The Air War in El Salvador

DR. JAMES S. CORUM

HE CIVIL WAR in El Salva dor, US military aid was provided to the Salva­ which lasted from 1980 to 1992, doran Air Force.2 Some aspects of the war in was one of the larg est and bloodi est El Salvador and the US involvement have in sur gen cies that the Western been told in numer ous books and publica - HemiT sphere has seen. During the 12-year tions.3 Yet, al though air power played a ma jor war, an esti mated one hundred thousand role in the con flict, its story has not been dealt peo ple died—fairly horren dous losses for a with in any detail. In deed, there are no books coun try of only five million people. or major journal arti cles specifi cally on the The war in El Salvador saw signifi cant in­ his tory of the Sal va doran Air Force dur ing the volve ment by the United States in the form of war. Con sid er ing that the Sal va doran war pro­ mili tary and economic aid, advi sors, and vides us with one of the most re cent ex am ples training. During the course of the war, the of the use of airpower in a coun ter in sur gency United States poured $4.5 billion of eco ­ cam paign, this is a signifi cant gap in the lit- nomic aid into the country and over $1 bil­ erature about the use of airpower in modern lion in military aid.1 Almost a quarter of the warfare. 4

27 28 AIRPOWER JOURNAL SUMMER 1998

This article is an attempt to fill some gaps The various smaller factions, however, main­ in the history of the air war in El Salvador. It tained their identity. be gins by outlin ing the history of the air war The rightist factions and parties in El and then looks at some issues in greater de- Salvador, which in cluded parts of the armed tail, issues such as the effec tive ness of the forces, reacted to the insur rec tion with a train ing and equipment provided to El Salva­ ruthless assassi na tion program conducted by dor by the United States. The doctrine and “death squads.” Anyone suspected of leftist tac tics of the air war also merit discussion . sym pa thies was liable to be abducted and Was airpower used in an appro pri ate man­ shot. Dozens of murders by progov ern ment ner? Finally, the article outlines some of the les sons about the use of airpower in counter- forces and mi li tia were con ducted nightly. In- insur gency that might be learned from the deed, an esti mated 10,000 people were killed 6 war. in this manner in the first year of the war. How ever, in stead of sup press ing the in sur rec­ tion, the extreme violence by the regime Background of the Conflict pushed many more Salvadorans into open re- volt. The violence escalated, and the Carter In 1980, El Salvador was ripe for a major ad mini stra tion, in its dis gust with the mas sive in sur rec tion. It was a small, poor, and densely level of human rights violations, cut off US populated nation long dominated by a small economic and military aid. By January 1991, oli gar chy and ruled by a series of military the rebels, who by this time numbered as gov ern ments that had little regard for civil rights. The in fant mor tal ity rate was high, and many as 10,000 fighters, mounted a final of- the lack of eco nomic op por tu nity had pushed fen sive with the intent of occu py ing San Sal­ hundreds of thousands of Salva dorans across va dor and overthrow ing the government . the bor der into Hon du ras in a search for land Alarmed at the very real possi bil ity of insur­ and jobs. Several Marxist-oriented revolu­ gent victory, the Carter administra tion in its tion ary groups were already organized in the last days lifted the impounded military aid country. The events of 1979 would set the and authorized new aid.7 As distasteful as the con di tions for an open rebel lion.5 regime was, in the US view, it was preferabl e The success ful revolu tion by the Sandi­ to an other Marx ist revo lu tion ary gov ern ment nistas against the So moza re gime in Nica ra­ in Central America. The revolution in Nicara­ gua in 1979 provided encour age ment to gua had alerted the United States and the revo lu tion ary movements in Central Amer­ other Central American nations who all ica. If such a power ful and oppres sive re­ feared a “domino effect.” If El Salvador fell, gime could be brought down by a poorly then revo lu tions might also suc ceed in Gua te­ equipped popular movement, then the oli­ mala and Hondu ras, and the Carter admini­ gar chy in El Salva dor could also be brought stration did not want Central America to col­ down. Fur ther more, the Oc to ber 1979 coup lapse on its watch. that resulted in a new military govern ment in El Salva dor left that country in chaos. The rebel of fen sive in El Sal va dor made sig­ The Salva doran armed forces were divided nifi cant gains but failed to achieve victory in with some offi cer factions fa vor ing re forms early 1981. The Car ter ad mini stra tion was fol­ and others violently opposed. As a result of lowed in that month by a con ser va tive Rea gan chaos in the gov ern ment and the un popu lar ad mini stra tion that was ready to take a more state of the regime, guerrilla war broke out ac tive role against the expansion of commu­ in 1980 and the major rebel factions amal­ nism in the hemisphere. In 1981 the Reagan ga mated into one large al li ance, the Marx ist ad mini stra tion made the commit ment that it Fara bundo Martí National Libera tion Front would as sist El Sal va dor in de feat ing the most (FMLN), which directed the insur gency. se ri ous insur gency in the region. THE AIR WAR IN EL SALVADOR 29

The State of the Salvadoran Armed Forces in 1981 El Salvador had a small armed force of ap­ proxi mately 10,000 military person nel and seven thousand paramili tary police in 1980 when the war began. The army, the largest part of the armed forces, had approxi mately nine thousand soldiers organ ized into four An AC-47 gunship of the FAS. This old platform provided the small in fan try bri gades, an ar til lery bat tal ion, most accurate and effective close air support (CAS) of the war. and a light armor battalion. 8 The level of train ing was low. The training that the army did have was all for conventional war—prepa­ of 11 Ouragan ground-attack fighters ac­ ration for a re play of the short war with Hon­ quired from the Israelis, who had acquired du ras in 1969, where the army performed them from the French in the 1950s, and four credita bly. There was no training or prepara­ Fouga Magister trainers modified for combat tion for fighting a counter in sur gency cam­ (another 1950s aircraft). The combat squad­ paign. rons also had four Su per Mystère fight ers and The armed forces as a whole had severe six Ral lye coun ter in sur gency air craft. The rest lead er ship problems. The offi cer corps was of the air force consisted of a trans port squad­ dis united af ter the coup of Oc to ber 1979. As ron with six C-47s and four Arava transports. in most ar mies in Cen tral Amer ica, ad vance­ ment and selec tion for command were The training squadron consisted of a handful based more upon politi cal con nec tions and of T-34s, T-6s, T-41s, and four Magisters. The spon sors than merit. In fact, there were no heli cop ter force amounted to one Alouette merit promo tions in the Salva doran army. III, one FH- 1100, one Lama, and ten UH- 1Hs.9 All promo tion was by senior ity. While offi­ The FAS had two major air bases. The pri­ cers had gone through a cadet school and mary air base was Ilo pango on the out skirts of many had attended training in US Army the capi tal, and there was a smaller base at San courses, they were not members of an espe­ Miguel in the southern part of the country. cially capa ble offi cer corps. On the other These remained the two bases of the FAS hand, there was nothing even resem bling a through out the conflict. The training in the pro fes sional noncom mis sioned offi cer FAS was, like the army, geared for a conven­ (NCO) corps in the Sal va doran forces. Most tional war. Unlike the army, the FAS had not en listed men were simply conscripted (or done as well in the war with Hondu ras a dec­ “press- ganged”) young men, many of them ade be fore and had lost air su pe ri or ity.10 Since in their mid teens. If of fi cer train ing was me­ then, the only action the air force had seen dio cre, the training of the enlisted men was was in the 1972 coup.11 The air force had only mini mal. In short, it was an army that was a handful of pilots, and the pilot-training not ready for a seri ous war. In compari son with the other branches of level was only fair. For a small and poor coun­ the armed forces, the Salvadoran Air Force— try like El Salvador, an air force is an expen­ the Fuerza Aerea Salvadorena (FAS)— was the sive luxury. There were few funds for main­ most professional service arm. It was a small tain ing the ob so lete air craft of the force or for force of un der a thou sand men con sist ing of a pro vid ing more than rudimen tary combat small paratroop battalion, a security force, a train ing for the pilots. Things like joint train­ small anti air craft unit, and four small flying ing or practic ing for close air support (CAS) squad rons with a grand total of 67 aircraft. were simply not part of the air force’s reper­ The main combat force of the FAS consisted toire. 30 AIRPOWER JOURNAL SUMMER 1998

