The War of 1812 Magazine Issue 22 May 2014

The Thames River Wrecks: A Paper Exploring the Lost Vessels of Major-General Henry Procter’s Retreat up the Thames River in the Western District of Upper Canada By Dana William Ashdown

Abstract

Two centuries after the defeat of the British naval squadron on Lake Erie at Put-in-Bay, and the subsequent withdrawal of British forces from Amherstburg and Detroit, questions remain about the fate of the bateaux and five vessels that accompanied Major-General Henry Procter’s army in its retreat up the Thames River. A reminder of their presence on the river came to light in 1899, when an old hull was discovered upstream from Chatham and subsequently identified — wrongly as it turns out — as the gunboat General Myers. The raising of this wreck in 1901 brought to light countless artefacts, and even threatened to touch-off an international incident when a Detroit antiquarian attempted to remove two other wrecks. Today, little remains save for a few photographs, and a small collection of items in the Chatham-Kent Museum.

This paper will attempt to offer some clarification about which vessels attended the army, and what ultimately happened to them.

Acknowledgements

Special thanks are due to Dave Benson, director of the Chatham-Kent Museum, and his staff for their assistance.

Background

In the summer 1813, the British Right Division in Upper Canada was concentrated along the Detroit River, principally at Amherstburg, Sandwich and Detroit, and under the overall command of Major-General Henry Procter. Its position was weak, having too few regular troops to adequately defend the frontier, and suffering from an extended supply-line that relied upon the free passage of vessels on Lake Erie between a depot at Long Point and Amherstburg. The Right Division was chiefly composed of the 1st Battalion of Procter’s 41st Regiment, supported by elements of the 10th Royal Veteran Battalion, the Royal Newfoundland Fencible Infantry, the 38th Provincial Dragoons, the Royal Artillery, and local militia. In addition, the Indian Department oversaw several thousand allied native warriors, plus their families. Under the leadership of the great Shawnee Chief Tecumseth, the warriors proved themselves as effective fighters, as well as deterrents against an American attack. However, they were not easily controlled and their sheer numbers became an increasing drain on an already limited food supply.

During the first half of the season, Lake Erie was under the control of the Royal Navy’s small squadron based at Amherstburg, commanded by Commander Robert Heriot Barclay. Short of qualified naval officers and seamen, Barclay’s vessels were largely manned by troops and militia The War of 1812 Magazine Issue 22 May 2014

seconded from Procter’s army. Naval personnel and guns, though often promised, were never sent, and so Fort Amherstburg was eventually stripped of most of its ordnance to supply the squadron. Consequently, while the Americans assembled a flotilla at the protected harbour of Presque Isle (Erie), Pennsylvania, Barclay’s force was able to maintain the line of supply with little opposition for much of the time, all the while maintaining a watch on the enemy’s shipbuilding activities.

Any thoughts that Procter and Barclay shared to destroy the American squadron at Presque Isle were dashed by Major-General Francis Baron De Rottenburg’s refusal to release men from his Centre Division. As Procter bewailed in a July letter to Governor-General Sir George Prevost:

“If the Means had been afforded me, which were no more than what Your Excellency has repeatedly directed should be sent to me, I could, in all probability, have effected the Destruction of the Enemy’s Vessels at Presqu’isle, and have secured the Superiority of the Lake.”1

As a consequence, the ten vessels of the American squadron took to the lake en masse on 12 August, forcing Barclay’s retirement to the relative safety of Hartley’s Point, three miles below Amherstburg, until his new flagship Detroit was ready. As Procter told Prevost: “I will venture to offer my Opinion to your Excellency that as long as Captain Barclay, without Seamen, can avoid the Enemy he should do so.”2

Even properly manned and armed, the 250-ton corvette Detroit would have been inferior to either of the two large American brigs, each of which mounted eighteen 32-pounder carronades and a pair of long 12-pounders. Detroit was designed to carry sixteen 24-pounder carronades and four long 12s, but most of her original guns were captured en route by the Americans when they attacked York in April 1813. Replacements were delayed, and were still in transit when she put to sea on the morning of 9 September. Consequently, Detroit was armed with an ad hoc assortment of guns (fourteen of which were long 12- and 9-pounders) collected from Fort Amherstburg.

The somewhat smaller 180-ton Queen Charlotte had fourteen 24-pounder carronades on board, along with three long guns, giving her a superior broadside in close action compared to the Detroit. The rest of the squadron were smaller, more lightly armed vessels, viz.: the schooner Lady Prevost (80 tons, 13 guns); the brig General Hunter (73 tons, 10 guns); the sloop Little Belt (65 tons, 3 guns); and the schooner Chippewa (50 tons, 1 gun). The sloop or schooner Erie (60 tons, capable of mounting up to 5 guns), was left unarmed at the dock at Amherstburg due to a shortage of men and guns. 3

The American squadron under Commodore Oliver Hazard Perry assumed a station at the western end of Lake Erie, from whence it could co-operate with Major-General William Henry Harrison’s army and maintain a blockade of Amherstburg and Barclay. Now, having been prevented from reaching supplies at Long Point and faced with a possible landing by American forces, Procter and Barclay were pressured to act.

Barclay’s position was precarious, not having received the necessary support from Commodore Yeo, whose earlier instructions had urged him to use caution in dealing with the enemy. True The War of 1812 Magazine Issue 22 May 2014 enough, seamen and guns were finally on their way but, owing to the blockade on Lake Erie, there was no telling when they might arrive. Worse still, unbeknownst to Procter and Barclay, the seamen (who were detached from HMS Dover) were seconded on their way up at Prescott to reinforce gunboats tasked with searching for an American gunboat flotilla thought to be lurking in the St. Lawrence River. They were released after a week or so, but the delay proved costly for operations on Lake Erie. Any precipitate action by Barclay now might jeopardize the entire western frontier of Upper Canada. Meanwhile, Procter was increasingly worried about the vast quantities of provisions that were daily consumed by the warriors and their families, the shortage of which was growing rapidly. If the British failed to deliver the support promised, Procter warned Prevost’s headquarters that the Indians might well turn to the Americans.4

Prevost had insisted in August that Yeo’s recent actions on Lake Ontario “will satisfy Captain Barclay that he has only to dare and the enemy is discomfitted [sic].”5 But Barclay was wise enough to avoid an unequal contest. Now, with matters worsening daily and the navigation season drawing to a close, Barclay could no longer avoid battle. As he explained to Yeo:

“That such a thing is necessary, there can be no doubt … I shall sail and risk every thing to gain so great a point — as that of opening the communication by water.

“That the Risk is very great I feel very much, but that in the present state of this place, without provisions, without stores — & without Indian Goods (which last is a matter of the highest importance) it is necessary, I fully agree with the Genl [Procter].”6

It has been said that Procter was particularly insistent about bringing the Americans to action. Doubtless, this was true given the predicament that Procter’s army was in. But it is also a fact that, as Barclay stated, inaction was no longer an option, and that the final decision to engage the enemy was his and his alone. This was made clear in Barclay’s letter to Yeo, written after the battle of Lake Erie, when the commander stated that “such were the motives which induced Major General Proctor, (whom, by your Instructions I was directed to consult, and whose wishes, I was enjoined to execute as far as related to the good of the Country) to concur in the necessity of a Battle being risqued [sic] under the many disadvantages which I laboured…”7

Having discreetly maintained a regular reconnaissance on the enemy, Barclay easily found the American squadron within a day’s sailing, sighting them off Bass Island in Put-in-Bay on the morning of the 10th. The two squadrons manoeuvred towards each other, and around noon opened fire. The battle was heated, with the principal ships of the two respective squadrons taking the brunt of the cannonade. From a hill overlooking the lake, Procter’s second-in- command, Lieutenant-Colonel Augustus Warburton of the 41st Regiment, and a party of others from Amherstburg, could see and hear the naval action as it progressed:

“… the firing was incessant and the vessels appeared to be very near each other. The spectators were fully impressed with the idea that our fleet were the victors, but circumstances have since placed it beyond a doubt that the whole of our fleet has been taken or destroyed. The wind was fair for Amherstburg the whole of the 10th and 11th inst. No accounts from or of Captain Barclay, and on the latter day eleven vessels, evidently under one flag, worked down the lake.”8

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The loss of the squadron placed Procter in an even more precarious position, given that an invasion by a superior force was now entirely possible, if not imminent. Seeing the need to withdraw from the frontier as quickly as possible, the general proposed the following action to De Rottenburg:

“I take the liberty of suggesting the expediency of occupying immediately an eligible piece of ground at Turkey Point by blockhouses, connected by picketting, that may be defended by from three to five hundred men. I do not see the least chance of occupying to advantage my present position, which can be so easily turned by means of the entire command of the waters here which the enemy now has, a circumstance that would render my Indian force very inefficient. It is my opinion that I should retire on the Thames without delay, preparatory to any other movement that may be found requisite or determined on. I have written to Colonel Talbot to send to the Thames whatever articles of food there may be in his reach, also to have the road as far as possible repaired thro' the wilderness. I feel myself much at a loss with respect to the Indians. The loss of the fleet is a most calamitous circumstance. Michilimackinac will require immediate attention. It is to be apprehended that the enemy may make an attempt to pass up some of their vessels to possess themselves of that place, and some vessels we must send to the upper lake. Requesting to hear from you by return of the express.”9

The response to the news of the British defeat was curious. To Prevost, De Rottenburg concluded that:

“This terrible disaster, if not counterbalanced by a complete victory on this lake [Ontario], must eventually change all my dispositions and force me back to the position of Burlington Heights. I shall now stop the sailors at Burlington until I hear from Sir James. Every exertion shall be used to provide General Procter with provisions by land.”

