMF, and the World Bank all support the hegemon's
campaign for creating stability and increasing dependency on international trade. The
system leader uses loans and favorable trading privileges as both rewards and enticements
for eliciting certain political behavior or rapprochement (i.e. China). The US also aetively
employs retaliatory taritfs against unfair trading praetices. In August 1988, President
Reagan signs a trade bill giving him broad powers to retaliate by imposing significant
tariffs against unfair competitors, such as Japan. The US seeks to remedy several ofthe
unilateral trading privileges it originally encouraged while creating the free(r) trade system.
This economic strategy succeeds to regulate trade practices for itselfand the entire trading
system.
Militaty Strategy
The hegemon and its NATO allies maintain a deterring vigil against global Soviet
( threat. The nuclear arms race, naval anns race, the SDI (i.e. Stars Wars) program, the
81 MX missile all attempt to diseourage Soviet aggression. Decision-makers in the 1970s opt l
for diplomatie solutions against tbis systemie threat7 resulting in détente and a relatively
low rate ofmilitary growth. During the early and mid-1980s7 the Reagan Administration
renews military rearmament to unpreeedented levels. Decision-makers support the
spending program based on the perceived global eommunist threat. Incidents in
Niearagu~ Afghanistan7 and Grenada renew the public beliefin the domino theory. Other
regional threats posed by Ir~ Liby~ and Cub~ contribute to public support for inereased
spending7 and therefore7 a more substantial deterrent to aggression.
Military Size
As referred above, the rate ofmilitary spending slows during the mid-1970s7
following disarmament from Vietnam. Appendix C, "United States: US Military
6 Expenditures", demonstrates the reduetion in expenditure growth from 1971-1976 ,
proceeded by relatively small growth through 1980. The Reagan Administration
stimulates excessive inereases in growth from 1981-1986. The armed forces adopt the
latest technology while also expanding their peaeetime mission around the globe.
Scholars, Iike Kennedy, interpret these increases as the heighten cost ofsystemic
7 leadership . The slower rate ofgrowth7 from 1987-1989, reflect the improving relations
between the superpowers.
Military Commitments
The system leader maintains its traditional eommitments throughout this period.
The O.S. plays a leading role in NATO and Japan's security in the Far East. It continues
6 Primarily as a result ofmilitaJy disannameot foUowing the Vietnam War. Also compounded by ( improved East-West relations, as witnesses in the later 19705. 7 See Kennedy, Rise and Fan orthe Great Powers.
82 to maintain a robust military presence in virtually every region ofthe world. On several l occasions, the hegemon employs its armed forces for enforcing systemic security in
regions deemed important to decision makers - Lebanon (1983), Caribbean (1983), Libya
(1986), Panama (1989). The US also provides foreign and military assistance to various
regions - Afghanistan, Angola, and Nicaragua/Honduras/EI Salvador. The commitments
the US maintains are those its has always maintained as hegemon. US diplomats ensure
open communications with ail its commitments, monitoring regional adherence to the
international rules.
PHASE II: 1990-Present Post Cold War (No Threat and Allies)
This current phase begins with the fall ofthe Soviet Union and its Eastern
European allies in late 1989. The demolition ofthe Berlin Wall (1989) cornmemorates the
sYffibolic elimination ofthe hegemon's systemic threat. A new world order replaces
former East-West antagonism. With only 6 years ioto the phases, no one can accurately
predict what grand strategy the hegemon will pursue. Initial postulation assumes the
8 1990s will ref1ect the growing multi-polarity ofthe 1920s . Current trends indicate that
the system leader will adopt the grand strategy predicted in this theoretical model - free(r)
trade policy, defense military strategy, reductions in military size and expenditures, and the
status quo ofits commitments.
The following two sub-sections summarize growing policy trends for the 1990s:
Reductions in Military Costs
The US clearly seeks to reduce military expenditures during the 1990s. Plans
proposed by the Bush Administration dictate the down-scaling ofUS forces from its Cold ( 8 See Kennedy, Grand Strategies in War and Peace.
83 War posture. The US Navy looses its 500-ship force while the Army shrinks to a 10 l division unit. While overseas posts close, the government rnaintain security ofits overseas
interests through technology and re-organization. Increased spending in surveillance
systems as weil as rapid deployrnent means (i.e. air mobile units, pre-position equipment,
etc) ensure the hegemon's capability to project force without maintaining the high costs
associated with a global garrison network. The US redeployment oftroops resembles the
Royal Navy's re-organization of 1904.
Increase in Foreign Interventions
US global force deployment increase significantly during this phase. With the end
ofthe Cold War, the hegemon actively enforces ilS relative control throughout the
international system. Campaigns in the Persian Gult: Somalia, Haïti and Bosnia satisfY the
hegemon's new agenda for systemic peace. A 1992 Pentagon policy study bases the
future US strategy on the "one-superpower world". The paper recommends that the
hegemon thwart emerging rivals, check nuclear proliferation, maintain regional stability,
and reject collective intemationalism. The study emphasizes America's ability to maintain
ilS own leadership position. While the US has yet to endorse this last policy, conditions
proposed by the study resemble Britain's last phase ofrelative decline (1919-1932).
(
84 Table 7: U.s. Grand Strategies in Relative Decline (1971-present): Resalts
Threat ofa Challenger Ves No
(War) Ves -1990-preseDt Post Cold War
(peace)
Allies
No
(War) (Peace)
Tbreat and -1971-1989 Cold War Allies
Table 8: U.S Grand Strategies (1971-preseot): Cross-Sectiooal Analysis
1971·1989 1990-present Cold War Post Cold War ~Policy (ThreatlAllies) (No Threat/Allies) Model Actual Model Actual Economic Free(r) Free(r) Free(r) Free(r) Trade Policy Military Deter Deter Defense Defense Strategy
Military Sïze Increase Increase Reduce Reduce
Commitment MntlInc Increase Maintain Mntllne c
85 LESSONS LEARNED
The foUowing buUets summarize the paper's major contributions:
• Policies associated with ''No ThreatlAllies" prove most conducive to managing the
hegemon's relative decline.
• Extended periods ofwarfare accelerate the hegemon's relative decline
• Systemic threat raises the costs associated with maintaining ofthe free(r) trade system.
• The hegemon effeetively distributes costs ofleadership through extemal balancing.
• Despite the higher costs ofleadership, the system leader does not retrench
commitments. lnstead, it seeks to reduce the costs associated with their security.
The preceding theoretical model and historical study only begin to examine the
complexities associated with a hegemon's grand strategy in relative decline. The reader
can draw many ofthe thesis' lessons from the preceding c10sing sections ofthe Dutch and
British cases. These lessons re-affirm Many generalizations associated with relative
decline. The strength this thesis offers is its original interpretation ofhegemonic decline.
based on grand strategies. While most studies on hegemony focus on "why" they decline,
this study targets "how" hegemons manage decline as well as "why" they pursue cenain
policies. This contribution to the study ofhegemonic development will help the reader to
understand better the past, present, and future ofhegemonic transition.
(
86 APPENDICES
APPENDIXA OUTeR REPUBLIC (1672-17208)
A-l RELATIVE DECLINE OF OUTCR REPUBLIC (TIMELINE) A-2 DUTCH REPUBLIC: ESTIMATED ANNUAL NUMBER OF WARSHIPS (TABLE) A-3 DUTeH REPUBLIC: MAJOR POWERS ESTIMATED ANNUAL NUMBER OF WARSHIPS (GRAPH) A-4 OUTCH REPUBLIC: ESTIMATED ANNUAL TROOP STRENGTH (TABLE)
APPENDIXB GREAT BRITAIN (1889-1932)
B-l RELATIVE DECLINE OF GREAT BRITAIN (TIMELINE) B-2 GREAT BRITAIN: PERCENTAGE OF WORLD TRADE (TABLE) 8-3 GREAT BRITAIN: MAJOR POWERS ESTIMATED ANNUAL NUMBER Of WARSmPS (GRAPH) 8-4 GREAT BRITAIN: MILITARY EXPENDITURES (TABLE)
APPENDIXC UNITED STATES (1971-PRESENT)
C-l RELATIVE DECLINE OF THE UNITED STATES (TIMELINE) C-2 UNITED STATES: DEFENSE EXPENDITURES, 1971-1991. (TABLE)
( APPENDIX A-I: RELATIVE DECLINE OF BUTCR REPUBLIC (1672-17208) ~ PHASES
1672·1673 FRENCH INVASION OF DUTCH REPUBLIC PHASE 1 (THREAT AND NO ALLIES)
1673·1678 WAR WITH FRANCE PHASE 2 (THREAT AND ALLIES)
1678-1688 FRAGILE PEACE PHASE 3 (NO THREAT & ALLIES)
1688-1697 GLORIOUS REVOLUTION AND NINE YEARS WAR PHASE 4 (THREAT & ALLIES)
1697·1702 PARTITION TREATŒS PHASE 5 (THREAT AND ALLIES)
1702-1713 WAR OF SPANISH SUCCESSION PHASE 6 (THREAT AND ALLIES)
1713·1720s POSTWAR EUROPE PHASE 7 (NO THREAT AND ALLIES)
TIMELINE
1660 08 May. England's civil war emls after 11 years as the son oC the laie Charles [is proclaimed king. He lands al Oover May 26, arrives al Whitehall May 29 amidst universal rejoicing, and will reign until 1685 as Charles Il.
OIOctober. Charles II acts 10 strengthen England's Navigation Act: cenain "enumerated articles" from England's American colonies may he exported oRly to the British Isles. Included are tobacco. sugar. wool. indigo. and apples. The liSI will he amended to include rice. molasses. and other articles. and Virginia tobacco prices take a precipitous drop as transport bottlenecks delay shipments. producing widespread economic distress and politicaJ unrest in the colony. Aimed at stopping direct Dutch trade with colonies.
French and English compete \Vith Dutch economica1ly while France bas more politica1 ambitions
1662 Holland and France fonn an alliance against possible attack by England.
1663 27 July. A Second Navigation Act passed by Parliamenl forbids English colonists to trade with other European countries. European goods bound for America must be unloaded at English ports and reshippecl. even though English export dulies and profits to middlemen may make priees prohibitive in America. Aimed al cutting Dutch middlemen from transporting colonial goods.
1664 27 August. Nieuw Amsterdam becomes New York as 300 English soldiers take the ( town from the Dutch onder Charles Il.
A·l-l English seamen take Africa's Cape Verde Islands ftom Outeh forces in Guinea although no war bas been declared.
French Tariffof 1664 restriets the trade ofcertain goods with Dutch traders.
1665 03 June. English naval forces defeat a Dutch Oeet otT Lowestoft as a second AngJo Dutch war begins (1665.67).
1666 France and HoUand declare war on England French forces take Antigua Montserrat. and St. Kitts in the Greater Antilles, and an English privateer takes Tobago. The Dutch sign a treaty ofalliance with the elector ofBrandenburg Friedrich Wilhelm and sign a quadruple alliance with Bmnswic~ Brandenburg, and Denmark.
1667 21 July. The Treaties ofBreda end the second Anglo-Dutch war after a Dutch Oeet bas broken the chain in England's Medway River. reacbed Cha~ and captured the Oagship Royal Charles.
England receives New Netherlands in retum for sugar·rich Surinam in South America Wlder tenns reached at Breda. Acadia is restored to Holland~s ally France. England receives Antigua Montserrat. and St. Kitts from France. and Charles Il makes a secret treaty with Louis XIV against Spain.
French troops invade Flanders and Hainault 10 begin the War ofDevolution (1667-68).
French Tariffof 1667 restriets the trade ofcertain goods with Dutch traders.
1668 23 January. A Triple Alliance negotiatedjoins England HoHand, and Sweden in resistance to France's Louis XIV in the Spanish Netherlands. but Louis will soon buy off the English and Swedes.
02 May. The Treaty of Aix-la.chapeUe ends a brief War ofDevolution waged over Louis XIV's claim to the Spanish possessions in the Belgian provinces foUowing the death of ms father-in-Iaw Philip IV ofSpain in 1665. Treaty grants France Il Conresses captured in Flanders. among them Lille and Douai.
1670 May. France's Louis XIV rnakes a defensive alliance with Bavaria and with England's Charles II~ the Treaty ofDover. French troops occupy Lorraine the same year.
Dutch Republic owns more tonnage than any other COWltry in the world.
1672 29 March. Charles Il declares war on the Dutch Republic. Louis XIV declares war against the Dutch on 06 April.
May. A Frencb army 01 100,000 crosses tbe Rbine witbout lVaminl and Învades tbe Outcb Republic as Louis XIV aets to punisb the Dutcb lor tbeir role in tbe Triple Alliance. England's Charles 0 supports Louis under secret provisions in tbe Treaty 01 Dover 01 May 1670 (Jn! Angl.Outcb War). Tbe Dutcb turn lor belp to tbe prince of Orange. The staats-general revive tbe stadbolderate July 8, and tbey make Willem m01 Orange, stadbolder, captain·general, and admirai for Iile. A mob at The Hague bnttally murden tbe grand pensionary Jan De Witt and bis brother Cornelius. (
A-l·2 06 June. DeRuyter engages the Anglo-French Oeel al Solebay in a surprise attack. l forcing the allies to postpone their planned invasion ofthe Dutch Republic. Late 1672. Imperial and Braclenburg troops are sent to Cologne to divert part ofthe French anny away from their offensive in the Dutch Republic. per an alliance between the Emperor. Bradenburg and the Dutch.