The Rebels Hold the Initiative, plies into El Sal va dor at night from Nica ra gua us ing small land ing strips set up for crop dust- 1981–83 ers.14 One of the FMLN leaders who later left Although the rebel “final offen sive” of the cause admitted the impor tance of the air routes from Nicara gua to El Salvador in sup- early 1981 failed, the 10,000 rebels of the 15 FMLN alli ance held the initia tive during the ply ing the insurgents. first three years of the war. Large areas of El The whole country became the rebel infra­ struc ture. Large ar eas in the moun tains along Sal va dor’s 14 provinces were held by guerril- the Hondu ran border were rebel terri tory in las.12 The rebels were able to put signifi cant the early 1980s. The rebels also had several forces into the field and fight an almost con­ other strongholds un der their con trol in clud­ ventional war with battalion-sized columns. The insurgents were fairly well equipped and ing the region around Mount Guazapa—only supplied with small arms (assault rifles and 30 miles from the capital of San Salvador. In ma chine guns), as well as mor tars, mines, and the rural areas and small towns, the rebels ex plo sives. Some FMLN weapons were pro- could compel the local landowners and busi­ cured from Cuba and Nica ra gua, but many of ness men to provide food and pay taxes to the the rebels’ weapons were captured from gov­ rebel forces—or face de struc tion of their prop­ ern ment troops. The rebels were, however, erty and assas si na tion. In short, the rebels were largely self-sufficient for many of their defi cient in anti air craft armament with only needs. a few .50- caliber ma chine guns for pro tec tion Early in the war, the tendency of the El Sal­ against aircraft and helicopters. va doran armed forces (ESAF) was to conduct Ef fec tive inter dic tion of sup plies and arms sweeps in company and battalion strength. to the rebels was not really possi ble. El Salva­ dor shared a long land border with Hondu ras These tac tics worked to the bene fit of the reb­ and Guatemala and was separated by only 30 els, who could pick an engage ment with miles of water from Sandini sta Nicara gua at company- strength govern ment units and the Gulf of Fonseca. Light weapons and sup- then ambush the reinforc ing column. Whole plies could be brought in by land, sea, or air. compa nies of the army were annihi lated in The land borders were hard to seal, although this manner. The rebels also specialized in the United States made a major effort in pro­ night opera tions—which nullified the Salva­ doran Air Force and the firepower advantage vid ing Hondu ran armed forces with aid and of the army. In the early 1980s, relatively heli cop ters to help close the land border to large rebel col umns could even seize and hold gunrun ners and rebel suppli ers.13 However, towns for several days. light aircraft could also bring arms and sup- With the war going badly for the gov ern­ ment, Brig Gen Fred Woer ner, later com­ mander of US Southern Command, led a small group of US mili tary spe cial ists to El Sal­ vador for consul ta tions with the Salvadoran govern ment and military leaders. The result was a national strategic plan for waging the war, which was ap proved by the United States and Salva doran leader ship.16 Essen tially, the US policy was to emphasize land reform, po­ litical reform in the form of honest elections, economic devel op ment, and the end of hu­ man rights abuses. Most of the US aid was to be civilian and financial aid. However, the The FAS headquarters and barracks at Ilopango Air Base. mili tary and economic aid to be provided to This was the scene of heavy ground combat during the 1981 El Salvador would be depend ent upon the and 1989 FMLN offensives. THE AIR WAR IN EL SALVADOR 31 will ing ness of the Salva doran government and armed forces to go along with the re- forms. If serious progress was not made on the issue of human rights, for example, then aid would be halted or delayed until satisfac ­ tory progress occurred. The military strategy was to dramatically in crease the size of El Sal va dor’s armed forces and train the ESAF in counter in sur gency op­ erations. Between 1980 and 1984, the ESAF more than tripled in size from 12,000 troops to 42,000 troops.17 The ESAF would be pro­ vided with mod ern weap ons and equip ment. Even simple equipment such as adequate field ra dios for the army were not avail able to govern ment forces in 1980. Once the army An MD-500 reconnaissance helicopter of the FAS. This is the was built up and re trained, a ma jor por tion of gunship version at Ilopango Air Base. the counter in sur gency campaign would be car ried out by spe cially trained “hunter” light in fan try battalions. These light battalions aircraft had been fully modified and refur­ would patrol aggres sively and move quickly bished before being transferred. An addi­ to keep the rebel columns under pressure. tional $2 million worth of aerial munitions Air power was to have a major role in the was provided for the FAS in 1982. As fast as national strat egy for the El Sal va doran forces. equip ment trans fers were ap proved by the US The air craft of the force would be mod ern ized Con gress, the US Air Force would rush the air- and in creased. Train ing and weap onry would craft and muni tions to El Salvador. In June be improved. However, the primary empha­ 1982, the USAF sent 12 planeloads of muni­ sis was to build up a large and capa ble heli­ tions to the FAS while still more muni tions cop ter force that could lift a sig nifi cant in fan- went by sea.20 try force for offensive operations and also In 1982, the IMET program emphasize d pro vide helicopter gunship support. This im prov ing the Sal va doran Air Force. A to tal of type of mobil ity could provide a rapid reac­ $1.4 million was spent on pilot, aircrew, and tion force to block and pin down rebel col­ tech ni cian training of Salvadorans in the umns that engaged the ground troops. United States.21 The whole issue of training The United States provided a total of the Salvadorans, however, was very complex. $48,920,000 in military equipment sales, Due to strong opposi tion from many in the mili tary equipment credits, and military aid US Congress who remem bered how the to El Sal va dor in 1981.18 In 1982, the military United States had started in Vietnam with a assis tance and sales program for El Salvado r small group of advi sors, the administra tio n had grown to $82,501,000 with another im posed upon itself a strict limit to the $2,002,000 for the inter na tional military number of military person nel that could be edu ca tion and train ing (IMET) pro gram (of fi ­ as signed to the US Mili tary Group (MilGroup) cer and NCO training).19 The portion of aid in El Salvador. Throughout the conflict, no go ing to the Sal va doran Air Force was sig nifi­ more than 55 military person nel at any time cant. A steady stream of new aircraft for the could be assigned to the MilGroup .22 With FAS flowed south throughout the conflict. In con gres sional committee acquies cence, addi­ just the first six months of 1982 the United tional US military person nel could serve for States delivered four O-2A aircraft for recon­ brief periods on TDY in El Salvador. Some- nais sance, six A- 37B coun ter in sur gency fight­ times the to tal number of US per son nel in the ers, and two C-123K transports. All of these coun try reached as high as 150. How ever, the 32 AIRPOWER JOURNAL SUMMER 1998 nomi nal restriction of the MilGroup to only sance air craft were also pro vided as well as 12 55 meant that the USAF contingent in El Sal­ UH- 1H helicop ters to replace the losses. 