Replying to Procter on behalf of De Rottenburg, Lieutenant-Colonel John Harvey questioned both the motivation for Barclay’s action and the need to retire from Amherstburg and Detroit:

“He [General De Rottenburg] directs me to ask in the first place whether the sailing of Captain Barclay's squadron to meet the enemy at a time when it was so incompetently manned was the consequence of a positive order to that purport from Commodore Sir James Yeo or the Commander of the Forces, or whether that measure was adopted by you, and in that case that you will be pleased to state the circumstances or motives by which you were led to the adoption of so hazardous a measure with the knowledge which you possessed of the intention to urge forward seamen with all possible expedition, and the assurance which you had received that they were actually on the way. Secondly, I have Major-General De Rottenburg's direction to say that he does not clearly see the necessity or expediency of your immediately retiring from your present position. There certainly may be reasons which you have not stated, or with which the Major- General is consequently unacquainted, which may point more urgently to the necessity of such a movement than he is at present aware of. But the view M. Genl. De Rottenburg is inclined to take of your situation, as connected with the loss of the squadron, is that that event cannot affect you so immediately as to make any precipitate retrograde movement necessary. After an action of three hours and a half the enemy's vessels must have received so much damage as to not be in a situation to undertake anything further for some time. This interval you will employ in looking The War of 1812 Magazine Issue 22 May 2014 well at your situation, in communication with Tecumseth and the Indians, in ascertaining the impression which this disaster has produced on them and in concerting with them the means best calculated to lessen the consequences of that disaster, concentrating or making such a disposition of your remaining force as may prove to them the sincerity of the British Government in its intention not to abandon them so long as they are true to their own interests. An officer of engineers proceeds immediately to Long Point to construct the blockhouses you recommended and such other defensive works as may appear to him to be required. Colonel Murray, who has lately joined this division of the army, will also proceed to assume the command at Long Point. He will be instructed to call out the militia.

“With reference to the concluding paragraph of your letter, I am directed to enquire what means do we possess in vessels, &c., by which to send assistance to Michilimackinac? Does the enemy possess any vessels at present on Lake Huron and would it be practicable to prevent their passing the narrows of the St. Clair and thus to preserve the ascendency on that lake, the enemy possessing that of Lake Erie? Would the seamen, now hourly expected, be of any service, or may their progress be stopped? Do you wish the 10 24-pdrs. carronades intended for the Detroit to be sent on, and to what place? Your answers to these queries and a full communication of everything relating to your situation, intentions and wants it is requested may be transmitted by the most expeditious means at your disposal.”10

Unlike Baron De Rottenburg, who at least acknowledged the loss of the squadron, Sir George Prevost seems to have been under the impression that Barclay’s squadron was defeated, but not captured. This is made clear in a letter to Commodore Sir James Lucas Yeo dated 19 September:

“You are already acquainted with the decided line of conduct I wish to be observed on Lake Erie by Captain Barclay, and you will not fail to impress on that officer the absolute necessity of regaining the naval superiority and to preserve uninterrupted the intercourse between Amherstburg and Long Point in order that the supplies and stores at the latter place and at the head of the lake may be transported in safety to the Right Division.”11

Soon enough, the full consequence of the defeat was made manifest to Prevost, and just three days later he was forced to admit to Lord Bathurst the full extent of the situation:

“It is now with deep regret that I transmit to Your Lordship the copy of a letter addressed to me by Major-General Procter. The Major-General does not report the extreme case which prevented his waiting the arrival of the remainder of the Dover’s seamen, who had been announced to him as being on their way. However, I am inclined to believe the necessities of his army and those of the navy left him no alternative but to consent to Captain Barclay seeking a general action with the enemy's squadron in order to restore a communication with the depot at Long Point, for the purpose of relieving their general distress. I cannot bring myself to believe our misfortune has been so great as it is supposed, but in the event of it proving such as is apprehended and Major- General Procter should find himself without the means of feeding his army at Detroit and Amherstburg, and should have lost in the fleet all his heavy ordnance, I have signified to him that it is expedient and necessary he should retire from his present position, and bring his force more in connection with the Centre Division by falling back to the Thames, with his right towards Lake St. Clair and his left extending to Dundas street, which leads to the head of Lake The War of 1812 Magazine Issue 22 May 2014

Ontario, the proposed headquarters of the Centre Division, and I have directed Major-General De Rottenburg to be prepared to meet the Right Division with supplies in this movement.

“With respect to Michilimackinac, the garrison there is of so little numerical importance, even if its intercourse with the Right Division should be cut off, that I am disposed not to withdraw it, as Mr. Robert Dickson, superintendent in the Indian Department now here, has undertaken immediately to convey to that post from York by Lake Simcoe and its communication with Lake Huron a supply of salt pork and flour to enable it to exist during the winter months, and in the spring a change of affairs may take place to afford it relief.”12

Prevost’s final approval for Procter’s retreat was apparently not actually sent until 6 October, a day after Procter’s small army had already been soundly defeated by the Americans at Moraviantown!:

“I entirely approve of your determination consequent upon this disastrous event, (the loss of the Fleet on Lake Erie,) of your making a stand upon the Thames, and have the fullest reliance on the zeal and ability you have hitherto manifested, to conduct your retreat, so as to afford the enemy no decided advantage over you. I recommend to you to persevere in the conduct you are observing of conciliating the Indians by every means in your power.”13

Of course De Rottenburg’s headquarters were not fully aware of Procter’s situation, either, prior to Moraviantown. For one thing, the retreat of Procter’s army was, to say the least, measured, if not downright slow. And by the end of September a new worry was developing. A large contingent of the American army at Niagara had departed in bateaux and Durham boats, heading east. De Rottenburg rightly suspected an enemy assault on Kingston, and so warned Brigadier- General Duncan Darroch of their approach. Beyond that, De Rottenburg could do little to reinforce the Kingston garrison, in part owing to Procter’s tardiness. As he told Prevost in a letter dated the 28th:

“From reports of deserters I have every reason to believe that the force now embarked in their small craft is destined for Sackett's Harbour to act in conjunction with the troops there against Kingston. I have made General Darroch acquainted with my suspicions that he may be on his guard. Had General Procter's army joined me and the fact ascertained I should not hesitate falling back on Kingston, but, situated as that General is, I do not feel myself authorized in abandoning him, and if fall we must we will fall together. Was not my army crippled by disease and dispirited by want and misery we might still have a chance of retrieving affairs, even if our fleet should be disabled.”14

The threat to Kingston was very real. In the summer of 1813, the American Secretary of War, General John Armstrong, had conceived a strategy to take Canada in much the same way that Jeffery Amherst had done in 1760, by sending two armies against Montréal: one by way of Lake Champlain and the other down the St. Lawrence from Lake Ontario. The St. Lawrence operation was placed under the command of Major-General James Wilkinson, whilst that on Lake Champlain was directed by Wilkinson’s perceived nominal subordinate, Major-General Wade Hampton. The operation was poorly planned and relied heavily on makeshift and last-minute preparations, such that Wilkinson’s troops at Niagara were not ready to leave for their first The War of 1812 Magazine Issue 22 May 2014 rendezvous near Sacket’s Harbor with the rest of the army until late September. As the entire Lake Ontario force of some six thousand men began to assemble at Grenadier Island, Armstrong and Wilkinson were still in disagreement over their first target. There was good reason to take Kingston first and, indeed, this seems to have been the initial plan. But the dithering over the decision by Armstrong and Wilkinson cost them time, and the onset of bad weather resulted in further delays, such that it was well into October before the army had assembled at Grenadier Island, and they did not leave until early November. Since Kingston had now received reinforcements, Wilkinson elected to bypass the town and proceed directly to Montréal in concert with Hampton. The outcome ultimately proved disastrous to the Americans. Wilkinson was hounded down the St. Lawrence by a flotilla of the Royal Navy carrying troops from the army, ultimately leading to the American defeat at Crysler’s Farm on 11 November. Worse still for Wilkinson, Hampton’s force had retreated to Plattsburgh after meeting defeat at Châteauguay on 25 October, and so there would be no meeting of the two. As a result, Wilkinson’s disheartened army moved into winter quarters at French Mills on the Salmon River, and was soon after disbanded.

Given the danger, De Rottenburg evidently decided to head east with three corps from the Centre Division to reinforce Kingston, leaving Major-General John Vincent in command of the Centre Division. Upon leaving, De Rottenburg’s instructions to Vincent, as relayed to Prevost on 3 October, were as follows:

“He [Vincent] will concentrate his troops and keep the position at Queenston as long as possible, and ultimately fall back on Burlington, keeping up his communication with General Procter's army, who was, according to his last despatch, upon the eve of falling back upon the River Thames with a large proportion of Indians. I have ordered the Indian presents to be forwarded to him as soon as they arrive at the head of the lake.”15

When it came to Procter’s situation, there was clearly no sense of urgency in De Rottenburg’s report, and so it must have come as a surprise when a distraught survivor, named Lieutenant John Christopher Reiffenstein, burst into camp at Burlington Heights on the 5th with hysterical reports of the complete loss of Procter’s command and the imminent approach of an 8,000-strong American army. Fortunately, panic was averted when a letter to Colonel Harvey from Captain John Hall arrived later in the day, officially announcing Procter’s defeat:

“SIR, — I am commanded by Major-General Procter to acquaint you, for Major-General De Rottenburg's information, the result of an affair that took place with the enemy near Moravian Town this afternoon about 4 o'clock. One of the guns being deserted early in the action the troops near it gave way, and the consequence was a complete rout, notwithstanding the exertions of the General to rally them, so much so that I thought it impossible he could escape being taken. We are just arrived here. The General is so fatigued by riding from the field of battle, the other side of the Moravian Town, through the wilderness, that he cannot write and I am not much better.”16

Retreat and Defeat

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There were three principal reasons offered by General Procter for his retreat to the Thames:

First, there were then two to three thousand warriors attached to the Right Division, along with their wives and families, to whom the government had pledged not to abandon them, nor the territory. Moreover, the natives were extremely hostile to any retreat — a point proven at a council convened by the Indian Department with the chiefs at Amherstburg on 15 September. Procter’s arrival from his headquarters at Sandwich and subsequent meeting with Tecumseth — during which the general outlined his proposed withdrawal and intention to make a stand on the Thames — seems to have allayed most of the natives’ concerns, though only just. Dwindling stocks of Indian presents had so weakened the influence of the Indian Department that, without Tecumseth’s tacit support, it is doubtful that Procter could have kept their allegiance for much longer.17

As Procter later asserted: “To have dismantled the fort of Amherst, or to have withdrawn the troops from that fort, without the concurrence of the Indians, would have produced their secession, perhaps hostility.”18

Second, by maintaining a position on the Thames, the Army could, as Procter stated, “preserve the naval and military stores, and thereby facilitate the recovery of a naval ascendancy on Lake Erie. As they could be conveyed in vessels and boats to a depot upon the Thames, no time was lost, and in the event of our being obliged to retire farther, they might be destroyed.”19

Third, the Thames gave the Right Division control over the cultivated regions to the south around Long and Turkey points, thereby denying the enemy of sustenance from that quarter.20

It was Procter’s stated belief that any attempt to join up directly with the Centre Division on Lake Ontario would not only have lost their native allies, but brought the force of the American Army down upon the two divisions from west and east.21 In this, Procter’s strategy was favourably received by Sir George Prevost, who specifically stated in a response dated 23 September: “The precautionary measures you are taking appear to me proper, The concentration of your force has become indispensable and your nearer connection with the Centre Division may be requisite.”22 This echoed Prevost’s official report to Earl Bathurst in London, on the deteriorating situation in the west:

“I cannot bring myself to believe our misfortune has been so great as it is supposed, but in the event of it proving such as is apprehended and Major-General Procter should find himself without the means of feeding his army at Detroit and Amherstburg, and should have lost in the fleet all his heavy ordnance, I have signified to him that it is expedient and necessary he should retire from his present position, and bring his force more in connection with the Centre Division by falling back to the Thames, with his right towards Lake St. Clair and his left extending to Dundas street, which leads to the head of Lake Ontario, the proposed headquarters of the Centre Division, and I have directed Major-General De Rottenburg to be prepared to meet the Right Division with supplies in this movement.”23

Procter outlined his evacuation measures at his court martial at Montréal in December 1814:

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“The sick, together with the women and children belonging to the Division, were sent to the Moravian Town.

