WHO IS RESPONSIBLE FOR THE TALIBAN? By Michael Rubin*
Abstract: The September 11, 2001 attacks on New York City and Washington refocused sustained American attention on Afghanistan for the first time since the Soviet invasion ended. The origin and rise of the Taliban became a subject of great interest. The U.S.-backed mujahidin from the era of the Soviet occupation and the Taliban, a movement developed a decade later, were fierce rivals. As such, the “blowback” argument—that Central Intelligence Agency policies of the 1980s are directly responsible for the rise of the Taliban—is inaccurate. It was Pakistan that backed radical Islamists to protect itself from Afghan nationalist claims on Pakistani territory, which Islamabad feared, might pull apart the country. Indeed, for independent Pakistan’s first three decades, nationalist “Pushtunistan” rhetoric from Afghanistan posed a direct threat to Pakistani territorial integrity.
As the United States prepared for war subsequent transformation into a safe-haven against Afghanistan, some academics or for the world’s most destructive terror journalists argued that Usama bin Ladin’s al- network is a far more complex story, one Qa’ida group and Afghanistan’s Taliban that begins in the decades prior to the Soviet government were really creations of invasion of Afghanistan. American policy run amok. A pervasive myth exists that the United States was THE CURSE OF AFGHAN DIVERSITY complicit for allegedly training Usama bin Afghanistan’s shifting alliances and Ladin and the Taliban. For example, Jeffrey factions are intertwined with its diversity, Sommers, a professor in Georgia, has though ethnic, linguistic, or tribal variation repeatedly claimed that the Taliban had alone does not entirely explain these turned on “their previous benefactor.” internecine struggles. Afghanistan in its David Gibbs, a political science professor at modern form was shaped by the nineteenth- the University of Arizona, made similar century competition between the British, claims. Robert Fisk, widely-read Middle Russian, and Persian empires for supremacy East correspondent for The Independent, in the region. The 1907 Anglo-Russian wrote of “CIA camps in which the Convention that formally ended this “Great Americans once trained Mr. bin Ladin’s Game” finalized Afghanistan’s role as a fellow guerrillas.”(1) Associated Press writer buffer between the Russian Empire’s Mort Rosenblum declared that “Usama bin holdings in Central Asia, and the British Ladin…was the type of Soviet-hating Empire’s holdings in India. freedom fighter that U.S. officials applauded The resulting Kingdom of Afghanistan when the world looked a little different.”(2) was and remains ethnically, linguistically, In fact, neither bin Ladin nor Taliban and religiously diverse. Today, Pushtuns are spiritual leader Mullah Umar were direct the largest ethnic group within the country, products of the CIA. The roots of the but they represent only 38 percent of the Afghan civil war and the country’s population. An almost equal number of
Middle East Review of International Affairs, Vol. 6, No. 1 (March 2002) 1 Michael Rubin
Pushtuns live across the border in Pakistan’s with the Isma’ili communities “just across Northwest Frontier Province. Ethnic Tajiks the river,” despite the watchful guard of the comprise one-quarter of the population. The Russian 201st brigade. Hazaras, who generally inhabit the center of Many countries thrive on diversity. the country, represent another 19 percent. However, in the context of both Afghanistan Other groups—such as the Aimaks, and the civil war, the fact that most Turkmen, Baluch, Uzbek, and others identifiable Afghan groups have co-linguists, comprise the rest.(3) co-ethnics, or co-religionists across national Linguistic divisions parallel, and in some boundaries became a catalyst for the nation’s cases, overlap ethnic divisions. In addition collapse, as well as a major determinant in to Dari (the Afghan dialect of Persian that is the coalition-building during both the years the lingua franca of half the population) and of Soviet occupation and post-liberation the Pushtun’s own Pashtu, approximately ten struggle. For example, the Pushtuns of percent of the population speaks Turkic Kandahar have traditionally looked eastward languages like Uzbek or Turkmen. Several toward their compatriots in Pakistan, while dozen more regional languages exist.(4) the Persian-speakers of Herat have looked Tribal divisions further compound the westward into Iran. Uzbeks in Mazar-i Afghan vortex. The Pushtuns are divided Sharif have more in common with their co- among the Durrani, Ghilzai, Waziri, linguists in Uzbekistan than they have with Khattak, Afridi, Mohmand, Yusufzai, their compatriots in Kandahar. Shinwari, and numerous smaller tribes. In As various Afghan constituencies looked turn, each of these tribes is divided into toward their patrons across Afghanistan’s subtribes. For example, the Durrani are frontiers for support, they created an divided into seven sub-groups: the Popalzai, incentive for Afghanistan’s neighbors to Barakzai, Alizai, Nurzai, Ishakzai, Achakzai, involve themselves in internal Afghan and Alikozai. These, in turn, are divided affairs. The blame cannot be placed only on into numerous clans.(5) Zahir Shah, ruler of outside interference in Afghanistan, though, Afghanistan between 1933 and 1973, for the Afghan government has a long belongs to the Muhammadzai clan of the though often forgotten history of interfering Barakzai subtribe of the Durrani tribe. Such with the ethnic minorities in surrounding clan, subtribal, and tribal divisions countries and especially Pakistan. contribute already intense rivalries and divisions. DOWN THE SLIPPERY SLOPE Religious diversity further complicated Zahir Shah took the throne of internal Afghan politics and relations with Afghanistan in 1933 after the assassination neighbors. Once home to thriving Hindu, of his father, Nadir Shah. Zahir was not a Sikh, and Jewish communities as recently as strong leader, though. As Louis Dupree, the the mid-twentieth century, Afghanistan preeminent anthropologist of Afghanistan today is overwhelmingly Muslim. The vast observed, “King Mohammed Zahir Shah majority—84 percent—are Sunni Muslims. reigned but did not rule for twenty years.”(6) However, the Hazaras are Twelver Shi’i, and Instead, real power remained vested in his so have sixty million co-religionists in Iran. uncles who sought to break Afghanistan out In the northeastern Badakhshan region of of both its isolation and dependence on Afghanistan, there are many Isma’ili Shi’ia. either the Soviet Union or Great Britain. It When I traveled along the Tajik-Afghan was during this period that Afghanistan and frontier in 1997, numerous Tajik villagers the United States first exchanged told me they had regular clandestine contacts ambassadors. The Afghan government