26 va dor was only five peo ple—one Air Force sec­ The FMLN strongholds along the Hondu­ tion chief who acted as the senior advisor to ran border and in the south of El Salva dor the FAS and four Air Force mainte nance offi­ were simply too strong in the early 1980s for cers or instructor pilots.23 The Army also pro­ the govern ment forces to attack directly. On vided a few heli cop ter and mu ni tions main te­ the other hand, the Salvadoran forces were nance in struc tors to the Sal va doran Air Force, not about to allow the rebels sanctuar ies and some US contract person nel (not on the within the bor ders of their own coun try. So in MilGroup offi cial strength) also assisted the 1982 and 1983 the FAS began a program of FAS. However, this handful of Americans was bomb ing the rebel-held villages in the not enough to make a serious impact on the strongly FMLN regions of Chalatenango in train ing require ments of the FAS, so FAS per- the north and Mount Guazapa in the cen ter of son nel had to be trained outside their coun­ the coun try. What the air ac tion amounted to try in the United States or at the Inter- was small har ass ment at tacks in which flights American Air Force Academy (IAAFA) at Al­ of aircraft would regularly bomb and strafe brook Field in Panama. the rebel areas in a desultory fashion. If no During the period 1981–84, as the ground ma jor mili tary prog ress was made, at least the and air forces of El Salvador were being re- rebels could be brought under some pres- trained and reequipped by the United States, sure.27 Yet, the attacks seem to have made no the FAS put in a com bat per form ance that can real impact in terms of rebel morale, infra­ be rated as fair. As small and poorly equipped struc ture, or combat capa bil ity. At the same as it was in 1981, it still repre sented the pri­ time that the FAS began its bombing cam­ mary mobile firepower of the govern ment. paign—which it never actu ally acknowl­ The FAS per formed well in help ing to stop the edged—the rebel forces managed to win a January 1981 offensive. It was limited in its abil ity to provide effec tive support to the number of victo ries in the field, to destroy several army compa nies, and capture army army by the lack of training in the ESAF to ef­ 28 fectively coordi nate air/ground operations. 24 weapons and ammuni tion . The FAS was also essentially a daytime air force with a minimal ability to operate at night. The Government Gains the The FAS suffered a major blow in January Initiative, 1984–88 1982 when five Ouragans, six UH-1Bs, and three C-47s were destroyed and another five By 1984, the US military aid program was air craft were badly dam aged on the ground at start ing to pay off in terms of increased ef fec­ Ilo pango in a raid by one hun dred rebel com­ tive ness of the govern ment forces. While the mandos. At one stroke, most of El Salvador’ s rebel forces had not increased past 10,000 op era tional combat aircraft were knocked combat ants, the Salvadoran army now out ­ out of action.25 It was a well-planned and exe­ num bered the rebels four to one. Moreover, cuted operation and demonstrated the tacti­ new battal ions had been formed and inten­ cal supe ri or ity of the FMLN guerrillas over sively trained by the US Army in the United the sol diers at this stage of the war. While this States, in Hon du ras, and in Pan ama, and then was counted as a major victory for the rebels, re turned to El Salvador. These forces were it was also some thing of a bless ing for the FAS ready to use a more aggres sive strategy and in the long term. The worn-out Ouragans de­ take the war to the rebels. The FAS had also stroyed by the commandos were quickly re- been strengthened, had an improved level of placed by US- provided A- 37s, a far more ca pa­ train ing, and was ready to take on a larger role ble and suit able aircraft for a in airmo bile operations and air support op­ coun ter in sur gency war. The O-2 reconnais ­ erations for the army. THE AIR WAR IN EL SALVADOR 33

Even so, 1984 started off badly for the gov­ them—learned to spot likely helicopter land­ ern ment forces when a large rebel force man- ing zones and prepare them for ambush.36 aged to overrun and capture the army’s 4th The Salva dorans by the mid-1980s had Brigade headquarters at El Paraiso on New built up a group of small, well-trained elite Year’s Eve.29 However, the army recov ered units. Some functioned as light infantry pa­ from this setback, and throughout 1984 and trol forces that could be inserted by helicop­ 1985, government forces started to gain the ter to search out the enemy and estab lish out- initia tive throughout the country. Airpower in the form of the A-37 fighters, helicop ter gunships, and helicopter lift played a major role in the gov ern ment’s suc cess. The FAS op­ era tional tempo in creased no ta bly. There had been a total of only 227 A-37 strikes in all of 1983. In June 1984 alone, there were 74 A-37 strikes.30 The army went on the offensive in the spring of 1984 in order to protect the na­ tional elections from disrup tion by the FMLN. The UH- 1H gun ship mis sions were in- creased by three or four times their previ ous rate of opera tions during March to May 1984.31 During 1984, US military assistance enabled the FAS to increase its helicopter in­ ventory from 19 at the start of the year to 46 A UH-1M helicopter gunship of the FAS. These aircraft played 32 an important role in the ground fighting during the later by year’s end. The air attacks on the rebel years of the war. strong holds surged throughout 1984 and 1985 despite strict rules of engagement is- sued by President Jose Napoléon Duarte in posts deep in enemy territory. If contact with Septem ber 1984.33 the rebels was made, the FAS could quickly Ac cord ing to former FMLN lead ers, the im­ trans port company-sized forces to reinforc e provement of the FAS played a major role in the light troops and block rebel units. The turn ing the ini tia tive over to the gov ern ment heli cop ter force was the only practical means of trans port ing troops in much of the coun try forces. The US-supplied O-2 light reconnais ­ due to the mountainous terrain and the bad sance planes cov ered the coun try thor oughly. roads. With effec tive recon nais sance and The rebels could no longer operate relatively light he liborne forces, the gov ern ment could, openly in large columns. Larger formations for the first time in the war, initi ate com bat at made lucra tive targets that could be easily places of its own choosing.37 spotted from the air and then sub jected to at- 34 One of the US advisors rated the FAS as tacks by aircraft or heliborne troops. In- “par ticu larly effec tive” in the govern ment stead, the rebel forces op er ated in smaller col­ opera tions of 1984 and 1985.38 One of the umns, which would combine for larger most important events in the air war came in 35 opera tions such as the attack on El Paraiso. late 1984–85, when the United States sup plied Re bel forces had to stay on the move, making two AC-47 gunships to the FAS and trained it more diffi cult for the rebels to coor di nate aircrews to operate the system.39 The AC-47 several columns to participate in an opera­ gun ship carried three .50-caliber machine tion. However, the rebels learned to adapt to guns and could loiter and provide heavy fire- the in creased dan ger of aer ial at tack. Af ter the power for army operations. As the FAS had FAS was able to successfully insert company- long oper ated C-47s, it was easy for the sized reac tion forces to deal with FMLN at- United States to train pi lots and crew to op er­ tacks, the FMLN—like the Vietcong before ate the aircraft as a weapons platform. By all 34 AIRPOWER JOURNAL SUMMER 1998 ac counts, the AC-47 soon became probably found in the Central American offi cer corps. the most ef fec tive weapon in the FAS ar se nal. The pay and conditions for the enlisted me­ The tempo of aid to the FAS in creased dur­ chan ics in the FAS were poor, and the most ing 1984 and 1985. Five O-2A aircraft were tal ented mainte nance person nel would leave de liv ered be tween Sep tem ber and No vem ber to find much higher-paying civil ian jobs as 1984. Two more O-2As and two O-2Bs along soon as their term of enlistment was up. An with three A- 37s were pre pared for de liv ery in even more serious problem was the pilot early 1985 along with an ad di tional five C-47 shortage. The pilot officers of the FAS had to transports that had been modified and refur­ be graduates of the military academy, and, bished for the FAS at a cost of almost $1 mil- with the rapid ex pan sion of the armed forces, lion each.40 However, the increased flow of there were not enough graduates to meet the aircraft to the FAS in 1984 and 1985 did not needs of all the services. Even with a serious re sult in a rapid in crease in the number of air- train ing effort by the United States, the FAS craft avail able for com bat, as the at tri tion rate had only about half the pilots it needed. In as a re sult of op era tional ac ci dents was heavy. 1987, the FAS had only 70 ac tive pi lots for 135 For example, in early 1994, an O-2A and one aircraft. 