“The naval and military stores were sent by water, in vessels and boats, to the Thames.

“Orders were given to the officers of the Artillery and Quarter Master General's Department, to provide such means of land carriage as they in their discretion might think necessary, and funds were provided, depots with ovens were formed at proper distances. Instructions were given to the Commissariat for provisioning the troops. I had even written to Colonel Talbot, at Long Point, commanding the militia in that District, to send to the Thames whatever articles of food there might be within his reach, and to have the roads through the wilderness as far as possible repaired, to facilitate the conveyance of them. Colonel Baby, of the Militia Staff, was directed to have the bridges repaired between Sandwich and the Thames, for the passage of the troops upon the retreat. The fort of Amherst was dismantled, and its garrison withdrawn; Dragoons were stationed between Sandwich, Amherstburgh, and below this last place, to give the earliest intelligence of the appearance of the enemy and of their landing, as it was inexpedient to let the enemy know, as long as it could be avoided, our intention to retreat, and as the garrison at Detroit could, at the shortest notice, be conveyed to Sandwich, the abandonment of that fort was delayed to the last moment, and on the 27th orders were given to Major Muir, commanding there, to destroy the public buildings and cross to our side.”24

As Procter indicated, the sick and non-combatants, and the naval and military stores, were sent away from Amherstburg well in advance of the Army and main body of Indians. The former by road and the latter by water. Many of the invalids and the baggage were moved out by wagon, of which there was a sufficient number on hand to meet the Army’s needs. But what vessels were used for the stores?

There were an unknown number of army bateaux and perogues or large canoes available at Amherstburg and Detroit, and these were evidently all pressed into service.25 Some were used to transfer troops and natives across the river from Detroit to Sandwich, others to ferry troops across the Thames during the march. The rest carried whatever stores and ammunition they were capable of.

The heavy lifting was left to the five larger vessels which remained at Amherstburg when Barclay departed for the last time:

Two of these were the Army’s gunboats: Colonel Myers and Mary Eliza (sometimes shortened to Myers and Eliza). Ordered by General Procter in December 1812, these decked gunboats were launched by Master Builder William Bell on the Thames River (presumably at Chatham) in April 1813 for the Provincial Marine.26 Propelled by 26 oars and sails, these small schooners were designed to carry a single long 18-pounder cannon in the bow. They each had a recommended complement of 45 men (including 26 oarsmen), but, when they participated in the Miamis expedition shortly after completion, they embarked up to 85 men each.27 They saw further action in May in the assault on Fort Meigs. Never part of the Royal Navy’s squadron, they were laid up unarmed at Amherstburg for the duration of the summer.

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The 60-ton sloop or schooner Erie was captured by Captain Charles Roberts at Michilimackinac when she arrived from Chicago on 20 or 21 July 1812. She was built at Black Rock, New York, in 1810 for the Black Rock trading firm of Porter, Barton & Company, and had been on her way from Chicago to Detroit loaded with peltries under Master Walter Norton when she called at the island, only to be surprised to find that Michilimackinac was in British hands.28 Erie was purchased into the Provincial Marine by March 1813, with a recommended crew of 33.29 Although intended to carry up to five guns, she does not appear to have mounted more than a 12- pounder carronade on a pivot for most of her naval career. Due to a shortage of men and guns, Commodore Barclay laid her up at Amherstburg in August. She was thus the only member of the Royal Navy’s squadron on Lake Erie to have escaped the Battle of Lake Erie.30

The 100-ton schooner Mary was originally built at Erie, Pennsylvania, in 1805 by Thomas Wilson for trade between Buffalo and Erie. She, too, was taken by British forces at Michilimackinac. In Mary’s case, she was at the American outpost on 17 July 1812 when Captain Charles Roberts forced the surrender of the garrison. As part of the terms of capitulation, the merchant vessels and their cargoes that were in the harbour were to remain private property, and so the Mary, Captain Rouff (or Rough), and another schooner named Salina were returned to their respective masters and ordered to transport the garrison’s paroled defenders to Cleveland. In direct violation of the agreement, the schooners were stopped at Detroit by Brigadier-General William Hull and the parolees ordered to join the American garrison there. Consequently, when Major-General Isaac Brock’s forces took Detroit on 16 August, Mary and Salina were retaken and subsequently used to return the paroled members of the Ohio Militia surrendered at Detroit. Mary embarked 208 prisoners for Cleveland. These vessels returned to Amherstburg by 29 August and remained in government service, Mary as an unarmed transport. As such, she participated in Procter’s Miamis expedition in April 1813. And she was credited in August as having carried 670 barrels of flour from Long Point, which was apparently the last shipment of such that year owing to the appearance of the American squadron on Lake Erie.31

Finally, the 59-ton schooner Ellen — which confusingly also appears under the names Eleanor, Ellenor, and Helen — was owned by Richard Pattinson of Sandwich, a merchant, captain of militia, and Member for Essex in the provincial legislature. After the surrender of Detroit in August 1812, she was employed in the transport of paroled American prisoners to Cleveland, embarking 88 United States regulars. She was taken into government service as a hired transport at Amherstburg on 15 June 1813, at which time she was valued by Pattinson at £500.32

Mention should also be made of the North West Company’s schooner Nancy, which was requisitioned for government service on 1 July 1812. She served as a transport on Lake Erie and Lake Huron and, at the time of the Battle of Lake Erie in September 1813, she was busy supplying the posts at Fort St. Joseph and Michilimackinac. She narrowly missed being captured by the Americans in the St. Clair River on her return to Amherstburg in October. Consequently, she was not part of Procter’s retreat.

Procter evacuated Amherstburg on 25 September, destroying all public buildings therein, and headed for Sandwich, leaving a number of Dragoons stationed between Lake Erie and Sandwich as lookouts. The first enemy reconnaissance party arrived at the entrance to the Detroit River on the 26th, and on the following afternoon the main body of American troops landed and took The War of 1812 Magazine Issue 22 May 2014 possession of the ruins at Amherstburg. Their march on Sandwich began on the 28th, arriving there on the following day.

Warned in advance of the enemy’s approach by the Dragoons, Procter ordered Fort Detroit destroyed, and transferred its garrison across the river to Sandwich on the 27th, so beginning the complete withdrawal of the Right Division to the Thames that evening. The Americans did not reach Sandwich until 29 September, where they halted until 2 October.

Procter was later accused of being dilatory in these arrangements and that he should have started for the Thames far earlier than he did. In his defence, Procter submitted:

“But I am charged with having unnecessarily delayed to commence the retreat until the evening of the 27th of September. The main body of the Indians arrived at the Thames only on the evening of the 30th. If I had commenced the retreat earlier, the naval and military stores could not have been conveyed to the Thames, but must have been destroyed at Amherstburgh. Besides there was no reason to apprehend a speedy attack of the enemy. It was not to be thought that the loss of the squadron could affect me so immediately as to render a precipitate retrograde movement necessary.”33

Indeed, such action was fully sanctioned by Sir George Prevost’s headquarters, as demonstrated by a letter of 20 September from Edward Baynes advising:

“The superior resources of the Enemy have indeed enabled him to render our situation critical and difficult but it still does not yet amount to that point as to render a retrograde movement indispensible, and until that is the case, it should be avoided by every possible exertion & device.—Shd. however such a measure became unfortunately unavoidable, it is His Excellency's express commands that it be not resorted to until its necessity and the mode of carrying it into effect has been previously well weighed and considered, and all necessary arrangements made that under every circumstance it be conducted with order and regularity.—His Excellency trusts that the advanced divisions of the Army are not encumbered with heavy or superfluous baggage, no consideration of that nature is to be suffered to impede the march of the Troops for one moment, the removal of all sick and convalescents must be previously provided for.—Every position which the Country affords, is to be occupied & defended so that the Enemy be made to pay dearly for every step he advances. All retrograde movements are to be resorted to with reluctance, and they are to be as limited as the circumstances which cause them will permit, and they are never to be hurried or accelerated, Unless warranted by circumstances of peculiar urgency.

“Should Your situation become desperate you are recommended to adopt a line of conduct suited to the exegency of the Case, and as every thing must be sacrificed by a retrograde movement, you will exhaust every resource and means within your power, before you resort to that measure…”34

It is doubtful that Procter received this letter prior to the evacuation. Nevertheless, it does prove the high degree to which Prevost’s headquarters and Procter were in agreement on general The War of 1812 Magazine Issue 22 May 2014

principles. A second, unsigned letter from Prevost’s headquarters, dated three days later, again reinforces the notion that Procter’s actions were fully endorsed, especially this telling line:

“The precautionary measures you are taking appear to me proper, The concentration of your force has become indispensible and your nearer connection with the Centre Division may be requisite.”35

There remains one rather curious point regarding Procter’s retreat. It appears that the last communication between Procter and Major-General Francis de Rottenburg of the Centre Division was dated 22 September, for on the 30th Rottenburg complained to Prevost:

“I have not heard from Major Genl Proctor [sic] since the 22nd Instant he was then preparing everything for his retreat and I think it is now high time he should seriously endeavour to bring his Force in connection with mine provided the Indians will permit him.”36

By the 30th the Right Division was advancing to the Thames Valley, where it took up a position at Dover (Dolsen’s Farm)37 on 1 October. Here the Army paused prior to advancing to the Forks at Chatham, where Procter was to make a stand against the Americans. However, this plan changed when the general was advised that it would take considerable time and effort to put Chatham into a state of defence. Having been advised by Colonel Talbot that Moraviantown offered a more suitable defensive position, Prevost set off on the 2nd to reconnoitre the site, only to turn back when he was told that American vessels had entered Lake St. Clair. This was thought to be a false alarm — it wasn’t — but was enough to cause the rearguard to come up to Dover, leaving intact all the bridges behind them. Orders were given for their destruction, though late that evening it was learned that one enemy vessel was in the lake, but had not entered the Thames. Believing the Americans were looking for the schooner Nancy, Procter set out again on the 3rd with his engineer and aid.

