Coca, Contention and Identity: the Political Empowerment of The

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Coca, Contention and Identity: the Political Empowerment of The THE LONDON SCHOOL OF ECONOMICS AND POLITICAL SCIENCE DEPARTMENT OF GOVERNMENT Coca, Contention and Identity: The Political Empowerment of the Cocaleros of Bolivia and Peru URSULA DURAND OCHOA Thesis submitted for the degree of Doctor of Philosophy LONDON APRIL 2012 DECLARATION I certify that the thesis I have presented for examination for the PhD degree of the London School of Economics and Political Science is solely my own work other than where I have clearly indicated that it is the work of others (in which case the extent of any work carried out jointly by me and any other person is clearly identified in it). The copyright of this thesis rests with the author. Quotation from it is permitted, provided that full acknowledgement is made. This thesis may not be reproduced without my prior written consent. I warrant that this authorisation does not, to the best of my belief, infringe the rights of any third party. I declare that my thesis consists of 75,474 words. 2 ABSTRACT In April 2003, Peru’s cocaleros broke into the national spotlight by mobilising a six thousand- strong March of Sacrifice from their coca-producing valleys to the capital city of Lima. In 2006, cocalero leaders ascended to several political positions at the municipal and national level. However, their political impact has been limited and divisions amongst coca-producing valleys have prevented cocaleros from articulating a unified agenda on the coca issue itself, let alone on wider issues. The experience of Bolivia’s cocaleros presents a very different picture. In 2005, cocalero leader Evo Morales was elected president with the highest margin of victory in the country’s electoral history. He was re-elected in 2009 by a greater margin. Morales and his political party mobilised a broad coalition as they developed an identity of ‘excluded’ that challenged Bolivia’s unrepresentative democracy, neoliberal economic model and relationship with the United States. How do we explain the political ascent of these unprecedented actors that stand on the border of illegality? Why has the empowerment and impact of these actors on their national political landscapes varied so significantly? This work aims to explain the different experiences of the Bolivian and Peruvian cocaleros in gaining political empowerment through contentious action that originated in defence of coca—an issue that is both de-legitimising and divisive. This work presents the political ascent of these actors as cases of identity-formation. It argues that their ability to construct identities that deterred disunity, legitimised their struggle and broadened their appeal determined their degree of political empowerment. Furthermore, it reveals how contentious interactions—bound by the context in which they unfolded—distinctly shaped each case’s identity-formation processes. In Peru, the imposed identity of ‘illegitimate’ weakened the identity of ‘cocalero’ and generated disunity, isolation and a limited political impact. In Bolivia, the identities of ‘syndicalist’ and ‘excluded’ strengthened the identity of ‘cocalero’ and engendered unity, alliance formation and a significant political impact. 3 ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS I would like to acknowledge a number of individuals that contributed to the completion of this thesis. Specifically, I would like to thank those that assisted my field work in Lima, Peru and in La Paz, Cochabamba and Villa Tunari in Bolivia by allowing themselves to be interviewed, especially Jaime Antesana, Cesar Sara Sara, Paulino Guarachi and Dionicio, Núñez, whose first-hand accounts proved essential in putting together the stories of the Bolivian and Peruvian cocaleros. I am especially grateful to my supervisor George Philip, who provided important insights and advice, read various draft chapters and was always available for questions. I would also like to extend my gratitude to my advisor Francisco Panizza, who consistently encouraged my work. Their comments helped refine and improve various aspects of my theoretical framework as well as empirical research. Lastly, I would like to thank the many individuals that read and provided insightful constructive criticisms throughout the progress of this work. I am especially thankful to David and Paco for their consistent support and willingness to proof-read, and to Tula and Paco for their unwavering example. 