French invasion and 3rd Anglo-Dutch War halls Dutch seabome trade for 2 years.
1673 21 August. Battle ofTexel. - DeRuyter drives offAnglo-French fleet from the Dutch coast preventing an allied invasion ofthe Dutch Republic.
30 August. Hague Alliance of 1673 - Spainjoins with the Dutch to fJustrate the ambitions ofLouis XIV. Agreement between Spain and the Dutch Republic covers the protection and future security ofthe Southem Netherlands. Alliance marks the beginning ofthe Dutch offensive against the French.
Dutch forces retake New York and Delaware
1674 The Treaty ofWestminster February 19 ends the 2-year war between England and the Dutch. [t returns New York and Delaware to England. freeing the English to expand their trade and grow prosperous while Europe becomes embroiled in depleting warfare. Parliament cuts offfunds. forcing Charles II to cease hostilities. Dutch seabome trade renewed.
Louis XIV's forces assume defensive positions on the northem border and the cast by trouncing a powerful coalition army al Seneffe and expelling the imperial forces that invaded Alsace.
Dutch Placard ofFebruary 1674 forbids the imponation ofFrench wine, brandy, vinegar, paper. sail canvas. etc. Removed by 1678.
1675 05 JanuaIy. Marshal Turenne inflicts a hea~ defeat on the Dutch at Turkheim. recovers ail ofAlsace within a few weeks. but is kiUOO 27 July in a battle at Sassbach in Baden. The French retreat across the Rhine.
1676 ln the Mediterran~ the new French fleet. commanded by Admirai Abraham Duquesne. crownOO Colbert's efforts by beating the Spanish and Dutch forces 100 by the Dutch admirai Michel de Ruyter. French victory gives France control ofthe Mediterranean.
1678 10 January. England and the Dutch Republic sign an Anglo-Dutch Defensive Treaty.
March. The capture ofGhent by the French sttengthcns the peace party in HoUand. Merchants fear that Antwerp would suffer the same fate. and then Amsterdam's prosperity would be destroyed.
r "
A-I-3 10 August. The Treaty ofNijmegen offers the Dutch very favorable tenus on condition that she maintains neutrality, motivating il ta abandon its other allies. The treaty retums ta Rolland the territories she lost ta France and Spain and the reduetion oftaritrbarriers raised against Dutch merchants. A second treaty signed at Nijmegen Seplember 17 forces Spain to give up the Franche-Comle and twelve additionaI strongholds in F1anders. Dutch Placard of 1674 against French goods is removed. ResuIts in delicate peace between France and the Dulch Republic (1678-1687)
1679 Late 1679. Louis XIV offers Dulch a Treaty ofFriendsbip; uses threal oftariffs to persuade Dutch to accept. Amsterdam wishes to accept but Willem m persuades other provinces not to accept. Louis XIV. in the meanwhile, claims French ·~reunions". border areas, based on the Peace ofNijmegen.
1681 30 September. France, maintaining its armies al full stren~ annexes the Cree city of StrASbourg. This annexation sets offthe formation ofnew defensive coalitions against Louis XIV.
1682 Louis XIV blockades Luxembourg. Despite opposition by regents, Willem ID convinces the Republic ta send 8000 troops to Spain's assistance in Luxembourg as stipulated in the Dutch-Spanish Pact of 1673. French forces saon lift the siege. By 1684, Louis succeeds to annex Luxembourg despite Spanish resistance.
1683 Spain declares war on France, and Spain's Carlos D isjoined by the Holy Roman Emperor Leopold. The emperor is suddenly immobilized by a tierce invasion by the Turks who approach the gates ofVienna. Spain thus bas to bear a10ne the wrath of Louis XIV who resurnes bis attack on the Spanish towns in Belgium. Dutch again send troops to support Dutch-Spainish Pact; troops are kept in reserve and don't participate in conflict.
1684 241une. States-General accepts French airer for a 20 Year Truce in the Spanish Netherlands, leaving France with Lu."embourg and other recently annexed locaIities.
1685 06 Feb. James II ascends to the English throne. Pro-Catholic, the English monarch becomes a potential aIly ta Catholic France and a potential enemy to Protestant Dutch Republic. Also in 1685, Louis XIV revocates the Edict ofNantes, ending religious toleration in France. leading ta emigration ofFrench Huguenots to HoUand, the Holy Roman Empire, and the New World.
1686 09 July. The League ofAugsburg, created ta resist France's expansion into Germany, allies the Holy Roman Emperor Leopold l, Spain's Carlos n, Sweden's Charles XI. and the electors ofBavaria. Saxony, and the Palatine. Last year's revocation ofthe Edict of Nantes bas aroused Protestants against France.
1687 September. Louis XIV revokes concessions to Dutch trade made al Treaty ofNijmegen and reimposes the French TariffList of 1667. Dutch respond with retaliatory tariffs against France (similar ta 1674); French tariffs raUy Dutch support in favor of Willem's invasion ofEngland and the Nine Years War.
1688 ID June. The birth ofa son ta England's Queen Mary suggests the Iikelihood ofa Catholic succession. England's Whig leaders send an invitation ta the king's son-in-Iaw Willem ofOrange June 30. (
A-I-4 24 September. Louis XIV declares war against Gennan states and moves his anny l toward the Rhine. 15 November. Willem lands at Tor Bay, and moves to assume the throne with bis wife Mary. Louis XIV deelares war on the Dutch Republic as invasion annada leaves HoUand.
"'Glorious Revolution" ends nearly 4 years ofRoman Catholic mie in EngJand. James Il escapes to France December 23 and begins etTorts to regain the throne.
1689 April. Anglo-Dutch naval agreement whereby two maritime powers are to provide capital ships for joint operations in a ratio of5 to 3.
12 May. The War ofthe League of Augsburg widens as England's new king William lU fonns a Grand Alliance with the Dutch and with the League. (England takes part by virtue ofthe 1678 Anglo-Dutch Defensive Alliance)
The War ofthe League ofAugsburg begins the involvement ofthe Dutch Republic in a series ofland wars that will cause the Dutch to negleet their naval strength and thus facilitate English domination ofthe bigh seas.
1690 Spain and Savoy join the League ofAugsburg against France's Louis XIV.
30 June. The Battle ofBeachy Head gives the French a triumph over an English Oeel.
01 July. The Battle ofBoyne completes the Protestantconquest ofIreland as England's William III defeats the Catholic pretender James II and bis French supponers.
1691 12 July. The Battle of Aughrim gives William and Mary's Dutch-bom general Godert de Ginkel a victory over lreland's earl ofLucan Patrick Sarsfield and bis French allies. The resulting Treaty ofLimerick emls the Irish rebellion.
1692 29 May. The Battle ofLa Hogue costs France 15 sbips, and Louis XIV's military advisers persuade bim that great fleets are a waste ofmoney. France will avenge her loss in 1693 but willleave England and the Dutch to dispute supremacy orthe seas.
24 July. The Battle ofSteinkirk gives France's duc de Luxembourg a victory over England.
1693 26-27 May. French naval forces defeat an Anglo-Dutch Oeet offCape St. Vincent, and on 30 June gain another viclory al the Battle ofLagos offPortugal.
29 July. The Battle ofNeerwinden gives the duc de Luxembourg another victory ovec the English, but William UI remains in the field as the French sack Heidelberg for a second time.
Swiss Protestant cantons agree to supply mercenary troops to the Dutch after Catholic cantons have supplied mercenaries for Louis XIV to throw against the Dutch.
1694 The Royal Navy bombards Dieppe, Le Havre, and Dunkirk, bUl the French turn back an attack on Brest despite having been weakened by hunger and disease. (
A-1-5 1695 04 January. Marshal Luxembourg dies as the War ofthe League ofAugsburg continues. Francois de NeufviJle. Duc de Villeroi. succeeds to the command ofFrench forces in the Low Countries but will praye far less capable.
August. French forces under duc de Villeroi bombard Brussels. damaging town hall and destroying the wooden guild halls.
September. William ru recaptures Namur from the French.
1697 30 September. The Treaty ofRyswick ends the 9 year old War ofthe League of Augsburg. France restores to Spain all conquests made since the Treaty ofNijmegen in 1679 (except Strasbourg). and the French East India Company regains the Indian pepper port ofPondichery on condition that the Dutch relain commercial privileges. Spain cedes the western third ofHispaniola to France and relains the eastem part. France recognizes William m as king ofEngland with his sister-in-Iaw Anne as heiress presumptive.
The Dutch Republic gels defensive barriers in Southern Netherlands and a new Tariff list from France in 1699. French control impoct ofLevant (Turkish) conunodities as a result ofFrench presence in the Meditenanean during the war.
1698 Il October. A (First) Treaty ofPartition signed by the European powers attempts to deal with the question ofthe Spanish succession. Spain's Carlos II is childless. and the Spanish house ofHapsburg is doomed.
1700 March. (Second) Partition Treaty. France agrees to recognize the archduke Charles of Austria as successor to the Spanish throne upon Carlos D's death in return for Spanish possessions in llaIy.
01 November. Spain's Carlos Il dies at age 39 after a 35-year reign. He bas named as his heir Philip ofAnjou. grandson ofFrance's Louis XIV: the first Bourbon king of Spain ascends the throne and will reign until 1746 as Philip V. Louis XIV recognizes the succession on 16 November. breaking the Second Partition Treaty.
The Great Northern War begins in Europe as Russia, Poland. and Denmarkjoin forces to oppose Swedish supremacy in the Baltic. Sweden's Charles XII surprises the Danes by landing troops in Zeeland. Threatening Copenhagen. he forces Denmark to sign the Treaty ofTravendal August 18 and to remove itselffrom the alliance against Sweden. Wu significantly disturbs trade in Baltics, hurting Dutch commerce.
1701 February. French troops enter the Southern Netherlands securing Philip V's claim and forcing Dutch garrisons stationed there to withdraw to the Republic. Philip prohibits Dutch trade in Spanish America. French commerce insinuates itselfinto the Spanish colonies.
September. The War ofSpanish Succession begins in Europe as Philip ofAnjou gain recognition as king ofSpain, and the Holy Roman Emperor Leopold 1 moves to take over Spain's Dutch and Italian possessions. England and Holland. fearful ofhaving the France ofLouis XIVjoined with Spain, fonn a Grand Alliance with the emperor. and Eugene~ prince ofSavoy, joins the alliance September 7.
1702 08 March. England's William ID dies. He is succeeded by his sister-in-Iaw Anne. who ( will reign uotil 1714, the last monarch ofthe House ofStuart.
A-I-6 14 May. The Grand Alliance declares war 00 France. Queeo Anne names John Churchill as captain-geoeral ofEngiand's land forces and raises him to duke of Marlborough December 14 after he bas forœd the surrender ofKaisenverth on the Rhine in June, Venlo on the Meuse in September. and Liege October 29.
Convention between England and the Dutch Republic concludes the desired troop/naval appropriations for the war. By this time. the Dutch Republic is a secondaJy military power in comparison to England and France.
1702 marks the beginning ofongoing domestic debate between trading provinces and land provinces over military issues (naval vs. army expenditures) and economic policies (free-trade vs. protectionism) rising out ofthe War ofSpanish Succession.
1703 The Grand Alliance proclaims Austria's archduke Charles king ofSpain and he prepares to invade Catalonia. The Duke ofMarlborough invades the Spanish Netherlands. taking Bonn. Huy, Limburg and Guelders.
27 December. The Methuen Treaty between England and Portugal facilitates trade in English woolens and Portuguese \Vines. England expands ils commerce role during the war often at the Dutch's expense.
June. Dutch traders are probibited by English allies to trade with France. repealed in summer 1704. States-General bans MOst impons from France, Spain and South Netherlands. but this proves too hannful to Dutch trade, leading to the eventuaJ lifting ofthe ban in the summer of 1704.
Convention of 1703, expanding the Anglo-Dutch Defense Treaty.
1704 13 August. The Battle ofBlenheim gives the Duke ofMarlborough a stunning victory over the French-Bavarian coalition.
1705 14 October. The Austrian archduke Charles lands in Catalonia and English forces help him take Barcelona in continuing the War of Spanish Succession. Holy Roman Emperor Leopold 1dies and the throne is assumed by bis son, Joseph 1.
1706 23 May. The Battle ofRamillies gives the duke ofMarlborough a victol)' over a French army conunanded by the duc de Villeroi. Marlborough's triumph is followed by the submission ofBrussels, Antwerp, Ghent, Ostend, and other major cilies in Southem Netherlands.
23 May. English forces raise a French siege ofBarcelona. Portuguese forces invade Spain and install the Austrian archduke as king at Madrid, but Philip V drives them out in Oclober.
Anglo-Dutch Treaty. (Firsl Barrier Treaty - Act ofSettlement) First mention ofDutch guarantee ofEnglish succession.