2 Middle East Review of International Affairs, Vol. 6, No. 1 (March 2002) Who is Responsible for the Taliban? awarded a San Francisco-based engineering was Daoud’s support for a Pushtun firm the rights to develop hydroelectric and nationalist movement in Pakistan that would irrigation projects in the Hilmand River have the greatest lasting repercussions. Valley. Slowly, Afghanistan began drifting toward the West, both politically and THE QUESTION OF GREATER economically. PUSHTUNISTAN In 1953, Zahir Shah’s first cousin, the 43- The root of the Pushtunistan problem year-old Muhammad Daoud Khan became begins in 1893. It was in that year that Sir prime minister. Daoud sought to root out Henry Mortimer Durand, foreign secretary graft in the huge Hilmand scheme, speed up of India, demarcated what became known as reforms, but he remained a firm opponent of the Durand line, setting the boundary the liberalization in Afghan society. Seeking between British India and Afghanistan, and to recalibrate Afghanistan’s neutrality, in the process dividing the Pushtun tribes Daoud sought closer relations with the into two countries. Soviet Union.(7) However, neutrality in the The status quo continued until 1947, Cold War was a fleeting phenomenon. when the British granted both India and Both the Soviet Union and the United Pakistan their independence. Afghanistan States increasingly plied Afghanistan with (and many Pushtuns in Pakistan) argued that economic and technical assistance. Daoud’s if Pakistan could be independent from India, government sought to buy arms, and then the Pushtun areas of Pakistan should approached the United States several times likewise have the option for independence as between 1953 and 1955. However he was an entity to be called “Pushtunistan,” or unable to come to an agreement with “land of the Pushtun.”(9) Once independent Washington, which tied arms sales to either of Pakistan, Pushtunistan would presumably membership in the anti-Communist Baghdad choose to unite with the Pushtun-dominated Pact or at least in a Mutual Security Pact.(8) Afghanistan, to form a “Greater The Soviet Union, though, was eager to Pushtunistan” (and also bolster the supply what the United States would not. In proportion of Pushtuns within Afghanistan). 1956, Afghanistan purchased $25 million in The Pushtunistan issue continued to tanks, airplanes, helicopters, and small arms simmer into the 1950s, with Afghanistan- from the Soviet bloc, while Soviet experts based Pushtuns crossing the Durand Line in helped construct or convert to military 1950 and 1951 in order to raise Pushtunistan specifications airfields in northern flags. Daoud, prime minister from 1953 to Afghanistan. The Cold War had come to 1963, supported the Pushtun claims. The Afghanistan. issue soon became caught up in Cold War While acceleration of the Cold War rivalry. As Pakistan ensconced itself more competition in Afghanistan—with its firmly in the American camp, the Soviet subsequent tragic impact on the country— Union increasingly supported Afghanistan’s would be a major legacy of Daoud, it would Pushtunistan agitations.(10) not be his most important one. Rather, In 1955, Pakistan reordered its during Daoud’s premiership Afghanistan’s administrative structure to merge all relations with neighboring Pakistan would provinces in West Pakistan into a single unit. irreversibly sour. Afghanistan increasingly While this helped rectify, at least in theory, saw in Pakistan both a competitor and a the power discrepancy between West and threat. Indeed, Daoud’s quest for arms was East Pakistan (the latter of which became in large part motivated by Afghanistan’s Bangladesh in 1971), Daoud interpreted the own cold war with Pakistan. However, it move as an attempt to absorb and
Middle East Review of International Affairs, Vol. 6, No. 1 (March 2002) 3 Michael Rubin marginalize the Pushtuns of the Northwest Nevertheless, the Pushtunistan issue did Frontier Province. In March 1955, mobs not disappear. In 1964, Zahir Shah called a attacked Pakistan’s embassy in Kabul, and loya jirga—a general assembly of tribal ransacked the Pakistani consulates in leaders and other notables—during which Jalalabad and Kandahar. Pakistani mobs several delegates spoke out on the issue. retaliated by sacking the Afghan consulate in Subsequent Afghan prime ministers Peshawar. Afghanistan mobilized its continued to pay lip service to the issue, reserves for war. Kabul and Islamabad keeping the irritant in Afghan-Pakistani agreed to submit their complaints to an relations alive. arbitration commission consisting of Even if Kabul’s support for Pushtun representatives from Egypt, Iraq, Saudi nationalist aspirations did not pose a serious Arabia, Iran, and Turkey. Arbitration failed, challenge to the integrity of Pakistan, the but the process provided time for tempers to impact on Pakistan-Afghanistan relations cool.(11) was lasting. As Barnett Rubin commented Twice, in 1960 and in 1961, Daoud sent in his 1992 study, The Fragmentation of Afghan troops into Pakistan’s Northwest Afghanistan, “The resentments and fears that Frontier Province. In September 1961, the Pashtunistan issue aroused in the Kabul and Islamabad severed diplomatic predominantly Punjabi rulers of Pakistan, relations and Pakistan attempted to seal its especially the military, continue to affect border with Afghanistan. The Soviet Union Pakistani perceptions of interests in was more than happy to provide an outlet, Afghanistan.”(15) though, for Afghanistan’s agricultural exports, which the Soviets airlifted out from THE RETURN OF DAOUD AND THE the Kabul airport. Between October and RISE OF THE ISLAMISTS November 1961, 13 Soviet aircraft departed In 1973, Daoud overthrew his cousin Kabul daily, transporting more than 100 tons Zahir Shah and declared Afghanistan a of Afghan grapes.(12) The New Republic republic. Pakistan, still reeling from the commented, “The Soviet Government does secession of Bangladesh, feared a return of not intend to miss any opportunity to the fierce Pushtun nationalism of Daoud’s increase its leverage.” Indeed, not only did first term. Meanwhile, Soviet Premier the Soviet Union “save” the Afghan harvest, Leonid Brezhnev, embracing a strategy of but Pakistan’s blockade also effectively Third World activism, sought to exploit ended the U.S. aid program in Daoud’s coup to retrench Soviet regional Afghanistan.(13) interests.(16) Pakistan, meanwhile, looked with In 1971, Pakistan fought a bloody and, growing suspicion on the apparent ultimately unsuccessful, war to prevent the development of a Moscow-New Delhi- secession of East Pakistan which, backed by Kabul alliance.(14) For the next two years, India, had declared its independence as Afghanistan and Pakistan traded vitriolic Bangladesh. While Pakistan had been radio and press propaganda as Afghan- founded on the basis of Islamic unity, the supported insurgents fought Pakistani units 1971 war reinforced the point that in inside the Northwest Frontier Province. On Pakistan, ethnicity trumped religion. March 9, 1963, Daoud stepped down. Two Accordingly, Pakistan viewed Daoud’s months later, with the mediation of the Shah Pushtunistan rhetoric (and his simultaneous of Iran, Pakistan and Afghanistan support for Baluchi separatists), as well as reestablished diplomatic relations. his generally pro-India foreign policy, as a serious threat to Pakistani security.
