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THE ARTS This PDF document was made available CHILD POLICY from www.rand.org as a public service of CIVIL JUSTICE the RAND Corporation. EDUCATION ENERGY AND ENVIRONMENT Jump down to document6 HEALTH AND HEALTH CARE INTERNATIONAL AFFAIRS The RAND Corporation is a nonprofit NATIONAL SECURITY institution that helps improve policy and POPULATION AND AGING PUBLIC SAFETY decisionmaking through research and SCIENCE AND TECHNOLOGY analysis. SUBSTANCE ABUSE TERRORISM AND HOMELAND SECURITY TRANSPORTATION AND Support RAND INFRASTRUCTURE Purchase this document WORKFORCE AND WORKPLACE Browse Books & Publications Make a charitable contribution For More Information Visit RAND at www.rand.org Explore the RAND National Defense Research Institute View document details Limited Electronic Distribution Rights This document and trademark(s) contained herein are protected by law as indicated in a notice appearing later in this work. This electronic representation of RAND intellectual property is provided for non-commercial use only. Unauthorized posting of RAND PDFs to a non-RAND Web site is prohibited. RAND PDFs are protected under copyright law. Permission is required from RAND to reproduce, or reuse in another form, any of our research documents for commercial use. For information on reprint and linking permissions, please see RAND Permissions. This product is part of the RAND Corporation monograph series. RAND monographs present major research findings that address the challenges facing the public and private sectors. All RAND mono- graphs undergo rigorous peer review to ensure high standards for research quality and objectivity. Victory Has a Thousand Fathers Detailed Counterinsurgency Case Studies Christopher Paul • Colin P. Clarke • Beth Grill Prepared for the Office of the Secretary of Defense Approved for public release; distribution unlimited NATIONAL DEFENSE RESEARCH INSTITUTE The research described in this report was prepared for the Office of the Secretary of Defense (OSD). The research was conducted in the RAND National Defense Research Institute, a federally funded research and development center sponsored by OSD, the Joint Staff, the Unified Combatant Commands, the Department of the Navy, the Marine Corps, the defense agencies, and the defense Intelligence Community under Contract W74V8H-06-C-0002. Library of Congress Control Number: 2010930815 ISBN: 978-0-8330-4967-4 The RAND Corporation is a nonprofit research organization providing objective analysis and effective solutions that address the challenges facing the public and private sectors around the world. RAND’s publications do not necessarily reflect the opinions of its research clients and sponsors. R® is a registered trademark. Cover photo: A U.S. marine stands in a doorway after searching one of the houses of Saddam Hussein's family in Owja, Iraq, April 15, 2003. The village, which is just outside Tikrit, was the former leader's birthplace. AP Photo/Kevin Frayer. © Copyright 2010 RAND Corporation Permission is given to duplicate this document for personal use only, as long as it is unaltered and complete. Copies may not be duplicated for commercial purposes. Unauthorized posting of RAND documents to a non-RAND website is prohibited. RAND documents are protected under copyright law. For information on reprint and linking permissions, please visit the RAND permissions page (http://www.rand.org/publications/ permissions.html). Published 2010 by the RAND Corporation 1776 Main Street, P.O. Box 2138, Santa Monica, CA 90407-2138 1200 South Hayes Street, Arlington, VA 22202-5050 4570 Fifth Avenue, Suite 600, Pittsburgh, PA 15213-2665 RAND URL: http://www.rand.org To order RAND documents or to obtain additional information, contact Distribution Services: Telephone: (310) 451-7002; Fax: (310) 451-6915; Email: [email protected] Preface This research grew out of the sponsor’s desire to be able to evidence the historical contribution (or lack of contribution) of activities con- cordant with what is now referred to as strategic communication to the outcomes of counterinsurgency (COIN) campaigns. The method that the RAND Corporation proposed to answer this question—a com- bination of historical case studies and the qualitative comparative approach—was capable of answering a much broader set of questions about the contributions of a wider range of approaches to COIN with minimal additional effort. This research, then, reports on the demon- strated effectiveness of a variety of approaches to counterinsurgency (including strategic communication) through case studies of the world’s 30 most recent resolved insurgencies. This monograph presents detailed case histories for each of the COIN campaigns examined in the analysis. A companion volume, Victory Has a Thousand Fathers: Sources of Success in Counterinsurgency, describes the qualitative comparative approach, presents findings from the overall analyses, and explains the study’s case selection and meth- odology in more detail. It also presents an overview and in-depth assessments of the key approaches, practices, and factors that feature prominently in successful COIN operations.1 The full case data can be downloaded at http://www.rand.org/pubs/monographs/MG964/. 