1707 01 May. The United Kingdom ofGreat Britain created unites England and Scotland onder the Union Jack. (
A-I-7 1788 Il July. Ghent and Bruges resume their aUegiance to France in early July. Fearing that other cities will follow sui~ the duke ofMarlborough defeats the French at the Battle of l Oudenarde with the help from Eugene ofSavoy.
The United East India Company created by a meager ofBritain's two rival East India companies is the strongest European power on the coasts ofIndia. The company ships [ndian silks. coltons. indigo. cotfee. and saltpeter as weil as China tca.
1789 Ready to make peace. Louis XIV cao not bring bimselfto accept the stifJterms ofthe alliance, which included the demand that he transfer ail Spanish possessions to the archduke Charles. recognize him as king ofSpain and remove Philip V from Madrid.
11 September. The Battle ofMalplaquet is the bloodiest ofthe War ofSpanish Succession taking 20.000 allied lives The French retire in good arder from the triumphant prince ofSavoy and duke ofMarlborough (whose Tory opponents cali him a butcher and use bis excesses to attack the power ofBritain's Whigs)
Treaty ofSuccession and Barrier. or Townshend Barrier Treaty, conducted between the Dutch Republic and Great Britain. provides a Dutch guarantee ofProtestant English succession and Dutch barrier rights in the Southem Netherlands following the war. guaranteeing Dutch security against French expansionism.
1710 November. Britain achieves her first clean-cut peaceful transfer ofpower. The Tory party wins a clear majority in the Commons and ousts the Whig government headed by the duke ofMarlborough. Queen Anne dismisses the duke ofMarlborough by 1711 as his enemies increase their influence on the Queen. They have accused the duke of speculation. and the Queen makes James Butler. duke ofOrmonde. the commander in chiefofBritish forces.
Louis XIV ends trading with the Dutch Republic. Dutch States·GeneraJ imposes the 1703 ban against importing goods from France. Spain and Southem Netherlands. which was first repealed by 1704.
1711 17 April. The Holy Roman Emperor Josef 1dies ofsmallpox and is succeeded by bis brother archduke Charles who will reign uotil 1740 as Charles VI. Heir to all the empire's Austrian territories. he fights to restore the empire ofbis Hapsburg ancestor Charles V.
1712 Talks between France and English minister Bolingbroke resuJt in preliminary peace agreement. France signs an armistice with England at Utrecht in July.
24 July. French forces onder Marshal Villars defeat A1lied forces (Dutch and Imperial) commanded by Prince Eugene and earl AJbemarle at Denain. the French recapture Douai. Le Quesnoy, and Bouchain. and the Congress ofUtrecht opens to resolve the war.
1713 11 April. The Treaty ofUtreeht ends the War ofSpanish Succession. France's Louis XIV agrees not to unite France and Spain uoder one king, recognizes the Protestant succession in Britain. agrees to tear down French fortifications at Dunkirk and to fill up Dunkirk harbor, and gives up sorne Northem American territories to Britain.
( Third Barrier Treaty between Great Britain and Dutch Republic.
A·l·8 1714 06 March. The Treaty ofRastatt eods the war belWeeo Austria and S~ the Spanish l Netherlands becomes the Austrian NetherIands. and Spain gives up her possessions in Italy and Luxembourg aJoog with those in Flanders.
1714 onward. Marks major and pennanent decline in Duteh warships. Important for Dutch to gain British support for its barrier system in the Southem Netherlands to augment its security~ reason for Barrier Treaty.
1715 01 September. Louis XIV dies at age 76 after 72·year reign. His great·grandson will reign until 1774 as Louis XV, initially with Philip fi Bourbon, duc d'Orleans as regent.
November. AustnrDutch Treaty ofAntwerp confirms Austria's acœptance ofthe 16~8 Scheldt Restrictions and the 1680 TaritfList and Barrier Agreement effectively reducing Antwerp's economic role and providing for Dutch trade supremacy in Southem (Austrian) Netherlands.
Dutch send troops ta EngJand in fear ofJacobite attaek. per the Barrier Treaty agreement guaranteeing Dutch support for Protestant succession. Dutch also send troops to EngJand in 1719.
French forces in the Indian Ocean take Mauritius from the Dutcb. who held it since 1638.
1717 04 January. The triple alliance fonned by Britain.. France and the Dutch Republic forces the Dld Pretender James ru to leave France. Objective is to secure stability in Europe.
1718 02 August. Spain's Philip V sends troops ioto SiciJy in July and bis seizure ofthe country raises fears ofa new European war. The Quadruple Alliance fonned by the Holy Roman Emperor. Britain., and France determines to prevent Philip from overtuming the peace of 171~. The Dutch Republic hesilates to jaïn. preferring neutrality towards Spain guaranteeing continued access to Spanish trade.
II Deœmber. Sweden's Charles XII dies. Charles is sucœeded by bis sister Ulrika Eleanora who brings the Great Nonhem War to a close.
1720 17 February. Spain's Philip V joins the Quadruple Alliance ofBritain. France. and Austria in January. He signs the Treaty ofThe Hague giving up bis ltalian daims in return for an Austrian promise that bis son Charles will succeed to Panna, Piacenza. and Tuscany. The Holy Roman Emperor Charles VI gives up bis claims to Spain. and Savoy receives Sardinia from Austria in retum for Sicily.
1720s - Spread of Îndustrial mercantililm in Rallies and much of Europe. Marks begïnnÎng of the end of Dutch primacy in Rallies commerce, ils most important market.
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A-I-9 APPENDIX A-2: DUTCH RD'UBLIC: ESTIMATED ANNUAL NUMBER OF WARSBIPS. l_ 1660-17201* YEAR NUMBER Of WARSHIPS SOURCES ON NUMBER OF WARSHIPS 1660 78 "78' wl3O+- guns (Vreugdenhil. 1938) 1661 82 "82' wl3O+ guns (Vreugdenhil~ 1938) 1662 83 "83' w/30+ guns (Vreugdenhil, 1938) 1663 87 '87' w/30+ guns (Vreugdenhil. 1938) 1664 95 "95' wl3O+ guns (Vreugdenhil. 1938) 1665 93 "93' w/30+ guns (Vreugdenbil, 1938) 1666 96 "96' w/30+ guns (Vreugdenhil. 1938) 1667 95 "95' w/30+ guns (VreugdenhiL 1938) 1668 94 "94' w/30+ guns (Vreugdenhil. 1938) 1669 94 '94' w/30+ guns (Vreugdenhil. 1938) 1670 96 '96' wl3O+ guns (Vreugdenhil. 1938) 1671 80 "80' w/40+ guns (Vreugdenhil. 1938) 1672 77 '77' w/40+ guns (Vreugdenhil. 1938) 1673 70 '70' w/40+ guns (Vreugdenhil. 1938) 1674 63 "63' w/40+ guns (Vreugdenhil. (938) 1675 63 '63' w/40+ guns (Vreugdenhil. 1938) 1676 51 "51' w/40+ guns (VreugdenhiL 1938) 1677 51 .. 51' w/40+ guns (Vreugdenhil. 1938) 1678 53 '53' w/40+ guns (Vreugdenhil, 1938) 1679 54 '54' w/40+ guns (Vreugdenhil. 1938) 1680 54 '54' w/40+ guns (Vreugdenhil. 1938) 1681 54 '54' w/40+ guns (VreugdenhiJ. 1938) 1682 61 '61' w/.JO+ guns (VreugdenhiJ. 1938) 1683 61 '61' \\"/40+ guns (VreugdenhiJ. 1938) 168.J 61 '61' w/40+ guns (Vreugdenhil. 1938) 1685 65 '65' w/40+ guns (VreugdenhiL 1938) 1686 53 '53' w/40+ guns (Vreugdenhil. 1938) 1687 55 '55' w/40+ guns CVreugdenhiJ. 1938) 1688 66 '66' \\"/40+ guns (VreugdenhiJ. 1938) 1689 71 '71' w/40+ guns (VreugdenhiL 1938) 1690 61 "61' w/40+ guns (VreugdenhiL 1938) 1691 60 '60' w/50+ guns (VreugdenhiJ. 1938) 1692 61 '61' w/50+ guns (VreugdenhiJ. 1938) 1693 65 '65' w/50+ guns (Vreugdenhil, 1938) 1694 73 '73' w/50+ guns CVreugdenhil, 1938) 1695 74 "74' w/50+ guns (Vreugdenhil, 1938) 1696 73 "73' \\"/50+ guns (Vreugdenhil, 1938) 1697 73 '73' \\"/50+ guns (Vreugdenhil. 1938) 1698 72 '72' w/50+ guns CVreugdenhil. 1938) 1699 81 "81' w/SO+ guns (VreugdenhiJ. 1938) 1700 86 "86' w/50+ guns CVreugdenhiJ, (938) 1701 86 "86' w/SO+ guns (Vreugdenhil. 1938) 1702 89 '89' w/50+ guns (Vreugdenhil~ 1938) 1703 88 34 w/50+ (de Jonge. 1869): [22 in European waters) Owen. (1938) 1704 87 35 w/50+ (de Jonge. 1869): [20 in European waters) Owen. (1938) 1705 86 35 w/50+ (de Jonge. 1869): ( [31 in European waters] Owen. (1938) 1706 85 30 w/50+ (de Jonge, (869); [25 in European waters) Owen. (1938)
A-2-1
------_.. --- -- APPENDIX A-2: OUTeR REPUBLIC: ESTIMATEO ANNUAL NUMBER OF WARSHlPS, 1660-17201* (CONTINUED)
YEAR NUMBER OF WARSHIPS SOURCES ON NUMBER OF WARSHIPS 1707 84 32 w/50+ (de longe. 1869); [26 in European waters] Owen. (1938) 1708 83 31 w/50+ (de longe. 1869); [25 in European waters] Owen. (1938) 1709 82 30 w/50+ (de longe. 1869); [23 in European waters] Owe~ (1938) 1710 81 [14 in European waters] Owen., (1938) 1711 80 50 (Charnock. 1800-3): 40 (Richmond, 1946) 1712 79 1713 78 1714 77 77 w/50+ (Bruijn., 1970) 1715 73 1716 70 1717 66 1718 63 1719 59 1720 56 1721 53 1722 49 1723 45 1724 42 1725 42
* Data extracted frOID Modelski. George and William Thompson. Seapower in Global Politics. 1494-1993. Seattle: Univ ofWashington Press. 1988.
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A-2-2 OZla. 8&.l&. 91.ll. tl.l&. Zl.l&. Ol.l&. 80la. 9OL&. tOl&. ZOLa. OOLI. 869&. 969&. t691.
Z69a. fi) ~ca 069&. GJ 889&. > 989&. t89&. Z89&. 0891. 8L9a. 9L9&. tL9&. ZL9&. OL9&. 8991. 999&. t991. Z99&. 0991. 0 0 0 N ..-
"a• c li ." 'i: C G G li U ~ c -a. Il C ~ ( •Z W U. y + + APPENDIXA-4: OUTCR REPUBLIC: ESTIMATEO ANNUAL TROO. STRENGTH 1672-17201* ( YEAR TROOP STRENGTH EVENT/SOURCE OF CHANGE (+/-) 1672 29,000 French invasion ofDutch Republic 1673 29,000+ Willem mobilizes Dutch resources 1674 100,000 1675 68,000 Debt forces reduction in strength 1676 68.000 1677 90,000 Willem rallies wartime support despite debt 1678 90,000 1679 45,000 Peacetime troop strength 1680 45,000 1681 45.000 1682 45,000 Willem initiates increaselAmsterdam laler 1683 45.000 blacks increase in expenditures 1684 45.000 1685 35,000 Amsterdam forces reduction in expenditures 1686 35,000 1687 35,000 1688 50,000 1688-89 50,000+ Nine Years War - specific data not available 1690-92 73.000·· Nine Years War 1693 93.000·· Nine Years War 1694-97 73,000-93,000 Nine Years War - specific data not available 1698-1701 51,000+ Intenvar period - data not available 1702 100.000 War ofSpanish Succession 1708 119,000 1712 130.000 1713 90.000 Treaty ofUtrecht 1715 40,000 Debt forces reduction in strength 1717 34,000 2nd Great Assembly votes reduction 1718-1725 34,000
• Data extracted from Israel. Jonathan. The Dutch Republic. 1477-1806. Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1995. Nwnbers are approximations, derived directly from the above reading. These numbers include total military forces in European theater. including numerous foreign troops hired by Dutch particularly during wartïme. VOC and WIC soldiers excluded; approximately 7500 VOC soldiers in East Indies between 1672-1730.
•• Data Crom Kennedy, Paul. Rise and FaU ofGreat Powers. New York: Random House, 1987.
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A-4-1 APPENDIX 8-1: RELATIVE DECLINE OF GREAT BRITAIN (1889-1931)
l PHASES
1889-1904 SPLENDID ISOLATION PHASE 1 (THREAT AND NO ALLIES)
1904-1914 PREPARING FOR WAR PHASE 2 (THREAT AND ALLIES)
1914-1918 WORLDWARI PHASE 3 (THREAT AND ALLIES)
1919-1932 POSTWAR PEACE PHASE 4 (NO THREAT AND NO ALLIES)
TIMELINE
1880 8 March. Britain's Conservatives lose in the generaJ electioDS. Lord Beaconsfield (Disraeli), now 75. resigns 18 April. William Gladstone's Liberais will hold office until 1885.