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Pakistani Prime Minister Zulfiqar Ali Bhutto responded by supporting an Islamist THE SAUR REVOLUTION movement in Afghanistan, a strategy that Under Daoud’s presidency, Afghanistan Islamabad would replicate two decades later became increasingly polarized. The with the Taliban.(17) For Islamabad, the Islamists were by no means the only strategy was two-fold. Not only could opposition seeking to reshape the status quo. Pakistan deter Afghan expansionism by Just as Pakistan backed the Islamist pressuring Afghanistan from within, but also opposition, the Soviet Union threw its a religious opposition would have broad encouragement behind the People’s appeal in an overwhelmingly Muslim Democratic Party of Afghanistan (PDPA), country without the implicit territorial threat sometimes referred to by either of its two of an ethnic-nationalist opposition. It was constituent factions, the Khalq and the from this Islamist movement that Pakistan’s Parcham. The Khalq and the Parcham intelligence agency, Inter-Services effectively remained competitors under Intelligence (ISI), would introduce the separate leadership between 1967 and 1977, United States to such important later when the Soviet Union pressured them to mujahidin figures as Burhanuddin Rabbani, reunite. Ahmad Shah Masud, and Gulbuddin Why did the Soviet Union shift its Hikmatyar. The latter is actually a Ghilzai support from Daoud, with whom it Pushtun, but from the north, with only previously had a good relationship? Barnett limited links to the Pushtuns of the south. Rubin explains that Soviet policy toward the Accordingly, he was not considered a Third World underwent a fundamental shift Pushtun nationalist by his Pakistani in the 1970s. The ouster of President benefactors (or most Afghans).(18) Sukarno in Indonesia and Anwar Sadat’s In 1974, the Islamists plotted a military decision to expel Soviet advisers from Egypt coup, but Daoud’s regime discovered the convinced Moscow that it could no longer plot and imprisoned the leaders—at least rely on non-communist nationalists. those who did not escape to Pakistan. The Simultaneously, the American defeat in following year, the Islamists attempted an Vietnam had emboldened the Soviet Union uprising in the Panjshir Valley. Again they to push harder and compromise less.(20) failed, and again the Islamist leaders fled In 1978, a leading Parcham official fell to into Pakistan. Islamabad found that an assassin’s bullet. Massive supporting an Afghan Islamist movement demonstrations erupted against Daoud and both gave Pakistan short-term leverage the CIA, which Parcham blamed for the against Daoud, and also a long-term card to killing. Daoud responded by arresting the play should Afghanistan again seek to PDPA leadership, spurring military officers strategically challenge its neighbor to the sympathetic to the PDPA to move against East. With a sympathetic force in his government. On April 27, 1978, they Afghanistan, Pakistan would be better able seized power in a bloody coup. On April 30, to influence succession should the elderly a Revolutionary Council declared Daoud die. It was thus in the mid-1970s, Afghanistan to be a Democratic Republic. while both the United States and the Soviet The Soviet Union welcomed the new Union continued to ply the Kabul regime regime with a massive influx of aid. with aid, that Pakistani intelligence—with However, the old rivalries between the financial support for Saudi Arabia—first Khalqis, who dominated the new began their ties to the Islamist opposition in government, and the Parchamis, crippled the Afghanistan.(19) regime. Hafizullah Amin sought to
Middle East Review of International Affairs, Vol. 6, No. 1 (March 2002) 5 Michael Rubin implement the Khalq’s program through ARMING THE AFGHAN RESISTANCE brute force and terror, alienating many of his The decision to arm the Afghan former partners. The Soviet Union, resistance came within two weeks of the witnessing the disintegration of state control, Soviet invasion, and quickly gained sought to salvage their influence in momentum.(21) In 1980, the Carter Afghanistan through a change of leadership, administration allocated only $30 million for but Hafizullah Amin refused to accept the Afghan resistance, though under the Soviet dictates. Reagan administration this amount grew steadily. In 1985, Congress earmarked $250 THE SOVIET INVASION million for Afghanistan, while Saudi Arabia Having lost in Iran’s Islamic revolution contributed an equal amount. Two years their staunchest regional ally, the United later, with Saudi Arabia still reportedly States again sought to engage Afghanistan. matching contributions, annual American aid In December 1979, Soviet Premier Leonid to the mujahidin reportedly reached $630 Brezhnev, not willing to lose the tenuous million.(22) This does not include Soviet advantage in Afghanistan, sent the contributions made by other Islamic Red Army pouring into the country. When countries, Israel, the People’s Republic of Hafizullah Amin still refused to relinquish China, and Europe. Many commentators power, Soviet units stormed his palace and cite the huge flow of American aid to executed him. While the Red Army and its Afghanistan as if it occurred in a vacuum; it client regime in Kabul controlled the city, did not. According to Pakistani journalist the Soviets were never fully able to gain Ahmed Rashid, the Soviet Union contributed control over the countryside. Pockets of approximately $5 billion per year into resistance continued despite all attempts to Afghanistan in an effort to support their stamp them out. counterinsurgency efforts and prop up the Despite the oversimplifications of some puppet government in Kabul.(23) Milton in academe and opponents of the military Bearden, Central Intelligence Agency station campaign against the Taliban, the mujahidin chief in Pakistan between 1986 and 1989, was not simply created by the CIA in the commented that by 1985, the occupying aftermath of the Soviet invasion. Rather, as Soviet 40th army had swollen to almost Red Army crack soldiers flew on Aeroflot 120,000 troops and with some other planes into Kabul, and as Soviet tanks rolled elements crossing into the Afghan theater on across the Friendship Bridge from what is a temporary duty basis.(24) now Uzbekistan, a cadre for the enlargement Initially, the CIA refused to provide of the Afghan mujahidin already existed. American arms to the resistance, seeking to This cadre had remained in Pakistani exile maintain plausible deniability.(25) (The since their failed uprising four years before. State Department, too, also opposed However, even if the mujahidin existed prior providing American-made weapons for fear to the Soviet invasion, it was the occupation of antagonizing the Soviet Union.(26) The of a foreign power that caused the mujahidin 1983 suggestion of American Ambassador to movement to grow exponentially in both Pakistan Ronald Spiers, that the U.S. provide influence and size as disaffected Afghans Stingers to the mujahidin accordingly went flocked to what had become the only viable nowhere for several years.(27) Much of the opposition movement. resistance to the supply of Stinger missiles was generated internally from the CIA station chief’s desire (prior to the accession of Bearden to the post) to keep the covert