47 C- 123K were lost to ac ci dents.41 How ever, the With a slowly growing capac ity to airlift United States tried to replace aircraft as soon troops by helicopter, the FAS and its airborne as they were lost. For exam ple, a re place ment reac tion force began to make a real impact in C-123K was on the way from the United the war. In June 1984, an FMLN force at tacked States within a month of the loss of the FAS the Cerron Grande Dam, El Salvador’s largest C-123 transport.42 hy droe lec tric plant. Two compa nies were The United States also increased the train­ quickly airlifted to rein force the small garri­ ing funds avail able to the FAS dur ing 1984. In son at Cerron Grande. The rebel attack was 1984, 117 FAS personnel took courses at the success fully beaten back, albeit with heavy Inter- American Air Force Acad emy in Pan ama losses.48 However, the FMLN also proved that in contrast to 98 person nel the year before. it would not be easily cowed by the FAS’s fire- The IMET program funded training for 118 power. In October 1984, six hundred FMLN Sal va dorans in the United States in l984.43 US insur gents attacked an army “hunter” battal­ mili tary aid was also committed to building ion at Watikitu. The guerrillas were attacked up the infrastruc ture of the FAS. The FAS re­ by aircraft that inflicted heavy casualties on ceived $16.4 million in assistance funds in the rebels. Still, the FMLN troops persisted in 1984, some of which went to building new the attack and by afternoon, the army battal­ hangars and repair shops at the main air base ion had simply disin te grated.49 at Ilopango. By the mid-1980s, Ilopango had The wider use of helicop ters in support of become a well-equipped air base.44 the ground campaigns also resulted in heavy De spite all the training and expense, the losses for the FAS. In the October 1984 fight­ FAS re mained ham pered by the ex cep tion ally ing, one UH-1 was shot down. In November low opera tional readiness rate of its aircraft. of that year, three more UH-1s were shot While the FAS could muster well over one down and four heavily damaged in the fight­ hundred aircraft by 1985, only 50 percent or ing around Suchitoto.50 While the A-37s and fewer of the aircraft were opera tional at any the AC-47 gunships proved to be relatively time due to severe mainte nance problems safe from enemy ground fire, the small arms and a shortage of qualified pilots.45 The heli­ of the FMLN proved to be lethal against heli­ copter readiness rate was lower than that of cop ters. airplanes. The FAS was only able to maintain Throughout 1985 and 1986, ground and a small pro por tion of its heli cop ter in ven tory air operations increased, while the compe­ at any one time.46 The FAS suffered continu­ tence of the army in counter in sur gency war- ally from a lack of com pe tent me chan ics. Part fare continued to improve. In 1985 and early of this is a cultural disdain for maintenance 1986, the FAS aircraft and helicop ters sup- THE AIR WAR IN EL SALVADOR 35 ported several large army offensives, which finally reduced some of the FMLN’s major strong holds in Guazapa and Chalatenango . The population and the rebel forces in these en claves were bombed heav ily as army troops swept in and forci bly evacu ated thou sands of civil ians in FMLN ar eas and re set tled them in refu gee camps. It was a harsh cam paign, but it succeeded in depriving the FMLN units of their civil ian in fra struc ture in what had been their most secure strongholds.51 One of the FMLN leaders credits the greater airmobil ity of the army in the mid- 1980s and the will ing ness of some army units An O-2 Skymaster at Ilopango Air Base. This simple aircraft to move by air deep into rebel coun try as hav­ proved to be a very effective reconnaissance tool for the FAS in ing caused “a very signifi cant turn in the the war. war.”52 However, it should also be noted that the im prove ment of the air for ce’s and army’s tac tics and firepower was not the primary artil lery force had been tripled since the start cause for the demor ali za tion of the FMLN al­ of the war and communi ca tions and support li ance in the mid-1980s. The rebels were just im proved. The tiny 1980 navy of three patrol as capa ble as the govern ment of making ma­ craft had been expanded to a fifteen- jor strategic and tactical mistakes. By 1984, hundred- man force by 1988 and included a the infight ing within the FMLN groups be- ma rine battalion, marine commandos, and came se vere and, in true com mu nist fash ion, 30 patrol craft. was re solved by purges and exe cu tions within The FAS had more than doubled in size the ranks of the FMLN. Soon FMLN leaders since the start of the war. By 1987, The FAS were ordering the killing of rival leaders. By was a force of twenty-five hundred with an 1984 and 1985, the mem ber ship of the FMLN air borne battalion, a security group, five air- be gan to de cline as the rebel forces saw some plane squadrons and a large helicopter force. of their own officers abandon the FMLN The airplane force was organ ized into a cause in disgust.53 Yet, despite the interna l fighter squadron, with eight Ouragans, a dissen sion, being outnum bered six or seven counter in sur gency squadron with 10 A-37Bs to one, and under steady pounding by army and two AC-47 gunships. A recon nais sance and air force firepower, the FMLN was still a squadron of 11 O-2As supported the counter- for mi da ble force by the end of 1988 and insur gency squadron. The transport squad­ could still field approxi mately seven thou - ron consisted of five C-47s, one DC-6, three sand combat ants throughout the country. Ara vas, and two C- 123Ks. The train ing squad­ ron had one T-41 and six CM-170 Magisters . The helicopter force had expanded into a From Stalemate to Peace, force of nine Hughes 500MD attack helicop­ 1989–92 ters, 14 UH-1H gunships, 38 UH-1H utility heli cop ters, three SA-315 Lamas, and three By 1988, the govern ment of El Salva dor SA- 316 Alouette IIIs, for a total of 67 helicop- could bring a tremen dous su pe ri or ity of mili­ ters.54 tary power against the rebels. The army had Progress in El Salvador’s inter nal politi cal grown to 43,000 troops or gan ized into six bri­ situation had been made since the mid-1980s gades. There were 20 light infantry battalions af ter free elec tions and the elec tion of a mod­ and six counterin sur gency battalions that erate reformer, Duarte, as president. Human were able to take the war to the enemy. The rights abuses by the armed forces had been 36 AIRPOWER JOURNAL SUMMER 1998 curbed. US aid was continu ing to flow. main FAS base at Ilopango was a major target Throughout the mid-1980s, the direct US of the FMLN, and the rebel forces came close mili tary role had grown es pe cially in the avia­ to over run ning the main air base in the coun­ tion side of the war. US Army OV-1 Mohawk try. If the rebels had been successful, they re con nais sance planes of the 24th Military could have destroyed 80 percent of the FAS. Intel li gence Battalion stationed in Palmerola As it was, only with heavy fighting and rein- force ments did the FAS manage to hold on to the base. A further disturbing develop ment for the air war in 1989 was the acqui si tion of hand- held SAM-7 anti air craft missiles by the reb- els.57 The attrition of FAS helicop ters to the light weap ons of the reb els had been heavy all through the war. However, until 1989, the A- 37s and AC-47s had been relatively immune from the short-range ground fire of the FMLN. Now the guerrillas had a weapon that could knock down the best com bat air craft of the FAS. An A-37B fighter-bomber at Ilopango Air Base. These fairly The war continued into 1990, and the low-tech aircraft took the place of the Salvadoran Air Force’s FMLN was still able to conduct numer ous old Ouragans and Fouga Magisters. However, due to the guer rilla at tacks against the armed forces and FAS’s low level of training, the A-37s could not be counted on economic targets despite the heavy losses of for accurate CAS. the 1989 offensive. In 1990, the FMLN forces inflicted over two thousand casualties on the Salva doran armed forces and police, an al­ Air Base in Hondu ras conducted regular re- most 5 percent casualty rate.58 By this time, 55 con nais sance flights over El Salva dor. The the nation was simply exhausted by more coun ter in sur gency campaign progressed, than a dec ade of war. Both sides fi nally agreed and the elec tion of the right wing Arena Party to serious peace talks in 1990. A national govern ment in 1989, a party that ran on a cease- fire was agreed to in 1991, and peace ac­ “law and order” platform, indicated that cords were signed between the govern ment there was consider able support among the and the FMLN in early 1992. popu lace for the counter in sur gency cam­ The war was ended by a compromise solu­ paign. tion. The FMLN disarmed its