De Beers Mining Corp. is founded by English diarnond operator Cecil John Rhodes and English financier Alfred Beit. Rhodes gains a virtual monopoly in the South Africau diamond industry by 1888.
French Equatorial Africa is established as a French protectorate.
Dec 30. A Boer Republic independent ofBritain's Cape Colony is proclaimed by Oom Paul Kruger who begins a short-lived revoit that will end with the establishment ofthe independent South African Republic under British suzerainty.
188t Boers in the Transvaal repulse British forces Janwuy 28 at Laing's Neck and defeat them February 27 at Majuba Hill. The Treaty ofPretoria conducted April 5 gives independence to the South African Republic ofthe Boers but under British suzerainty.
1882 20 May. A Triple Alliance pledges Gennany, Austria and Italy to come to each other's aid should any be attacked by France within the next 5 years.
11 July. Alexandria is bombarded by the British fleet under Sir Beauchamp Seymour. British troops are landed to proteet the Suez Canal from nationalist forces. British forces occupy Caïro September 15 and dual Anglo-French control ofEgypt is abolished November9.
ltaly takes over Ethiopia' nonhem town ofAssab and will make it the basis ofan Eritrean colony in 1890.
France claims a protectorate over the entire northwestem portion ofMadagascar.
1883 8 June. The Convention ofMarsa with the bey ofTunis assures French control of Tunisia. (
B-l-l 2S August. Treaty signed a Hue rccognizes Tonkin, ~ and Cochin China as l French protectorates. but China rejects the treaty, and continues to resist French control. The Mahdi Mohammed Ahmed ibn-Seyyid Abdullah ofDongola challenges Egyptian control ofthe Sudan.
1884 24 April. Chancellor Bismarck cables Cape Town that Southwest Africa (Namibia) is a Gennan colony. The consul at Tunis proclaims a protectorate over the coast of Togoland Joly 5 and a protectorate over the Cameroon Coast a week later.
Egypt's khedive Mohammed Tewfik gives fonner Sudaoese govemor Charles Gordon executive powers and Gordon moves out to rescue Egyptian garrisoos in the Sudan from the Mahdi.
1885 26 January. Khartoum falls to the Mahdi Mohammed Ahmed whose forces massacre General Gordon and bis garrison just before a British reliefexpedition reaches the city.
9 June. Britain's second Gladstone ministry ends. Robert Arthur Talbot Gascoyne Cecil. marquis ofSalisbury. bas headed the Tories since the death ofLord Beaconsfield in 1881 and begins a brief ministry.
Russia approaches the brink ofwar with Britain over Afghanistan. Russia builds up ilS neet in the next few years and becomes more receptive to an entente with France. The prospect ofa Franco-Russian naval alliance. which would pincer the under-strength British Mediterranean F1eet and eut thal vital line ofcommunication in time ofwar. provokes the British govemment to introduce the Two-Power Standard in 1889.
British troops occupy Port Hamilton. Korea.
Britain establishes protectorates in the Niger River southem regjon. in north Bechuanaland and in Guinea.
Germany annexes Tanganyika and Zanzibar.
The king ofthe Belgjans Leopold II assumes the tille ofsovereign ofthe Congo Free State.
1886 27 January. Britain's first Salisbury ministry ends after 7 months and a third Gladstone ministry begjns Febmary 12.
08 April. An Irish home mie bill introduced in Parliament by Prime Minister Gladstone provides a separate Irish legislature but retaios control ofmatters relating to the army. navy, trade and navigation, and the crown in the British Parliament where the Irish will no longer be represented. Conservatives attack the measure, the marquis ofHuntington Joseph Chamberlain resigns from the Gladstone cabinet and leads a secession from the Liberal party, the bill is defeated in Joly, and the third Gladstone ministry ends Joly 26 when a general election gjves victory to the Conservatives. A second Salisbury ministry takes power (1886-1892).
Britain annexes upper Bunna following a third Anglo-Burmese war. but desultory guerrilla warfare will continue for years. (
B-I-2 1887 II Ianuary. Bismarck wams Europe agaiDSt war in a speech advocatiog a much larger German arroy. Ententes are fonned among the powers, the Triple Alliance of 1882 is renewed for another 5 years, and a secret Russian-Gennan treaty is signed 18 Joo foUowing Russia's refusai to renew the expiring 1881 Alliance ofthe Tbree Emperors.
22 May. Britain promises to evacuate Egypt within 3 years in the Drummond-Wolff Convention with Constantinople. but ooly ifconditions are favorable: Britain relains the right to reoccupy Egypt should the country he menaced by invasion or internal disorder.
Britain annexes Zululand to block the Transvaal government from establishing a link to the sea.
1888 09 March. Wilhelm 1dies at Berlin, after a 27-year reign ofPrussia and Gennany. Wilhelm is succeeded by bis son Friedrich Wilhelm but the new emperor dies 15 June of throat cancer and is succeeded in tom by bis so~ Wilhelm II, 29. who will reign uotil 1919 as the last Gennan monarch.
11 Mar. Britain establishes a protectorate over Sarawak and over North Bomeo May 12.
30 October. The Matehele king Lobengula accepts a British protectorate and signs a treaty giving the Cecil Rhodes interests exclusive mining rights.
1889 10 January. The Ivory Coast becomes a French protectorate.
Marcb. Tbe Britisb government proclaimed in intention to maintain a two-power standard by introducing tbe Naval Defense Act into Parliament - under wbicb L21.S million will be spent upon new constnction, including 16 battlesbips. Tbe government proposes tbe standard in ligbt oftbe Franco-Russian naval cballenge and tbe public's sudden realization ofBritain's relatively declining maritime supremacy. (Kennedy, Britisb Naval Mutery, p.178)
The British South Africa Co. headed by Cecil Rhodes receives almost unlimited rights and powers ofgovemment in the area nonh ofthe Transvaal and west ofMozambique.
1890 The Influence ofSea Power Uoon Historv. 1660-1783. by V.S. naval officer-historian Alfred Thayer Mahan demonstrates the decisive role of naval strength and will have enonnous influence in encouraging the world powers to develop powerful navies. His book is eagerly read in Britain, Russia, Japan and Germany.
18 March. Kaiser Wilhelm forces Bismarck to resign as prime minister.
01 July. Anglo-German disputes in cast Africa are resolved in an agreement by which the Gennans give up all daims to Uganda, reœive the island ofHeligoland in the North Sea. and recognize the British protectorate over Zanzibar established 14 June.
11 July. Cecil Rhodes becomes prime minister ofAfrica's Cape Colony and adds the political post to bis position as head ofDe Becrs Consolidated Gold Fields and of British South African Railway.
1891 August. France and Russia reach consensus on entente, seen as a threat by Britain. Russia demonstrates this entente with the pon cali ofa Russian naval squadron al Toulon in 1893. The British government believes the Russian naval presence poses a ( threal to the British Mediterranean nect and the Suez Canal.
B-I-3 1892 13 AugtlSL Britain's second Salisbwy ministty falls in the general election after 6 years l in power. A fourth Gladstone cabinet takes office August 18.
French forces defeat the Fulani on the Upper Niger and take Segu. French forces also depose the king ofDahomey but encounter resistance in the fonn ofnative uprisings agaiDSt imperialism.
1893 France establishes French Guiana in South America and the Ivory Coast in Africa as fonnal colonies. Laos becomes a French protectorate in 1893 as France begins to develop a new colonial empire in Indochina. On the Niger River, French forces defeat Tuareg warnors.
Natal gains self-government while Transvaal annexes Swaziland.
1894 05 Mar. Britain's fourth Gladstone ministry ends after Gladstone bas shattered the Liberal party with his 6gbt for Irish home Me. The LiberaIs retain power with Archibald Philip Prirnrose, earl ofRosebery, as prime minister.
12 May. The Congo Treaty with the king ofthe Belgians Leopold U gives Britain a lease on a wide corridor between Lake Tanganyika and Lake Albert Edward. German protests force the British to abandon their corridor and give up the possibility ofa Capetown to Cairo railroad.
22 June. Dahomey becomes a French colony. French imperialists have hopes oftaking over the southem part ofthe former Egyptian Sudan and forcing the British to evacuate Egypt by threatening to divert the course ofthe Nile.
01 August. China and Japan declare war on each other, and the Japanese win easy victories in the ensuing months. Berlin and Washington reject a British invitation to Gennany, France, Russia and the United States to join in a united move to intenrene.
Outraged by the Russian port caU at Toulon, the British government increases naval spending to include 9 first-class battleships to maintain maritime superiority.
1895 25 June. Britain's Tories regain power in the general elections and a third Salisbury ministry begins. Il will continue UDtil 1902.
17 April. The Treaty ofShimonoseki ends a briefSino-lapanese war thal bas destroyed the Chinese Army and Navy. China recognizes the independence ofKorea, cedes Taiwan and agrees to open four more ports to foreign commerce. France obtains territorial and commercial concession's in China's southem provinces.
II June. Britain annexes Tongaland ta black any possible access ofthe Transvaal to the sea via Swaziland, and Becbuanaland is attached to the Cape Colony in November.
Venezuela Border Dispute. United States declares it has a duty to detennine the boundary between Venezuela and British Guiana and would resist British aggression beyond that line. Britain recognizes this broad interpretation ofthe Monroe Doctrine and the boundary was finaily redrawn in 1899.
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8-14 29 December. The Jameson Raid is an attempt to fonnent rebellion against the Boer govemment ofthe Transvaal's Oom Paul Kruger. Leander Stan' Jameson leads men in l a 140-mile dash across the Transvaal. Jameson is defeated by Boer forces at Krugerdorp on lanuary 1 and turned over to the British for trial in Englan~ where he is convieted but receives only a light sentence. A telegram ofcongratulations to Kruger from the German kaiser on lanuary 3 strains Anglo-Gennan relations. and mutual suspicions set in among the Boers and British in South Africa.
1896 06 JanuaJY. Cecil Rhodes resigns the Cape Colony premiersmp; a committee ofthe Cape Assembly fins mm guilty ofhaving engineered the Jameson raid. The Transvaal government sÎgns a defensive alliance with the Orange Free State in mid-March: it fortifies Pretoria and Johannesburg with munitions ordered from Europe.
AngIo-Egyptian troops begin a reconquest ofthe Sudan under the command ofGeneral Horatio Hebert Kitchener. who builds a railroad as he advances.
June. Chamberlain first introduces his proposai for the British ZoUverein, or Customs Union. in the British parliament. His proposai, to create a customs union with British overseas possessions and thos discriminate against non-union goods through tariffs. encounters major opposition by the summer of 1897. The proposai is later re-introduced into parliament after the Boer War.
06 August. France proclaims the African island ofMadagascar a French colony. Also in 1896, a French expedition. onder Jean Baptiste Marchan~ to claim the Sudan sets out for Fashoda.
1897 23 February. French forces have taken Busa and take Nikki November 30, bringing vigoroos protests from Britain and raising the threat of\Var between Britain and France.
22 June. Queen Victoria celebrates her Diamond Jubilee.
14 November. German forces in China occupy Tsingtao following the mucder oftwo German missionaries. Germans select Tsingtao as their reward for having intervened in behalfofChina against Japan in 1895. Their action precipitates a scramble for concessions in China by most ofthe great European powers (Le. Britain. Russia France)
Germany declares policy ofWelunacht. or world power.
1898 January. Lansdowne proposes adding 6 infantry battalions to the Home Defense Force. as a result ofboth invasion scare and the realization that British forces are spread thinly around the empire (i.e. imperial overstretch)
15 February. The U.S. battleship Maine blows up in Havana harbor, precipitating a Spanish-American War that lasts for 112 days.
March. Chamberlain proposes an alliance with Germany. Both British ministers rejects the proposai. AIse in Match, Britain shows concem over Russian pressure on North China. The govemment drafts an ultimatum to Russia aimed at discouraging aggression.
Britain approves funding for 8 additional battleships due to Russia's intention to add 6 ( battleships to its fleet. Britain views both France and Russia as its most viable threat.
8-1-5 Gennany passes the First German Navy Law, aimed al gaining popular support for the construction ofa battle Oeel The legislation designates the British Royal Navy as the l enemy.
02 September. The Battle ofOmdurman gives Gen. Kitchener a decisive viClory over the khalifa ofthe Sudan Abullah et Taashi. Kitchener~s British anny takes Khartoum from the dervishes. reaches Fashoda September 19. and finds it occupied by French forces onder Major Jean-Baptiste Marchand.
03 November. Paris orders the evacuation ofFashoda. France had claimed the left bank ofthe Nile and Ethiopia the right bank. London demanded that the French evacuate the territory that Britain claims for Egypt by right ofconquest. The French tIy to gel Russian support but fail.
1899 21 Mareh. France and Britain agree on established spheres ofinfluence in Mrica as a result ofthe Fashoda Crisis.
Il Oetober. Samoa Incident. Competing British and German daims on the South Pacifie Samoan islands ends on 8 November with the exchange ofpossessions between the two countries.
