The Thames River Wrecks: a Paper Exploring the Lost Vessels of Major
Total Page:16
File Type:pdf, Size:1020Kb
The War of 1812 Magazine Issue 22 May 2014 The Thames River Wrecks: A Paper Exploring the Lost Vessels of Major-General Henry Procter’s Retreat up the Thames River in the Western District of Upper Canada By Dana William Ashdown Abstract Two centuries after the defeat of the British naval squadron on Lake Erie at Put-in-Bay, and the subsequent withdrawal of British forces from Amherstburg and Detroit, questions remain about the fate of the bateaux and five vessels that accompanied Major-General Henry Procter’s army in its retreat up the Thames River. A reminder of their presence on the river came to light in 1899, when an old hull was discovered upstream from Chatham and subsequently identified — wrongly as it turns out — as the gunboat General Myers. The raising of this wreck in 1901 brought to light countless artefacts, and even threatened to touch-off an international incident when a Detroit antiquarian attempted to remove two other wrecks. Today, little remains save for a few photographs, and a small collection of items in the Chatham-Kent Museum. This paper will attempt to offer some clarification about which vessels attended the army, and what ultimately happened to them. Acknowledgements Special thanks are due to Dave Benson, director of the Chatham-Kent Museum, and his staff for their assistance. Background In the summer 1813, the British Right Division in Upper Canada was concentrated along the Detroit River, principally at Amherstburg, Sandwich and Detroit, and under the overall command of Major-General Henry Procter. Its position was weak, having too few regular troops to adequately defend the frontier, and suffering from an extended supply-line that relied upon the free passage of vessels on Lake Erie between a depot at Long Point and Amherstburg. The Right Division was chiefly composed of the 1st Battalion of Procter’s 41st Regiment, supported by elements of the 10th Royal Veteran Battalion, the Royal Newfoundland Fencible Infantry, the 38th Provincial Dragoons, the Royal Artillery, and local militia. In addition, the Indian Department oversaw several thousand allied native warriors, plus their families. Under the leadership of the great Shawnee Chief Tecumseth, the warriors proved themselves as effective fighters, as well as deterrents against an American attack. However, they were not easily controlled and their sheer numbers became an increasing drain on an already limited food supply. During the first half of the season, Lake Erie was under the control of the Royal Navy’s small squadron based at Amherstburg, commanded by Commander Robert Heriot Barclay. Short of qualified naval officers and seamen, Barclay’s vessels were largely manned by troops and militia The War of 1812 Magazine Issue 22 May 2014 seconded from Procter’s army. Naval personnel and guns, though often promised, were never sent, and so Fort Amherstburg was eventually stripped of most of its ordnance to supply the squadron. Consequently, while the Americans assembled a flotilla at the protected harbour of Presque Isle (Erie), Pennsylvania, Barclay’s force was able to maintain the line of supply with little opposition for much of the time, all the while maintaining a watch on the enemy’s shipbuilding activities. Any thoughts that Procter and Barclay shared to destroy the American squadron at Presque Isle were dashed by Major-General Francis Baron De Rottenburg’s refusal to release men from his Centre Division. As Procter bewailed in a July letter to Governor-General Sir George Prevost: “If the Means had been afforded me, which were no more than what Your Excellency has repeatedly directed should be sent to me, I could, in all probability, have effected the Destruction of the Enemy’s Vessels at Presqu’isle, and have secured the Superiority of the Lake.”1 As a consequence, the ten vessels of the American squadron took to the lake en masse on 12 August, forcing Barclay’s retirement to the relative safety of Hartley’s Point, three miles below Amherstburg, until his new flagship Detroit was ready. As Procter told Prevost: “I will venture to offer my Opinion to your Excellency that as long as Captain Barclay, without Seamen, can avoid the Enemy he should do so.”2 Even properly manned and armed, the 250-ton corvette Detroit would have been inferior to either of the two large American brigs, each of which mounted eighteen 32-pounder carronades and a pair of long 12-pounders. Detroit was designed to carry sixteen 24-pounder carronades and four long 12s, but most of her original guns were captured en route by the Americans when they attacked York in April 1813. Replacements were delayed, and were still in transit when she put to sea on the morning of 9 