6 Middle East Review of International Affairs, Vol. 6, No. 1 (March 2002) Who is Responsible for the Taliban? assistance program small and inconspicuous. The ISI used its coordinating position to Instead, the millions appropriated went to promote Pakistani interests as it saw them purchase Chinese, Warsaw Pact, and Israeli (within Pakistan, the ISI is often described weaponry. Only in March 1985, did as “a state within a state”).(33) The ISI Reagan’s national security team formally refused to recognize any Afghan resistance decide to switch their strategy from mere group that was not religiously based. harassment of Soviet forces in Afghanistan Neither the Pushtun nationalist Afghan to driving the Red Army completely out of Millat party, nor members of the Afghan the country.(28) After vigorous internal royal family were able to operate legally in debate, Reagan’s military and national Pakistani territory. The ISI did recognize security advisors agreed to provide the seven groups, but insisted on contracting mujahidin with the Stinger anti-aircraft directly with each individual group in order missile. At the time, the United States to maintain maximum leverage. Pakistani possessed only limited numbers of the intelligence was therefore able to reward weapon. Some of the Joint Chiefs of Staff compliant factions among the fiercely also feared accountability problems and competitive resistance figures.(34) Indeed, proliferation of the technology to Third the ISI tended to favor Gulbuddin World countries.(29) It was not until Hekmatyar, perhaps the most militant September 1986, that the Reagan Islamist of the mujahidin commanders, administration decided to supply Stinger largely because Hekmatyar was also a strong anti-aircraft missiles to the mujahidin, proponent of the Pakistani-sponsored thereby breaking the embargo on “Made-in- Islamist insurgency in Kashmir.(35) Masud, America” arms. the most effective Mujahid commander, but [While there was significant fear of a Tajik, received only eight Stingers from Stinger missiles falling into the wrong hands the ISI during the war. in the 1990s, very little attention was paid to Outside observers were not unaware that the threat from the anti-aircraft missiles in Pakistan had gained disproportionate the 2001 U.S. campaign against the Taliban. influence through aid distribution. However, This may have been due to an early 1990s India, the greatest possible diplomatic check covert campaign to purchase or otherwise to Washington’s escalating relationship with recover surplus Stinger missiles still in the Islamabad, removed herself from any hands of the mujahidin factions .](30) position of influence because its unabashed The CIA may have coordinated purchase pro-Soviet policy eviscerated any American of weapons and the initial training, but fear of antagonizing India. The U.S. State Pakistan’s Inter-Services Intelligence (ISI) Department considered India a lost controlled their distribution and their cause.(36) transport to the war zone. John McMahon, While beneficial to Pakistani national deputy director of the CIA, attempted to interests at least in the short-term, the ISI’s limit CIA interaction with the mujahidin. strategy had long-term consequences in Even at the height of American involvement promoting the Islamism and fractiousness of in Afghanistan, very few CIA operatives the mujahidin. However, the degree to were allowed into the field.(31) Upon the which disunity would plague the mujahidin weapons’ arrival at the port of Karachi or the did not become fully apparent until after the Islamabad airport, the ISI would transport withdrawal of the Soviet army from the weapons to depots near Rawalpindi or Afghanistan. Quetta, and hence on to the Afghan Afghanistan was a bleeding wound for border.(32) the Soviet Union. Each year, the Red Army
Middle East Review of International Affairs, Vol. 6, No. 1 (March 2002) 7 Michael Rubin suffered thousands of casualties. Numerous Islamist commanders like Hikmaytar, Soviets died of disease and drug addiction. upset with the U.S.-led coalition in the The quick occupation had bogged down into Persian Gulf, broke with their Saudi and a huge economic drain at a time of Kuwait patrons and found new backers in tightening Soviet resources. In 1988, Soviet Iran, Libya, and Iraq. [Granted, while the Premier Mikhail Gorbachev announced his break was sudden, the relationship with intention to withdraw Soviet troops. Despite Tehran was not. Hikmaytar had started Gorbachev’s continued military and much earlier to collaborate with Iran]. It economic assistance to Najibullah, was only in this second phase of the Afghan Afghanistan’s communist president, most war, a phase that developed beyond much of analysts believed the Najibullah would the Western world’s notice, that Afghan quickly collapse. The CIA expected that, at Arabs first became a significant political, if most, Najibullah would remain in power for not military, force in Afghanistan. one year following the Soviet withdrawal. However, Najibullah proved the skeptics THE EMERGENCE OF THE AFGHAN wrong. Mujahidin offensives in the wake of ARABS the Soviet withdrawal failed. Washington One of the greatest criticisms of U.S. had only budgeted money to support the policy, especially after the rise of the mujahdin for one year following the Soviet Taliban, has been that the CIA directly withdrawal, but Saudi and Kuwaiti donors supported Arab volunteers who came to provided emergency aid, much of which Afghanistan to wage jihad against the went to Hikmaytar and other Wahabi Soviets, but eventually used those American commanders.