forces and be- This im pres sion of prog ress was spoiled on came a legal politi cal party. Amnesty was 11 Novem ber 1989, when the FMLN guer ril­ granted to FMLN mem bers. More than half of las launched a sur prise of fen sive against mili­ the army would be de mo bi lized, and all of the tary and ci vil ian tar gets across the na tion. For para mili tary security forces—includ ing the three weeks, the guerrillas attacked military noto ri ous Treasury Police, which operated units and govern ment installa tions in San un der the Defense Ministry and was identi­ Salva dor, San Miguel, Santa Ana, and other fied as having one of the worst human rights cit ies. The military in curred heavy losses, but records—were disbanded. A new national po­ the FMLN sustained heavy losses as well. The lice force was cre ated, and former FMLN guer­ FMLN reportedly suffered 1,773 dead and ril las were brought in. United Na tions and Or­ 1,717 wounded by the end of the of fen sive on gani za tion of American States observ ers 5 December .56 The rebels did not gain their remained in the country to help ensure that pri mary objec tives, but the power of the of - the disar ma ment was properly carried out fen sive as well as the sur prise fac tor was a real and free and fair elections were held.59 Some shock to the government and military. The of the American commenta tors would com- THE AIR WAR IN EL SALVADOR 37 plain that the military strat egy had failed and them usually expect a campaign of many that the Salva doran armed forces were never years’ duration. The FMLN intended to win able to defeat the FMLN on the battlefield. quickly in 1981. The govern ment thought That might be true, but in retrospect, the pro- that the rebels could be crushed in a rapid gram of military aid to El Salvador was a cam paign. General Woer ner shocked the genu ine suc cess for the United States. The pri­ chair man of the Joint Chiefs of Staff and some mary objec tive of keeping El Salvador from mem bers of the Reagan administra tion in his be com ing a commu nist state was real ized. 1981 re port when he out lined a five- year plan Moreo ver, El Salvador ended the war with a (the five-year time frame was used as an out- demo cratic govern ment that remains line only, and Wo er ner was care ful not to pre­ friendly to the United States and commit ted dict the length of the war) and estimated that to work ing peace fully with its neigh bors. The de feat ing the rebels would cost $300 million peace accord may have been a compromise, in mili tary aid. Wo erner’s analy sis was seen as but it has been recognized as fair by both un duly pessimis tic. 60 In reality, General Wo­ sides and provides a solid ba sis for peace fully erner’s assessment was way off. The counter- de vel op ing El Salva dor—and a favor able insur gency campaign cost over $1 billion, peace is, after all, the primary objective in lasted for 12 years, and still did not lead to waging war. outright military victory. Part of the problem in conducting a coun­ ter in sur gency campaign is the long lead time Comments and Observations in creating and training military and police forces that can effec tively wage a counterin ­ The second half of this article focuses on sur gency campaign. As is typical with coun­ some specific comments and obser va tions tries that face insurgen cies, El Salvador was about the air war in El Sal va dor. The war in El unpre pared. Even with massive US support Sal va dor was one of the longest-lasting com­ for a small country, it took three or four years bat operations supported by the US military be fore the Salva doran armed forces could since the end of World War II. In many re­ con duct operations effec tively. Air forces in spects, it was a classic counterin sur genc y par ticu lar require a long time to build infra­ campaign fought by the United States and El struc ture, ac quire equip ment, and train pi lots Sal va dor. Be cause of the long du ra tion and re- to operate in the kind of joint operations re­ cent nature of the opera tion, it is likely that quired by counter in sur gency campaigns. It the conduct of the air war in El Salvador can did not help that the US Army and Air Force, offer insights that are useful for US air doc- suf fer ing from the effects of post-Vietnam trine and for execut ing future counterin sur ­ syn drome, had largely dropped coun ter in sur­ gency campaigns. gency operations out of the doctrine and train ing repertoire in the late 1970s. Despite A Prolonged Conflict the many Vietnam veterans in the force, the US military was not ready to train the Salva­ Most insurgen cies tend to last for years. In dorans in unconven tional warfare. The bu­ Ma laya, the British faced a 12-year- long in­ reau cratic require ments of the US military sur gency (1948–60). In the Philippines, the sys tem also got in the way of a timely re ­ United States supported the Philippine gov­ sponse to El Salva dor’s situa tion. The re quire­ ernment through an eight-year campaign ment that foreign pilots training with the US (1946–54). Co lom bia has faced an in sur gency Air Force first take a six-month language for more than 20 years. The 12-year duration course slowed down the pilot training pro- of the war in El Salvador fits the typical pat- gram for the Salvadorans. Finally, when the tern. short age of helicopter pilots became truly se­ Mao’s teachings notwith stand ing, neither vere, the US Army conducted a one-time ef­ the insurgents nor governments that oppose fort at Fort Rucker, Alabama, to train Salva- 38 AIRPOWER JOURNAL SUMMER 1998 doran pilots with Spanish-speaking flight the offer of gener ous aid. If reforms were not instruc tors .61 Ideally, the FAS pilots and tech­ enacted quickly enough, the aid would be nicians should have been fluent in Eng lish, if with held or de layed. Thus, the aid to El Sal va­ only to read the techni cal manuals for the dor was made contingent upon a program of equipment. However, the imme di ate needs na tional land reform, fair elections, and judi­ of the war overruled this requirement . cial reforms.64 This approach by the United For various reasons, US military schools States caused constant friction between the were slow to create the courses that the Salva­ two govern ments, but, in the end, it pushed doran mili tary ur gently needed. For ex am ple, the gov ern ment to make nec es sary re forms. the US- run Inter- American Air Force Acad emy How ever, aid restrictions and the strong in Panama only initiated an advanced train­ objec tions of many US congress men towards ing course for the A-37B in 1985, three years aid to El Salvador’s armed forces resulted in after that model aircraft had been supplied to un pre dict able fund ing in the mili tary aid pro - the FAS.62 gram. This, in turn, inhib ited long- term plan­ Most com men ta tors on the war in El Sal va­ ning and resulted in many inef fi cien cies in dor agree that by the mid-1980s, the FAS the mili tary aid.65 Fis cal year 1983 be gan with could operate fairly effec tively. However, the no congressional appro pria tions for El Salva­ abil ity to conduct more complex joint opera­ dor. A $25 million dollar continuing resolu­ tions came very slowly. It was not until tion was provided instead of the $60 million 1986–87 that the FAS intel li gence section that the US military support program re­ was reor gan ized for the needs of the coun ter­ quired. Without adequate funds in the am- insur gency operations and a special analysis muni tion ac count, the army and FAS cut back center was set up at the FAS headquarters at op era tions and main tained a pol icy of hoard­ Ilopango. The cen ter was able to in te grate re- ing ammuni tion and supplies until a con­ con nais sance, area intel li gence inves ti ga­ tinua tion of the aid flow was assured.66 tions, aerial photogra phy, and special intelli ­ In the case of a small and poor country gence into one coher ent system. This had like El Salva dor, such funding disputes had much to do with the improvement of FAS a major impact upon opera tions and doc- combat capabili ties .63 trine. El Sal va dor’s lead ers were en cour aged In short, even if the United States had re­ to look on an expen sive asset such as the air sponded to the crisis in El Salvador in 1981 force as too valuable to risk in combat if re- with mas sive aid cou pled with the right kinds place ments, mu ni tions, and funds were not of training programs given in a timely fash­ as sured. In the first half of the war, the atti­ ion, it still would have taken the FAS two to tude existed that the FAS was an “insurance three years to become a capa ble force. Sup- pol icy” for the govern ment. One might not porting an air force involved in a counterin ­ win the war with airpower, but airpower sur gency is likely to involve a long commit­ would keep one from losing. Therefore, the ment by the United States. air force was sometimes held back as a re- serve for use only in emergen cies.67 Al­ though a prac ti cal doc trine from the view of The Effect of US Aid Restrictions the Salva dorans, this was not a way to con - At the start of the war, human rights abuses duct ef fec tive joint op era tions in the field or by the Sal va doran armed forces and gov ern­ keep the rebels under constant pressure. ment were so bad and the govern ment so The most problem atic restrictions on the mired in its tradi tional authoritar ian cul­ US military aid program for El Salvador were ture, that the US govern ment had no real is- those governing the military trainers and ad­ tic choice but to use a carrot-and- stick ap­ vi sors in the coun try. The Mil Group through- proach in provid ing mili tary and eco nomic out the war was limited to a total of only 55 aid to El Sal va dor. The mili tary and the gov­ ad vi sors in order to deflect disapproval of a ern ment would be en cour aged to re form by Con gress worried about another Vietnam. THE AIR WAR IN EL SALVADOR 39