September. Consequently, Detroit was armed with an ad hoc assortment of guns (fourteen of which were long 12- and 9-pounders) collected from Fort Amherstburg. The somewhat smaller 180-ton Queen Charlotte had fourteen 24-pounder carronades on board, along with three long guns, giving her a superior broadside in close action compared to the Detroit. The rest of the squadron were smaller, more lightly armed vessels, viz.: the schooner Lady Prevost (80 tons, 13 guns); the brig General Hunter (73 tons, 10 guns); the sloop Little Belt (65 tons, 3 guns); and the schooner Chippewa (50 tons, 1 gun). The sloop or schooner Erie (60 tons, capable of mounting up to 5 guns), was left unarmed at the dock at Amherstburg due to a shortage of men and guns. 3 The American squadron under Commodore Oliver Hazard Perry assumed a station at the western end of Lake Erie, from whence it could co-operate with Major-General William Henry Harrison’s army and maintain a blockade of Amherstburg and Barclay. Now, having been prevented from reaching supplies at Long Point and faced with a possible landing by American forces, Procter and Barclay were pressured to act. Barclay’s position was precarious, not having received the necessary support from Commodore Yeo, whose earlier instructions had urged him to use caution in dealing with the enemy. True The War of 1812 Magazine Issue 22 May 2014 enough, seamen and guns were finally on their way but, owing to the blockade on Lake Erie, there was no telling when they might arrive. Worse still, unbeknownst to Procter and Barclay, the seamen (who were detached from HMS Dover) were seconded on their way up at Prescott to reinforce gunboats tasked with searching for an American gunboat flotilla thought to be lurking in the St. Lawrence River. They were released after a week or so, but the delay proved costly for operations on Lake Erie. Any precipitate action by Barclay now might jeopardize the entire western frontier of Upper Canada. Meanwhile, Procter was increasingly worried about the vast quantities of provisions that were daily consumed by the warriors and their families, the shortage of which was growing rapidly. If the British failed to deliver the support promised, Procter warned Prevost’s headquarters that the Indians might well turn to the Americans.4 Prevost had insisted in August that Yeo’s recent actions on Lake Ontario “will satisfy Captain Barclay that he has only to dare and the enemy is discomfitted [sic].”5 But Barclay was wise enough to avoid an unequal contest. Now, with matters worsening daily and the navigation season drawing to a close, Barclay could no longer avoid battle. As he explained to Yeo: “That such a thing is necessary, there can be no doubt … I shall sail and risk every thing to gain so great a point — as that of opening the communication by water. “That the Risk is very great I feel very much, but that in the present state of this place, without provisions, without stores — & without Indian Goods (which last is a matter of the highest importance) it is necessary, I fully agree with the Genl [Procter].”6 It has been said that Procter was particularly insistent about bringing the Americans to action. Doubtless, this was true given the predicament that Procter’s army was in. But it is also a fact that, as Barclay stated, inaction was no longer an option, and that the final decision to engage the enemy was his and his alone. This was made clear in Barclay’s letter to Yeo, written after the battle of Lake Erie, when the commander stated that “such were the motives which induced Major General Proctor, (whom, by your Instructions I was directed to consult, and whose wishes, I was enjoined to execute as far as related to the good of the Country) to concur in the necessity of a Battle being risqued [sic] under the many disadvantages which I laboured…”7 Having discreetly maintained a regular reconnaissance on the enemy, Barclay easily found the American squadron within a day’s sailing, sighting them off Bass Island in Put-in-Bay on the morning of the 10th. The two squadrons manoeuvred towards each other, and around noon opened fire. The battle was heated, with the principal ships of the two respective squadrons taking the brunt of the cannonade. From a hill overlooking the lake, Procter’s second-in- command, Lieutenant-Colonel Augustus Warburton of the 41st Regiment, and a party of others from Amherstburg, could see and hear the naval action as it progressed: “… the firing was incessant and the vessels appeared to be very near each other. The spectators were fully impressed with the idea that our fleet were the victors, but circumstances have since placed it beyond a doubt that the whole of our fleet has been taken or destroyed. The wind was fair for Amherstburg the whole of the 10th and 11th inst.