1 Christopher Paul, Colin P. Clarke, and Beth Grill, Victory Has a Thousand Fathers: Sources of Success in Counterinsurgency, Santa Monica, Calif.: RAND Corporation, MG-964-OSD, 2010. iii iv Victory Has a Thousand Fathers: Detailed Counterinsurgency Case Studies This work will be of interest to defense analysts and military plan- ners who are responsible for evaluating current U.S. operations and COIN approaches; to academics and scholars who engage in historical research of COIN, insurgency, and irregular warfare; and to students of contemporary and historic international conflicts. This research was sponsored by Office of the Secretary of Defense, Cost Analysis and Program Evaluation, Irregular Warfare Division, and conducted within the International Security and Defense Policy Center of the RAND National Defense Research Institute, a federally funded research and development center sponsored by the Office of the Secretary of Defense, the Joint Staff, the Unified Combatant Com- mands, the Navy, the Marine Corps, the defense agencies, and the defense Intelligence Community. For more information on RAND’s International Security and Defense Policy Center, contact the Director, James Dobbins. He can be reached by email at [email protected]; by phone at 703- 413-1100, extension 5134; or by mail at the RAND Corporation, 1200 South Hayes Street, Arlington, Virginia 22202-5050. More informa- tion about RAND is available at www.rand.org. Contents Preface ............................................................................. iii Figures .............................................................................vii Tables .............................................................................. ix Summary .......................................................................... xi Abbreviations ................................................................... xvii Detailed Overviews of 30 Counterinsurgency Cases ...................... 1 Nicaragua (Somoza), 1978–1979 ................................................. 2 Afghanistan (Anti-Soviet), 1978–1992 .........................................11 Kampuchea, 1978–1992..........................................................25 El Salvador, 1979–1992 ..........................................................37 Somalia, 1980–1991 ..............................................................47 Peru, 1980–1992 ..................................................................57 Nicaragua (Contras), 1981–1990 ................................................67 Senegal, 1982–2002 ............................................................. 77 Turkey (PKK), 1984–1999 ...................................................... 87 Sudan (SPLA), 1984–2004 ..................................................... 98 Uganda (ADF), 1986–2000 ................................................... 108 Papua New Guinea, 1988–1998 ............................................... 117 Liberia, 1989–1997 ............................................................. 126 Rwanda, 1990–1994 ............................................................ 136 Moldova, 1990–1992 ........................................................... 147 Sierra Leone, 1991–2002 ....................................................... 158 Algeria (GIA), 1992–2004 ..................................................... 168 Croatia, 1992–1995 ............................................................. 179 Afghanistan (Post-Soviet), 1992–1996 ....................................... 189 v vi Victory Has a Thousand Fathers: Detailed Counterinsurgency Case Studies Tajikistan, 1992–1997 .......................................................... 198 Georgia/Abkhazia, 1992–1994 ................................................ 209 Nagorno-Karabakh, 1992–1994 .............................................. 219 Bosnia, 1992–1995 .............................................................. 230 Burundi, 1993–2003 ........................................................... 241 Chechnya I, 1994–1996 ........................................................ 253 Afghanistan (Taliban), 1996–2001 ........................................... 264 Zaire (Anti-Mobutu), 1996–1997 ............................................. 274 Kosovo, 1996–1999 ............................................................
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