(37) While the United States arms to engage in terrorist war against the budgeted $250 million for the mujahidin in West. However, the so-called “Afghan 1991, the following year the Bush Arabs” only emerged as a major force in the administration allocated no money for 1990s. During the resistance against the military assistance. Money is influence, and Soviet occupation, Arab volunteers played at individuals in the Persian Gulf continued to best a cursory role. provide almost $400 million annually to the According to a former intelligence Afghan mujahidin.(38) official active in Afghanistan during the late Many Afghan specialists criticized the 1980s, the Arab volunteers seldom took part United States for merely walking away from in fighting and often raised the ire of local Afghanistan after the fall of the Soviet Afghans who felt the volunteers merely got Union. Ed Girardet, a journalist and in the way. In an unpublished essay, a Afghanistan expert, observed, “The United military officer writing under the name States really blew it. They dropped Barney Krispin, who worked for the CIA Afghanistan like a hot potato.”(39) Indeed, during its support of the Afghan mujahidin’s Washington’s lack of engagement created a fight against the Soviet Army, summoned up policy void in which radical elements in the the relationship between Afghan and non- ISI eagerly filled. However, to consider Afghan fighters at that time: Afghanistan in a vacuum ignores the crisis that developed when, on August 2, 1990, The relationship between the Iraqi troops invaded Kuwait. Washington’s Afghans and the Internationalists was attention and her resources shifted from the like a varsity team to the scrubs. The last battle of the Cold War to a different type Afghans fought their own war and of conflict. outsiders of any stripe were kept on the sidelines. The bin Ladin’s of this
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Jihad could build and guard roads, Similar comments were made by other dig ditches, and prepare fixed commanders. positions; however, this was an So where did the Afghan Arabs come Afghan Jihad, fought by real from? Many of the volunteers originated in Afghans, and eventually won by real the Muslim Brotherhood or other radical Afghans. Bin Ladin sat out the ‘big Islamist organizations. The Saudi Arabia- one.’ based Islamic Coordination Council organized both the new recruits, and Milton Bearden, former CIA station chief in disbursement of assistance. In Pakistan, Pakistan, was equally blunt, writing: Arab volunteers staffed numerous Saudi Red Crescent offices near the Afghan frontier. Despite what has often been written, The Arab volunteers also the CIA never recruited, trained, or disproportionately gravitated to the Ittihad-i otherwise used the Arab volunteers Islami (Islamic Union), led by Abd al-Rabb who arrived in Pakistan. The idea al-Rasul Sayyaf. Sayyaf was a Pushtun, but that the Afghans somehow needed he long lived in Saudi Arabia, had studied at fighters from outside their culture al-Azhar in Cairo, and spoke excellent was deeply flawed and ignored basic Arabic. Sayyaf preached a strict Salafi historical and cultural facts. version of Islam critical of manifestations of both Sufism and tribalism in Afghanistan. Bearden continued to explain though that However, successful as he was with Saudi while the Afghan Arabs were “generally financiers, he remained unpopular among viewed as nuisances by mujahidin ordinary Afghans both because of his commanders, some of whom viewed them as rampant corruption and also because only slightly less bothersome than the Afghans considered both Sayyaf and his Soviets,” the work of Arab fundraisers was fundamentalist brand of Islam foreign.(42) appreciated.(40) Even without a central role in the jihad, In 1995, Ali Ahmad Jalali, a former though, Afghan Arabs did establish a well- Afghan Army Colonel and top military financed presence in Afghanistan (and the planner on the directing staff of the Islamic border regions of Pakistan). While he does Unity of Afghan Mujahidin, along with Lt. not cite his source, Pakistani journalist Col. Lester W. Grau, US Army, ret., a career Ahmed Rashid estimated that between 1982 Soviet Foreign Area Officer, published a and 1992, some 35,000 Islamists would collection of essays by mujahidin serve in Afghanistan.(43) commanders explaining their tactics in Is the United States responsible for various engagements. Throughout their creating the Afghan Arab phenomenon? It essays, various commanders make reference would be a gross over-simplification to to the presence of Afghan Arabs, often in ascribe the rise of the Taliban to mere ways which indicate their combat role was “blowback” from Washington’s support of marginal at best. For example, describing a radical Islam as a Cold War tool. After all, 1987 mujahidin raid on a division garrison in while many mujahidin groups are fiercely Kandahar, Commander Akhtarjhan religious, few adhere to the combative commented, “We had some Arabs who were radicalism of the Arab mercenaries. Nor can with us for jihad credit. They had a video one simply attribute the rise of Islamic camera and all they wanted to do was to take fundamentalism to U.S. involvement, for videos. They were of no value to us.”(41) this ignores the very real fact that a country preaching official atheism occupied
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Afghanistan. Nevertheless, by delegating surrounding Kabul preceded to shell the city responsibility for arms distribution to the mercilessly. Meanwhile, Ismail Khan ISI, the United States created an controlled Herat and much of Western environment in which radical Islam could Afghanistan, while several Pushtun flourish. And, with the coming of the commanders held sway over eastern Taliban, radical Islam did just that. Afghanistan. Kandahar and southern Afghanistan was THE RISE OF THE TALIBAN in a state of chaos, with numerous warlords The Taliban seemingly arose from thin and other “barons” dividing not only the air. Newspapers like The New York Times south, but also Kandahar city itself into only deemed the Taliban worthy of numerous fiefdoms. Human Rights Watch newsprint months after it had become the labeled the situation in Kandahar dominant presence in southern “particularly precarious,” and noted that, Afghanistan.(44) The rise of the Taliban was “civilians had little security from murder, accompanied by heady optimism. Just as rape, looting, or extortion. Humanitarian many Iranian opponents of the Islamic agencies frequently found their offices Republic freely admit to having initially stripped of all equipment, their vehicles supported Ayatollah Ruhollah Khomeini, a hijacked, and their staff threatened.”