Early on the morning of 4 October, Procter received a despatch from Lieutenant-Colonel Augustus Warburton. Warburton had been left in charge at Dover, and wrote to say that he had withdrawn from that place the previous day upon seeing the American advance. Just as the rearguard had warned on the 2nd, he enemy was indeed moving in force with 3,500 troops and a flotilla of bateaux for their baggage, escorted by three schooner gunboats (Scorpion, Tigress, and Porcupine) under Commodore Perry. Moreover, the dragoons sent back to destroy the bridges in the rear had been captured before they could complete their work, so that only one bridge was actually dismantled, and that was easily repaired by the Americans.

And it didn’t help the British cause that General William Henry Harrison’s knowledge of the territory was greatly enhanced by one of his guides: a traitor named Mathew Dolsen, by whose farm Procter’s army had encamped. Dolsen and his wife and children were living on the farm when war erupted. Taken into the local militia, Dolsen soon deserted to Hull’s army at Detroit. And when that place was taken by Brock, Dolsen evaded capture and made his way to Harrison. Dolsen’s wife and family continued on the farm until Procter’s defeat, at which time they removed to Detroit.38

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Procter condemned Warburton’s unsanctioned withdrawal — the third that had occurred during the retreat — because it was the last place “where our force would have been entire — where the confidence and aid of the Indians would have been undiminished, and on a ground well calculated for their mode of warfare.”39 But where the general contended that he had ordered Warburton to fortify Dover for defence, others believed that Procter failed to provide Warburton with any proper instructions regarding the approach of the enemy.40 Consequently, Warburton initially fell back a short distance up the river in order to prepare for an enemy attack, but then retired to Chatham where most of the Indians were encamped. Warburton planned to continue the retreat to Moraviantown, but the warriors told the colonel that they were only prepared to stop the American advance at Chatham, as promised by Procter at Amherstburg, and refused to budge. Not wishing to compound matters, Warburton decided to placate his allies and halted for the night, taking care to encamp his troops in a defensive position. On the morning of the 4th the natives agreed to meet the Americans at Moraviantown, and so the army resumed its march east.

When Warburton left Chatham on the morning of the 4th, the Erie was anchored by a farm just upstream. As it appears that the Erie could not be moved any further, the vessel, “loaded with arms and ordnance stores,”41 was ordered to be burned. Similarly, a house near the bridge over McGregor’s Creek, used to store arms, was torched. But only at the last minute, for a large party of Indians remained behind, and it was they who also destroyed the bridge over McGregor’s Creek at Chatham and one other just below. The Indians held back Harrison’s advanced guard for only a short time before retreating, and so the Americans managed to put out the house fire and save the arms.

The two other large schooners — Ellen and Mary — were well upstream of Chatham at the time, and presumably just beyond the reach of the enemy. However, Procter was under the mistaken impression that the American gunboats were keeping pace with Harrison’s army. In fact, the narrowness of the river above Dover had caused Harrison and Perry to leave their vessels there. As Harrison later explained: “Above Dolsen’s,... the character of the river and adjacent country, is considerably changed. The former, though still deep, is very narrow, and its banks high and woody. The commodore and myself, therefore, agreed upon the propriety of leaving the boats under a guard of 150 infantry, and I determined to trust to fortune, and the bravery of my troops, to effect the passage of the river.”42 Perry himself stated that they reached as high as McCrea’s, where “they were obliged to stop as the banks of the River were too high for their guns to be of any service.”43

Procter might have known this had he sent Indian scouts to the rear earlier. As it was, the general met up with Warburton about six miles above Chatham. With his options dwindling, he determined to sink the schooners midstream to prevent Perry’s gunboats from ascending further. Given Warburton’s precipitous withdrawal from Dover, the general reasoned that:

“No alternative was left to me but to adopt those dispositions which so new and unexpected a circumstance called for. In order to prevent the advance of the enemy's gun boats, and to impede his approach, I directed Captain Hall, late of the Provincial Marine, to warp two vessels down to a proper part of the river, to scuttle and sink them across it, and burn them to the water's edge. Captain Hall having only left directions for my orders being carried into effect, it was done voluntarily by the Brigade Major and Captain Crowther. The Deputy Assistant Quarter Master The War of 1812 Magazine Issue 22 May 2014

General had directions to destroy every thing that could not be brought away, and which I believe was completely done.”44

Captain Hall was George Benson Hall, the former commander of the Provincial Marine on Lake Erie, whose place had been taken by Commander Robert Heriot Barclay. Hall resented being made subordinate to the Royal Navy — especially after his squadron had done so much to support Brock’s campaign against Detroit in 1812 — and declined to serve as anything less than the captain of a vessel. This Barclay refused, and so Hall remained ashore as the superintendent and storekeeper of the naval yard at Amherstburg. As he was now acting in his recently appointed capacity as a captain in the 1st Essex Militia, Hall evidently had other priorities and so he only left instructions for the others to carry out. After Moraviantown, Hall became the naval storekeeper at Montreal. The deputy quartermaster general was Brevet Major Peter L. Chambers of the 41st.

Procter implies that these directions were not being complied with, and so he called on Captain Webb Crowther of the 41st to finish the job. As Crowther later recounted:

“I immediately went to the General [Procter] who was at the head of the line, he informed me that he wished to stop the navigation of the river at Bowles’s to prevent the Enemy’s Gunboats from coming up, by laying the Mary and Ellenor in the best position, and scuttling them, and to destroy the naval ordnance stores. I proceeded to Bowles’s and found that the Deputy Ass’t Quarter Master General was destroying the stores that had been landed. I then went on board the two vessels, and with the assistance of the naval officers, we moored the vessels across the river. I took the entrenching tools and carpenters tools and … I commenced immediately destroying the naval and ordnance stores that were on board these two vessels, breaking them, and cutting them and throwing into the river such as would sink. I then gave directions to the master carpenter to scuttle the two vessels, which was done, and in their scuttling in the water set fire to the upper works …”45

The master carpenter noted by Crowther was William Bell, the Provincial Marine’s master builder at Amherstburg, who had launched every government-built vessel on lakes Erie and Huron since 1802.46 After escaping Harrison’s army, Bell took up the position of master builder at the naval yard at Kingston, until superseded by Master Shipwright Thomas Strickland later in 1814. However, it was Bell who designed and built the largest sailing warship to serve on the Great Lakes — the first rate St. Lawrence on Lake Ontario — in 1814.

Bowles’ Farm was four miles above Chatham and, from Crowther’s testimony, it is evident that the task of scuttling the schooners was in fact proceeding as ordered. However, with the enemy moving rapidly forward, time was of the essence and the work had to be completed quickly. At any rate, the brief action at Chatham slowed the enemy somewhat, and by the time Harrison’s troops reached Bowles’ there was little left to salvage. As Harrison relates:

“At Bowles’s farm, four miles from the bridge, we halted for the night, found two other vessels, and a large distillery, filled with ordnance and other valuable stores, to an immense amount, in flames. It was impossible to put out the fire; two twenty-four pounders, with their carriages, were taken, and a large quantity of ball and shells of various sizes.”47 The War of 1812 Magazine Issue 22 May 2014

It is worth stressing that the two schooners were not captured. They were destroyed before the Americans arrived.

The American army resumed its march on the morning of the 5th and soon fell on the gunboats Colonel Myers and Mary Eliza, and a number of British bateaux and Indian canoes. As Harrison recalled the morning’s events:

“The army was put in motion early on the morning of the 5th. I pushed on, in advance, with the mounted regiment, and requested governor Shelby to follow, as expeditiously as possible, with the infantry. The governor’s zeal, and that of his men, enabled them to keep up with the cavalry, and by 9 o’clock, we were at Arnold’s mills, having taken, in the course of the morning, two gun-boats and several batteaux, loaded with provisions and ammunition.”48

According to the morning state of the 41st Regiment for that day, one captain, nine sergeants, four corporals, ten drummers and 120 privates were assigned to the two gunboats and bateaux.49 Presumably there were others as well at the time of their capture.

Henry Procter placed the blame for this particular disaster directly upon several of his officers, including: Colonel Warburton; Major Peter L. Chambers, the deputy assistant quartermaster- general; and Lieutenant Allan H, McLean, the brigade-major and one of Procter’s two aide-de- camps. As Procter understood the situation:

“[T]he boats containing ammunition and stores were not captured till the morning of the fifth of October, at about ten o'clock, A.M. The officer immediately responsible for them was the Deputy Assistant Quarter Master General, who having repeatedly passed on the communication, must have been thoroughly acquainted with the navigation, and might be presumed to be attending to so essential and peculiar a part of his duty. They left Bowles' on the afternoon of the fourth. In the evening of that day they appear to have been within five miles of Sherman's [Sherman’s farm], where the Troops halted, and the Deputy Assistant Quarter Master General states that he there reported the danger of the boats to the officer in the immediate command of the Troops. The danger of the boats was again communicated to the Deputy Assistant Quarter Master General, and to the officer in the command, on the evening of the fourth, by Sergeant Grant. Instead of instantly affording assistance, the sergeant who came to seek aid was obliged to come to me, four miles, on foot, (although there was Cavalry with the Division,) and when my orders were communicated to the officer in the immediate command of the Troops, about eight in the morning, my Brigade Major was told that the boats were already taken, and that he need not give himself any trouble about them, although in fact they were not then captured.”50

Sherman’s farm was on the north side of the Thames immediately south of the present town of Thamesville. Five or six miles downstream is the modern village of Kent Bridge, also on the north or right bank of the river. Arnold’s Mills may have been just above Kent Bridge near where Arnold’s Creek enters the Thames on the south bank. From this we may deduce that the gunboats Colonel Myers and Mary Eliza were captured just below modern-day Kent Bridge because, as Harrison explained, there were rapids at Arnold’s Mills. Consequently, the gunboats could go no farther. The War of 1812 Magazine Issue 22 May 2014

Curiously, a map in Richardson’s War of 1812 places Arnold’s Mills at the S-bend in the Thames near Thamesville, at about the location where Canadian National Railways’ main line crosses the river.51 That this map is wrong is shown by Harrison’s own narrative:

“A rapid, at the river at Arnold’s mills, affords the only fording to be met with for a very considerable distance; but, upon examination, it was found too deep for the infantry. Having, however, fortunately taken two or three boats, and some canoes, on the spot, and obliging the horsemen to take a footman behind each, the whole were safely crossed by 12 o’clock. Eight miles from the crossing, we passed a farm, where a part of the British troops had encamped the night before, under the command of colonel Warburton. The detachment with general Procter had arrived the day before, at the Moravian towns, four miles higher up. Being now certainly near the enemy, I directed the advance of Johnson’s [mounted Kentucky] regiment to accelerate their march, for the purpose of procuring intelligence. The officer commanding it, in a short time, sent to inform me, that his progress was stopped by the enemy, who were formed across our line of march. One of the enemy’s wagoners, being also taken prisoner, from the information received from him, and my own observation, assisted by some of my officers, I soon ascertained enough of their position, and order of battle, to determine that which it was proper for me to adopt.”52

Procter’s most immediate explanation for the loss of the Army’s vessels and his ultimate stand against Harrison can be found in a letter to General de Rottenburg, dated at Ancaster on 23 October. Calling Warburton’s retreat from Dover and Chatham:

“a hasty Measure that made it requisite to immediately sink and destroy the Vessels and Naval Stores brought from Amherstburg as well as all others that could not from the Want of Time, or Means be removed, and which was accordingly done.