4 TABLE OF CONTENTS Abstract 3 Acknowledgements 4 Table of contents 5 Acronyms and abbreviations 7 1 Introduction 10 1.1 Background and research question 10 1.2 Case selection 11 1.3 Theoretical framework 14 1.4 Argument 24 1.5 Methodology 32 1.6 Main findings 34 1.7 Chapter summaries 34 2 The Criminalisation of Coca and Cocaine 36 2.1 Polemic beginnings 36 2.2 Coca: Coming of age 42 2.3 Cocaine: Great expectations 45 2.4 Criminalisation and the War on Drugs 49 2.5 Conclusion 57 3 Peru: Formation of a Social Movement—Crisis and Repression during the Transition(s) to Democracy 60 3.1 The social crisis 61 3.2 The political crisis 66 3.3 Formation of a social movement 71 3.4 Mechanisms 80 3.5 Conclusion 84 5 4 Bolivia: Formation of a Social Movement—Crisis and Opportunity during the Transition to Democracy 87 4.1 The coca-cocaine dependency 88 4.2 The economic crisis 90 4.3 The political crisis 93 4.4 Formation of a social movement 98 4.5 Mechanisms 108 4.6 Conclusion 111 5 Peru: Transformation of a Social Movement—Radicalisation, Division and Demobilisation 114 5.1 The new democratic era 114 5.2 Division and radicalisation 121 5.3 De-legitimisation 126 5.4 Cocaleros as political actors 134 5.5 Mechanisms 140 5.6 Conclusion 143 6 Bolivia: Transformation of a Social Movement—Convergence and Diffusion 146 6.1 Democracy in crisis 146 6.2 Politicisation 157 6.3 Cocaleros as political actors 164 6.4 Mechanisms 174 6.5 Conclusion 178 7 Conclusion: The Cocaleros of Bolivia and Peru Compared 180 7.1 The argument revisited 181 7.2 Phase I: Bolivia and Peru compared 184 7.3 Phase II: Bolivia and Peru compared 189 7.4 Closing discussion 196 Bibliography 199 Appendices 218 6 ACRONYMS AND ABBREVIATIONS Bolivia ANAPCOCA National Association of Coca Producers AND Democratic Nationalist Action ASP Assembly for the Sovereignty of the People CIDOB Confederation of Indigenous People of Eastern Bolivia COB Bolivian Workers’ Confederation COFECAY Council of Federations of the Yungas of La Paz COMIBOL Mining Corporation of Bolivia CSCB Syndicalist Confederation of Bolivian Colonisers CSUTCB Unified Syndicalist Confederation of Rural Workers of Bolivia EGTK Túpac Katari Guerilla Army FAMA Front of the Anti-Imperialist Masses FETCTC Special Federation of Peasant Workers of the Tropic of Cochabamba FINSA Arévalo Savings Society FSTMB Syndicalist Federation of Mining Workers of Bolivia IPSP Political Instrument for the Sovereignty of the People IU United Left MAS Movement toward Socialism MAS-IPSP Movement toward Socialism -Political Instrument for the Sovereignty of the People MBL Free Bolivia Movement MIP Pachakuti Indigenous Movement MIR Movement of the Revolutionary Left MITKA Túpac Katari Indian Movement MNR Revolutionary Nationalist Movement MNRI Revolutionary Nationalist Movement of the Left MRTK Túpac Katari Revolutionary Movement NFR New Republican Force NPE New Economic Plan PCB Communist Party of Bolivia 7 SPY Society of Landowners of the Yungas and Inquisivi UCS Civic Solidarity Union UDP Popular and Democratic Union Peru AAAHCPA Association of Livestock and Coca Leaf Farmers of the Padre Abad Province AIDESEP Inter-ethnic Development Association of the Peruvian Jungle APRODEH Pro Human Rights Association CAOI Andean Coordinator of Indigenous Organisation CCP Peasant Confederation of Peru CENACOP National Coca Agricultural Organisation of Peru CGTP General Confederation of Workers of Peru CNA National Agrarian Confederation CNT National Confederation of Workers CODEDU Committee of Development and Defence of Uchiza CODETO Committee of Development and Defence of Tocache COICA Coordinator of Indigenous Organisations of the Amazon Basin CONACAMI National Confederation of Peruvian Communities Affected by Mining CONAPA National Coordinating Committee of Agricultural Producers CONPACCP National Confederation of Agricultural Producers of the Coca Valleys of Peru COPPIP Permanent Coordinator of Indigenous Peoples of Peru CORAH Upper Huallaga Special Project for the Control of Coca Crop Eradication and Reduction CRPCLP-A Regional Committee of Coca Producers of the Province of Leoncio Prado and Annexes CTP Confederation of Workers of Peru CTRP Centre of Workers of the Peruvian Revolution CVR Commission of Truth and Reconciliation DESCO Centre for the Study of Promotion and Development DEVIDA National Commission for Development and Life without Drugs DL 22095 Supreme Law 22095 (Law of Drugs) DS 044 Supreme Decree 044 DS 245 Supreme Decree 254 8 IDL Institute of Legal Defence ENACO National Enterprise of Coca FASMA Agrarian Federation of the Maestra Jungle FECVRA Peasant Federation of the Valley and River Apurímac FEDECAH Defence Front against the Eradication of Coca in the Upper Huallaga FENDEPCO National Front in Defence of the Producers of the Coca Leaf FEPA-VRAE Federation of Agricultural Producers of the Valley of the River Apurímac-Ene FEPCACYL Federation of Peasant Producers of the La Convención, Yanatile and Lares FIDH International Human Rights Federation MRTA Túpac Amaru Revolutionary Movement PCP Communist Party of Peru PDC Christian Democracy Party PEAH Special Project Upper Huallaga SIN National Intelligence Service SUTEP Unitary Syndicate of Education
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