12 October. The Boer War begins in South Africa as President Kruger ofthe Boer republie aets to black suspected British moves towards acquiring the rich Transvaal \Vith its gold mines. The Boers lay siege to British South Africa; Mafeking October 13. Kimberley October 15, and Ladysmith November 2.
An "Open DooT" policy in China proposed by the United States receives support from the great powers. Theyagree that ail the imperialist couotries shaH have equal commercial opportunity in spheres ofspecial interest.
1900 The Boer War continues in South Africa where Frederick Sleigh Roberts arrives January 10 to assume position ofcommander-in-cbief with Lord Kitchener as bis chiefofstaff. British cavalry relieves Kimberley February 15 after a 4-month Boer siege. General Roberts forces the surrender ofConje's Boer army near Paardeberg Febmary 27 while British forces under Buller relieves Ladysmith February 28. BloeDÛontein falls on March 13 and Mafeking is relieved May 1T after a 215 day siege. British forces, numbering 250,000, invade the Boer republics seizing Johannesburg May 31, Pretoria June 5 and Vlakfontein July 4. Britain annexes the Orange Free State and the Transvaal. President Kruger Oees to Delagoa Bay and voyages to Europe in hopes of obtaining German support, but Kaiser Wilhelm U deDies the aged Kruger an audience October6.
21 May. Russia annexes Manchuria.
20 June. A "Boxer Rebellion" rocks China as foreign legations at Beijing are besieged by members ofa militia backed by an anti-foreigner clique at the Manchu court. An eight-nation expeditionary force lifts the siege ofthe legations August 14, but al least 231 foreign civilians are kiUed in various pans ofChina. Russian troops retaliate for mid-July Chînese bombardments across the Amur River. The Russians seize southem Manchuria in the fall.
16 October. Britain's "Khaki" election results in a victory for the Conservatives who ( retain power under the marquis ofSalisbury.
B-I-6 Gennany passes the Second Gennan Navy Law in reaction to the British Royal Navy l stopping 3 German ships believed to be supplying the Boer republics in January. Legislation approves funding for 8 battleships, which seriously alarms the British AdmiraIty.
1901 SpringiSummer. Renewed taIks between Britain and Germany conceming a possible alliance aimed against Russian expansion in Asia fails for a second time.
18 November. Second Hay-Pauncefote Treaty. Britain abandons rights to an isthmian canal to the United States. U.S. pledges the principle ofneutraIity providing that the canal would be open to aU nations on equal tenns. Tacit admission ofU.S. supremaC)' in the Western Hemisphere.
1902 20 January. The Anglo-Japanese Alliance ends the "splendid isolation" ofBritain and recognizes Japan's interests in Korea. Ifeither party should become involved in war with a third party, its ally is to remain neutral, but ifwar should expand to involve any other power or powers, then the ally is obligated to enter the conflict.
15 May. Chamberlain's "Cali for Inquiry" speech within the Conservative party leads to the debate on Imperial Preferences. Chamberlain anempts to solidify the Empire and promote imperial unity~ campaïgn starts after the Boer War with the temporary tariffon imported grain to mise fonds in April 1902. Campaign ends with defeat in 1905 election.
31 May. The Treaty ofVereeniging ends the Boer War. The Boers accept British sovereignty in South Africa, the British promise L3 million for rebuilding Boer farms.
Il JuIy. Britain's prime minister Lord Salisbury retires and is succeeded by bis nephew Arthur James Balfour who will head the govemment until 1905.
09 December. Venezuela refuses ta meet her debt obligations: British. Gennan and ltalian warships blockade Venezuelan ports until February 1903 until the Venezuelan ruler agrees to arbitration by a Hague Tribunal commission. President Roosevelt in 1904, announces the Roosevelt Corollary to the Momoe Doctrine stating that the U.S. would act as t.he "policeman" ofthe region.
1903 Failure ofthe Russians to evacuate Manchuria onder last year's Russo-Chinese agreement brings Japanese notes which the Russians contemptuously ignore.
U.S. gunboat diplomacy expedites construction ofthe Panama Canal.
British government announces its intention to maintain a 25.000 soldier garrison in South Africa. Little ofthis garrison remained by 1910. Also in 1903. British forces complete the conquest ofnorthem Nigeria.
1904 Gennan colonial forces face an insurrection in German South-West Africa that will continue uotil early 1908. The revoit will he suppressed after methodicaJ campaigns requiring 20,000 Gennan troops.
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B-I-7 08 February. Japanese navaI forces attack Pon Arthur in southem Manehuria. bottling op a Russian squadron. Concerned al Russia's failure to withdraw from Manehuria and l her oontinuing penetration ofKorea.. the Japanese foUow their snea.k attaek with a declaration ofwar Febrwuy 10. defeat the Russians at the Yalu River. al Liaoyang. occupy Dairen and Seou!. and force the Russians to puU back ta Mukden.
07 April. Anglo-Freneh Entente Cordia1e. While the intent addressed mattees externaJ to Europe. the agreement provided the foundation for military baeking against Gennan aggression.
21 October. Dogger Bank Crisïs. Russian Oeet. on its way ta fight J~ tires on English fishing boats by mistake. Britain is ouuaged but bath nations aven oonfliet.
21 October. Admirai Fisher becomes First Sea Lord. ln an AdmiraitY Memorandum dated 06 December. he announces the e.xtensive redeployment ofthe Royal Nav)". uith the intent ofreducing oost and improving force projection.
1905 02 January. Russian forces at Pon Arthur surrender to Japanese infantry as SL Petersburg verges on l'eVolution. On 27 May. the Japanese Nav)' defeats the Russian fleet. sent around the Cape ofGood Hope. at the Hattie ofTsushima Straits. (Defeat of Russian fleets reduces perceived threat to Royal Navy) President Roosevelt Mediates the dispute and a treaty is signed September 5. 80th nations agree to evaeuate Manchuria Russia cedes the southem haIf ofSakhalin Island and recognizes Japan's paramount interest in Korea.
06 Febrtléll)·. Cabinet decides to withdraw troops from West Indies. Bennuda and Mediterranean. AdmiraitYannounces cutbacks in Halifax. Esquimalt. Jamaica. and Trincomalee.
March. First Moroccan Crisis. Emperor Wilhelm n delivers a speech in Tangiers challenging the French protectorate in favor ofMoroccan independence and asserting Gennany's role in Morocco's destiny. While the speech was intended to drive Britain and France apart. the erisis brought the two nations closer. Results in the A1geciras Conference. January-April 1906. whieh affirms French protectorate.
12 AugusL Britain and Japan renew their alliance in a revised and enJarged tenns. including pro\ision for its protection ofIndia (Japanese support in lndia not deemed feasible by 1906-7)
04 December. Britain's Balfour minisuy ends and the liberais take ovec "ith a cabinet headed b~' Sir Henry Campbell·Bannennan.
1906 08 January. A1ened b).' Grey ofthe possibility ofa German attaek upon France. Secretary ofState for War Haldane initiates wide scale reorganization ofthe British Arm~' based on continental warfare and cuts in e.xpenditures; refonns resulted in an E~-peditionary Force ofsix large divisions. simply the largest force whieh could be raised from the peacetime army.
31 January. British foreign secretary Sir Edward Grey assumes a "moral obligation" to support France in the event ofa German auaek. but the Cabinet will not leam ofbis pledge to France until 1911. Grey authorizes secret General Stafftalks between Britain and France.
B-I-8 10 February. The British battleship H.MS. Dreadnought Iaunched: ten 12·inch guns the first battleship whose guns are 50 large. Berlin decides in May to increase tonnages l ofGerman battleships. add six cruisers to the fleet. and widen the Kiel Canal to permit passage oflarger ships (SupplementaJy German Navy Law). British AdmiraIty recognizes Gennany as threat to Royal Navy.
04 July. A Tripartite Pact declares the independence ofEthiopia but divides the counU)' into British. French and ltalian spheres ofinfluence.
1907 10 June. A Franco-Japanese treaty guarantees "'open door" access ofboth France and Japan to China.
31 August. An Angla.Russian entente resolves differences between Britain and Russia in Persia and elsewhere in Asia The entente foUows by 2 days a Russian note recognizing British preeminence in the Persian Gulf.
Britain grants dominion status to New Zea1and.
1908 OS April. Britain·s prime minister Sir Henry CampbeU·Bannennan resigns and is succeeded by Hebert Henry Asquith. whose Liberal ministry will continue until 1916.
05 October. Bulgaria declares independence from Turkey; Austria annexes Bosnia and Herzegovina October 6. Berlin supports Vienna. London and Paris support objections by Russia, Turkey and Balkan nations. By 1909. Turkey recognizes Austria's annexation and Bulgarian independence in retum for over L20 million indemnity.
Gennany passes Supplementary Navy Law accelerating the scheduJe ofproduction to challenge British naval supremacy.
1909 Winter/Spring. Naval Scare in Britain provoked by increases in the German Na~· results in 10 new Dreadnought~lassbattleships.
August. Britain rejects limits on German shipbuilding in exchange for British neutrality.
Britain institutes new tax measures to finance its social security programs. Chancellor ofthe Exchequer David Lloyd George's budget imposes a superta.x on higher incornes and levies steep estate taxes.
1910 06 May. Edward VII dies and is succeeded by bis second son, George V, who will reign untiJ 1936.
31 May. The Repubüc ofSouth Afri~ independent ofBritain, is established under tenns ofthe South Africa Act. The new UDion ofSouth Africa bas dODÙnion status. it unites the Cape Colony, Orange River Colony. Natal and Transvaal.
22 August. Japan formally annexes Korea by treaty and caUs it Choosen.
1911 01 July. Second Moroccan Crîsis. Germany semis a gunboat "'Panther" to Agadir to protect Gennan interests whiJe France anempts to put down a rebeUion in the country. Wbile the crisis passes 4 November with the exchange of minor colonies, the main resuIt was to increase British fear and hostility and to draw Britain closer to France. ( This crisis helped tum the Entente Cordial ioto a practically binding alliance.
B·I-9 10 August. Britain's House ofLords gives up its veto power under the Parliameot Act l passed under pressure from Prime Minister Asquith, who threatens to create eoough peers to carry the bill.
09 September. Italy declares war 00 the Ottoman Turks. Rome announces annexatioo ofLiby~ Tripolitania and Cyrenaica November 5. The 12-month war ends 18 October 1912 with the Treaty ofLausanne according to whicb Turkey gives up Tripoli to Italy.
1912 08 February. Haldane Mission to Berlin in an attempt to dissuade accelerated German naval build-up fails.
18 Marcb. Churchill abandons the Two-Power Standard for 60% superiority over the Gennan Navy.
May. Supplementary German Navy Lawapproves significant increases in naval build up.
September. French agree to supplemeot British naval presence in the Mediterranean Sea with a redistribution ofthe Royal Navy in the Atlantic and North Sea. Signifies mutual defense ofBritain and France.
08 Detober. First Balkan War. Montenegro declares war on Turkey, followed by Turkey declaring war on Bulgaria and Serbia October 17. Greece also joins the conflict: the Turks suffer major reverses. Russia intercede on behalfofTurkey to prevent a Bulgarian occupation ofConstantinople. Austria opposes Serbia occupation ofA1bania. thereby mobilizing its forces which causes Russia to also mobilize ils forces. An armistice December 3 ends most ofthe violence.
1913 30 May. The Treaty oflondon resolves the Balkan War but a 32-day Second Balkan War begins 29 June when a Bulgarian commander orders an attack 00 Serbo-Greek positions. Bucharest and Constantinople declare war and Bulgaria is quickly defeated. The Treaty ofBucharest 10 August eods hostilities.
The United States bas 40 percent ofworld production.
1914 28 June. The heir to the Austrian throne, archduke Ferdinand, is assassinated in Sarajevo by a Serbian terrorist. leading to the outbreak ofWorld War.
01 August. The war quickly widens as Gennany declares war on Russia and on France August 3. German troops invade neutraI Belgium August 4 and Britain declares war on Germany.
05 August. The offensive sub-committee ofC.I.O. recommeods seizing German bases and installations around the globe. On 7 August.. Parliament sanctions an increase in the size ofthe army to 500,00 men, the first ofseveral increase. On the same day, the War Council recommends seoding the expeditiooary force to the continent.
23 August. Japan declares war on Gennany and on Austria August 25. They begin to land forces in Shantung for an attack 00 the German position at Tsingtao and a British detachmentjoins them.
B-I-1O 26-30 August. The Battle ofTannenberg eD(ls in crushing defeat for a large Russian anny that bas invaded East Pmssia to take pressure offthe French on the western front.
26 August. German colonial forces in Togoland surrender to an Anglo-French force. Britain and France divide the German African colony between tbem. In September. Australian and New Zealand troops capture Yap, German New Guinea, Samora and Nam. South Africa's prime minister Louis Botha puts down a pro-German Boer revoit. He takes command oftroops that enter German South-West Africa and eventually occupies the colony 09 July 1915.
05 September. France. Russia and Britain sign the Pact ofLondon, formalizing their alliance. On the same day, The Battle ofMarne, 5-12 September, ends the German advance.