With so few ad vi sors and train ers in the coun­ armed forces played a large role not only in try, the US military had to create numerou s ap point ing officers to command, but also in expen sive and ineffi cient workarounds to the way the war was fought. train the Salvadoran army and air force out- Gen Juan Ra fael Bus ti llo, who served as the side the coun try. Some troops were trained, at chief of the FAS from 1979 to 1989, was a enor mous ex pense, at Fort Bragg, North Caro­ com pe tent pilot and probably one of the lina. A new training center had to be built in more ca pa ble of the sen ior of fi cers in El Sal va­ Hon du ras, where US Army trainers could dor when the war started. However, he also train whole battal ions of the Salva doran played a highly politi cal role in the armed army.68 Salva doran Air Force pilots had to do forces and used his posi tion as air force com­ vir tu ally all their training outside their coun­ mander to defy and even threaten the ci vil ian try. However, when the pilots returned, there govern ment. In 1983, one of the most right was virtu ally no infra struc ture to enable wing of the army of fi cers, Col Sig frido Ochoa, them to maintain proficiency or develop ad­ demanded the firing of defense minister Gen vanced skills. Due to the shortage of pilots José Guillermo Garcia and declared his mili­ and the variety of aircraft models flown by tary district to be in re bel lion against the gov­ the FAS, each pilot had to be able to fly three ern ment. General Busti llo supported Ochoa or four types of air craft. As a re sult, the FAS pi- and refused to fly in troops to oppose him. lots could not become truly proficient in any Eventu ally, a compromise was worked out one aircraft.69 Another serious problem was that allowed Ochoa to remain but removed the lack of qualified instructor pilots in the the defense minister. 71 FAS to oversee individ ual and unit training. As was typi cal with the sen ior mili tary lead­ This translated into a high accident rate and er ship in El Salvador, the FAS under Bustillo only a fair level of com pe tence for the av er age was scarcely a meritoc racy. An officer’s poli­ FAS pilot.70 tics and connec tions tended to count for One very clear lesson from the war in El more in promotions and gaining coveted as- Sal va dor is the need for a far larger number of sign ments than competence on the battle- US trainers and advisors to be present in the field. It was alleged by army officers that Bus- coun try in order to effectively support a ti llo often reserved the helicopter force for country at war. An advi sor/in struc tor group the air force paratroop battalion and tended sent in early to support the FAS would have to give air support to army units commanded been far more effective in improving the by his friends while withholding air support combat efficiency of the force and would from units commanded by his rivals.72 There have been far less expen sive than all of the is also consider able evidence that US military train ing workarounds that the US had to im­ aid funds were diverted to an FAS slush fund. provise to train the FAS. An early commit­ In 1989, the US General Accounting Office ment of in struc tor pi lots and main te nance in­ found that the FAS had sold more than one struc tors would have im proved the hun dred thousand dollars worth of US- op er abil ity rate of the FAS and brought it to a supplied avia tion fuel to the Nica ra guan Con­ re spect able level of combat capa bil ity in one tras in violation of US rules. 73 For years, the to two years instead of the three to five years FAS DC-6 that carried pilots and cargo to that it actu ally took. How ard Air Force Base, Pan ama, re turned full of liquor and appli ances which were sold on the black market.74 The Problem of Internal Politics Un for tu nately, in a mili tary cul ture such as The military culture of El Salvador was not El Salvador’s, such behavior was to be ex­ only authoritar ian and corrupt, it was also pected. It is also ar gued that the United States highly politicized. Despite training and ad - tol er ated this behavior and the diver sion of vice from the United States, old habits were funds because General Busti llo allowed the very hard to break. The in ter nal poli tics of the Ilo pango Air Baseto be come the hub of the US 40 AIRPOWER JOURNAL SUMMER 1998

Both the critics and support ers of the gov­ ern ment of El Salvador provided testimony about the bomb ing of ci vil ians to the US Con­ gress that was so propagandis tic as to border on the absurd. On the left, American critics tes ti fied about the bru tal ity of the FAS. For ex- ample, the mayor of Berkeley, California, tes­ ti fied in 1986 that 60,000 civil ians had al­ ready been killed by aerial bombard ment in El Salvador—a very implausi ble figure.77 On the right, Assis tant Secretary of State Elliot Abrams rounded up tes ti mony that was just as implau si ble. Abrams argued that there had been no indiscrimi nate bombing in El Salva­ National Security Council’s supply network dor, despite the admis sions made by Salva­ 78 for the support of the anti-Sandinista rebels doran officers . Others supporting Abrams’s in Nicaragua. Some 109 clandestine flights view provided the US Congress with anec­ for Con tra sup port shut tled in and out of Ilo- dotes about FAS pilots complain ing that they pango.75 In any case, Americans who become were denied permission to attack rebel troop con cen tra tions because of the fear that civil­ in volved in supporting counterin sur genc y 79 cam paigns need to be ready to face the po liti­ ians might be caught in the cross fire. It was cal friction gener ated from within the armed even argued that the AC-47 gunships were forces of a third world state. used so care fully in bat tle that in the course of the war they never fired a short round or even ac ci den tally hit ci vil ians.80 If true, this is a rec­ The Bombing Dilemma ord for accuracy in aerial warfare that far sur­ The most controver sial aspect of the air war passes the com pe tence of the United States or in El Sal va dor was the bomb ing of ci vil ians by any other major air force. the FAS. From 1981 to 1986, the FAS regu larly In reality, the bombing campaign was nei­ bombed the rebel-controlled areas of the ther so bru tal as the crit ics al leged nor as care­ country, especially the strongholds of the ful of civil ians as the US State Department ar­ Guazapa and Chalate nango regions. The gued. The bombing campaign seems to have bombing campaign was virtu ally the only had no decisive results aside from harassing means to keep the rebels under pressure in the insurgents and forcing the FMLN units to these ar eas un til they were over run and oc cu­ re main dispersed. According to witness ac­ pied by govern ment troops in the campaigns counts and US journal ists who traveled in the of 1985 and 1986. The air attacks, car ried out rebel-held areas, the air attacks caused rela­ pri mar ily by the A-37s, but also by helicop ter tively few civil ian casual ties. Civil ians who gunships, were aimed at villages that sup- lived in the free-fire zones quickly adapted to ported the rebels. Civilian casualties were a be ing the targets of aerial bombard ment. conse quence of the campaign. The Salva­ They dug bomb shelters, learned to camou­ doran forces were sometimes open about the flage their homes, and took cover as soon as a helicop ter, an A-37, or an O-2 recon nais sance bombing campaign. Colonel Ochoa, com­ 81 mander in the Cha late nango dis trict, told the aircraft was