(45) wide variety of Afghans from various social Pakistani journalist Ahmed Rashid argued classes and cities told me in March 2000 that that the internecine fighting, especially in they too were initially willing to give the Kandahar, had virtually eliminated the Taliban a chance, even though few still traditional leadership, leaving the door open supported the movement at the time of my to the Taliban.(46) travel through the Islamic Emirate. Teachers, Afghanistan became a maelstrom of merchants, teachers, and gravediggers all shifting alliances. Dostum defected from his said that the Taliban promised two things: alliance with Rabbani and Masud, and joined Security and an end to the conflict between Himatyar in shelling the capital. The rival mujahidin groups that continued to southern Pushtun warlords and bandits wrack Afghanistan through the 1990s and, continued to fight each other for territory, indeed, until the ultimate victory of the while continuing to sell off Afghanistan’s Northern Alliance with U.S. air support in machinery, property, and even entire December 2001. factories to Pakistani traders. Kidnappings, Following the 1989 withdrawal of the murders, rapes, and robberies were frequent Soviet military, Afghan president Najibullah as Afghan civilians found themselves in the managed to maintain power for three years crossfire. without his patrons. In 1992, ethnic Tajik It was in the backdrop to this fighting that mujahidin forces captured Kabul and the Taliban arose, not only in Afghanistan, unseated the communist president. but also among Afghan refugees and former However, Rabbani, Ahmad Shah Masud, mujahidin studying in the madaris (religious and ethnic Uzbek commander General colleges) of Pakistan. Ahmed Rashid Rashid Dostum could not control the prize. conducted interviews with many of the Hikmatyar immediately contested the new founders of the movement in which they government that, for the first time in more openly discussed their distress at the chaos than three centuries (except for a ten-month afflicting Afghanistan. After much interlude in 1929), had put Tajiks in a discussion, they created their movement predominant position. Hikatyar’s forces based on a platform of restoration of peace, took up positions in the mountains disarmament of the population, strict
10 Middle East Review of International Affairs, Vol. 6, No. 1 (March 2002) Who is Responsible for the Taliban? enforcement of the shari’a, and defense of just 18 hours, a rebellion forced the Taliban the “Islamic character” of Afghanistan.(47) from the city. When the Taliban again took Mullah Muhammad Umar, an Afghan the refugee-swollen city in August 1998, Pushtun of the Ghilzai clan and Hotak tribe they took no chances, brutally massacring who had been wounded toward the end of thousands. With Dostum in an Uzbek exile, the conflict with the Soviet army, became the only major mujahidin commander the movement’s leader. remaining was Ahmad Shah Masud, The beginning of the Taliban’s activity in nicknamed ‘the Lion of the Panjshir’ for his Afghanistan is shrouded in myth. Ahmed heroism during the war against the Rashid recounted what he deemed the most Soviets.(50) credible: Neighbors of two girls kidnapped While supported materially by Pakistan, and raped by Kandahar warlords asked the the Taliban relied heavily upon momentum Taliban’s help in freeing the teenagers. The in its near-complete conquest of Taliban attacked a military camp, freed the Afghanistan. Following the fall of girls, and executed the commander. Later, Kandahar, thousands of Afghan refugees, another squad of Taliban freed a young boy madrasa students, and Pakistani Jamiat-i over whom two warlords were fighting for Ulama supporters rushed to join the the right to sodomize. A Robin Hood myth movement. Ahmed Rashid estimates that by grew up around Mullah Umar resulting in December 1994, more than 12,000 recruits victimized Afghans increasingly appealing joined the Taliban.(51) Each subsequent to the Taliban for help against local Taliban victory resulted in thousands of new oppressors.(48) recruits. Often these victories were less a Territorial conquest began on October 12, result of military prowess than cooption of 1994, when 200 Taliban seized the Afghan opposing warlords into the Taliban border post of Spin Baldak. Less than a movement. month later, on November 3, the Taliban I was in Mazar-i Sharif in 1997, when the attacked Kandahar, the second-largest city in Taliban first marched on the city. Their Afghanistan. Within 48 hours, the city was advance was surprisingly fast (leaving theirs. Each conquest brought the Taliban foreigners in the city scrambling to new equipment and munitions—from rifles evacuate). The reason was they had simply and bullets to tanks and MiG fighters, for coopted General Dostum’s deputy Malik, their continued advance.(49) The Taliban who was in command of the neighboring maintained their momentum and quickly province. Rather than fighting their way seized large swathes of Afghanistan. By through more than 100 kilometers, the February 11, 1995, they controlled 9 of Taliban force suddenly found themselves Afghanistan’s 30 provinces. On September with free passage to within a dozen 5, 1995, the Taliban seized Herat, sending kilometers of the city. Ismail Khan into an Iranian exile. Just over Stalemate ensued as the Taliban were one year later, Jalalabad fell, and just 15 unable to gain significant ground against days later, on September 26, 1996, the Masud, who retained control of between 5 Taliban took Kabul. and 10 percent of Afghan territory. The A stalemate ensued for almost eight fight between the mujahidin forces months, but shattered when General Malik commanded by Masud and the Taliban rebelled against Dostum, allowing Taliban became a fight between those who had been forces into the north. On May 24, 1997, the beneficiaries of American assistance in the Taliban seized Mazar-i Sharif, the last major 1980s, and those who had sprung to city held by the mujahidin. However, after