“Immediately on my Determination to fall Back Directions were given and Measures immediately taken for the Construction of Ovens, and a Sufficiency of Perogues or large Canoes on the Communication. Had my Intentions been carried into Effect promptly we should have been well accommodated with Provisions; and not encumbered with them on the Move, as I had explicitly directed that every Article of Food should be in our Rear, and that Portions of it, as well as Individuals of the Commissariat be at stated Distances for the Accommodation of the Sick, and of the Women & children who were to be sent off as Conveyances could be found. In short every Measure was adopted that my Experience or Enquiries could prompt for the disencumbering my Force and facilitating it's Supplies. In the Attempt to save Provisions and Ammunition we became encumbered with Boats not suited to the State of the Navigation. The Indians and the Troops retreated on different Sides of the River, and the Boats to which sufficient Attention had not been given became particularly exposed to the Fire of the Enemy who were advancing on the Side the Indians were retiring, and most unfortunately fell into the Possession of the Enemy, and with them several of the Men, Provisions, all the Ammunition that had not been issued to the Troops and Indians. This disastrous Circumstance afforded the Enemy the Means of Crossing and advancing on both Sides of the River: Finding the Enemy were advancing too near I resolved to meet him, being strong in Cavalry, in a Wood below the Moravian Town, which last was not cleared of Indian Women and Children or of those of the The War of 1812 Magazine Issue 22 May 2014

Troops; nor of the Sick. The Troops were formed with their Left to the River, with a Reserve, and a Six pounder on the Road, near the River. The Indians on the Right.”53

Procter, his staff, and his scouts reconnoitred the approaching Americans before the general made his final dispositions early in the afternoon of 5 October. Consequently, most of the remaining British artillery (five brass guns) was placed on a hill on the south bank of the Thames overlooking the Moravian village and a ford across the river. This, Procter reasoned would protect their retreat, should it become necessary.

Meantime, the main body was deployed on the north bank, two or three miles to the west. The road there runs beside the river through a beech forest, squeezed between a swamp two or three hundred yards to the north and the river bank. Though wooded, the ground itself was free of underbrush and, at the place chosen by Procter, it was bisected by a small swamp. This terrain, it was hoped, would work to the British advantage, especially against mounted troops. Procter deployed his main body of Indians in the swampy ground to the north where they might anchor his right. His infantry was arrayed to either side of the small swamp, with the left protected by the river. The only artillery present was a single brass six-pounder that Procter had placed on the road so to scour that approach.

The total number of British troops on the field was less than six hundred, plus perhaps eight hundred native warriors. But the troops were sick, hungry and tired from protracted marches, and no doubt demoralised by the entire situation. And now Procter was mortified to learn that there was no further ammunition beyond what the men carried in their bags, owing to a lapse by the officer in charge of the artillery:

“It was at this time that I ascertained that the ammunition for the troops, which ought to have been conveyed with the Artillery, and for which waggons had been provided, had been, in consequence of an act of forgetfulness of the Officer of Artillery, conveyed by water, and had been lost.”54

The ammunition for the troops had been put aboard the gunboats Colonel Myers and Mary Eliza, along with a number of bateaux, and was now in American hands.

General Harrison’s force amounted to somewhat less than 2,500 men, including mounted units and Indians, thereby outnumbering the British force by a factor of perhaps two to one. Procter had chosen the site of battle well, but for the inspiration of Harrison who, against all normal reason, decided to break the British lines by sending his mounted infantry against them. As Harrison later wrote:

“… the measure was not sanctioned by any thing that I had seen or heard of, but I was fully convinced that it would succeed. The American backwoodsmen ride better in the woods than any other people. A musket or rifle is no impediment to them, being accustomed to carry them on horseback from their earliest youth. I was persuaded, too, that the enemy would be quite unprepared for the shock, and that they could not resist it.”

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This bold action had its desired effect, breaking the first British line before being stopped by the second line of defence. However, the damage was done, so that the main American advance by the infantry over-ran the British and sent them into disarray. The six-pounder covering the road never even fired. Some of the British troops — including Procter under an escort of dragoons — escaped, but most (over six hundred) were taken prisoner, including Colonel Warburton. On the British side, 12 soldiers and 33 Indians were killed, the great war chief Tecumseth amongst them. The Americans lost seven on the day and a further five later as a result of wounds.

Amongst the American casualties was the severely injured Lieutenant-Colonel James Johnson of Kentucky. According to Benson J. Lossing, Johnson “was conveyed to a vessel a few miles below, under charge of Captain Champlin, of the Scorpion, which that gallant officer had captured from the British. In that vessel he was conveyed to the Scorpion, at Dolsen’s, and in her to Detroit.”55 The implication is that one of the two gunboats was employed, these having been placed under the control of the United States Navy. Johnson survived, though he lost the use of legs, and later resumed his seat in Congress.

The guns overlooking the Moravian village were also seized. Of the “fine brass field train of artillery”56 captured, Harrison remarked:

“On the day of the action, six pieces of brass artillery were taken, and two iron 24 pounders the day before. Several others were discovered in the river, and can easily be procured. Off the brass pieces, three are the trophies of our revolutionary war, that were taken at Saratoga and York, and surrendered by general Hull.”57

Thus ended the retreat of the British Right Division from the west. It only remained for the Americans to burn Moraviantown, recover what they could of British equipment and supplies, and remove their prisoners to American soil. British captives taken along the line of retreat and at the Battle of Moraviantown (or Battle of the Thames, as the engagement is also known) were quickly removed to prison camps in Ohio, there joining many of the survivors from the Battle of Lake Erie. Some from the British squadron were later transferred to the State Penitentiary of Kentucky at Frankfort. The War of 1812 Magazine Issue 22 May 2014

Aftermath

The first news of Procter’s defeat sent shockwaves throughout the Centre Division. But this was not caused by the receipt of Captain John Hall’s letter from Delaware, for it was preceded by another messenger of somewhat dubious character: one Lieutenant John Christopher Reiffenstein.

Reiffenstein was Colonel Warburton’s staff adjutant who, during the Battle of Moraviantown, made his escape before the final outcome was certain and headed to Burlington Heights. His exaggerated report to Colonel Robert Young — to the effect that Procter’s entire command had been made prisoner and that an American army 8,000-strong was moving towards Lake Ontario — caused Major-General Vincent to accelerated his withdrawal from the Niagara Peninsula, and spread terror throughout the civilian population of Upper Canada. Reiffenstein went down to Montréal shortly after, where he was appointed adjutant to the 1st Battalion of Select Embodied Militia in Lower Canada on 21 November.58

Reiffenstein’s disreputable conduct caught-up with him, and he was eventually castigated by both de Rottenburg and Prevost. But the damage was done, especially to Procter’s reputation. Writing to De Rottenburg on 16 October, Procter emphasised: “I have to notice and to complain of Staff Adjutant Reiffenstein, who not only without leave, but in direct disobedience of orders, has gone to the Lower Province, and with circumstances of marked disrespect. I am confident that, tho' unfortunate, I shall not be prejudged, and that opinion will not be formed on vague or malicious Report.”59 Procter’s expectation was ill-founded, for the poison had already spread too far. The anonymous Montreal editorialist Veritas certainly believed Reiffenstein:

“The misfortune that thus befel[l] the right division, had like to have proved fatal to the centre division. General Vincent, panic struck, retreated from St. David, (General De Rottenburg having some time before gone down to Kingston,) towards Burlington, after destroying quantities of stores, provisions, and Indian goods, and the post at Long Point was called in with precipitation, as if Harrison and his men could have come through the intermediate wilderness unimpeded, or without their advance, if attempted, being previous ascertained.

“The infection of this panic extended to Head Quarters, from whence orders issued for the evacuation of all our posts beyond Kingston, and for the retreat of the troops to that place, which, from a paragraph in an Albany paper, appeared to be known to the enemy, as soon or sooner, than to General Vincent at Burlington.”60

The fact is that Vincent actually had no direct knowledge of Procter’s defeat when he retired from St. Davids. Moreover, the withdrawal of British forces from the Niagara Peninsula in favour of Burlington Heights was already decided upon by De Rottenburg prior to that general’s departure for Kingston, as his 3 October despatch to Prevost proves:

“Major-General Vincent will remain in command of this army, and has received instructions for his guidance during my absence. He will concentrate his troops and keep the position at Queenston as long as possible, and ultimately fall back on Burlington, keeping up his The War of 1812 Magazine Issue 22 May 2014

communication with General Procter's army, who was, according to his last despatch, upon the eve of falling back upon the River Thames with a large proportion of Indians.”61

General Vincent’s real and immediate dilemma was the shortage of suitable transport. On the evening of 9 October, along the road at Twelve Mile Creek, Vincent received a letter from Colonel Young at Burlington Heights, informing him of Procter’s defeat. This bleak news was compounded by word that the party under Lieutenant-Colonel Christopher Hamilton (100th Regiment), which was on its way to establish a depot at Turkey Point, had turned back for fear of being overtaken by the American cavalry. Consequently, rather than resting at Twenty Mile Creek, as planned, Vincent instead began a forced march to Burlington. Writing to De Rottenburg, Vincent explained that: “In this rapid movement I fear much that I shall be under the necessity of leaving my sick, stores and baggage behind me, unless I find batteaux sufficient at the 40 [Forty Mile Creek], as wagons I have not half sufficient, and the horses of these are perfectly knocked up.” There would be no immediate help from Burlington, since Colonel Young advised that he had “not a batteau that will swim; waggons most difficult to be procured. The people are not our friends. I have parties, horse and foot, scouring the country for waggons.”62