spotted. The best esti mates of US press that he had de clared a dozen free- fire casual ties are provided by Tutela Legal, the zones in his area and that anything in those hu man rights of fice of the Catho lic Church in ar eas would be presumed hostile and El Salvador. This organi za tion estimated that bombed.76 in 1985, a year of heavy combat, 371 ci vil ians had been killed by air bombard ment.82 Since the air attacks in civilian areas were carried THE AIR WAR IN EL SALVADOR 41 out between 1981 and 1986, an estimate of ap proxi mately two thousand civil ians killed by air bom bard ment for the course of the war is probably close. The di lemma of a coun ter in sur gency cam­ paign is that the govern ment is bound to bomb rebel areas and inflict civil ian casual- ties even if no de ci sive ef fect is likely to oc cur. The gov ern ment forces can not al low the reb­ els to hold sanctu ar ies within the country where they can rest, rearm, recruit, and stage opera tions unmolested. Even if the govern­ ment is not in a position to clear an area by a ground offensive, it can at least apply some A 1940s-vintage FAS Ouragan ground attack aircraft at pres sure to the guer ril las by air power. In fact, Ilopango Air Base. In the early years of the war, these cranky and obsolete aircraft were a mainstay of the Salvadoran Air civil ians in rebel strongholds have normally Force. been subjected to bombing in modern coun­ ter in sur gency campaigns. The Philippine Air Force bombed rebel villages in the 1940s and Air power played an important role in the Sal­ va doran civil war. The air force was used pri­ 1950s with war planes sup plied by the United mar ily as an army support force, and certain States.83 The United States provided 40 dive- weapon systems proved very success ful for bomb ers to the Greek Air Force in 1949, this mis sion. The low- tech O-2 spot ter air craft which used them to bomb rebel strongholds 84 and the AC-47 gun ships were used ef fec tively dur ing their civil war. The RAF in the Mala­ by the FAS in close support operations. The yan insur gency even used the heavy Lincoln slow, easy-to- fly A-37, a modified trainer, car­ bomb ers (the British equivalent of the B-29) ried a moderate bomb load and machine-gun to bomb the jungle strongholds of the insur- ar ma ment. It was not a heavy weapon sys tem, 85 gents. but it still gave the army a ma jor fire power ad- The brutal real ity of insurgent and coun­ vantage in battle with the lightly armed reb ­ terin sur gent warfare is that there is no such els. It proved very sur viv able in the low- threat thing as a “clean” war, either on the ground counter in sur gency envi ron ment.87 The AC- or in the air. In virtu ally every insur gency 47 was one of the real success stories of the mounted since the end of World War II, the war. These easy-to- operate weapons were ma jor ity of casualties have been civilians. In probably about as much as the Salva doran pi- El Salvador, both sides conducted campaigns lots, air crew, and sup port per son nel could ef­ designed essentially to assassi nate, maim, fec tively handle at the time. and ter ror ize ci vil ians. As for an as sess ment of Of the aircraft supplied by the United the FAS’s bombing campaign of civilian ar­ States to the FAS during the war, the most ef­ eas, it probably had some effect in harassing fective was probably the UH-1 helicop ters and dis rupt ing the rebel strong holds, but it is used for me de vac and troop lift. Even though doubtful that these benefits of the bombing the oper abil ity rate was low, the limited lift campaign were greater than the consider able was essen tial for transport in a mountainous propa ganda bene fits that the reb els gained by coun try with few roads. The next most useful be ing por trayed as vic tims of a re pres sive gov­ aircraft were the O-2 light recon nais sance ern ment in the inter na tional media.86 planes that forced the rebels to operate in smaller columns and start a move out of the ru ral strongholds and back to the cities. The The Operational Effectiveness of Airpower in El third most useful aircraft of the war was the Salvador AC- 47, the only truly accu rate and reli able 42 AIRPOWER JOURNAL SUMMER 1998

emy. An array of US Army of fi cers who served in El Salvador, as well as a USAF-sponsored RAND study, all expressed misgiv ings about the large number of helicop ters as well as the heavy equipment provided to the Salva- dorans.90 These mili tary crit ics of our mili tary pol icy argued that the Salva doran army and air force were trying to become a mini-US Army and Air Force and were try ing to sub sti­ tute airpower for basic military skills—a very danger ous strategy for a poor country with few resources. The large airmo bile force that the United States supplied to El Salvador was likely to make the army behave much as the The rugged terrain of eastern El Salvador. The mountains United States had done in Vietnam, with the and lack of roads in the region inhibited army movement and army flying over the population rather than made the area a haven for the FMLN until helicopter-borne ground units could take the fight into the field after 1985. work ing on the ground and oper at ing closely with the civil ian popula tion. What was needed, it was ar gued, was a greater em pha sis on training more ground troops and saturat­ CAS weapon. The A-37 fighter comes way ing the country with light infantry forces that down on the list of useful aircraft simply be- are always patrol ling and always present. If cause it was hard to bomb accurately with it one has limited resources to allo cate, the and the training levels of the FAS pilots were counter in sur gency experi ence of the last 50 rarely up to where they could re lia bly and ac­ 88 years would tend to support a policy of curately provide close air support. greater numbers of ground troops and a per­ Probably the most effective single air unit vasive presence over a smaller army with in the war was the five me de vac heli cop ters of more technology . the FAS, coupled with the improved medical care for the Salvadoran army made possible Of course, the US military is not alone in through the US aid program. The availability pre fer ring high-tech solu tions. The FAS, of rapid me de vac as well as good medi cal care which could barely operate and maintain the can not be un der es ti mated as a ma jor fac tor in A- 37s, AC-47s, and UH-1Hs it was equipped im prov ing the morale and fighting ability of with, re quested that the United States pro vide the army. Soldiers fight much harder if they F-5 fighters and AH-1 Cobra gunships. 91 So know they are likely to sur vive their wounds. en am ored was the Salva doran army with the Even though the army took more casualtie s airmo bil ity concept that its leaders insisted due to the increased level of combat in 1985, on buying the much more expen sive air- there were fewer fatali ties due to helicopter transportable 105 mm howit zers from the me de vac operations. 89 United States in stead of the very ca pa ble—and How ever, airpower in a low inten sity con­ much cheaper—heavier and older model. It flict has its downside. Air forces are very ex- was probably a blessing for the Salvadoran pen sive for small countries to man and oper­ forces that their plans for a relatively high- ate. The FAS soaked up a dispropor tion ate tech, airmo bile force never came to fruition. share of the aid and defense budget, yet its By the mid-1980s, they hoped to have a heli­ real capabili ties were very limited due to the copter force large enough to airlift at least a low opera tional rate of aircraft, the shortage bat tal ion anywhere in the country. However, of pi lots, and the de fi cien cies in train ing. Cer­ the low opera tional rate and the pilot short- tainly through most of the war, the FAS was age ensured that the high command never not employed very efficiently against the en­ could deploy more than a company or two at THE AIR WAR IN EL SALVADOR 43 a time. Like it or not, the Salvadoran army likely to face in sup port ing a na tion in a coun­ had to learn to be an infantry force. ter in sur gency campaign are all found in El There are more than a few lessons to be Salva dor. The 12-year US expe ri ence shows learned about the role of an air force and the how airpower can be used well—and used employ ment of airpower in a low intensity badly. While the contribu tion of the Salva­ con flict from the war in El Sal va dor. As a case doran Air Force to that war was signifi cant, study, it is ex cel lent in that most of the op era­ the fi nal analy sis in di cates that coun ter in sur­ tional and politi cal problems that one is ever gen cies still do not lend themselves to a pre­ domi nately airpower solution.

