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Nouvel Ordre Géopolitique Mondial Les Géostratégies De Domination

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Nouvel Ordre Géopolitique Mondial Les Géostratégies De Domination Dr. Angel ANGELIDIS LE NOUVEL ORDRE GÉOPOLITIQUE MONDIAL LES GÉOSTRATÉGIES DE DOMINATION Doc. AA – 06 FR – 06 – 2014 Auteur: Dr. Angel ANGELIDIS Docteur Ingénieur Agronome (ETSIA - Université Polytechnique de Madrid), Docteur d’Etat ès Sciences Economiques (Université de Montpellier), Ex-Membre du Cabinet du Commissaire G. Contogeorgis, (Commission Thorn 1981-1984) Ex-Chef de Division et Conseiller auprès du Parlement Européen, Comendador de la Orden Civil de Mérito Agrícola de España Comendador de la Real Orden de Isabel la Católica de España, Ex-professeur invité à l’Ecole Diplomatique de Madrid et à l’Université Montesquieu Bordeaux IV, American Order of Excellence and Academician for lifetime, American Bibliographical Institute, USA, Vice-Président de l’Institut de Gestion des Crises Géopolitiques, Thessalonique, Grèce. De gauche à droite: Βυζάντιοv, Αυτοκρατορικός Θυρεός κατά τήν περίοδον τών Παλαιολόγων (Blason de l’Empire Byzantin, Dynastie de Paléologues - Coat of Arms of the Byzantine Empire, Paleologos Dynasty - Escudo del Imperio Bizantino, Dinastía de Paleólogos); Emblème du Patriarcat Orthodoxe de Constantinople - Coat of arms of the Orthodox Patriarchate of Constantinople - Escudo del Patriarcado Ortodoxo de Constantinopla; Aigle bicéphale russe impériale et contemporaine - Russian double-headed eagle Imperial and contemporary - Águila bicéfala rusa imperial y contemporánea; Armoiries de l'Alcazar de Tolède, Espagne - Coat of arms of the Alcazar of Toledo, Spain - Escudo del Alcázar de Toledo, España. Éditeur : Dr. Angel ANGELIDIS 97, Avenue Marcel Thiry B - 1200 Bruxelles BELGIQUE TÉL. & FAX : (+32) 02 762 91 19 E-MAIL : [email protected] WEBSITES : WWW.ANGELIDIS.EU, WWW.ANGELIDIS.BE Les opinions exprimées dans ce document relèvent de la responsabilité exclusive de l’auteur. La reproduction et la traduction de ce document à des fins non commerciales sont autorisées, à condition que la source soit expressément mentionnée et que l'auteur et l'éditeur en soient préalablement informés et qu'ils aient reçu un exemplaire de la publication. Imprimé à Bruxelles (2014). 2 AA-06 FR-06-2014 «NOUVEL ORDRE GÉOPOLITIQUE MONDIAL - GÉOSTRATÉGIES DE DOMINATION» LE NOUVEL ORDRE GÉOPOLITIQUE MONDIAL LES GÉOSTRATÉGIES DE DOMINATION SOMMAIRE 1. LA SECONDE GUERRE MONDIALE - LE FRONT DE L’EST 2. LA «GUERRE FROIDE» 2.1 Les crises de la guerre froide 2.1.1 Le blocus de Berlin (1948-1949) 2.2.2 La guerre de Corée (1950-1953) 2.2.3 La construction du Mur de Berlin (1961) 2.2.4 Le Débarquement de la baie des Cochons et la Crise des missiles de Cuba (1961-1962) 2.2 Un nouvel équilibre 2.2.1 La détente 2.2.2 La modification des sphères d'influence L’agrandissement de la sphère d'influence soviétique Le rétablissement des Etats Unis – La «Guerre fraîche» 2.3 L'écroulement du régime soviétique - Fin de la Guerre froide 2.3.1 Le prélude 2.3.2 Le désarmement 2.3.3 La crise économique et alimentaire 2.3.4 Les nationalismes 2.3.5 Le chaos politique et socio-économique 2.3.6 Pourquoi l'URSS s'est-elle écroulée au début des années 1990 ? 2.3.7 Trahison ?... 3. LES ÉTATS-UNIS SEULE SUPERPUISSANCE AU MONDE 3.1 Les Géostratégies de domination 3.1.1 La stratégie de l’Anaconda 3.1.2 La puissance Maritime («Sea Power») de Alfred Mahan 3.1.3 “Heartland” contre “World Island” de Halford John Mackinder 3.1.4 Le «Rimland» de Spykman 3.1.5 Le pan européanisme et les pan régions de Friedrich Ratzel et de Karl Haushofer 3.1.6 Le «Nomos de la Terre» de Carl Schmitt 3.1.7 La Stratégie d’endiguement («containment») de George Kennan 3.1.8 La Théorie du «Système mondial» d’Immanuel Wallerstein 3.1.9 La Théorie des «Régions géostratégiques» de Saul B. Cohen 3.1.10 «Le choc des civilisations» de Samuel Huntington 3.1.11 «Le Grand échiquier» de Zbigniew Brzezinski AA-06 FR-06-2014 «NOUVEL ORDRE GÉOPOLITIQUE MONDIAL - GÉOSTRATÉGIES DE DOMINATION» 3 LE NOUVEL ORDRE GÉOPOLITIQUE MONDIAL LES GÉOSTRATÉGIES DE DOMINATION 1. LA SECONDE GUERRE MONDIALE - LE FRONT DE L’EST On imagine trop souvent que le débarquement allié du 6 juin 1944 fut le tournant de la Seconde Guerre mondiale. Or le véritable revers dans cette guerre se déroula loin des plages de Normandie, dans une ville nommée Stalingrad. La place de l’URSS dans cette guerre fut trop souvent oubliée voire délibérément écartée. Pourtant, l’URSS joua un rôle crucial durant la Seconde Guerre mondiale, car c’est elle qui a gagné la guerre sur le front de l’Est, qui fut déterminant dans la chute du Troisième Reich. En effet le front de l’Est fut le plus grand et le plus sanglant théâtre d'opérations de la Seconde Guerre mondiale et probablement de toute l'histoire militaire, mais il est peu connu; c’est pourquoi nous avons décidé de rendre justice aux millions de soldats de toutes les républiques constituant l’URSS