Vincent pressed on from Twelve Mile Creek with his army and artillery, leaving the sick and provisions behind in the charge of Lieutenant-Colonel John Murray (100th Regiment). His orders to Murray — to the effect that “All possible exertion was to be made to bring away the Sick and stores of every description, but that in the event of failure to provide the requisite means of Transport, everything was to be destroyed rather than leave a Sick or wounded Soldier behind.” — were diligently carried out. All the sick were evacuated in the wagons available, but unlike Veritas’ claims, only some of the stores and arms were destroyed. Almost all of the Indian presents had already been distributed; and of the Commissariat stores, all that remained was a quantity of flour that was shared out amongst the local inhabitants.63 It should be pointed out that most of the sick had been ordered to the rear at the end of September, these cases being moved in bateaux to Burlington Heights and York. Thus, as of 1 October, only 143 remained with the Centre Division, these being the “slightest cases.”64

Henry Procter reached the Grand River by the 9th, where he met up with Colonel Hamilton. Believing that there was no “expectation now, of the Enemys advancing, soon at least, thro the Wilderness,” Procter rescinded Young’s order and sent Hamilton back to Turkey Point. At that time there were, in the general’s estimate, more than four hundred Indians still making their way along the road; and at least two hundred troops who were either in camp or on their way.65 Procter was at Ancaster on 23 October when he penned the first of his lengthier reports to de Rottenburg about the retreat, and another from Burlington on 16 November.66

Far from pursuing the remnants of Procter’s defeated army to Ancaster, William Henry Harrison remained but two days at Moraviantown to oversee its destruction by the Kentuckians. There was now more pressing business along the Niagara Frontier and he was eager to transfer his regulars to that theatre of operations. Harrison arrived at Sandwich with the first contingents of his army on 10 October, whilst the rest followed along with the prisoners and prizes, including the gunboats Colonel Myers and Mary Eliza, and the smaller boats. However, the weather proved anything but co-operative for the victors, blowing up “a furious storm of wind and snow, during The War of 1812 Magazine Issue 22 May 2014 which several of the vessels from the Thames were injured and much of the captured property lost.”67 In a postscript to a letter to the Secretary of War dated at Detroit, 16 October, Harrison advised:

“The late storm has deprived us of a great deal of valuable property taken from the enemy. A small schooner laded with camp equipage, ordnance and ordnance stores and several boats were abandoned by them and I fear that very few of the articles will be recovered but all the artillery taken in the field is safe. I greatly fear too some of the prisoners may have escaped, they were under a militia guard and were scattered for several miles as I am informed. However I believe that we shall be able to muster six hundred exclusively of the officers.”68

Luckily for the British garrison at Michilimackinac, the storm also dashed the general’s immediate plans for the reduction of the garrison there.

According to diver and historian Cris Kohl, as the two gunboats “and their armament, cannons included, were being returned to Detroit, they sank in soft-bottomed Lake St. Clair and were never recovered.” He goes on to state that “Harrison knew where more cannons lay in the Thames River, and he likely retrieved those over the next year.”69 The latter seems unlikely as Harrison seemed satisfied that he had all of the artillery. Moreover, none of the British reports mention anything about the vessels transporting guns, only ordnance stores and provisions. As to the former, Harrison’s postscript is rather vague on the fate of the two gunboats, and Kohl provides no supporting evidence for their loss.70

On a final note, mention should be made of Richard Pattison’s request for compensation for the loss of his schooner Ellen. On 7 December 1813, he applied to General John Vincent for compensation, writing from his refuge in Dundas:

“Herewith I beg leave to enclose copy of a certificate signed in duplicate by Major General Proctor, by which it appears the schooner Ellen of fifty nine Tons burthen, my Property[,] was taken into the Public Service as a Transport at Amherstburg about the fifteenth of June last and was so continued until the third of October when she was burnt at the River Thames to prevent her falling into the Hands of the Enemy (by order of Major General Proctor) — That she was valued by me at Five Hundred Pounds when taken into the Service; for which amount together with reasonable allowance for the use of her from said 15th June to 3d October following[,] compensation is now claimed by me from government. I trust this matter will meet your early attention, and as the justice of the claim is evident you will see it right to order immediate payment.”71

Unable to act personally, Vincent passed this along to headquarters in Montreal for further action and, on 30 January 1814, it was referred to General De Rottenburg, who was president of a board of claims, “to report how far a claim for remuneration may be deemed proper & equitable.”72 Presumably, Pattison received his due, but just when and for how much has not yet been ascertained.

The story of the battle and the sunken boats was passed on by succeeding generations along the Thames, but much was forgotten until a chance discovery was made in 1899. The War of 1812 Magazine Issue 22 May 2014

Discovery & Recovery

As it happened, the building of a new Canadian Pacific Railway line to Windsor in 1899 led to the construction of a bridge over the Thames at Pikeville, just above Chatham. This was the same area where locals once collected old muskets and cannon balls along the river banks. The work itself did not reveal anything new, but the altered currents washed away part of the bank downstream. Here, two men using pike poles to retrieve submerged logs to sell, discovered some old timbers that were too heavy to raise. Unsure of what they had found, the pair passed their news onto to Chatham’s waterworks superintendent, Edwin Bassett Jones, as it might affect the local water supply.73

Jones was something of a local historian and he took an immediate interest the discovery. In his youth, he was regaled with stories of Procter’s retreat and so quickly recognised the outline of a what he thought was a gunboat. As Jones later recounted, “where earth had washed away from one bank the ribs of an old ship were visible. It lay two feet under water, slanted toward the bank with the outer end sunk under sand and debris.” Satisfying himself that this must have been one of the British supply vessels, Jones returned to the site and “recovered some bottom boards [probably ceiling planks] that had been charred by fire, one of which had three large auger holes, showing that the vessel had been scuttled as well as burned.”74

Around this time it was determined that the wreck was not a gunboat after all, “but that of the two-masted schooner General Myers, captured from the Americans and used as a supply boat.”75 This was indeed a captured American schooner, but she was actually named Erie — a point causing much confusion for future researchers.

Word of the discovery was spread through Victor Lauriston at the Chatham Daily Banner, meetings were held, and soon the Tecumseh Historical Society was formed through the leadership of Captain J.S. Black of the Kent militia and R.C. Burt. The society’s aim was to take charge of the wreck and raise the hull for inclusion in a new museum. For this purpose, permission was obtained from the Canadian and Ontario governments to take possession of the remains. This could not have come soon enough, for the curious were beginning to appear at the site and much pillaging occurred, so much so that a guard had to be posted to prevent further thefts. Together with hull fragments and small items, many cannon balls and shells were pilfered for their scrap value.76

When the hull was raised in early 1901, the surviving cargo was removed, and included: “about two tons of cannon balls, considerable 24-pound, 5-pound [probably 6-pound], and 2-pound solid shot, 42-pound shells, quantities of grape and canister shot, and bayonets, American made flintlocks, an Indian Chief piece, artillery buttons and other items. One large shell found in the river was too big to have been fired by the brass 6-pounde[r] cannon. The cannon that did fire it has never been found.”77 The brass 6-pounder mentioned here by Jones probably refers Procter’s field guns. The American flintlocks were captured at Detroit and frequently supplied to militia units.

The hull was placed on a raft and floated downriver to Tecumseh Park in Chatham. This point of land, at the fork in the river, was the location of Simcoe’s naval yard in the 1790s, and later The War of 1812 Magazine Issue 22 May 2014 housed a barracks from the 1837 Rebellion (still extant in 1901). Now it would also host the Erie, propped up on wooden blocks for public display.

According to Jones, the schooner’s “solid oak ribs and planking were water-logged and very heavy and from the cargo of iron shells the wood was black as ebony and took a fine polish.” He went on to describe the hull as found:

“One side of the hull had been sprung as if from an explosion within. The vessel had beautiful lines and had been built for speed as well as strength. Her keel and keelson were tremendous oak beams. Her ribs were so close-set they almost touched. Her stem had been shaped from the root of a noble black walnut tree. She had been built to ride with the winds and breast the waves for a century or more and, as an example of superb ship-builders art and skill was well worth preserving. We hoped to search for and raise what remained of the Eliza and the Ellen to form an historic flotilla housed, perhaps, in the old Barracks on the Park.”78

A search for the other two schooners — actually Ellen and Mary — was anticipated and they may even have been found, but lack of money prevented any further advances, and the exposed Erie soon succumbed to weather and rot. As Jones sombrely concluded, the “deplorable fate of the [Erie] was lack of funds to house it, the wood was sold for making furniture. I made a small cabinet ...”79

This was not the end of the story, however. The wreck of the Erie drew the attention of the Americans, although the true story was as often as not lost in translation. According to Cris Kohl, some newspapers south of the border believed that the Erie was discovered in Michigan waters, whilst others claimed that the three wrecks were to be recovered and presented to the City of Detroit.80

The worst culprit in this war of misinformation must certainly have been Clarence Monroe Burton, a wealthy Detroit antiquarian, president of the Michigan Pioneer & Historical Society and founder of the Burton Historical Collection at the Detroit Public Library. His interest was piqued in 1901 when he learned that the Erie had been raised and that two other wrecks had been located. It was almost certainly Burton who originated the plan to bring the hulks to Detroit, and in 1905 followed through when he arrived on the Thames to search for Ellen and Mary. With a small steamer and a crew that included a diver, Burton spent part of the summer scouring the river above Chatham, and then proudly announced that he had located the wrecks. “I’m going to have them, if I have to go to war,” he crowed, insisting that if they belonged to anyone they belonged to the United States government, not to Canada. He even claimed that the Canadian government would not interfere with their removal. As to his plans: “It will cost $1,500 to raise the boats and put them on Belle Isle [an island park in the Detroit River belonging to the City of Detroit]. I will pay the sum out of my own pocket and present them to the city, if it will provide proper shelter for them …”81

Burton arrogantly asserted that the wrecks “don’t belong to anybody now, but they will soon belong to me. Wait until spring. As soon as navigation opens, I shall proceed to raise them, and the Canadian government won’t interfere either.”82 No thought at all was given to the fact that the wrecks belonged to the Crown in right of the province — although in those days laws The War of 1812 Magazine Issue 22 May 2014

protecting archaeological sites were much vaguer than today — nor did he consider that the Tecumseh Historical Society had already established a custodial claim to the vessels. The people of Canada well understood this and protested loudly. So much so that they were even heard in New York City! Burton was forced to back down.83 Burton came away with nothing, with the possible exception of a few artefacts that might have been scavenged from Ellen and Mary during his 1905 hunt.