Middle East Review of International Affairs, Vol. 6, No. 1 (March 2002) 11 Michael Rubin prominence in the aftermath of American some Taliban trade occurred with withdrawal from Afghan affairs. Turkmenistan and even Iran, and the Taliban benefited from the supply of opium to all of PAKISTANI SUPPORT FOR THE its neighbors, Pakistan remained the TALIBAN effective diplomatic and economic lifeline The Taliban became the latest incarnation for the Taliban’s Islamic Emirate. Senior of Pakistan’s desire to support Islamist ISI veterans like Colonel “Imam” Sultan rather than nationalist rule in neighboring Amir functioned as district advisors to the Afghanistan. The Taliban arose in madaris regional Taliban leadership. Pakistan also on Pakistani territory. Upon the capture of supplied a constant flow of munitions and Spin Baldak, mujahidin commanders in recruits for the Taliban’s war with the Kandahar immediately accused Pakistan of Northern Alliance, and provided crucial supporting the new group. In late October technical infrastructure support to allow the 1994, the local mujahidin warlords Taliban state to function.(55) intercepted a convoy containing arms, senior This did not represent a radical change in ISI commanders, and Taliban.(52) The men Pakistan’s Afghanistan policy. Rather, and material in this transport proved crucial Islamabad’s support of the Taliban was in the seizure of Kandahar. simply a continuation of a pattern to support Even after the stalemate ensued between Islamist rather than nationalist factions the Taliban and Ahmad Shah Masud, inside its neighbor. Nor was the ISI the only Pakistan provided the Taliban with a supporter of the Taliban within the Pakistan constant flow of new recruits. Rumors government. Former Prime Minister spread throughout the city while I was there Benazir Bhutto’s interior minister Nasrullah that 5,000 new ‘Punjabis’ were on their way Babar also staunchly supported the group. into Afghanistan to supplement the fight Robert Kaplan, correspondent for The against Masud. Former Defense Intelligence Atlantic Monthly went so far as to argue that Agency analyst Julie Sirrs gained access to Bhutto and Babar “conceived of the Taliban Taliban prisoners held by Ahmed Shah as the solution to Pakistan’s problems.”(56) Masud; among them were several Pakistani Ahmed Rashid commented, “The mercenaries. Taliban…were not beholden to any single Merchants in the book market in central Pakistani lobby such as the ISI…. In contrast Kabul talked about seeing many Pakistanis the Taliban had access to more influential “here for jihad.” In Rish Khor, on the lobbies and groups in Pakistan than most outskirts of Kabul, operated a training camp Pakistanis.”(57) for the Harakat ul-Mujahidin, a Pakistani- Taliban volunteers, interviewed by supported terrorist group waging a separatist Human Rights Watch, described Pakistani campaign against India.(53) It was members instructors at Rish Khor which, according to of this group that hijacked an Air India flight Afghans I interviewed, also served as a from Nepal to Kandahar in December 1999, training camp for the Harakat ul-Mujahidin, eventually releasing the hostages after the violent Kashmiri separatist group Taliban mediation and escaping. engaged in terrorist operations against Afghanistan provided a useful base not only India.(58) Citizens of Kabul derisively spoke to train pro-Pakistani militants and terrorists, of “Punjabis,” volunteers from Pakistan. but also to give them field experience. Guarding ministries in Kabul in March 2000 While politicians in Islamabad repeatedly were Taliban officials who only spoke Urdu, denied that Pakistan supported the Taliban, and did not speak any Afghan language. the reality was quite the opposite.(54) While The Pakistani government did not dispute
12 Middle East Review of International Affairs, Vol. 6, No. 1 (March 2002) Who is Responsible for the Taliban? reports that thousands of trained Pakistani Afghanistan. Bin Ladin caused a seeming volunteers serving with the Taliban.(59) paradox for Afghanistan watchers. On one While the Pakistani government was hand, the Taliban, recognized as the directly complicit in some forms of support government of Afghanistan by only for the Taliban, just as important was its Pakistan, Saudi Arabia, and the United Arab indirect support. In 1971, there were only Emirates, sought to break its isolation. On 900 madaris (religious seminaries) in the other hand, the Taliban continued to Pakistan, but by the end of President Zia ul shelter Usama bin Ladin, even after his Haq’s administration in 1988, there were involvement in the 1998 bombings of the over 8,000 official madaris, and more than U.S. embassies in Kenya and Tanzania. 25,000 unregistered religious schools.(60) As the media turned its attention to By January 2000, these religious seminaries Afghanistan after September 11, many were educating at least one-half million commentators sought answers as to why the children according to Pakistan’s own Taliban continued to host Usama bin Ladin, estimates.(61) The most prominent of the despite the international ire that he brought seminaries—the Dar al-Ulum Haqqania to the regime. CNN’s correspondent even from which the Taliban leadership was went so far as to postulate that the Taliban disproportionately drawn—reportedly had could not turn over Usama bin Ladin 15,000 applications for only 400 spots in because of Afghanistan’s tradition of 1999.(62) hospitality (something which did not stop Ahmed Rashid comments that the the Afghan’s from killing nearly 17,000 mullahs running most of the religious British men, women, and children schools were but semi-literate themselves, evacuating Kabul under a truce during the and blindly preached the religious First Afghan War in 1842.) philosophy adopted by the Taliban. Visiting The answer to the paradox is actually one such religious seminary in the aftermath much more mundane, and also a result of the of the World Trade Center attacks, students discrepancy in the fighting ability of the told a Western reporter that, “We are happy Taliban versus the mujahidin commanders many kaffirs [infidels] were killed in the like Ahmad Shah Masud who had received World Trade Center.” Regarding Muslim U.S. support and training in the 1980s. casualties in the World Trade Center, one Masud remained undefeated against the Red student responded, “If they were faithful to Army and, lacking both men and material, Islam, they will be martyred and go to he managed to stubbornly hold back the paradise. If they were not good Muslims, Taliban from the last five percent of they will go to hell.” The seminary students Afghanistan not under their control. Masud’s generally learn only Islam, tainted with secret was superior training and a fiercely strong strain of anti-Westernism and anti- loyal cadre of fighters. While the Taliban’s Semitism.(63) rank-and-file may have talked jihad, more often than not they would flee or hide when TALIBAN SUPPORT USAMA BIN the bullets began to fly. Unlike Masud’s LADIN men, the Taliban simply were incapable of Where does Usama bin Ladin fit into the fighting at night. picture? The Taliban and Usama bin Bin Ladin brought with him to Ladin’s al-Qa’ida network retained distinct Afghanistan a well-equipped and fiercely identities. Indeed, only in 1996 did Usama loyal division of fighters—perhaps bin Ladin relocate from refuge with the numbering only 2,000. While many of these Sudanese government to the Taliban’s trained in al-Qa’ida’s camps for terrorism