18 September. Irish Home Rule Bill passes with an act suspending its implementation until after the Great War.
30 October-24 November. The Battle ofYpres pits German troops against French poilus and British Tommies in trench warfare that will consume huge numbers of soldiers on both sides for the neX! 4 years.
02 November. Russia declares war on Turkey, Britain and France do likewise November 5. and Britain proclaims the annexation ofCyprus which the British have occupied sioce 1878. 00 18 December. Britain proclaims a protectorate over Egypt after the Khedive flees to Turkey.
1915 13 January. The British War Council agrees to allow planning for altemate theaters of war, to include Salonika, Alexandretta and the Dardanelles. On 25 April. British troops land on Turkey's Gallipoli peninsula. Britain withdraws its forces by early January 1916, while blame for its costly failure falls on the first lord ofthe admiralty Winston Churchill.
18 February. A German U-boat blockade ofBritain begins while casualty lists mount for both sides on the eastern and western fronts. On 22 February, David Lloyd George responds with caUs on Britain to wage "total war". On Il March. the British government declares an unrestrieted blockade ofail goods to Germany.
28 April. ·Italy enters the war as an ally with the signing of Treaty ofLondon.
07 May. German U-boat sinks the Cunard Line passenger ship S.S. Lusitania offthe coast of[retand, killing 1.198 including 128 U.S. citizens. The ship was carrying 173 tons ofmilitary aid to Britain.
25 May. Prime minister Asquith forms a coalition govemment due to public embarrassment over the shortage ofshells incident and the resignation ofAdmirai Fisher over the Dardanelles campaign. The govemment establishes a Ministry of Munitions in June.
07 August. Warsaw faUs to the Germans and by September the Russians have lost ail of Poland, Lithuania, and Courland, along with nearly 1 million men.
20 August. British cabinet reluctantly agrees to participate in Loos offensive, marking ( the collapse ofthe allied policy of attritio~ due to pressure from allies.
B-I-ll 25 September-08 October. Artois Offensive: the Battle ofLoos proves to he a defeat for the allies.
05 October: A Franco·British expeditionary force is sent to Salonika (Greece).
06.()8 December. Allied Conference at Chantilly. Allies conduct planning for offensive campai~ including Somme. Britain passes the First MilitaIy Service Act in January 1916. as a prelude to conscriptio~followed by the Second Military Service Act 25 May 1916.
28 Decernber. War Committee agrees that France and Flanders are the main theaters of the war and that the allied forces can no longer remain solely on the defensive ifit hopes to defeat Imperial Gennany.
British incorne taxes rise to an unprecedented 15 percent as the Great War drains the nation's financial resources.
1916 21 February-ll July. Battle ofVerdun on the western front takes 350,000 French lives and nearly as many German lives.
February. Gennan Cameroon fall to British troops.
01 March. Berlin bas notified Washington that German U-boats will treat armed merchantmen as cruisers, extending the U-boat campaign. Washington bas warned Berlin that the UDited States will sever diplomatie relations unJess Germany abandons "submarine warfare against passenger and fteight-earrying vessels". Washington also protests against London when the London Official Gazette blacklists sorne 30 U.S. finns under the Enemy Act of 18 July.
24 April. Ireland's Easter rebellion las15 a week but has Iittle support. While 150,000 Irish volunteers 6gbt for the king in F1anders, sorne 2.000 rebels rise at Dublin. Police acrest leaders where they are convicted of treason and hanged August 3.
16 May. Britain and France sign the secret Sykes·Picot Trealy calling for a division of the Ottoman Empire (Middle East) between the two powers.
31 May-o1 June. The Battle ofJutland ends with heavy losses on bath sides, but the German Oee15 escapes the larger British Deel.
05 June. An Arab revoit against the Ottoman Turks begins with an attack on the garrison at Medina which surrendered June 10.
01 July-IS November. The Battle ofSomme is the bloodiest battle in history. The Allies drive the Germans back no more than 7 miles at any point, and the Germans will regain most ofthe lost ground in 1918.
04 December. Britain's Asquith government resigns and a war cabinet takes over, headed by the new prime minister is Welshman David Lloyd George. Lloyd George institutes campaign for total war. On 12 December, Germany makes a peace offer through the D.S. but it is rejected by the allies.
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8-1·12 1917 17 January. British intelligence intercepts a wireless message. the Zimmerman tele~ outlining a Gennan proposai for an alliance with Mexico against the United States.
Il March. British-Indian forces occupy Baghdad. Aqaba in Arabia falls to Arab forces 100 by Col. T.E. Lawrence.
06 April. The United States declares war on Gennany.
20 August. British government accepts responsible government as the goal of constitutional development in India. At the same time. there is a renewed interest in [mperial Preferences by Lloyd George ministry and the Dominions.
02 November. The Balfour Declaratio~ issued by Foreign Secretary Balfour, says the British government favors the establishment in Palestine ofa national home for the Jewish people. British troops have invaded Palestine and take it from the Ottoman Turks. Jerusalem falls to the British December 9.
1918 03 March. The Treaty ofBrest-Litovsk ends Russian participation in the '"capitalist imperialist" war. Russia's new Bolshevik regime abandons ail daims to Poland, Lithuania.. the Ukraine, the Baltic provinces. and Finland.
British income taxes rise to 30 percent. up from 15 percent in 1915. as the national debl climbs to an unprecedented L8 billion. Britain also passes its second Conscription Act. widening the age limit for conscription.
06 July. Montagu-Chelmsford repon on the future government in [ndia falls shon of [ndian expectations.
August. Final Allied offensive begins. with British forces breaching the Hindenberg line by October 5.
08 November. Germany's Wilhelm II abdicates and hostilities on the western front end November Il in an armistice signed by Gennany and Allies at Compiegne outside Paris.
Following the war. Britain recognizes that its naval superiority is threatened by the U.S. naval building program of 1918, leading to the Washington Conference of 1921. Britain also sends forces to Russia to intervene in the Boishevik Revolution. Britain returns forces in July 1919.
1919 21 January. Sinn Fein members ofParliament have proclaimed an independent Irish Republic and organized a parliament oftheir own. War begins November 26 between Sinn Fein and British regulars.
25 January. Delegates from Versailles Peace conference adopt a unanimous resolution to create a League ofNations. League meets for first time 15 November 1920 but its membership includes neither the USSR nor the United States.
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B-I-13 28 June. The Treaty ofVersailles obliges Gennany to accept sole responsibility for causing the Great War. Gennany retums to France the Alsace-Lorraine conquests of 1871, cedes other territories to Belgium and Poland. cedes her colonies to the Allies to be administered as mandates onder the League ofNations, and agrees to pay large reparations. France acquires mandate control ofSyria from Turkey and ofTogo and Cameroon in Africa from Germany.
15 August. British Cabinet decides on "Ten Year Rule": regulates planning for military services based on assumption that Britain will not experienee major war for the next 10 years. States that Britain's chiefconcern will be imperiaJ policing, and that it should maintain semee strength approximating that of 1914 whiJe scientific weapons should replace manpower.
10 September. The Treaty ofSaint-Germain obliges Austria to recognize the independence ofCzechoslovakia, Hungary, Polan 09 October. Britain. France and the U.S. agree and sign a 15-year guarantee against unprovoked Gennan aggression. The defense agreement is rejected by the U.S. Senate 19 November. 19 November. The U.S. Senate rejects the Versailles Treaty and rejects U.S. memberslùp in the League ofNations. 23 December. Government of Inma Act sets up government in India according to Montagu-Chelmsford report. 1920 20 Janwuy. AdmiraIty demands that Britain should maintain "at least" naval equality with the U.S. through a One-Power Standard. 19-26 April. San Remo Conference allocates Middle East mandates to France and Britain based on the Sykes-Picot and other inter-allied wartime agreements. 05 May. Britain accepts mandate over Iraq in Mesopotamia from the supreme allied COUReil. A great Arab insurrection against the British begins in July, sorne garrisons are besieged for weeks, but the uprising is finally suppressed in December. Britain installs Syria's FaisaJ 1as king of Iraq in August 1921 but continues its guardian role over the mandate. 15 May. British reinforcements arrived in Ireland to support His Majesly's forces against attacks by Sinn Fein political militants who continue resistance to British regulars and to the new"Black and Tans". By 23 December, the Government oflreland Act passed Parliament giving Northern and Southern Ireland the right to elect separale parliaments oftheir own with each to retain representatives in the British Parliament in London. 10 August. The Treaty ofSevres signed by the feeble Ottoman sultanate obliges Constantinople to renounee all daims to non-Turkish territory, makes Syria a French mandate and Mesopotamia and Palestine British mandates. 1921 09 February. Govemment ofIndia Act (Dec 1919) cornes into effeet giving Inma a partial selfgovenunent, or dyarchy, where power is divided between the British crown and the Indian people. ( B-I-14 21 March. An Anglo-Russian commercial agreement eD(1s hostilities in lodian / ~ provinces but is merely a hoUow commitment that helps rednce the RussianlSoviet threat to lama. June-August. Imperial Conference. Dominions favor antonomy over centralization of foreign and defense policy, agree to maintain single power standard (navy), and aJso discuss possible renew ofJapanese alliance, but allow it to expire. On 16 June, the Cabinet accepts recommendation for establishing a naval base in Singapore, in lieu ofa Japanese alliance. British unemployment reaches 2.5 million in July but then begins a graduai drop to 1.2 million where it will remain until 1930. 12 November. The Washington Conference on Limitation ofNaval Annaments opens, ending February 6 after nearly 3 months with a naval armaments treaty that provides for a 10-year period during wlùch no new slùps ofmore than 10,000 tons with guns larger than 8 inches in width are to be built by Britain, France, ltaly, Japan or the United States. Britain and the United States are then to be pennitted totals of525,000 tons each, Japan 315,000 tons, France and ltaly 175,000 tons each. The Conference restriets submarine warfare and the use ofpoison gas. 06 December. Southem Ireland gains Dominion status in a treaty signed with Britain. 14 December. Geddes Committee Report calls for drastic cuts in military spending while talks between Britain and France about establishing a security arrangement fail. 1922 28 FebruaJy. Allenby Declaration ofthe fonnal independence ofEgypt. Kingdom of Egypt proclaimed 15 Marcb. Britain expresses continued interest in security matters. lO include control ofSuez Canal. The Sudan remains underjoint Anglo-Egyptian sovereignty. August. Cabinet approves fonnation of20 HDAF squadrons - increase in RAF size 05 October. Britain and Iraq sign the Treaty ofAlliance giving Britain control over Iraq's army and administration. Renewed in 1930 19 October. Lloyd George cabinet resigns after Conservatives vote to quit the coalition government. Andrew Bonar Law heads a new Conservative government. 06 Deœmber. The Irish Free State is oflicially proclaimed, the parliament ofNorthern Ireland votes December 7 to remain outside the Free State, and the last British troops leave the Free State December 17. 1923 II January. French troops occupy Gennany's rich Ruhr Basin due the Germans default on coal deliveries promised at Versailles in 1919. 20 May. Britain's prime minister Andrew Bonar law resigns and bis chancellor ofthe exchequer Stanley Baldwin heads a new Conservative cabinet until the general elections in November. 26 May. Jordan (Transjordania) becomes an autonomous state. Britain recognizes Jordanian independence in early 1928 but retains military control and sorne financial ( control. B-I-15 / 24 July. The Treaty ofLausanne returns various islands to Tudey. Britain retains ,,- Cyprus. 1924 22 January. Baldwin's Conservative govemment is defeated on an Imperial Preferences platfonn, temporarily stopping the protectionist debate. Britain's first Labour govemment takes office under James Ramsay MacDonald who opposed British participation in the waf. Britain signs a commercial treaty in which the Soviet Union gives British goods most-favored nation treatmenl 04 November. Britain's Labour governmeot falls after the general election October 29 bas given the Conservatives a great vietory, partly through the release October 25 ofthe so-caIled Zinoviev letter, implicating Labour and communism. Stanley Baldwin heads a new government that denounees British treaties with Russia November 21. 