Future Investigations

The recovery of the Erie is today a lesson in how not to treat a wreck. No means to protect or preserve her were implemented. And so far as we know, no measurements, let alone measured drawings, were made of the hull and only a handful of photographs were taken. Nor has an inventory of the artefacts collected been found, for it does appear that some attempt was made to obtain assistance with this from the provincial education department.84 Consequently, most of the artefacts have been lost. A few dozen items, mostly cannon balls and shells, have been recovered and are now displayed in the Chatham-Kent Museum in Chatham.

Notwithstanding the absence of any formal documentation, the extant photographs of Erie may aid in developing suitable drawings of the hull as recovered. At the very least, this could reveal the underwater lines of common Great Lakes merchant sailing vessels built just before the War of 1812, offering a useful comparison to the Hamilton and Scourge at the bottom of Lake Ontario.85 This may be especially important because the Hamilton and Scourge are currently resting upright in the silt, making the accurate interpretation of their underwater lines problematic.

A hull structure similar to Erie’s that has been studied in considerable detail is that of the somewhat larger merchant schooner Nancy, launched at Detroit in 1789.86 Nancy was destroyed by an American naval bombardment at the mouth of the Nottawasaga River, Georgian Bay, in 1814 while in British service, and so — like Erie — only the bottom of the hull remains — today under the protection of a specially constructed building at Nancy Island Historic Site, Wasaga Beach Provincial Park. Because of the differences in age and the shipwrights responsible, we should expect noticeable variations as well as similarities.

Unfortunately, one point that may never be totally resolved is that of Erie’s rig. Was she, as Jones stated, a two-masted schooner? Or was he mistaken, and that she was still rigged as a sloop?

As for the Ellen and Mary, they remain where they were scuttled in 1813. It is not clear if any artefacts were taken from them by Burton or others. However, the remaining hull structures may still be relatively intact, in which case they may yet offer new insights into early ship construction on the Great Lakes and, again, be subject to comparison with the Nancy. If their cargo was similar to Erie’s, a magnetometer survey should easily reveal their position under the silt. The comparatively shallow waters of the river will aid in any underwater archaeological survey. At time of writing, a Chatham-based group are planning to relocate the wrecks for long- term protection and study.

The War of 1812 Magazine Issue 22 May 2014

The fate of the Provincial Marine’s decked gunboats General Myers and Mary Eliza remains uncertain. Cris Kohl contends that the two sank, armament and all, “in soft-bottomed Lake St. Clair” en route to Detroit “and were never recovered.”87 This may be true, but he offers nothing to substantiate his claim. A fierce snow storm had swept across the lakes at the time, and there were certainly fears for the safety of two other American schooners down on Lake Erie (Chippewa and Ohio), but little was said about the vessels from the Thames apart from a somewhat cryptic comment from General Harrison, to wit: “The late storm has deprived us of a great deal of valuable property taken from the enemy.”88 The gunboats were certainly not armed and likely carried “camp equipage, ordnance and ordnance stores,” as Harrison suggests. A search of the American archives might turn up something more tangible, perhaps an indication of if, when, and where they sank. Otherwise, we can only assume that they were lost somewhere along the Lake St. Clair shoreline between the mouth of the Thames and the entrance to the Detroit River.

Finding General Myers and Mary Eliza will prove challenging, although the rewards could be significant. As decked gunboats, designed to row as well as sail, these were rather unique vessels intended solely to support the Army’s operations. To that end, they participated in Procter’s 1813 attack on Fort Meigs in May, and in operations against Fort Meigs and Fort Stephenson at the end of July and early August. Designed by the Provincial Marine’s master builder at Amherstburg, William Bell, and built at Chatham, they shared a common parentage with the Provincial Marine’s four other stalwarts lost at the Battle of Lake Erie: General Hunter, Lady Prevost, Queen Charlotte, and Detroit. Of these, the schooner/brig General Hunter stands out owing to her wreck being uncovered by ice and wave action along the Lake Huron shore at Southampton, Ontario, in April 2001.

As the American merchant brig Hunter, General Hunter was employed after the war carrying army supplies from Detroit to the fort at Mackinac. Returning from one of these voyages in August 1816, Hunter was caught in a gale and driven across Lake Huron and onto the Canadian shore near the mouth of the Saugeen River, at present day Southampton. Although no one on board perished, the vessel was too badly damaged to be re-floated, and she was later salvaged and burned by a party sent out by the U.S. military. In time, her remains were concealed by sand and there she endured, buried and forgotten for nearly two centuries.

The Southampton Beach Shipwreck Project was formed formed in 2001 to investigate and study the wreck. But unlike Erie, the wreck of the General Hunter has been in the hands of marine archaeologist Ken Cassavoy and a volunteer team, who carefully excavated the hull over the course of several seasons with the intention that the hulk will eventually be displayed at the local museum. Work is still ongoing, but it has produced a significant body of evidence on the design and construction of Provincial Marine vessels before the War of 1812.89 Some of this may be key to corroborating the identity of General Myers and Mary Eliza.

The boats and bateaux captured from the British may have met a similar fate to General Myers and Mary Eliza. Being comparatively small, they would be harder to locate, unless they were lost in association with the two gunboats, in which case they would form a notable collection of 1812-era boats, few of which have ever been found.

1 Procter to Prevost, 11 July 1813. Library & Archives Canada, Ottawa (hereafter LAC), RG8 I 3173 vo. 679: 220. The War of 1812 Magazine Issue 22 May 2014

2 Henry Procter to Sir George Prevost, Sandwich, 26 August 1813. LAC, RG 8 I 3173 vol. 679: 494. 3 The tonnages given above are as reported, but may not be entirely accurate. 4 Procter to Freer, 6 September 1813. LAC, RG8 I 3173 vol. 680: 26. 5 Prevost to Procter, 22 August 1813. LAC, RG8 I, 3173 vol. 476: 476. 6 Barclay to Yeo, Amherstburg, 6 September 1813. Transcript from Adm. Sec. In Letters, 5445, Court Martial Papers of Robert Heriot Barclay. William Wood, ed. Select British Documents of the Canadian War of 1812, The Champlain Society, Toronto, vol. II: 292. 7 Barclay to Yeo, 12 September 1813. LAC, RG8 C, 3244 vol. 731: 116. 8 Procter to de Rottenburg, 12 September 1813. LAC RG8, I 3173 vol. 680: 71. 9 Procter to de Rottenburg, 12 September 1813. LAC, RG8, I 3173 vol. 680: 75. 10 Harvey to Procter, 17 September 1813. LAC, RG 8, C 3173 vol. 680: 75. 11 Prevost to Yeo, 19 September 1813. Ernest Cruikshank, ed. Documentary History of the Campaign upon the Niagara Frontier, 1813, Part III, August-October 1813, Welland, 1909: 148-9. This letter was found in Procter’s baggage when captured by the Americans on 5 October 1813, and later published in Niles's Weekly Register, Baltimore, Md., November 20, 1813, vol. V, 204. 12 Prevost to Bathurst, 22 September 1813.LAC, CO 42/151: 177, 13 [Procter, Henry], Defence. Major General Procter, Tried at Montreal by a General Court Martial, 13. 14 de Rottenburg to Prevost, 28 September 1813. LAC, RG 8 C 3173 vol. 680: 119-122. 15 de Rottenburg to Prevost, 3 October 1813. LAC, RG 8 3173 vol. 680: 119-122. 16 Hall to Harvey, 5 October 1813. LAC, RG 8 C 3233 vol. 690: 205-6, 17 [Procter, Henry], Defence. Major General Procter, Tried at Montreal by a General Court Martial. John 10-11. 18 Ibid, 13. 19 Ibid, 11, 12. 20 Ibid, 12. 21 Ibid,12. 22 [Prevost] to Procter, 23 September 1813. LAC, RG 8 C 3173 vol. 680: 112,. Although unsigned, this copy was in reply to Procter’s letter dated the 13th, informing Prevost of the loss of the Lake Erie squadron. 23 Prevost to Bathurst, 22 September 1813. LAC CO 42/122: 177, 24 [Procter, Henry], Defence. Major General Procter, Tried at Montreal by a General Court Martial 13-14. 25 Procter to de Rottenburg, 23 October 1813. LAC, RG 8, C 3174 vol. 680: 273. In this letter, Procter mentioned the situation on the Thames during the retreat, noting “Measures immediately taken for the Construction of Ovens, and a Sufficiency of Perogues or large Canoes on the Communication.” It is not entirely clear if the perogues were drawn from the areas around Amherstburg and Detroit, or if they were pressed into service along the Thames. 26 Procter to Sheaffe, 13 January 1813. LAC, RG 8 C 3172 vol. 678: 25. 27 Peter L. Chambers, “Establishment Required by Captain Hall Senior Officer on Lakes Erie and Huron for His Majesty’s Ships & Vessels in Commission,” Amherstburg, 10 March 1813. LAC, RG8 C 3243 vol. 729: 122. Peter L. Chambers, “Embarkation Return of the Western Army Commanded by Brigadr-General Procter on an Expedition to the Miamis,” 23 April 1813. LAC, RG 8 C 3234 vol. 695A: 274. 28 William Lee and Walter Norton to Porter Hanks, Michilimackinac, July 1813. Michigan Historical Commission, Michigan Historical Collections, Vol. XL. Lansing, Michigan, 1929: 449. 29 Peter L. Chambers, “Establishment Required by Captain Hall Senior Officer on Lakes Erie and Huron for His Majesty’s Ships & Vessels in Commission,” 10 March 1813. LAC, RG 8 C 3243 vol. 729: 122. 30 Sources are not in total agreement on the matter of rig. Erie was probably a sloop when captured, but may have been altered to a schooner because the wreck found at Chatham was said to have been a two masted vessel. Further to this, a July letter from Robert Barclay to William Bell, requesting certain alterations to the Little Belt and Erie, refers to them both as schooners, suggesting that they may have been altered from their original sloop rig. Barclay to Bell, 6 July 1813. LAC, William M. Bell Papers, MG24, F3, File 1: 48. 31 Gilmour to Procter, 14 August 1813Niles’ Weekly Register, Baltimore, Vol. V, 15 January 1814, 327 (This issue of Niles’ Register reprinted letters that were captured with Procter’s baggage). 32 Pattinson to Vincent, 7 November 1813. LAC, RG 8, C 2852 vol. 257: 190. Certificate of Henry Procter, Burlington Heights, 22 November 1813. LAC, RG 8 C 2852 vol. 257: 197. Freer to de Rottenburg, 30 January 1814. LAC, RG 8, C 2852 vol. 257:191. 33 [Procter, Henry], Defence. Major General Procter, Tried at Montreal by a General Court Martial, 15. 34 Baynes to Procter, 20 September 1813. LAC, RG 8 C 3173 vol. 680: 105. The War of 1812 Magazine Issue 22 May 2014