Middle East Review of International Affairs, Vol. 6, No. 1 (March 2002) 13 Michael Rubin abroad or protected bin Ladin and his The United States is not without fault, associates at their various safe-houses, bin however. Following the Soviet Union’s Ladin made available several hundred for collapse, Washington could have more duty on the Taliban’s frontline with Masud, effectively pressured Pakistan to tone down where they assured the Taliban of at a the support for Islamic fundamentalism, minimum continued balance and stalemate. especially after the rise of the Taliban. While the Taliban suffered a high Instead, Washington ceded her responsibility international cost for hosting bin Ladin, this and gave Pakistan a sphere of influence in was offset by the domestic benefits the Afghanistan unlimited by any other foreign regime gained. The war with the Northern pressure. Alliance—not recognition by Washington or even the Islamic World—was the Taliban’s chief priority. * Michael Rubin is an adjunct scholar of The Washington Institute for Near East Policy, WHO IS RESPONSIBLE? currently a visiting lecturer of Iranian In hindsight, and especially after the politics at Hebrew University’s Leonard World Trade Center and Pentagon attacks, it Davis Institute for International Relations. is easy to criticize Washington’s Prior to the September 11, 2001, terrorist shortsightedness. But American attacks, he traveled extensively in both the policymakers had a very stark choice in the Northern Alliance and Taliban-controlled 1980s: Either the United States could portions of Afghanistan. Dr. Rubin wishes support an Afghan opposition, or they could to thank Col. Nick Pratt, USMC (ret.), simply cede Afghanistan to Soviet course director and professor at The George domination, an option that might result in an C. Marshall Center for European Strategic extension of Soviet influence into Pakistan. Studies, for his insightful comments and Contrary to the beliefs of many critics of criticisms. American foreign policy, the United States is not able to dictate its desires even to foreign NOTES clients. Washington needed Pakistan’s 1. Robert Fisk, “Think-Tank Wrap-Up,” cooperation, but Pakistan was very mindful United Press International, September 15, of its own interests. Chief among these, 2001; “Public Enemy No. 1, a title he always especially following the secession of wanted” The Independent, August 22, 1998. Bangladesh in 1971, was minimizing the 2. Mort Rosenblum, "Bin Ladin once nationalist threat to Pakistani integrity. thought of as ‘freedom fighter’ for United Islamabad considered Afghanistan, States." Chattanooga Times/Chattanooga especially with successive Afghan Free Press, September 20, 2001. Even some government’s Pushtunistan claims, to pose a foreign dignitaries have sought to promote direct challenge to Pakistani national the myth. In a December 7, 2001, interview security. Accordingly, Islamabad only with the pro-Syrian Lebanese daily al-Safir, allowed religiously based rather than Egyptian President Hosni Mubarak nationalist opposition groups to operate on commented, "...When the so-called Pakistani territory. If American Mujahideen went to Afghanistan, they policymakers wanted to oppose Soviet became more extreme, and began to imperialism in Afghanistan, then they disseminate extremist ideas. People like simply would have to accede to Pakistani Omar Abd Al-Rahman and bin Laden were interests. American heroes."
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3. “Afghanistan.” The World Factbook Unconventional Warfare, House Republican 2001, (Washington: Central Intelligence Research Committee, U.S. House of Agency, 2001) Representatives, March 1, 1990.
Middle East Review of International Affairs, Vol. 6, No. 1 (March 2002) 15 Michael Rubin
States.” Chattanooga Times/Chattanooga 57. Amit Baruah, “Pak. Ripe for Taliban- Free Press, September 20, 2001. style revolution,” The Hindu, February 24, 40. Bearden, “Afghanistan, Graveyard of 2000. Empires,” Foreign Affairs, 58. “Afghanistan: Crisis of Impunity,” November/December 2001. Human Rights Watch, July 2001, Vol. 13, 41. Commander Akhtarjhan, “Raid on 15 No. 3, p.29. Division Garrison,” In: Ali Ahmad Jalali 59. Gregory Copley, “Pakistan Under and Lester W. Grau, eds, The Other Side of Musharraf,” Defense and Foreign Affairs’ the Mountain: Mujahideen Tactics in the Strategic Policy, January 2000. Soviet-Afghan War, (Quantico, Virginia: 60. Rashid, p.89. The United States Marine Corps Studies and 61. Gregory Copley, “Pakistan Under Analysis Division, 1995), p.396. Musharraf,” Defense and Foreign Affairs’ 42. Rubin, 223-224; Rashid, p.85. Strategic Policy, January 2000. 43. Rashid, p.130. 62. Reuel Marc Gerecht, “Pakistan’s 44. See: John Burns. “New Afghan Force Taliban Problem; And America’s Pakistan Takes Hold, Turning to Peace,” The New Problem,” The Weekly Standard, Vol. 7. York Times, February 16, 1995, p.A3. No. 8. 2001, p.24. 45. “Afghanistan: Crisis of Impunity,” 63. Barry Shlachter, “Inside Islamic Human Rights Watch. July 2001. Vol. 13, seminaries, where the Taliban was born,” No. 3, p.15. The Philadelphia Inquirer. November 25, 46. Rashid, p.19. 2001. The views of the Pakistani madrasa 47. Rashid, p.22 students were equally anti-Western before 48. Rashid, pp.25-26. the September 11 attacks. See: Robert 49. “Afghanistan: Crisis of Impunity,” Kaplan, “The Lawless Frontier; tribal Human Rights Watch, July 2001, Vol. 13, relations, radical political movements and No. 3, p.15. social conflicts in Afghanistan-Pakistan 50. See chronology in Rashid, pp.226-235. border,” The Atlantic Monthly, September 1, 51. Rashid, p.29. 2000. 52. Rashid, p.28. 53. Michael Rubin and Daniel Benjamin, “The Taliban and Terrorism: Report from Afghanistan,” Policywatch, The Washington Institute for Near East Policy. No. 450. April 6, 2000. 54. For Pakistani denials of support for the Taliban, see: Pamela Constable. “Pakistani Agency Seeks to Allay U.S. on Terrorism,” The Washington Post, February 15, 2000, p.A17. 55. “Afghanistan: Crisis of Impunity,” Human Rights Watch, July 2001, Vol. 13, No.3, p.23. 56. Robert Kaplan, “The Lawless Frontier; tribal relations, radical political movements and social conflicts in Afghanistan-Pakistan border,” The Atlantic Monthly, September 1, 2000.
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