qui se sont battus et tués pour notre liberté en précédent cet ouvrage d’un résumé sur l’importance et les conséquences du front de l’Est. a Seconde Guerre mondiale constitue le conflit armé le plus vaste que l’humanité ait connu, mobilisant plus de 100 millions de combattants de 61 L nations, déployant les hostilités sur quelque 22 millions de km², et tuant environ 62 millions de personnes, dont une majorité de civils. N’opposant pas seulement des nations, la Seconde Guerre mondiale fut aussi la plus grande guerre idéologique de l’Histoire, ce qui explique que les forces de collaboration en Europe et en Asie occupées aient pu être solidaires de pays envahisseurs ou ennemis. Guerre totale, elle gomma presque totalement la séparation entre espaces civil et militaire et vit, dans les deux camps, la mobilisation poussée non seulement des ressources matérielles – économiques, humaines, techniques et scientifiques – mais aussi morales et politiques, dans un engagement des sociétés tout entières. L’agression de l’Allemagne nazie en Europe revêt un caractère différent à l’est et à l’ouest. Les pays de l’Est européens, au peuplement slave sont considérés par les nazis comme un «espace vital» («Lebensraum») revenant à la «Race des Seigneurs». Dans cet espace immense, il s’agit à la fois d’implanter des colons allemands, de germaniser de force les populations qui peuvent l'être, de déplacer, stériliser ou faire mourir des millions de «sous- hommes»: slaves soviétiques, polonais, tziganes, etc. en utilisant les survivants comme esclaves, allant jusqu'à la solution finale pour les juifs. Les ressources des pays conquis sont soumises au pillage systématique au service du IIIe Reich en guerre, puis elles sont systématiquement détruites lorsque la Wehrmacht commence à reculer devant l’avance de l’Armée rouge. La mise au travail des prisonniers de guerre et les déplacements en Allemagne AA-06 FR-06-2014 «NOUVEL ORDRE GÉOPOLITIQUE MONDIAL - GÉOSTRATÉGIES DE DOMINATION» 4 de millions de travailleurs représentent une forme encore plus directe de l’exploitation des ressources. Par contre, l’Ouest n’est pas considéré comme un espace vital à vider pour que des Allemands puissent y prendre place et ses populations ne connaitront pas la terreur de l’occupation allemande des pays de l’Est. Le front de l’Est (en allemand: die Ostfront), ou la campagne orientale (en allemand: der Ostfeldzug) ou la campagne de Russie (en allemand: der Rußlandfeldzug) a constitué de loin le plus grand théâtre d'opérations de la Seconde Guerre mondiale, qui a opposé l'Allemagne nazie à l'Union soviétique du 22 juin 1941 au 9 mai 1945. Il est considéré comme le conflit le plus sanglant de l'Histoire – faisant plus de 30 millions de morts – et se déroulant sur les territoires plus vastes que tous les autres théâtres d'opérations réunis. Durant les quatre années que dura le conflit germano-soviétique il y eut, en permanence, une moyenne de 9 millions d'hommes simultanément impliqués dans les opérations de ce front. Il est le lieu de la guerre totale la plus extrême, nourrie par des objectifs idéologiques, politiques, économiques et militaires et d’un antagonisme farouche entre les belligérants1. Le cours de la guerre sur le front de l'Est fut déterminé par les personnalités et les idéologies des commandants suprêmes - Adolf Hitler et Joseph Staline, respectivement - bien plus que sur tout autre front de la Seconde Guerre mondiale. Les Allemands nazis ont adopté une ligne de conduite qui se résume à la lutte du fascisme contre le communisme et le combat entre la race aryenne et les races slaves. Par contre, pour les Soviétiques s’était la lutte pour le sauvetage de la «Mère patrie» (en russe: Родина-Мать, Rodina), par allusion à la «guerre patriotique» de 1812 contre Napoléon Ier2. La religion orthodoxe, autrefois persécutée, fut instrumentalisée pour souder la population autour du régime soviétique. Le conflit sur le front de l’Est est ainsi caractérisé par son extrême brutalité sans commune mesure avec le front de 1 Dans ce conflit, l'Allemagne bénéficie de l'aide de la Roumanie, de l'Italie, de la Hongrie, de la République slovaque et de la Finlande. L’Allemagne nazie est également assistée par des forces d'appoints: partisans anticommunistes dans les territoires occupés (OUN ukrainienne, Armée Vlassov), division espagnole (División Azul), unités de volontaires SS venant de différents pays conquis (France: Légion des volontaires français, dont les troupes rejoignirent ensuite la division SS Charlemagne; Belgique: division SS Wallonie, Norvège: division SS Viking, etc.). En outre, dès 1941, des volontaires plus ou moins forcés des territoires soviétiques occupés se joignent aux troupes allemandes formant des unités de qualité variable, les «Hiwis» (abréviation du mot allemand Hilfswillige, en français: auxiliaire volontaire), d'abord employés pour l'intendance et les services, puis intégrés dans le cadre d'unités anti-partisans à partir de 1942.
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