1925 Britain's chancellor ofthe exchequer Winston Churchill returns to the gold standard al the prewar gold and dollar value ofthe pound. Parliament and the people respond with enthusiasm but the move makes British coaJ. steel. machinery, textiles. ships, cargo rates, and other goods and services 10 percent above world priees, and the result in unemployment and wage cuts. 01 January. Syria is created by a union ofDamascus and A1eppo with French general Maurice Sarrail as high commissioner. Starts 2-year Druse insurrection against the French ending in June 1927. Britain declares Cyprus a crown colony in 1927. May. Cabinet redefines the One Power Standard 50 to exclude having dominate forces in another power's home waters, thereby weakening the standard. 17 June. A protocol signed by world powers bars use ofpoison gas in war. An anns traffic convention signed the same day govems international trade in arms and munitions. 05-16 October. The Locarno Conference resuIts in the Locarno Treaty signed 1 December to guarantee Franco-Gennan and Belgo-German frontiers by mutuaI agreement, byarbitration treaties between World War antagonists. and by mutual assistance treaties that give Europe sorne sense ofsecurity. French interpret treaty as necessary substitution in light offailed attempt for bilateral Anglo-French alliance. 1926 March. Creation ofEmpire Marketing Board announced. Aim is to promote and stimulate imperial trade in lieu ofimperial preferences. Reflects an attempt to unite the dominions without necessarily imposing tariffs and shutting out other nations. 23 May. France proclaims Lebanon a republic. 19 October-23 November. Imperial Conference. defines Dominion status. leading to the Statute ofWestminster (1931). 1927 24 May. London breaks relations with Moscow following accusations ofBolshevik espionage and subversion throughout the British Empire. 20 June.Q7 August. U.S. and Britain fail to reach agreement at the Geneva Naval Conference. B-I-16 1928 28 July. France and Britain compromise to violate postwar arms limitations by extending British light cruisers and Freneh draft numbers. Compromise angers V.S. Churchill extends "len Year RuJe~ in 1928. regulating growth ofthe military senices under the assomption Britain won't face majorwar in the next 10 years. 27 August. The KeUogg·Briand Pact (Pact ofParis) is signed by 63 world powers whose representatives renounce WM. The pact is implemented in September by the League of NatioDS. 1929 30 May. Britain's Labour party "ins the general election and Ramsay MacDonald fonus a second cabinet June 5. Diplomatie relatioDS with Moscow resume October 1. Wall Street's Dow Jones Industrial Average reaehes 381 in September. but breaks in October foUowing a drop in U.S. iron and steel production and a rise in British interest rates to 6.5 percent that bas pulled European capital out ofthe V.S. money market. A record 16.4 million sbares trade Tuesday. October 29: the Dow plummets 30.57 points. and liquidation continues. Speculators who bave bought on margin are forced to sell and $30 billion disappears. 19JO A generaI world economie depression sets in as world trade declines. production drops. and unemplo}ment increases. British unemployment tops 12.2 percent. Countries mise tariffs in response to the US's Smoot·Hawley Taritf Act. 21 January·22 April. A London Naval Conference convened "ith a treal)° signed by Britain. the United States. France. Italy. and Japan who agree to limit submarine tonnage and gun~iberand scrap cenain warships. Britain capitulates to U.S. demands. thereby reducing the strengtb ofthe Royal Nav)'" ° 30 June. The last Allied troops lea\"e the Rhineland.. 5 years before the dale set b). the Treal)· of Versailles. 12 November. First session ofthe Roundtable Conference on Go\'ernment ofIndia. convening 31 Januar)" 1931. Agrees on preliminaries for executi\'e to legislature based on federaI system. 19J1 18 June. Canada raises tariffs~ estimating tbat the new customs duties \\ill cut offtwa. thirds ofgoods imponed from the United States. 01 August. Britain receives a Freneh·American loan but London and Glasgow have riots September 10 10 protest govemment economy measures. naval units mutiny September 15 to protest pay cuts. the pound sterling is de\-ëlIued September 20. and Britain is forced to abandon the gold standard once again September 21. 24 August. Britain's Labour government resigns in a disagreement over remedies for the nation's financial crisis. but Prime Minister Ramsay MaeDonaJd heads a new coalition cabinet that will relain power until mid·1935. 18 September. Japanese forces invade Manehuria. Britain offers prolest but too weak in East Asia to baek protest "ith force. October·November. Second session ofRoundtable Conference fails to find compromise for minority safeguards in India. ( Il Deœmber. Statute ofWestminster provides legal fonn for the equality ofDominions l establisbed al the Imperial Conference of 1926. II Deœmber. Japan abandons the gold standard. 1932 Import Duties Act. Britain abandons free trade for the Ont time sin" 1849. Britain imposes a 10 percent tarifron 1D0st imported goods but agrees at tbe Imperial ConfereDf:e at Ottawa to exempt Canada. Australia. New Zealand, and otber Commonwealth nations, "bicb in tum will provide lDarkets for Britain'5 otberwise UDcolDpetitive teItiI~ steel, 1D0torca~ and teiecommunicatioDs equipment. BritaiD imposes tarilrs and quantitative restrictions on many farm imports "bile subsidizinl British farmen to belp tbem sunive the depression. Imperial preferences are introduced to 'avor imports from colonial and Commonwealth COUDtries, witb special preferences given to dairy products, meal, and "beat from Australia, Canada, and New Zealand at the expeDse of Denmark and Argentina. July. A tariffwar between Britain and Ireland begins. depriving Ireland of its chief expon market. 1933 19 April. The United States abandons the gold standard by presidential proclamation but Roosevelt rejects a currency stabilization plan proposed by the gold standard countries meeting in July al a World Monetary and Economie Conference al London. ( ~. r-- APPENDIX 8-2: GREAT BRITAIN: PERCENTAGE OF WORLD TRADE." 1860 1870 1880 1889 1898 1911-1913 BRITAIN 25.2 24.9 23.2 18.1 17.1 14.1 GERMANY 8.8 9.7 9.7 10.4 11.8 FRANCE 11.2 10.4 11.2 9.3 8.4 UNITED STATES 9.1 7.5 )O.) 9.0 10.3 *Data extracted from Kennedy, Paul M. The Rise and FaU ofBritish Naval Mastery. London: Ashfield Press, )976. ZEe&. ote&. 8ze&. • Re&. tze&. ÎII~~~tr-m~~jll;~llil~t~I~Î~IIII~:ù~~1 oze&. ZZ6&. 8&.6&. 1 9&.e&. zoe&. 006&. 8681. 9681. t681. Z681. 068&. 888&. 9881. t88&. Z88&. o ( ~ /-... APPENDIX 8-4: GREAT 8RITAIN: MILITARY EXPENDITURES 1889-1932. (Current Priees in L Million Sterling) 1889 29.0 (33.5) 86.5 1890 32.7(36.1) 90.6 1891 33.4 (35.8) 93.4 1892 33.2 (34.6) 96.0 1893 33.2 (95.8) 9S.8 1894 33.4 (33.9) 98.5 1895 35.4 (3S.2) 100.9 1896 38.2 (36.3) 10S.1 1897 40.5 (36.9) 109.7 1898 40.2 (35.8) 112.3 1899 44.1 (37.5) 117.7 1900 69.6 (48.4) 143.7 1901 121. (62.6) 193.3 1902 123.3 (60.1) 205.2 1903 100.6 (SI.8) 194.2 1904 72.2 (46.5) 155.3 Pbase Il Anoy (Ofo) Na, ~ RAF (!:l Total ~ Gross Esp. Total 1905 29.2 (19.S) 36.8 (24.6) 66.0 (44.1) 149.5 1906 28.9 (19.7) 33.3 (22.7) 62.2 (42.4) 147.0 1907 27.8(19.3) 31.4(21.9) 59.2(41.2) 143.7 1908 27.1(18.9) 31.1(21.9) 58.2(40.8) 143.4 1909 26.8 (18.5) 32.2 (22.2) 59.0 (40.7) 144.8 1910 27.2 (17.3) 35.8 (22.8) 63.0 (40.1) 156.9 1911 27.4 (16.3) 40.4 (24.1) 67.8 (40.4) 167.9 1912 27.6 (15.9) 42.9 (24.6) 70.5 (40.5) 174.1 1913 28.1 (15.3) 44.4 (24.1) 72.5 (39.4) 184.0 ~ (' Phase III Army (0/0) Navy (%) RAF (%) Total (%) Gross EIP. Total 1914 28.3 (14.7) 48.8 (25.4) 77.1 (40.1) 192.3 1915 559.5 1916 1,559.2 1917 2,198. 1 1918 2,696.2 Phase IV Army (0t'o) Na, (%) RAF (%) Total (%) Gross Elp. Total 1919 2,579.3 1920 395.0 (23.7) 156.5 (9.4) 52.5 (3.2) 604.0 (36.3) 1,665.8 1921 181.5(15.3) 88.4 (7.4) 22.3 (1.9) 292.2 (24.6) 1,188.1 1922 95.1 (8.9) 80.8 (7.6) 13.6 (1.3) 189.5 (17.8) 1,070.1 1923 45.4 (5.6) 56.2 (6.9) 9.4 (1.2) 111.0(13.7) 812.5 1924 43.6 (5.8) 52.6 (7.0) 9.6 (1.3) 105.8 (14.1) 748.8 1925 44.8 (6.0) 55.6 (7.4) 14.3 (1.9) 114.7 (15.3) 150.8 1926 44.3 (5.7) 59.7 (7.7) 15.5 (2.0) 119.5(15.4) 776.1 1921 43.6 (5.6) 57.6(7.4) 15.5 (2.0) 116.1(15.0) 782.4 1928 44.2 (5.7) 58.1 (7.5) 15.5 (2.0) 117.5(15.2) 773.6 1929 40.5 (5.3) 56.9 (7.5) 16.1 (2.1) 113.5(14.8) 760.5 1930 40.5 (5.2) 55.8 (7.1) 16.8(2.1) 113.1 (14.4) 781.7 1931 40.5 (5.0) 52.6 (6.5) 17.8 (2.2) 110.9(13.7) 814.2 1932 38.5 (4.7) 51.1 (6.2) 17.7 (2.2) 107.3 (13.1) 818.6 APPENDIX C-l: RELATIVE DECLINE OF UNITED STATES 11971-PRESEND PHASES 1971-1989 COLDWAR PHASE 1 (THREAT AND ALLIES) 1990-PRESENT POST COLO WAR PHASE 2 (NO THREAT AND ALLIES) TIMELINE 1970 Paris peace talks to end Vietnam continue for a second year without progress but Washington reduces US troop strength in Vietnam below 400,000 in response to mounting public pressure as causalities rise. Gold priees in the world market at London fall below the official US price of535 per ounce. 1971 04 August. A "New Economic Policy" announced by President Nixon imposes a 90-day freeze on US wages and priees, temporarily suspends conversion ofdollars into gold, and asks Congress to impose a 10 percent import surcharge in an effort to strengthen the dollar as the Vietnam increases inflationary pressures. The US unlinking the dollar from any gold value begins the breakdown of the international monetary system established by the Bretton Woods Conference of 1944. 20 Oecember. US impons top expons by 52.05 billion - the first trade deficit since 1888. President Nixon kills the 10 percent import surcharge and raises the official gold price, thus devaluing the dollar by 8.57 percent. US troop withdrawals from South Vietnam reduce the total number to about 200.000. down from 534,000 in mid 1969. 1972 20 February. President Nixon arrives at Beijing and confers with Chairman Mao Zedong, ending the US hostility towards the People's Republic ofChina that bas persisted since 1949. Six days earlier, the president ordered that US trade with China he on the same basis as trade with Moscow and the Soviet-bloc nations. 22 May. President Nixon arrives at Moscow and confers with Party Secretary Leonid Brezhnev in the first visit ofa US president to the Soviet Union since 1945. 17 June. The Watergate atrair that will grow into the greatest constitutional crisis in US history bas its beginnings when District ofColumbia police acrest five men inside Democratic party national headquarters in Washington's new Watergate apanment complex. 19 Joly. The United States enters the international money market. selling Gennan marks at decreasing prices in the first move since August 1971 to shore up the dollar. ( C-l-l 1973 28 Janwuy. A œasefire in Vietnam ends direct involvement ofUS ground troops in l Indochinese hostilities. The last US troops leave South Vietnam March 29. 12 February. Speculative selling ofUS doUars on foreign exchanges forces the second devaluation ofthe doUar in 14 montbs. DoUar is devaluated by 10 percent agaiDSt aU other major world currencies in a move to make US goods more competitive in foreign trade. The devaluation boosts the priee ofimponed goods and imponed oil to US consumers. 06 October. The Yom Kippur War begins in the Middle East and is the founh and fiercest Arab-Israeli war since 1948. 07 November. A congressionaI War Powers Resolution passed over President Nixon's veto Iimits a president's authority to commit troops in a foreign conflict without CongressionaJ approval. Nixon bas said the resolution would impose unconstitutionaI and dangerous restrictions on presidential power and "seriously undennine the nation's ability to act decisively and convincingly in limes ofinternational crisis. 1974 18 January. Israel and Egypt sign a disengagement agreement after negotiations by US Secretary ofState Henry Kissinger. 09 August. President Nixon resigns in disgrace - the first US chiefofstate to ever quit office. Vice-President Gerald Ford is swom in the same day. One month later he grants Nixon a "full, free. and absolute pardon" for ail federal crimes. 1975 01 August. The Helsinki Accord fonnalizes détente between East and West. The declaration issued by the COlÛerence on Security and Cooperation in Europe (CSCE) emphasizes the inviolability offrontiers, full support for the United Nations. and mutual respect for "sovereign equality and individuality". 1976 November. Jimmy Carter wins the US presidential election with 297 eleetoral votes to 240 for President Ford. 1977 21 September. Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty seeks to curb the spread ofnuclear materials. The fifteen signatories include the United States and the USSR. 1978 24 October. US inflation pressures forces President Carter to act. he announces a program ofvoluntary wage-price guidelines, resisting demands that he imposes mandatol)' controls and raising fears that inflation will worsen. 15December. Washington recognizes the People's Republic ofChina. announcing that il will sever diplomatie ties with Taiwan as of 1 January 1979. 