35 [unsigned] to Procter, 23 September 1813. LAC, RG 8 C 3173 vol. 680 : 112, 36 de Rottenburg to Prevost, 30 September 1813. LAC, RG 8 C 3173 vol. 680: 125, 37 Dover is Dover Township in Kent County, which encompassed the land north of the River Thames between Lake St. Clair and Chatham. In William Henry Harrison’s account, Dover is referred to as Dolsen’s, meaning Dolsen’s Farm which was on the right bank of the river about 56 miles from Sandwich, or 15 miles above the mouth of the Thames, and 2½ miles below Chatham. At Dolsen’s, the river narrows and the open prairie below gives way to higher, more forested terrain. 38 Alexander Clark Casselman, ed. Richardson’s War of 1812, Historical Publishing Company, Toronto, 1902, 242. 39 [Procter, Henry], Defence. Major General Procter, Tried at Montreal by a General Court Martial. 40 Casselman, ed., Richardson’s War of 1812, 224-5. That Procter left no instructions for Colonel Warburton was the impression given to Richardson and other officers at that time. As one unnamed officer wrote: “Col. Warburton did not appear to know how to act, the General not having left any directions.” 41 Harrison to Armstrong, 9 October 1813..John Brannan,, ed. Official Letters of the Military and Naval Officers of the United States during the War with Great Britain in the Years 1812, 13, 14 & 15, Washington, 1823: 233-9, 42 Harrison to Armstrong, 9 October 1813. Brannan, Official Letters of the Military and Naval Officers of the United States: 233-9, 43 Perry to Jones, U.S. Schooner Aerial , Detroit, 7 October 1813Dudley, William S., The Naval War of 1812: A Documentary History, Vol. II. Naval Historical Center, Department of the Navy, Washington, D.C., 1992: 570. McCrea’s was, presumably, one of the farms at Dover and a neighbour of Dolsen. 44 [Procter, Henry], Defence. Major General Procter, Tried at Montreal by a General Court Martial, 21. 45 Testimony of Captain Webb Crowther, 41st Regiment of Foot, 12 January 1815. Quoted in Cris Kohl. Shipwreck Tales of the Great Lakes, Seawolf Communications, Inc., West Chicago, 2004, 82-3. 46 William Bell’s first ship launched at Amherstburg was the snow Earl of Camden in 1802. This vessel was built under contract by John Norman, but Bell was foreman and he considered it very much his own work. Bell was subsequently appointed the Provincial Marine’s master builder at the station. 47 Harrison to Armstrong, 9 October 1813. Brannan. Official Letters of the Military and Naval Officers of the United States: 233-9. 48 Ibid. 49 Cruikshank, ed, The Documentary of the Campaign upon the Niagara Frontier in the year 1813, Part III: 196. 50 [Procter, Henry], Defence. Major General Procter, Tried at Montreal by a General Court Martial, pages 21-22. 51 “Map of Harrison’s Invasion of Upper Canada.” Casselman, ed., Richardson’s War of 1812, between pages 224 and 225. 52 Harrison to Armstrong, 9 October 1813. Brannan. Official Letters of the Military and Naval Officers of the United States: 233-9, 53 Procter to de Rottenburg, 23 October 1813. LAC, RG 8, C 3173 vol. 680: 273. 54 [Procter, Henry], Defence. Major General Procter, Tried at Montreal by a General Court Martial, 27. 55 Lossing, Benson J., The Pictorial Field-Book of the War of 1812, Harper & Brothers, New York, 1868, 556-7. Captain Champlin was actually Sailing Master Stephen Champlin, United States Navy. He was captured in the following year on Lake Huron whilst in command of the Tigress. He would later rise to the rank of commodore. 56 Harrison to Meigs, 11 October 1813.Brannan. Official Letters of the Military and Naval Officers of the United States, 239-40, 57 Harrison to Armstrong, 9 October 1813.Brannan. Official Letters of the Military and Naval Officers of the United States, 233-9, 58 Galarneau, Claude, “John Christopher Reiffenstein,” Dictionary of Canadian Biography Online, Volume VII, 1836-1850 (retrieved 4 October 2012); Irving, L. Homfray, Officers of the British Forces in Canada during the War of 1812-15, Welland, 1908. General Orders, Montréal, 24 November 1813. LAC, CO 42/152: 67, 59 Procter to de Rottenburg, 16 October 1813. LAC, RG 8 C 3173 vol. 680 : 259, 60 Veritas, The Letters of Veritas, W. Gray, Montreal, July 1815: 74-5. 61 de Rottenburg to Prevost, 3 October 1813. LAC RG 8 C, 3173 vol. 680 : 119-122, 62 Vincent to de Rottenburg, 9 October 1813. LAC, RG 8 C 3173 vol. 680: 186. Young to Vincent, 9 October 1813. LAC RG 8 C 3173 vol. 680: 186-7, 63 Vincent to de Rottenburg, 15 November 1813. LAC, RG 8 C 3173 vol. 681 : 87. That a quantity of articles were destroyed is suggested by following statement from Colonel Winfield Scott of the United States Army: “The British burnt everything in store in this neighborhood [Fort George and Niagara], three thousand blankets, many hundred stand of arms, also the blankets in the men's packs, and every article of clothing not in actual use.” Scott to The War of 1812 Magazine Issue 22 May 2014

Wilkinson,11 October 1813.Ernest Cruikshank, ed. The Documentary of the Campaign upon the Niagara Frontier in the year 1813, Volume VIII, Part V, Lundy’s Lane Historical Society, Tribune Office, Welland, 1907: 47-50. 64 Vincent to de Rottenburg, 15 November 1813. LAC, RG 8 C 3173 vol. 681: 87. 65 Procter to De Rottenburg, 9 October 1813. LAC RG 8 C 3173 vol. 680 : 210. 66 Procter to de Rottenburg, 23 October 1813. LAC RG 8 C 3173 vol. 680: 273. Procter to de Rottenburg, 16 November 1813. LAC, RG 8 C 3173 vol. 681: 118. 67 James Hannay. History of the War of 1812, Morang & Company, Limited, Toronto, 1905, 201. This same system left a foot of snow at Erie, Pennsylvania. National Intelligencer, Washington, D.C., 30 October 1813, citing a letter from Erie dated 15 October. Cruikshank., The Documentary of the Campaign upon the Niagara Frontier in the year 1813, Volume VIII, Part V: 46. 68 Harrison to Secretary of War, Detroit, 16 October 1813. Logan Esarery, ed. Messages and Letters of William Henry Harrison, vol.II, pt.2, Indianapolis, 1922: 579-81, (original source: Harrison Papers, pages 193-195), (No.94). 69 Kohl. Shipwreck Tales of the Great Lakes, 84. 70 The author’s attempts to clarify the loss of the two gunboats with Cris Kohl have been unsuccessful. 71 Pattinson to Vincent, 7 November 1813. LAC, RG 8 C 2852 vol. 257: 190. 72 Freer to de Rottenburg, 30 January 1814. LAC, RG 8 C 2852 vol. 257 : 191. 73 Edwin Bassett Jones. The Recollections of Edwin Bassett Jones. Grace Jones Morgan, Alameda, California, 1974, 61. 74 Ibid, 61. 75 Ibid, 62. 76 Ibid, 61-2. 77 Ibid, 62. 78 Ibid, 62. 79 Ibid, 62. 80 Kohl. Shipwreck Tales of the Great Lakes, 85. 81 Ibid, 86. 82 Ibid 86. 83 Cris Kohl believes that Burton would win his case today, “at least for the General Myers.” To support this, he cites the case of the U.S. Navy’s armed schooners Hamilton and Scourge on the bottom of Lake Ontario. Kohl Shipwreck Tales of the Great Lakes, 86-7. This is plain false. Lost in a storm in 1813 on the Canadian side of the lake and relocated in 1973, these wrecks were recognised as both U.S. Navy property and war graves, and permission was sought to transfer title to the City of Hamilton through the auspices of the Royal Ontario Museum. They have been respected as archaeological resources ever since. 84 A telegram requesting $150.00 in aid was sent to the Department of Education in 1901, and is still extant in the Archives of Ontario, Toronto, Department of Education files (RG 2-42), item reference RG 2-42-0-1756, microfilm reel MS 5629, “Chatham - telegram - re: aid of $150.00.” This document has not been examined; consequently, it is not known if any reply was sent. 85 See, for instance, the articles of the Hamilton and Scourge wrecks in Laanela, Erika, & Moore, Jonathan, editors, ACUA Underwater Archaeological Proceedings 2009, Advisory Council on Underwater Archaeology, 2009, pages 128-186. (This report is available for paid download at .) See also, The Hamilton and Scourge National Historic Site at . For further information, see Moore, Jonathan, “Fore-and- Afters at Fifty Fathoms: The Wrecks of Hamilton and Scourge,” in Kevin J. Crisman, ed. Coffins of the Brave. Lake Shipwrecks of the War of 1812, Texas A&M University Press, College Station, Texas, 2014, 123-152. 86 Sabick, Christopher R., His Majesty’s Hired Transport Nancy, Masters Thesis, Department of Anthropology, Texas A&M University, May 2004. (This thesis is available for download at .) For further information, see Sabick, Christopher R., “‘A Perfect Masterpiece of Workmanship’: His Majesty’s Hired Transport Nancy,” in Crisman. Coffins of the Brave, 71-85. 87 Kohl., Shipwreck Tales of the Great Lakes, 84. 88 Logan Esarery, ed. Messages and Letters of William Henry Harrison, vol.II, pt.2, Indianapolis, 1922: 579-81, (original source: Harrison Papers, pages 193-195), (No.94) Harrison to Secretary of War, Detroit, 16 October 1813. 89 For more information, see Cassavoy, Kenneth, “‘Cast Away on the Canadian Shore”:The British Brig General Hunter,” in Crisman. Coffins of the Brave. Lake Shipwrecks of the War of 1812, 51-70.