Notes 1. Benjamin Schwarz, American Counterinsurgency Doctrine 21. History, Programs and Evaluation, DCS, July–December and El Salvador: The Frustrations of Reform and the Illusions of 1982, USAFHRA, K145.01, 181. Nation Building, RAND Report R-4042 (Santa Monica, Calif.: 22. Gen Fred Woerner, former CINCSOUTHCOM, interview RAND, 1991), 2. with author, 26 January 1998. 2. Charles Lane, “The Pilot Shark of El Salvador,” New 23. Waghelstein, appendix F. Republic, 24 September 1990, 27. 24. Commander, US MilGroup, El Salvador, memo to chief of 3. For very useful works that cover both sides of the conflict, staff, El Salvador armed forces, 10 June 1982. Cited in see Marvin Gettleman et al., eds., El Salvador: Central America in Waghelstein, appendix E. the New Cold War (New York: Grove Press, 1986). See also Max 25. Flintham, 365. Manwaring and Courtney Prisk, eds., El Salvador at War: An Oral 26. Ibid. History (Washington, D.C.: National Defense University Press, 27. A good description from the rebel viewpoint of these 1988). operations in 1982 and 1983 is found in Charles Clements, 4. I was fortunate to have some valuable assistance and Witness to War (New York: Bantam Books, 1984). advice in writing this article from Gen Fred Woerner, USA, 28. Manwaring and Prisk, 132–41. Retired, former CINC SOUTHCOM; Ambassador David Passage, 29. Ibid., 145–46. deputy chief of the US Mission in El Salvador, 1984–1986; and Dr. 30. Gettleman et al., 233. Judy Gentleman of the Air War College faculty, who has 31. Ibid. interviewed former FMLN leaders. Comments and interviews 32. Ibid., 234. with these three experts were tremendously helpful in 33. Ibid. conducting research. 34. Dr. Judy Gentleman, Air War College faculty, interview 5. For the background to the revolution in El Salvador, see with author, 19 January 1998. Tommie Sue Montgomery, Revolution in El Salvador: Origins and 35. Lt Col Edward King, USA, Retired,Testimony before House Evolution (Boulder, Colo.: Westview Press, 1982). See also Liisa Committee on Foreign Affairs, 99th Cong., 1st sess. (31 January North, Bitter Grounds: Roots of Revolt in El Salvador (Toronto, Ont.: 1985), 21–22. Between the Lines, 1982). 36. Colonel Duryea, US defense attaché to El Salvador, cited 6. Schwarz, 23. in Manwaring and Prisk, 316–19. 7. North, xxii–xxiii. 37. Ambassador David Passage, deputy chief of US Mission in 8. The Military Balance, 1981–1982 (London: The Inter- El Salvador, 1984–1986, interview with author, 10 January 1998. national Institute for Strategic Studies, 1982), 101. 38. Col James Steele, USA, cited in Manwaring and Prisk, 9. Ibid. 145–46. 10. Victor Flintham, Air Wars and Aircraft (New York: Facts 39. History, Directorate of International Programs, on File, 1990), 359–60. July–December 1984, USAFHRA, K145.01, 6–7. 11. Steffen Schmidt, El Salvador: America’s Next Vietnam? 40. Ibid. (Salisbury, N.C.: Documentary Publications, 1983), 82. 41. History, US Southern Command, 1985, USAFHRA, 12. Schwarz, 85. K463.0l, 6. 13. Donald Schulz and Deborah Schulz, The United States, 42. Ibid. Honduras, and the Crisis in Central America (Boulder, Colo.: 43. History, US Southern Command, 1984, USAFHRA, Westview Press, 1994), 60. K463.01, 46–47. 14. John Waghelstein, El Salvador: Observations and 44. A. J. Bacevich et al., American Military Policy in Small Wars: Experiences in Counterinsurgency (Carlisle Barracks, Pa.: US Army The Case of El Salvador (Washington, D.C.: Pergamon-Brassey’s, War College, 1985), 21–22. 1998), 29. 15. Miguel Castellanos and Courtney Prisk, eds., The 45. Ibid., 32. Commandante Speaks: Memoirs of an El Salvadoran Guerrilla Leader 46. Vance Bateman, “Tactical Air Power in Low Intensity (Boulder, Colo.: Westview Press, 1991), 36–38. Conflict,” Airpower Journal5, no. 1 (Spring 1991): 77. 16. Schwarz, 2–5; and Waghelstein, 36. 47. Bacevich et al., 32. 17. Gettleman et al., 230. 48. Joseph Cirincione, “Latin America: Regional Threats to 18. History, US Southern Command, 1981. USAF Historical Western Security,” International Security Yearbook, Barry Research Agency (HRA), Maxwell AFB, Ala., 463.01, 10–11. Blechman, ed. (Boulder, Colo.: Westview Press, 1984/85), 19. Ibid., 1982, 50–54. 183–210, especially 188. 20. History, Directorate of International Programs, 1 49. Col Joseph Stringham, cited in Manwaring and Prisk, January–30 June 1982, USAFHRA, K145.01, 5–6. 148–51. 44 AIRPOWER JOURNAL SUMMER 1998

50. Flintham, 366. 68. The cost of building the training facilities in Honduras in 51. For an account of this campaign from the rebel FY 83 was $14 million. History, Programs and Evaluation, DCS, viewpoint, see Joe Fish and Cristina Sganga, El Salvador: July–December 1982, USAFHRA, K145.01, 181. Testament of Terror(New York: Olive Branch Press, 1988), 88–89. 69. Bacevich et al., 32. 52. Castellanos and Prisk, 88–89. 70. Ibid. 53. Ibid., xvii–xix. 71. Lane, 27; and History, US Southern Command, 1983 , 54. The Military Balance 1987/1988 (London: International USAFHRA, K463.01, 85. Institute for Strategic Studies, 1987). 72. Lane, 28. 55. Schulz and Schulz, 153; and Barry Blechman and Edward 73. Ibid. Luttwak, eds., International Security Yearbook (Boulder, Colo.: 74. Ibid. Westview Press, 1984/85), 189, 192. 75. Ibid. 56. Leroy Thompson, Ragged War: The Story of Unconven­ 76. Dallas Morning News, 21 January 1985. tional and Counterrevolutionary Warfare (London: Arms and 77. Statement of Gus Newport, mayor of Berkeley, House Armour, 1994), 79. Committee on Foreign Affairs,Congressional Record, 14 May 1986, 57. Ibid. 17, 20, 21. 58. Ibid. 78. Ibid., 23, 41, 51. 59. For a useful overview of the final stages of the peace 79. Statement of Samuel Dickens, American Security Council process, see Tommie Sue Montgomery, “Getting to Peace in El Foundation, House Committee on Foreign Affairs, Congressional Salvador: The Roles of the United Nations Secretariat and Record, 31 January 1985, 29–31. ONUSAL,” Journal of Interamerican Studies and World Affairs, 80. Ibid. Winter 1995, 139–72. 60. Schwarz, 2–3. 81. “El Salvador’s Guerrillas,” Washington Post , 7–8 Novem­ 61. Waghelstein, 46–47. ber 1985. 62. History, US Southern Command, 1985, USAFHRA, 82. Congressional Record,14 May 1986, 121. K463.01, 50. 83. Stanley Karnow, In Our Image: America’s Empire in the 63. Col Orlando Seeped, cited in Manwaring and Prisk, 310. Philippines (New York: Ballantine, 1989), 350. 64. See Edwin Corr and Courtney Prisk, “El Salvador: 84. Flintham, 9–13. Transforming Society to Win the Peace,” in Low Intensity Conflict: 85. Ibid., 326–37. Old Threats in a New World , Edwin Corr, ed. (Boulder, Colo.: 86. General Woerner interview, 19 January 1998. Westview Press, 1992), 223–53. 87. Bateman, 77. 65. Bacevich et al., 13. 88. General Woerner interview, 19 January 1998. 66. Waghelstein, 42–45. See also Col Joseph Stringham, cited 89. Elliot Abrams, Congressional Record, 14 May 1986, 31. in Manwaring and Prisk, 148–51. 90. See Waghelstein; Barcevich et al., 32; and Schwarz, 19. 67. Col John Ellerson, cited in Manwaring and Prisk, 86–87. 91. Bacevich et al., 32.