1979 16 Janwuy. The Shah of[ran Oees to Egypt after nearly 38 years in power. The Shiite Muslim leader Khomeini flies into Teheran February 1 after 15 years in exile. Iranian lerrorists seize the US embassy al Teheran November 4, taking 66 hostages and demanding US extradition ofthe shah. ( C-1-2 18 June. US Senate leaders block a Strategie Arms Limitation Treaty (SAL1) signed at Vienna by President Carter and Premier Brezhnev after nearly 5 years ofnegotiations. The United States bas 2283 missiles and bombers. the Soviets 2504. President Carter approves construction ofa new generation ofsmaUer aircraft carriers 8 January and approves development 7 lune ofa S30 billion MX missile plan that would Slln'ive Soviet "first strike'~. 07 July. US grants China most-favored-nation status. allowing her the lower tarifT rates available to most other US trading panners. US exports to China will reach SI.7 billion next year. imports from China will reach $600 million. 17 July. Nicaraguan dictator Anastasio Somoza resigns bis presidency after a 7-week civil war, endîng the 46 year Somoza family dynasty. Sandinista rebels enter Managua July 20. 17 September. The Camp David accord after 13 days ofnegotiating by Egypt's President Sadat, Israel's Prime Minister Begin. and President Carter provides what ail parties cali a "framework for peace" in the Middle East. 24 December. Soviet troops invade Afghanistan. allegedly at the invitation ofthe new Afghan president. US.supplied Afghan guerrillas will resist Soviet occupation forces for more than 9 years. forcing them to retreat ioto fortified cities. President Carter orders a partial embargo ofUS graio sales to the USSR 4 January 1980 in response to the Soviet invasion. 1980 27 June. A draft registration measure signed by President Carter requires that sorne 4 million US men aged 19 and 20 register. Double digit inflation continues in the US with prices rising 12.4 percent by year's end. fueling opposition to President Caner. November. US voters elect Ronald Reagan to the presidency. with 489 electoral votes to Carter's 49. 1981 20 January. [ran releases ail US hostages after US oegotialors agree to unblock certain Iranian funds and [ran agrees to repay US bank loans. Il lune. Washington announces that heavy tariffs will be imposed on sorne steel imports in order 10 help struggling US steel makers whose foreign competition receives government subsidies. 13 August. President Reagan signs a bill mandating the deepest tax and budget cuts in US history, based on "supply-side" economic theories. While "Reaganonomics" will be credited with producing the longest peacetime boom in bistory. it will also lead to neglect ofcilies, deterioration ofinfrastructure, and massive deficits finaoced by foreign borrowing. 1982 06 FebruaJy. President Reagan's budget address caUs for much higher military appropriations and less spending on social programs. Congress votes 346 to 68 to increase military spending by 6 percent after inflation over fiscal 1982. November. Recession continues throughout most ofthe worl~ international trade ( declines, unemployment in the US reaches 10.8 percent. C-1-3 10 November. Premier Brezhnev dies after 17 years as Soviet party secretary. Succeeded by former KGB head Yuri Andropov. 1983 08 March. President Reagan teUs an evangelical group in Orlando~ FL that ""the Soviet Union is the focus ofevil in the modem world" and that the USSR is an" evil empire". 23 March. President Reagan proposes a "Strategie Defense Initiative" to proteet America and her allies with a tùgh-tech shield against nuclear missiles. 23 October. US Marines in Lebanon come under inereasing attack in September and October. A ten'Orist drives a truck packed with explosives into a Marine barracks and French paratroop barracks, killing 241 US and 58 French soldiers. 25 October. US Marines and Anny Rangers land on Grenada to oppose Cuban presence and intentions on the island., and rescue US medical students. 1984 US economic growth rises at a 6.8 percent rate, highest since 1951. The inflation rate, 3.7 percent is the lowest since 1967. 09 February. Soviet leader Yuri Andropov dies and is succeeded by Politburo member Konstantin Chemenko. November. President Reagan is re-elected with 525 electoraI votes to 13 for fonner vice president Walter Mondale. 1985 Il March. Mikhail Gorbachev becomes Soviet leader after death ofChemenko at age 73. Moscow and Washington reach compromise agreement 8 January to resume negotiations towards limiting and reducing nuclear weapons and preventing an anns race in space. 16 September. The Unites States becomes a debtor nation for the first time since 1914. announces the Department ofCommerce. After years ofdeficits in the balance of payments, the nation relies on foreign buying ofUS Treasury bonds and notes iostead of on taxation. 1986 The US national debt tops $2 trillioa up from SI trillion in 1981. The nation's trade deficit worsens despite a weakening dollar. setting a record ofover $ 170 billion. 15 April. US warplanes bomb Libya's Muarnmar Qadaffi's headquarters al Tripoli in retaliation for the terrorist bombing ofa West Berlin discotheque killing a US soldier. 26 June. Congress votes to approve S100 million in aid to the Contras Uying to overthrow Nicaragua's Sandinista regime. November. Beirut magazine reveals that the United States bas sent spare parts and ammunition to Iran in hopes that "moderates" there would help oblain the release ofUS hostages. Further investigation will show that other arms sales were made to Iran with profits going to fond Contra forces in Nicaragua. ( C-l-4 1987 07 December. Gorbachev arrives at Washington for a three day summit on arms reduction. He and President Reagan sign the first treaty to reduœ the size ofnuclear l arsenals. agreeing to dismantle ail Soviet and US medium and shoner range missiles. with extensive weapons inspections on bath sides. 1988 02 January. President Reagan and Canadian Prime Minister Brian Mulroney sign a trade agreement that eliminates tariffs and lowers trade barriers. 14 April. Moscow agrees to withdraw Soviet forces from Afghanistan. promising to have ail 115.000 out by mid-Febrwuy 1989 and agrees to restore a non-aligned Afghan state. 01 July. Delegates to a Communist conference at Moscow endorse Gorbachev's proposais. including partial transfer ofpower from the party to democratically elected legislatures, and approve inauguration ofthe position ofPresident. Gorbachev is named President 1 October and addresses the United Nations on 7 Deœmber, promising unilateral reduction ofSoviet troops. missiles. and munitions on the western frontiers of the Warsaw Bloc. August. President Reagan signs a trade bill giving him broad powers to retaliate against countries found to be engaged in unfair trade practices. A protectionist trade bill to limit textile imports passes the Honse 248 to 150 and the Senate 59 to 36 but the President vetoes the measure 28 Seplember. November. Vice President George Bush wins the US presidential election with 53 percent of the popular vote over Massachusetts Govemor Michael Dukakis. 1989 06 June. Chïnese students gather in Tiananmem Square for weeks to demand politicaJ reform and the resignation ofPremier Li Peng. Chinese leader Deng Xiaoping sends Mongolian soldiers who fire into the crowd killing hundreds ifnot thousands. 180ctober. Pro-democracy demonstrations in East Gennany lead to resignation of President Erich Honecker and freedom to travel to West. East Gennans begin demolition ofthe Berlin Wailleading to the opening ofthe Brandenburg Gate on 22 December and the reunification ofBerlin 20 December. US troops invade Panama in an attempt to apprehend strongman Manuel Noriega. Surrenders to US authorities for trial al Miami on drug charges. 1990 07 February. Soviet leaders agree to surrender the Communist Pany's 72 year monopoly on power. Gorbachev strongly endorses political pluralism. Boris Yeltsin is elected president ofthe Russian Republic in May. 02 August. Iraqi forces invade Kuwait. United Nations denounces Iraqi invasion and imposes economic sanctions. Iraq masses troops on the border ofSaudi Arabia and Riyadh agrees to receive US ground and air forces as part ofOperation Desen Shield. 03 October. Germany reunites after 43 years ofseparation. A 3-day meeting at Ottawa ends with an accord by Soviet. British, French and US foreign ministers on a framework for negotiating reunification. Foreign Ministers Shevardnadze and Baker agree to reduce Soviet and US strength in Central Europe to 195,000 troops each, while pennitting an additional 30,000 US troops to be stationed in England. PortugaJ, Spain, ( Greece and Turkey. 19 November. The Conventional Forces in Europe (CFE) treaty signed by 22 world leaders at Paris ends the "era ofconfrontation and division" tbat bas foUowed World War II. NATO and Warsaw Pact countries agree to reduce weapons (Moscow will scrap 19.000 tanks, NATO 2.000). no one country may have more than one-third the total nomber ofarms in a single category. 1991 17 January. US and allied missiles and planes bomb targets in Iraq and Kuwait. Congress votes to approve legislation pennitting President Bush to make war on Iraq if it does not withdraw from Kuwait by 15 January in accordance with UN resolutions. 24 February. Operation Desett Storm begins and ends 100 hours laler with Iraqi forces defeated. US General H. Norman Schwarzkopfplans the combined air and ground attack. sending 270.000 US. British and French troops in a sweep around the Iraqfs western flank. More than 100.000 Iraqi troops surrender and at least 100.000 are killed. 25 June. Croatia and Siovenia declare independence from Yugoslavia. Serba-Croat battJes eropt. Belgrade sends in troops. the European Community tries to mediate. 19 August. A coup attempt by Communist bard liners ends 23 August after President Yeltsin in Moscow caUs for a general strike to resist the coup. Sorne tank commanders support Yeftsin. and the coup leaders flee. 05 September. President Gorbachev persuades the all Soviet Congress to surrender power. He works with leaders ofthe republics to restore order. draft a new constitution. and create a new. non-Communist political order. He recognizes the independence of the Baltic republics an other republics gain autonomy. Gorbachev resigns 25 December. 1992 01 January. Egyptian Boutros Boutros-Ghali takes office as secretaJy-generaJ ofthe United Nations. Within 2 years. the number ofpeacekeepers will have grown from 11.500 to 72.000. straining the UN·s financial resources. 29 Febrwuy. Voters in Bosnia-Herzegovina opt for independence from Yugoslavia provoking fresh hostilities in the Balkans. Serbia's President Siobodan Milosevic sends troops into 80snia. They besiege Sarajevo for most ofthe year as both sides commit bloody atrocities while European countries dither about how to end the fighting. 16 June. President Bush and Yeltsin agree to drastic cuts in their respective nuclear arsenals. scrapping key land-based missiles and reducing long-range warheads. A second Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty (START 2) announced at Geneva calfs for mutual reductions ofnuclear warheads. November. US voters elect Arkansas govemor William Clinton to the presidency over President Bush with 370 to 168 electoral votes. 1993 01 January. The Ewopean Community permits free movement ofgoods across national borders. 08 December. The North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFfA) signed into law by President Clinton provides the phasing out ofail tariffs and other trade barriers over a 14 year period between the US. Canada and Mexico. ( C-I-6 1994 19 September. US forces occupy Haïti foUowing fast minute negotiations by fonner President Carter and others with General Cedras to aven a military invasion. Cedras steps down by 15 October permitting the reswnption ofpower by elected President Jean Bertrand Aristide. who agreed to comply with Haïti's Constitution and not seek a second tenD. 01 December. Congress gives overwhelming approval to a seventh General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATI). Japan and other major countries (124 total) foUow suit and agree lowering ofobstacles to Cree trade (including CUls in agricultural subsidies and eustom duties) ushers in what proponenls say will create jobs. lower priees and benefit everyone. ( C-I-7 r--... APPENDIX C-2: UNITED STATES: MILITARY EXPENDITURES 1971-1991. 11 1971 1972 1973 1974 1975 1976 1977 1978 1979 1980 TOTAL CURRENT DOLLARS 74,472 75,076 73,223 77,550 84,900 87,891 95,557 103,402 115,013 132,840 CONSTANT DOLLARS 259,560 241,450 220,994 216,892 212,658 205,531 208,271 209,524 217,267 224,056 PERCENT REAL GROWTH -9.1 -6.9 -8.5 -1.8 -2 -3,4 1.3 0.6 3,8 3,1 1981 1982 1983 1984 1985 1986 1987 1988 1989 1990 1991 TOTAL CURRENT DOLLARS 156,035 182,850 205,012 220,806 245,370 265,636 274,007 281,935 294,880 286,791 292,145 CONSTANT DOLLARS 235,412 253,777 270,209 280,124 297,481 314,557 315,421 314,403 316,240 298,702 292,145 PERCENT REAL GROWTH 5.1 7 7.6 3.7 6.2 5.7 0.3 -0.3 0.6 -5.5 -2.2 *Data from Borklund, C. W. V.S. 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Rosecrance, Richard. America's Economie Resurgence: A Bold New Strategy. New York: Harper and Row, 1990. 72. Taft, John. American Power: the Rise and Decline ofU.S. Globalisl1l, 1918-1988. New York: Harper and Row, 1989. ( . 10 ~~ ~ 1111 · ~: w 2 0 11111 1.1 t ~ 1 . 11111.8 111111.25 I~ 1.4 ~ 1.6 1 ~- - 150mm ...... 1 J 1 1 L...... - 1 APPLIEO.=::.:fi IMAGE1 • 1ne ..=::: 653 East Main Street ~~ Rochester. NY 14609 USA .==--== Phone: 7161482-0300 _..:::::: Fax: 7161288-5989 c 1993, AppIIed 1mage. lne.. Ail Rlghts Reserved